Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Jie Hu v. United States

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In

Supreme Court of the

United States

October Term, 2000

<<cciltie

JIE HU and SHAO ZHEN LIN,

Petitioners,

— against -

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to The United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JOEL B. RUDIN

Attorney of Record for Petitioner - Jie Hu

110 E. 59” Street

New York, New York 10022

(212) 752-7600

a wan

JEREMY GUTMAN

Attorney of Record for Petitioner - Shao Zhen Lin

110 E. 59” Street

New York, New York 10022

(212) 644-5200

on

St. Louis West, Inc.

Question Presented

Is it a violation of the Fourth Amendment’s

“particularity” requirement for federal agents to obtain

authorization from a magistrate to seize documents evidencing a

particular form of fraud, but then to search for and seize an

enormous quantity of confidential records based on an entirely

separate, dubious theory of fraud they had withheld from the

issuing magistrate?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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Constitutional Provisions Involved................cssccsssssseeeeseeeeeeeees 2

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I. IG osiviinceicsessnsissiinintaininadiirandaceceaialiintals $

I]. The Motion to Suppress the Fruits of the

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Il. Petitioners’ Trial and Sentence....................06 6

IV. ‘The Court of Appeals’ Opinion .....................006. 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should resolve a conflict among the

Circuits concerning the obligation of government

agents, under the Fourth Amendment, to disclose

available information necessary for a magistrate

to “particularly describe” the items to be seized

SUNT 00 G WII oiiisiisssrccicdcintictioneniennsmomninane 8

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969)...............

Andreson v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976)............cccccccceeeeee

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) .................

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) ...............00.. 8, 11

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) ...........ccccceeeeeees 9

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).......:ccccccceccesseeeeeees 9

Montilla Records of Puerto Rico v. Morales, 575

Fk Ae Sale BT iicdssnicnichesteiientibtaticteinausanaisaaes 13

— eT

United States v. Fucillo, 808 F.2d 173 (ist Cir.), cert.

denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987) ...ccccssssssssssssssssssseeseeeeeeee 12 |

;

United States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423 (9th Cir. 1995)................ +

United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir. 1988).......... 12

United States v. Liu, 239 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2000).......... passim

United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959 (9th Cir. 1986)........ 14

United States v. Stubbs, 873 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1989)...........

Statutes Page

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Other Authorities

W. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(d) (3d ed. 1996)........... 10

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TO APPENDIX

Page

Appendix A:

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit, December 27, 2000 (affirming judgment

SITTIN, « 1s susislecneiiennnienhdenccenlintgunieabunieaianimnliiaiiien la

Appendix B:

Order of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit (denying petition for

rehearing), February 13, 2001 .............ccccseeseseeeeeees 12a

Appendix C:

Oral decision of the United States District Court

for the Southern District, April 3, 1998 ................... l3a

Appendix D:

-Ruling of the United States District Court

for the Southern District, June 19, 1998 .................. 1Sa

Appendix E:

Oral decision of the United States Distnct Court

for the Southern District, November 16, 1998.........

No.

In the

SUPREME COURT of the UNITED STATES

JIE HU and SHAO ZHEN LIN,

Petitioners,

against

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Petitioners Jie Hue and Shao Zhen Lin respectfully pray

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion

of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

entered in this proceeding on December 27, 2000.

Opinions Below

The opinion of the Court of Appeals, United States v. Liu,

239 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2000), appears as Appendix A to this

petition. That court’s order, entered February 13, 2001, denying a

petition for rehearing is not yet reported and appears as Appendix

B. The district court’s unreported decisions concerning a pretrial

motion to suppress the fruits of a search appear as Appendices C,

D, and E.

Jurisdiction

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit was entered on December 27, 2000. The Court. of

Appeals denied a timely petition for rehearing by an order

entered on February 13, 2001. This petition for certiorari was

timely filed. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

Constitutional Provision Involved

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,

and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

STATEMENT

1. Background

As employees of the Foochowese Translation Center

(“FTC”) in New York’s Chinatown, petitioners Jie Hu and Shao

Zhen Lin helped recent immigrants complete English-language

forms required by the Immigration & Naturalization Service

(“INS”) and other government agencies. Based on their alleged

———

assistance to two government informants who participated in a

10-month-long undercover investigation that ended in July 1997,

Hu and Lin were indicted, along with Lin’s husband, Shi Yan

Liu, for conspiring to submit fraudulent political asylum

applications to the INS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1546.

Immediately following petitioners’ arrests, a team of INS

agents, on the authority of a warrant issued by a federal

magistrate, conducted an extensive search of the FTC offices in

which they seized over 66,000 pages of documents, and a diverse

collection of other materials. The affidavit submitted by an INS

agent in support of that warrant had alleged that the petitioners

had assisted the two government informants prepare political

asylum applications containing false narrative descriptions of the

persecution they had suffered. Based on such allegations, the

agent convinced the magistrate that there was probable cause to

believe the FTC was engaged in a practice of supplying fictitious

stories about persecution in China to applicants for political

asylum, and to authorize the seizure of:

Documents containing fraudulent statements in

relation to political asylum applications,

fraudulent birth certificates, “boiler-plate”’

political asylum applications, fictitious stones

outlining political persecution, receipts and

financial records relating to these asylum

applications, including computer records, in

violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section

1546.

At a pretrial hearing, the INS agent who supervised the

search acknowledged that he did not discover a single document

on the premises that contained a discernibly “fictitious” account

of political persecution — the sole type of “fraudulent statement”

referred to in the warrant and the underlying affidavit. (H. 180)!

Nonetheless, the agent determined that asylum applications in

the FTC’s client files contained “fraudulent statements” because

they listed petitioner Lin’s home address (on Van Doren Street)

as the “mailing address” of applicants who did not in fact live at

that address. (H. 15-16, 165-70) After examining approximately

50 files, and finding the Van Doren address on “most” of them,

the agent directed the seizure of every one of the approximately

1,200 political asylum files found in petitioners’ file cabinets.

The agents also seized thousands of pages of additional materials

— including bank statements, address books, and appointment

books — that bore no relation at all to asylum applications. (H.

20-22, 180)

Although the agent had been aware for many months that

the FTC used the Van Doren address on many of the applications

it prepared. (and that comparable agencies throughout the country

similarly utilized an address under their control where vital

notices from the INS could be received and communicated to

their transient, non-English-speaking clients) (H. 15-19), his

search warrant affidavit did not present any information

regarding this practice to the issuing magistrate, and thus did not

give the magistrate an opportunity to evaluate the agent’s theory

that the listing of such an address would render a document

“fraudulent.” During the hearing, the agent was unable to point

to any law, regulation, or other authority for his conclusion that

'Record references preceded by “H” are to the transcript of the

pretrial suppression hearing; references preceded by “T” are to the tnal

transcript.

an alien’s use of such a mailing address indicated that an

application contained “fraudulent” statements.” (H. 171)

Il. The Motion to Suppress the Fruits of the Search

In a pretrial motion to suppress the fruits of the search,

petitioners argued, inter alia, that applications containing the

Van Doren Street address were not “fraudulent” within the

meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1546 (the statute referred to in the

warrant), and that those items and their fruits should be

suppressed because they were outside the scope of the warrant.

Petitioners also contended that, by seizing those applications as

well as a wide array of other materials that bore no relation to

asylum applications (a fact that the government in large measure

conceded), the agents had flagrantly disregarded the terms of the

warrant.

In the alternative, petitioners argued that, if the warrant

was sufficiently broad to permit seizure of documents that were

“fraudulent” on the theory that they listed Lin’s address as the

applicant’s “mailing address,” the INS agent’s failure to present

this theory to the issuing magistrate resulted in a violation of the

Fourth Amendment’s requirement that warrants “particularly”

describe the things to be seized. Petitioners argued that, instead,

the warrant improperly left to the discretion of the executing

at petitioners’ trial, the government acknowledged that it

would not contend that a fraud conviction could be based on the use of

a “false” address in an asylum application (T. 1855-57), and the

district court instructed the jury that the use of the Van Doren Street

address was “not to be considered by you in determining whether or

not those political asylum applications contain false, fictitious or

fraudulent statements” (T. 1887).

agents the determination of which items could be deemed

“fraudulent.” )

In an oral decision, the district court rejected these

arguments. Appendix C. On reconsideration, the court granted a

hearing to resolve whether government agents had acted in

flagrant disregard of the warrant. Appendix D: At the

conclusion of that hearing, petitioners renewed their challenge to

the warrant’s “particularity” based on testimony of the

supervising agent concerning his awareness of the so-called

“false address” practice at the time he applied for the warrant.

The district court, however, adhered to its initial decision.

Appendix E.

IIl. Petitioners’ Trial and Sentence

Following the seizure of the 1,200 client files, the

government, apparently relying on evidence derived from the

fruits of that search’, filed two superseding indictments that

substantially expanded the scope of the charged conspiratorial

agreement. The subsequent indictments alleged that the

conspiracy began more than three years prior to the undercover

investigation involving the two government informants, and that

the petitioners prepared false political asylum applications on

behalf of at least 16 of their actual clients, each of whom became

*Because the district court ruled that there had not been a

violation of the Fourth Amendment, petitioners have not had an

opportunity to litigate the issue of taint. See Alderman v. United

States, 394 U.S. 165, 181-85 (1969)(government is not required to

disclose evidence to enable a defendant to substantiate a claim that

evidence at trial was tainted until a Fourth Amendment violation is

established).

the subject of substantive counts in the indictment. At tral on

the second superseding indictment, the government presented

testimony of two FTC clients whom Lin had assisted in 1994, as

well as the testimony of the two government informants, whose

first contact with the agency was in 1996. The court charged the

jury that it could consider the filing of the allegedly false 1994

applications against Hu and Lin with respect to the conspiracy

charge. At the conclusion of the trial, Hu and Lin were acquitted

of the substantive counts relating to the two actual clients, but

they were found guilty of the charged conspiracy, as well as

substantive counts relating to an application filed on behalf of

one of the informants in 1994.

Notwithstanding the verdict indicating that the petitioners

may have gone “over the line in terms of assisting people with

political asylum applications,” the district court recognized that

petitioners were law-abiding individuals who conducted a

legitimate business, and it sentenced them to one-year terms of

probation, with Lin’s term including four months of home

detention.

IV. The Court of Appeals’ Opinion

On appeal, petitioners again argued, inter alia, that, while

the search warrant and the underlying affidavit had described

only one form of fraud — the creation of false stories describing

political persecution in China — the INS had identified asylum

applications as “fraudulent” and seized them based on the

entirely different theory, not presented to the magistrate, that they

bore a “false” address, in violation of the “particularity”

requirement. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the

warrant was adequately particularized because it “identified the

statute that had allegedly been violated, and authorized only the

:

is

seizure of a relatively narrow range of items.” Appendix A, p.

4a. In its cursory resolution of this issue, the court did not discuss

the supervising agent’s failure to ask the issuing magistrate for

permission to seize documents on this dubious theory of fraud, a

theory that the agent had been investigating for months.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This Court should resolve a conflict among the

Circuits concerning the obligation of government agents,

under the Fourth Amendment, to disclose available

information necessary for a magistrate to “particularly

describe” the items to be seized pursuant to a warrant.

As this Court has long recognized, the Fourth

Amendment's requirement that search warrants “particularly

describe . . . the persons or things to be seized” serves a number

of fundamental purposes. The “particularity” requirement

ensures that a decision to invade an individual’s interest in

property will not be left to the discretion of zealous officers

“engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out

crime,” but will be made by a “neutral and detached magistrate.”

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). It prevents

“general, exploratory rummaging in a persons belongings,”

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971), and

other hallmarks of the “general searches” that were abhorred by

the American colonists. Additionally, it prevents:

the seizure of one thing under a warrant

describing another. As to what is to be taken,

nothing is left to the discretion of the officer

executing the warrant.

Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See also

Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987)(“By limiting the

authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which

there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the

search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not

take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches

the Framers intended to prohibit”).

The present case offers this Court an opportunity to

consider, as it never has before, whether government agents

defeat the fundamental purposes served by the “particularity”

requirement when they withhold from the issuing magistrate

information that they will ultimately rely on to determine which

documents to seize under the warrant. While, as indicated in the

cases cited in the paragraph above, this Court has repeatedly

emphasized the important function of the “particularity”

requirement, it has not spoken to the obligations that requirement

imposes on the agents who seek a warrant, as opposed to the

judicial officer who issues it. The distinction is significant

because an issuing magistrate is necessarily dependent on law

enforcement officers to supply the facts pertinent to the warrant.

As a practical matter, the magistrate’s ability to comply with the

constitutional mandate to “particularly describe” the things to be

seized hinges on the information supplied by government agents.

Granting certiorari in the present case will allow this Court to

provide much-needed, authoritative guidance to law enforcement

officers concerning their obligations in this regard.

This case presents this opportunity in the especially

sensitive context of searches involving documents that are not

readily identifiable as contraband or evidence of a crime. As a

leading commentator has observed:

- ———eeeeeEeEeee—ee—eeEeEeEOeeeeeeeree

10

Search warrants for documents are

generally deserving of somewhat closer scrutiny

with respect to the particularity requirement

because of the potential they carry for a very

serious intrusion into personal privacy. As the

Supreme Court noted in Andreson v. Maryland

[427 U.S. 463 (1976)], there are grave dangers

inherent in executing a warrant authorizing a

search and seizure of a person’s papers that are

not necessarily present in executing a warrant to

search for physical objects whose relevance is

more easily ascertainable. In searches for papers,

it is certain that some innocuous documents will

be examined, at least cursorily, in order to

determine whether they are, in fact, among those

papers authorized to be seized.

W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.6(d) (3d ed. 1996).

While the warrant here authorized the seizure of

documents containing “fraudulent statements” relating to

political asylum applications, it did not provide any specific

guidance as to how the agents executing the warrant were to

identify which of the many applications kept in the FTC’s client

files were “fraudulent.” The underlying affidavit presented facts

relating to only one type of “fraudulent ” statement: “fictional” or

“boilerplate” stories outlining political persecution at the hands

of Chinese authorities. The agents did not discover any

documents that fit that definition of fraud, but they nonetheless

seized approximately 1,200 confidentia! client files based on

their observation that some of them utilized what the agents

characterized as a “false” address.

17

The warrant, however, did not make any reference to

“false” addresses as a criteria for identifying “fraudulent”

documents. Even though the supervising INS agent was aware of

the FTC’s practice of using petitioner Lin’s “Van Doren Street”

address as the applicants’ mailing address on multiple

applications, he did not inform the magistrate of that information

or of his intention to rely on the presence of that address as an

indicator that a document contained a “fraudulent statement.” As

a result, the magistrate never had an opportunity to assess the

agent’s legal conclusion that the use of the Van Doren Street

address would render an asylum application “fraudulent.” The

decision that such documents could be seized on that basis was

not made by a “neutral and detached magistrate,” but by the

“zealous officers” who conducted the search. Johnson, 333 U.S.

at 14.

In view of the agent’s inability to articulate a basis for

his conclusion that listing the Van Doren Street address

constituted fraud, and the district court’s instruction to the jury

that the use of that address could not support a fraud conviction,

the agent’s legai conclusion was extremely dubious. The Second

Circuit’s tacit approval of the agent’s reliance on the observation

of the Van Doren address as a basis to seize documents is

anomalous, since it is unaccompanied by any discussion of a

rationale for treating that address not only as an indicator that

the documents on which it appeared were “fraudulent,” but as a

justification for the seizure of every one of the 1,200 client files

on the premises. The Court of Appeals did not attempt to

reconcile its implicit conclusion that the warrant authorized that

wholesale seizure of documents with its conclusion that the

warrant “authorized only the seizure of a relatively narrow range

of items.” Appendix A, p. 4a.

12

In its discussion of petitioners’ challenge to the warrant’s

compliance with the “particularity” requirement, the Second

Circuit treated the agent’s undisclosed knowledge of the “false”

address practice as a matter of no consequence. Without

mentioning that information or the government’s failure to

disclose it to the magistrate, the Court simply announced its

conclusion that the warrant was sufficiently “particularized”

because it “identified the statute that had allegedly been

violated, and authorized only the seizure of a relatively narrow

range of items.” Appendix A, p. 4a.

By effectively holding that a warrant’s compliance with

the “particularity” requirement could be assessed solely by

looking to the face of the warrant, the Second Circuit followed

an approach that is at odds with that of several other Circuits,

which recognize that the “particularity” requirement implicates a

responsibility on the part of government agents to provide

available information to the issuing magistrate that could be

used to specify the items to be seized. The Tenth Circuit, for

example, has recognized that “the fourth amendment requires

that the government describe the items to be seized with as

much specificity as the government's knowledge and

circumstances allow...” United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592,

600 (10th Cir. 1988)(emphasis added).

The First Circuit held, in United States v. F; ucillo, 808

F.2d 173, 176 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987), that

the duty of law enforcement agents to advise the magistrate of

available information in order to ensure that the warrant

specifically describes the items to be seized is particularly

important in cases in which lawful items that fall within the

same general classification are likely to be found at the same

13

location as the unlawful objects that are to be seized. In Fucillo,

FBI agents had applied for authority to seize cartons of stolen

women’s garments from warehouses, but the warrant did not

explain how the agents were to distinguish stolen garments from

other garments on the premises. Holding that the warrant

violated the “particularity” requirement, the First Circuit

observed that “the FBI clearly could have obtained specific

information for presentment to the magistrate and placement in

the warrant which would have enabied the agents executing the

FAD and Milford warehouse searches to differentiate

contraband cartons of women’s clothing from legitimate ones.”

808 F.2d at 176-77. As a result of their failure to do so, the

agents “had no ‘physical criteria or detailed description in the

warrant to enable them to determine what they might lawfully

seize....”” Jd. at 177, quoting Montilla Records of Puerto Rico

v. Morales, 575 F.2d 324, 326-27 (ist Cir.1978).

Similarly, in contrast to the approach followed by the

Second Circuit in the present case, the Ninth Circuit has

recognized that a warrant’s particularity should be assessed with

reference to the information that was known to the agents who

applied for the warrant:

In determining whether a description is

sufficiently precise, we have focused on one or

more of the following: (1) whether probable

cause exists to seize all items of a particular type

described in the warrant, . . . (2) whether the

warrant sets out objective standards by which

executing officers can differentiate items subject

to seizure from those which are not, . . . and (3)

whether the government was able to describe the

items more particularly in light of the

ca

information available to it at the time the

warrant was issued... .

United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th

Cir.1986)emphasis added).

Thus, in United States v. Stubbs, 873 F.2d 210, 211 (9

Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit affirmed an order suppressing the

fruits of a search because “[t]he IRS knew both what the

seizable documents looked like and where to find them, but this

information was not contained in the warrant.” See also United

States v. Kow, 58 F.3d 423, 427 (9" Cir. 1995)(warrant was

insufficiently particularized because it relied on “generic

classifications” even though “(t]he government could have made

the warrant more particular”).

Wide-ranging searches and seizures of documents can

inflict serious damage to the legitimate privacy interests of

individuals, legitimate businesses, and their customers or clients,

as the questionable seizure of 1,200 confidential client files in

this case demonstrates. This Court should grant certiorari so

that it can resolve the conflict among the Circuits concerning the

extent of law enforcement agents’ obligation to ensure that

search warrants comply with the “particularity” requirement.

15

For these reasons, a writ of certiorari should issue to

CONCLUSION

review the judgment and opinion of the Second Circuit.

May 2001

Respectfully submitted,

JOEL B. RUDIN

110 East 59" Street

23” Floor

New York, New York 10022

(212) 752-7600

Attorney of Record

for Petitioner Jie Hu

JEREMY GUTMAN

110 East 59" Street

23” Floor

New York, New York 10022

(212) 644-5200

Attorney of Record

for Petitioner Shao Zhen Lin

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the

United States

October Term, 2000

ansisellibsmnin

JIE HU and SHAO ZHEN LIN,

Petitioners,

— against —

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to The United

States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.

APPENDIX

—— SW.

St. Louis West, Inc. (9428)

NY (212) 684-3117 NJ (201) 863-8133

Printed on Recycled Paper

Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

Decided December 27, 2000 [Pages 1a— 11a]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term, 2000

(Argued: October 18, 2000

Decided: December 27, 2000)

Docket Nos. 00-1037(L), 00-1038(CON)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

SHI YAN LIU, a/k/a Simon Liu,

Defendant,

Ji—E HU and SHAO ZHEN LIN,

Defendants-Appellants.

Before:

MESKILL, CABRANES, and POOLER,

Circuit Judges.

Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

Appeal from judgments of conviction entered by the

United States District Court for the Southern District of New

York (Sidney H. Stein, Judge) following a jury trial. We hold,

inter alia, that government agents do not flagrantly disregard

the terms of a warrant so that all fruits of their search must

be suppressed when they conduct a search that bears none of

the hallmarks of a general search.

Affirmed.

JOEL B. RUDIN, New York, NY, for defendant-

appellant Jie Hu.

JEREMY GUTMAN, New York, NY, for defendant-

appellant Shao Zhen Lin.

MICHAEL GILBERT, Assistant United States

Attorney for the Southern District of New

York (Kevin S. Reed, Jamie L. Kogan, and

Christine H. Chung, Assistant United States

Attorneys, on the brief), for appellee.

JOSE A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge:

Defendants Jie Hu and Shao Zhen Lin appeal from judg-

ments of conviction entered by the District Court (Sidney H.

Stein, Judge) on January 25, 2000. For the reasons stated

below, we affirm the judgments.

The following facts are not in dispute. At all relevant

times, Hu and Lin were employees of a New York immigra-

tion assistance agency (“the agency”). On October 2, 1996,

Wing Fung Chau, a government informant posing as an

3a

Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

undocumented alien, met with Hu at the agency. During the

meeting, Chau signed a blank copy of Immigration and Nat-

uralization Service (“INS”) Form 1-589, an application for

political asylum, and left it at the agency. Chau subsequently

spoke with Lin. The content of Chau’s conversations with Hu

and Lin is discussed below to the extent relevant.

On November 8, 1996, the agency filed a completed asy-

lum application with the INS on Chau’s behalf. The com-

pleted application contained an allegedly fictitious account

of Chau’s persecution in China.

On July 8, 1997, a grand jury in the Southern District

of New York returned an indictment that charged Hu and

Lin with conspiring to file fraudulent political asylum appli-

cations in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.! On July 10, 1997,

United States Magistrate Judge Theodore H. Katz issued a

search warrant (“the warrant”) authorizing INS agents to

search the agency. The agents did so, and seized various

materials. Hu and Lin then moved to suppress these materi-

als, and on November 16, 1998, the District Court denied

their motion in a ruling from the bench.

A trial followed, and on July 22, 1999, the jury returned its

verdicts, convicting both Hu and Lin on one count each of

conspiring to submit fraudulent political asylum applications

to the INS in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and on two counts

each of preparing and filing fraudulent political asylum

applications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546. The District

Court entered judgment accordingly, and this timely appeal

followed.

On appeal, Hu and Lin press four substantial arguments,

none of which is persuasive.

! Subsequently filed superseding indictments added counts of, inter alia,

preparing and filing fraudulent asylum applications in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1546.

SSeS ay Si EEE I Hees ee

TL iT essai aeesnnesieitleiisnesisenisinnsitimensianes

4a Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

I.

First, appellants contend that their motion to suppress

should have been granted because the warrant issued by Mag-

istrate Judge Katz was insufficiently particular. We disagree.

A warrant must be “sufficiently specific to permit the ratio-

nal exercise of judgment [by the executing officers] in select-

ing what items to seize.” United States v. LaChance, 788 F.2d

856, 874 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The warrant here met this standard. It identified the statute

that had allegedly been violated, and authorized only the

seizure of a relatively narrow range of items—namely,

“(djocuments containing fraudulent statements in relation to

political asylum applications, fraudulent birth certificates,

‘boiler-plate’ political asylum applications, fictitious stories

outlining political persecution, [and] receipts and financial

records relating to these asylum applications, including com-

puter records.”

II.

Appellants next argue that the INS agents’ search was con-

ducted in “flagrant disregard” of the warrant so that all fruits

of the search must be suppressed. Again, we disagree.

Government agents “flagrantly disregard” the terms of a

warrant so that wholesale suppression is required only when

(1) they effect a “widespread seizure of items that were not

within the scope of the warrant,” United States v. Matias, 836

F.2d 744, 748 (2d Cir. 1988), and (2) do not act in good faith,

see Marvin v. United States, 732 F.2d 669, 675 (8th Cir.

1984) (holding that complete suppression is inappropriate

where government “agents attempted to stay within the

boundaries of the warrant and. . . the extensive seizure of

documents was prompted largely by practical considerations

Appendix A

5a .

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

and time constraints”); United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83,

93 (6th Cir. 1985) (similar); United States vy. Tamura, 694

F.2d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 1982) (similar); United States v.

Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (similar); see

also United States v. Foster, 100 F.3d 846, 852 (10th Cir.

1996) (ordering blanket Suppression when “at the time he

obtained the warrant, [the officer who applied for it]. . .

knew that the limits of the warrant would not be honored”);

United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978)

(similar).

The cornerstone of the blanket Suppression doctrine is the

enduring aversion of Anglo-American law to so-called gen-

eral searches. Such searches—which have been variously

described as “wide-ranging exploratory searches,” Maryland

v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987), and “indiscriminate

rummaging[s],” United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, 75

(2d Cir. 1992)—are especially pernicious, and “have long

been deemed to violate fundamental rights.” Marron vy.

United States, 275 U.S. 192, 195 (1927); see also, e.g.,

Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357

(1931) (“Since before the creation of our government, [gen-

eral] searches have been deemed obnoxious to fundamental

Principles of liberty. They are denounced in the constitu-

tions or statutes of every State in the Union. The need of

Protection against them is attested alike by history and

present conditions.” (internal citation omitted)). Eliminating

general searches was the basic impetus for the Fourth

Amendment’s Warrant Clause, see Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84,

and the instruments that authorized government agents to

conduct such searches were much-reviled throughout the

colonial period.?

2 During that period, general searches were conducted pursuant to, inter

alia, general warrants and writs of assistance. See Vernonia School Dis-

trict 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)

————————E——

Bi I a ar comune cree rer

6a Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

- The rationale for blanket suppression is that a search that

greatly exceeds the bounds of a warrant and is not conducted

in good faith is essentially indistinguishable from a general

search. See United States v. Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 556

(4th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases); cf. United States v.

Dzialak, 441 F.2d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 1971) (describing law

enforcement officers as conducting a “general search” when

“liJn executing what was a very precise warrant, the[y] spent

more than four hours ransacking a[ ] house for any possible

incriminating evidence,” and “[o]f the items seized, those

which were not described in the warrant far outnumbered

those described”). Accordingly, to satisfy the first prong of

the two-part test described above, the search conducted by

government agents must actually resemble a general search.’

See Heldt, 668 F.2d at 1262 (declining to require “complete

(collecting sources). To great acclamation in the American colonies, Chief

Justice Pratt (later Lord Camden) criticized general warrants on the

ground that they would permit “the secret cabinets and bureaus of every

subject in this kingdom [to] be thrown open to the search and inspection

of a messenger.” Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029, 1063 (C.P.

1765); see also Wilkes v. Wood, 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 (C.P. 1763) (similar).

See generally William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal

Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 397 (1995) (noting that Lord Camden

became “famous” throughout the colonies for these views). Similarly,

in a 1761 argument before a Boston court, James Otis, the Massachusetts

lawyer and legislator, described the writs of assistance “as the worst

instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty,

and the fundamental principles of law, that was ever found in an English

law book.” JAMES OTIS, SPEECH ON THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE (1761),

in 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 7 n.35 (2d ed.

1991). John Adams later characterized Otis’s argument to the court as

the precise moment when “the child Independence was born.” See Boyd

v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886). See generally Thomas

Davis, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV.

547, 561 n.20 (1999) (describing dissemination of Otis’s argument in the

colonies).

3 To satisfy the second prong, it is not the search itself that must resem-

ble a general search. Rather, the search must resemble a general search in

the sense that it—like a general search—is not conducted in good faith.

ieee Be

NE IDS SCN

7a Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

suppression” when conduct of government agents did not

“result{] in a general search”); Rettig, 589 F.2d at 423

(ordering blanket suppression where, “[a]s interpreted and

executed by the [searching] agents, th{e] warrant became an

instrument for conducting a general search”). See generally

Dzialak, 441 F.2d at 217 (describing a general search).

Here, appellants claim, inter alia, that government agents

seized some asylum application files without first deter-

mining that they contained “fraudulent statements,” as

required by the warrant. Accordingly, appellants argue, Judge

Stein erred in not granting their motion for wholesale sup-

pression.

We are not persuaded. At a suppression hearing, the INS

agent who supervised the search testified—credibly, Judge

Stein found—as follows: during the search he spent approx-

imately 30 minutes reviewing asylum application files con-

tained in agency file cabinets; of the files he reviewed in that

time, “pretty much all of the[m]” listed the asylum appli-

cant’s address as 55-03 Van Doren Street; such repetition of

one address indicated that the applications might include

fraudulent statements; and he ordered all files in the file cab-

inets seized—even the ones that he had not individually

searched.

These actions bear none of the hallmarks of a general

search: They suggest a fairly systematic inventory, not

“indiscriminate rummaging,” and a search for items enu-

merated in the warrant, not an “exploratory” search for items

not mentioned there. Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly

held that such actions as were taken by the INS agents in this

case, standing alone, do not support a finding that govern-

ment agents have flagrantly disregarded the terms of a

warrant. See, e.g., United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358,

1363 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that where government agents

EG 5 ie ERG, Se A i

8a ’ Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

were authorized by a warrant to search for “broad categories”

of documentary evidence, and records belonging to each cat-

egory were found in every drawer of some file cabinets, the

officers did not “grossly exceed” the terms of the warrant

when they seized entire file cabinets so that complete sup-

pression was required) (collecting cases).

Accordingly, even assuming arguendo that the INS agents

exceeded the bounds of the warrant when they seized indi-

vidual agency files without first searching them, we hold

that appellants have not shown that the agents’ search resem-

bled a general search. We therefore conclude that the first

prong of the two-part test for flagrantly disregarding the

terms of the warrant has not been satisfied, and whole-

sale suppression—a remedy that we have described as

“drastic,” Matias, 836 F.2d at 747—is not required here.

See generally Foster, 100 F.3d at 852 (observing that “the

extreme remedy of blanket suppression should only be

imposed in the most extraordinary of cases” (internal

quotation marks omitted)).

In light of our conclusion that the first prong of the appli-

cable test has not been satisfied, we do not reach the question

of whether the proper approach to “good faith” in this con-

text is objective or subjective. Compare, e.g., United States

v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 n.23 (1984) (describing a “good-

faith inquiry . . . confined to the objectively ascertainable

question [of] whether a reasonably well trained officer would

have known that the search was illegal”) (emphasis added),

with DELUXE BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 693 (6th ed. 1990)

(defining “good faith” in a subjective fashion as, inter alia,

“an honest belief, the absence of malice”).

9a Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

Il.

Appellants’ third argument is that the evidence was insuf-

ficient to support the jury’s conspiracy verdict because it

failed to establish the existence of an agreement between Hu

and Lin. We believe, however, that a rational juror could

have found that such an agreement existed. See generally

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (holding that

a verdict must be sustained against a sufficiency of the evi-

dence challenge if “any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the [charged] crime beyond a rea-

sonable doubt”); United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1121

(2d Cir. 1992) (noting that deference to a jury’s verdict is

“especially important when reviewing a conviction of con-

spiracy. . . . because a conspiracy by its very nature is a

secretive operation, and it is a rare case where all aspects of

a conspiracy can be laid bare in court with the precision of a

Surgeon's scalpel” (internal quotation marks and citations

omitted)). A rational juror could have found beyond a rea-

sonable doubt that at his October 2, 1996 meeting with Chau,

Hu outlined three “persecution stories” for possible use in

Chau’s asylum application; picked one of these stories for

use in the application, not because it was true, but because it

was most likely to induce the INS to grant Chau asylum; and

directed Chau to sign a blank application form so that agency

personnel could write the persecution story on the application

and file it on Hu’s behalf. Furthermore, based on the tran-

scripts of Lin’s conversations with Chau, a rational juror

could have inferred that Hu told Lin about this conversation,

and that Hu and Lin then agreed to complete and file the

fraudulent application together. For example, on October 24,

1996, Chau spoke by telephone with Lin, who had apparently

acquired Chau’s file; during that conversation, Lin expressed

reluctance to process the application after Chau said that he

had not been persecuted in China, but agreed to do so after

Appendix A

Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

Chau told her that the “previous person” had said that the

application could be filed in “this way.”

IV.

Finally, appellants argue that the District Court should not

have given a Pinkerton charge. See generally Pinkerton v.

United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); United States v. Romero,

897 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that under a Pinkerton

theory of liability, a “conspirator can be held responsible for

the substantive crimes committed by his co-conspirators to

the extent those offenses were reasonably foreseeable con-

sequences of acts furthering the unlawful agreement, even if

he did not himself participate in the substantive crimes”). A

Pinkerton charge should not be given where “the jury is

required to resort to the inversion of Pinkerton and infer the

existence of a conspiracy from a series of disparate criminal

offenses.” United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 149 (2d Cir.

1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, however,

there was sufficient evidence, independent of the substantive

counts, from which the jury could have found beyond a rea-

sonable doubt that Hu and Lin conspired to file a fraudulent

application on Chau’s behalf. Moreover, this was not a case

in which the jury found that defendants had participated in a

“series of disparate criminal offenses.” Rather, the jury con-

victed defendants on two substantive counts, each of which

was directly related to the filing of fraudulent asylum appli-

cations on behalf of Chau. Finally, the District Court

instructed the jurors that they could consider a Pinkerton the-

ory of liability only if they first determined that the charged

conspiracy existed, and that defendants were members of it.

See id. at 149-50 (upholding use of Pinkerton charge where

“the district court cautiously instructed the jury that [defen-

dant] could be found guilty of the substantive crimes only

Appendix A

11a Opinion of the USCA for the Second Circuit

after the jury had concluded that he was a conspirator”);

United States v. Harwood, 998 F.2d 91, 100 (2d Cir. 1993)

(similar).

CONCLUSION

To summarize, we hold that:

(1) the warrant was not insufficiently particular;

(2) INS agents did not flagrantly disregard the terms of

the warrant because the search they conducted bears

none of the hallmarks of a general search:

(3) the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s

finding that a conspiratorial agreement existed between

Hu and Lin; and

(4) the Pinkerton charge was not erroneously given.

We have considered appellants’ remaining arguments, and

conclude that they are without merit.

Accordingly, the judgments entered by the District Court

are AFFIRMED.

12a

Appendix B

Order of the USCA for the Second Circuit (Denying

Petition for Rehearing), February 13, 2001

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse,

Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 13" day of

February two thousand one.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

v. Dkt No: 00-1037 L,

00-1038 con

SHI YAN LIU, et al.

Defendants.

A petition for panel rehearing and a petition for rehearing en

banc having been filed herein by the appellants Jie Hu and Shao

Zhen Lin.

Upon consideration by the panel that decided the appeal,

it is Ordered that said petition for rehearing is DENIED.

It is further noted that the petition for rehearing en banc has

been transmitted to the judges for the court in regular active

service and to any other judge that heard the appeal and that

no such judge has requested that a vote be taken thereon.

FOR THE COURT

ROSEANN B. MACKECHNIE, Clerk

By:

Beth J. Meador,

Administrative Attorney

ee

13a Appendix C

Oral Decision of the USDC for the Southern

District, June, 1998 [Pages 13a — 14a]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

97 Crim. 0666 (SHS)

v. ORDER

SHI YAN LIU, et al.

Defendants.

April 3, 1998

Before:

HON. SIDNEY H. STEIN,

District Judge

THE COURT: I understand the arguments.

This is what I am going to do. And I’ve indicated that

I am troubled. I won’t belabor the point. I’m very troubled

by the conduct of the government agents here, and

particularly in connection with the concededly false

statements in the affidavit underlying the warrant.

With regard to the motion to suppress everything, I am

going to deny that. I find that I’ve indicated the cases say that

the suppression of all evidence is a drastic remedy which is

not normally justified unless those executing those the

warrants acted in flagrant disregard of the warrant’s terms,

a

14a

Appendix C

Oral Decision of the USDC for the Southern District

United States v. Matias, 836 F.2d 744, Second Circuit 1988.

But, I find that given the baseline that I was talking about,

nine out of the 35 out of the scope of the warrant, that is,

boxes, that there isn’t flagrant disregard; that is, the flagrant

disregard standard has not been met here. So, I am not going

to grant the motion, I’m going to deny the motion.

In terms of what I see as the second argument. that is

the overbreadth of the warrant, the argument is that it is

overbroad because it essentially allows for the seizure of all

documents conceivably related to any political asylum

application. And I disagree with the defendants on that. The

agents need readily ascertainable guidelines as to what items

to seize, and I cite United States v. George, 975 F.2d 72, a

Second Circuit case 1992, at page 76. There are sufficient

documents which bear indicia of fraud on their face, that 1s,

the false addresses, is sufficient to give the guidance to the

officers that George requires, that is, readily ascertainable

guidelines for the executing officers.

So, I am not going to suppress everything on the basis

that the warrant was overbroad.

In regard to the motion for a Franks hearing, again,

under the Padilla and Lavasseur cases, the burden on the

defendants is very heavy. They have to make a substantial

preliminary showing in order to get the hearing that false

statements were included in the warrant affidavit. That’s the

first hurdle, That hurdle they’ve met, and I’ve berated the

government on that point and, again, it continues to be

troubling.

I do think, however, that there is probable cause

independent of those false statements, and Mr. Gilbert listed

them.

15a

Appendix D

Ruling of the USDC for the Southern District,

November 16, 1998 [Pages 15a — 16a]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

97 Crim. 0666 (SHS)

v. ORDER

SHI YAN LIU, et al.

Defendants.

SIDNEY H. STEIN, U.S. District Judge

By order dated April 8, 1998, for the reasons set forth on

the record on Apmil 3, 1998, this Court denied defendants’

motion to suppress the fruits of a July 10, 1997 search of the

premises at Suites 202 and 501 at 52 East Broadway, New York,

New York. Defendants have requested that that ruling be

reconsidered, and that a hearing be held to establish facts

necessary to the Court’s determination of whether the

government agents who conducted the search in question acted

in flagrant disregard of the scope of the warrant.

Defendants have properly noted that this Gourt’s finding

that ten file folders that were seized bore indicia of fraud on

their face is not sufficient factual basis for the holding that the

agents who conducted the search did not act in flagrant disregard

of the warrant’s terms. Accordingly, defendants’ request for a

hearing on the issue of whether the agents who conducted the

search flagrantly disregarded the scope of the warrant is granted.

16a

Appendix D

Ruling of the USDC for the Southern District

Dated: New York, New York

June 19, 1998

SO ORDERED:

By:

Sidney H. Stein, U.S.D.J.

17a Appendix E

Oral Decision of the USCA for the Second Circuit,

November 16, 1998 [Pages 17a — 20a]

THE COURT: I think I have heard enough. I am

going to deny the request for the additional people, given the

state of the record so far and the timing of the request. The

question is whether the search was conducted in flagrant

disregard of the scope of the search warrant. If so, it would

result in a suppression of all the documents, pursuant to

United States v. Rettig, 589 F.2d 418 (3™ Cir. 1978).

The standard of flagrant disregard, as I have said

several times, is extremely high. The closest case I could find

in this Circuit is United States v. Glass Menagerie, Inc., 721

F.Supp. 54, 60-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). There is an Eighth

Circuit case which also has very similar facts. Marvin v. U.S.,

732 F.2d 669, 675. In order to sustain an attack on a search

as being in flagrant disregard of the warrant, there must be a

determination by me that the agents acted in bad faith in

executing the warrant, such that a specific search for the

documents set forth in the rider became a general search. |

am not prepared to draw that conclusion. On the basis of the

evidence so far and viewing the credibility of Agent

Bogdanski, as I am obligated to do, I find that the agents did

not act in bad faith in executing the search warrant here.

Similarly, in viewing the credibility of the witness,

and all of the exhibits that I have been looking at and have

looked at, I do not find that the search was a pretext to look

for evidence outside the scope of the warrant. I repeat that

the uncontradicted evidence is that it was Agent Bogdanski

who was deciding which documents to seize and which not to

seize.

I find that the agents attempted to stay within the

boundaries of the warrant; that this obtaining of documents

outside of the scope of the warrant--that is, the 4,000

documents that were returned and the additional items

referred to, to wit, some computer disks that didn’t have

relevant information on them--was due to either time

constraints or practical considerations, such as the need to

18a

Appendix E

Oral Decision of the USCA for the Second Circuit

follow up the cross-check of the names with respect tot the

telephone numbers, and the alien registration numbers on the

supporting documents with political asylum applications--

something that could not have been done on site, and

probably should not have been done on site, given the

testimony as to how long it would take to make that cross-

check. Therefore, I find that there is no bad-faith effort to

gain information outside of the warrant.

The recurring address of 55-03 Van Doren Street,

Suite 1R, Corona, New York, was sufficient grounds to seize

the 1,200 files after the review of 50 of them by the agent

who testified. In fact, the evidence is that the applications

listed the Van Doren address or the home address. I think

you have fodder at trial for arguing that there is absolutely

nothing improper or illegal about that address if you are going

to make an argument that the form called for a mailing

address as opposed to a residence address. Obviously, the

government has responses to that, including the fact that that

rider at the end of the applications for the preparer to fill out

apparently wasn’t filled out by the preparer. Those are

arguments that can be made, such as the fact that there is

nothing illegal about the political asylum applications, but it

is not a ground to argue that this search and seizure was done

in flagrant disregard of the warrant. Of the 1,200 files seized,

1,004 listed either the Van Doren address or 61 East

Broadway, Suite 170. Similarly, the form G-352A and the

supporting documents apparently on multiple occasions listed

the Van Doren address as “residence in the United States.” In

addition, the testimony was that agents did not seize all

political asylum documents.

Similarly, a political asylum story was up on the

computer screen. So, rather than go through the process of

putting the disks up to try to read all of the disks on that

computer, they took the disks with them in order to do so. |

don’t know that they should have taken the monitor, but on

Appendix E

Oral Decision of the USCA for the Second Circuit

the state of this agent’s testimony, which is the only evidence

I have, he thought that he was assisting in preserving the

political asylum story that was up on the screen. Apparently

he believed that he would have better access to the disks if he

took the monitor. I think the hard drive was taken as well, if I

remember. But even if I were able to Say, as a technological

matter, that is not true, certainly that was his good-faith

belief.

The same, too, with the insurance documents and the

driving school documents. They were taken because the Cl’s

had informed him that people with political asylum cases that

were being made up were being steered to purchase insurance

and go into the driving program, so they thought they would

be able to get a handle on who the true political asylum

applicants are by cross-indexing the names and the telephone

numbers on the insurance and driving school applications

with the allegedly fraudulent political asylum applications.

I have already spoken to those documents that clearly

should not have been taken, but life is not perfect and there

are not a significant number of them. As a matter of fact, all

the nonresponsive items have been returned.

For the foregoing reasons, I am denying the request at

this time for additional witnesses, and I am denying the

motion to strike all of the seized documents and other things

on the ground that the warrant was executed in flagrant

disregard of its terms. Sir?

MR. RUDIN: In view of the testimony by Agent

Bogdanski, while we would renew our motion to controvert

the warrant based on the fact that it violated the particularity

requirement of the Fourth Amendment--

THE COURT: That was already decided. We have

already been through that.

MR. RUDIN: I know, your Honor, just for the

purpose of the record, in view of his testimony about what he

know at the time of the search and the discussion that he had

20a

Appendix E

Oral Decision of the USCA for the Second Circuit

with the prosecutor about that very subject, all the memos that

he said he had in his possession, it seems to us that the

government had an obligation to present that material, under

the cases we previously cited to the Court, so that the Court

could determine whether or not to authorize the seizure of the

60,000-plus documents merely because they somehow

related, in the agent’s view, to false address.

A WL ER ELT ty Ee we