Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board
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OFAIGE OF THE OLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
ADVANCED STRETCHFORMING INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Petitioner,
Vv.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent,
and
INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE
AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLANT WORKERS OF AMERICA
(UAW), AMALGAMATED LOCAL UNION No. 509, AFL-CIO,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
LARRY A. WALRAVEN
BRIAN A. SELVAN
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
610 Newport Center Dr.
Suite 1700
Newport Beach, CA 92660
(949) 760-9600
WALTER E. DELLINGER
(Counsel of Record)
SRI SRINIVASAN*
ERIKA FRICK*
JOHN B. OWENS
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
555 13" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 383-5300
*Admitted in California only
Attorneys for Petitioner
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 406 U.S.
272 (1972), holds that a “successor” employer generally is
not confined to its predecessor’s collective bargaining
agreement, and has the right unilaterally to set the initial
terms and conditions on which it will hire the employees of
its predecessor before consulting with the employees’
bargaining unit. Burns provides an exception to this rule that
applies where it is “perfectly clear” that the new employer
plans to retain all of the employees in the unit. In that
circumstance, the successor should initially consult with the
employees’ bargaining unit before it fixes the initial terms.
The questions presented in this petition are:
1. Whether, as the Ninth Circuit held below, the NLRA
requires a successor employer that commits any unfair
labor practice to forfeit its Burns right and pay back
wages and benefits under its predecessor’s collective
bargaining agreement, or whether, as the D.C. Circuit has
held, the forfeiture doctrine applies only where the
successor employer’s unfair labor practice falls within
the “perfectly clear” exception of Burns.
2. Whether, as the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits
have held, the NLRB has the power to require the
successor employer to pay back wages under the
predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement for the
period from the unfair labor practice until the successor
reaches or would have reached a new agreement or
impasse, or whether, as the Sixth and D.C. Circuits have
held, the Board’s power is limited to imposing the
predecessor’s collective bargaining agreement upon the
successor employer only for a reasonable time for
bargaining.
3. Whether application of , the forfeiture doctrine is
appropriate under any circumstances.
ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29, petitioner states that
Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc. has no affiliates,
parents, or subsidiary companies. Since the inception of this
case, Advanced Stretchforming International, Inc., merged
with Camarillo Dynamics, Inc., from which Advanced
Stretchforming International, Inc., was the surviving
corporation. At the merger’s completion, the corporation’s
name was changed to Advanced Machine & Stretchforming
International, Inc. For convenience, petitioner will be
referred to as “ASI.”
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .............-scssssssssssesssessenssesnsessnseenes i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .............0.0++8 ii
sy. OTe # Yay) 6 15). v
ET cssnsesnonitionenannsiadensateleatiodiodl a
I e, ssntssnegupbissbenteeabpninninsedpieds l
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ...............:c:00:0000 l
EE tI © SP OI cnctccccscnsnonscacsecscnnsososoesenecnsonne 2
A. Factual Background. .............ccscccceseeeeeeeeenees 4
B. The Original Ninth Circuit Panel
See Ne &
C. The Amended Ninth Circuit Panel
EEE LES TO a ee OC 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT..................0:0008 11
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING
THAT A SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER
FORFEITS ITS BURNS RIGHT BY
COMMITTING ANY UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE CONFLICTS
WITH THIS COURT’S OPINION IN
BURNS AND CREATES A SPLIT
OF AUTHORITY WITH THE D.C.
SSRIS aera 13
IV
TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Conflicts
With This Court’s Opinion In Burns,
Which Held That A Successor
Employer May Unilaterally Set Initial
Terms of Employment Even If It
Committed An Unfair Labor Practice. ........ 14
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Creates A
Split With The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion
In Capital Cleaning, Which Held That
The Forfeiture Doctrine Is A
“Corollary” To The Perfectly Clear
Exception And Does Not Apply To
Other Types Of Unfair Labor
PUTIN, sci dissdathicelichiapadiliahRtatgdanaiaabaningedon 17
II. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE
SPLIT OVER THE PROPER
REMEDY UNDER THE
FORFEITURE DOCTRINE. ..............:000005 20
Il]. | THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE
CONFUSED ABOUT WHETHER
THE FORFEITURE DOCTRINE IS
ESV Meee FAP WOO TERIA Ble cccnsecesasessscaccsneszcones 22
IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF
THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
MANDATE THIS COURT’S
IMMEDIATE ATTENTION. .............0200000 23
IRI sistacichscidaincipnienseahinntaebiigeapieissaeiibecspiinealcamlaniig 26
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
CASES
Armco, Inc. v. NLRB,
cya we Bg Lo 1; Seen 20
Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB,
147 PBS DOD GDL. Cae, BGG) scrccccsttonscciniccesnissnnin’ passim
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
NLRB, .
Me Cs Ee CT Pecnnssinhinemntidacsiniapaniunianintonsasinibiiaia 14n.2
Kallman v. NLRB,
GOD FOG BDA CIR Ce BODE Di cccrsseciccssnnessnncnacavbecstancsic 17
New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB,
pie Bo of. Le My EERE eoneren 3, 9, 20
NLRB vy. Burns International Security
Services,
406 U.S. 272 Ce cciicchdisdibenieashichpslpleinsatciuamiiendibiaainned passim
NLRB v. Staten Island Hotel Ltd. Partnership,
S08 FB ae Ce Ge Bi crittietscsasentnsdscnctcnitatiiniinenss 20
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, -
OOF ET Bae a catia cette ppcsitniiicinarniittintniitcinaniitanaiin 21
U.S. Marine Corp. v. NLRB,
944 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc)...............passim
STATUTES
a i Tae siisitescescs ccecisitsssteinntatseniniinaeciiniaicaiiaii 2.7
S660 0a. acencsee ee 19
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1979) ..........c..ccseeesees 13
|
|
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioner ASI respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, denying petitioner’s suggestion for rehearing
en banc, is not reported and is reprinted in the Appendix to
this Petition (“App.”) at App. 101a. The amended opinion of
the panel of the Ninth Circuit is reported at 233 F.3d 1176
(9th Cir. 2000), and is reprinted at App. la. The orginal
opinion of the panel of the Ninth Circuit is reported at 208
F.3d 801 (9th Cir. 2000), and is reprinted at App. 25a. The
opinion of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or
“Board”) is reported at 323 N.L.R.B. 529 (1997) and is
reprinted at App. 53a. The opinion of the administrative law
judge (“ALJ”) is reported in the appendix of the Board’s
opinion at 323 N.L.R.B. 529 (1997), and is reprinted at App.
70a.
JURISDICTION
A timely petition for rehearing and suggestion for
rehearing en banc was denied on February 7, 2001. On
April 23, 2001, Justice O’Connor granted petitioner an
extension up to and including June 7, 2001, to file this
petition. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). j
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The amended National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) is
codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158 ef seg., and pertinent provisions
are reprinted at App. 103a.
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The NLRA prohibits a covered employer from refusing
to bargain collectively with a duly elected representative of
its employees and from interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees with respect to their exercise of the
right to elect such a representative. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). In
NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, 406 U.S. 272
(1972), this Court held that a successor employer who hires a
majority of its predecessor’s workforce is obligated to
recognize and negotiate with the predecessor employees’
union. Jd. at 278-79.
The Burns Court made clear, however, that
notwithstanding any duty to bargain with the union, the
successor employer is not “bound to observe the substantive
terms of the collective-bargaining contract the union had
negotiated with [the predecessor] and to which [the
successor] had in no way agreed.” /d. at 281-82. Rather, a
successor employer remains free to set the initial terms and
conditions of employment at its facility. Jd. at 294-95. That
is so even where, as in Burns, the successor employer has
committed the unfair labor practice of unlawfully
recognizing and assisting a rival union. /d. at 276. This
right to set the initial terms and conditions of employment is
known as the “Burns nght.” The Burns Court held that the
NLRB could not retroactively enforce the predecessor’s
collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) against the
successor, even though the successor had committed an
unfair labor practice. /d. at 287-88.
Although it was not implicated in the case, the Court
suggested one exception to the general rule that a successor
employer may unilaterally set the initial terms and conditions
before meeting with the union. That exception applies when
“it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all
of the employees in the unit.” /d. at 294. Under this
“perfectly clear” exception, as it is called, the employer still
3
retains the right to set the initial terms and conditions of
employment. The only difference for cases falling within the
perfectly clear exception is a difference of timing: “it will be
appropriate to have [the employer] initially consult with the
employees’ bargaining representative before he fixes terms,”
id. at 295 (emphasis added), rather than after fixing initial
terms as in Burns. Because the “perfectly clear” exception
did not apply in Burns, however, the Court had no occasion
to expound upon it.
Since Burns was decided, several courts of appeals have
interpreted the Court’s brief discussion of the “perfectly
clear” exception. They hold — over strenuous dissents — that
a successor employer that discriminates against union
employees to avoid ‘retaining all of the employees and
thereby avoid application of the “perfectly clear” exception
is subject to forfeiture of the Burns right and to imposition of
back pay under the predecessor’s CBA. See, e.g., Capital
Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999, 1008
(D.C. Cir. 1998); New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB, 111
F.3d 1460, 1467-68 (9th Cir. 1997); U.S. Marine Corp. v.
NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1319-20 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc).'
The courts of appeals’ expanded interpretation of the
“perfectly clear” doctrine has come to be known as the
“forfeiture doctrine,” as the successor forfeits its Burns rights
to set the initial terms and conditions of employment. Courts
adopting the forfeiture doctrine have reasoned that it restores
the status quo ante: these courts believe that absent the
discriminatory hiring, the successor employer would not
have been free to set the initial terms and conditions of
employment, but would have been required under Burns to
consult with the union first. Such an obligation would have
arisen because the employer would have been perfectly clear
' How long a period of time the successor is required to adopt the
CBA is the subject of much debate. See Section II infra.
4
in its intention to hire all of the predecessor employees. See
U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1320.
This case involves three important questions about a
successor employer’s right to set the initial terms of
employment under Burns when the successor employer has
engaged in an unfair labor practice that does not fall within
the “perfectly clear” exception. The first question is whether
the forfeiture doctrine developed by the courts of appeals
applies when a successor employer engages in an unfair
labor practice unrelated to the “perfectly clear” exception.
The Ninth Circuit holds in this case that it does apply,
whereas the D.C. Circuit has held that it does not apply.
The second question concerns the remedy that the Board
may impose under the forfeiture doctrine. The Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits hold that the Board has the
power to award back pay under the predecessor’s CBA from
the time of the unfair labor practice until a new agreement or
impasse is or would have been reached. The Sixth and D.C.
Circuits, however, hold that the Board’s power to award
back pay is limited to the period allowing for a reasonable
time of bargaining.
The third question is whether the forfeiture doctrine is
ever appropriate, even in light of the perfectly clear
exception. While several courts of appeals have accepted the
doctrine over strenuous dissents, this Court has never
addressed that question.
A. Factual Background.
The ALJ made the following findings of fact, which ASI
does not challenge for purposes of this petition:
Aero Stretch (“Aero”) owned and operated a metal
stretchforming and fabrication facility in Gardena, California
until November 30, 1992. App. 72a. UAW represented
Aero’s production and maintenance employees, and Aero
5
had entered into a CBA with UAW (“Aero’s CBA”)
effective August 19, 1991, through August 19, 1994. App.
72a.
In June 1992, Aero filed for bankruptcy and unilaterally
stopped complying with several terms of its CBA. App. 72a.
Aero also failed to implement pay raises and assigned work
without regard for the job classifications established in its
CBA. App. 73a. UAW never filed a grievance or unfair
labor practice charge regarding Aero’s unilateral changes.
App. 73a.
On November 19, 1992, the United States Bankruptcy
Court conducted a judicial sale of Aero, calling for bids.
App. 73a. Steven Brown, a local entrepreneur, submitted the
highest bid. App. 73a. The judge approved the sale of
assets, but imposed several conditions, including a
requirement that Aero terminate all of its employees on or
before November 30, 1992. App. 73a. In the meantime,
Brown formed ASI Corporation and continued with Aero’s.
work in progress, using a skeleton crew. App. 73a-74a.
On November 30, 1992, Aero’s workers were called
together and informed that their employment was terminated.
App. 78a. Aero’s Director of Operations, Eric Cunningham,
informed the employees that if they were interested in
interviewing for a position with the new company, ASI, they
should return to the facility the following morning. App.
78a. Cunningham also told the workers that (1) the new
company would hire only some of Aero’s former employees,
and (2) the employees hired by the new company would all
start with no seniority from their employment with Aero.
App. 78a, 81a. Cunningham further stated that there would
be “no union” at ASI. App. 77a, 83a.
Cunningham returned to the plant on December 1, 1992,
and was the first applicant interviewed by Brown for
employment with the new company. “App.-79a. At Brown’s
6
request, Cunningham signed an acknowledgment of the
terms and conditions of employment being offered and was
hired as ASI’s General Manager. Cunningham then assisted
Brown in interviewing and hiring some of the former Aero
employees who came to the facility that day. App. 79a.
During the interviews, each applicant was informed of
the new terms and conditions of employment offered by ASI
and signed the following acknowledgment:
I UNDERSTAND THAT I WILL BE WORKING
UNDER NEW TERMS AND CONDITIONS
WHICH IS NOT A CONTRACT AND IS SUBJECT
TO CHANGE. NEW COMPANY IS NOT
ASSUMING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT. YOU MAY BE EMPLOYED BY
NEW COMPANY ON AN AT WILL BASIS.
DETAILED LIST OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
IS TO FOLLOW.
App. 74a, 79a, 8la-82a. The applicants were informed that
ASI’s_ benefits would be similar to those offered to
Cunningham and inferior to those under Aero’s CBA (i.e.,
different wages, no 401(k) plan, less vacation, fewer
holidays, no medical or dental benefits, and at-will
employment). App. 79a.
During the December 1, 1992, interviews, ASI hired
eight production and maintenance employees. App. 79a.
Aero had employed seventeen such employees on November
30, 1992, having already laid off many of its workers. App.
72a. Four of the workers were employed at the same hourly
rate they had earned with Aero, two received wage increases,
and two had their wages reduced. App. 79a. The ALJ later
found that ASI’s initial terms and conditions were inferior to
those offered by Aero, including less vacation time, fewer
paid holidays, and no medical or dental benefits. App. 79a.
7
In early December 1992, after ASI had hired its initial
contingent of workers and established the terms and
conditions of employment, UAW sent several letters to
Brown demanding recognition. App. 74a. On December 14,
1992, ASI refused to recognize UAW based on evidence that
it lacked the workers’ support. App. 74a, 86a.
In an opinion dated November 18, 1994, the ALJ
concluded that ASI had committed an unfair labor practice.
The ALJ determined that the “no union” statement at Aero’s
closing by Cunningham, the former Aero employee,
precluded ASI’s reliance on evidence that UAW lacked the
workers’ support. App. 90a. Therefore, the ALJ held that
ASI did not have a good faith belief that UAW lacked
majority support, so ASI should have recognized UAW as its
employees’ bargaining representative. App. 89a-90a. The
ALJ ordered a remedy of cease and desist, posting, and a
bargaining order. App. 92a-94a.
On April 25, 1997, the Board adopted the ALJ’s
recommended order in part, but also determined that ASI had
violated Sections 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158,
by failing to adopt the substantive terms of Aero’s CBA.
The Board did not base its holding that ASI was required to
adopt the CBA on a conclusion that it was “perfectly clear”
that ASI intended to retain all of Aero’s employees. Instead,
the Board understood the forfeiture doctrine to be an
“equitable doctrine,” and thus concluded that ASI had
“forfeited” its Burns right to set the initial terms and
conditions of employment altogether by committing the
unfair labor practice of stating there would be “no union.”
App. 57a-59a. The Board ordered a remedy of cease and
desist, posting, bargaining order, and back pay according to
the predecessor’s CBA until ASI bargained to a new
agreement or reached impasse. App. 60a-63a.
8
B. The Original Ninth Circuit Panel Decision.
On September 17, 1997, the Board applied to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to have its
order enforced. On April 4, 2000, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit (Judges Boochever and Tashima; Judge O’Scannlain,
dissenting) granted in part the Board’s Petition for
Enforcement. App. 25a. The panel majority, however, did
not rely upon the Board’s “equitable” interpretation of the
forfeiture doctrine in reaching this conclusion. Rather, it
determined that ASI violated the Act by setting the initial
terms and conditions because ASI had made it “perfectly
clear” that it planned on hiring all of the employees of its
predecessor, and thus was subject to the “perfectly clear”
exception. App. 35a.
dl The Amended Ninth Circuit Panel Decision.
1. Following issuance of the panel majority’s decision,
both ASI and the Board timely filed petitions for rehearing
and rehearing en banc. ASI argued in its petition that the
Court should enforce or deny the Board’s order based on the
forfeiture doctrine, noting that the Board had expressly
declined to make any finding at all that it was clear —
perfectly or otherwise — that ASI intended to hire all of
Aero’s employees. App. 105a.
In response to the petitions, the panel majority filed an
amended opinion on November 22, 2000. App. la. The
amended opinion again enforced the Board’s order in part,
this time by adopting the Board’s “equitable forfeiture”
doctrine. The panel majority began by holding that “‘it
would be contrary to statutory policy to confer Burns rights
on an employer that has not conducted itself like a lawful
Burns successor.” App. 8a (quoting App. 58a). The panel
majority recognized that the forfeiture doctrine previously
had been applied only “in instances where an employer seeks
to avoid [the ‘perfectly clear’ exception] by strategically
9
refusing to hire its predecessor’s employees based on their
union membership.” App. 8a. The panel majority
acknowledged that this case did not concern the Burns
“perfectly clear” exception — the genesis of the forfeiture
doctrine in the courts of appeals — because the Board
expressly did not rely on that exception. App. 9a.
According to the panel majority, “the question before us
is whether ASI’s ‘no union’ statement ‘blocked the process
by which the obligations of a successor are incurred’ in a
manner similar to the discriminatory hiring practices to
which the forfeiture doctrine previously has been applied.”
App. 9a (quoting App. 58a). The panel majority concluded
that it did, for the “no union” statement likely caused the
predecessor’s workers to believe “that employment with ASI
was contingent on abstaining from union representation,
including insistence on the nght to bargain before ASI
imposed initial terms.” App. 10a. Thus, “i]t was not
unreasonable for the Board to conclude, as a practical matter,
that the ‘no union’ statement blocked the process by which ~
ASI’s obligations as a successor were incurred.” App. 10a.
Accordingly, ASI forfeited its Burns right to establish the
initial terms and conditions of employment. App. 7a, 10a.
The panel majority tlen set out to determine what the
proper remedy should be. According to the panel, normally
the Board may award back pay for a “reasonable time of
bargaining,” and not the period from when the successor
takes over the business until a new agreement or impasse is
actually reached. App. 10a. However, the panel believed
that “the limitation on the period for which back pay may be
awarded applies, however, only when it is clear that the
successor ‘lawfully would not have agreed to the wage scale
provided by the predecessor’s labor agreement, and the
resulting impasse would have resulted in reduced wages.’”
App. 10a-1la (quoting New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB,
111 F.3d 1460, 1467 (9th Cir. 1997)). Any uncertainty on
10
this question should be resolved against the employer, the
panel majority concluded, for “a successor should not benefit
from any ambiguity that results from its own wrongdoing.”
App. lla. The panel majority remanded to the Board the
question whether ASI lawfully would have refused to adopt
the predecessor’s labor agreement. App. 13a. If ASI failed
to establish that it lawfully would have refused to adopt
Aero’s CBA, the Board had the power to require ASI to pay
back wages under Aero’s CBA from the time of the “no
union” statement until a new agreement or impasse would
have been reached. App. 11a-13a.
2. In his dissent, Judge O’Scannlain began by noting
that this Court has held that “when a new employer acquires
a business, it is free, generally, to set the initial terms and
conditions of employment, and is not bound by its
predecessor’s CBA.” App. 15a. Citing the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147
F.3d 999 (D.C. Cir. 1998), Judge O’Scannlain explained that
the forfeiture doctrine is a “corollary” to the “perfectly clear”
exception of Burns, and thus is limited to those situations
where the “perfectly clear” exception comes into play, ie.,
where an employer attempts to avoid the “perfectly clear”
exception by discriminating against and not hiring the
predecessor’s union employees. App. 18a-19a. Here,
however, the panel majority applied the forfeiture doctrine to
a successor employer who committed an unfair labor
practice — the “no union” announcement — that had nothing
to do with any desire to avoid the “perfectly clear” exception
through discriminatory hiring practices. App. 19a.
According to the dissent, not only was the panel
majority’s extension of the forfeiture doctrine both
unprecedented and unwarranted, but it also conflicted with
the clear dictate of Burns. Judge O’Scannlain explained that
the successor employer in Burns had committed an unfair
labor practice similar to the “no union” violation in this case
11
by assisting a new union against the predecessor union.
Despite this unfair labor practice, Judge O’Scannlain noted
that this Court held that the successor retained the right to set
the initial terms and conditions of employment. App. 23a
(citing Burns, 406 U.S. at 294). Judge O’Scannlain
concluded:
[Bjecause the rationale underlying the forfeiture
doctrine is inapplicable to this case, the
discriminatory hiring cases provide absolutely no
authority for the [panel majority’s] argument that ASI
should be held to have forfeited its right to set initial
hiring terms. The remedy that the Board misapplied
in this case is one specifically designed to redress an
employer’s violation of the obligation created by the
“perfectly clear” exception, nothing more.
App. 2la. According to Judge O’Scannlain, the proper
remedy for the “no union” statement was “an order directing
ASI to cease and desist telling potential applicants that ASI
intends to operate with no union,” not forfeiture of ASI’s
Burns right. App. 24a.
On February 7, 2001, the Ninth Circuit, over Judge
O’Scannlain’s vote, denied ASI’s request for a rehearing and
suggestion for rehearing en banc. App. 101a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case raises
fundamental questions about the Burns right of a successor
employer and the correct remedy for a_ successor’s
commission of an unfair labor practice. It also concerns the
forfeiture doctrine, a controversial “remedy” that the Board
invented and that several courts of appeals have accepted
over vigorous dissents.
12
1. The Ninth Circuit’s holding that the forfeiture
doctrine applies to any unfair labor practice committed by a
successor squarely conflicts with a ruling of the D.C. Circuit
that holds the forfeiture doctrine is strictly limited to the
“perfectly clear” exception of Burns. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit’s decision is clearly wrong under Burns, in which the
successor committed an unfair labor practice very similar to
the one in this case but did not forfeit its mght to set the
initial terms and conditions of employment. The Ninth
Circuit’s expansion of the forfeiture doctrine outside the
“perfectly clear” exception transforms what is at least
ostensibly a remedial means of restoring the status quo into
an equitable hammer that the Board can wield to punish
successors who commit unfair labor practices unrelated to
the “perfectly clear” exception. In addition to the conflict
that the opinion creates, the practical effects that flow from
the Ninth Circuit’s decision necessitate this Court’s
intervention.
2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision concerning the extent of
the Board’s “remedial” powers also deepens an existing split
among the courts of appeals. The Second, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits hold that, pursuant to the forfeiture doctrine,
the Board has the power to award back pay under the
predecessor’s CBA from the time of the unfair labor practice
until a new agreement or impasse is or would have been
reached. The Sixth and D.C. Circuits, however, believe that
the Board’s power to award back pay is limited to the period
allowing for a reasonable time of bargaining. As the D.C.
Circuit has explained in detail, the more limited “reasonable
time of bargaining” rule comports with this Court’s
precedent holding that the Board’s powers are remedial, not
punitive. Permitting the “punitive” approach of the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits to proceed unchecked not only
leaves the courts of appeals in conflict, but also turns what is
supposed to be a remedy for employees into a windfall. The
financial difference between these approaches is enormous,
13
and can determine whether a successor employer will try to
save a failing company (and the jobs of its employees), or
simply liquidate the company and sell off its assets.
3. This case also presents the Court with the opportunity
to review, for the first time, whether the forfeiture doctrine is
appropriate under any circumstances. The forfeiture doctrine
has continually puzzled the courts of appeals since this
Court’s decision in Burns almost 30 years ago. Several
respected appellate court judges, including Judges
Easterbrook and Posner, have concluded that the doctrine is
inappropriate no matter what the unfair labor practice may —
be, even when the employer is trying to evade the “perfectly
clear” exception through discriminatory hiring. Considering
how divisive the doctrine has been among the courts of
appeals, this case presents an excellent vehicle for this Court
to examine whether the forfeiture doctrine has any validity,
and if so, how the doctrine should operate.
I. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING THAT A
_ SUCCESSOR EMPLOYER FORFEITS ITS BURNS
RIGHT BY COMMITTING ANY UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE CONFLICTS WITH THIS COURT’S
OPINION IN BURNS AND CREATES A SPLIT OF
AUTHORITY WITH THE D.C. CIRCUIT.
Under fundamental principles of contract law, a party
becomes bound to a contract by voluntarily agreeing to the
terms in exchange for consideration from the other party.
See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 18, 24 (1979); see
also Burns, 406 U.S. at 287. With this case, the Ninth
Circuit has dramatically departed from this elemental
premise. Employers within the Ninth Circuit now may find
themselves retroactively bound to contracts with terms that
they have never discussed or even seen. In fact, the term
“collective bargaining agreement” has become a misnomer,
because an employer may find itself subject to binding
14
obligations with which it has never agreed. Such a
fundamental departure from the paradigm of traditional
contract law is directly contrary to the holdings of this Court
and the D.C. Circuit, and merits immediate reversal.
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Conflicts With This
Court’s Opinion In Burns, Which Held That A
Successor Employer May Unilaterally Set Initial
Terms of Employment Even If It Committed An
Unfair Labor Practice.
This Court addressed the privileges and obligations of a
successor employer in Burns.“ The Court held that when a
new employer takes over a isiness, it must recognize and
bargain with the union that represented the predecessor’s
employees if a majority of the new employer’s work force is
comprised of the predecessor’s employees. Burns, 406 U.S.
at 284. But, the Court also held that, notwithstanding any
duty to bargain, a successor employer is generally free to set
the initial terms and conditions of employment and is not
bound by its predecessor’s CBA. Jd.
In Burns, the successor employer not only refused to
recognize and bargain with the incumbent union in violation
of Sections 8(a)(1) and (5), but also unlawfully assisted a
rival union in violation of Section 8(a)(2). See Burns, 406
U.S. at 274-77. The Board argued that the importance of
stable labor relations outweighed the traditional principles of
contract law, and that therefore Burns, the successor
employer, should be bound to its predecessor's CBA. /d.
This Court disagreed, reasoning that Congress did not intend
that “the bargaining freedom of employers and unions [be]
totally subordinate” to the goal of “stable labor relations.”
? The Court has explained that the appropriate test to determine
whether an employer is a successor is whether substantial continuity
exists between the two employers. See Fall River Dyeing & Finishing
Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1987).
15
Id. at 287. Neither the employer nor the union should be
required to “make any concessions as a result of Government
compulsion,” and both “are free from having contract
provisions imposed upon them against their will.” Id. at 287
(emphasis added). The Court then explained that Burns had
not indicated any intention to assume the predecessor’s
CBA, and that the Board’s attempt to compel such
agreement violated “the fundamental premise on which the
Act is based.” Jd. The Court therefore determined that a
CBA is binding upon a party only if it voluntarily consents to
be bound.
The Court in Burns noted a single exception, commonly
called the “perfectly clear” exception, to the general rule that
a successor employer may set the initial terms and conditions
of employment without first consulting with the bargaining
unit: “Although a successor employer is ordinarily free to
set initial terms on which it will hire the employees of a
predecessor, there will be instances in which it is perfectly
clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the
employees in the unit.” Jd. at 272 (emphasis added). In that
case, “it will be appropriate to have [the successor] consult
with the employees’ bargaining representative before [the
successor] fixes terms.” Jd.
As explained infra, the Board and several courts of
appeals have dramatically expanded upon the Court’s
“perfectly clear” language in Burns to create the forfeiture
doctrine. These courts have misunderstood the Burns right
and the relevance of the “perfectly clear” exception. This
Court in Burns explicitly held that even under the “perfectly
clear” exception where a successor retains all of the
employees of the predecessor, the successor is still entitled to
set the initial terms and conditions of employment. All the
“perfectly clear” exception does is require the successor to
“consult with the employees’ bargaining representative
before [the successor] fixes terms.” /d. Under no
16
circumstances must the successor employee adopt the
predecessor’s CBA, even if the “perfectly clear” exception
applies. Therefore, the forfeiture doctrine, which supposedly
returns the situation to the status quo ante, actually does far
more: it penalizes a successor for its unfair labor practice. If
the employer had complied with the “perfectly clear”
exception, its only duty under Burns would have been to
consult with the union before fixing the initial terms and
conditions of employment, nothing more. See id; U.S.
Marine Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1329 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (rejecting the forfeiture doctrine
because “an obligation to ‘consult’ does not imply an
obligation to use the old terms unless the union agrees to
different ones.””).
But even assuming arguendo that application of the
forfeiture doctrine is ever appropriate, perhaps what is most
startling about the Ninth Circuit’s expansion of the forfeiture
doctrine outside of the “perfectly clear” exception is that it
completely ignores the Court’s treatment of this precise issue
in Burns. In Burns, the successor employer committed an
unfair labor practice strikingly similar to ASI’s by refusing
to negotiate with the predecessor’s union and instead
negotiating exclusively with a different union -— a “this
union” unfair labor practice instead of the “no union” unfair
labor practice in this case. Burns, 406 U.S. at 276. Yet
instead of holding that the successor forfeited this important
right, the Supreme Court ruled that the successor retained
the nght. Jd. at 294; see also Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at
1008. Under the Ninth Circuit’s severance of the forfeiture
doctrine from its basis in the “perfectly clear” exception, the
successor in Burns would have lost its right to set the initial
terms and conditions because it did not “conduct[] itself like
a lawful Burns successor.” App. 8a. '
The Ninth Circuit never offers a principled distinction
between the “this union” unfair labor practice in Burns and
17
the “no union” unfair labor practice in this case. As in
Burns, no nexus exists between ASI’s “no union” unfair
labor practice and a forfeiture of its Burns right. If ASI had
not made its “no union” statement, it still would not have
been subject to the “perfectly clear” exception in Burns, and
it would have been legally entitled to set the initial terms and
conditions of employment. See Burns, 407 U.S. at 284;
Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008. Application of the
forfeiture doctrine in ASI’s case does not even arguably
restore the situation to the status quo ante, the basis on
which the courts have justified the forfeiture doctrine as a
corollary to the “perfectly clear” exception. See U.S. Marine
Corp. v. NLRB, 944 F.2d 1305, 1320 (7th Cir. 1991); Capital
Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008. This clear evasion of Burns
warrants the Court’s immediate attention and correction.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Holding Creates A Split With
The D.C. Circuit’s Opinion In Capital Cleaning,
Which Held That The Forfeiture Doctrine Is A
“Corollary” To The Perfectly Clear Exception
And Does Not Apply To Other Types Of Unfair
Labor Practices.
The forfeiture doctrine originated in the courts of appeals
as a corollary to the Burns perfectly clear exception. See,
e.g., Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1008. As discussed
supra at 3-4, in applying this exception, some courts of
appeals have concluded that where a successor employer
attempts to avoid the “perfectly clear” exception by
discriminatorily refusing to hire predecessor employees, that
employer forfeits its right unilaterally to set the initial terms
and conditions of employment. See, e.g., id. See also
Kallman v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 1094, 1102-03 (9th Cir. 1981);
U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1320-21.
But the Ninth Circuit has drastically expanded the
forfeiture doctrine by applying it to all circumstances in
18
which an employer commits an unfair labor practice, rather
than only those implicating the “perfectly clear” exception.
The Ninth Circuit adopted the Board’s view that the
forfeiture doctrine was equitable in nature, so a successor
employer that commits an unfair labor practice during the
transition process is not a “lawful Burns successor’ and,
therefore, forfeits its Burns nght. App. 8a.
According to the Ninth Circuit, such freedom is
“conferred” only upon a “deserving” employer who has
avoided unfair labor practices: “the Burns right to set initial
terms and conditions of employment must be understood in
the context of a successor employer that will recognize the
affected unit employees’ collective-bargaining representative
and enter into good-faith negotiations with that union about
those terms and conditions.” App. 8a. In other words,
according to the Ninth Circuit, a successor employer who
commits amy unfair labor practice during the transition
process forfeits its Burns right and must, against its will,
abide by its predecessor’s CBA. App. 10a.
This holding directly conflicts with the D.C. Circuit’s
understanding of Burns and the forfeiture doctrine. In
Capital Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 147 F.3d 999
(D.C. Cir. 1998), the successor employer refused to hire the
predecessor’s workers who belonged to a union. /d. at 1008.
Because the successor employer’s actions qualified for the
“perfectly clear” exception, the D.C. Circuit applied the
forfeiture doctrine. Jd. at 1008-09.
However, the D.C. Circuit also made clear that the
forfeiture doctrine is a “corollary” to the “perfectly clear”
exception — it does not apply to all unfair labor practices, but
only to those practices that implicate the “perfectly clear”
exception. The D.C. Circuit recognized that the “this union”
unfair laber practice in Burns — favoring one union over
another and failing to bargain with the predecessor union —
was not the unfair labor practice of “refusing to hire a
19
majority of union employees.” /d. at 1008. “For that unfair
labor practice,” a non-“perfectly clear” violation, “the proper
remedy was a bargaining order,” not a forfeiture of the
Burns right. Id. (emphasis added).
It is impossible to reconcile the D.C. Circuit’s decision in
Capital Cleaning with the Ninth Circuit’s holding in this
case. Under Capital Cleaning, ASI would have retained its
Burns right because its “no union” unfair labor violation has
nothing to do with the “perfectly clear” exception of Burns.
See id. However, because. this litigation was filed in the
Ninth Circuit, ASI lost its Burns right and is now forced to
endure a CBA that it never negotiated, much less accepted.
Rather than treating the forfeiture doctrine as a corollary
to the “perfectly clear” exception, as the D.C. Circuit does,
the Ninth Circuit, like the Board, wields the doctrine as a
hammer to punish any unfair labor practice that a successor
employer commits by imposing potentially enormous
retroactive liabilities on successor employers. In essence,
the Ninth Circuit now requires a successor employer to earn
its Burns rights, and nothing in Burns even remotely
suggests this is correct. Considering the size of the Ninth
Circuit, with thousands of successor employers, as well as
the importance of the D.C. Circuit in Board litigation, this
clear split of authority cannot go unresolved. Section 10(f)
of the NLRA permits an employer to file a petition to set
aside a Board’s order either in the circuit of the dispute or in
the D.C. Circuit. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). It is safe to say that
unless this Court grants certiorari in this case, successor
employers always will choose the D.C. Circuit, rather than
the Ninth Circuit, when petitioning to set aside a Board’s
order involving Burns nights.
What would restore the situation to the status quo ante is
the remedy that Judge O’Scannlain thought was appropriate:
barring ASI from telling applicants that ASI plans to operate
without a union. App. 24a. Applying the forfeiture doctrine
20
in this case constitutes 2 penalty by putting ASI in a worse
position than it would have been absent its unfair labor
practice. Jd.
Il. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE SPLIT OVER
THE PROPER REMEDY UNDER THE
FORFEITURE DOCTRINE.
In addition to the conflict over the substantive scope of
the forfeiture doctrine, this case implicates an even broader
conflict over the remedial power of the Board to award back
pay under the forfeiture doctrine. When an employer forfeits
its Burns rights and must pay the predecessor’s employees
under the terms of the predecessor’s CBA, some courts of
appeals, including the Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,
hold that the Board has the power to award back pay
according to the terms of the prior CBA for the entire period
from the date of the unfair labor practice until the successor
employer reaches or would have reached a new agreement or
an impasse with the predecessor’s employees. See NLRB v.
Staten Island Hotel Ltd. Partnership, 101 F.3d 858, 861-62
(2d Cir. 1996); U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1319-24;
New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1460, 1467-69
(9th Cir. 1997); App. 10a-1 1a.
Other courts of appeals, namely the Sixth and D.C.
Circuits, conclude that the Board’s remedial powers to award
back pay under the CBA are limited to a period of a
“reasonable time of bargaining,” and do not cover the entire
period between the unfair labor practice and impasse or new
agreement with the predecessor’s employees. See Armco,
Inc. v. NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 365 (6th Cir. 1987); Capital
Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1011 (“We recognize that our view of
the limitation [the NLRA] places upon the remedial authority
of the Board in this type of case conflicts with that of several
other circuits.”’).
a ee ee eT en ees
21
This disagreement is more than a semantic one. It goes
to the heart of the Board’s power to fashion “remedies,” not
penalties. As this Court stated in Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB,
467 U.S. 883 (1984), “a backpay remedy must be
sufficiently tailored to expunge only the actual, and not
merely speculative, consequences of the unfair labor
practices.” Jd. at 900. A “remedy” that requires an
employer to pay a predecessor’s employees for all back
wages from the time of the unfair labor practice until
impasse or agreement requires the employer to pay wages
and benefits that it never would have agreed to pay. The
Rai time of bargaining” standard “focuses the
Board’s efforts upon the only proper remedial goal, namely,
placing the employees in the situation they would have
enjoyed but for [the successor’s] having unlawfully refused
to hire them.” Capital Cleaning, 147 F.3d at 1011. A
broader “remedial” power, the view adopted by the Second,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, penalizes the successor
employer. This the Board cannot do. See id. at 1012; see
also U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1331 (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (“None of this is remedial, and as a penalty it is
not only too high but also interferes with the future operation
of the plant.”).
Moreover, disputes between successor employers and the
predecessor employees’ union often take years to resolve.
The difference between a “reasonable time of bargaining”
and the interval between the unfair labor practice and
impasse or new agreement may amount to years, and thus
millions of dollars. In this case, for example, the controversy
began nine years ago. Thus, even if the forfeiture doctrine
applies to all successor unfair labor practices, this Court
should clarify the remedial powers of the Board and resolve
the split among the courts of appeals, especially considering
the D.C. Circuit’s important role in NLRB litigation.
22
Ill. THE COURTS OF APPEALS ARE CONFUSED
ABOUT WHETHER THE FORFEITURE
DOCTRINE IS EVER APPROPRIATE.
The courts of appeals created the forfeiture doctrine to
remedy situations where the Burns “perfectly clear”
exception applies. See supra at 3-4. However, this Court
has neither endorsed nor ratified such a remedy, and any
straightforward reading of Burns reveals that the doctrine has
no basis. This case presents the Court with an excellent
vehicle to examine, for the first time, whether the forfeiture
doctrine is ever an appropriate remedy for a successor’s
unfair labor practice.
As discussed supra at 14-16, this Court in Burns stated
that when the “perfectly clear” exception applies, the
successor merely has the duty to consult with the union. It is
not required to adopt the predecessor’s CBA. Therefore,
requiring the successor to forfeit its Burns rights and to adopt
the predecessor’s CBA when the successor tries to avoid the
“perfectly clear” exception does not return the situation to
the status quo ante. Rather, it penalizes the successor for
committing the unfair labor practice, a result consistent with
the Board’s “equitable” understanding of the forfeiture
doctrine but inconsistent with this Court’s interpretation of
the Board’s authonty. Nothing in Burns supports the
forfeiture doctrine; to the contrary, the Court squarely
rejected its application in that case, which featured a “this
union” violation remarkably similar to the “no union”
violation in this case. See Burns, 406 U.S. at 284-87; see
also id. at 281-82 (“It does not follow ... from [the
successor’s] duty to bargain that it was bound to observe the
substantive terms of the [CBA] the union had negotiated
with [the predecessor] and to which [the successor] in no
way agreed.”).
Largely for this reason, several respected appellate
judges have rejected the doctrine as a remedy for any unfair
23
labor practice, even as a corollary to the Burns “perfectly
clear” exception. Judge Easterbrook, for example, noted that
the Board lacks the power to penalize an employer for an
unfair labor violation, id. at 1327 (citing Sure-Tan, 467 U.S.
at 900-01), and reasoned that “[w]hat the Board characterizes
as a ‘forfeiture’ of the successor employer’s privilege to set
its own terms and conditions of employment is a penalty by
another name—and not a much different name at that.” U.S.
Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1328 (Easterbrook, J., joined by
Posner, Coffey, Manion & Kanne, JJ., dissenting); see also
App. 14a (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (“By arming the
Board with an unauthorized power to punish, the majority
has impermissibly upset the balance of power between
management and labor that Congress established in the
Act.”).
The proper remedy for evading a duty to bargain with the
union is a bargaining order. See U.S. Marine Corp., 944
F.2d at 1330 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). The fact that the
obligation to consult arises prior to setting terms rather than
after setting terms does not justify the drastic remedy of the
forfeiture doctrine, even under the “perfectly clear”
exception. Until this Court examines the viability of the
forfeiture doctrine, this confusion among the courts of
appeals will continue to grow. This case presents an
excellent vehicle for the Court to examine the forfeiture
doctrine and end this confusion.
IV. THE PRACTICAL EFFECTS OF THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S DECISION MANDATE THIS
- COURT’S IMMEDIATE ATTENTION.
The ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this
matter cannot be overstated. By ruling that a successor
employer may be bound to a CBA that it never voluntarily
assumed, the Ninth Circuit has created a significant obstacle
to any effort to revitalize a failing or failed business. As this
24
Court explained in Burns: “A potential employer may be
willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make
changes in corporate structure, composition of the labor
force, work location, task assignment, and nature of
supervision. Saddling such an employer with the terms and:
conditions of employment contained in the old collective-
bargaining contract may make these changes impossible and
may discourage and inhibit the transfer of capital.” 406 U.S.
at 287-88; see also U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1328
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (“Change [in the terms of
employment] may be the only alternative to consigning the
plant to the scrap heap. Denying the successor the nght to
establish its own wages and other terms whenever it is likely
to hire substantially all of the predecessor’s workers could
prevent this process from occurring and lead to liquidation
rather than revivification.”’).
Unions often file charges of unfair labor practices, and a
successor employer cannot predict the outcome of such a
proceeding with any certainty. Even the most diligent
employer makes mistakes, and no employer can ensure that
no unlawful labor practices will occur. Litigating whether an
unfair labor practice has occurred can take years, and often
boils down to a single fact or credibility determination.
This case is an excellent example of this uncertainty,
where ASI was held to have committed an unfair labor
practice due to a statement by an Aero employee,
Cunningham. Almost 10 years have passed between
Mr. Brown’s decision to purchase Aero’s assets and the
Ninth Circuit’s decision to require ASI to adopt Aero’s
CBA. When Mr. Brown agreed to purchase Aero’s assets,
the predecessor employer already had stopped honoring the
terms of the CBA. Mr. Brown purchased Aero’s assets with
the understanding that to save the company, he needed to
scrap Aero’s business model, including its CBA, and start
from scratch to build a new, healthy company. Now that
25
very same CBA has been foisted on ASI, the company that
Mr. Brown formed to avoid Aero’s business mistakes.
This risk of learning after years of litigation that the
successor is retroactively bound to an earlier CBA that it
never negotiated or accepted will likely force a successor
either to (i) involuntarily adopt the predecessor CBA as the
prudent course of action, or (ii) determine that the risk is too
great to invest in the failing business. The former violates
the fundamental principles of contract law; the latter runs
contrary to national policy and hurts employers and workers
alike. As Judge Easterbrook has described, the forfeiture
doctrine “increase[s] the risks of taking over foundering
firms, and frustrate[s] the revival of aging plants. Neither
American workers nor American consumers will welcome
this consequence.” U.S. Marine Corp., 944 F.2d at 1331
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Application of the forfeiture
doctrine in this case is especially unfair. A statement of an
employee of a predecessor that had abandoned the CBA now
requires the successor to honor that same abandoned CBA,
even though the successor agreed to buy the company only if
it could be free from the predecessor’s CBA.
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case directly
conflicts with this Court’s decision in Burns and the D.C.
Circuit’s decision in Capital Cleaning. The opinion also
deepens an existing split concerning the Board’s remedial
power. It provides an enormous disincentive for successor
employers to purchase and attempt to revive a failing
business, ultimately harming employees of failing
businesses. It also highlights the infirmity of the forfeiture
doctrine, and why it should never apply under any
circumstances. This Court should grant certiorari and
reverse the Ninth Circuit.
26
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of
certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
LARRY A. WALRAVEN WALTER E. DELLINGER
BRIAN A. SELVAN (Counsel of Record)
O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP SRI SRINIVASAN*
610 Newport Center Dr. ERIKA FRICK*
Suite 1700 JOHN B. OWENS
Newport Beach, CA 92660 O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
(949) 760-9600 555 13" Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 383-5300
*Admitted in California only
Attorneys for Petitioner
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