Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board

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OFAIGE OF THE OLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ADVANCED STRETCHFORMING INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,

Respondent,

and

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE

AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLANT WORKERS OF AMERICA

(UAW), AMALGAMATED LOCAL UNION No. 509, AFL-CIO,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

LARRY A. WALRAVEN

BRIAN A. SELVAN

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

610 Newport Center Dr.

Suite 1700

Newport Beach, CA 92660

(949) 760-9600

WALTER E. DELLINGER

(Counsel of Record)

SRI SRINIVASAN*

ERIKA FRICK*

JOHN B. OWENS

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

555 13" Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 383-5300

*Admitted in California only

Attorneys for Petitioner

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 406 U.S.

272 (1972), holds that a “successor” employer generally is

not confined to its predecessor’s collective bargaining

agreement, and has the right unilaterally to set the initial

terms and conditions on which it will hire the employees of

its predecessor before consulting with the employees’

bargaining unit. Burns provides an exception to this rule that

applies where it is “perfectly clear” that the new employer

plans to retain all of the employees in the unit. In that

circumstance, the successor should initially consult with the

employees’ bargaining unit before it fixes the initial terms.

The questions presented in this petition are:

1. Whether, as the Ninth Circuit held below, the NLRA

requires a successor employer that commits any unfair

labor practice to forfeit its Burns right and pay back

wages and benefits under its predecessor’s collective

bargaining agreement, or whether, as the D.C. Circuit has

held, the forfeiture doctrine applies only where the

successor employer’s unfair labor practice falls within

the “perfectly clear” exception of Burns.

2. Whether, as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits

have held, the NLRB has the power to require the

successor employer to pay back wages under the

predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement for the

period from the unfair labor practice until the successor

reaches or would have reached a new agreement or

impasse, or whether, as the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have

held, the Board’s power is limited to imposing the

predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement upon the

successor employer only for a reasonable time for

bargaining.

3. Whether application of , the forfeiture doctrine is

appropriate under any circumstances.

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29, petitioner states that

Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc. has no affiliates,

parents, or subsidiary companies. Since the inception of this

case, Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc., merged

with Camarillo Dynamics, Inc., from which Advanced

Stretchforming International, Inc., was the surviving

corporation. At the merger’s completion, the corporation’s

name was changed to Advanced Machine & Stretchforming

International, Inc. For convenience, petitioner will be

referred to as “ASI.”

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............-scssssssssssesssessenssesnsessnseenes i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............0.0++8 ii

sy. OTe # Yay) 6 15). v

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I e, ssntssnegupbissbenteeabpninninsedpieds l

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...............:c:00:0000 l

EE tI © SP OI cnctccccscnsnonscacsecscnnsososoesenecnsonne 2

A. Factual Background. .............ccscccceseeeeeeeeenees 4

B. The Original Ninth Circuit Panel

See Ne &

C. The Amended Ninth Circuit Panel

EEE LES TO a ee OC 8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT..................0:0008 11

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING

THAT A SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER

FORFEITS ITS BURNS RIGHT BY

COMMITTING ANY UNFAIR

LABOR PRACTICE CONFLICTS

WITH THIS COURT’S OPINION IN

BURNS AND CREATES A SPLIT

OF AUTHORITY WITH THE D.C.

SSRIS aera 13

IV

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(continued)

Page

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Conflicts

With This Court’s Opinion In Burns,

Which Held That A Successor

Employer May Unilaterally Set Initial

Terms of Employment Even If It

Committed An Unfair Labor Practice. ........ 14

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Creates A

Split With The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion

In Capital Cleaning, Which Held That

The Forfeiture Doctrine Is A

“Corollary” To The Perfectly Clear

Exception And Does Not Apply To

Other Types Of Unfair Labor

PUTIN, sci dissdathicelichiapadiliahRtatgdanaiaabaningedon 17

II. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE

SPLIT OVER THE PROPER

REMEDY UNDER THE

FORFEITURE DOCTRINE. ..............:000005 20

Il]. | THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE

CONFUSED ABOUT WHETHER

THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IS

ESV Meee FAP WOO TERIA Ble cccnsecesasessscaccsneszcones 22

IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

MANDATE THIS COURT’S

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. .............0200000 23

IRI sistacichscidaincipnienseahinntaebiigeapieissaeiibecspiinealcamlaniig 26

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

CASES

Armco, Inc. v. NLRB,

cya we Bg Lo 1; Seen 20

Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,

147 PBS DOD GDL. Cae, BGG) scrccccsttonscciniccesnissnnin’ passim

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.

NLRB, .

Me Cs Ee CT Pecnnssinhinemntidacsiniapaniunianintonsasinibiiaia 14n.2

Kallman v. NLRB,

GOD FOG BDA CIR Ce BODE Di cccrsseciccssnnessnncnacavbecstancsic 17

New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB,

pie Bo of. Le My EERE eoneren 3, 9, 20

NLRB vy. Burns International Security

Services,

406 U.S. 272 Ce cciicchdisdibenieashichpslpleinsatciuamiiendibiaainned passim

NLRB v. Staten Island Hotel Ltd. Partnership,

S08 FB ae Ce Ge Bi crittietscsasentnsdscnctcnitatiiniinenss 20

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, -

OOF ET Bae a catia cette ppcsitniiicinarniittintniitcinaniitanaiin 21

U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB,

944 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc)...............passim

STATUTES

a i Tae siisitescescs ccecisitsssteinntatseniniinaeciiniaicaiiaii 2.7

S660 0a. acencsee ee 19

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) ..........c..ccseeesees 13

|

|

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner ASI respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari

issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit, denying petitioner’s suggestion for rehearing

en banc, is not reported and is reprinted in the Appendix to

this Petition (“App.”) at App. 101a. The amended opinion of

the panel of the Ninth Circuit is reported at 233 F.3d 1176

(9th Cir. 2000), and is reprinted at App. la. The orginal

opinion of the panel of the Ninth Circuit is reported at 208

F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2000), and is reprinted at App. 25a. The

opinion of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or

“Board”) is reported at 323 N.L.R.B. 529 (1997) and is

reprinted at App. 53a. The opinion of the administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) is reported in the appendix of the Board’s

opinion at 323 N.L.R.B. 529 (1997), and is reprinted at App.

70a.

JURISDICTION

A timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing en banc was denied on February 7, 2001. On

April 23, 2001, Justice O’Connor granted petitioner an

extension up to and including June 7, 2001, to file this

petition. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). j

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The amended National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is

codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158 ef seg., and pertinent provisions

are reprinted at App. 103a.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The NLRA prohibits a covered employer from refusing

to bargain collectively with a duly elected representative of

its employees and from interfering with, restraining, or

coercing its employees with respect to their exercise of the

right to elect such a representative. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). In

NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 406 U.S. 272

(1972), this Court held that a successor employer who hires a

majority of its predecessor’s workforce is obligated to

recognize and negotiate with the predecessor employees’

union. Jd. at 278-79.

The Burns Court made clear, however, that

notwithstanding any duty to bargain with the union, the

successor employer is not “bound to observe the substantive

terms of the collective-bargaining contract the union had

negotiated with [the predecessor] and to which [the

successor] had in no way agreed.” /d. at 281-82. Rather, a

successor employer remains free to set the initial terms and

conditions of employment at its facility. Jd. at 294-95. That

is so even where, as in Burns, the successor employer has

committed the unfair labor practice of unlawfully

recognizing and assisting a rival union. /d. at 276. This

right to set the initial terms and conditions of employment is

known as the “Burns nght.” The Burns Court held that the

NLRB could not retroactively enforce the predecessor’s

collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) against the

successor, even though the successor had committed an

unfair labor practice. /d. at 287-88.

Although it was not implicated in the case, the Court

suggested one exception to the general rule that a successor

employer may unilaterally set the initial terms and conditions

before meeting with the union. That exception applies when

“it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all

of the employees in the unit.” /d. at 294. Under this

“perfectly clear” exception, as it is called, the employer still

3

retains the right to set the initial terms and conditions of

employment. The only difference for cases falling within the

perfectly clear exception is a difference of timing: “it will be

appropriate to have [the employer] initially consult with the

employees’ bargaining representative before he fixes terms,”

id. at 295 (emphasis added), rather than after fixing initial

terms as in Burns. Because the “perfectly clear” exception

did not apply in Burns, however, the Court had no occasion

to expound upon it.

Since Burns was decided, several courts of appeals have

interpreted the Court’s brief discussion of the “perfectly

clear” exception. They hold — over strenuous dissents — that

a successor employer that discriminates against union

employees to avoid ‘retaining all of the employees and

thereby avoid application of the “perfectly clear” exception

is subject to forfeiture of the Burns right and to imposition of

back pay under the predecessor’s CBA. See, e.g., Capital

Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1008

(D.C. Cir. 1998); New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB, 111

F.3d 1460, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. Marine Corp. v.

NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc).'

The courts of appeals’ expanded interpretation of the

“perfectly clear” doctrine has come to be known as the

“forfeiture doctrine,” as the successor forfeits its Burns rights

to set the initial terms and conditions of employment. Courts

adopting the forfeiture doctrine have reasoned that it restores

the status quo ante: these courts believe that absent the

discriminatory hiring, the successor employer would not

have been free to set the initial terms and conditions of

employment, but would have been required under Burns to

consult with the union first. Such an obligation would have

arisen because the employer would have been perfectly clear

' How long a period of time the successor is required to adopt the

CBA is the subject of much debate. See Section II infra.

4

in its intention to hire all of the predecessor employees. See

U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1320.

This case involves three important questions about a

successor employer’s right to set the initial terms of

employment under Burns when the successor employer has

engaged in an unfair labor practice that does not fall within

the “perfectly clear” exception. The first question is whether

the forfeiture doctrine developed by the courts of appeals

applies when a successor employer engages in an unfair

labor practice unrelated to the “perfectly clear” exception.

The Ninth Circuit holds in this case that it does apply,

whereas the D.C. Circuit has held that it does not apply.

The second question concerns the remedy that the Board

may impose under the forfeiture doctrine. The Second,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that the Board has the

power to award back pay under the predecessor’s CBA from

the time of the unfair labor practice until a new agreement or

impasse is or would have been reached. The Sixth and D.C.

Circuits, however, hold that the Board’s power to award

back pay is limited to the period allowing for a reasonable

time of bargaining.

The third question is whether the forfeiture doctrine is

ever appropriate, even in light of the perfectly clear

exception. While several courts of appeals have accepted the

doctrine over strenuous dissents, this Court has never

addressed that question.

A. Factual Background.

The ALJ made the following findings of fact, which ASI

does not challenge for purposes of this petition:

Aero Stretch (“Aero”) owned and operated a metal

stretchforming and fabrication facility in Gardena, California

until November 30, 1992. App. 72a. UAW represented

Aero’s production and maintenance employees, and Aero

5

had entered into a CBA with UAW (“Aero’s CBA”)

effective August 19, 1991, through August 19, 1994. App.

72a.

In June 1992, Aero filed for bankruptcy and unilaterally

stopped complying with several terms of its CBA. App. 72a.

Aero also failed to implement pay raises and assigned work

without regard for the job classifications established in its

CBA. App. 73a. UAW never filed a grievance or unfair

labor practice charge regarding Aero’s unilateral changes.

App. 73a.

On November 19, 1992, the United States Bankruptcy

Court conducted a judicial sale of Aero, calling for bids.

App. 73a. Steven Brown, a local entrepreneur, submitted the

highest bid. App. 73a. The judge approved the sale of

assets, but imposed several conditions, including a

requirement that Aero terminate all of its employees on or

before November 30, 1992. App. 73a. In the meantime,

Brown formed ASI Corporation and continued with Aero’s.

work in progress, using a skeleton crew. App. 73a-74a.

On November 30, 1992, Aero’s workers were called

together and informed that their employment was terminated.

App. 78a. Aero’s Director of Operations, Eric Cunningham,

informed the employees that if they were interested in

interviewing for a position with the new company, ASI, they

should return to the facility the following morning. App.

78a. Cunningham also told the workers that (1) the new

company would hire only some of Aero’s former employees,

and (2) the employees hired by the new company would all

start with no seniority from their employment with Aero.

App. 78a, 81a. Cunningham further stated that there would

be “no union” at ASI. App. 77a, 83a.

Cunningham returned to the plant on December 1, 1992,

and was the first applicant interviewed by Brown for

employment with the new company. “App.-79a. At Brown’s

6

request, Cunningham signed an acknowledgment of the

terms and conditions of employment being offered and was

hired as ASI’s General Manager. Cunningham then assisted

Brown in interviewing and hiring some of the former Aero

employees who came to the facility that day. App. 79a.

During the interviews, each applicant was informed of

the new terms and conditions of employment offered by ASI

and signed the following acknowledgment:

I UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL BE WORKING

UNDER NEW TERMS AND CONDITIONS

WHICH IS NOT A CONTRACT AND IS SUBJECT

TO CHANGE. NEW COMPANY IS NOT

ASSUMING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AGREEMENT. YOU MAY BE EMPLOYED BY

NEW COMPANY ON AN AT WILL BASIS.

DETAILED LIST OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS

IS TO FOLLOW.

App. 74a, 79a, 8la-82a. The applicants were informed that

ASI’s_ benefits would be similar to those offered to

Cunningham and inferior to those under Aero’s CBA (i.e.,

different wages, no 401(k) plan, less vacation, fewer

holidays, no medical or dental benefits, and at-will

employment). App. 79a.

During the December 1, 1992, interviews, ASI hired

eight production and maintenance employees. App. 79a.

Aero had employed seventeen such employees on November

30, 1992, having already laid off many of its workers. App.

72a. Four of the workers were employed at the same hourly

rate they had earned with Aero, two received wage increases,

and two had their wages reduced. App. 79a. The ALJ later

found that ASI’s initial terms and conditions were inferior to

those offered by Aero, including less vacation time, fewer

paid holidays, and no medical or dental benefits. App. 79a.

7

In early December 1992, after ASI had hired its initial

contingent of workers and established the terms and

conditions of employment, UAW sent several letters to

Brown demanding recognition. App. 74a. On December 14,

1992, ASI refused to recognize UAW based on evidence that

it lacked the workers’ support. App. 74a, 86a.

In an opinion dated November 18, 1994, the ALJ

concluded that ASI had committed an unfair labor practice.

The ALJ determined that the “no union” statement at Aero’s

closing by Cunningham, the former Aero employee,

precluded ASI’s reliance on evidence that UAW lacked the

workers’ support. App. 90a. Therefore, the ALJ held that

ASI did not have a good faith belief that UAW lacked

majority support, so ASI should have recognized UAW as its

employees’ bargaining representative. App. 89a-90a. The

ALJ ordered a remedy of cease and desist, posting, and a

bargaining order. App. 92a-94a.

On April 25, 1997, the Board adopted the ALJ’s

recommended order in part, but also determined that ASI had

violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158,

by failing to adopt the substantive terms of Aero’s CBA.

The Board did not base its holding that ASI was required to

adopt the CBA on a conclusion that it was “perfectly clear”

that ASI intended to retain all of Aero’s employees. Instead,

the Board understood the forfeiture doctrine to be an

“equitable doctrine,” and thus concluded that ASI had

“forfeited” its Burns right to set the initial terms and

conditions of employment altogether by committing the

unfair labor practice of stating there would be “no union.”

App. 57a-59a. The Board ordered a remedy of cease and

desist, posting, bargaining order, and back pay according to

the predecessor’s CBA until ASI bargained to a new

agreement or reached impasse. App. 60a-63a.

8

B. The Original Ninth Circuit Panel Decision.

On September 17, 1997, the Board applied to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have its

order enforced. On April 4, 2000, a panel of the Ninth

Circuit (Judges Boochever and Tashima; Judge O’Scannlain,

dissenting) granted in part the Board’s Petition for

Enforcement. App. 25a. The panel majority, however, did

not rely upon the Board’s “equitable” interpretation of the

forfeiture doctrine in reaching this conclusion. Rather, it

determined that ASI violated the Act by setting the initial

terms and conditions because ASI had made it “perfectly

clear” that it planned on hiring all of the employees of its

predecessor, and thus was subject to the “perfectly clear”

exception. App. 35a.

dl The Amended Ninth Circuit Panel Decision.

1. Following issuance of the panel majority’s decision,

both ASI and the Board timely filed petitions for rehearing

and rehearing en banc. ASI argued in its petition that the

Court should enforce or deny the Board’s order based on the

forfeiture doctrine, noting that the Board had expressly

declined to make any finding at all that it was clear —

perfectly or otherwise — that ASI intended to hire all of

Aero’s employees. App. 105a.

In response to the petitions, the panel majority filed an

amended opinion on November 22, 2000. App. la. The

amended opinion again enforced the Board’s order in part,

this time by adopting the Board’s “equitable forfeiture”

doctrine. The panel majority began by holding that “‘it

would be contrary to statutory policy to confer Burns rights

on an employer that has not conducted itself like a lawful

Burns successor.” App. 8a (quoting App. 58a). The panel

majority recognized that the forfeiture doctrine previously

had been applied only “in instances where an employer seeks

to avoid [the ‘perfectly clear’ exception] by strategically

9

refusing to hire its predecessor’s employees based on their

union membership.” App. 8a. The panel majority

acknowledged that this case did not concern the Burns

“perfectly clear” exception — the genesis of the forfeiture

doctrine in the courts of appeals — because the Board

expressly did not rely on that exception. App. 9a.

According to the panel majority, “the question before us

is whether ASI’s ‘no union’ statement ‘blocked the process

by which the obligations of a successor are incurred’ in a

manner similar to the discriminatory hiring practices to

which the forfeiture doctrine previously has been applied.”

App. 9a (quoting App. 58a). The panel majority concluded

that it did, for the “no union” statement likely caused the

predecessor’s workers to believe “that employment with ASI

was contingent on abstaining from union representation,

including insistence on the nght to bargain before ASI

imposed initial terms.” App. 10a. Thus, “i]t was not

unreasonable for the Board to conclude, as a practical matter,

that the ‘no union’ statement blocked the process by which ~

ASI’s obligations as a successor were incurred.” App. 10a.

Accordingly, ASI forfeited its Burns right to establish the

initial terms and conditions of employment. App. 7a, 10a.

The panel majority tlen set out to determine what the

proper remedy should be. According to the panel, normally

the Board may award back pay for a “reasonable time of

bargaining,” and not the period from when the successor

takes over the business until a new agreement or impasse is

actually reached. App. 10a. However, the panel believed

that “the limitation on the period for which back pay may be

awarded applies, however, only when it is clear that the

successor ‘lawfully would not have agreed to the wage scale

provided by the predecessor’s labor agreement, and the

resulting impasse would have resulted in reduced wages.’”

App. 10a-1la (quoting New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB,

111 F.3d 1460, 1467 (9th Cir. 1997)). Any uncertainty on

10

this question should be resolved against the employer, the

panel majority concluded, for “a successor should not benefit

from any ambiguity that results from its own wrongdoing.”

App. lla. The panel majority remanded to the Board the

question whether ASI lawfully would have refused to adopt

the predecessor’s labor agreement. App. 13a. If ASI failed

to establish that it lawfully would have refused to adopt

Aero’s CBA, the Board had the power to require ASI to pay

back wages under Aero’s CBA from the time of the “no

union” statement until a new agreement or impasse would

have been reached. App. 11a-13a.

2. In his dissent, Judge O’Scannlain began by noting

that this Court has held that “when a new employer acquires

a business, it is free, generally, to set the initial terms and

conditions of employment, and is not bound by its

predecessor’s CBA.” App. 15a. Citing the D.C. Circuit’s

decision in Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147

F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1998), Judge O’Scannlain explained that

the forfeiture doctrine is a “corollary” to the “perfectly clear”

exception of Burns, and thus is limited to those situations

where the “perfectly clear” exception comes into play, ie.,

where an employer attempts to avoid the “perfectly clear”

exception by discriminating against and not hiring the

predecessor’s union employees. App. 18a-19a. Here,

however, the panel majority applied the forfeiture doctrine to

a successor employer who committed an unfair labor

practice — the “no union” announcement — that had nothing

to do with any desire to avoid the “perfectly clear” exception

through discriminatory hiring practices. App. 19a.

According to the dissent, not only was the panel

majority’s extension of the forfeiture doctrine both

unprecedented and unwarranted, but it also conflicted with

the clear dictate of Burns. Judge O’Scannlain explained that

the successor employer in Burns had committed an unfair

labor practice similar to the “no union” violation in this case

11

by assisting a new union against the predecessor union.

Despite this unfair labor practice, Judge O’Scannlain noted

that this Court held that the successor retained the right to set

the initial terms and conditions of employment. App. 23a

(citing Burns, 406 U.S. at 294). Judge O’Scannlain

concluded:

[Bjecause the rationale underlying the forfeiture

doctrine is inapplicable to this case, the

discriminatory hiring cases provide absolutely no

authority for the [panel majority’s] argument that ASI

should be held to have forfeited its right to set initial

hiring terms. The remedy that the Board misapplied

in this case is one specifically designed to redress an

employer’s violation of the obligation created by the

“perfectly clear” exception, nothing more.

App. 2la. According to Judge O’Scannlain, the proper

remedy for the “no union” statement was “an order directing

ASI to cease and desist telling potential applicants that ASI

intends to operate with no union,” not forfeiture of ASI’s

Burns right. App. 24a.

On February 7, 2001, the Ninth Circuit, over Judge

O’Scannlain’s vote, denied ASI’s request for a rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc. App. 101a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case raises

fundamental questions about the Burns right of a successor

employer and the correct remedy for a_ successor’s

commission of an unfair labor practice. It also concerns the

forfeiture doctrine, a controversial “remedy” that the Board

invented and that several courts of appeals have accepted

over vigorous dissents.

12

1. The Ninth Circuit’s holding that the forfeiture

doctrine applies to any unfair labor practice committed by a

successor squarely conflicts with a ruling of the D.C. Circuit

that holds the forfeiture doctrine is strictly limited to the

“perfectly clear” exception of Burns. Moreover, the Ninth

Circuit’s decision is clearly wrong under Burns, in which the

successor committed an unfair labor practice very similar to

the one in this case but did not forfeit its mght to set the

initial terms and conditions of employment. The Ninth

Circuit’s expansion of the forfeiture doctrine outside the

“perfectly clear” exception transforms what is at least

ostensibly a remedial means of restoring the status quo into

an equitable hammer that the Board can wield to punish

successors who commit unfair labor practices unrelated to

the “perfectly clear” exception. In addition to the conflict

that the opinion creates, the practical effects that flow from

the Ninth Circuit’s decision necessitate this Court’s

intervention.

2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision concerning the extent of

the Board’s “remedial” powers also deepens an existing split

among the courts of appeals. The Second, Seventh, and

Ninth Circuits hold that, pursuant to the forfeiture doctrine,

the Board has the power to award back pay under the

predecessor’s CBA from the time of the unfair labor practice

until a new agreement or impasse is or would have been

reached. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits, however, believe that

the Board’s power to award back pay is limited to the period

allowing for a reasonable time of bargaining. As the D.C.

Circuit has explained in detail, the more limited “reasonable

time of bargaining” rule comports with this Court’s

precedent holding that the Board’s powers are remedial, not

punitive. Permitting the “punitive” approach of the Second,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits to proceed unchecked not only

leaves the courts of appeals in conflict, but also turns what is

supposed to be a remedy for employees into a windfall. The

financial difference between these approaches is enormous,

13

and can determine whether a successor employer will try to

save a failing company (and the jobs of its employees), or

simply liquidate the company and sell off its assets.

3. This case also presents the Court with the opportunity

to review, for the first time, whether the forfeiture doctrine is

appropriate under any circumstances. The forfeiture doctrine

has continually puzzled the courts of appeals since this

Court’s decision in Burns almost 30 years ago. Several

respected appellate court judges, including Judges

Easterbrook and Posner, have concluded that the doctrine is

inappropriate no matter what the unfair labor practice may —

be, even when the employer is trying to evade the “perfectly

clear” exception through discriminatory hiring. Considering

how divisive the doctrine has been among the courts of

appeals, this case presents an excellent vehicle for this Court

to examine whether the forfeiture doctrine has any validity,

and if so, how the doctrine should operate.

I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT A

_ SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER FORFEITS ITS BURNS

RIGHT BY COMMITTING ANY UNFAIR LABOR

PRACTICE CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S

OPINION IN BURNS AND CREATES A SPLIT OF

AUTHORITY WITH THE D.C. CIRCUIT.

Under fundamental principles of contract law, a party

becomes bound to a contract by voluntarily agreeing to the

terms in exchange for consideration from the other party.

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 18, 24 (1979); see

also Burns, 406 U.S. at 287. With this case, the Ninth

Circuit has dramatically departed from this elemental

premise. Employers within the Ninth Circuit now may find

themselves retroactively bound to contracts with terms that

they have never discussed or even seen. In fact, the term

“collective bargaining agreement” has become a misnomer,

because an employer may find itself subject to binding

14

obligations with which it has never agreed. Such a

fundamental departure from the paradigm of traditional

contract law is directly contrary to the holdings of this Court

and the D.C. Circuit, and merits immediate reversal.

A. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Conflicts With This

Court’s Opinion In Burns, Which Held That A

Successor Employer May Unilaterally Set Initial

Terms of Employment Even If It Committed An

Unfair Labor Practice.

This Court addressed the privileges and obligations of a

successor employer in Burns.“ The Court held that when a

new employer takes over a isiness, it must recognize and

bargain with the union that represented the predecessor’s

employees if a majority of the new employer’s work force is

comprised of the predecessor’s employees. Burns, 406 U.S.

at 284. But, the Court also held that, notwithstanding any

duty to bargain, a successor employer is generally free to set

the initial terms and conditions of employment and is not

bound by its predecessor’s CBA. Jd.

In Burns, the successor employer not only refused to

recognize and bargain with the incumbent union in violation

of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5), but also unlawfully assisted a

rival union in violation of Section 8(a)(2). See Burns, 406

U.S. at 274-77. The Board argued that the importance of

stable labor relations outweighed the traditional principles of

contract law, and that therefore Burns, the successor

employer, should be bound to its predecessor's CBA. /d.

This Court disagreed, reasoning that Congress did not intend

that “the bargaining freedom of employers and unions [be]

totally subordinate” to the goal of “stable labor relations.”

? The Court has explained that the appropriate test to determine

whether an employer is a successor is whether substantial continuity

exists between the two employers. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing

Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1987).

15

Id. at 287. Neither the employer nor the union should be

required to “make any concessions as a result of Government

compulsion,” and both “are free from having contract

provisions imposed upon them against their will.” Id. at 287

(emphasis added). The Court then explained that Burns had

not indicated any intention to assume the predecessor’s

CBA, and that the Board’s attempt to compel such

agreement violated “the fundamental premise on which the

Act is based.” Jd. The Court therefore determined that a

CBA is binding upon a party only if it voluntarily consents to

be bound.

The Court in Burns noted a single exception, commonly

called the “perfectly clear” exception, to the general rule that

a successor employer may set the initial terms and conditions

of employment without first consulting with the bargaining

unit: “Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to

set initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a

predecessor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly

clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the

employees in the unit.” Jd. at 272 (emphasis added). In that

case, “it will be appropriate to have [the successor] consult

with the employees’ bargaining representative before [the

successor] fixes terms.” Jd.

As explained infra, the Board and several courts of

appeals have dramatically expanded upon the Court’s

“perfectly clear” language in Burns to create the forfeiture

doctrine. These courts have misunderstood the Burns right

and the relevance of the “perfectly clear” exception. This

Court in Burns explicitly held that even under the “perfectly

clear” exception where a successor retains all of the

employees of the predecessor, the successor is still entitled to

set the initial terms and conditions of employment. All the

“perfectly clear” exception does is require the successor to

“consult with the employees’ bargaining representative

before [the successor] fixes terms.” /d. Under no

16

circumstances must the successor employee adopt the

predecessor’s CBA, even if the “perfectly clear” exception

applies. Therefore, the forfeiture doctrine, which supposedly

returns the situation to the status quo ante, actually does far

more: it penalizes a successor for its unfair labor practice. If

the employer had complied with the “perfectly clear”

exception, its only duty under Burns would have been to

consult with the union before fixing the initial terms and

conditions of employment, nothing more. See id; U.S.

Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1329 (7th Cir. 1991)

(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (rejecting the forfeiture doctrine

because “an obligation to ‘consult’ does not imply an

obligation to use the old terms unless the union agrees to

different ones.””).

But even assuming arguendo that application of the

forfeiture doctrine is ever appropriate, perhaps what is most

startling about the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of the forfeiture

doctrine outside of the “perfectly clear” exception is that it

completely ignores the Court’s treatment of this precise issue

in Burns. In Burns, the successor employer committed an

unfair labor practice strikingly similar to ASI’s by refusing

to negotiate with the predecessor’s union and instead

negotiating exclusively with a different union -— a “this

union” unfair labor practice instead of the “no union” unfair

labor practice in this case. Burns, 406 U.S. at 276. Yet

instead of holding that the successor forfeited this important

right, the Supreme Court ruled that the successor retained

the nght. Jd. at 294; see also Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at

1008. Under the Ninth Circuit’s severance of the forfeiture

doctrine from its basis in the “perfectly clear” exception, the

successor in Burns would have lost its right to set the initial

terms and conditions because it did not “conduct[] itself like

a lawful Burns successor.” App. 8a. '

The Ninth Circuit never offers a principled distinction

between the “this union” unfair labor practice in Burns and

17

the “no union” unfair labor practice in this case. As in

Burns, no nexus exists between ASI’s “no union” unfair

labor practice and a forfeiture of its Burns right. If ASI had

not made its “no union” statement, it still would not have

been subject to the “perfectly clear” exception in Burns, and

it would have been legally entitled to set the initial terms and

conditions of employment. See Burns, 407 U.S. at 284;

Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008. Application of the

forfeiture doctrine in ASI’s case does not even arguably

restore the situation to the status quo ante, the basis on

which the courts have justified the forfeiture doctrine as a

corollary to the “perfectly clear” exception. See U.S. Marine

Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1320 (7th Cir. 1991); Capital

Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008. This clear evasion of Burns

warrants the Court’s immediate attention and correction.

B. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Creates A Split With

The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion In Capital Cleaning,

Which Held That The Forfeiture Doctrine Is A

“Corollary” To The Perfectly Clear Exception

And Does Not Apply To Other Types Of Unfair

Labor Practices.

The forfeiture doctrine originated in the courts of appeals

as a corollary to the Burns perfectly clear exception. See,

e.g., Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008. As discussed

supra at 3-4, in applying this exception, some courts of

appeals have concluded that where a successor employer

attempts to avoid the “perfectly clear” exception by

discriminatorily refusing to hire predecessor employees, that

employer forfeits its right unilaterally to set the initial terms

and conditions of employment. See, e.g., id. See also

Kallman v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1981);

U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1320-21.

But the Ninth Circuit has drastically expanded the

forfeiture doctrine by applying it to all circumstances in

18

which an employer commits an unfair labor practice, rather

than only those implicating the “perfectly clear” exception.

The Ninth Circuit adopted the Board’s view that the

forfeiture doctrine was equitable in nature, so a successor

employer that commits an unfair labor practice during the

transition process is not a “lawful Burns successor’ and,

therefore, forfeits its Burns nght. App. 8a.

According to the Ninth Circuit, such freedom is

“conferred” only upon a “deserving” employer who has

avoided unfair labor practices: “the Burns right to set initial

terms and conditions of employment must be understood in

the context of a successor employer that will recognize the

affected unit employees’ collective-bargaining representative

and enter into good-faith negotiations with that union about

those terms and conditions.” App. 8a. In other words,

according to the Ninth Circuit, a successor employer who

commits amy unfair labor practice during the transition

process forfeits its Burns right and must, against its will,

abide by its predecessor’s CBA. App. 10a.

This holding directly conflicts with the D.C. Circuit’s

understanding of Burns and the forfeiture doctrine. In

Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999

(D.C. Cir. 1998), the successor employer refused to hire the

predecessor’s workers who belonged to a union. /d. at 1008.

Because the successor employer’s actions qualified for the

“perfectly clear” exception, the D.C. Circuit applied the

forfeiture doctrine. Jd. at 1008-09.

However, the D.C. Circuit also made clear that the

forfeiture doctrine is a “corollary” to the “perfectly clear”

exception — it does not apply to all unfair labor practices, but

only to those practices that implicate the “perfectly clear”

exception. The D.C. Circuit recognized that the “this union”

unfair laber practice in Burns — favoring one union over

another and failing to bargain with the predecessor union —

was not the unfair labor practice of “refusing to hire a

19

majority of union employees.” /d. at 1008. “For that unfair

labor practice,” a non-“perfectly clear” violation, “the proper

remedy was a bargaining order,” not a forfeiture of the

Burns right. Id. (emphasis added).

It is impossible to reconcile the D.C. Circuit’s decision in

Capital Cleaning with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this

case. Under Capital Cleaning, ASI would have retained its

Burns right because its “no union” unfair labor violation has

nothing to do with the “perfectly clear” exception of Burns.

See id. However, because. this litigation was filed in the

Ninth Circuit, ASI lost its Burns right and is now forced to

endure a CBA that it never negotiated, much less accepted.

Rather than treating the forfeiture doctrine as a corollary

to the “perfectly clear” exception, as the D.C. Circuit does,

the Ninth Circuit, like the Board, wields the doctrine as a

hammer to punish any unfair labor practice that a successor

employer commits by imposing potentially enormous

retroactive liabilities on successor employers. In essence,

the Ninth Circuit now requires a successor employer to earn

its Burns rights, and nothing in Burns even remotely

suggests this is correct. Considering the size of the Ninth

Circuit, with thousands of successor employers, as well as

the importance of the D.C. Circuit in Board litigation, this

clear split of authority cannot go unresolved. Section 10(f)

of the NLRA permits an employer to file a petition to set

aside a Board’s order either in the circuit of the dispute or in

the D.C. Circuit. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). It is safe to say that

unless this Court grants certiorari in this case, successor

employers always will choose the D.C. Circuit, rather than

the Ninth Circuit, when petitioning to set aside a Board’s

order involving Burns nights.

What would restore the situation to the status quo ante is

the remedy that Judge O’Scannlain thought was appropriate:

barring ASI from telling applicants that ASI plans to operate

without a union. App. 24a. Applying the forfeiture doctrine

20

in this case constitutes 2 penalty by putting ASI in a worse

position than it would have been absent its unfair labor

practice. Jd.

Il. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE SPLIT OVER

THE PROPER REMEDY UNDER THE

FORFEITURE DOCTRINE.

In addition to the conflict over the substantive scope of

the forfeiture doctrine, this case implicates an even broader

conflict over the remedial power of the Board to award back

pay under the forfeiture doctrine. When an employer forfeits

its Burns rights and must pay the predecessor’s employees

under the terms of the predecessor’s CBA, some courts of

appeals, including the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,

hold that the Board has the power to award back pay

according to the terms of the prior CBA for the entire period

from the date of the unfair labor practice until the successor

employer reaches or would have reached a new agreement or

an impasse with the predecessor’s employees. See NLRB v.

Staten Island Hotel Ltd. Partnership, 101 F.3d 858, 861-62

(2d Cir. 1996); U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1319-24;

New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1460, 1467-69

(9th Cir. 1997); App. 10a-1 1a.

Other courts of appeals, namely the Sixth and D.C.

Circuits, conclude that the Board’s remedial powers to award

back pay under the CBA are limited to a period of a

“reasonable time of bargaining,” and do not cover the entire

period between the unfair labor practice and impasse or new

agreement with the predecessor’s employees. See Armco,

Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1987); Capital

Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1011 (“We recognize that our view of

the limitation [the NLRA] places upon the remedial authority

of the Board in this type of case conflicts with that of several

other circuits.”’).

a ee ee eT en ees

21

This disagreement is more than a semantic one. It goes

to the heart of the Board’s power to fashion “remedies,” not

penalties. As this Court stated in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,

467 U.S. 883 (1984), “a backpay remedy must be

sufficiently tailored to expunge only the actual, and not

merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor

practices.” Jd. at 900. A “remedy” that requires an

employer to pay a predecessor’s employees for all back

wages from the time of the unfair labor practice until

impasse or agreement requires the employer to pay wages

and benefits that it never would have agreed to pay. The

Rai time of bargaining” standard “focuses the

Board’s efforts upon the only proper remedial goal, namely,

placing the employees in the situation they would have

enjoyed but for [the successor’s] having unlawfully refused

to hire them.” Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1011. A

broader “remedial” power, the view adopted by the Second,

Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, penalizes the successor

employer. This the Board cannot do. See id. at 1012; see

also U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1331 (Easterbrook, J.,

dissenting) (“None of this is remedial, and as a penalty it is

not only too high but also interferes with the future operation

of the plant.”).

Moreover, disputes between successor employers and the

predecessor employees’ union often take years to resolve.

The difference between a “reasonable time of bargaining”

and the interval between the unfair labor practice and

impasse or new agreement may amount to years, and thus

millions of dollars. In this case, for example, the controversy

began nine years ago. Thus, even if the forfeiture doctrine

applies to all successor unfair labor practices, this Court

should clarify the remedial powers of the Board and resolve

the split among the courts of appeals, especially considering

the D.C. Circuit’s important role in NLRB litigation.

22

Ill. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE CONFUSED

ABOUT WHETHER THE FORFEITURE

DOCTRINE IS EVER APPROPRIATE.

The courts of appeals created the forfeiture doctrine to

remedy situations where the Burns “perfectly clear”

exception applies. See supra at 3-4. However, this Court

has neither endorsed nor ratified such a remedy, and any

straightforward reading of Burns reveals that the doctrine has

no basis. This case presents the Court with an excellent

vehicle to examine, for the first time, whether the forfeiture

doctrine is ever an appropriate remedy for a successor’s

unfair labor practice.

As discussed supra at 14-16, this Court in Burns stated

that when the “perfectly clear” exception applies, the

successor merely has the duty to consult with the union. It is

not required to adopt the predecessor’s CBA. Therefore,

requiring the successor to forfeit its Burns rights and to adopt

the predecessor’s CBA when the successor tries to avoid the

“perfectly clear” exception does not return the situation to

the status quo ante. Rather, it penalizes the successor for

committing the unfair labor practice, a result consistent with

the Board’s “equitable” understanding of the forfeiture

doctrine but inconsistent with this Court’s interpretation of

the Board’s authonty. Nothing in Burns supports the

forfeiture doctrine; to the contrary, the Court squarely

rejected its application in that case, which featured a “this

union” violation remarkably similar to the “no union”

violation in this case. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 284-87; see

also id. at 281-82 (“It does not follow ... from [the

successor’s] duty to bargain that it was bound to observe the

substantive terms of the [CBA] the union had negotiated

with [the predecessor] and to which [the successor] in no

way agreed.”).

Largely for this reason, several respected appellate

judges have rejected the doctrine as a remedy for any unfair

23

labor practice, even as a corollary to the Burns “perfectly

clear” exception. Judge Easterbrook, for example, noted that

the Board lacks the power to penalize an employer for an

unfair labor violation, id. at 1327 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S.

at 900-01), and reasoned that “[w]hat the Board characterizes

as a ‘forfeiture’ of the successor employer’s privilege to set

its own terms and conditions of employment is a penalty by

another name—and not a much different name at that.” U.S.

Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1328 (Easterbrook, J., joined by

Posner, Coffey, Manion & Kanne, JJ., dissenting); see also

App. 14a (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“By arming the

Board with an unauthorized power to punish, the majority

has impermissibly upset the balance of power between

management and labor that Congress established in the

Act.”).

The proper remedy for evading a duty to bargain with the

union is a bargaining order. See U.S. Marine Corp., 944

F.2d at 1330 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The fact that the

obligation to consult arises prior to setting terms rather than

after setting terms does not justify the drastic remedy of the

forfeiture doctrine, even under the “perfectly clear”

exception. Until this Court examines the viability of the

forfeiture doctrine, this confusion among the courts of

appeals will continue to grow. This case presents an

excellent vehicle for the Court to examine the forfeiture

doctrine and end this confusion.

IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE NINTH

CIRCUIT’S DECISION MANDATE THIS

- COURT’S IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.

The ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this

matter cannot be overstated. By ruling that a successor

employer may be bound to a CBA that it never voluntarily

assumed, the Ninth Circuit has created a significant obstacle

to any effort to revitalize a failing or failed business. As this

24

Court explained in Burns: “A potential employer may be

willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make

changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor

force, work location, task assignment, and nature of

supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and:

conditions of employment contained in the old collective-

bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and

may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital.” 406 U.S.

at 287-88; see also U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1328

(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Change [in the terms of

employment] may be the only alternative to consigning the

plant to the scrap heap. Denying the successor the nght to

establish its own wages and other terms whenever it is likely

to hire substantially all of the predecessor’s workers could

prevent this process from occurring and lead to liquidation

rather than revivification.”’).

Unions often file charges of unfair labor practices, and a

successor employer cannot predict the outcome of such a

proceeding with any certainty. Even the most diligent

employer makes mistakes, and no employer can ensure that

no unlawful labor practices will occur. Litigating whether an

unfair labor practice has occurred can take years, and often

boils down to a single fact or credibility determination.

This case is an excellent example of this uncertainty,

where ASI was held to have committed an unfair labor

practice due to a statement by an Aero employee,

Cunningham. Almost 10 years have passed between

Mr. Brown’s decision to purchase Aero’s assets and the

Ninth Circuit’s decision to require ASI to adopt Aero’s

CBA. When Mr. Brown agreed to purchase Aero’s assets,

the predecessor employer already had stopped honoring the

terms of the CBA. Mr. Brown purchased Aero’s assets with

the understanding that to save the company, he needed to

scrap Aero’s business model, including its CBA, and start

from scratch to build a new, healthy company. Now that

25

very same CBA has been foisted on ASI, the company that

Mr. Brown formed to avoid Aero’s business mistakes.

This risk of learning after years of litigation that the

successor is retroactively bound to an earlier CBA that it

never negotiated or accepted will likely force a successor

either to (i) involuntarily adopt the predecessor CBA as the

prudent course of action, or (ii) determine that the risk is too

great to invest in the failing business. The former violates

the fundamental principles of contract law; the latter runs

contrary to national policy and hurts employers and workers

alike. As Judge Easterbrook has described, the forfeiture

doctrine “increase[s] the risks of taking over foundering

firms, and frustrate[s] the revival of aging plants. Neither

American workers nor American consumers will welcome

this consequence.” U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1331

(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Application of the forfeiture

doctrine in this case is especially unfair. A statement of an

employee of a predecessor that had abandoned the CBA now

requires the successor to honor that same abandoned CBA,

even though the successor agreed to buy the company only if

it could be free from the predecessor’s CBA.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case directly

conflicts with this Court’s decision in Burns and the D.C.

Circuit’s decision in Capital Cleaning. The opinion also

deepens an existing split concerning the Board’s remedial

power. It provides an enormous disincentive for successor

employers to purchase and attempt to revive a failing

business, ultimately harming employees of failing

businesses. It also highlights the infirmity of the forfeiture

doctrine, and why it should never apply under any

circumstances. This Court should grant certiorari and

reverse the Ninth Circuit.

26

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

LARRY A. WALRAVEN WALTER E. DELLINGER

BRIAN A. SELVAN (Counsel of Record)

O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP SRI SRINIVASAN*

610 Newport Center Dr. ERIKA FRICK*

Suite 1700 JOHN B. OWENS

Newport Beach, CA 92660 O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP

(949) 760-9600 555 13" Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 383-5300

*Admitted in California only

Attorneys for Petitioner

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