Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore County
Supreme Court brief2001
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No. 01227 iy ra 9 20M
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In The
Supreme Court of the United States
°
GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, INC.;
WILLIAM HIRSHFELD; and LORETTA HIRSHFELD,
Petitioners,
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,
a body corporate and Politic,
Respondents.
S
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The-Fourth Circuit
¢
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¢
Rosert H. FReticn* Juurus W. LicHTER
Jason M. Drve.siss Court Towers, Suite 300
FREILICH, LEITNER & 210 W. Pennsylvania
CARLISLE Avenue
4600 Madison, Suite 1000 Towson, MD 21204
Kansas City, MO 64112 (410) 825-7300
(816) 561-4414
*Counsel of Record for Petitioners
January 26, 2001
ISSeP
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether a regulatory takings claim based on a land
use ordinance’s failure to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest is categorically barred when-
ever the regulation is an “ordinary zoning restriction”
limiting height and density and when “statements by
local lawmakers set out legitimate reasons” for
imposing the height and density restrictions? (App.
12-13, 14).
In light of Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, is a land use
ordinance creating irrational and wholly arbitrary
classifications and motivated by malice, bad faith and
retaliatory intent immune from a claim that it violates
the equal protection clause?
In light of Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, may federal causes of action be dis-
missed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted notwithstanding litigant’s request to
stay all proceedings in federal court until the causes
of action are “ripened” in state court and litigant’s
express “reservation” in the state action of all federal
claims which may be subsequently pursued?
li
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
All parties are listed in the caption.
Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. has neither parent
nor subsidiary companies.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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pe alain ind baie 6:d.d6.00.40.0.6.0606 0a ees 1
PGT a Sects beccccasvassced Se er ere 1
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-
PUTT th edadep badges oeescuns¢esasscanees 2
WRPURUEUEEUE GO REE CAGE... ccc cccccccsccceces 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................05. 7
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 11
I. THE STANDARDS GOVERNING THE
REQUIREMENT THAT A REGULATION SUB-
STANTIALLY ADVANCE LEGITIMATE STATE
INTERESTS IS AN IMPORTANT AND RECUR-
RING QUESTION OF REGULATORY TAKINGS
LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED BY
eee ceeh edbenkbaeesereresece ss 11
A. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS COM-
PLETELY NEGATED THE “SUBSTAN-
TIALLY ADVANCE” TEST FOR
REGULATORY TAKINGS ESTABLISHED
IN AGINS V. CITY OF TIBURON BY
HOLDING THAT THE MERE ENUNCIA-
TION OF A LEGITIMATE STATE INTER-
EST SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT
THAT THE REGULATION SUBSTAN-
TIALLY ADVANCE THAT INTEREST.... 15
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
Il. IN DISMISSING GREENSPRING’S EQUAL
PROTECTION COUNTS FOR FAILURE TO
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN
BE GRANTED THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
IGNORED THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT IN
VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH ..... 20
III. GREENSPRING IS A CASUALTY OF THE
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION AMONG THE
CIRCUIT COURTS ABOUT HOW TO PRO-
CEDURALLY ACHIEVE THIS COURT’S WIL-
LIAMSON COUNTY REQUIREMENT THAT
PROPERTY OWNERS “RIPEN” THEIR CON-
STITUTIONAL CLAIMS BY SEEKING RELIEF
IN STATE COURT BEFORE PURSUING AN
ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT............... 22
COPPA Shobhan ccedercceussssereshrucwsehes 28
Appendix
FourtH Circutr FIiincs:
PIO gov cc cnnccncnvestnndnsnncevenshaaus gant App. 1
District OF MARYLAND FIINGs:
Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Original
Action With Leave to File an Amended Com-
plaint and Motion to Stay................... App. 25
Memorandum and Order Granting Motion to
CIID os cbc cctscsccnscsscssannqesséscesvecs App. 27
Memorandum and Order Granting Motion for
AMOUROS FOB. occ oc ccdccccsnnccconcscosecs App. 47
Vv
TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued
PLEADINGS:
Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay and Memorandum in
OTE os pn nnigna na caenpee vane di ah vaneev nant App.
Second Amended Complaint .................. App
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES:
BORD Fee ED abc canrenresecaceus App.
The Fourteenth Amendment .................. App
BP Was a sere cbc devas sva ceteturnesiy App.
ee | Me PeeeT Terre ty ere Orr rere ere App.
Oe ek a a id hk bho od one dae nene cae el App.
Se Ree I oe Oi ook uk ua cole chs tae App.
JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE:
ee Rea BREED wad ccd arscndnctsvdseterenin App.
Page
120
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ..... passim
Bennis v. Michigan Dept. of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154
i fo B. ( PrPPrrrrrrrrirrrrrri ir Tere 22
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,
526 US. 667 (1999) ..ccccccccccess 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17
Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,
426 US. GOO (2GTS) onc ccvncccccccccccesscesesccsss 26
Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th
Che, BRGR) cccccccuscesssecesskisecousscetaauucussé 22
Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.
BODE x na vccecs cdvcuccensssesuehubesdusdaavauaes 24, 25
Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.
BOSE s oc cccccennescacceccebanneasanneeeatielsaaue 25
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ...12, 17, 18
Fields v. Sarasota - Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d
S20) CRUG Coe, BOR co vccecccsccccvccesens 24, 25, 26
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County
of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) ............. 14, 15
Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v.
Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275 (4th Cir.
ODEs a cccvcvecnceccenssceveccscusaacsnaees 25, 26, 27
Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989) ....... 22
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).............0005 18
Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529 (9th
CO SOD kas bcccccvansseunsceecekauusedescewenieten 10
Vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 531 F.2d 1331
Ge Ge, Ts bc 0 566i 656 she bc ce cede de sindeeesens 25
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)..... 18
Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th
Ge BOOED és weRecceddeccesddascdadedecsbameeeteese. 22
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. De Benedictis, 480
Sh GW GUND 6 wacecnsndctensessundistccecs 8, 12, 18
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S.
Ge UNE hn 0b sb ntneechanctadeduénccsaesasctsesses 18
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
ED GUUUEE 6 ccc cccncddcnccutacsancsacessvancs passim
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477
Sh DU NEE d bc ccccteutndbicecsucsbabscneues 10, 18
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ............ 11
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 _.
6At ctenecthkeest chesetasen 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20
Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (3rd
Git ME FA WdeRasectccndtcbhevandestédbeceds cesses 24
Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
Se EE SE ee én ennedns ccentunsestudes oss des 11, 17
Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) ......... 12
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)
i ducedheats head kb abaeineans vanneecurées shen 15, 17, 18
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
ee eae ba hb sacecckibichidebateadencanneeddas 26
Rainey Brothers Construction Co., Inc. v. Memphis
and Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F.Supp.
ok rr rrr re 24
Viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Rocky Mountain Mat. & Asph., Inc. v. Board of
County Comm'rs of El Paso County, 972 F.2d 309
COE GA. IS hn cn snnsccnseeeceecacunseanns
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,
GD TED GE. CHO 6 oc cdcnccescccccccscscnaves
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932)........
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
GE GEE CUE ches eecnbscccocecbussercachanss
Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988) ....
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)
canbubesshsaseeens bAabeeesseceenns 9, 10, 20, 21,
Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs, 142 F.3d
ee Ee rrr ree
Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 US. 172 (1905) ... 2 cccvcccccccccsces
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)...9, 12,
PUBLICATIONS:
Berger, The “Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use
Cases or How the Supreme Court Converted Federal
Judges into Fruit Peddlers, InstrruTE ON PLANNING,
ZONING AND EMINENT Domain Ch. 7 (1991) .....
Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial
Regulation of Constitutionally Protected Property
Rights, 29 Cat. West L. Rev. 1 (1992)..........
Page
22, 28
passim
18, 20
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Meacham, The Williamson Trap, 32 Urb. Law. 239
GE SE 50h es che bas csictaces seed eeeuedban on. 23
Meltz, Merriam & Frank, THE Taxincs Issue (Island
FY SNS bk ed Kd hdd 660 00d sh eKee eR eRe esses 24, 25
Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in Federal
Court: The State Compensation Requirement and
Principles of Res Judicata, 24 Urb. Law. 479 (1992) .... 24
Roberts, RirENEss AND Forum SELECTION IN LAND-UsE
LITIGATION IN TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDI-
TIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND
Lucas (ABA, Callies, ed., 1996) ................... 24
Strong, Mandelker, and Kelly, Property Rights and
Takings, 62 J. AM. PLAN. Ass’N (1996).............. 19
LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:
Private Property Rights Implementation Act: Hearings
on H.R. 1534 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1997)......... 10
A hind CN AAA EUR SIS IN itt Nn eel Ve nmr
Saree
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. and William and
Loretta Hirshfeld respectfully petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari to review a final judgment and order of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
&
OPINIONS BELOW
The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
was filed on October 31, 2000, and was not recommended
for publication; it appears at App. 1-24 to this Petition.
On January 3, 2001, a motion by Respondents to publish
the Fourth Circuit’s opinion was denied. The decision of
the district court was filed on September 27, 1999 and is
reported as Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore
County, 70 F.Supp.2d 598 (D.Md. 1999); it appears at App.
27-46 to this Petition.
JURISDICTION
This case arises from the lower courts’ refusal to
follow principles of regulatory takings and equal protec-
tion law as decided by this Court as well as the lower
courts’ failure to recognize their obligation to abstain
from deciding the merits of claims which, pursuant to the
directives of this Court, must first be fully litigated in
state court before federal jurisdiction is conferred. The
Fourth Circuit’s opinion was entered on October 31, 2000.
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
¢
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides in pertinent part: “nor shall private prop-
erty be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without the due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution, along with pertinent federal statutes,
are reproduced in App. 109-120.
+
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioners Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. and Wil-
liam and Loretta Hirshfeld (collectively “Greenspring”)
have battled Baltimore County, Maryland (“the County”)
for several years for the right to redevelop a 5.5 acre
parcel of land within an established, major commercial
office center. The Property is owned by the Hirshfelds
and leased to Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. which,
since 1976, has operated a tennis club on the site. In June
1998, Greenspring amended the original site plan to pro-
pose razing the aging tennis barn and construct in its
place two adjoining office buildings of five and six stories
with attached parking facilities. (App. 4). Greenspring’s
redevelopment efforts were thwarted by various efforts
of the County; the most onerous being an arbitrary and
irrational legislative enactment designed to single out
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Greenspring’s property. Such ordinance was the result of
conspiratorial collaboration between the County and cer-
tain adjacent and nearby property owners who were,
based upon their own economic self-interests, opposed to
Greenspring’s project. (App. 89, { 44). The district court
found and the Fourth Circuit affirmed that, as a matter of
law, this restrictive Ordinance although enacted in bad
faith retaliation to Greenspring’s redevelopment initia-
tive, substantially adwanced a legitimate state interest
and thus failed to state a facial claim for a regulatory
taking. The courts also held that Greenspring’s allega-
tions of arbitrariness and bad faith were insufficient to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted under
the equal protection clause. Because Greenspring did not
prevail in the Fourth Circuit they seek relief from this
Court for the constitutional errors committed by the
lower courts.
A. Factual Background.
Since 1976 Greenspring has operated a tennis club
consisting of a single, corrugated steel tennis barn struc-
ture on the subject property. In 1998 Greenspring under-
took what would become a futile attempt to utilize the
full potential of the Property’s “Business Major” (“BM”)
zoning classification which permits, as a matter of right,
office buildings as high as 100 feet with a maximum floor
area ratio (“FAR”) of 4.0.
After amending the previously approved 1975 tennis
club site plan to reflect the office building redevelopment,
Greenspring went to the Baltimore County Development
Review Committee (“DRC”) seeking an exemption
(“(b)(9) exemption”) from portions of the development
plan approval process which would allow them to pro-
ceed directly to building permit. (App. 5). Although
Greenspring demonstrated compliance with all the
requirements for this exemption, the request was denied.
In response to Greenspring’s redevelopment pro-
posal and at the behest of Greenspring’s self-interested
neighboring property owners, the County adopted on
October 5, 1998 Bill 111-98 (“the Ordinance”). (App. 89,
{ 44; 91, { 50). The Ordinance restricts building heights
to 35 feet and a maximum FAR of .5.! Its restrictions,
however, apply only to property such as Greenspring’s
zoned “Business Major” (“BM”), “Business Light” (“BL”),
or “Business Rural” (“BR”) when the exterior wall of any
proposed building lies within 750 feet of a “Resource
Conservation Zone.” (App. 5). Property zoned “Office
Building - Residential” (“OR”), “Office and Technology”
(“OT”), “Manufacturing Light” (“ML”), “Manufacturing
Heavy” (“MH”) or “Manufacturing Light, Restricted”
(“MLR”), which permit similar or more intensive uses
than those permitted in business zones, were unaffected
by the Ordinance regardless of how close a building may
be to a Resource Conservation Zone. (App. 81, {{ 19-20).
The Ordinance destroyed Greenspring’s office develop-
ment capacity and fails to substantially advance its
avowed purpose of protecting resource conservation
zones. (App. 83, { 25). Such failure is occasioned by the
very terms of the Ordinance which prevent a BM zoned
property from constructing a building that exceeds 35
1 The impact of the ordinance on Greenspring’s property
was to reduce the property’s use and value by 95.6%. (App. 9).
|
feet and .5 FAR within 750 feet of a Resource Conserva-
tion Zone while permitting, without exception, construc-
tion of buildings far in excess of those limits immediately
adjacent to a Resource Conservation Zone so long as it is
zoned office or manufacturing. This scheme creates an
irrational and arbitrary classification that fails to advance
any legitimate government interest. (App. 97, { 63).
Following the adoption of Bill 111-98, Greenspring
requested a rezoning from BM to “Office/Residential-2”
(“OR-2”) so as to be removed from the scope of the
ordinance. The Baltimore County Planning Board denied
Greenspring’s request in March of 1999. (App. 6). Green-
spring again sought relief from the DRC by seeking both
a (b)(9) exemption which would permit Greenspring to
proceed directly to building permit and an exemption
under Bill 111-98 which would allow redevelopment
within the same “footprint” as the existing improvement
so long as the new building had equal or less square
footage per story as the existing building. To support this
request, Greenspring submitted a revised site plan for
one eight-story office building with attached parking that
met all the requirements for a “footprint exemption”. In
May of 1999 the DRC held an open meeting to consider
both requests for relief and failed to grant either remedy.
(App. 6-7).
B. Judicial Proceedings.
On June 26, 1998, Greenspring filed a complaint in
the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking man-
damus, declaratory and injunctive relief from the DRC’s
denial of its original request for a (b)(9) exemption. (App.
5). After the County adopted Bill 111-98 Greenspring
amended the complaint to include damage and compen-
sation claims based on the Ordinance’s failure to advance
any legitimate state interests, creation of irrational and
arbitrary classifications, and the retaliatory, bad faith.
motive for the Ordinance. To preserve its federal causes
of action for later review in federal court, Greenspring
included a “Jennings-Fields Reservation” of those claims.
(App. 6).
In February 1999, the County removed the state court
case to federal district court where it was dismissed with
leave to file an amended complaint and with leave “to
seek a stay pending exhaustion of all state law claims” in
a newly filed state court action. (App. 25-26). Greenspring
filed an amended complaint in district court (App.
74-109) and requested a stay pending resolution of the state
court action. (App. 62-73). The amended complaint
alleged, inter alia, that Bill 111-98 on its face and as
applied to Greenspring’s property effected a taking of the
property without just compensation because it was
adopted in bad faith and in retaliation to Greenspring’s
development application (App. 91, { 50), and therefore,
did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest as
required under Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255
(1980). The amended complaint also alleged that the
Ordinance, on its face and as applied to Greenspring’s
Property, violated the equal protection clause because it
treated similarly situated properties with the same poten-
tial for endangering Resource Conservation Zones differ-
ently as the result of personal ill will, bad faith and
retaliatory intent to harm Greenspring. (App. 97, { 63-64).
Greenspring’s remaining counts sought relief for viola-
tion of procedural due process, economic taking of the
Property based upon the as-applied effects of the ordi-
nance, and violation of substantive due process, both
facial and as applied.
On June 7, 1999 the County filed a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Wholly ignoring Greenspring’s pro-
tests and Motion to Stay, the district court dismissed the
entire amended complaint with prejudice (App. 27-46),
and granted thereafter an award of attorney’s fees to the
County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (App. 47-61).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
district court’s dismissal on all counts except Green-
spring’s as-applied takings claim which the Fourth Cir-
cuit held should not have been dismissed because it was
not yet ripe and therefore the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction. (App. 12). For the same reason, the Fourth
Circuit vacated the award of attorney’s fees since such
award necessarily included legal fees attributable to
Greenspring’s as-applied taking claim which could not be
adjudged frivolous for want of subject matter jurisdiction
over it. (App. 23).
¢-—
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Court of
Appeals found, as a matter of law, that land use ordi-
nances are immune from takings claims under the first
prong of Agins if a legitimate reason for the ordinance is
given by a single legislator. In the words of the court “[t]he
height and density limits contained in Bill 111-98 are ordi-
nary zoning restrictions and, quite obviously, they sub-
stantially advance a legitimate state interest... . ” (App.
12-13). Furthermore, in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion,
“[w]hen statements by local lawmakers set out legitimate
reasons for imposing height and density restrictions on
property in a particular class of zones, there can be no
claim in federal court that the law fails to substantially
advance a legitimate purpose.” (App. 14). The Court of
Appeals’ analysis of the first prong of Agins began and
ended with the initial step of finding a legitimate state
interest for adopting the regulation. It clearly ignored the
legal and factual issues to be determined in the second
step — whether the regulation adopted substantially
advances the legitimate state interest.
It has long been recognized by this Court that a land
use regulation effects a taking of property if (1) the regu-
lation fails to substantially advance a legitimate state
interest; or (2) the regulation denies a property owner
economically viable use of his land. See, e.g., Agins, 447
U.S. at 260; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis,
480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992); City of Monterey v.
Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999).
Although no standard has ever been provided by this
Court regarding the nature of the requirement that a land
use ordinance substantially advance a legitimate public
interest, it is intuitive that this Court intended the stan-
dard to garner more respect than that afforded by the
Fourth Circuit.
aia
If the Fourth Circuit’s opinion is an accurate state-
ment of regulatory takings law, proclamations of legiti-
mate reasons for adopting land use ordinances may serve
as the pretext for bad faith, retaliatory or corrupt legisla-
tive motives and will automatically defeat any taking
claim based upon a failure to substantially advance a
legitimate state interest. Unmitigated deference to the
stated rationale of local governments is antithetical to this
Court’s repeated pronouncement that regulatory takings
cases “necessarily entail complex factual assessments of
the purposes and economic effects of government
actions.” Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992).
This Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) rejected such immunity in
the context of “land-use decisions” as “contrary to settled
regulatory takings principles.” Id. at 707. To accept such
immunity for land use regulations would be equally con-
trary to established regulatory takings principles and
should be rejected.
Petitioners urge the Court to either clarify the stan-
dards applicable to the “substantially advance” test of
Agins or overrule Agins and Del Monte Dunes and every
other decision by this Court which recites the principle of
substantial advancement.
In holding that Greenspring’s allegations of arbitrary
classifications motivated by personal ill will, bad faith,
and retaliatory intent were insufficient to state an equal
protection claim, the Fourth Circuit ignored the impor-
tance of this Court’s recent decision in Village of Wil-
lowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). After accurately
10
stating the holding in-Olech that allegations of an “irra-
tional and wholly arbitrary” zoning decision were suffi-
cient to state an equal protection claim, the Fourth Circuit
circuitously stated that “[b]ecause the local zoning deci-
sion at issue in the instant case is not ‘irrational and
wholly arbitrary,’ Greenspring’s complaint is easily dis-
tinguished from the complaint at issue in Olech.” (App. 17
n.4). Instead of evaluating whether Greenspring’s allega-
tions, deemed true under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, stated a
sufficient claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the
Fourth Circuit made a conclusory determination on the
merits of the case and on that basis adjudged the allega-
tions insufficient. This result is patently inconsistent with
the Olech decision. The Court should take this oppor-
tunity to define and clarify the true import of Olech and
overturn the Fourth Circuit's opinion as being in clear
conflict with that decision.
The circuitous enigma that is the ripeness doctrine
poses a substantial obstacle to property owners in consti-
tutional land use cases and if wrongly applied can pose
“a trap” for the unwary who seek to comply with its
requirements.? Despite their cautionary attempt to
2 See, e.g., Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (“Williamson County”); MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Hoehne v.
County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (“ruling
case law makes it very difficult to open the federal courthouse
door for relief from state and local land use decisions.”); Private
Property Rights Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 1534 Before
the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-4 (1997)
(discussing survey results which indicate 81% of as-applied
takings claims decided in lower federal courts between 1990
11
—_—
negotiate the procedural thicket spawned by this Court's
decision in Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v. Ham-
ilton Bank and the Circuit Courts’ attempt to implement
its directives, Greenspring was denied the opportunity to
litigate its federal causes of action. The Court's clarifica-
tion and guidance is urgently needed so lower courts can
accurately apply Williamson County and litigants can uti-
lize the correct procedures to preserve federal claims for
adjudication in federal court after first ripening those
claims in state court.
+
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
lL. THE STANDARDS GOVERNING THE REQUIRE-
MENT THAT A REGULATION SUBSTANTIALLY
ADVANCE LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS IS AN
IMPORTANT AND RECURRING QUESTION OF
REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW THAT HAS NOT
BEEN SETTLED BY THIS COURT
In Agins, this Court held that “[t]he application of a
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking
‘€ the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate
state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188
(1928), or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104, 138, n.36 (1978).” Agins, 447 U.S. at 260
(emphasis supplied). In the twenty years since Agins was
decided, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the
and 1997 never reached the merits and more than 50% of those
who pursued appeals had their takings claims dismissed as
unripe).
12
case accurately states regulatory takings law. See San
Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 647
(1981); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474
U.S. 121, 126 (1985); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De
Benedictis, 480 U.S. at 485; Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Pennell v. City of San
Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.
at 534; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at
1015-16; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994);
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S.
at 704. However, in these twenty years of repeated cita-
tion to the case and its two pronged takings analysis “this
Court has [never] provided . . . a thorough explanation of
the nature or applicability of the requirement that a regu-
lation substantially advance legitimate public interests
outside the context of required dedications or exactions.”
- Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704.5 There has certainly
been instructive discussion of the issue, but the time has
come for the Court to clarify the standards necessary to
“substantially advance legitimate state interests.”
In Nollan, this Court recognized that “[o]ur cases
have not elaborated on the standards for determining
. . what type of connection between the regulation and
the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former
‘substantially advance’ the latter,” but offered a clear
statement of what type of connection did not satisfy the
3 The nature and applicability of the “substantially
advance” test in the context of required dedications and
exactions is discussed at length in Nollan v. California Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994).
13
requirement. 483 U.S. at 834. The level of connection must
be greater than the deferential “rational basis” standard
employed in due process and equal protection analysis.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. In the instant case, neither the
district court nor the Fourth Circuit even so much as
applied a rational basis level of scrutiny. Their analysis
began and ended with the initial step of finding a legiti-
mate state interest for the local government's adoption of
the regulation. It clearly ignored the logical and legally
required second step of determining whether the regula-
tion actually adopted substantially advanced that inter-
est.
Ini Del Monte Dunes, the Court undertook an examina-
tion of whether the issue of “substantially advancing”
was a question of fact for a jury to decide or whether it
could be decided as a matter of law by the court, and
found that the “narrow, factbound question” of “whether,
when viewed in light of the context and protracted his-
tory of the development application process, the city’s
decision to reject a particular development plan bore a
reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications” was
properly submitted to the jury. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.
at 721. However, the Court qualified its decision with the
caveat that “we do not attempt a precise demarcation of
the respective provinces of judge and jury in determining
whether a zoning decision substantially advances legiti-
mate governmental interests.” Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.
at 722. The Fourth Circuit zeroed in on the Court’s deter-
mination to reserve that question in Del Monte Dunes and
gave the decision an extremely narrow reading.
14
In the opinion of the Fourth Circuit, Del Monte Dunes
did not establish the principle that substantially advanc-
ing a legitimate state interest is an issue of fact to be
resolved by a jury. (App. 14). Rather, it established only
the factual nature of whether a particular land use decision
substantially advances a legitimate state interest. (App.
14). The court went on to forecast a trite “parade of
horribles” that would be occasioned if “the federal court-
house [were opened] to a veritable flood of local land use
litigation by putting every [allegation of failure to sub-
stantially advance a legitimate government purpose]
before a jury.” (App. 14). The remedy, according to the
Fourth Circuit, is to completely ban from federal court all
regulatory takings claims based on the first prong of the
long recognized standard set forth in Agins. On its face
this remedy is preposterous, but so is the prognosticated
“parade of horribles.”
Similar fears were voiced by the Los Angeles County
and amici in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) where the
county argued that municipalities would be unable to
effectively govern if just compensation was a mandatory
remedy for regulatory takings. This Court rejected the
county’s argument and mandated monetary compensa-
tion stating:
We realize that even our present holding will
undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom
and flexibility of land-use planners and govern-
ing bodies of municipal corporations when
enacting land-use regulations. But such conse-
quences necessarily flow from any decision
upholding a claim of constitutional right; many
of the provisions of the Constitution are
15
designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of
governmental authorities, and the Just Compen-
sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of
them. As Justice Holmes aptly noted more than
50 years ago, “a strong public desire to improve
the public condition is not enough to warrant
achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change.”
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416
(1922).
First English, 482 U.S. at 321. A similar response to the
exaggerated, “flood gate” prognostications and alarmist
decision of the Fourth Circuit is warranted in this case.
It is imperative for the Court to address this issue
directly and either clarify the standards of the “substan-
tially advance” test of Agins or overrule Agins, and the
subsequent reliance on Agins, in every regulatory takings
decision of this Court.
A. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS COMPLETELY
NEGATED THE “SUBSTANTIALLY
ADVANCE” TEST FOR REGULATORY TAK-
INGS ESTABLISHED IN AGINS V. CITY OF
TIBURON BY HOLDING THAT THE MERE
ENUNCIATION OF A LEGITIMATE STATE
INTEREST SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT
THAT THE REGULATION SUBSTANTIALLY
ADVANCE THAT INTEREST
According to the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit,
where a regulatory taking claim is made under the first
prong of Agins, a standard “long recognized” (Nollan, 483
U.S. at 834) and referred to on “numerous occasions”
(Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016) as the standard for determining
16
whether a regulation violates the takings clause, the con-
stitution offers only token protection because “ordinary
zoning restrictions . . . quite obviously . . . substantially
advance a legitimate state interest.” (App. 12-13). The
Agins test for regulatory takings is further eviscerated by
the Fourth Circuit’s additional finding that, “[w]hen
statements by local lawmakers set out legitimate reasons
for imposing height and density restrictions on property
in a particular class of zones, there can be no claim in
federal court that the law fails to substantially advance a
legitimate purpose.” (App. 14). What local lawmaking
body will not from this point forward, if they haven’t
already, make it a routine practice to give lip service to
some plausible (if not wholly pretextual) reason for enact-
ing a regulation? The Fourth Circuit has made into law a
roadmap for local governments to avoid any meaningful
scrutiny of their regulations, even if motivated by bad
faith, retaliatory intent or corruption, by pronouncing
boiler plate language concerning the state’s interest.
This Court addressed a remarkably similar situation
in Lucas in responding to the dissent’s view that even in
cases where a property owner is denied all beneficial uses
of his land the standard for requiring just compensation
is whether a harm-preventing justification was recited by
the legislature.
Since such a justification can be formulated in
practically every case, this amounts to a test of
whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We
think the Takings Clause requires courts to do
more than insist upon artful harm-preventing
characterizations.
17
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12.4 The precise analysis is_
applicable here. By making the de facto standard for what
constitutes “substantially advancing” a legitimate gov-
ernment interest wholly dependent upon the mere recita-
tion of a legitimate reason for the regulation, the Fourth
Circuit has made the first prong of Agins “a test of
whether the legislature has a stupid staff.” Certainly the
Agins Court, and every decision of this Court that has
restated the Agins standard, intended more than this cur-
sory level of examination.
This Court’s takings jurisprudence is replete with
references to the takings analysis as dependent upon the
particular facts and circumstances of the case from Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)
through Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
and Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720 (“Almost from the
inception of our regulatory takings doctrine, we have
held that whether a regulation of property goes so far
that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act . . . depends upon the
4In Nollan, this Court emphasized that the Fifth
Amendment is to be respected with more than mere cursory
attention paid to its requirements. “We view the Fifth
Amendment’s Property Clause to be more than a pleading
requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise
in cleverness and imagination.” (483 U.S. at 841). In Dolan the
Court emphasized its concern by stating, “[w]e see no reason
why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part
of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth
Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor
relation. ...” (512 U.S. at 392).
18
sau
particular facts.
at 413)).°
(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S.
“Pennsylvania Coal instructs courts to examine the
operative provisions of a statute, not just its stated pur-
pose, in assessing its true nature.” Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 487 n.16 (upholding statute against
facial taking challenge). By summarily accepting the prof-
fered legitimate reasons for adopting a land use ordi-
nance and presuming, because it contains height and
density restriction (even where oppressive) that it “quite
obviously . . . substantially advance[s] a legitimate state
interest” (App. 12-13) the Fourth Circuit contradicts this
Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. “The greatest
weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it
always is open to interested parties to contend that the
legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power.”
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. The Fourth Circuit
ignores this principle by foreclosing examination of a
legislature’s act under the first prong of Agins.
The Court in Lucas advocated a similar probing anal-
ysis of actual circumstances rather than blind acceptance
of legislative findings and declarations. To defer com-
pletely to the legislature would be misplaced and unfair
because it would ignore the rights of individual citizens
5 See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175
(1979); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 649-50; Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982);
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 349
(1986), Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 474 and 495;
Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Yee v. City of Escondido,
503 U.S. at 522-23; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825
(1987); Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
19
in favor of the convenient prerogatives of the majority.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31. Prominent law and planning
professors have recognized that the presumption of land
use regulation constitutionality has gone too far and indi-
vidual rights are indeed being abridged as a direct result.
Strong, Mandelker, and Kelly, Property Rights and Takings,
62 J. Am. Pian. Ass’n 5 (1996).
According to the Fourth Circuit, once a local law-
maker voices a legitimate reason for a land use ordinance
the courts can never determine that the ordinance vio-
lates the Constitution pursuant to the first prong of Agins.
In effect the determination becomes the municipality’s
and it thereby gets to pass constitutional judgment on its
own legislation. Placing municipal regulations above the
reproach of judicial review was long ago forbidden by
this Court.
If this extreme position could be deemed to be
well taken, it is manifest that the fiat of a state
governor, and not the Constitution of the United
States, would be the supreme law of the land;
[and] that the restrictions of the Federal Consti-
tution upon the exercise of state power would
be but impotent phrases. . . . Under our system
of government, such a conclusion is obviously
untenable. . .. When there is a substantial show-
ing that the exertion of state power has overrid-
den private rights secured by that Constitution,
the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry
in an appropriate proceeding directed against
the individuals charged with the transgression.
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 3778, 397-98 (1932).
20
The Fourth Circuit’s ruling effects a categorical bar to
regulatory takings claims under the “long recognized”
(Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834) standard of Agins. This unmiti-
gated deference to the stated rationale of local govern-
ments is antithetical to this Court’s repeated
pronouncement that regulatory takings cases “necessarily
entail complex factual assessments of the purposes and
economic effects of government actions.” Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992). Because the Fourth
Circuit’s decision cannot be reconciled with the regula-
tory takings jurisprudence of this Court, a writ of cer-
tiorari must be granted to resolve the issue.
II. IN DISMISSING GREENSPRING’S EQUAL PRO-
TECTION COUNTS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE
GRANTED THE FOURTH CIRCUIT IGNORED
THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT IN VILLAGE OF
WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH
In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech a property owner
alleged that the actions of the local government in
requesting a 33 foot easement as a condition to connec-
ting the property to the municipal water supply was
“irrational and wholly arbitrary” in light of the typical 15
foot easement requirement. 528 U.S. 562 (2000). The true
motivation for the Village’s disparate treatment, accord-
ing to the property owner’s allegations, was personal
animus and ill will resulting from a previous, unrelated
law suit won by the property owner against the Village.
In deciding that viable equal protection claims may be
brought by a “class of one”, this Court also held that
allegations of “irrational and wholly arbitrary” actions by
21
the local government “are sufficient to state a claim for
relief under traditional equal protection analysis.” Olech,
528 U.S. at 563. What distinguished this case from “the
simple and common instance” of a zoning action which
lacked a rational basis for the intentional disparate treat-
ment of landowners was the allegation of an “extra fac-
tor . . . the Court of Appeals called ‘vindictive action,’
‘illegitimate animus,’ of ‘ill will.’” Olech, 528 U.S. at 563
(Breyer, J., concurring). This line of analysis is directly
applicable to the circumstances of the instant case.
Greenspring alleged that Bill 111-98 intentionally sin-
gled out its property for irrational and wholly arbitrary
disparate treatment® and that such treatment was moti-
vated by “bad faith” and “retaliatory intent” (App. 82,
{ 21; 91, { 50; 97, | 63). Clearly these allegations are as
serious if not more serious than those set forth in Olech.
The Fourth Circuit wholly ignored the Olech decision
because of its illogical and unfounded conclusion that
“{bJecause the local zoning decision at issue in the instant
case is not ‘irrational and wholly arbitrary,’ Greenspring’s
complaint is easily distinguished from the complaint at
issue in Olech.” (App. 17 n.4). Instead of evaluating
whether Greenspring’s allegations stated a sufficient
claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Cir-
cuit made a conclusory determination on the merits of the
® At the heart of Greenspring’s allegation of disparate
treatment is Bill 111-98’s restriction of BM, BL and BR zoned
properties, including Greenspring’s, and lack of restriction for
similarly situated properties which have the same or greater
potential to have harmful effects on Resource Conservation
Zones. (App. 97, | 63).
22
case and on that basis adjudged the allegations insuffi-
cient. This analysis is counterintuitive and entirely incon-
sistent with this Court’s decision in Olech which decided
the sufficiency of allegations not whether the govern-
mental action at issue actually was irrational or moti-
vated by bad faith, retaliation or corruption.
The Court should take this opportunity to define and
clarify the ramifications of the Olech decision and over-
turn the Fourth Circuit’s judgment as being in clear con-
flict with that decision.
III. GREENSPRING IS A CASUALTY OF THE
CONFLICT AND CONFUSION AMONG THE
CIRCUIT COURTS ABOUT HOW TO PRO-
CEDURALLY ACHIEVE THIS COURT’S WIL-
LIAMSON COUNTY REQUIREMENT THAT
PROPERTY OWNERS “RIPEN” THEIR CONSTI-
TUTIONAL CLAIMS BY SEEKING RELIEF IN
STATE COURT BEFORE PURSUING AN ACTION
IN FEDERAL COURT
This Court held in Williamson County Reg. Plan.
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank that as-applied claims for
the taking of property” are “not ripe until the
7 The Williamson County ripeness requirement has been
extended and applied to due process and equal protection. See,
e.g., Bennis v. Michigan Dept. of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.
1992); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); Herrington v. County of
Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090
(1989); Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.
1994); Rocky Mountain Mat. & Asph., Inc. v. Board of County
Comm'rs of El Paso County, 972 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1972); Corn v.
City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).
23
government .. . has reached a final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue”
and “the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain
just compensation through the procedures provided by
the State.” 473 U.S. 172, 186 and 195. Thus, litigants are
required to first litigate their claims in state court before
their federal action is ripe and the district court has
subject matter jurisdiction. Although Williamson County
has been precedent for nearly sixteen years, the process
by which litigants satisfy its deceptively simple require-
ments remains a mystery.®
The primary obstacle to satisfying Williamson
County’s ripeness requirement is the existence of a
Catch-22 known as the “ Williamson Trap” which works as
follows:
- Following the directives of Williamson
County, property owner first seeks, and is
denied, compensation in state court;
- When property owner proceeds to federal
court with now ripened federal causes of
action he is confronted with the argument __
that the state litigation has preclusive effect
on the federal action via res judicata or col-
lateral estoppel.
This cannot be the result intended by the Williamson
County Court.
8 See, e.g., Meacham, The Williamson Trap, 32 Urs. Law. 239,
240 (2000) (“The circuits have been divided on whether there is
a way to avoid the Williamson trap, and the Supreme Court has
sent conflicting messages.”)
24
The Courts of Appeal are manifestly confused and
contradict each other in applying the Williamson County
ripeness requirement. Some hold that once a property
owner litigates in state court a federal action is res judicata
or barred by collateral estoppel so that federal constitu-
tional claims can never be litigated in federal district
court.? See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219
(9th Cir. 1998); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs,
142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998); Rainey Bros. v. City of
Memphis, 967 F.Supp. 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1997)!°; Peduto v.
City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1989). Other
courts have attempted to recognize Williamson County's
promise by adopting a procedural mechanism whereby
the preclusive effects of state litigation are tempered.
® This result has been criticized by legal scholars and
practicing attorneys as “anomalous” and “surprising” (Roberts,
RIPENESS AND ForuM SELECTION IN LaND-Use LrnGarTION IN TAKINGs:
‘LaAND-DEvVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND ReGuLaTory TAKINGS AFTER
Dotan AND Lucas (ABA, Callies, ed., 1996)), “unpleasant”
(Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in Federal Court: The
State Compensation Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24
Urb. Law. 479 (1992), and “a trap for the unwary.” Meacham,
The Williamson Trap, 32 Urb. Law. 239 (2000); Meltz, Merriam &
Frank, THe Taxincs Issue, Ch. 5 (Island Press 1999); Berger, The
“Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the Supreme
Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, INstrrute ON
PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT Domain Ch. 7 (1991). Indeed, the
“Williamson County Trap” has caught even the most
experienced, careful and vigilant. See, e.g., Fields v. Sarasota-
Manatee Airport Auth., 755 F.Supp. 377 (M. D. Fla. 1991), aff'd,
953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992).
10 Affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on June 19, 1997, in an
unpublished opinion.
25
The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have found that a
property owner can subsequently maintain federal causes
of action for adjudication in federal court if they are first
“reserved” in the preceding state litigation. This is essen-
tially an “England Reservation” without the requirement
of first filing in federal court. See, Front Royal & Warren
County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d
275 (4th Cir. 1998); Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth.,
953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992) (criticizing the reasoning
and efficiency of the “Jennings Reservation” advocated in
Jennings v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.
1976), but nevertheless concluding that it was “too late in
the day” to change the practice). The Ninth Circuit also
acknowledged this reservation procedure in Dodd v. Hood
River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995), but later repudi-
ated it by finding that subsequent federal claims were
barred by collateral estoppel. Dodd v. Hood River County,
136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit expressed
doubts as to whether a “reservation” was the proper
procedural mechanism and noted that it was difficult to
reconcile the Williamson County ripeness requirement
with established res judicata principles. Wilkinson v. Pitkin
County Bd. of Comm'rs, 142 F.2d at 1325, n.4.11
Recognizing the confusion among the Circuits and
the lack of definitive guidance or affirmation from this
11 The lower courts’ efforts have been described as “riddled
with obfuscation and inconsistency,” “unclear and inexact”
(Meltz, Merriam & Frank, THe Taxincs Issue, p. 67 (Island Press
1999)), a “judicially created quagmire” and a “Kafkaesque
maze.” (Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial
Regulation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 Cat.
West L. Rev. 1, 44, 51 (1992).
26
Court as to the legitimacy of any approach to the prob-
lem, in attempting to avoid the “Williamson Trap,” Green-
spring combined two precautionary steps:!* (1) a state
court action (seeking only Maryland constitutional and
statutory remedies) reserving the federal claims pursuant
to the instructions of the Fourth Circuit in Front Royal,
135 F.3d at 283 (praising the Fields Reservation practice
and instructing district courts to advise takings litigants of
their right to make such a reservation); and (2) a separate
federal action in United States District Court (seeking
only federal constitutional and legal remedies) reiterating
the “Reservation” and simultaneously moving for a stay
of “all proceedings . . . until the conclusion of the state
court action” (App. 65) pursuant to the precedent of this
Court in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.
496 (1941), and Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1973).
Initially, in considering Greenspring’s original
removed action, the district court properly ruled “as a
matter of law” that Greenspring’s federal claims would
be reserved and stayed and therefore would survive litiga-
tion in state court and be ripe for review in federal court.
Tue Court: So, what I contemplate is that some
of the federal claims will be stayed, and plaintiff
12 It is important to note that Greenspring took these steps
after first having its original action removed from state court.
Despite its stated reservation of federal claims, Baltimore
County removed Greenspring’s action based upon the
inadvertent mention of a federal cause of action. This adds a
second layer of complication to the Williamson County ripeness
mystery; what is the appropriate treatment for a case removed
to federal court.
27
will be given leave to institute an action in state
court in the nature of inverse condemnation, or
whatever they want to call it.
Mr. Fremicu: And the state court claims as
well.
THE Court: Whatever they are, yes. And you
will proceed in state court with an express reser-
vation so you don’t run into a res judicata or
collateral estoppel bar - well, collateral estoppel
maybe, but you won’t run into a res judicata bar.
And then, when all is said and done in state
court, then you will come back, and will pro-
ceed with your facial claim, your as-applied
claim, and your now ripe takings claim.
(Transcript April 21, 1999 United States Dist. Ct. Hearing,
pp. 64-65). But, upon filing an amended complaint, in an
action directly contrary with its prior ruling, Green-
spring’s express Reservation and Motion to Stay, as well
as the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Front Koyal, the district
court accepted, considered and granted, with prejudice, a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Greenspring’s reserved
and stayed federal constitutional claims. The district
court’s dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit except for Greenspring’s as-applied tak-
ings claim. (App. 10-11). In so affirming, the Fourth Cir-
cuit ignored its prior decision in Front Royal and the
requested stay and severely penalized Greenspring’s cau-
tion in attempting to negotiate the procedural thicket
created by Williamson County's ripeness requirement.
Greenspring’s federal complaint should not have been
dismissed by the district court given the express reserva-
tion and the requested stay. Greenspring should not have
been penalized for being careful and prudent in light of
28
the uncertainty and confusion regarding Williamson
County.
Dismissal of Greenspring’s reserved and stayed federal
claims is a new variation on the “Williamson Trap” and
yet another example of the legal morass created by the
Williamson County ripeness requirement for federal tak-
ings, due process and equal protection claims. The confu-
sion now reigning among the circuits on how to apply
Williamson County, and particularly how to procedurally
satisfy its ripeness requirement deserves this Court’s
immediate attention.
CONCLUSION
In light of the Fourth Circuit’s evisceration of the first
prong of Agins as a meaningful standard for regulatory
takings analysis, its summary dismissal of the importance
of this Court’s recent decision in Olech, and its perpetua-
tion of the legal morass surrounding the ripeness require-
ment of Williamson County, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the circuit court’s decision.
Respectfully submitted,
Rosert H. Fremicn*
Jason M. Drve siss
FReEILICH, LEITNER & CARLISLE
and
Juurus W. LicHTER**
Counsel for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
** Mr. Lichter passed away one
week prior to the filing of this
petition.
App. 1
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
~)
GREENSPRING RACQUET CLus,
INCORPORATED; WILLIAM HIRSHFELD;
Loretta HIrsHFELD,
Plantiffs-Appellants,
W.
Battimore County, MARYLAND,
a body corporate and Politic
Defendant-Appellee,
and No. 99-2444
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
BattIMoRE County DEPARTMENT or )
PERMITS AND DEVELOPMENT )
MANAGEMENT; ARNOLD M. JABLON, )
Director, DEPARTMENT OF Permits _)
AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT; )
BALTIMORE County Counct; S.G. )
SAMUEL Moxtey; KEVIN KAMENETz; )
T. BRIAN McIntire; VINCENT J. )
GARDINA; JOSEPH BARTENFELD, )
Baltimore County Council )
Members, ;
)
Defendants.
App. 2
GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB,
INCORPORATED; WILLIAM HIRSHFELD;
Loretta HIRSHFELD,
Plantiffs-Appellants,
V.
BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,
a body corporate and Politic
Defendant-Appellee,
al No. 00-1012
BALTIMORE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
PERMITS AND DEVELOPMENT
MANAGEMENT; ARNOLD M. JABLON,
DireEctoR, DEPARTMENT OF PERMITS
AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;
BALTIMORE County Counciz; S.G.
SAMUEL Mox.ey; KEvIN KAMENETZ;
T. BriAN McIntire; VINCENT J.
GARDINA; JOSEPH BARTENFELD,
Baltimore County Council
Members,
Defendants.
ee ee ee ee a i a i a a a a i a a a Le a a a a a
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore
Andre M. Davis, District Judge.
(CA-99-469-AMD)
Argued: June 8, 2000
Decided: October 31, 2000
App. 3
Before MURNAGHAN,”* WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL,
Circuit Judges
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by
unpublished per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Robert Henry Freilich, FREILICH, LEITNER
& CARLISLE, Kansas City Missouri, for Appellants.
Jeffrey Grant Cook, OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Virginia W. Barnhart, County
Attorney, John E. Beverungen, OFFICE OF LAW, Towson,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this
circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., William Hirshfeld, and
Loretta Hirshfeld (collectively “Greenspring”) claim that
application of Baltimore County Council Bill 111-98 to
property located on Falls Road in Baltimore County vio-
lates their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under
* Judge Murnaghan heard oral argument in this case but
died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is
filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).
App. 4
the federal Constitution. The United States District Court
for the District of Maryland granted the County’s motion
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted and shortly thereafter granted the County’s
motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West
1994 & Supp.2000). This appeal followed. We affirm the
dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of all claims but the as-
applied takings claim. We hold that the as-applied tak-
ings claim is not ripe and therefore should have been
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Because the district court’s award of
attorney’s fees was based in part upon a finding that the
unripe as-applied takings claim is frivolous, we vacate
the award of attorney’s fees and remand the attorney’s
fee issue to the district court for reconsideration in light
of this opinion.
Es
William and Loretta Hirshfeld own the property at
issue in this case - a 5.5 acre parcel on the east side of
Falls Road in Baltimore County, Maryland - which they
lease to Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. Greenspring cur-
rently operates a tennis club on the property; however,
Greenspring wants to tear down the tennis club and build
one or more office buildings and a parking garage in the
club’s place.
To this end, Greenspring developed plans to raze the
tennis club and to construct two adjoining office towers,
one five stories and one six stories, with an attached
parking garage. In June 1998, Greenspring submitted a
App. 5
letter to the Baltimore County Development Review
Committee (“DRC”) requesting that Greenspring be
exempt from portions of the process for public approval
of the building plan pursuant to Baltimore County Code,
County Development Regulations, § 26-171(b)(9). Green-
spring maintains that it is legally entitled to a (b)(9)
exemption because the proposed development qualifies
as a “minor development” under the Code. The DRC
responded to Greenspring by letter, and denied the
requested (b)(9) exemption from portions of the public
review process. An open hearing was held on June 22,
1998 to further consider the matter, but Greenspring’s
request for a (b)(9) exemption was never granted.
On June 26, 1998, Greenspring filed suit in state court
seeking mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief
from the denial of the (b)(9) exemption. Greenspring
argued that it is entitled to the exemption and that denial
by the DRC was unlawful.
Meanwhile, on October 5, 1998, the County Council
enacted a new zoning ordinance, Bill 111-98, which
imposed more restrictive limits on building improve-
ments in areas with certain zoning designations located
near rural conservation zones. Specifically, Bill 111-98
imposed a height limit of 35 feet and a floor area ratio
(“FAR”) of .5 in areas zoned “Business Light,” “Business
Major,” or “Business Rural” when the exterior wall of any
Proposed building is within 750 feet of a rural conserva-
tion zone. The County asserts that Bill 111- 98 affects 150
sites in Baltimore County. Greenspring asserts that the
new restrictions only apply to its site and one other
within the county.
App. 6
In January 1999, Greenspring amended its state court
complaint by adding counts seeking damages and com-
pensation under the state and federal constitutions.
Greenspring reserved its federal claims, calling the action
a “Jennings-Fields reservation.” In February 1999, the
County removed the case to federal court and filed a
motion to dismiss.
In the meantime, Greenspring was still doing battle
directly with the Baltimore County zoning authorities.
After Bill 111-98 was enacted, Greenspring asked the
Baltimore County Planning Board (“the Board”) to rezone
Greenspring’s Falls Road property from a “Business
Major” zone to an “Office/Residential-2” zone, in order
to avoid the more restrictive limitations contained in Bill
111- 98. In March of 1999, the Board denied Greenspring’s
request.
In April 1999, Greenspring submitted another request
to the DRC asking, again, for a (b)(9) exemption from
certain public approval procedures. Along with this sec-
ond request, Greenspring included a revised site plan
describing construction of one eight-story office tower
with a garage. The proposed building in the revised plan
was confined to the same “footprint” as the pre existing
improvements on the property (the tennis club), had a
per-story square footage less than that of the pre-existing
building, and required, according to Greenspring, no
public works agreement. For these reasons, Greenspring
explained to the DRC, the revised plan should be exempt
from the new limitations imposed by Bill 111-98, under
section 2 of that ordinance.
App. 7
The DRC held an open meeting in May of 1999 to
consider Greenspring’s request for both a (b)(9) exemp-
tion from the public review process and a section 2
exemption from the new limits contained in Bill 111-98.
The DRC denied the request for the (b)(9) exemption,
again, but did not discuss the section 2 exemption.
After a hearing in the district court, Greenspring
filed a Second Amended Complaint seeking declaratory,
injunctive, and monetary relief under § 1983 for viola-
tions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Green-
spring included seven counts in the Second Amended
Complaint, alleging state action which amounted to (1) a
denial of procedural due process; (2) facial and as-
applied takings; (3) facial and as-applied violations of the
Equal Protection Clause; and (4) facial and as-applied
violations of substantive due process. At the core of
Greenspring’s elaborate complaint is the contention that
Bill 111-98 was adopted in bad faith, with an intent to
discriminate against Greenspring, and that the Bill fails to
advance a legitimate state interest.
On June 7, 1999, the County filed a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Greenspring opposed this motion, and
urged the district court to abstain from consideration of
the motion because of ripeness requirements relating
specifically to the as-applied takings claim. In September
1999, the district court issued an order granting the
County’s motion and dismissing the case with prejudice.
See Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County, 70
F.Supp.2d 598, 607 (D. Md. 1999).
In October of 1999, the County filed a motion seeking
attorney's fees under § 1988, which the district court
App. 8
awarded. See Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County,
77 F.Supp.2d 699, 705 (D. Md. 1999). Greenspring now
appeals the order granting the 12(b)(6) motion, the dis-
trict court’s refusal to abstain from consideration of the
12(b)(6) motion, and the subsequent award of attorney’s
fees. We will consider each issue in turn.
Il. The District Court’s Grant of the 12(b)(6) Motion
This court reviews de novo a district court’s order
granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,
467 (4th Cir. 1999). A district court should not grant a
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Moreover, all
well-pleaded factual allegations are assumed to be true
and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). We will
first examine the district court’s dismissal of the as-
applied takings claim and then turn to the facial takings,
equal protection and due process claims.
A. As-Applied Takings Claim
We first examine the district court’s dismissal with
prejudice of Greenspring’s as-applied takings claim.
Because Greenspring’s takings claim is still pending in
state court, Greenspring argues that the district court
ruled prematurely on the County’s Motion to Dismiss.
Greenspring claims that as applied to the property on
App. 9
Falls Road in Baltimore County, Bill 111-98 effects a regu-
latory taking without just compensation. Greenspring
asserts that the application of Bill 111-98 will cause a
95.6% reduction in economically viable use of the prop-
erty. This, Greenspring asserts, amounts to a taking. The
district court dismissed Greenspring’s as-applied takings
claim, however, on the basis that Greenspring could not
establish that the regulations at issue deprived Green-
spring of economically viable use of the property. See
Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County, 70 F.Supp.2d
598, 603 (D. Md. 1999).
Subject matter jurisdiction is a logical prerequisite to
dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6). Whether a district court has subject mat-
ter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo
review. See Anita's New Mexico Style Mexican Food, Inc. v.
Anita’s Mexican Foods Corp., 201 F.3d 314, 316 (4th Cir.
2000). In Williamson County Reg’! Planning Comm. v. Ham-
ilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court estab-
lished a set of ripeness requirements for Just-
Compensation-Clause actions against local governments.
See id. at 190-91. Failure to satisfy the Williamson ripeness
requirements is fatal to the presence of federal court
subject matter jurisdiction for a claim founded on the
Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause. See Front
Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front
Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing the
Williamson “ripeness requirement . . . for the existence of
federal court subject matter jurisdiction .. . ”).
App. 10
A claim alleging that a state or local governmental
body has violated the Fifth Amendment Just Compensa-
tion Clause is not ripe under Williamson until a land-
owner has satisfied two requirements. First, a property
owner must test the regulation’s limits by exhausting
available administrative exemption or variance pro-
cedures. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-88. Until
there is a final decision as to the challenged regulation’s
scope, no taking occurs, and the claim is not ripe. The
second ripeness prerequisite is that the governmental
body actually must have denied compensation for the
taking. See id. at 194-95. The nature of the constitutional
injury in a Just-Compensation-Clause case is twofold: the
government must have: (1) taken private property, (2)
without just compensation. See id. at 195 (recognizing that
“a property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just
Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully
attempted to obtain just compensation . . . ”). Williamson,
therefore, requires a federal takings litigant first to liti-
gate in state court.?
1 The Eleventh Circuit addressed the awkward posture of a
plaintiff in state court who must raise his federal takings claim,
or else risk having that claim precluded by the principles of res
judicata in Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299,
1303 (11th Cir. 1992). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that
a takings litigant may “reserve” his federal claim at the time he
brings the state claim required by Williamson County Reg’l
Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Id. at 1306.
The Fields court believed that its holding in the Williamson
context was dictated by its predecessor circuit’s holding in
Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Dist., 531 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir.
1976), that a reservation of federal questions pursuant to
England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411
(1964), ordinarily applicable in the context of Pullman
App. 11
Greenspring has satisfied the first of the two ripeness
preconditions, but it has not satisfied the second. Green-
spring has not yet been denied just compensation because
its takings claim is still pending in state court. Thus,
Greenspring’s federal as-applied takings claim is not ripe.
See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687, 718 (1999) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.)
(“Simply put, there is no constitutional or tortious injury
until the landowner is denied just compensation.”).
Accordingly, no case or controversy presently exists, and
the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction
over that claim. Thus, dismissal should not have been for
failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 12(b)(6), but rather should have been under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), governing the
dismissal of claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
As noted above, the district court dismissed all
counts of Greenspring’s amended complaint with preju-
dice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See
abstention, may be entered even where a litigant has filed suit
first in state court. Influenced by Migra v. Warren City School
Dist. Bd. of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 85 n. 7 (1984), however, the
Fields court limited Jennings to circumstances in which a litigant
is involuntarily forced to litigate first in state court. Thus, once
the state has had a chance to decide whether there was any
taking of property and if so whether any compensation is due, a
litigant may return for his day in federal court to resolve his
federal takings claim. This Circuit indicated agreement with the
Fields approach in Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp.
v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (praising
the Fields reservation practice as premised on “cogent analysis”
and recommending that district courts advise takings litigants
of their right to make such reservations).
App. 12
Greenspring Racquet Club Inc. v. Baltimore County, 70
F.Supp. 2d 598, 607 (D. Md. 1999). With respect to the as-
applied takings claim, the district court based its Rule
12(b)(6) dismissal on its holding that Greenspring could
not establish that the regulations at issue deprived Green-
spring of all economically viable use of the property. See
id. at 604-05. Because the District Court was without
subject-matter jurisdiction over the as-applied takings
claim, however, it was precluded from dismissing that
claim on the merits with prejudice. Greenspring may
return to federal court to litigate the as-applied takings
claim once Greenspring has exhausted Maryland’s
inverse condemnation procedures.
B. Facial Takings Claim
Greenspring next argues that enactment of Bill 111-98
was facially unconstitutional as a violation of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Agins v. City of
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Supreme Court explained
that a facial takings claim raises the question of whether
the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance constitutes a
taking. See id. at 260. A general zoning law effects a
taking “if the ordinance does not substantially advance
legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economi-
cally viable use of his land.” Id. (internal citations omit-
ted).
In this case, the district court found that Greenspring
could prove no facts to satisfy either element of the Agins
test. See Greenspring Racquet Club, 70 F.Supp.2d at 603-05.
The height and density limits contained in Bill 111-98 are
ordinary zoning restrictions and, quite obviously, they
App. 13
substantially advance a legitimate state interest in con-
trolling dense development in areas located near rural
conservation zones. The district court took note of state-
ments made by Baltimore County Councilman Bryan
McIntire, explaining that the restrictions in Bill 111-98
would avoid the detrimental impact on traffic, roads,
sewers, and water use that can result from dense devel-
opment.? See id. at 603. These rationales “clearly fall
within those recognized by the courts as reasonable bases
for zoning laws.” Id. (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert
County, 48 F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995)).
Greenspring contends that while a desire to limit
traffic, water, or sewer use may be a legitimate state
interest as a matter of law, whether Bill 111-98 “substan-
tially advances” that interest is a fact question to be
resolved by a jury. To support its argument, Greenspring
relies heavily upon City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
526 U.S. 687 (1999). Greenspring’s reading of Del Monte
Dunes, however, is misleading. In Del Monte Dunes, the
* Greenspring argues that consideration of the
councilman’s statements was inappropriate at the motion to
dismiss stage, because those statements were not contained in
the pleadings. We disagree. Statements made by the sponsor of
legislation during a legislative debate are an important part of
the legislative history of a bill. See United States v. Newport News
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 837 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1988).
Moreover, at the 12(b)(6) stage “the legislative history of an
ordinance is not a matter beyond the pleadings” because
matters of public record may properly be taken into account. See
Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1311 (4th Cir. 1995),
vacated on other grounds, 517 US. 1206, 116 S.Ct. 1821, 134
L.Ed.2d 927 (1996); 5A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1990).
App. 14
jury was asked to decide whether a particular decision to
deny a building permit “substantially advanced” a legiti-
mate state interest. See id. at 700. Whether the local zon-
ing laws themselves advanced a legitimate state interest
was not the question before the jury. In fact, the Court
said that where a plaintiff brings a broad challenge to the
constitutionality of the city’s zoning ordinances them-
selves (rather than challenging a particular decision made
pursuant to those ordinances), “the determination
whether the statutory purposes were legitimate, or
whether the purposes, though legitimate, were furthered
by the law or general policy, might well fall within the
province of the judge.” Id. at 722.
Greenspring’s suggestion, moreover, does not make
any logical sense. If the question of whether a zoning
ordinance substantially advances a legitimate state inter-
est is always a triable issue of fact for a jury, then every
challenge to any zoning regulation would warrant a jury
trial in federal court. We cannot accept such a remarkable
proposition and decline Greenspring’s invitation to open
the federal courthouse to a veritable flood of local land
use litigation by putting every such allegation before a
jury. When statements by local lawmakers set out legiti-
mate reasons for imposing height and density restrictions
on property in a particular class of zones, there can be no
claim in federal court that the law fails to substantially
advance a legitimate purpose.
The second prong of the Agins rule requires a plain-
tiff to show that the mere enactment of a zoning ordi-
nance “denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.” 447 U.S. at 260. Because Greenspring currently
operates a viable tennis club on the property at issue, and
App. 15
the enactment of Bill 111-98 will not prohibit Greenspring
from continuing to do so, the district court found that
Greenspring could prove no set of facts to establish that
Bill 111-98 denies Greenspring economically viable use of
the land. Greenspring objects to the district court looking
beyond the pleadings, but the fact of the tennis club’s
current operation is acknowledged in the pleadings.3
Greenspring asks this court to ignore reality and find that
it conceivably could prove that the mere enactment of the
zoning ordinance denies them all viable economic use of
the property. We conclude that there is no way for Green-
Spring to prove such a claim, considering the currently
operational tennis club and the possibility of building
something new on the Property within the limits imposed
by Bill 111-98.
The district court correctly found that Greenspring
could prove no set of facts to sustain a facial takings
claim regarding Bill 111-98. Thus, the motion to dismiss
was properly granted as to the facial takings claim.
C. Equal Protection Claims
Greenspring’s equal protection claims are based on
the assertion that Bill 111-98 was Passed in bad faith with
discriminatory intent. These allegations, however, are not
sufficient to state an equal protection claim because the
law at issue easily passes rational basis scrutiny.
3 See Second Amended Complaint, { 12 (stating that “there
is adequate infrastructure and capacity ... which are currently
being used by the existing athletic/racquet club to
accommodate the proposed development.”).
App. 16
When “government action [does] not burden a fun-
damental right or employ a suspect classification, the
pertinent question for determining whether the govern-
mental action violated the Equal Protection Clause is
whether the . . . officials reasonably could have believed
that the action was rationally related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental interest.” Front Royal & Warren County Indus-
trial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 290
(4th Cir. 1998).
Greenspring does not allege that Bill 111-98 utilizes a
suspect classification or burdens a fundamental right.
Rational basis review is therefore the proper standard for
evaluating this claim. Greenspring contends, however,
that even under rational basis review, the enactment of
Bill 111-98 must be struck as constitutionally invalid.
Greenspring alleges that the ordinance was enacted by
local authorities with malicious, bad-faith, discriminatory
intent, which, of course, is not related to any legitimate
state purpose. These allegations, according to Green-
spring, are enough to survive the motion to dismiss. We
disagree.
The facial equal protection challenge to the law must
fail because on its face Bill 111-98 applies to all property
within the delineated zones — it is a generally applicable
law, and all similarly situated persons are treated alike.
The as-applied equal protection challenge also must fail,
because there is an obvious, legitimate basis for the Bill’s
enactment: restricting dense growth in areas located near
rural conservation zones. While Greenspring is free to
speculate about the hostility that local officials directed
toward them, in order to state an equal protection claim
Greenspring also must demonstrate that there is no other
|
|
App. 17
legitimate purpose for the law. In other words, Green-
spring must allege that malice and bad faith were the only
conceivable bases for enacting Bill 111-98, and this they
cannot do. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 315 (1993) (stating that “[t]hose attacking the ratio-
nality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to
negative every conceivable basis which might support
it.” ”) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410
U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). Where an obvious, legitimate pur-
pose is evident on the face of a challenged law, an equal
protection claim under rational basis review must fail.4
Thus, we conclude that both the facial and as-applied
equal protection claims properly were dismissed.
D. Due Process Claims
Finally, Greenspring argues that the enactment and
application of Bill 111-98 deprives it of both substantive
and procedural due process. The procedural due process
claim easily is dismissed, because administrative and
4 This fundamental tenet of equal protection jurisprudence
is not changed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Village
of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000). In Olech, local
zoning authorities demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition
of connecting plaintiff’s Property to the municipal water supply
although only a 15-foot easement was required from other
similarly situated property owners. The Court held that the
complaint, which alleged that the local zoning decision was
“irrational and wholly arbitrary,” was sufficient to state a claim
for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. Because
the local zoning decision at issue in the instant case is not
“irrational and wholly arbitrary,” Greenspring’s complaint is
easily distinguished from the complaint at issue in Olech.
App. 18
judicial appeals from all Baltimore County zoning deci-
sions are readily, if not speedily, available. The mere fact
that post-deprivation remedies may take some time to
pursue does not render them constitutionally infirm. See
Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 817, 827
(4th Cir. 1995).
The substantive due process claim is based speci-
fically upon Greenspring’s allegation that Bill 111-98 is
arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, not related to any
legitimate governmental interest. Greenspring fails to
address, however, the threshold inquiry in any due pro-
cess claim: In order to state a viable due process claim,
Greenspring must do more than attack the quality of the
legislative process in Baitimore County; Greenspring
must identify a constitutionally protected property inter-
est upon which Bill 111-98 infringes.5 If no protected
property interest exists, there is no need to consider
whether any alleged deprivation of that interest was
effected with “due process.” See Scott v. Greenville County,
5 Greenspring argued below, and on appeal, that it has a
constitutionally protected property interest in a (b)(9)
exemption from portions of the public review process usually
required as a prerequisite to issuance of a building permit. We
note, however, that the parties have since agreed that
Greenspring’s application to amend the site plan must be
subject to the approval regulations in effect in 1975, the year that
the original site plan was approved. See Greenspring Racquet
Club v. Baltimore County, No. 99-4790, slip op. at 1 (Cir. Ct.
Baltimore County, May 16, 2000). The disagreement over
whether Greenspring legally is entitled to the (b)(9) exemption
is therefore moot, and we will accordingly restrict our
discussion of the due process claim to the enactment and
application of Bill 111-98.
App. 19
716 F.2d 1409, 1418 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he
starting point for our [due process] inquiry is to deter-
mine whether state or local law afforded Scott a ‘protect-
ible property interest in the permit’ sufficient to trigger
federal due process guarantees”).
A constitutionally protected property interest must
be “more than an abstract need or desire. .. . [and] more
than a unilateral expectation” and instead must be some-
thing to which one has a “legitimate claim of entitle-
ment.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
Greenspring has no legal entitlement to develop the Falls
Road property with buildings in excess of 35 feet in
height and .5 FAR. Greenspring certainly had such an
expectation, but because Greenspring had no legally
vested right to develop the property in this way, it cannot
claim a constitutionally protected property interest in
doing so. Because Greenspring has no constitutionally
protected property interest in development of the prop-
erty outside the bounds of Bill 111-98, Greenspring does
not state a viable substantive due process claim. We
therefore conclude that the claim properly was dismissed.
In summary, the district court properly dismissed
Greenspring’s due process, equal protection, and facial
takings claims under Rule 12(b)(6).
Ill. The District Court’s Refusal to Abstain from Consider-
ation of the 12(b)(6) Motion
Greenspring argues that the district court should
have abstained from ruling on each of its claims. We
review the district court’s decision not to abstain from
App. 20
hearing a case for abuse of discretion. See Pomponio v.
Fauquier County, 21 F.3d 1319, 1324 (4th Cir. 1994).
The abstention issue is relevant only to Greenspring’s
as-applied takings claim and is based upon the ripeness
requirements set forth in Williamson County Reg’l Planning
Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson,
however, is not an abstention doctrine but a jurisdictional
rule calling for dismissal simply because the federal
courts do not possess subject matter jursidiction over a
takings claim until Williamson's requirements have been
met. See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v.
Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998)
(indicating that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking
when Williamson's ripeness requirements have not been
met). Thus, while the difference may appear merely for-
mal, the district court’s error was not in refusing to
abstain, but, rather, in reaching the merits of a claim over
which it possessed no jurisdiction.
IV. The Award of Attorney’s Fees
Finally, Greenspring asserts that the district court
erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the County. This
court reviews an attorney’s fee award for abuse of discre-
tion. Hitachi Credit America Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d
614, 631 (4th Cir. 1999). By definition, a district court
abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. See
Brodziak v. Runyon, 145 F.3d 194, 196 (4th Cir. 1998).
Section 1988(b) provides that “[i]Jn any action or proceed-
ing to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . . the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a
reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C.A.
App. 21
§ 1988(b) (West 2000). Fee motions must be filed within
fourteen days of judgment pursuant to District of Mary-
land Local Rule 109.2, and failure to timely file a fee
request can justify the court of appeals in vacating a
district court’s award of attorney’s fees. See Ortega v.
Geelhaar, 914 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1990). An applicant
must present properly authenticated and accurate docu-
mentation for an attorney’s fee request. See Hensley v.
Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983).
An award of attorney’s fees to a defendant in a § 1983
Suit only may be made where a plaintiff’s claims are
“ “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith.’ ” Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).
The district court found that Greenspring’s claims
were “wholly without foundation.” Greenspring Racquet
Club Inc. v. Baltimore County, 77 F.Supp.2d 699, 703
(D.Md.1999). The due Process and equal protection claims
were deficient under obvious and well established legal
principles. As the entire preceding analysis indicates, the
district court’s conclusion that Greenspring’s due pro-
cess, equal protection and facial takings claims were
“frivolous and unreasonable” is amply supported by the
record and well within the district court’s appropriate
exercise of discretion. The district court's award of attor-
ney’s fees also clearly rested upon a finding that the
unripe as-applied takings claim was entirely frivolous.
We have held, however, in Section II.A that a district
court may not make such a determination with respect to
an unripe claim, because such a determination would
App. 22
finally dispose of the merits of a claim over which the
district court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction.
The First Circuit has held that where a plaintiff
brings interrelated claims, some of which are frivolous
and some of which are not frivolous, a district court may
award fees to the defendant under § 1988 for the costs of
defending the frivolous claims. See Ward v. Hickey, 996
F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir. 1993). The First Circuit has indi-
cated that the District Court should calculate a fee
amount in light of the fact that only some of the claims at
issue were found to be frivolous. See id. (stating that “a
district court should not deny fees for defending frivo-
lous claims merely because calculation would be diffi-
cult” and thus implying that calculation of an appropriate
fee amount could not include fees attributable to the non-
frivolous claims). The Sixth Circuit has held that a district
court does not abuse its discretion by entirely denying a
defendant’s request for attorney’s fees under § 1988 on
the basis that some of the plaintiff’s claims were mer-
itorious even though others may have been frivolous. See
Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994).
No circuit, however, has held that a district court may
award attorney’s fees for the costs of defending non-
frivolous portions of a § 1983 suit. Our holding in Section
Il.A necessarily means that at this stage in the litigation,
the district court may not definitively determine that
Greenspring’s unripe as-applied takings claims are frivo-
lous. Thus, the impossibility of making a determination
of frivolity as to the unripe as-applied claims makes it
necessary for us to vacate the District Court’s award of
attorney’s fees and remand this issue for reconsideration
App. 23
in light of this opinion.6 On remand, the District Court
may wish to recalculate the fee amount, excluding any
amount attributable to the unripe as-applied takings
claim, or it may wish instead to entirely defer consider-
ation of the attorney’s fees issue until such time as the as-
applied takings claim becomes ripe.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, the orders entered by the
district court are affirmed except insofar as they dismiss
Greenspring’ as-applied takings claim and insofar as they
award attorney’s fees to the County under § 1988. The
order dismissing the as-applied takings claim is vacated
and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss
® Greenspring also lodges two specific complaints
regarding the fee award. We address these issues because they
“surely would be raised again on remand with attendant delays
of hearing and appeal.” South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717
F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983). First, Greenspring argues that the
motion for fees was not timely. This issue will arise on remand if
the District Court decides to recalculate the fee award based
upon the initial application. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
6(b)(2) grants the trial judge discretion to accept a fee motion
beyond the prescribed time limits. The district court’s decision
to do so in this case was entirely reasonable. Second,
Greenspring challenges the time records submitted by the
County. Admittedly, the records are not entirely regular; they
are hand written, for example. However, the district court found
that the records comply with the requirements outlined in the
local court rules and accurately reflect the time spent by
defendant’s counsel. We find that the district court’s resolution
of this issue was within “the district court’s broad discretion” in
calculating an attorney’s fee award. Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071,
1085 (4th Cir. 1986).
App. 24
that claim without prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)
on the ground that the district court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction. The order awarding attorney's fees is
vacated and the issue of attorney’s fees is remanded for
reconsideration in light of this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED.
App. 25
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREENSPRING
RACQUET CLUB, INC.,
et al.,
Plaintiffs Civil No. AMD 99-231
V.
BALTIMORE COUNT 4
MARYLAND, et al.,
Defendants
GREENSPRING
RACQUET CLUB, INC.
et al., Civil No. AMD 99-469
Plaintiffs .
V.
BALTIMORE COUNTY
MARYLAND, et al.,
Defendants
ORDER
These cases came before the Court for a hearing on
the pending motions on April 21, 1999. Counsel having
been heard, and the Court having rendered its rulings on
the record, it is this 22nd day of April, 1999, ORDERED
(1) That the motion to dismiss filed in case no.
AMD 99-231 (Paper # 4) is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED
(2) That the motion to dismiss filed in case AMD
99-469 (Paper # 8) is GRANTED, AND PLAINTIFFS ARE
GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COM-
PLAINT ON OR BEFORE MAY 15, 1999, and to seek a
App. 26
stay pending exhaustion of all state law claims; and it is
further ORDERED
(3) That the motions to remand in case no AMD
99-469 (Paper # 11), to consolidate (AMD 99-231 Paper
#5; AMD 99-469 Paper #9) and for leave to file a response
(AMD 99-231 Paper #14; AMD 99-469 Paper #16) are
DENIED AS MOOT; and it is further ORDERED
(4) That The Clerk shall CLOSE CASE NO AMD
99-231 and TRANSMIT a copy of this Order to all coun-
sel.
/s/ Andre M. Davis
ANDRE M. DAVIS
United States District Judge
MRI RE at ee ree
se
App. 27
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREENSPRING
RACQUET CLUB, INC., :
et al., : Civil No.
Plaintiffs AMD 99-469
V.
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MARYLAND
Defendant
MEMORANDUM
(Filed Sept. 27, 1999)
This is a poorly disguised zoning case masquerading
as a collection of constitutional claims. Plaintiffs, Green-
spring Racquet Club, Inc., William Hirshfeld, and Loretta
Hirshfeld (collectively “Greenspring”), own the property -
which is the subject of this litigation: a parcel consisting
of approximately 5.5 acres located on the east side of Falls
Road, north of Joppa Road in Baltimore County, Mary-
land. Plaintiffs currently operate a tennis club on the
Property but they would rather raze the tennis club and
construct one or more office buildings and a parking
garage.
Plaintiffs have filed a seven count second amended
complaint seeking equitable relief and damages in respect
to the County’s application to their property of County
Council Bill No. 111-98 (“the Ordinance”). To date, the
County has not approved Greenspring’s site plans, thus
delaying construction; a prolonged challenge in state
App. 28
court is in the offing, with the effect, perhaps, of perma-
nently depriving Greenspring of the opportunity to
redevelop its property in an economically advantageous
environment. Pending before the court is the County’s
Motion to Dismiss. The issues have been fully briefed and
no hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated below, I
shall grant the County’s motion.?}
(i)
A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) “unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to
relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); accord
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim are “granted sparingly and with caution in
order to make certain that plaintiff is not improperly
denied a right to have his claim adjudicated on the
merits.” 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, CIVIL 2D § 1349 at
192-93 (1990).
Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint include “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A claimant
is not required to “set out in detail the facts upon which
he bases his claim” so long as the claim “will give the
1 Greenspring’s Motion to Strike Impertinent and
Scandalous Material, its Motion to Stay and the County’s
Motion to Strike are denied as moot.
App. 29
defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
Moreover, all well-pleaded factual allegations are
assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.
411, 421-22 (1969). Only when the factual allegations in
support of a claim are not well-pleaded (e.g., when they
are “functionally illegible” or “baldly conclusory,” Shus-
ter v. Oppelman, 962 F.Supp. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y.1997)),
should they not be accepted as true and the claim dis-
missed.
Application of the above Principles to the instant
case compels the conclusion that the motion should be
granted.
(ii)
Accepting Greenspring’s account of the facts as true,
the following constitutes the course of events leading to
this litigation. Greenspring developed plans to raze the
tennis club currently occupying its site and to construct
two adjoining office towers, one five stories and one six
stories, with a structured parking garage. On June 10,
1998, Greenspring submitted a letter to the County Devel-
opment Review Committee ( “CDR”), requesting that it be
exempted from portions of the Process for plan approval
delineated in Division 2 of the County Development Reg-
ulations. Balt. County Code §§ 26- 201 to 26-217.2 In this
? These portions consisted of Community Input Meetings,
Hearing Officer Review and de novo appeal to the Baltimore
County Board of Appeals.
App. 30
letter, Greenspring explained that it was entitled to be
exempted from this process pursuant to Baltimore
County Code § 26-171(b)(9) because its proposed devel-
opment qualified as a “minor development” under the
Code. Attached to this letter request was a site plan for
the proposed demolition and construction. The DRC indi-
cated by letter dated June 17, 1998, that it would not
allow the requested exemption from portions of the
review process, and it held an open meeting on June 22,
1998, to further consider Greenspring’s request. Green-
spring’s request was never granted.
Meanwhile, on October 5, 1998, the County Council
enacted the Ordinance, which imposes a height limit of 35
feet and a floor area ratio limit (“FAR”) of 0.5 for certain
new construction on Greenspring’s site and one other site
in Baltimore County.? Greenspring promptly requested
that the Baltimore County Planning Board rezone its
property from a “Business Major” zone to an “Office/
Residential-2” zone. This request was denied on March
18, 1999.
On April 27, 1999, Greenspring submitted a second
request to the DRC asking again that it be exempted from
3 The Ordinance does not specify Greenspring’s site but
limits the maximum building height to 35 feet and the FAR to 0.5
of any proposed building in zones classified as “Business
Light,” “Business Major,” or “Business Rural,” when “the
exterior wall of any proposed building . . . is within 750 feet of [a
Rural Conservation] Zone.” Balt. County Council Bill No.
111-98. Greenspring claims these restrictions cover only its site
and one other. The County asserts that the Ordinance affects 150
sites. County’s Motion to Dismiss at 9. For the purposes of the
motion, I assume that Greenspring’s allegations are true.
ee
App. 31
the specified procedural requirements of Division 2. In
addition, Greenspring attached a revised site plan
describing construction of one eight story office tower
with garage, and it requested that it be exempted from
the limitations of the Ordinance. According to Green-
spring, this letter explained that under Section 2 of the
Ordinance, the revised development plan qualified for
exemption from the height and floor ratio requirements
because the new construction is confined to the same
footprint as the preexisting improvements on the site, the
Square footage per story of the proposed building is less
than the preexisting one, and no public works agreement
is required.
The DRC held an open meeting to consider Green-
Spring’s request for exemptions from both portions of the
review process and the height/floor area ratio restrictions
of the Ordinance. It denied the request for exemption
from the review Process, indicating that Greenspring
should speak with Arnold Jablon, the Director of Permits
and Development Management, who could direct the
DRC to later approve the request. The request for exemp-
tion from the height and floor area ratio requirements of
the Ordinance was not discussed. See County’s Motion to
Strike, Ex. 1 (Transcript of the Meeting of the DRC on
May 10, 1999).
(iii)
The amended complaint contains seven counts: two
claims alleging unconstitutional takings without just
compensation (one facial, one as applied); two claims
alleging equal protection violations (one facial, one as
SSS
App. 32
applied); one claim alleging a violation of procedural due
process; and two claims alleging substantive due process
violations (one facial, one as applied). I shall address
these in turn.
Takings Claims
Greenspring alleges that the County has effectively
taken its property without just compensation in violation
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.* The facial and most of the variations
of the “as applied” takings claims fail, among other rea-
sons, because Greenspring does not have any constitu-
tionally protected property interest that was affected by
the County’s enactment and application of the zoning
laws and regulations at issue. Furthermore, while I shall
assume, for the purposes of the pending motion, that
Greenspring does have a constitutionally protected prop-
erty interest insofar as it claims an entitlement to a non-
discretionary exemption from the Ordinance (as provided
in Section 2 thereof), this “as applied” claim also fails
because Greenspring does not sufficiently allege that it
has been deprived of substantially all of the economic
value of its property in consequence of its failure to
obtain the desired exemption.
4 The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation,”
and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 14; see First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1987).
ileal
ee Ee Oe ee ee
App. 33
Facial Taking
Greenspring contends that the enactment of the
height and floor area ratio restrictions of the Ordinance
on their face effectively deprived it of “all or substantially
all of the economic use and/or value” of its Property.>
Second Amended Complaint at 11 45, 47, and 60. How-
ever, Greenspring has no constitutionally protected prop-
erty right in the airspace or anything else which was
affected by the Ordinance, so it fails to State a claim that
the County took something from it by enacting the Ordi-
nance.
Since 1909, the Supreme Court has upheld height
restrictions on buildings which a state or local legislative
body reasonably concluded promoted “the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare.” Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91
(1909). Even in the absence of height restrictions, the
Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v, City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978), made it clear that no
“taking” is established “simply by showing that [plain-
tiffs] have been denied the ability to exploit a property
interest [in air space] that “ney heretofore had believed
was available for development... . ”6 As in Penn Central,
° Greenspring also asserts that the Ordinance on its face
“took title” to the airspace above its property and thus effected
a taking. However, this claim fails because Greenspring does
not allege that the County repossessed its title to the property or
encumbered it in any way. A takings claim cannot rest upon a
“symbolic taking” of a title.
© Greenspring asserts a “vested property right” in the
development it would have been able to achieve under the
App. 34
Greenspring continues to be able to use its building as it
has in the past, and the Ordinance does not prohibit all
air development, just development higher than 35 feet.
Moreover, the rationales cited by the County to sup-
port its enactment of the Ordinance clearly fall within
those recognized by the courts as reasonable bases for
zoning laws. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48
F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that proper bases
for zoning determinations include concern about further
growth in rural areas, residential density, community aes-
thetics, traffic congestion, and water supplies). In urging
passage of the Ordinance, County Councilman T. Bryan
McIntire explained that the height and floor area ratio
restrictions would have esthetic benefits, would decrease
transportation congestion, improve flood management,
and conserve water and sewer resources. Motion to Dis-
miss at 11 (quoting Councilman McIntire). Thus, the Ordi-
nance represents a valid exercise of the County’s
authority to protect the health and welfare of its resi-
dents, and its enactment was without a cognizable effect
- constitutionally speaking — upon the protected property
interests enjoyed or owned by Greenspring.
zoning law applicable to its property prior to the enactment of
the Ordinance. However, it is well settled in Maryland that such
a right does not vest unless the property owner had acquired a
building permit under the old law and had commenced
construction. Prince George’s County v. Sunrise, 330 Md. 297, 623
A.2d 1296 (1993); Richmond Corp. v. Prince George’s County, 254
Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969). Greenspring never acquired a
permit under the old law and had not commenced demolition
and construction.
App. 35
As Applied Taking
Greenspring asserts that three actions (or, more cor-
-Tectly, refusals to act) by County officials constitute
unconstitutional takings: (1) the County’s refusal to
reclassify Greenspring’s property so as to exclude it from
the Ordinance; (2) the County’s refusal to exempt Green-
spring’s plans from the public meeting and hearing offi-
cer review process specified in Division 2 of the County’s
development regulations; and (3) the County’s refusal to
exempt Greenspring’s amended site plan from the Ordi-
nance pursuant to Section 2 thereof.” It is plain, however,
that neither singly nor in combination do these conten-
tions state a claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The first two of these claims, like the facial claim
discussed above, fail to state a claim because Greenspring
lacked a constitutionally protected Property interest that
? This third claim is clearly not ripe for decision because,
despite Greenspring’s claim that its request for a Section 2
exemption “was denied on May 10, 1999 by the DRC,” Second
viable federal claim, I would need to consider whether to grant
a stay and whether abstention would be appropriate.
App. 36
the County’s actions affected. The third fails to state a
claim because Greenspring has failed to allege suffi-
ciently - and is unable so to allege — that it was deprived
substantially of all the economic value of its property.
The first two as applied claims will be dismissed for
lack of a cognizable affected property interest. As the
Supreme Court held in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972), to have a property interest, “a person must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must
have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,
instead, have a legitimate entitlement to it.” Id. at 577.
The Fourth Circuit takes the position, predominant in the
circuits which have considered the issue, that such an
entitlement is created when, “under state or municipal
law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny issuance
of the permit or to withhold its approval. Any significant
discretion conferred upon the local agency defeats the
claim of a property interest.” Gardner v. City of Baltimore,
969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases); accord
Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 288 (4th
Cir. 1998); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995); Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991
F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 864 (1993).
Clearly, the County exercises discretion when it con-
siders requests to reclassify the zoning of property. See
Balt. County Code § 2-356.8 Greenspring’s hope that the
8 While the Board of Appeals must make certain findings
before reclassification is permitted, those findings are based
upon its exercise of discretion. The County Code specifies that
in deciding whether “[t]he prospective reclassification is
warranted by [the change in the neighborhood,]” the Board
App. 37
County would reclassify its site from “Business Major” to
“Office/Residential 2” is a mere unilateral expectation
and not an entitlement. Similarly, the County’s refusal to
waive portions of the Division 2 Process did not affect a
constitutionally protected Property interest. I assume for
the purposes of the motion that Greenspring qualified for
a waiver under Baltimore County Code § 26-171(b)(9).
Even if the grant of such a waiver is arguably nondiscre-
tionary when an applicant qualifies, however, the waiver
would not have resulted in a nondiscretionary approval
of Greenspring’s plans to build. Greenspring would still
have had to submit a development plan pursuant to
§ 26-203, undergo preliminary review by the department
of public works pursuant to § 26-204, and then undergo
review by over thirteen County agencies Pursuant to
§ 26-205, before getting consideration by the planning
board for final approval. See id. at § 26-208. Discretion is
exercised by the County at each of these Stages; accord-
ingly, Greenspring has no constitutionally protected enti-
tlement of which it has been deprived and for which it
might seek a remedy in federal court.
Analysis of the third as applied taking claim is
slightly different but the Outcome is the same. At this
Stage of the proceedings, I assume that Greenspring has a
property interest in obtaining a Section 2 exemption from
must consider a host of factors, including population trends,
adequacy of transportation, water, sewerage and solid waste
| disposal facilities, and the Proposed project’s impact on water
quality and fish, wildlife and plant habitats. Balt. County Code
§ 2-356(j).
App. 38
the height and floor ratio requirements of the Ordinance®
because the grant of such an exemption is nondiscretion-
ary provided Greenspring demonstrates it has fulfilled
the exemption’s prerequisites as spelled out in the Ordi-
nance. I further assume the truth of Greenspring’s allega-
tion that it demonstrated to the County that its amended
plan fulfilled the Section 2 requirements and that it is,
therefore, entitled to the exemption. I further assume that
the exemption would have resulted in a nondiscretionary
approval of its amended site plan to build the one eight
story office building and garage. Nevertheless, despite its
property interest in obtaining approval for the amended
site plan, Greenspring fails to state a claim because it fails
to allege a key element of a takings claim: that it was
deprived “of substantially all economic value” of its
property.
The Supreme Court recently reiterated this well
established element of a takings claim in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1996). “A land use regulation does
not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advances legitimate
state interests’ and does not ‘deny an owner economically
viable use of his land.’ ” Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
As the Fourth Circuit explained in Front Royal, “[nJot all
9 The Ordinance provides in relevant part: “Section 2. And
be it further enacted that this Act shall not apply to. . . the
redevelopment of an improvement existing on October 5, 1998,
if (1) the improvement occurs within the same footprint, (2) the
square footage, per story, of the existing improvement and (3) a
public works agreement is not required, in the opinion of the
Directors of Public Works, Permits and Development
Management, and Environmental Protection and Resource
Management.”
———————
App. 39
regulatory deprivations amount to regulatory takings,
and a regulatory deprivation that causes land to have
‘less value’ does not necessarily make it ‘valueless.’ ” 135
F.3d at 286. This principle is controlling in the case at bar.
While Greenspring’s complaint recites that it has
been deprived of “all economic benefit of [its] property,”
this is merely a conclusory assertion at odds with facts
which are subject to judicial notice; indeed, Greenspring
does not (because it cannot) contradict the County’s
assertion that it currently operates an economically viable
tennis club at the site. In any event, Greenspring has two
obvious economic uses for its property: it could continue
operating the tennis club, or it could raze the club and
build an office building not exceeding 35 feet in height or
0.5 floor area ratio.!° Thus, I conclude that Greenspring’s
assertion that it has been deprived of “all or substantially
all of the economic use” of its property is “baldly con-
clusory” and insufficient to withstand a motion to dis-
miss.1}
1° As to the facial takings claim, Greenspring’s own
complaint suggests a third possibility. While the Ordinance
apparently precludes it from building the two office buildings
(one five stories, one six stories) and garage envisioned in its
first site plan, its complaint asserts that it is entitled on the face of
Section 2 of the Ordinance to build an eight story office building
with garage in the footprint of the current improvements.
*! Despite the fact that the denial of a Section 2 exemption
would constitute a quasi judicial act, the more relaxed standard
enunciated in Dolan does not govern the determination of
whether Greenspring has been deprived of the economic use of
its property. See 512 U.S. at 384-85 (holding that the city
effectuated unconstitutional taking by prohibiting plaintiff from
doubling the size of her retail store unless she deeded over a
SS
App. 40
Equal Protection Claims
Greenspring alleges both facial and as applied claims
that the County has deprived it of equal protection of the
laws in the County’s enactment of height and floor area
ratio restrictions, and in the County’s application of these
restrictions to its property. These purported claims fail as
a matter of law because even if one assumes that the
Ordinance affects only two properties in the entire
County, Greenspring alleges no basis upon which a fact
finder could find a denial of equal protection.
“(E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge
the wisdom, fairness or logic of legislative choices.” FCC
v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
When “government action [does] not burden a funda-
mental right or employ a suspect classification the perti-
nent question for determining whether the governmental
action violated the Equal Protection Clause is whether
the . . . officials reasonably could have believed that the
action was rationally related to a legitimate governmental
portion of her property to it.). The Supreme Court held that the
requirement that the owner deed over part of her property was
critical to the application of a relaxed standard. Id. By contrast,
Greenspring will not be required to deed any portion of its
property to the County.
Greenspring also claims that the County effectuated a
“taking” in requiring it to pursue unconstitutionally
burdensome procedures for administrative and judicial relief
from a wrongful zoning decision. Second Amended Complaint
at { 58. This claim fails because, as I explain in text, the delay
which Greenspring speculates will occur in the appeals process
does not render that process unconstitutional. See infra at 15.
App. 41
interest.” Front Royal, 135 F.3d at 290. The legislators’
actual motivation is irrelevant. Id.; accord United States v.
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). As the Supreme
Court held in Beach Communications, Inc.:
[T]hose attacking the rationality of the legisla-
tive classification have the burden to negative
every conceivable basis which might support it.
Moreover because we never require a legislature
to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it
is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes
whether the conceived reason for the challenged
distinction actually motivated the legislature.
508 U.S. at 315 (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted); accord Front Royal, 135 F.3d at 290.
Furthermore, the mere fact that one is treated differ-
ently than someone who is similarly situated is not suffi-
cient to run afoul of the equal protection clause. As the
Fourth Circuit explained:
If disparate treatment alone were sufficient to
warrant a constitutional remedy, then every
blunder by a local authority, in which the
authority erroneously or mistakenly treats an
individual differently than it treats another who
is similarly situated, would rise to the level of a
federal constitutional claim.
Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 825.
Greenspring does not allege that any fundamental
right was adversely affected by the County’s actions.
Moreover, it does not allege any invidious discrimination
based upon suspect categories (i.e., race, ethnicity,
national origin, religion or sex). Thus, rational basis
App. 42
review applies. Greenspring alleges merely that the Ordi-
nance, on its face and as applied to it, singles out its
property and one other for adverse treatment while other
“similarly situated” (but differently zoned) properties
were unaffected by the height and floor area ratic
requirements. Greenspring contends further that con-
struction on those similarly situated properties could also
have an effect on the rural zones the Ordinance seeks to
protect.
These arguments are unavailing. While it is patently
clear that differently zoned properties are not similarly
situated as to zoning, these arguments also fail because
Greenspring does not allege an invidious purpose. Gov-
ernment is not consigned to inactivity because it cannot
legislate comprehensively in one step. The fact of dispa-
rate treatment, in the absence of invidious discrimination,
does not invoke a more stringent standard of review. As a
matter of law, the Ordinance is rationally supported by
legitimate objects of the County in its regulation of land
use within its borders. No more searching standard of
review is required or justified.
Procedural Due Process Claim
Greenspring contends that the County’s procedures
for administrative and judicial relief from a wrongful
zoning decision are unconstitutional.!2 The gravamen of
12 Because a successful due process claim depends upon
the existence of a cognizable property right, Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48
F.3d at 826-7, Greenspring’s due process claim fails as to the
passage of the Ordinance, the failure to reclassify the zoning
App. 43
this claim is Greenspring’s allegation that because it
might take “in excess of two years” to pursue administra-
tive and judicial appeals, these procedures are uncon-
stitutionally burdensome. However, Greenspring does
not explain how it arrived at this two year projection, and
in any event, delays of this magnitude are not unconstitu-
tional burdens. Even when a significant delay is incurred
in reversing a wrongful zoning board decision, and even
when that delay causes the plaintiffs to default on their
construction loans and lose everything to foreclosure, the
Fourth Circuit has held that plaintiffs have not been
deprived of procedural due process. Sylvia Dev., 48 F.3d
at 817, 827 (holding that 11 month delay in reversing
wrongful zoning board decision did not deprive plaintiff
of due process).
Greenspring speculates that it could take in excess of
two years to overturn County decisions regarding its
property. This delay, it believes, is unwarranted. But it
cannot, on the one hand, demand due process in the
review of County decisions, and on the other hand, claim
that the time it would take to provide this process ren-
ders it unconstitutional.
designation, and the refusal to exempt the plans from portions
of the Division 2 procedures for plan approval. I assume for the
purposes of the motion that as to its amended site plan,
Greenspring did have a cognizable property interest in the
Section 2 exemption from the height and floor area ratio
requirements of the Ordinance. See supra at 8-10.
App. 44
Substantive Due Process Claims
Greenspring alleges that the County deprived it of
substantive due process when it refused to recognize that
its amended site plan should be exempt from the height
and floor area ratio requirements of the Ordinance.}> This
allegation fails to state a claim. As the Fourth Circuit
summarized in Front Royal:
[S]ubstantive due process is a substantially nar-
rower concept than procedural due process, for
it serves as an absolute check on certain govern-
mental actions notwithstanding the fairness of
the procedures used to implement those actions.
We have determined that this absolute check is
warranted only where no process could cure the
deficiencies in the governmental action. In other
words, governmental action offends substantive
13 Greenspring also pleads violations of substantive due
process (facially and as applied) in regard to the County’s
enactment of the Ordinance, and its refusal to waive portions of
the Division 2 plan approval process. For the reasons set forth
supra at 8-10, these claims are dismissed for want of a
constitutionally protected property interest. It is well settled
that a claim of substantive due process under the “property
prong of the Fourteenth Amendment” is not stated unless the
claimant alleges possession of a property interest and that state
action deprived the claimant of the property interest. Sylvia
Dev., 48 F.3d at 827. As explained in text, I assume for the
purposes of the motion that Greenspring had a property interest
in the Section 2 exemption from the height and floor area ratio
requirements of the Ordinance, and that the County deprived it
of this interest in refusing to acknowledge its exemption. Thus,
my discussion of Greenspring’s substantive due process claim
centers on the Section 2 exemption.
App. 45
due process only where the resulting depriva-
tion of life, liberty, or property is so unjust that
no amount of fair procedure can rectify it.
135 F.3d at 287-88 (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted). This high standard is not remotely satisfied here.
Greenspring’s substantive due process claim fails
because there exists a post-deprivation process which
Greenspring is pursuing, which can rectify the depriva-
tion. Id. Its appeal of the denial of the Section 2 exemp-
tion in state fora might result in its obtaining the
exemption. In any event, the mere act of denying a Sec-
tion 2 exemption falls far short of the type of state action
which is “so arbitrary or irrational, so unjustified by any
circumstance or governmental interest” that the “residual
protections” of the equal protection clause are invoked.
See id.; accord Sylvia Dev., 48 F.3d at 827.
(iv)
For the reasons discussed above, I shall grant the
County’s Motion to Dismiss and dismiss all counts of
Greenspring’s second amended complaint with prejudice.
A separate order follows.
Filed: September 27, 1999
/s/ Andre M. Davis
ANDRE M. DAVIS
United States
District Judge
App. 46
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREENSPRING
RACQUET CLUB, INC.,
oe : Civil No.
Plaintiffs AMD 99-469
V.
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MARYLAND
Defendant
ORDER
(Filed Sept. 27, 1999)
In accordance with the foregoing Memorandum, it is
this 27th day of September, 1999, ORDERED
(1) That the motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and it
is further ORDERED
(2) That the Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and
TRANSMIT a copy of this Order and the foregoing Mem-
orandum to all counsel.
/s/ Andre M. Davis
ANDRE M. DAVIS
United States
District Judge
App. 47
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, :
INC., et al., :
Plaintiffs
V.
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MARYLAND
Defendant
Civil No.
AMD 99-469
ss OOO,
MEMORANDUM
(Filed Nov. 30, 1999)
On September 27, 1999, | dismissed with prejudice
the seven count complaint brought by plaintiff Green-
spring Racquet Club, Inc.1 Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc.
v. Baltimore County, __ F.Supp.2d __, 1999 WL 1005135
(D.Md., Sep 27, 1999). Now pending is defendant Bal-
timore County’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b). On the basis of the findings and conclu-
sions set forth herein, I am persuaded that all of Green-
spring’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, [and]
without foundation.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard
County, 124 F.3d 597, 606 (4thCir. 1997). Accordingly, I
shall award attorney’s fees to the County in the amount
of $33,522.50.
1 The individual Principals of Greenspring were joined as
plaintiffs, however, the fees award made here is solely against
the corporate plaintiff, Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc.
App. 48
(i)
Greenspring brought suit on January 29, 1999, in a
disorganized eight count complaint naming ten defen-
dants. At a hearing on April 21, 1999, I dismissed the
complaint with leave to amend and with instructions to
plaintiff’s counsel to properly allege separate counts
identifying their basis in law. On May 14, 1999, Green-
spring filed a “Second Amended Complaint” alleging
seven counts against the County challenging the
County’s enforcement of County Council Bill No. 111-98
(“the Ordinance”) to prevent it from replacing its racquet
club with one or more office towers more than three
stories high.?
To summarize briefly, and reading Greenspring’s
complaint liberally as was required in respect to a motion
to dismiss, see Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), I
found that Greenspring had alleged the County applied
the Ordinance to effectuate an unconstitutional “taking”
of their property without just compensation, and to vio-
late constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws. Greenspring sought relief pur-
suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional
rights under color of state law. I dismissed with prejudice
all of plaintiff’s claims.
2 The property which is the subject of this litigation is a
parcel consisting of approximately 5.5. acres located on the east
side of Falls Road, north of Joppa Road in Baltimore County,
Maryland.
App. 49
The takings claims alleged a property interest suffi-
cient to invoke a Fifth Amendment analysis,> however,
they failed because Greenspring did not allege facts sup-
porting its assertion that it had been deprived of “sub-
stantially all of the economic value of its property as a
3 I found Greenspring had made a sufficient showing for
purposes of the motion to dismiss that it had a cognizable
property interest because it was allegedly entitled to a
nondiscretionary exemption from the Ordinance (as provided in
Section 2 thereof). See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL
1005135 at *4; see Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th
Cir. 1992). However, Greenspring alleged a series of other
affected property interests which even a cursory review of well-
established law would have discounted. For example,
Greenspring alleged a “title taking” but this was purely a
Symbolic title taking, unsupported in precedent, since
Greenspring did not allege that the County had altered or
encumbered its title in any way. Greenspring alleged the County
had taken its rights in the airspace above its property, but the
invalidity of such a Property interest has been crystal clear at
least since the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
Greenspring asserted a “vested property right” in the
development it would have been able to achieve under the
zoning law applicable to its Property prior to the enactment of
the Ordinance. However, it is well-settled in Maryland that such
a right does not vest unless the property owner had acquired a
building permit under the old law and had commenced
construction. Prince George’s County v. Sunrise, 330 Md. 297, 623
A.2d 1296 (1993); Richmond Corp. v. Board of Prince George’s
County, 254 Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969). Greenspring never
acquired a permit under the old law and had not commenced
demolition and construction. Greenspring alleged other
property interests which were just as obviously legally
unsupportable as these. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999
WL 1005135 at *3-4.
App. 50
consequence of its failure to obtain the desired exemp-
tion.” See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135
at *4. This well-established element of a takings claim
was reiterated by the Supreme Court as recently as 1996
in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1994).
The equal protection claims failed because Green-
spring alleged neither that a fundamental right had been
compromised nor an invidious motive, either of which
would have triggered heightened scrutiny.* Instead, ratio-
nal basis review was appropriate, and the County’s
actions in enacting and enforcing the Ordinance were
clearly justified by legitimate concerns about traffic con-
gestion, protection of rural zones and other land use
purposes. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d
810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995).
The procedural due process claim failed because the
projected delay of two years to pursue administrative and
judicial appeals does not constitute an unconstitutional
burden. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL
1005135 at *5. Substantive due process was not violated
because a post deprivation procedure exists which can
41 note that Greenspring has suggested in neither its
original complaint nor its amended complaint (or in its
memoranda in opposition to defendant’s motions to dismiss)
that this case involved one of that narrow class of “vindictive
action” equal protection cases recognized by some circuits. See
Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 10 (1999), 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S.
September 28, 1999). Thus, its belated citation to Olech (in its
opposition to the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees) as
providing a non-frivolous basis for one or more of its equal
protection claims is unavailing.
App. 51
rectify any wrongful deprivation, and indeed Green-
spring is pursuing that process. Id. at *6. In any event, I
found that denial of the Section 2 exemption fell “far
short of the type of state action which is ‘so arbitrary or
irrational, so unjustified by any circumstance or govern-
mental interest’ that the ‘residual protections’ of the
equal protection clause are invoked.” Id. (citing Sylvia
Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 827).
(ii)
As a preliminary matter, Greenspring asserts that the
County’s motion for attorney’s fees should not be consid-
ered because it was filed three days late. However,
because the County has demonstrated good cause that
the short, nonprejudicial delay in filing its application
was the result of excusable neglect, I exercise my discre-
tion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) to accept the fees motion.
Rule 6(b)(2) provides that: “[T]he court for cause
shown may at any time in its discretion . . . permit [a
motion to be filed after the time period specified in the
rules] when... the failure to [timely file] . . . was the
result of excusable neglect.” “Excusable neglect” is “inad-
vertence, mistake, or carelessness,” In re SPR Corp., 45
F.3d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1995) (interpreting “excusable
neglect” provision of Bankruptcy Code), which is excus-
able, “ ‘taking account of all relevant circumstances sur-
rounding the party’s omission.’” Id. (quoting Pioneer
Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Part-
nership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (interpreting “excusable
neglect” provision of Bankruptcy Code)). In particular,
courts are to exercise an equitable discretion to alter time
App. 52
limits after considering four factors: “(1) the danger of
prejudice to the . . . nonmovant, (2) the length of the
delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3)
the reason for the delay, including whether it was within
the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the
movant acted in good faith.” Id. (internal quotations
omitted).
I have considered each of these factors and I find that
they militate heavily in favor of acceptance of the
County’s motion for attorney’s fees. Greenspring does
not allege that it has been prejudiced by the County’s
three-day delay in filing its fees motion. The delay was a
brief one and had no impact on these proceedings. The
judgment of dismissal is now on appeal to the Fourth
Circuit and the minor delay has not impeded the prompt
resolution of the motion. Any appeal of the instant deci-
sion on the County’s motion for attorney’s fees might be
easily joined with the appeal on the merits of Green-
spring’s claims.
Moreover, as affirmed in the affidavit of the lead
attorney for the County, the reason for the delay was a
personal family emergency utterly beyond his control to
predict or anticipate; it was perfectly understandable that
he would temporarily be distracted from some of his
professional obligations such as the fees motion deadline
in this case. Thus, for these reasons, and because, in fact,
the attorney for the County did not rely upon his per-
sonal circumstances as an excuse to seek a long delay, I
App. 53
find that the County attorney acted in good faith. Accord-
ingly, I deem the County’s motion for attorney’s fees is
timely filed.5
(iii)
As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides in perti-
nent part, “In any action or Proceeding to enforce a
Provision of section . . . 1983... . the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs.” Because the County’s
motion to dismiss was granted on all counts, the County
was clearly the prevailing party here.
Section 1988(b) is part of the Congressional scheme to
Promote enforcement of constitutional and civil rights
law by private parties. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14
(1980); see also Christiansburg Garment Company v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (setting standard for attorney’s
fees awards to defendants in actions under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964).¢ Thus, a different standard
applies to determine whether fees will be awarded when
a defendant prevails. As the Supreme Court explained, “To
take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against
plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail
would substantially add to the risks inhering in most
litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to
5 To be sure, the County should have filed a formal motion
to enlarge time contemporaneously with the filing of its motion
for attorney’s fees.
® The same standard applies to defendants’ fees claims
under § 1988 as under Title VII. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14.
App. 54
promote vigorous enforcement...” Id. at 422. Congress
specifically intended the attorney’s fees provision to
“make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a
meritorious suit.” Id. at 420. A second factor cited by the
Supreme Court as discouraging fee awards to defendants
in civil rights suits is the fact that an attorney’s fee award
to a prevailing plaintiff is an award “against a violator of
federal law.” Id. at 418.
The absence of these factors when a defendant pre-
vails in such cases dictates that an award of attorney’s
fees to a defendant must be based on the “quite different
equitable considerations,” id. at 419, of discouraging
groundless lawsuits. Id. at 420. Hence, “a plaintiff should
not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a
court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation, even though not brought in subjec-
tive bad faith.” Id. at 421. See also DeBauche v. Trani, 191
F.3d 499, 510 (4th Cir. 1999); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124
F.3d at 606. “In applying these criteria,” the Supreme
Court cautioned, “it is important that a district court
resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc
reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not
ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreason-
able or without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at
421-22.
Applying the Christiansburg criteria to the present
case dictates a grant of attorney’s fees to the County. In
particular, Greenspring’s takings claims were without
legal foundation. Greenspring asserted numerous theo-
ries of a property interest which were unjustly infringed
by the County’s actions. Only one of these theories had
legitimate legal support. See supra n. 2 and accompanying
App. 55
text. Put even as to this theory of property interest,
Greenspring’s takings claims failed because Greenspring
failed to allege (and it could not allege) any facts support-
ing the well-established element of a takings claim that it
had been deprived of “substantially all” economic value
of its affected property. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994). Thus, I find that these takings claims were
“frivolous, unreasonable, [and] . . . without foundation.”
Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22.
Greenspring’s due process and equal protection
claims were even less well-founded. Even assuming a
future appellate reversal of a wrongful decision in the
State litigation regarding Greenspring’s property, the
alleged delay “in excess of two years” that Greenspring
anticipated in the appeals process clearly does not rise to
the level of a denial of due process. See Sylvia Dev. Corp.,
48 F.3d at 817, 827. As I explained in my earlier opinion,
Greenspring “cannot, on the one hand, demand due pro-
cess in the review of County decisions, and on the other
hand, claim that the time it would take to provide this
process renders it unconstitutional.” See Greenspring Rac-
quet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135 at *5. Likewise, Green-
spring’s substantive due process claim fell undeniably
and woefully short of the type of state action which is
““so arbitrary or irrational, so unjustified by any circum-
stance or governmental interest’ that the ‘residual protec-
tions’ of the equal protection clause are invoked.” See
Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135 at *6
(quoting Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275,
288 (4th Cir. 1998)).
Any minimally attentive law student could have told
Greenspring that its equal protection claims lacked legal
App. 56
basis. It did not allege any basis for heightened scrutiny
of the County’s actions, and those actions were clearly
justified as rationally related to legitimate land use con-
cerns. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135
at *4-*5.
At bottom, none of Greenspring’s confused bluster
about abstention could obscure the fact that its federal
lawsuit was “frivolous, unreasonable, . . . [and] without
foundation.” The mere fact that in other cases complaints
alleging materially dissimilar facts survived motions to dis-
miss (or supported reasonable requests for temporary
federal court abstention), when they were alleged in sup-
port of legal claims like those Greenspring undertook to
assert here, does not militate in favor of a finding that
Greenspring’s claims were substantially justified as rea-
sonable and non-frivolous. Accordingly, the County is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees as a
prevailing defendant in a case asserting “frivolous [and]
unreasonable [claims, wholly] without foundation.”
(iv)
The County requests attorney’s fees in the amount of
$36,829.7 In accordance with the local rules of this Court,
7 Greenspring has limited its challenge to the fees request
to the grounds discussed in the text and it has not objected in
any manner to the bona fides or genuineness of the affidavits
submitted by counsel spelling out their work in this case or the
reasonableness and necessity for the work that the County’s
attorneys performed on the County’s behalf. Furthermore,
Greenspring has not objected to the fact - and therefore I deem
Greenspring to have waived the issue — that the County has
App. 57
the County provided to Greenspring quarterly statements
documenting its intention to seek attorney’s fees at the
conclusion of the case. See Rules of the United States
District Court (Md.), Appendix B, Rules and Guidelines for
Determining Lodestar Attorneys’ Fees in Civil Rights and
Discrimination Cases, l(c). These statements indicated the
County would seek $25,605 in fees for the first quarter of
litigation, and $18,000 for the second quarter.
Though attorneys employed by the Office of the
County Attorney do not normally maintain time sheets,
the attorneys handling this case recorded their time
because, from the start, they perceived Greenspring’s
claims to be frivolous, and they decided they would lay
the foundation for the unusual measure of seeking defen-
dants’ attorney’s fees. Motion for Attorney’s Fees at 7-8.
According to these time sheets, the lead attorney on the
case, Jeffrey Grant Cook, Esq., devoted 97.4 hours to the
case during the first quarter, and 70 hours during the
second quarter of litigation. The County Attorney, Vir-
ginia W. Barnhart, Esq., a more senior member of the Bar,
expended 13.7 hours conferencing with Cook and review-
ing his papers during the first quarter.
Pursuant to local rule “only one lawyer is to be
compensated for intra-office conferences . . . [except more
used a market-rate compensation formula in its motion for
attorney’s fees, notwithstanding the fact that each of the
attorneys representing the County is one of its own salaried
employees. Cf. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL
~ CIO, Local 3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 944 F.2d
922, 934-38 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (using market-rate compensation
formula in awarding fees to salaried attorneys of union in Back
Pay Act case).
App. 58
than one. lawyer may be compensated for] periodic con-
ferences [that] are reasonably necessary for the proper
management of the litigation.” Accordingly, both Cook
and Barnhart shall be credited for the 0.8 hour strategy
conference held on February 3, 1999, at the commence-
ment of the federal litigation, and both shall be credited
for the 0.4 hour strategy conference held on March 12,
1999. The award for Cook’s time is reduced by 12.5 hours
for the additional time spent conferencing with Barnhart,
because Barnhart will be credited for that time. Thus,
Barnhart shall be credited for a total of 13.7 hours, and
Cook for 84.9 for the first quarter and 70 for the second
quarter, or a total of 154.9 hours.
John Beverungen, Esq., worked 15 hours during the
first quarter and 10 hours in the second quarter. Four
hours in the first quarter are subtracted because Cook
was already credited for attending the hearing on April
21, 1999, and local rules allow for the compensation of
only one attorney at a hearing. Id., Appendix B, 2(d).
Thus, Beverungen shall be credited for 11 hours in the
first quarter and 10 hours in the second, or 21 total hours.
Pursuant to Local Rule 109.2b, the County submitted
an affidavit to support its request for $190.00 per hour for
all attorneys, as the “the customary fee for such work in
the local community.”® That affidavit was authored by K.
8 This fee request is consistent with the guidelines in the
appendix to the local rules stating that for lawyers of more than
eight years experience, which each of these lawyers have, the
permitted hourly rate is between $190 and $225. Appendix B,
Rule 3(b). However, I grant Cook and Beverungen the lower
amount of $175 per hour in accordance with the County’s
App. 59
Donald Proctor, Esq., an attorney in private practice in
Towson, who is well-acquainted with the quality of work
performed by the County’s attorneys, and who was also
well-qualified to offer an opinion as to the prevailing
attorney’s fees in the Towson market. He attested that an
attorney of Barnhart’s experience and background would
customarily charge between $200 and $225 for her time.
Attorneys of Cook’s and Beverungen’s experience and
background would customarily charge between $175 and
$190 per hour. Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Ex. 6 p. 3. This
evidence is unrebutted. Accordingly, I calculate the
County’s fee award based upon an hourly rate for Barn-
hart of $200 and for Cook and Beverungen of $175, as
follows:
Attorney Compensable Hourly Fees
Hours Rate Awarded
Jeffrey Grant
Cook 154.9 $175 $27,107.50
John
Beverungen 21 $175 $3,675.00
Virginia
Barnhart 13.7 $200 $2,740.00
Total $33,522.50
affidavit concerning customary fees in the Towson market. I
depart from the guidelines, in part, because these rates are set
for attorney’s fees awards to plaintiffs, not defendants, in civil
rights cases, and they are based upon a survey of local attorneys
concerning “the hourly rates paid on the defense side . . . adding
an upward adjustment to account for the risk of nonpayment
faced by a plaintiff’s lawyer in the event her client does not
prevail.” Id. n. 5. Clearly, as the defendant's attorneys, Cook,
Beverungen and Barnhart are not entitled to an upward
adjustment.
App. 60
(v)
For the foregoing reasons, I grant the County’s
Motion for Attorney’s Fees and make an award in the
amount of $33,522.50. A separate order follows.
Filed: November 30, 1999 /s/ Andre M. Davis
ANDRE M. DAVIS -
United States District
Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND
GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, :
INC., et al., ~
Plaintiffs Civil No.
AMD 99-469
v.
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MARYLAND
Defendant :
» OO....
- ORDER
(Filed Nov. 30, 1999)
In accordance with the foregoing Memorandum, it is
this 30th day of November, 1999, by the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland ORDERED
(1) That the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees
is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED
App. 61
(2) That Defendant Baltimore County is AWARDED
attorney's fees in the amount of $33,522.50, AND JUDG-
MENT FOR THAT AMOUNT, THIRTY-THREE THOU-
SAND, FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO AND 50/100
DOLLARS, IS HEREBY ENTERED IN FAVOR OF BAL-
TIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND AGAINST PLAINTIFF
GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, INC., ONLY; and it is
further ORDERED
(3) That the Clerk TRANSMIT copies of the forego-
ing Memorandum and this Order to all counsel of record.
/s/ Andre M. Davis
ANDRE M. DAVIS
United States District Judge
App. 62
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, NORTHERN DIVISION
GREENSPRING RACQUET
CLUB, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MARYLAND,
)
)
)
)
) Case No. AMD99-469
)
)
)
Defendant. )
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STAY
Come now plaintiffs, pursuant to the Court’s Order
entered on April 22, 1999, and move that the Court enter
its Order staying all proceedings on plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint until the further order of the court,
except as set forth in plaintiffs’ supporting Memorandum
of Law filed concurrently herewith which is made a part
hereof by reference.
Respectfully submitted,
FREILICH, LEITNER & CARLISLE
By: /s/ Robert H. Freilich
Robert H. Freilich
4600 Madison, Suite 1000
Kansas City, MO 64112-3012
Telephone: (816) 561-4414
Facsimile: (816) 561-7931
and
App. 63
LAW OFFICES OF
PETER G. ANEGLOS, P.C.
By: /s/ H. Russell Smouse
H. Russell Smouse
Suite 300, Court Towers
Towson, Maryland 21204
Telephone: (410) 825-7300
Facsimile: (410) 296-2541
Federal Bar Number: 01367
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFFS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May, 1999,
copies of plaintiffs’ above and foregoing Motion to Stay,
were mailed by United States mail, first class postage
prepaid, addressed to defendant's following attorneys:
Virginia W. Barnhart
County Attorney
Courthouse, Second Floor
400 Washington Avenue
Towson, Maryland 21204
Jeffrey Grant Cook
Assistant County Attorney
Courthouse, Second Floor
400 Washington Avenue
Towson, Maryland 21204
App. 64
John E. Beverungen
Assistant County Attorney
Courthouse, Second Floor
400 Washington Avenue
Towson, Maryland 21204
/s/ Robert H. Freilich
Attorney for Plaintiffs
PU eT ry
App. 65
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, NORTHERN DIVISION
GREENSPRING RACQUET
CLUB, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
BALTIMORE COUNTY,
MARYLAND,
)
)
)
)
) Case No. AMD99-469
)
)
)
Defendant. )
PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION TO STAY
Introduction
Concurrently with the filing of plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint in this action, and as suggested by
the Court at the hearing held on April 21, 1999, plaintiffs
have also filed a new state court action in the Circuit
Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, which sets forth
causes of action solely under the laws and Constitution of
the State of Maryland. A copy of that state court com-
plaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A.
As an Examination of plaintiffs’ respective new state
complaint and federal complaint will confirm, and again
being responsive to the Court’s suggestion, it is plaintiffs’
intention (1) first to litigate to a conclusion all of its
claims under Maryland law in the state court, and (2)
only then, after exhausting all of its state court remedies,
to litigate its instant federal claims of facial, as applied
and ripe Constitutional violations, if it is still necessary to
do so.
App. 66
The Court will note that the same fact issues are
involved in both pending proceedings. This is precisely
why Your Honor dismissed without prejudice Case No.
AMD 99-231. See, Order dated April 22, 1999, and partial
transcript of the April 21, 1999 hearing, p. 9, attached
hereto as Exhibit B*.
As the Court informed counsel at the time, Exhibit B,
p. 8:
... [P}laintiff will be given leave to institute an
action in state court in the nature of inverse
condemnation, or whatever they want to call it.
... And you will proceed in state court with an
express reservation so you don’t run into a res
judicata or a collateral estoppel bar — well, col-
lateral estoppel maybe, but you won’t run into a
res judicata bar. An then, when all is said and done
in state court, then you will come back, and we will
proceed with your facial claim, your as-applied
claim, and your now ripe takings claim. (Emphasis
supplied)
Discussion
Although the Court contemplated that some of plain-
tiffs’ federal claims might be challenged pursuant to a
Rule 12(b) (6) motion, it acknowledged that “other fed-
eral claims will be stayed” pending the outcome of the
state court action which has now been filed. Exhibit B, p.
* During the hearing, the Court inadvertently referred to
its intended dismissal without prejudice of Case No. AMD
99-469 when it meant Case No. 99-231. Exhibit B, p. 9.
Presumably, the correct reference is reflected in the Order as
entered.
eared
App. 67
8. Plaintiffs submit, however, that an order staying fur-
ther proceedings on all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, not
just some of them, should be entered.
Without reiterating all of the arguments advanced by
the parties previously, it is evident that it is the Court's
hope that, as a result of the concurrent state court litiga-
tion, it may become unnecessary to proceed with the
instant action at all. If plaintiffs do prevail in the state
court action, that will certainly be the case.
Given the non-prejudicial nature of the dismissal of
Case No. AMD 99-231, it is equally evident that the Court
desires to stay further proceedings in this case or, stated
otherwise, to abstain from addressing plaintiffs’ federal
claims consistent with a so-called Pullman abstention. In
Railroad Commission of Texas v. Puilman Co. 312 U.S. 496, 61
S. Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), the Supreme Court ruled
that such an abstention is indeed proper where, as here,
(1) a sensitive area of social policy is involved that the
district court does not want to consider if avoidable; (2) a
state court ruling could obviate the need for such a fed-
eral adjudication; and (3) the proper resolution of the
state court issues remains uncertain pending the outcome
of the state court action.
As noted in Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of
Alexandria, 680 F.Supp. 222, 225 (E.D. Va. 1988), a Pullman
abstention “is closely related to the ripeness issue,” the
very thing this Court expressed its concern about. Cf,,
Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).
App. 68
In indicating its willingness to consider a stay, the
Court was obviously mindful, as noted in Northwest For-
est Resource Council v. Robertson, 711 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Or.
1989), that whether to stay an action, until the resolution
of a similar action in another court, is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court. Where many of
the identical issues are involved, Northwest Forest notes, a
stay is appropriate. See also, EFCO Corp. v. Aluma Sys-
tems, USA; Inc., 983 F.Supp. 816 (S.D.lowa 1997)
Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Intern. Inc., 954
F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1197) also ruled that a stay was
within the inherent power of the court based on the
pendency of a related proceeding in another jurisdiction.
Among the relevant factors enumerated in Evergreen
which support the granting of a stay are: the similarity of
parties and issues; the promotion of judicial efficiency;
the adequacy of relief available in other forum; fairness to
and convenience of the parties and counsel; the possi-
bility of prejudice to the parties; and the temporal
sequence of the filing of the actions. Although no one
factor is dispositive, it is apparent that virtually all of
them are present in the instant case.
Cited in Evergreen, is the seminal case of Colorado
River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
814, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483, 496 (1973), where the
Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of federal absten-
tion is particularly appropriate in cases involving, as does
the instant case, federal constitutional issues which might
be mooted or later presented in a different posture by
reason of a state court determination of pertinent state
law.
App. 69
I. was further ruled in Colorado River that in deciding
whether to stay an action in favor of parallel litigation in
a state court, “a federal court should consider ‘wise judi-
cial administration, .. . conservation of judicial
resources, and comprehensive disposition of litigation.”
Id. at 424 U.S. 817, 96 S.Ct. 1246.
In short, the sound exercise of the Court’s discretion
in this case clearly justifies the entry of a stay for all of
the above cited reasons.
Where state administrative or judicial remedies need
to be exhausted to pursue 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions for as
applied land use claims alleging the violation of federal
due process and equal protection rights, a federal court
can enter a stay to await the conclusion of state court
proceedings. Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia,
135 F.3d 275, 282 (4th Cir. 1998). At that time, a plaintiff's
federal claims can be litigated, if necessary, where, as
here, an England reservation has been asserted.
About one thing the parties will not doubt agree.
Given the unsettled posture of both the state and federal
actions, no useful purpose will be served by rehashing
issues that might not have to be addressed. More than
enough time and “lawyering” have already been invested
by both sides. Therefore, plaintiffs submit that a review
of all federal issues in the instant case should be stayed
pending the outcome of the state court litigation, includ-
ing a review of plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim
regarding which the Court expressed skepticism.
Defendant should, of course, be required to file its
answer or otherwise timely respond to plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint. If it so elects, it might even be
App. 70
allowed to file a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss. Plain-
tiffs suggest, however, that supporting and opposing
Memoranda of Law should not be required at this time,
pending the outcome of the state court litigation. In the
event the necessity of ruling on any of the federal issues
is hereafter obviated, there is no reason to further impose
on the Court’s time now.
Conclusion
For each of the above reasons, all further proceedings
herein should be stayed, provided, however, defendant
should be required to file its Answer or otherwise
respond to plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with
the understanding that (1) supporting and opposing
Memoranda of Law, and (2) consideration by the Court of
any Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss will also be stayed
until further Order of th
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