Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore County

Supreme Court brief2001

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No. 01227 iy ra 9 20M

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

°

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, INC.;

WILLIAM HIRSHFELD; and LORETTA HIRSHFELD,

Petitioners,

BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,

a body corporate and Politic,

Respondents.

S

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The-Fourth Circuit

¢

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

Rosert H. FReticn* Juurus W. LicHTER

Jason M. Drve.siss Court Towers, Suite 300

FREILICH, LEITNER & 210 W. Pennsylvania

CARLISLE Avenue

4600 Madison, Suite 1000 Towson, MD 21204

Kansas City, MO 64112 (410) 825-7300

(816) 561-4414

*Counsel of Record for Petitioners

January 26, 2001

ISSeP

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether a regulatory takings claim based on a land

use ordinance’s failure to substantially advance a

legitimate state interest is categorically barred when-

ever the regulation is an “ordinary zoning restriction”

limiting height and density and when “statements by

local lawmakers set out legitimate reasons” for

imposing the height and density restrictions? (App.

12-13, 14).

In light of Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, is a land use

ordinance creating irrational and wholly arbitrary

classifications and motivated by malice, bad faith and

retaliatory intent immune from a claim that it violates

the equal protection clause?

In light of Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v.

Hamilton Bank, may federal causes of action be dis-

missed for failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted notwithstanding litigant’s request to

stay all proceedings in federal court until the causes

of action are “ripened” in state court and litigant’s

express “reservation” in the state action of all federal

claims which may be subsequently pursued?

li

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

AND RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

All parties are listed in the caption.

Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. has neither parent

nor subsidiary companies.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

i ar ale a k's i

PUES GD EMO THOCROTIGB. oc ccc cccccccccccccccecce ii

aie ncclarichceskeeéasosceceas. iii

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pe alain ind baie 6:d.d6.00.40.0.6.0606 0a ees 1

PGT a Sects beccccasvassced Se er ere 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-

PUTT th edadep badges oeescuns¢esasscanees 2

WRPURUEUEEUE GO REE CAGE... ccc cccccccsccceces 2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT....................05. 7

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 11

I. THE STANDARDS GOVERNING THE

REQUIREMENT THAT A REGULATION SUB-

STANTIALLY ADVANCE LEGITIMATE STATE

INTERESTS IS AN IMPORTANT AND RECUR-

RING QUESTION OF REGULATORY TAKINGS

LAW THAT HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED BY

eee ceeh edbenkbaeesereresece ss 11

A. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS COM-

PLETELY NEGATED THE “SUBSTAN-

TIALLY ADVANCE” TEST FOR

REGULATORY TAKINGS ESTABLISHED

IN AGINS V. CITY OF TIBURON BY

HOLDING THAT THE MERE ENUNCIA-

TION OF A LEGITIMATE STATE INTER-

EST SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT

THAT THE REGULATION SUBSTAN-

TIALLY ADVANCE THAT INTEREST.... 15

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

Il. IN DISMISSING GREENSPRING’S EQUAL

PROTECTION COUNTS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN

BE GRANTED THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

IGNORED THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT IN

VILLAGE OF WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH ..... 20

III. GREENSPRING IS A CASUALTY OF THE

CONFLICT AND CONFUSION AMONG THE

CIRCUIT COURTS ABOUT HOW TO PRO-

CEDURALLY ACHIEVE THIS COURT’S WIL-

LIAMSON COUNTY REQUIREMENT THAT

PROPERTY OWNERS “RIPEN” THEIR CON-

STITUTIONAL CLAIMS BY SEEKING RELIEF

IN STATE COURT BEFORE PURSUING AN

ACTION IN FEDERAL COURT............... 22

COPPA Shobhan ccedercceussssereshrucwsehes 28

Appendix

FourtH Circutr FIiincs:

PIO gov cc cnnccncnvestnndnsnncevenshaaus gant App. 1

District OF MARYLAND FIINGs:

Order Granting Motion to Dismiss Original

Action With Leave to File an Amended Com-

plaint and Motion to Stay................... App. 25

Memorandum and Order Granting Motion to

CIID os cbc cctscsccnscsscssannqesséscesvecs App. 27

Memorandum and Order Granting Motion for

AMOUROS FOB. occ oc ccdccccsnnccconcscosecs App. 47

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENTS — Continued

PLEADINGS:

Plaintiffs’ Motion to Stay and Memorandum in

OTE os pn nnigna na caenpee vane di ah vaneev nant App.

Second Amended Complaint .................. App

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES:

BORD Fee ED abc canrenresecaceus App.

The Fourteenth Amendment .................. App

BP Was a sere cbc devas sva ceteturnesiy App.

ee | Me PeeeT Terre ty ere Orr rere ere App.

Oe ek a a id hk bho od one dae nene cae el App.

Se Ree I oe Oi ook uk ua cole chs tae App.

JURISDICTIONAL STATUTE:

ee Rea BREED wad ccd arscndnctsvdseterenin App.

Page

120

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) ..... passim

Bennis v. Michigan Dept. of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154

i fo B. ( PrPPrrrrrrrrirrrrrri ir Tere 22

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey,

526 US. 667 (1999) ..ccccccccccess 8, 9, 12, 13, 14, 17

Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States,

426 US. GOO (2GTS) onc ccvncccccccccccesscesesccsss 26

Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th

Che, BRGR) cccccccuscesssecesskisecousscetaauucussé 22

Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.

BODE x na vccecs cdvcuccensssesuehubesdusdaavauaes 24, 25

Dodd v. Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir.

BOSE s oc cccccennescacceccebanneasanneeeatielsaaue 25

Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) ...12, 17, 18

Fields v. Sarasota - Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d

S20) CRUG Coe, BOR co vccecccsccccvccesens 24, 25, 26

First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County

of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) ............. 14, 15

Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v.

Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275 (4th Cir.

ODEs a cccvcvecnceccenssceveccscusaacsnaees 25, 26, 27

Herrington v. County of Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989) ....... 22

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).............0005 18

Hoehne v. County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529 (9th

CO SOD kas bcccccvansseunsceecekauusedescewenieten 10

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Bd., 531 F.2d 1331

Ge Ge, Ts bc 0 566i 656 she bc ce cede de sindeeesens 25

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)..... 18

Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th

Ge BOOED és weRecceddeccesddascdadedecsbameeeteese. 22

Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. De Benedictis, 480

Sh GW GUND 6 wacecnsndctensessundistccecs 8, 12, 18

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S.

Ge UNE hn 0b sb ntneechanctadeduénccsaesasctsesses 18

Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.

ED GUUUEE 6 ccc cccncddcnccutacsancsacessvancs passim

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477

Sh DU NEE d bc ccccteutndbicecsucsbabscneues 10, 18

Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) ............ 11

Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 _.

6At ctenecthkeest chesetasen 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20

Peduto v. City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (3rd

Git ME FA WdeRasectccndtcbhevandestédbeceds cesses 24

Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438

Se EE SE ee én ennedns ccentunsestudes oss des 11, 17

Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) ......... 12

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)

i ducedheats head kb abaeineans vanneecurées shen 15, 17, 18

Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.

ee eae ba hb sacecckibichidebateadencanneeddas 26

Rainey Brothers Construction Co., Inc. v. Memphis

and Shelby County Bd. of Adjustment, 967 F.Supp.

ok rr rrr re 24

Viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Rocky Mountain Mat. & Asph., Inc. v. Board of

County Comm'rs of El Paso County, 972 F.2d 309

COE GA. IS hn cn snnsccnseeeceecacunseanns

San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,

GD TED GE. CHO 6 oc cdcnccescccccccscscnaves

Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932)........

United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474

GE GEE CUE ches eecnbscccocecbussercachanss

Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th

Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988) ....

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)

canbubesshsaseeens bAabeeesseceenns 9, 10, 20, 21,

Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs, 142 F.3d

ee Ee rrr ree

Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton

Bank, 473 US. 172 (1905) ... 2 cccvcccccccccsces

Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992)...9, 12,

PUBLICATIONS:

Berger, The “Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use

Cases or How the Supreme Court Converted Federal

Judges into Fruit Peddlers, InstrruTE ON PLANNING,

ZONING AND EMINENT Domain Ch. 7 (1991) .....

Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial

Regulation of Constitutionally Protected Property

Rights, 29 Cat. West L. Rev. 1 (1992)..........

Page

22, 28

passim

18, 20

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Meacham, The Williamson Trap, 32 Urb. Law. 239

GE SE 50h es che bas csictaces seed eeeuedban on. 23

Meltz, Merriam & Frank, THE Taxincs Issue (Island

FY SNS bk ed Kd hdd 660 00d sh eKee eR eRe esses 24, 25

Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in Federal

Court: The State Compensation Requirement and

Principles of Res Judicata, 24 Urb. Law. 479 (1992) .... 24

Roberts, RirENEss AND Forum SELECTION IN LAND-UsE

LITIGATION IN TAKINGS: LAND-DEVELOPMENT CONDI-

TIONS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS AFTER DOLAN AND

Lucas (ABA, Callies, ed., 1996) ................... 24

Strong, Mandelker, and Kelly, Property Rights and

Takings, 62 J. AM. PLAN. Ass’N (1996).............. 19

LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL:

Private Property Rights Implementation Act: Hearings

on H.R. 1534 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and

Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on the

Judiciary, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-4 (1997)......... 10

A hind CN AAA EUR SIS IN itt Nn eel Ve nmr

Saree

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. and William and

Loretta Hirshfeld respectfully petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari to review a final judgment and order of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

&

OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals

was filed on October 31, 2000, and was not recommended

for publication; it appears at App. 1-24 to this Petition.

On January 3, 2001, a motion by Respondents to publish

the Fourth Circuit’s opinion was denied. The decision of

the district court was filed on September 27, 1999 and is

reported as Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. v. Baltimore

County, 70 F.Supp.2d 598 (D.Md. 1999); it appears at App.

27-46 to this Petition.

JURISDICTION

This case arises from the lower courts’ refusal to

follow principles of regulatory takings and equal protec-

tion law as decided by this Court as well as the lower

courts’ failure to recognize their obligation to abstain

from deciding the merits of claims which, pursuant to the

directives of this Court, must first be fully litigated in

state court before federal jurisdiction is conferred. The

Fourth Circuit’s opinion was entered on October 31, 2000.

This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

¢

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion provides in pertinent part: “nor shall private prop-

erty be taken for public use, without just compensation.”

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United

States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “nor shall

any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without the due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution, along with pertinent federal statutes,

are reproduced in App. 109-120.

+

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. and Wil-

liam and Loretta Hirshfeld (collectively “Greenspring”)

have battled Baltimore County, Maryland (“the County”)

for several years for the right to redevelop a 5.5 acre

parcel of land within an established, major commercial

office center. The Property is owned by the Hirshfelds

and leased to Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. which,

since 1976, has operated a tennis club on the site. In June

1998, Greenspring amended the original site plan to pro-

pose razing the aging tennis barn and construct in its

place two adjoining office buildings of five and six stories

with attached parking facilities. (App. 4). Greenspring’s

redevelopment efforts were thwarted by various efforts

of the County; the most onerous being an arbitrary and

irrational legislative enactment designed to single out

Sh et RD ae aS aa di Mgt NCE DU SARL Behe age 6 AL ath

Spyies nS alee SRN

Greenspring’s property. Such ordinance was the result of

conspiratorial collaboration between the County and cer-

tain adjacent and nearby property owners who were,

based upon their own economic self-interests, opposed to

Greenspring’s project. (App. 89, { 44). The district court

found and the Fourth Circuit affirmed that, as a matter of

law, this restrictive Ordinance although enacted in bad

faith retaliation to Greenspring’s redevelopment initia-

tive, substantially adwanced a legitimate state interest

and thus failed to state a facial claim for a regulatory

taking. The courts also held that Greenspring’s allega-

tions of arbitrariness and bad faith were insufficient to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted under

the equal protection clause. Because Greenspring did not

prevail in the Fourth Circuit they seek relief from this

Court for the constitutional errors committed by the

lower courts.

A. Factual Background.

Since 1976 Greenspring has operated a tennis club

consisting of a single, corrugated steel tennis barn struc-

ture on the subject property. In 1998 Greenspring under-

took what would become a futile attempt to utilize the

full potential of the Property’s “Business Major” (“BM”)

zoning classification which permits, as a matter of right,

office buildings as high as 100 feet with a maximum floor

area ratio (“FAR”) of 4.0.

After amending the previously approved 1975 tennis

club site plan to reflect the office building redevelopment,

Greenspring went to the Baltimore County Development

Review Committee (“DRC”) seeking an exemption

(“(b)(9) exemption”) from portions of the development

plan approval process which would allow them to pro-

ceed directly to building permit. (App. 5). Although

Greenspring demonstrated compliance with all the

requirements for this exemption, the request was denied.

In response to Greenspring’s redevelopment pro-

posal and at the behest of Greenspring’s self-interested

neighboring property owners, the County adopted on

October 5, 1998 Bill 111-98 (“the Ordinance”). (App. 89,

{ 44; 91, { 50). The Ordinance restricts building heights

to 35 feet and a maximum FAR of .5.! Its restrictions,

however, apply only to property such as Greenspring’s

zoned “Business Major” (“BM”), “Business Light” (“BL”),

or “Business Rural” (“BR”) when the exterior wall of any

proposed building lies within 750 feet of a “Resource

Conservation Zone.” (App. 5). Property zoned “Office

Building - Residential” (“OR”), “Office and Technology”

(“OT”), “Manufacturing Light” (“ML”), “Manufacturing

Heavy” (“MH”) or “Manufacturing Light, Restricted”

(“MLR”), which permit similar or more intensive uses

than those permitted in business zones, were unaffected

by the Ordinance regardless of how close a building may

be to a Resource Conservation Zone. (App. 81, {{ 19-20).

The Ordinance destroyed Greenspring’s office develop-

ment capacity and fails to substantially advance its

avowed purpose of protecting resource conservation

zones. (App. 83, { 25). Such failure is occasioned by the

very terms of the Ordinance which prevent a BM zoned

property from constructing a building that exceeds 35

1 The impact of the ordinance on Greenspring’s property

was to reduce the property’s use and value by 95.6%. (App. 9).

|

feet and .5 FAR within 750 feet of a Resource Conserva-

tion Zone while permitting, without exception, construc-

tion of buildings far in excess of those limits immediately

adjacent to a Resource Conservation Zone so long as it is

zoned office or manufacturing. This scheme creates an

irrational and arbitrary classification that fails to advance

any legitimate government interest. (App. 97, { 63).

Following the adoption of Bill 111-98, Greenspring

requested a rezoning from BM to “Office/Residential-2”

(“OR-2”) so as to be removed from the scope of the

ordinance. The Baltimore County Planning Board denied

Greenspring’s request in March of 1999. (App. 6). Green-

spring again sought relief from the DRC by seeking both

a (b)(9) exemption which would permit Greenspring to

proceed directly to building permit and an exemption

under Bill 111-98 which would allow redevelopment

within the same “footprint” as the existing improvement

so long as the new building had equal or less square

footage per story as the existing building. To support this

request, Greenspring submitted a revised site plan for

one eight-story office building with attached parking that

met all the requirements for a “footprint exemption”. In

May of 1999 the DRC held an open meeting to consider

both requests for relief and failed to grant either remedy.

(App. 6-7).

B. Judicial Proceedings.

On June 26, 1998, Greenspring filed a complaint in

the Circuit Court for Baltimore County seeking man-

damus, declaratory and injunctive relief from the DRC’s

denial of its original request for a (b)(9) exemption. (App.

5). After the County adopted Bill 111-98 Greenspring

amended the complaint to include damage and compen-

sation claims based on the Ordinance’s failure to advance

any legitimate state interests, creation of irrational and

arbitrary classifications, and the retaliatory, bad faith.

motive for the Ordinance. To preserve its federal causes

of action for later review in federal court, Greenspring

included a “Jennings-Fields Reservation” of those claims.

(App. 6).

In February 1999, the County removed the state court

case to federal district court where it was dismissed with

leave to file an amended complaint and with leave “to

seek a stay pending exhaustion of all state law claims” in

a newly filed state court action. (App. 25-26). Greenspring

filed an amended complaint in district court (App.

74-109) and requested a stay pending resolution of the state

court action. (App. 62-73). The amended complaint

alleged, inter alia, that Bill 111-98 on its face and as

applied to Greenspring’s property effected a taking of the

property without just compensation because it was

adopted in bad faith and in retaliation to Greenspring’s

development application (App. 91, { 50), and therefore,

did not substantially advance a legitimate state interest as

required under Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255

(1980). The amended complaint also alleged that the

Ordinance, on its face and as applied to Greenspring’s

Property, violated the equal protection clause because it

treated similarly situated properties with the same poten-

tial for endangering Resource Conservation Zones differ-

ently as the result of personal ill will, bad faith and

retaliatory intent to harm Greenspring. (App. 97, { 63-64).

Greenspring’s remaining counts sought relief for viola-

tion of procedural due process, economic taking of the

Property based upon the as-applied effects of the ordi-

nance, and violation of substantive due process, both

facial and as applied.

On June 7, 1999 the County filed a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss. Wholly ignoring Greenspring’s pro-

tests and Motion to Stay, the district court dismissed the

entire amended complaint with prejudice (App. 27-46),

and granted thereafter an award of attorney’s fees to the

County pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988. (App. 47-61).

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the

district court’s dismissal on all counts except Green-

spring’s as-applied takings claim which the Fourth Cir-

cuit held should not have been dismissed because it was

not yet ripe and therefore the court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction. (App. 12). For the same reason, the Fourth

Circuit vacated the award of attorney’s fees since such

award necessarily included legal fees attributable to

Greenspring’s as-applied taking claim which could not be

adjudged frivolous for want of subject matter jurisdiction

over it. (App. 23).

¢-—

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

In affirming the district court’s dismissal, the Court of

Appeals found, as a matter of law, that land use ordi-

nances are immune from takings claims under the first

prong of Agins if a legitimate reason for the ordinance is

given by a single legislator. In the words of the court “[t]he

height and density limits contained in Bill 111-98 are ordi-

nary zoning restrictions and, quite obviously, they sub-

stantially advance a legitimate state interest... . ” (App.

12-13). Furthermore, in the Fourth Circuit’s opinion,

“[w]hen statements by local lawmakers set out legitimate

reasons for imposing height and density restrictions on

property in a particular class of zones, there can be no

claim in federal court that the law fails to substantially

advance a legitimate purpose.” (App. 14). The Court of

Appeals’ analysis of the first prong of Agins began and

ended with the initial step of finding a legitimate state

interest for adopting the regulation. It clearly ignored the

legal and factual issues to be determined in the second

step — whether the regulation adopted substantially

advances the legitimate state interest.

It has long been recognized by this Court that a land

use regulation effects a taking of property if (1) the regu-

lation fails to substantially advance a legitimate state

interest; or (2) the regulation denies a property owner

economically viable use of his land. See, e.g., Agins, 447

U.S. at 260; Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De Benedictis,

480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-16 (1992); City of Monterey v.

Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999).

Although no standard has ever been provided by this

Court regarding the nature of the requirement that a land

use ordinance substantially advance a legitimate public

interest, it is intuitive that this Court intended the stan-

dard to garner more respect than that afforded by the

Fourth Circuit.

aia

If the Fourth Circuit’s opinion is an accurate state-

ment of regulatory takings law, proclamations of legiti-

mate reasons for adopting land use ordinances may serve

as the pretext for bad faith, retaliatory or corrupt legisla-

tive motives and will automatically defeat any taking

claim based upon a failure to substantially advance a

legitimate state interest. Unmitigated deference to the

stated rationale of local governments is antithetical to this

Court’s repeated pronouncement that regulatory takings

cases “necessarily entail complex factual assessments of

the purposes and economic effects of government

actions.” Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992).

This Court in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at

Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999) rejected such immunity in

the context of “land-use decisions” as “contrary to settled

regulatory takings principles.” Id. at 707. To accept such

immunity for land use regulations would be equally con-

trary to established regulatory takings principles and

should be rejected.

Petitioners urge the Court to either clarify the stan-

dards applicable to the “substantially advance” test of

Agins or overrule Agins and Del Monte Dunes and every

other decision by this Court which recites the principle of

substantial advancement.

In holding that Greenspring’s allegations of arbitrary

classifications motivated by personal ill will, bad faith,

and retaliatory intent were insufficient to state an equal

protection claim, the Fourth Circuit ignored the impor-

tance of this Court’s recent decision in Village of Wil-

lowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). After accurately

10

stating the holding in-Olech that allegations of an “irra-

tional and wholly arbitrary” zoning decision were suffi-

cient to state an equal protection claim, the Fourth Circuit

circuitously stated that “[b]ecause the local zoning deci-

sion at issue in the instant case is not ‘irrational and

wholly arbitrary,’ Greenspring’s complaint is easily dis-

tinguished from the complaint at issue in Olech.” (App. 17

n.4). Instead of evaluating whether Greenspring’s allega-

tions, deemed true under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, stated a

sufficient claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the

Fourth Circuit made a conclusory determination on the

merits of the case and on that basis adjudged the allega-

tions insufficient. This result is patently inconsistent with

the Olech decision. The Court should take this oppor-

tunity to define and clarify the true import of Olech and

overturn the Fourth Circuit's opinion as being in clear

conflict with that decision.

The circuitous enigma that is the ripeness doctrine

poses a substantial obstacle to property owners in consti-

tutional land use cases and if wrongly applied can pose

“a trap” for the unwary who seek to comply with its

requirements.? Despite their cautionary attempt to

2 See, e.g., Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v. Hamilton

Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (“Williamson County”); MacDonald,

Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Hoehne v.

County of San Benito, 870 F.2d 529, 532 (9th Cir. 1989) (“ruling

case law makes it very difficult to open the federal courthouse

door for relief from state and local land use decisions.”); Private

Property Rights Implementation Act: Hearings on H.R. 1534 Before

the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House

Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-4 (1997)

(discussing survey results which indicate 81% of as-applied

takings claims decided in lower federal courts between 1990

11

—_—

negotiate the procedural thicket spawned by this Court's

decision in Williamson County Reg. Plan. Comm'n v. Ham-

ilton Bank and the Circuit Courts’ attempt to implement

its directives, Greenspring was denied the opportunity to

litigate its federal causes of action. The Court's clarifica-

tion and guidance is urgently needed so lower courts can

accurately apply Williamson County and litigants can uti-

lize the correct procedures to preserve federal claims for

adjudication in federal court after first ripening those

claims in state court.

+

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

lL. THE STANDARDS GOVERNING THE REQUIRE-

MENT THAT A REGULATION SUBSTANTIALLY

ADVANCE LEGITIMATE STATE INTERESTS IS AN

IMPORTANT AND RECURRING QUESTION OF

REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW THAT HAS NOT

BEEN SETTLED BY THIS COURT

In Agins, this Court held that “[t]he application of a

general zoning law to particular property effects a taking

‘€ the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate

state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188

(1928), or denies an owner economically viable use of his

land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438

U.S. 104, 138, n.36 (1978).” Agins, 447 U.S. at 260

(emphasis supplied). In the twenty years since Agins was

decided, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the

and 1997 never reached the merits and more than 50% of those

who pursued appeals had their takings claims dismissed as

unripe).

12

case accurately states regulatory takings law. See San

Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 647

(1981); United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474

U.S. 121, 126 (1985); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. De

Benedictis, 480 U.S. at 485; Nollan v. California Coastal

Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Pennell v. City of San

Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 18 (1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S.

at 534; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at

1015-16; Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994);

City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S.

at 704. However, in these twenty years of repeated cita-

tion to the case and its two pronged takings analysis “this

Court has [never] provided . . . a thorough explanation of

the nature or applicability of the requirement that a regu-

lation substantially advance legitimate public interests

outside the context of required dedications or exactions.”

- Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 704.5 There has certainly

been instructive discussion of the issue, but the time has

come for the Court to clarify the standards necessary to

“substantially advance legitimate state interests.”

In Nollan, this Court recognized that “[o]ur cases

have not elaborated on the standards for determining

. . what type of connection between the regulation and

the state interest satisfies the requirement that the former

‘substantially advance’ the latter,” but offered a clear

statement of what type of connection did not satisfy the

3 The nature and applicability of the “substantially

advance” test in the context of required dedications and

exactions is discussed at length in Nollan v. California Coastal

Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), and Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.

374 (1994).

13

requirement. 483 U.S. at 834. The level of connection must

be greater than the deferential “rational basis” standard

employed in due process and equal protection analysis.

Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3. In the instant case, neither the

district court nor the Fourth Circuit even so much as

applied a rational basis level of scrutiny. Their analysis

began and ended with the initial step of finding a legiti-

mate state interest for the local government's adoption of

the regulation. It clearly ignored the logical and legally

required second step of determining whether the regula-

tion actually adopted substantially advanced that inter-

est.

Ini Del Monte Dunes, the Court undertook an examina-

tion of whether the issue of “substantially advancing”

was a question of fact for a jury to decide or whether it

could be decided as a matter of law by the court, and

found that the “narrow, factbound question” of “whether,

when viewed in light of the context and protracted his-

tory of the development application process, the city’s

decision to reject a particular development plan bore a

reasonable relationship to its proffered justifications” was

properly submitted to the jury. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.

at 721. However, the Court qualified its decision with the

caveat that “we do not attempt a precise demarcation of

the respective provinces of judge and jury in determining

whether a zoning decision substantially advances legiti-

mate governmental interests.” Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S.

at 722. The Fourth Circuit zeroed in on the Court’s deter-

mination to reserve that question in Del Monte Dunes and

gave the decision an extremely narrow reading.

14

In the opinion of the Fourth Circuit, Del Monte Dunes

did not establish the principle that substantially advanc-

ing a legitimate state interest is an issue of fact to be

resolved by a jury. (App. 14). Rather, it established only

the factual nature of whether a particular land use decision

substantially advances a legitimate state interest. (App.

14). The court went on to forecast a trite “parade of

horribles” that would be occasioned if “the federal court-

house [were opened] to a veritable flood of local land use

litigation by putting every [allegation of failure to sub-

stantially advance a legitimate government purpose]

before a jury.” (App. 14). The remedy, according to the

Fourth Circuit, is to completely ban from federal court all

regulatory takings claims based on the first prong of the

long recognized standard set forth in Agins. On its face

this remedy is preposterous, but so is the prognosticated

“parade of horribles.”

Similar fears were voiced by the Los Angeles County

and amici in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v.

County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) where the

county argued that municipalities would be unable to

effectively govern if just compensation was a mandatory

remedy for regulatory takings. This Court rejected the

county’s argument and mandated monetary compensa-

tion stating:

We realize that even our present holding will

undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom

and flexibility of land-use planners and govern-

ing bodies of municipal corporations when

enacting land-use regulations. But such conse-

quences necessarily flow from any decision

upholding a claim of constitutional right; many

of the provisions of the Constitution are

15

designed to limit the flexibility and freedom of

governmental authorities, and the Just Compen-

sation Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of

them. As Justice Holmes aptly noted more than

50 years ago, “a strong public desire to improve

the public condition is not enough to warrant

achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the

constitutional way of paying for the change.”

Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416

(1922).

First English, 482 U.S. at 321. A similar response to the

exaggerated, “flood gate” prognostications and alarmist

decision of the Fourth Circuit is warranted in this case.

It is imperative for the Court to address this issue

directly and either clarify the standards of the “substan-

tially advance” test of Agins or overrule Agins, and the

subsequent reliance on Agins, in every regulatory takings

decision of this Court.

A. THE FOURTH CIRCUIT HAS COMPLETELY

NEGATED THE “SUBSTANTIALLY

ADVANCE” TEST FOR REGULATORY TAK-

INGS ESTABLISHED IN AGINS V. CITY OF

TIBURON BY HOLDING THAT THE MERE

ENUNCIATION OF A LEGITIMATE STATE

INTEREST SATISFIES THE REQUIREMENT

THAT THE REGULATION SUBSTANTIALLY

ADVANCE THAT INTEREST

According to the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit,

where a regulatory taking claim is made under the first

prong of Agins, a standard “long recognized” (Nollan, 483

U.S. at 834) and referred to on “numerous occasions”

(Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016) as the standard for determining

16

whether a regulation violates the takings clause, the con-

stitution offers only token protection because “ordinary

zoning restrictions . . . quite obviously . . . substantially

advance a legitimate state interest.” (App. 12-13). The

Agins test for regulatory takings is further eviscerated by

the Fourth Circuit’s additional finding that, “[w]hen

statements by local lawmakers set out legitimate reasons

for imposing height and density restrictions on property

in a particular class of zones, there can be no claim in

federal court that the law fails to substantially advance a

legitimate purpose.” (App. 14). What local lawmaking

body will not from this point forward, if they haven’t

already, make it a routine practice to give lip service to

some plausible (if not wholly pretextual) reason for enact-

ing a regulation? The Fourth Circuit has made into law a

roadmap for local governments to avoid any meaningful

scrutiny of their regulations, even if motivated by bad

faith, retaliatory intent or corruption, by pronouncing

boiler plate language concerning the state’s interest.

This Court addressed a remarkably similar situation

in Lucas in responding to the dissent’s view that even in

cases where a property owner is denied all beneficial uses

of his land the standard for requiring just compensation

is whether a harm-preventing justification was recited by

the legislature.

Since such a justification can be formulated in

practically every case, this amounts to a test of

whether the legislature has a stupid staff. We

think the Takings Clause requires courts to do

more than insist upon artful harm-preventing

characterizations.

17

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1025 n.12.4 The precise analysis is_

applicable here. By making the de facto standard for what

constitutes “substantially advancing” a legitimate gov-

ernment interest wholly dependent upon the mere recita-

tion of a legitimate reason for the regulation, the Fourth

Circuit has made the first prong of Agins “a test of

whether the legislature has a stupid staff.” Certainly the

Agins Court, and every decision of this Court that has

restated the Agins standard, intended more than this cur-

sory level of examination.

This Court’s takings jurisprudence is replete with

references to the takings analysis as dependent upon the

particular facts and circumstances of the case from Penn-

sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)

through Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)

and Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. at 720 (“Almost from the

inception of our regulatory takings doctrine, we have

held that whether a regulation of property goes so far

that ‘there must be an exercise of eminent domain and

compensation to sustain the act . . . depends upon the

4In Nollan, this Court emphasized that the Fifth

Amendment is to be respected with more than mere cursory

attention paid to its requirements. “We view the Fifth

Amendment’s Property Clause to be more than a pleading

requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise

in cleverness and imagination.” (483 U.S. at 841). In Dolan the

Court emphasized its concern by stating, “[w]e see no reason

why the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as much a part

of the Bill of Rights as the First Amendment or Fourth

Amendment, should be relegated to the status of a poor

relation. ...” (512 U.S. at 392).

18

sau

particular facts.

at 413)).°

(quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S.

“Pennsylvania Coal instructs courts to examine the

operative provisions of a statute, not just its stated pur-

pose, in assessing its true nature.” Keystone Bituminous

Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 487 n.16 (upholding statute against

facial taking challenge). By summarily accepting the prof-

fered legitimate reasons for adopting a land use ordi-

nance and presuming, because it contains height and

density restriction (even where oppressive) that it “quite

obviously . . . substantially advance[s] a legitimate state

interest” (App. 12-13) the Fourth Circuit contradicts this

Court’s decision in Pennsylvania Coal Co. “The greatest

weight is given to the judgment of the legislature, but it

always is open to interested parties to contend that the

legislature has gone beyond its constitutional power.”

Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413. The Fourth Circuit

ignores this principle by foreclosing examination of a

legislature’s act under the first prong of Agins.

The Court in Lucas advocated a similar probing anal-

ysis of actual circumstances rather than blind acceptance

of legislative findings and declarations. To defer com-

pletely to the legislature would be misplaced and unfair

because it would ignore the rights of individual citizens

5 See also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175

(1979); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 649-50; Loretto v.

Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982);

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 349

(1986), Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n, 480 U.S. at 474 and 495;

Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 714 (1987); Yee v. City of Escondido,

503 U.S. at 522-23; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825

(1987); Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (1994).

19

in favor of the convenient prerogatives of the majority.

Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31. Prominent law and planning

professors have recognized that the presumption of land

use regulation constitutionality has gone too far and indi-

vidual rights are indeed being abridged as a direct result.

Strong, Mandelker, and Kelly, Property Rights and Takings,

62 J. Am. Pian. Ass’n 5 (1996).

According to the Fourth Circuit, once a local law-

maker voices a legitimate reason for a land use ordinance

the courts can never determine that the ordinance vio-

lates the Constitution pursuant to the first prong of Agins.

In effect the determination becomes the municipality’s

and it thereby gets to pass constitutional judgment on its

own legislation. Placing municipal regulations above the

reproach of judicial review was long ago forbidden by

this Court.

If this extreme position could be deemed to be

well taken, it is manifest that the fiat of a state

governor, and not the Constitution of the United

States, would be the supreme law of the land;

[and] that the restrictions of the Federal Consti-

tution upon the exercise of state power would

be but impotent phrases. . . . Under our system

of government, such a conclusion is obviously

untenable. . .. When there is a substantial show-

ing that the exertion of state power has overrid-

den private rights secured by that Constitution,

the subject is necessarily one for judicial inquiry

in an appropriate proceeding directed against

the individuals charged with the transgression.

Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 3778, 397-98 (1932).

20

The Fourth Circuit’s ruling effects a categorical bar to

regulatory takings claims under the “long recognized”

(Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834) standard of Agins. This unmiti-

gated deference to the stated rationale of local govern-

ments is antithetical to this Court’s repeated

pronouncement that regulatory takings cases “necessarily

entail complex factual assessments of the purposes and

economic effects of government actions.” Yee v. City of

Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522 (1992). Because the Fourth

Circuit’s decision cannot be reconciled with the regula-

tory takings jurisprudence of this Court, a writ of cer-

tiorari must be granted to resolve the issue.

II. IN DISMISSING GREENSPRING’S EQUAL PRO-

TECTION COUNTS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE

GRANTED THE FOURTH CIRCUIT IGNORED

THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT IN VILLAGE OF

WILLOWBROOK V. OLECH

In Village of Willowbrook v. Olech a property owner

alleged that the actions of the local government in

requesting a 33 foot easement as a condition to connec-

ting the property to the municipal water supply was

“irrational and wholly arbitrary” in light of the typical 15

foot easement requirement. 528 U.S. 562 (2000). The true

motivation for the Village’s disparate treatment, accord-

ing to the property owner’s allegations, was personal

animus and ill will resulting from a previous, unrelated

law suit won by the property owner against the Village.

In deciding that viable equal protection claims may be

brought by a “class of one”, this Court also held that

allegations of “irrational and wholly arbitrary” actions by

21

the local government “are sufficient to state a claim for

relief under traditional equal protection analysis.” Olech,

528 U.S. at 563. What distinguished this case from “the

simple and common instance” of a zoning action which

lacked a rational basis for the intentional disparate treat-

ment of landowners was the allegation of an “extra fac-

tor . . . the Court of Appeals called ‘vindictive action,’

‘illegitimate animus,’ of ‘ill will.’” Olech, 528 U.S. at 563

(Breyer, J., concurring). This line of analysis is directly

applicable to the circumstances of the instant case.

Greenspring alleged that Bill 111-98 intentionally sin-

gled out its property for irrational and wholly arbitrary

disparate treatment® and that such treatment was moti-

vated by “bad faith” and “retaliatory intent” (App. 82,

{ 21; 91, { 50; 97, | 63). Clearly these allegations are as

serious if not more serious than those set forth in Olech.

The Fourth Circuit wholly ignored the Olech decision

because of its illogical and unfounded conclusion that

“{bJecause the local zoning decision at issue in the instant

case is not ‘irrational and wholly arbitrary,’ Greenspring’s

complaint is easily distinguished from the complaint at

issue in Olech.” (App. 17 n.4). Instead of evaluating

whether Greenspring’s allegations stated a sufficient

claim under the Equal Protection Clause, the Fourth Cir-

cuit made a conclusory determination on the merits of the

® At the heart of Greenspring’s allegation of disparate

treatment is Bill 111-98’s restriction of BM, BL and BR zoned

properties, including Greenspring’s, and lack of restriction for

similarly situated properties which have the same or greater

potential to have harmful effects on Resource Conservation

Zones. (App. 97, | 63).

22

case and on that basis adjudged the allegations insuffi-

cient. This analysis is counterintuitive and entirely incon-

sistent with this Court’s decision in Olech which decided

the sufficiency of allegations not whether the govern-

mental action at issue actually was irrational or moti-

vated by bad faith, retaliation or corruption.

The Court should take this opportunity to define and

clarify the ramifications of the Olech decision and over-

turn the Fourth Circuit’s judgment as being in clear con-

flict with that decision.

III. GREENSPRING IS A CASUALTY OF THE

CONFLICT AND CONFUSION AMONG THE

CIRCUIT COURTS ABOUT HOW TO PRO-

CEDURALLY ACHIEVE THIS COURT’S WIL-

LIAMSON COUNTY REQUIREMENT THAT

PROPERTY OWNERS “RIPEN” THEIR CONSTI-

TUTIONAL CLAIMS BY SEEKING RELIEF IN

STATE COURT BEFORE PURSUING AN ACTION

IN FEDERAL COURT

This Court held in Williamson County Reg. Plan.

Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank that as-applied claims for

the taking of property” are “not ripe until the

7 The Williamson County ripeness requirement has been

extended and applied to due process and equal protection. See,

e.g., Bennis v. Michigan Dept. of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154 (5th Cir.

1992); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 891 (1988); Herrington v. County of

Sonoma, 857 F.2d 567 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090

(1989); Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir.

1994); Rocky Mountain Mat. & Asph., Inc. v. Board of County

Comm'rs of El Paso County, 972 F.2d 309 (10th Cir. 1972); Corn v.

City of Lauderdale Lakes, 816 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1987).

23

government .. . has reached a final decision regarding the

application of the regulations to the property at issue”

and “the owner has unsuccessfully attempted to obtain

just compensation through the procedures provided by

the State.” 473 U.S. 172, 186 and 195. Thus, litigants are

required to first litigate their claims in state court before

their federal action is ripe and the district court has

subject matter jurisdiction. Although Williamson County

has been precedent for nearly sixteen years, the process

by which litigants satisfy its deceptively simple require-

ments remains a mystery.®

The primary obstacle to satisfying Williamson

County’s ripeness requirement is the existence of a

Catch-22 known as the “ Williamson Trap” which works as

follows:

- Following the directives of Williamson

County, property owner first seeks, and is

denied, compensation in state court;

- When property owner proceeds to federal

court with now ripened federal causes of

action he is confronted with the argument __

that the state litigation has preclusive effect

on the federal action via res judicata or col-

lateral estoppel.

This cannot be the result intended by the Williamson

County Court.

8 See, e.g., Meacham, The Williamson Trap, 32 Urs. Law. 239,

240 (2000) (“The circuits have been divided on whether there is

a way to avoid the Williamson trap, and the Supreme Court has

sent conflicting messages.”)

24

The Courts of Appeal are manifestly confused and

contradict each other in applying the Williamson County

ripeness requirement. Some hold that once a property

owner litigates in state court a federal action is res judicata

or barred by collateral estoppel so that federal constitu-

tional claims can never be litigated in federal district

court.? See, e.g., Dodd v. Hood River County, 136 F.3d 1219

(9th Cir. 1998); Wilkinson v. Pitkin County Bd. of Comm'rs,

142 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1998); Rainey Bros. v. City of

Memphis, 967 F.Supp. 998 (W.D. Tenn. 1997)!°; Peduto v.

City of North Wildwood, 878 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1989). Other

courts have attempted to recognize Williamson County's

promise by adopting a procedural mechanism whereby

the preclusive effects of state litigation are tempered.

® This result has been criticized by legal scholars and

practicing attorneys as “anomalous” and “surprising” (Roberts,

RIPENESS AND ForuM SELECTION IN LaND-Use LrnGarTION IN TAKINGs:

‘LaAND-DEvVELOPMENT CONDITIONS AND ReGuLaTory TAKINGS AFTER

Dotan AND Lucas (ABA, Callies, ed., 1996)), “unpleasant”

(Roberts, Fifth Amendment Takings Claims in Federal Court: The

State Compensation Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24

Urb. Law. 479 (1992), and “a trap for the unwary.” Meacham,

The Williamson Trap, 32 Urb. Law. 239 (2000); Meltz, Merriam &

Frank, THe Taxincs Issue, Ch. 5 (Island Press 1999); Berger, The

“Ripeness” Mess in Federal Land Use Cases or How the Supreme

Court Converted Federal Judges into Fruit Peddlers, INstrrute ON

PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT Domain Ch. 7 (1991). Indeed, the

“Williamson County Trap” has caught even the most

experienced, careful and vigilant. See, e.g., Fields v. Sarasota-

Manatee Airport Auth., 755 F.Supp. 377 (M. D. Fla. 1991), aff'd,

953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992).

10 Affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on June 19, 1997, in an

unpublished opinion.

25

The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have found that a

property owner can subsequently maintain federal causes

of action for adjudication in federal court if they are first

“reserved” in the preceding state litigation. This is essen-

tially an “England Reservation” without the requirement

of first filing in federal court. See, Front Royal & Warren

County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d

275 (4th Cir. 1998); Fields v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth.,

953 F.2d 1299 (11th Cir. 1992) (criticizing the reasoning

and efficiency of the “Jennings Reservation” advocated in

Jennings v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 531 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.

1976), but nevertheless concluding that it was “too late in

the day” to change the practice). The Ninth Circuit also

acknowledged this reservation procedure in Dodd v. Hood

River County, 59 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 1995), but later repudi-

ated it by finding that subsequent federal claims were

barred by collateral estoppel. Dodd v. Hood River County,

136 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998). The Tenth Circuit expressed

doubts as to whether a “reservation” was the proper

procedural mechanism and noted that it was difficult to

reconcile the Williamson County ripeness requirement

with established res judicata principles. Wilkinson v. Pitkin

County Bd. of Comm'rs, 142 F.2d at 1325, n.4.11

Recognizing the confusion among the Circuits and

the lack of definitive guidance or affirmation from this

11 The lower courts’ efforts have been described as “riddled

with obfuscation and inconsistency,” “unclear and inexact”

(Meltz, Merriam & Frank, THe Taxincs Issue, p. 67 (Island Press

1999)), a “judicially created quagmire” and a “Kafkaesque

maze.” (Kassouni, The Ripeness Doctrine and the Judicial

Regulation of Constitutionally Protected Property Rights, 29 Cat.

West L. Rev. 1, 44, 51 (1992).

26

Court as to the legitimacy of any approach to the prob-

lem, in attempting to avoid the “Williamson Trap,” Green-

spring combined two precautionary steps:!* (1) a state

court action (seeking only Maryland constitutional and

statutory remedies) reserving the federal claims pursuant

to the instructions of the Fourth Circuit in Front Royal,

135 F.3d at 283 (praising the Fields Reservation practice

and instructing district courts to advise takings litigants of

their right to make such a reservation); and (2) a separate

federal action in United States District Court (seeking

only federal constitutional and legal remedies) reiterating

the “Reservation” and simultaneously moving for a stay

of “all proceedings . . . until the conclusion of the state

court action” (App. 65) pursuant to the precedent of this

Court in Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S.

496 (1941), and Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1973).

Initially, in considering Greenspring’s original

removed action, the district court properly ruled “as a

matter of law” that Greenspring’s federal claims would

be reserved and stayed and therefore would survive litiga-

tion in state court and be ripe for review in federal court.

Tue Court: So, what I contemplate is that some

of the federal claims will be stayed, and plaintiff

12 It is important to note that Greenspring took these steps

after first having its original action removed from state court.

Despite its stated reservation of federal claims, Baltimore

County removed Greenspring’s action based upon the

inadvertent mention of a federal cause of action. This adds a

second layer of complication to the Williamson County ripeness

mystery; what is the appropriate treatment for a case removed

to federal court.

27

will be given leave to institute an action in state

court in the nature of inverse condemnation, or

whatever they want to call it.

Mr. Fremicu: And the state court claims as

well.

THE Court: Whatever they are, yes. And you

will proceed in state court with an express reser-

vation so you don’t run into a res judicata or

collateral estoppel bar - well, collateral estoppel

maybe, but you won’t run into a res judicata bar.

And then, when all is said and done in state

court, then you will come back, and will pro-

ceed with your facial claim, your as-applied

claim, and your now ripe takings claim.

(Transcript April 21, 1999 United States Dist. Ct. Hearing,

pp. 64-65). But, upon filing an amended complaint, in an

action directly contrary with its prior ruling, Green-

spring’s express Reservation and Motion to Stay, as well

as the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Front Koyal, the district

court accepted, considered and granted, with prejudice, a

Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Greenspring’s reserved

and stayed federal constitutional claims. The district

court’s dismissal was subsequently affirmed by the

Fourth Circuit except for Greenspring’s as-applied tak-

ings claim. (App. 10-11). In so affirming, the Fourth Cir-

cuit ignored its prior decision in Front Royal and the

requested stay and severely penalized Greenspring’s cau-

tion in attempting to negotiate the procedural thicket

created by Williamson County's ripeness requirement.

Greenspring’s federal complaint should not have been

dismissed by the district court given the express reserva-

tion and the requested stay. Greenspring should not have

been penalized for being careful and prudent in light of

28

the uncertainty and confusion regarding Williamson

County.

Dismissal of Greenspring’s reserved and stayed federal

claims is a new variation on the “Williamson Trap” and

yet another example of the legal morass created by the

Williamson County ripeness requirement for federal tak-

ings, due process and equal protection claims. The confu-

sion now reigning among the circuits on how to apply

Williamson County, and particularly how to procedurally

satisfy its ripeness requirement deserves this Court’s

immediate attention.

CONCLUSION

In light of the Fourth Circuit’s evisceration of the first

prong of Agins as a meaningful standard for regulatory

takings analysis, its summary dismissal of the importance

of this Court’s recent decision in Olech, and its perpetua-

tion of the legal morass surrounding the ripeness require-

ment of Williamson County, a writ of certiorari should

issue to review the circuit court’s decision.

Respectfully submitted,

Rosert H. Fremicn*

Jason M. Drve siss

FReEILICH, LEITNER & CARLISLE

and

Juurus W. LicHTER**

Counsel for Petitioner

*Counsel of Record

** Mr. Lichter passed away one

week prior to the filing of this

petition.

App. 1

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

~)

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLus,

INCORPORATED; WILLIAM HIRSHFELD;

Loretta HIrsHFELD,

Plantiffs-Appellants,

W.

Battimore County, MARYLAND,

a body corporate and Politic

Defendant-Appellee,

and No. 99-2444

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

BattIMoRE County DEPARTMENT or )

PERMITS AND DEVELOPMENT )

MANAGEMENT; ARNOLD M. JABLON, )

Director, DEPARTMENT OF Permits _)

AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT; )

BALTIMORE County Counct; S.G. )

SAMUEL Moxtey; KEVIN KAMENETz; )

T. BRIAN McIntire; VINCENT J. )

GARDINA; JOSEPH BARTENFELD, )

Baltimore County Council )

Members, ;

)

Defendants.

App. 2

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB,

INCORPORATED; WILLIAM HIRSHFELD;

Loretta HIRSHFELD,

Plantiffs-Appellants,

V.

BALTIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND,

a body corporate and Politic

Defendant-Appellee,

al No. 00-1012

BALTIMORE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF

PERMITS AND DEVELOPMENT

MANAGEMENT; ARNOLD M. JABLON,

DireEctoR, DEPARTMENT OF PERMITS

AND DEVELOPMENT MANAGEMENT;

BALTIMORE County Counciz; S.G.

SAMUEL Mox.ey; KEvIN KAMENETZ;

T. BriAN McIntire; VINCENT J.

GARDINA; JOSEPH BARTENFELD,

Baltimore County Council

Members,

Defendants.

ee ee ee ee a i a i a a a a i a a a Le a a a a a

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore

Andre M. Davis, District Judge.

(CA-99-469-AMD)

Argued: June 8, 2000

Decided: October 31, 2000

App. 3

Before MURNAGHAN,”* WILLIAMS, and MICHAEL,

Circuit Judges

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by

unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Robert Henry Freilich, FREILICH, LEITNER

& CARLISLE, Kansas City Missouri, for Appellants.

Jeffrey Grant Cook, OFFICE OF LAW, Towson, Maryland,

for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Virginia W. Barnhart, County

Attorney, John E. Beverungen, OFFICE OF LAW, Towson,

Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this

circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., William Hirshfeld, and

Loretta Hirshfeld (collectively “Greenspring”) claim that

application of Baltimore County Council Bill 111-98 to

property located on Falls Road in Baltimore County vio-

lates their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under

* Judge Murnaghan heard oral argument in this case but

died prior to the time the decision was filed. The decision is

filed by a quorum of the panel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 46(d).

App. 4

the federal Constitution. The United States District Court

for the District of Maryland granted the County’s motion

to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be

granted and shortly thereafter granted the County’s

motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West

1994 & Supp.2000). This appeal followed. We affirm the

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of all claims but the as-

applied takings claim. We hold that the as-applied tak-

ings claim is not ripe and therefore should have been

dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction. Because the district court’s award of

attorney’s fees was based in part upon a finding that the

unripe as-applied takings claim is frivolous, we vacate

the award of attorney’s fees and remand the attorney’s

fee issue to the district court for reconsideration in light

of this opinion.

Es

William and Loretta Hirshfeld own the property at

issue in this case - a 5.5 acre parcel on the east side of

Falls Road in Baltimore County, Maryland - which they

lease to Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc. Greenspring cur-

rently operates a tennis club on the property; however,

Greenspring wants to tear down the tennis club and build

one or more office buildings and a parking garage in the

club’s place.

To this end, Greenspring developed plans to raze the

tennis club and to construct two adjoining office towers,

one five stories and one six stories, with an attached

parking garage. In June 1998, Greenspring submitted a

App. 5

letter to the Baltimore County Development Review

Committee (“DRC”) requesting that Greenspring be

exempt from portions of the process for public approval

of the building plan pursuant to Baltimore County Code,

County Development Regulations, § 26-171(b)(9). Green-

spring maintains that it is legally entitled to a (b)(9)

exemption because the proposed development qualifies

as a “minor development” under the Code. The DRC

responded to Greenspring by letter, and denied the

requested (b)(9) exemption from portions of the public

review process. An open hearing was held on June 22,

1998 to further consider the matter, but Greenspring’s

request for a (b)(9) exemption was never granted.

On June 26, 1998, Greenspring filed suit in state court

seeking mandamus, declaratory, and injunctive relief

from the denial of the (b)(9) exemption. Greenspring

argued that it is entitled to the exemption and that denial

by the DRC was unlawful.

Meanwhile, on October 5, 1998, the County Council

enacted a new zoning ordinance, Bill 111-98, which

imposed more restrictive limits on building improve-

ments in areas with certain zoning designations located

near rural conservation zones. Specifically, Bill 111-98

imposed a height limit of 35 feet and a floor area ratio

(“FAR”) of .5 in areas zoned “Business Light,” “Business

Major,” or “Business Rural” when the exterior wall of any

Proposed building is within 750 feet of a rural conserva-

tion zone. The County asserts that Bill 111- 98 affects 150

sites in Baltimore County. Greenspring asserts that the

new restrictions only apply to its site and one other

within the county.

App. 6

In January 1999, Greenspring amended its state court

complaint by adding counts seeking damages and com-

pensation under the state and federal constitutions.

Greenspring reserved its federal claims, calling the action

a “Jennings-Fields reservation.” In February 1999, the

County removed the case to federal court and filed a

motion to dismiss.

In the meantime, Greenspring was still doing battle

directly with the Baltimore County zoning authorities.

After Bill 111-98 was enacted, Greenspring asked the

Baltimore County Planning Board (“the Board”) to rezone

Greenspring’s Falls Road property from a “Business

Major” zone to an “Office/Residential-2” zone, in order

to avoid the more restrictive limitations contained in Bill

111- 98. In March of 1999, the Board denied Greenspring’s

request.

In April 1999, Greenspring submitted another request

to the DRC asking, again, for a (b)(9) exemption from

certain public approval procedures. Along with this sec-

ond request, Greenspring included a revised site plan

describing construction of one eight-story office tower

with a garage. The proposed building in the revised plan

was confined to the same “footprint” as the pre existing

improvements on the property (the tennis club), had a

per-story square footage less than that of the pre-existing

building, and required, according to Greenspring, no

public works agreement. For these reasons, Greenspring

explained to the DRC, the revised plan should be exempt

from the new limitations imposed by Bill 111-98, under

section 2 of that ordinance.

App. 7

The DRC held an open meeting in May of 1999 to

consider Greenspring’s request for both a (b)(9) exemp-

tion from the public review process and a section 2

exemption from the new limits contained in Bill 111-98.

The DRC denied the request for the (b)(9) exemption,

again, but did not discuss the section 2 exemption.

After a hearing in the district court, Greenspring

filed a Second Amended Complaint seeking declaratory,

injunctive, and monetary relief under § 1983 for viola-

tions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Green-

spring included seven counts in the Second Amended

Complaint, alleging state action which amounted to (1) a

denial of procedural due process; (2) facial and as-

applied takings; (3) facial and as-applied violations of the

Equal Protection Clause; and (4) facial and as-applied

violations of substantive due process. At the core of

Greenspring’s elaborate complaint is the contention that

Bill 111-98 was adopted in bad faith, with an intent to

discriminate against Greenspring, and that the Bill fails to

advance a legitimate state interest.

On June 7, 1999, the County filed a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion to dismiss. Greenspring opposed this motion, and

urged the district court to abstain from consideration of

the motion because of ripeness requirements relating

specifically to the as-applied takings claim. In September

1999, the district court issued an order granting the

County’s motion and dismissing the case with prejudice.

See Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County, 70

F.Supp.2d 598, 607 (D. Md. 1999).

In October of 1999, the County filed a motion seeking

attorney's fees under § 1988, which the district court

App. 8

awarded. See Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County,

77 F.Supp.2d 699, 705 (D. Md. 1999). Greenspring now

appeals the order granting the 12(b)(6) motion, the dis-

trict court’s refusal to abstain from consideration of the

12(b)(6) motion, and the subsequent award of attorney’s

fees. We will consider each issue in turn.

Il. The District Court’s Grant of the 12(b)(6) Motion

This court reviews de novo a district court’s order

granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462,

467 (4th Cir. 1999). A district court should not grant a

motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) “unless it appears

beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts

in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Moreover, all

well-pleaded factual allegations are assumed to be true

and are viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.

See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). We will

first examine the district court’s dismissal of the as-

applied takings claim and then turn to the facial takings,

equal protection and due process claims.

A. As-Applied Takings Claim

We first examine the district court’s dismissal with

prejudice of Greenspring’s as-applied takings claim.

Because Greenspring’s takings claim is still pending in

state court, Greenspring argues that the district court

ruled prematurely on the County’s Motion to Dismiss.

Greenspring claims that as applied to the property on

App. 9

Falls Road in Baltimore County, Bill 111-98 effects a regu-

latory taking without just compensation. Greenspring

asserts that the application of Bill 111-98 will cause a

95.6% reduction in economically viable use of the prop-

erty. This, Greenspring asserts, amounts to a taking. The

district court dismissed Greenspring’s as-applied takings

claim, however, on the basis that Greenspring could not

establish that the regulations at issue deprived Green-

spring of economically viable use of the property. See

Greenspring Racquet Club v. Baltimore County, 70 F.Supp.2d

598, 603 (D. Md. 1999).

Subject matter jurisdiction is a logical prerequisite to

dismissal with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

cedure 12(b)(6). Whether a district court has subject mat-

ter jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo

review. See Anita's New Mexico Style Mexican Food, Inc. v.

Anita’s Mexican Foods Corp., 201 F.3d 314, 316 (4th Cir.

2000). In Williamson County Reg’! Planning Comm. v. Ham-

ilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the Supreme Court estab-

lished a set of ripeness requirements for Just-

Compensation-Clause actions against local governments.

See id. at 190-91. Failure to satisfy the Williamson ripeness

requirements is fatal to the presence of federal court

subject matter jurisdiction for a claim founded on the

Fifth Amendment Just Compensation Clause. See Front

Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v. Town of Front

Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (discussing the

Williamson “ripeness requirement . . . for the existence of

federal court subject matter jurisdiction .. . ”).

App. 10

A claim alleging that a state or local governmental

body has violated the Fifth Amendment Just Compensa-

tion Clause is not ripe under Williamson until a land-

owner has satisfied two requirements. First, a property

owner must test the regulation’s limits by exhausting

available administrative exemption or variance pro-

cedures. See Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186-88. Until

there is a final decision as to the challenged regulation’s

scope, no taking occurs, and the claim is not ripe. The

second ripeness prerequisite is that the governmental

body actually must have denied compensation for the

taking. See id. at 194-95. The nature of the constitutional

injury in a Just-Compensation-Clause case is twofold: the

government must have: (1) taken private property, (2)

without just compensation. See id. at 195 (recognizing that

“a property owner has not suffered a violation of the Just

Compensation Clause until the owner has unsuccessfully

attempted to obtain just compensation . . . ”). Williamson,

therefore, requires a federal takings litigant first to liti-

gate in state court.?

1 The Eleventh Circuit addressed the awkward posture of a

plaintiff in state court who must raise his federal takings claim,

or else risk having that claim precluded by the principles of res

judicata in Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F.2d 1299,

1303 (11th Cir. 1992). In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that

a takings litigant may “reserve” his federal claim at the time he

brings the state claim required by Williamson County Reg’l

Planning Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Id. at 1306.

The Fields court believed that its holding in the Williamson

context was dictated by its predecessor circuit’s holding in

Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Dist., 531 F.2d 1331, 1332 (5th Cir.

1976), that a reservation of federal questions pursuant to

England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411

(1964), ordinarily applicable in the context of Pullman

App. 11

Greenspring has satisfied the first of the two ripeness

preconditions, but it has not satisfied the second. Green-

spring has not yet been denied just compensation because

its takings claim is still pending in state court. Thus,

Greenspring’s federal as-applied takings claim is not ripe.

See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,

526 U.S. 687, 718 (1999) (plurality opinion of Kennedy, J.)

(“Simply put, there is no constitutional or tortious injury

until the landowner is denied just compensation.”).

Accordingly, no case or controversy presently exists, and

the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction

over that claim. Thus, dismissal should not have been for

failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-

cedure 12(b)(6), but rather should have been under Fed-

eral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), governing the

dismissal of claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

As noted above, the district court dismissed all

counts of Greenspring’s amended complaint with preju-

dice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See

abstention, may be entered even where a litigant has filed suit

first in state court. Influenced by Migra v. Warren City School

Dist. Bd. of Education, 465 U.S. 75, 85 n. 7 (1984), however, the

Fields court limited Jennings to circumstances in which a litigant

is involuntarily forced to litigate first in state court. Thus, once

the state has had a chance to decide whether there was any

taking of property and if so whether any compensation is due, a

litigant may return for his day in federal court to resolve his

federal takings claim. This Circuit indicated agreement with the

Fields approach in Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp.

v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998) (praising

the Fields reservation practice as premised on “cogent analysis”

and recommending that district courts advise takings litigants

of their right to make such reservations).

App. 12

Greenspring Racquet Club Inc. v. Baltimore County, 70

F.Supp. 2d 598, 607 (D. Md. 1999). With respect to the as-

applied takings claim, the district court based its Rule

12(b)(6) dismissal on its holding that Greenspring could

not establish that the regulations at issue deprived Green-

spring of all economically viable use of the property. See

id. at 604-05. Because the District Court was without

subject-matter jurisdiction over the as-applied takings

claim, however, it was precluded from dismissing that

claim on the merits with prejudice. Greenspring may

return to federal court to litigate the as-applied takings

claim once Greenspring has exhausted Maryland’s

inverse condemnation procedures.

B. Facial Takings Claim

Greenspring next argues that enactment of Bill 111-98

was facially unconstitutional as a violation of the Takings

Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In Agins v. City of

Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), the Supreme Court explained

that a facial takings claim raises the question of whether

the mere enactment of a zoning ordinance constitutes a

taking. See id. at 260. A general zoning law effects a

taking “if the ordinance does not substantially advance

legitimate state interests, or denies an owner economi-

cally viable use of his land.” Id. (internal citations omit-

ted).

In this case, the district court found that Greenspring

could prove no facts to satisfy either element of the Agins

test. See Greenspring Racquet Club, 70 F.Supp.2d at 603-05.

The height and density limits contained in Bill 111-98 are

ordinary zoning restrictions and, quite obviously, they

App. 13

substantially advance a legitimate state interest in con-

trolling dense development in areas located near rural

conservation zones. The district court took note of state-

ments made by Baltimore County Councilman Bryan

McIntire, explaining that the restrictions in Bill 111-98

would avoid the detrimental impact on traffic, roads,

sewers, and water use that can result from dense devel-

opment.? See id. at 603. These rationales “clearly fall

within those recognized by the courts as reasonable bases

for zoning laws.” Id. (citing Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert

County, 48 F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995)).

Greenspring contends that while a desire to limit

traffic, water, or sewer use may be a legitimate state

interest as a matter of law, whether Bill 111-98 “substan-

tially advances” that interest is a fact question to be

resolved by a jury. To support its argument, Greenspring

relies heavily upon City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,

526 U.S. 687 (1999). Greenspring’s reading of Del Monte

Dunes, however, is misleading. In Del Monte Dunes, the

* Greenspring argues that consideration of the

councilman’s statements was inappropriate at the motion to

dismiss stage, because those statements were not contained in

the pleadings. We disagree. Statements made by the sponsor of

legislation during a legislative debate are an important part of

the legislative history of a bill. See United States v. Newport News

Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 837 F.2d 162, 167 (4th Cir. 1988).

Moreover, at the 12(b)(6) stage “the legislative history of an

ordinance is not a matter beyond the pleadings” because

matters of public record may properly be taken into account. See

Anheuser-Busch v. Schmoke, 63 F.3d 1305, 1311 (4th Cir. 1995),

vacated on other grounds, 517 US. 1206, 116 S.Ct. 1821, 134

L.Ed.2d 927 (1996); 5A Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller,

Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (1990).

App. 14

jury was asked to decide whether a particular decision to

deny a building permit “substantially advanced” a legiti-

mate state interest. See id. at 700. Whether the local zon-

ing laws themselves advanced a legitimate state interest

was not the question before the jury. In fact, the Court

said that where a plaintiff brings a broad challenge to the

constitutionality of the city’s zoning ordinances them-

selves (rather than challenging a particular decision made

pursuant to those ordinances), “the determination

whether the statutory purposes were legitimate, or

whether the purposes, though legitimate, were furthered

by the law or general policy, might well fall within the

province of the judge.” Id. at 722.

Greenspring’s suggestion, moreover, does not make

any logical sense. If the question of whether a zoning

ordinance substantially advances a legitimate state inter-

est is always a triable issue of fact for a jury, then every

challenge to any zoning regulation would warrant a jury

trial in federal court. We cannot accept such a remarkable

proposition and decline Greenspring’s invitation to open

the federal courthouse to a veritable flood of local land

use litigation by putting every such allegation before a

jury. When statements by local lawmakers set out legiti-

mate reasons for imposing height and density restrictions

on property in a particular class of zones, there can be no

claim in federal court that the law fails to substantially

advance a legitimate purpose.

The second prong of the Agins rule requires a plain-

tiff to show that the mere enactment of a zoning ordi-

nance “denies an owner economically viable use of his

land.” 447 U.S. at 260. Because Greenspring currently

operates a viable tennis club on the property at issue, and

App. 15

the enactment of Bill 111-98 will not prohibit Greenspring

from continuing to do so, the district court found that

Greenspring could prove no set of facts to establish that

Bill 111-98 denies Greenspring economically viable use of

the land. Greenspring objects to the district court looking

beyond the pleadings, but the fact of the tennis club’s

current operation is acknowledged in the pleadings.3

Greenspring asks this court to ignore reality and find that

it conceivably could prove that the mere enactment of the

zoning ordinance denies them all viable economic use of

the property. We conclude that there is no way for Green-

Spring to prove such a claim, considering the currently

operational tennis club and the possibility of building

something new on the Property within the limits imposed

by Bill 111-98.

The district court correctly found that Greenspring

could prove no set of facts to sustain a facial takings

claim regarding Bill 111-98. Thus, the motion to dismiss

was properly granted as to the facial takings claim.

C. Equal Protection Claims

Greenspring’s equal protection claims are based on

the assertion that Bill 111-98 was Passed in bad faith with

discriminatory intent. These allegations, however, are not

sufficient to state an equal protection claim because the

law at issue easily passes rational basis scrutiny.

3 See Second Amended Complaint, { 12 (stating that “there

is adequate infrastructure and capacity ... which are currently

being used by the existing athletic/racquet club to

accommodate the proposed development.”).

App. 16

When “government action [does] not burden a fun-

damental right or employ a suspect classification, the

pertinent question for determining whether the govern-

mental action violated the Equal Protection Clause is

whether the . . . officials reasonably could have believed

that the action was rationally related to a legitimate gov-

ernmental interest.” Front Royal & Warren County Indus-

trial Park Corp. v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 290

(4th Cir. 1998).

Greenspring does not allege that Bill 111-98 utilizes a

suspect classification or burdens a fundamental right.

Rational basis review is therefore the proper standard for

evaluating this claim. Greenspring contends, however,

that even under rational basis review, the enactment of

Bill 111-98 must be struck as constitutionally invalid.

Greenspring alleges that the ordinance was enacted by

local authorities with malicious, bad-faith, discriminatory

intent, which, of course, is not related to any legitimate

state purpose. These allegations, according to Green-

spring, are enough to survive the motion to dismiss. We

disagree.

The facial equal protection challenge to the law must

fail because on its face Bill 111-98 applies to all property

within the delineated zones — it is a generally applicable

law, and all similarly situated persons are treated alike.

The as-applied equal protection challenge also must fail,

because there is an obvious, legitimate basis for the Bill’s

enactment: restricting dense growth in areas located near

rural conservation zones. While Greenspring is free to

speculate about the hostility that local officials directed

toward them, in order to state an equal protection claim

Greenspring also must demonstrate that there is no other

|

|

App. 17

legitimate purpose for the law. In other words, Green-

spring must allege that malice and bad faith were the only

conceivable bases for enacting Bill 111-98, and this they

cannot do. See FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.

307, 315 (1993) (stating that “[t]hose attacking the ratio-

nality of the legislative classification have the burden ‘to

negative every conceivable basis which might support

it.” ”) (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410

U.S. 356, 364 (1973)). Where an obvious, legitimate pur-

pose is evident on the face of a challenged law, an equal

protection claim under rational basis review must fail.4

Thus, we conclude that both the facial and as-applied

equal protection claims properly were dismissed.

D. Due Process Claims

Finally, Greenspring argues that the enactment and

application of Bill 111-98 deprives it of both substantive

and procedural due process. The procedural due process

claim easily is dismissed, because administrative and

4 This fundamental tenet of equal protection jurisprudence

is not changed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Village

of Willowbrook v. Olech, 120 S.Ct. 1073 (2000). In Olech, local

zoning authorities demanded a 33-foot easement as a condition

of connecting plaintiff’s Property to the municipal water supply

although only a 15-foot easement was required from other

similarly situated property owners. The Court held that the

complaint, which alleged that the local zoning decision was

“irrational and wholly arbitrary,” was sufficient to state a claim

for relief under traditional equal protection analysis. Because

the local zoning decision at issue in the instant case is not

“irrational and wholly arbitrary,” Greenspring’s complaint is

easily distinguished from the complaint at issue in Olech.

App. 18

judicial appeals from all Baltimore County zoning deci-

sions are readily, if not speedily, available. The mere fact

that post-deprivation remedies may take some time to

pursue does not render them constitutionally infirm. See

Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d 810, 817, 827

(4th Cir. 1995).

The substantive due process claim is based speci-

fically upon Greenspring’s allegation that Bill 111-98 is

arbitrary and capricious and, therefore, not related to any

legitimate governmental interest. Greenspring fails to

address, however, the threshold inquiry in any due pro-

cess claim: In order to state a viable due process claim,

Greenspring must do more than attack the quality of the

legislative process in Baitimore County; Greenspring

must identify a constitutionally protected property inter-

est upon which Bill 111-98 infringes.5 If no protected

property interest exists, there is no need to consider

whether any alleged deprivation of that interest was

effected with “due process.” See Scott v. Greenville County,

5 Greenspring argued below, and on appeal, that it has a

constitutionally protected property interest in a (b)(9)

exemption from portions of the public review process usually

required as a prerequisite to issuance of a building permit. We

note, however, that the parties have since agreed that

Greenspring’s application to amend the site plan must be

subject to the approval regulations in effect in 1975, the year that

the original site plan was approved. See Greenspring Racquet

Club v. Baltimore County, No. 99-4790, slip op. at 1 (Cir. Ct.

Baltimore County, May 16, 2000). The disagreement over

whether Greenspring legally is entitled to the (b)(9) exemption

is therefore moot, and we will accordingly restrict our

discussion of the due process claim to the enactment and

application of Bill 111-98.

App. 19

716 F.2d 1409, 1418 (4th Cir. 1983) (stating that “[t]he

starting point for our [due process] inquiry is to deter-

mine whether state or local law afforded Scott a ‘protect-

ible property interest in the permit’ sufficient to trigger

federal due process guarantees”).

A constitutionally protected property interest must

be “more than an abstract need or desire. .. . [and] more

than a unilateral expectation” and instead must be some-

thing to which one has a “legitimate claim of entitle-

ment.” Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).

Greenspring has no legal entitlement to develop the Falls

Road property with buildings in excess of 35 feet in

height and .5 FAR. Greenspring certainly had such an

expectation, but because Greenspring had no legally

vested right to develop the property in this way, it cannot

claim a constitutionally protected property interest in

doing so. Because Greenspring has no constitutionally

protected property interest in development of the prop-

erty outside the bounds of Bill 111-98, Greenspring does

not state a viable substantive due process claim. We

therefore conclude that the claim properly was dismissed.

In summary, the district court properly dismissed

Greenspring’s due process, equal protection, and facial

takings claims under Rule 12(b)(6).

Ill. The District Court’s Refusal to Abstain from Consider-

ation of the 12(b)(6) Motion

Greenspring argues that the district court should

have abstained from ruling on each of its claims. We

review the district court’s decision not to abstain from

App. 20

hearing a case for abuse of discretion. See Pomponio v.

Fauquier County, 21 F.3d 1319, 1324 (4th Cir. 1994).

The abstention issue is relevant only to Greenspring’s

as-applied takings claim and is based upon the ripeness

requirements set forth in Williamson County Reg’l Planning

Comm. v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). Williamson,

however, is not an abstention doctrine but a jurisdictional

rule calling for dismissal simply because the federal

courts do not possess subject matter jursidiction over a

takings claim until Williamson's requirements have been

met. See Front Royal & Warren County Indus. Park Corp. v.

Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 283 (4th Cir. 1998)

(indicating that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking

when Williamson's ripeness requirements have not been

met). Thus, while the difference may appear merely for-

mal, the district court’s error was not in refusing to

abstain, but, rather, in reaching the merits of a claim over

which it possessed no jurisdiction.

IV. The Award of Attorney’s Fees

Finally, Greenspring asserts that the district court

erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the County. This

court reviews an attorney’s fee award for abuse of discre-

tion. Hitachi Credit America Corp. v. Signet Bank, 166 F.3d

614, 631 (4th Cir. 1999). By definition, a district court

abuses its discretion when it makes an error of law. See

Brodziak v. Runyon, 145 F.3d 194, 196 (4th Cir. 1998).

Section 1988(b) provides that “[i]Jn any action or proceed-

ing to enforce a provision of section . . . 1983 . . . the

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party a

reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C.A.

App. 21

§ 1988(b) (West 2000). Fee motions must be filed within

fourteen days of judgment pursuant to District of Mary-

land Local Rule 109.2, and failure to timely file a fee

request can justify the court of appeals in vacating a

district court’s award of attorney’s fees. See Ortega v.

Geelhaar, 914 F.2d 495, 498 (4th Cir. 1990). An applicant

must present properly authenticated and accurate docu-

mentation for an attorney’s fee request. See Hensley v.

Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1983).

An award of attorney’s fees to a defendant in a § 1983

Suit only may be made where a plaintiff’s claims are

“ “frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even

though not brought in subjective bad faith.’ ” Hughes v.

Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14 (1980) (quoting Christiansburg Garment

Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)).

The district court found that Greenspring’s claims

were “wholly without foundation.” Greenspring Racquet

Club Inc. v. Baltimore County, 77 F.Supp.2d 699, 703

(D.Md.1999). The due Process and equal protection claims

were deficient under obvious and well established legal

principles. As the entire preceding analysis indicates, the

district court’s conclusion that Greenspring’s due pro-

cess, equal protection and facial takings claims were

“frivolous and unreasonable” is amply supported by the

record and well within the district court’s appropriate

exercise of discretion. The district court's award of attor-

ney’s fees also clearly rested upon a finding that the

unripe as-applied takings claim was entirely frivolous.

We have held, however, in Section II.A that a district

court may not make such a determination with respect to

an unripe claim, because such a determination would

App. 22

finally dispose of the merits of a claim over which the

district court did not possess subject matter jurisdiction.

The First Circuit has held that where a plaintiff

brings interrelated claims, some of which are frivolous

and some of which are not frivolous, a district court may

award fees to the defendant under § 1988 for the costs of

defending the frivolous claims. See Ward v. Hickey, 996

F.2d 448, 455 (1st Cir. 1993). The First Circuit has indi-

cated that the District Court should calculate a fee

amount in light of the fact that only some of the claims at

issue were found to be frivolous. See id. (stating that “a

district court should not deny fees for defending frivo-

lous claims merely because calculation would be diffi-

cult” and thus implying that calculation of an appropriate

fee amount could not include fees attributable to the non-

frivolous claims). The Sixth Circuit has held that a district

court does not abuse its discretion by entirely denying a

defendant’s request for attorney’s fees under § 1988 on

the basis that some of the plaintiff’s claims were mer-

itorious even though others may have been frivolous. See

Wayne v. Village of Sebring, 36 F.3d 517, 530 (6th Cir. 1994).

No circuit, however, has held that a district court may

award attorney’s fees for the costs of defending non-

frivolous portions of a § 1983 suit. Our holding in Section

Il.A necessarily means that at this stage in the litigation,

the district court may not definitively determine that

Greenspring’s unripe as-applied takings claims are frivo-

lous. Thus, the impossibility of making a determination

of frivolity as to the unripe as-applied claims makes it

necessary for us to vacate the District Court’s award of

attorney’s fees and remand this issue for reconsideration

App. 23

in light of this opinion.6 On remand, the District Court

may wish to recalculate the fee amount, excluding any

amount attributable to the unripe as-applied takings

claim, or it may wish instead to entirely defer consider-

ation of the attorney’s fees issue until such time as the as-

applied takings claim becomes ripe.

V.

For the foregoing reasons, the orders entered by the

district court are affirmed except insofar as they dismiss

Greenspring’ as-applied takings claim and insofar as they

award attorney’s fees to the County under § 1988. The

order dismissing the as-applied takings claim is vacated

and the case is remanded with instructions to dismiss

® Greenspring also lodges two specific complaints

regarding the fee award. We address these issues because they

“surely would be raised again on remand with attendant delays

of hearing and appeal.” South Carolina ex rel. Tindal v. Block, 717

F.2d 874, 887 (4th Cir. 1983). First, Greenspring argues that the

motion for fees was not timely. This issue will arise on remand if

the District Court decides to recalculate the fee award based

upon the initial application. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

6(b)(2) grants the trial judge discretion to accept a fee motion

beyond the prescribed time limits. The district court’s decision

to do so in this case was entirely reasonable. Second,

Greenspring challenges the time records submitted by the

County. Admittedly, the records are not entirely regular; they

are hand written, for example. However, the district court found

that the records comply with the requirements outlined in the

local court rules and accurately reflect the time spent by

defendant’s counsel. We find that the district court’s resolution

of this issue was within “the district court’s broad discretion” in

calculating an attorney’s fee award. Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071,

1085 (4th Cir. 1986).

App. 24

that claim without prejudice under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

on the ground that the district court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction. The order awarding attorney's fees is

vacated and the issue of attorney’s fees is remanded for

reconsideration in light of this opinion.

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART,

AND REMANDED.

App. 25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GREENSPRING

RACQUET CLUB, INC.,

et al.,

Plaintiffs Civil No. AMD 99-231

V.

BALTIMORE COUNT 4

MARYLAND, et al.,

Defendants

GREENSPRING

RACQUET CLUB, INC.

et al., Civil No. AMD 99-469

Plaintiffs .

V.

BALTIMORE COUNTY

MARYLAND, et al.,

Defendants

ORDER

These cases came before the Court for a hearing on

the pending motions on April 21, 1999. Counsel having

been heard, and the Court having rendered its rulings on

the record, it is this 22nd day of April, 1999, ORDERED

(1) That the motion to dismiss filed in case no.

AMD 99-231 (Paper # 4) is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED

(2) That the motion to dismiss filed in case AMD

99-469 (Paper # 8) is GRANTED, AND PLAINTIFFS ARE

GRANTED LEAVE TO FILE AN AMENDED COM-

PLAINT ON OR BEFORE MAY 15, 1999, and to seek a

App. 26

stay pending exhaustion of all state law claims; and it is

further ORDERED

(3) That the motions to remand in case no AMD

99-469 (Paper # 11), to consolidate (AMD 99-231 Paper

#5; AMD 99-469 Paper #9) and for leave to file a response

(AMD 99-231 Paper #14; AMD 99-469 Paper #16) are

DENIED AS MOOT; and it is further ORDERED

(4) That The Clerk shall CLOSE CASE NO AMD

99-231 and TRANSMIT a copy of this Order to all coun-

sel.

/s/ Andre M. Davis

ANDRE M. DAVIS

United States District Judge

MRI RE at ee ree

se

App. 27

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GREENSPRING

RACQUET CLUB, INC., :

et al., : Civil No.

Plaintiffs AMD 99-469

V.

BALTIMORE COUNTY,

MARYLAND

Defendant

MEMORANDUM

(Filed Sept. 27, 1999)

This is a poorly disguised zoning case masquerading

as a collection of constitutional claims. Plaintiffs, Green-

spring Racquet Club, Inc., William Hirshfeld, and Loretta

Hirshfeld (collectively “Greenspring”), own the property -

which is the subject of this litigation: a parcel consisting

of approximately 5.5 acres located on the east side of Falls

Road, north of Joppa Road in Baltimore County, Mary-

land. Plaintiffs currently operate a tennis club on the

Property but they would rather raze the tennis club and

construct one or more office buildings and a parking

garage.

Plaintiffs have filed a seven count second amended

complaint seeking equitable relief and damages in respect

to the County’s application to their property of County

Council Bill No. 111-98 (“the Ordinance”). To date, the

County has not approved Greenspring’s site plans, thus

delaying construction; a prolonged challenge in state

App. 28

court is in the offing, with the effect, perhaps, of perma-

nently depriving Greenspring of the opportunity to

redevelop its property in an economically advantageous

environment. Pending before the court is the County’s

Motion to Dismiss. The issues have been fully briefed and

no hearing is necessary. For the reasons stated below, I

shall grant the County’s motion.?}

(i)

A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to

state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) “unless it

appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set

of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to

relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); accord

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); Scheuer v. Rhodes,

416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Motions to dismiss for failure to

state a claim are “granted sparingly and with caution in

order to make certain that plaintiff is not improperly

denied a right to have his claim adjudicated on the

merits.” 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, FED-

ERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, CIVIL 2D § 1349 at

192-93 (1990).

Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a complaint include “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). A claimant

is not required to “set out in detail the facts upon which

he bases his claim” so long as the claim “will give the

1 Greenspring’s Motion to Strike Impertinent and

Scandalous Material, its Motion to Stay and the County’s

Motion to Strike are denied as moot.

App. 29

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and

the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.

Moreover, all well-pleaded factual allegations are

assumed to be true and are viewed in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S.

411, 421-22 (1969). Only when the factual allegations in

support of a claim are not well-pleaded (e.g., when they

are “functionally illegible” or “baldly conclusory,” Shus-

ter v. Oppelman, 962 F.Supp. 394, 395 (S.D.N.Y.1997)),

should they not be accepted as true and the claim dis-

missed.

Application of the above Principles to the instant

case compels the conclusion that the motion should be

granted.

(ii)

Accepting Greenspring’s account of the facts as true,

the following constitutes the course of events leading to

this litigation. Greenspring developed plans to raze the

tennis club currently occupying its site and to construct

two adjoining office towers, one five stories and one six

stories, with a structured parking garage. On June 10,

1998, Greenspring submitted a letter to the County Devel-

opment Review Committee ( “CDR”), requesting that it be

exempted from portions of the Process for plan approval

delineated in Division 2 of the County Development Reg-

ulations. Balt. County Code §§ 26- 201 to 26-217.2 In this

? These portions consisted of Community Input Meetings,

Hearing Officer Review and de novo appeal to the Baltimore

County Board of Appeals.

App. 30

letter, Greenspring explained that it was entitled to be

exempted from this process pursuant to Baltimore

County Code § 26-171(b)(9) because its proposed devel-

opment qualified as a “minor development” under the

Code. Attached to this letter request was a site plan for

the proposed demolition and construction. The DRC indi-

cated by letter dated June 17, 1998, that it would not

allow the requested exemption from portions of the

review process, and it held an open meeting on June 22,

1998, to further consider Greenspring’s request. Green-

spring’s request was never granted.

Meanwhile, on October 5, 1998, the County Council

enacted the Ordinance, which imposes a height limit of 35

feet and a floor area ratio limit (“FAR”) of 0.5 for certain

new construction on Greenspring’s site and one other site

in Baltimore County.? Greenspring promptly requested

that the Baltimore County Planning Board rezone its

property from a “Business Major” zone to an “Office/

Residential-2” zone. This request was denied on March

18, 1999.

On April 27, 1999, Greenspring submitted a second

request to the DRC asking again that it be exempted from

3 The Ordinance does not specify Greenspring’s site but

limits the maximum building height to 35 feet and the FAR to 0.5

of any proposed building in zones classified as “Business

Light,” “Business Major,” or “Business Rural,” when “the

exterior wall of any proposed building . . . is within 750 feet of [a

Rural Conservation] Zone.” Balt. County Council Bill No.

111-98. Greenspring claims these restrictions cover only its site

and one other. The County asserts that the Ordinance affects 150

sites. County’s Motion to Dismiss at 9. For the purposes of the

motion, I assume that Greenspring’s allegations are true.

ee

App. 31

the specified procedural requirements of Division 2. In

addition, Greenspring attached a revised site plan

describing construction of one eight story office tower

with garage, and it requested that it be exempted from

the limitations of the Ordinance. According to Green-

spring, this letter explained that under Section 2 of the

Ordinance, the revised development plan qualified for

exemption from the height and floor ratio requirements

because the new construction is confined to the same

footprint as the preexisting improvements on the site, the

Square footage per story of the proposed building is less

than the preexisting one, and no public works agreement

is required.

The DRC held an open meeting to consider Green-

Spring’s request for exemptions from both portions of the

review process and the height/floor area ratio restrictions

of the Ordinance. It denied the request for exemption

from the review Process, indicating that Greenspring

should speak with Arnold Jablon, the Director of Permits

and Development Management, who could direct the

DRC to later approve the request. The request for exemp-

tion from the height and floor area ratio requirements of

the Ordinance was not discussed. See County’s Motion to

Strike, Ex. 1 (Transcript of the Meeting of the DRC on

May 10, 1999).

(iii)

The amended complaint contains seven counts: two

claims alleging unconstitutional takings without just

compensation (one facial, one as applied); two claims

alleging equal protection violations (one facial, one as

SSS

App. 32

applied); one claim alleging a violation of procedural due

process; and two claims alleging substantive due process

violations (one facial, one as applied). I shall address

these in turn.

Takings Claims

Greenspring alleges that the County has effectively

taken its property without just compensation in violation

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution.* The facial and most of the variations

of the “as applied” takings claims fail, among other rea-

sons, because Greenspring does not have any constitu-

tionally protected property interest that was affected by

the County’s enactment and application of the zoning

laws and regulations at issue. Furthermore, while I shall

assume, for the purposes of the pending motion, that

Greenspring does have a constitutionally protected prop-

erty interest insofar as it claims an entitlement to a non-

discretionary exemption from the Ordinance (as provided

in Section 2 thereof), this “as applied” claim also fails

because Greenspring does not sufficiently allege that it

has been deprived of substantially all of the economic

value of its property in consequence of its failure to

obtain the desired exemption.

4 The Fifth Amendment provides “nor shall private

property be taken for public use, without just compensation,”

and applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.

U.S. Const. Amends. 5, 14; see First English Evangelical Lutheran

Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 310 n.4 (1987).

ileal

ee Ee Oe ee ee

App. 33

Facial Taking

Greenspring contends that the enactment of the

height and floor area ratio restrictions of the Ordinance

on their face effectively deprived it of “all or substantially

all of the economic use and/or value” of its Property.>

Second Amended Complaint at 11 45, 47, and 60. How-

ever, Greenspring has no constitutionally protected prop-

erty right in the airspace or anything else which was

affected by the Ordinance, so it fails to State a claim that

the County took something from it by enacting the Ordi-

nance.

Since 1909, the Supreme Court has upheld height

restrictions on buildings which a state or local legislative

body reasonably concluded promoted “the health, safety,

morals, or general welfare.” Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91

(1909). Even in the absence of height restrictions, the

Supreme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v, City of

New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978), made it clear that no

“taking” is established “simply by showing that [plain-

tiffs] have been denied the ability to exploit a property

interest [in air space] that “ney heretofore had believed

was available for development... . ”6 As in Penn Central,

° Greenspring also asserts that the Ordinance on its face

“took title” to the airspace above its property and thus effected

a taking. However, this claim fails because Greenspring does

not allege that the County repossessed its title to the property or

encumbered it in any way. A takings claim cannot rest upon a

“symbolic taking” of a title.

© Greenspring asserts a “vested property right” in the

development it would have been able to achieve under the

App. 34

Greenspring continues to be able to use its building as it

has in the past, and the Ordinance does not prohibit all

air development, just development higher than 35 feet.

Moreover, the rationales cited by the County to sup-

port its enactment of the Ordinance clearly fall within

those recognized by the courts as reasonable bases for

zoning laws. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48

F.3d 810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that proper bases

for zoning determinations include concern about further

growth in rural areas, residential density, community aes-

thetics, traffic congestion, and water supplies). In urging

passage of the Ordinance, County Councilman T. Bryan

McIntire explained that the height and floor area ratio

restrictions would have esthetic benefits, would decrease

transportation congestion, improve flood management,

and conserve water and sewer resources. Motion to Dis-

miss at 11 (quoting Councilman McIntire). Thus, the Ordi-

nance represents a valid exercise of the County’s

authority to protect the health and welfare of its resi-

dents, and its enactment was without a cognizable effect

- constitutionally speaking — upon the protected property

interests enjoyed or owned by Greenspring.

zoning law applicable to its property prior to the enactment of

the Ordinance. However, it is well settled in Maryland that such

a right does not vest unless the property owner had acquired a

building permit under the old law and had commenced

construction. Prince George’s County v. Sunrise, 330 Md. 297, 623

A.2d 1296 (1993); Richmond Corp. v. Prince George’s County, 254

Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969). Greenspring never acquired a

permit under the old law and had not commenced demolition

and construction.

App. 35

As Applied Taking

Greenspring asserts that three actions (or, more cor-

-Tectly, refusals to act) by County officials constitute

unconstitutional takings: (1) the County’s refusal to

reclassify Greenspring’s property so as to exclude it from

the Ordinance; (2) the County’s refusal to exempt Green-

spring’s plans from the public meeting and hearing offi-

cer review process specified in Division 2 of the County’s

development regulations; and (3) the County’s refusal to

exempt Greenspring’s amended site plan from the Ordi-

nance pursuant to Section 2 thereof.” It is plain, however,

that neither singly nor in combination do these conten-

tions state a claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

The first two of these claims, like the facial claim

discussed above, fail to state a claim because Greenspring

lacked a constitutionally protected Property interest that

? This third claim is clearly not ripe for decision because,

despite Greenspring’s claim that its request for a Section 2

exemption “was denied on May 10, 1999 by the DRC,” Second

viable federal claim, I would need to consider whether to grant

a stay and whether abstention would be appropriate.

App. 36

the County’s actions affected. The third fails to state a

claim because Greenspring has failed to allege suffi-

ciently - and is unable so to allege — that it was deprived

substantially of all the economic value of its property.

The first two as applied claims will be dismissed for

lack of a cognizable affected property interest. As the

Supreme Court held in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.

564 (1972), to have a property interest, “a person must

have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must

have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must,

instead, have a legitimate entitlement to it.” Id. at 577.

The Fourth Circuit takes the position, predominant in the

circuits which have considered the issue, that such an

entitlement is created when, “under state or municipal

law, the local agency lacks all discretion to deny issuance

of the permit or to withhold its approval. Any significant

discretion conferred upon the local agency defeats the

claim of a property interest.” Gardner v. City of Baltimore,

969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases); accord

Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275, 288 (4th

Cir. 1998); Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 122 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995); Biser v. Town of Bel Air, 991

F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 864 (1993).

Clearly, the County exercises discretion when it con-

siders requests to reclassify the zoning of property. See

Balt. County Code § 2-356.8 Greenspring’s hope that the

8 While the Board of Appeals must make certain findings

before reclassification is permitted, those findings are based

upon its exercise of discretion. The County Code specifies that

in deciding whether “[t]he prospective reclassification is

warranted by [the change in the neighborhood,]” the Board

App. 37

County would reclassify its site from “Business Major” to

“Office/Residential 2” is a mere unilateral expectation

and not an entitlement. Similarly, the County’s refusal to

waive portions of the Division 2 Process did not affect a

constitutionally protected Property interest. I assume for

the purposes of the motion that Greenspring qualified for

a waiver under Baltimore County Code § 26-171(b)(9).

Even if the grant of such a waiver is arguably nondiscre-

tionary when an applicant qualifies, however, the waiver

would not have resulted in a nondiscretionary approval

of Greenspring’s plans to build. Greenspring would still

have had to submit a development plan pursuant to

§ 26-203, undergo preliminary review by the department

of public works pursuant to § 26-204, and then undergo

review by over thirteen County agencies Pursuant to

§ 26-205, before getting consideration by the planning

board for final approval. See id. at § 26-208. Discretion is

exercised by the County at each of these Stages; accord-

ingly, Greenspring has no constitutionally protected enti-

tlement of which it has been deprived and for which it

might seek a remedy in federal court.

Analysis of the third as applied taking claim is

slightly different but the Outcome is the same. At this

Stage of the proceedings, I assume that Greenspring has a

property interest in obtaining a Section 2 exemption from

must consider a host of factors, including population trends,

adequacy of transportation, water, sewerage and solid waste

| disposal facilities, and the Proposed project’s impact on water

quality and fish, wildlife and plant habitats. Balt. County Code

§ 2-356(j).

App. 38

the height and floor ratio requirements of the Ordinance®

because the grant of such an exemption is nondiscretion-

ary provided Greenspring demonstrates it has fulfilled

the exemption’s prerequisites as spelled out in the Ordi-

nance. I further assume the truth of Greenspring’s allega-

tion that it demonstrated to the County that its amended

plan fulfilled the Section 2 requirements and that it is,

therefore, entitled to the exemption. I further assume that

the exemption would have resulted in a nondiscretionary

approval of its amended site plan to build the one eight

story office building and garage. Nevertheless, despite its

property interest in obtaining approval for the amended

site plan, Greenspring fails to state a claim because it fails

to allege a key element of a takings claim: that it was

deprived “of substantially all economic value” of its

property.

The Supreme Court recently reiterated this well

established element of a takings claim in Dolan v. City of

Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1996). “A land use regulation does

not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advances legitimate

state interests’ and does not ‘deny an owner economically

viable use of his land.’ ” Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted).

As the Fourth Circuit explained in Front Royal, “[nJot all

9 The Ordinance provides in relevant part: “Section 2. And

be it further enacted that this Act shall not apply to. . . the

redevelopment of an improvement existing on October 5, 1998,

if (1) the improvement occurs within the same footprint, (2) the

square footage, per story, of the existing improvement and (3) a

public works agreement is not required, in the opinion of the

Directors of Public Works, Permits and Development

Management, and Environmental Protection and Resource

Management.”

———————

App. 39

regulatory deprivations amount to regulatory takings,

and a regulatory deprivation that causes land to have

‘less value’ does not necessarily make it ‘valueless.’ ” 135

F.3d at 286. This principle is controlling in the case at bar.

While Greenspring’s complaint recites that it has

been deprived of “all economic benefit of [its] property,”

this is merely a conclusory assertion at odds with facts

which are subject to judicial notice; indeed, Greenspring

does not (because it cannot) contradict the County’s

assertion that it currently operates an economically viable

tennis club at the site. In any event, Greenspring has two

obvious economic uses for its property: it could continue

operating the tennis club, or it could raze the club and

build an office building not exceeding 35 feet in height or

0.5 floor area ratio.!° Thus, I conclude that Greenspring’s

assertion that it has been deprived of “all or substantially

all of the economic use” of its property is “baldly con-

clusory” and insufficient to withstand a motion to dis-

miss.1}

1° As to the facial takings claim, Greenspring’s own

complaint suggests a third possibility. While the Ordinance

apparently precludes it from building the two office buildings

(one five stories, one six stories) and garage envisioned in its

first site plan, its complaint asserts that it is entitled on the face of

Section 2 of the Ordinance to build an eight story office building

with garage in the footprint of the current improvements.

*! Despite the fact that the denial of a Section 2 exemption

would constitute a quasi judicial act, the more relaxed standard

enunciated in Dolan does not govern the determination of

whether Greenspring has been deprived of the economic use of

its property. See 512 U.S. at 384-85 (holding that the city

effectuated unconstitutional taking by prohibiting plaintiff from

doubling the size of her retail store unless she deeded over a

SS

App. 40

Equal Protection Claims

Greenspring alleges both facial and as applied claims

that the County has deprived it of equal protection of the

laws in the County’s enactment of height and floor area

ratio restrictions, and in the County’s application of these

restrictions to its property. These purported claims fail as

a matter of law because even if one assumes that the

Ordinance affects only two properties in the entire

County, Greenspring alleges no basis upon which a fact

finder could find a denial of equal protection.

“(E]qual protection is not a license for courts to judge

the wisdom, fairness or logic of legislative choices.” FCC

v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).

When “government action [does] not burden a funda-

mental right or employ a suspect classification the perti-

nent question for determining whether the governmental

action violated the Equal Protection Clause is whether

the . . . officials reasonably could have believed that the

action was rationally related to a legitimate governmental

portion of her property to it.). The Supreme Court held that the

requirement that the owner deed over part of her property was

critical to the application of a relaxed standard. Id. By contrast,

Greenspring will not be required to deed any portion of its

property to the County.

Greenspring also claims that the County effectuated a

“taking” in requiring it to pursue unconstitutionally

burdensome procedures for administrative and judicial relief

from a wrongful zoning decision. Second Amended Complaint

at { 58. This claim fails because, as I explain in text, the delay

which Greenspring speculates will occur in the appeals process

does not render that process unconstitutional. See infra at 15.

App. 41

interest.” Front Royal, 135 F.3d at 290. The legislators’

actual motivation is irrelevant. Id.; accord United States v.

O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1968). As the Supreme

Court held in Beach Communications, Inc.:

[T]hose attacking the rationality of the legisla-

tive classification have the burden to negative

every conceivable basis which might support it.

Moreover because we never require a legislature

to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it

is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes

whether the conceived reason for the challenged

distinction actually motivated the legislature.

508 U.S. at 315 (internal quotations and citations omit-

ted); accord Front Royal, 135 F.3d at 290.

Furthermore, the mere fact that one is treated differ-

ently than someone who is similarly situated is not suffi-

cient to run afoul of the equal protection clause. As the

Fourth Circuit explained:

If disparate treatment alone were sufficient to

warrant a constitutional remedy, then every

blunder by a local authority, in which the

authority erroneously or mistakenly treats an

individual differently than it treats another who

is similarly situated, would rise to the level of a

federal constitutional claim.

Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 825.

Greenspring does not allege that any fundamental

right was adversely affected by the County’s actions.

Moreover, it does not allege any invidious discrimination

based upon suspect categories (i.e., race, ethnicity,

national origin, religion or sex). Thus, rational basis

App. 42

review applies. Greenspring alleges merely that the Ordi-

nance, on its face and as applied to it, singles out its

property and one other for adverse treatment while other

“similarly situated” (but differently zoned) properties

were unaffected by the height and floor area ratic

requirements. Greenspring contends further that con-

struction on those similarly situated properties could also

have an effect on the rural zones the Ordinance seeks to

protect.

These arguments are unavailing. While it is patently

clear that differently zoned properties are not similarly

situated as to zoning, these arguments also fail because

Greenspring does not allege an invidious purpose. Gov-

ernment is not consigned to inactivity because it cannot

legislate comprehensively in one step. The fact of dispa-

rate treatment, in the absence of invidious discrimination,

does not invoke a more stringent standard of review. As a

matter of law, the Ordinance is rationally supported by

legitimate objects of the County in its regulation of land

use within its borders. No more searching standard of

review is required or justified.

Procedural Due Process Claim

Greenspring contends that the County’s procedures

for administrative and judicial relief from a wrongful

zoning decision are unconstitutional.!2 The gravamen of

12 Because a successful due process claim depends upon

the existence of a cognizable property right, Sylvia Dev. Corp., 48

F.3d at 826-7, Greenspring’s due process claim fails as to the

passage of the Ordinance, the failure to reclassify the zoning

App. 43

this claim is Greenspring’s allegation that because it

might take “in excess of two years” to pursue administra-

tive and judicial appeals, these procedures are uncon-

stitutionally burdensome. However, Greenspring does

not explain how it arrived at this two year projection, and

in any event, delays of this magnitude are not unconstitu-

tional burdens. Even when a significant delay is incurred

in reversing a wrongful zoning board decision, and even

when that delay causes the plaintiffs to default on their

construction loans and lose everything to foreclosure, the

Fourth Circuit has held that plaintiffs have not been

deprived of procedural due process. Sylvia Dev., 48 F.3d

at 817, 827 (holding that 11 month delay in reversing

wrongful zoning board decision did not deprive plaintiff

of due process).

Greenspring speculates that it could take in excess of

two years to overturn County decisions regarding its

property. This delay, it believes, is unwarranted. But it

cannot, on the one hand, demand due process in the

review of County decisions, and on the other hand, claim

that the time it would take to provide this process ren-

ders it unconstitutional.

designation, and the refusal to exempt the plans from portions

of the Division 2 procedures for plan approval. I assume for the

purposes of the motion that as to its amended site plan,

Greenspring did have a cognizable property interest in the

Section 2 exemption from the height and floor area ratio

requirements of the Ordinance. See supra at 8-10.

App. 44

Substantive Due Process Claims

Greenspring alleges that the County deprived it of

substantive due process when it refused to recognize that

its amended site plan should be exempt from the height

and floor area ratio requirements of the Ordinance.}> This

allegation fails to state a claim. As the Fourth Circuit

summarized in Front Royal:

[S]ubstantive due process is a substantially nar-

rower concept than procedural due process, for

it serves as an absolute check on certain govern-

mental actions notwithstanding the fairness of

the procedures used to implement those actions.

We have determined that this absolute check is

warranted only where no process could cure the

deficiencies in the governmental action. In other

words, governmental action offends substantive

13 Greenspring also pleads violations of substantive due

process (facially and as applied) in regard to the County’s

enactment of the Ordinance, and its refusal to waive portions of

the Division 2 plan approval process. For the reasons set forth

supra at 8-10, these claims are dismissed for want of a

constitutionally protected property interest. It is well settled

that a claim of substantive due process under the “property

prong of the Fourteenth Amendment” is not stated unless the

claimant alleges possession of a property interest and that state

action deprived the claimant of the property interest. Sylvia

Dev., 48 F.3d at 827. As explained in text, I assume for the

purposes of the motion that Greenspring had a property interest

in the Section 2 exemption from the height and floor area ratio

requirements of the Ordinance, and that the County deprived it

of this interest in refusing to acknowledge its exemption. Thus,

my discussion of Greenspring’s substantive due process claim

centers on the Section 2 exemption.

App. 45

due process only where the resulting depriva-

tion of life, liberty, or property is so unjust that

no amount of fair procedure can rectify it.

135 F.3d at 287-88 (internal quotations and citations omit-

ted). This high standard is not remotely satisfied here.

Greenspring’s substantive due process claim fails

because there exists a post-deprivation process which

Greenspring is pursuing, which can rectify the depriva-

tion. Id. Its appeal of the denial of the Section 2 exemp-

tion in state fora might result in its obtaining the

exemption. In any event, the mere act of denying a Sec-

tion 2 exemption falls far short of the type of state action

which is “so arbitrary or irrational, so unjustified by any

circumstance or governmental interest” that the “residual

protections” of the equal protection clause are invoked.

See id.; accord Sylvia Dev., 48 F.3d at 827.

(iv)

For the reasons discussed above, I shall grant the

County’s Motion to Dismiss and dismiss all counts of

Greenspring’s second amended complaint with prejudice.

A separate order follows.

Filed: September 27, 1999

/s/ Andre M. Davis

ANDRE M. DAVIS

United States

District Judge

App. 46

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GREENSPRING

RACQUET CLUB, INC.,

oe : Civil No.

Plaintiffs AMD 99-469

V.

BALTIMORE COUNTY,

MARYLAND

Defendant

ORDER

(Filed Sept. 27, 1999)

In accordance with the foregoing Memorandum, it is

this 27th day of September, 1999, ORDERED

(1) That the motion to dismiss is GRANTED; and it

is further ORDERED

(2) That the Clerk shall CLOSE THIS CASE and

TRANSMIT a copy of this Order and the foregoing Mem-

orandum to all counsel.

/s/ Andre M. Davis

ANDRE M. DAVIS

United States

District Judge

App. 47

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, :

INC., et al., :

Plaintiffs

V.

BALTIMORE COUNTY,

MARYLAND

Defendant

Civil No.

AMD 99-469

ss OOO,

MEMORANDUM

(Filed Nov. 30, 1999)

On September 27, 1999, | dismissed with prejudice

the seven count complaint brought by plaintiff Green-

spring Racquet Club, Inc.1 Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc.

v. Baltimore County, __ F.Supp.2d __, 1999 WL 1005135

(D.Md., Sep 27, 1999). Now pending is defendant Bal-

timore County’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to

The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42

U.S.C. § 1988(b). On the basis of the findings and conclu-

sions set forth herein, I am persuaded that all of Green-

spring’s claims were “frivolous, unreasonable, [and]

without foundation.” Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard

County, 124 F.3d 597, 606 (4thCir. 1997). Accordingly, I

shall award attorney’s fees to the County in the amount

of $33,522.50.

1 The individual Principals of Greenspring were joined as

plaintiffs, however, the fees award made here is solely against

the corporate plaintiff, Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc.

App. 48

(i)

Greenspring brought suit on January 29, 1999, in a

disorganized eight count complaint naming ten defen-

dants. At a hearing on April 21, 1999, I dismissed the

complaint with leave to amend and with instructions to

plaintiff’s counsel to properly allege separate counts

identifying their basis in law. On May 14, 1999, Green-

spring filed a “Second Amended Complaint” alleging

seven counts against the County challenging the

County’s enforcement of County Council Bill No. 111-98

(“the Ordinance”) to prevent it from replacing its racquet

club with one or more office towers more than three

stories high.?

To summarize briefly, and reading Greenspring’s

complaint liberally as was required in respect to a motion

to dismiss, see Conley v. Gibson 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957), I

found that Greenspring had alleged the County applied

the Ordinance to effectuate an unconstitutional “taking”

of their property without just compensation, and to vio-

late constitutional guarantees of due process and equal

protection of the laws. Greenspring sought relief pur-

suant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of constitutional

rights under color of state law. I dismissed with prejudice

all of plaintiff’s claims.

2 The property which is the subject of this litigation is a

parcel consisting of approximately 5.5. acres located on the east

side of Falls Road, north of Joppa Road in Baltimore County,

Maryland.

App. 49

The takings claims alleged a property interest suffi-

cient to invoke a Fifth Amendment analysis,> however,

they failed because Greenspring did not allege facts sup-

porting its assertion that it had been deprived of “sub-

stantially all of the economic value of its property as a

3 I found Greenspring had made a sufficient showing for

purposes of the motion to dismiss that it had a cognizable

property interest because it was allegedly entitled to a

nondiscretionary exemption from the Ordinance (as provided in

Section 2 thereof). See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL

1005135 at *4; see Gardner v. City of Baltimore, 969 F.2d 63, 68 (4th

Cir. 1992). However, Greenspring alleged a series of other

affected property interests which even a cursory review of well-

established law would have discounted. For example,

Greenspring alleged a “title taking” but this was purely a

Symbolic title taking, unsupported in precedent, since

Greenspring did not allege that the County had altered or

encumbered its title in any way. Greenspring alleged the County

had taken its rights in the airspace above its property, but the

invalidity of such a Property interest has been crystal clear at

least since the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision Penn Central

Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).

Greenspring asserted a “vested property right” in the

development it would have been able to achieve under the

zoning law applicable to its Property prior to the enactment of

the Ordinance. However, it is well-settled in Maryland that such

a right does not vest unless the property owner had acquired a

building permit under the old law and had commenced

construction. Prince George’s County v. Sunrise, 330 Md. 297, 623

A.2d 1296 (1993); Richmond Corp. v. Board of Prince George’s

County, 254 Md. 244, 255 A.2d 398 (1969). Greenspring never

acquired a permit under the old law and had not commenced

demolition and construction. Greenspring alleged other

property interests which were just as obviously legally

unsupportable as these. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999

WL 1005135 at *3-4.

App. 50

consequence of its failure to obtain the desired exemp-

tion.” See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135

at *4. This well-established element of a takings claim

was reiterated by the Supreme Court as recently as 1996

in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384-85 (1994).

The equal protection claims failed because Green-

spring alleged neither that a fundamental right had been

compromised nor an invidious motive, either of which

would have triggered heightened scrutiny.* Instead, ratio-

nal basis review was appropriate, and the County’s

actions in enacting and enforcing the Ordinance were

clearly justified by legitimate concerns about traffic con-

gestion, protection of rural zones and other land use

purposes. See Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert County, 48 F.3d

810, 828-29 (4th Cir. 1995).

The procedural due process claim failed because the

projected delay of two years to pursue administrative and

judicial appeals does not constitute an unconstitutional

burden. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL

1005135 at *5. Substantive due process was not violated

because a post deprivation procedure exists which can

41 note that Greenspring has suggested in neither its

original complaint nor its amended complaint (or in its

memoranda in opposition to defendant’s motions to dismiss)

that this case involved one of that narrow class of “vindictive

action” equal protection cases recognized by some circuits. See

Olech v. Village of Willowbrook, 160 F.3d 386, 388 (7th Cir. 1998),

cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 10 (1999), 68 U.S.L.W. 3177 (U.S.

September 28, 1999). Thus, its belated citation to Olech (in its

opposition to the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees) as

providing a non-frivolous basis for one or more of its equal

protection claims is unavailing.

App. 51

rectify any wrongful deprivation, and indeed Green-

spring is pursuing that process. Id. at *6. In any event, I

found that denial of the Section 2 exemption fell “far

short of the type of state action which is ‘so arbitrary or

irrational, so unjustified by any circumstance or govern-

mental interest’ that the ‘residual protections’ of the

equal protection clause are invoked.” Id. (citing Sylvia

Dev. Corp., 48 F.3d at 827).

(ii)

As a preliminary matter, Greenspring asserts that the

County’s motion for attorney’s fees should not be consid-

ered because it was filed three days late. However,

because the County has demonstrated good cause that

the short, nonprejudicial delay in filing its application

was the result of excusable neglect, I exercise my discre-

tion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) to accept the fees motion.

Rule 6(b)(2) provides that: “[T]he court for cause

shown may at any time in its discretion . . . permit [a

motion to be filed after the time period specified in the

rules] when... the failure to [timely file] . . . was the

result of excusable neglect.” “Excusable neglect” is “inad-

vertence, mistake, or carelessness,” In re SPR Corp., 45

F.3d 70, 72 (4th Cir. 1995) (interpreting “excusable

neglect” provision of Bankruptcy Code), which is excus-

able, “ ‘taking account of all relevant circumstances sur-

rounding the party’s omission.’” Id. (quoting Pioneer

Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Limited Part-

nership, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993) (interpreting “excusable

neglect” provision of Bankruptcy Code)). In particular,

courts are to exercise an equitable discretion to alter time

App. 52

limits after considering four factors: “(1) the danger of

prejudice to the . . . nonmovant, (2) the length of the

delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, (3)

the reason for the delay, including whether it was within

the reasonable control of the movant, and (4) whether the

movant acted in good faith.” Id. (internal quotations

omitted).

I have considered each of these factors and I find that

they militate heavily in favor of acceptance of the

County’s motion for attorney’s fees. Greenspring does

not allege that it has been prejudiced by the County’s

three-day delay in filing its fees motion. The delay was a

brief one and had no impact on these proceedings. The

judgment of dismissal is now on appeal to the Fourth

Circuit and the minor delay has not impeded the prompt

resolution of the motion. Any appeal of the instant deci-

sion on the County’s motion for attorney’s fees might be

easily joined with the appeal on the merits of Green-

spring’s claims.

Moreover, as affirmed in the affidavit of the lead

attorney for the County, the reason for the delay was a

personal family emergency utterly beyond his control to

predict or anticipate; it was perfectly understandable that

he would temporarily be distracted from some of his

professional obligations such as the fees motion deadline

in this case. Thus, for these reasons, and because, in fact,

the attorney for the County did not rely upon his per-

sonal circumstances as an excuse to seek a long delay, I

App. 53

find that the County attorney acted in good faith. Accord-

ingly, I deem the County’s motion for attorney’s fees is

timely filed.5

(iii)

As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides in perti-

nent part, “In any action or Proceeding to enforce a

Provision of section . . . 1983... . the court, in its discre-

tion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable

attorney's fee as part of the costs.” Because the County’s

motion to dismiss was granted on all counts, the County

was clearly the prevailing party here.

Section 1988(b) is part of the Congressional scheme to

Promote enforcement of constitutional and civil rights

law by private parties. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 14

(1980); see also Christiansburg Garment Company v. EEOC,

434 U.S. 412, 418 (1978) (setting standard for attorney’s

fees awards to defendants in actions under Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964).¢ Thus, a different standard

applies to determine whether fees will be awarded when

a defendant prevails. As the Supreme Court explained, “To

take the further step of assessing attorney’s fees against

plaintiffs simply because they do not finally prevail

would substantially add to the risks inhering in most

litigation and would undercut the efforts of Congress to

5 To be sure, the County should have filed a formal motion

to enlarge time contemporaneously with the filing of its motion

for attorney’s fees.

® The same standard applies to defendants’ fees claims

under § 1988 as under Title VII. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 14.

App. 54

promote vigorous enforcement...” Id. at 422. Congress

specifically intended the attorney’s fees provision to

“make it easier for a plaintiff of limited means to bring a

meritorious suit.” Id. at 420. A second factor cited by the

Supreme Court as discouraging fee awards to defendants

in civil rights suits is the fact that an attorney’s fee award

to a prevailing plaintiff is an award “against a violator of

federal law.” Id. at 418.

The absence of these factors when a defendant pre-

vails in such cases dictates that an award of attorney’s

fees to a defendant must be based on the “quite different

equitable considerations,” id. at 419, of discouraging

groundless lawsuits. Id. at 420. Hence, “a plaintiff should

not be assessed his opponent’s attorney’s fees unless a

court finds that his claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or

without foundation, even though not brought in subjec-

tive bad faith.” Id. at 421. See also DeBauche v. Trani, 191

F.3d 499, 510 (4th Cir. 1999); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc., 124

F.3d at 606. “In applying these criteria,” the Supreme

Court cautioned, “it is important that a district court

resist the understandable temptation to engage in post hoc

reasoning by concluding that, because a plaintiff did not

ultimately prevail, his action must have been unreason-

able or without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at

421-22.

Applying the Christiansburg criteria to the present

case dictates a grant of attorney’s fees to the County. In

particular, Greenspring’s takings claims were without

legal foundation. Greenspring asserted numerous theo-

ries of a property interest which were unjustly infringed

by the County’s actions. Only one of these theories had

legitimate legal support. See supra n. 2 and accompanying

App. 55

text. Put even as to this theory of property interest,

Greenspring’s takings claims failed because Greenspring

failed to allege (and it could not allege) any facts support-

ing the well-established element of a takings claim that it

had been deprived of “substantially all” economic value

of its affected property. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.

374 (1994). Thus, I find that these takings claims were

“frivolous, unreasonable, [and] . . . without foundation.”

Christiansburg, 434 U.S. at 421-22.

Greenspring’s due process and equal protection

claims were even less well-founded. Even assuming a

future appellate reversal of a wrongful decision in the

State litigation regarding Greenspring’s property, the

alleged delay “in excess of two years” that Greenspring

anticipated in the appeals process clearly does not rise to

the level of a denial of due process. See Sylvia Dev. Corp.,

48 F.3d at 817, 827. As I explained in my earlier opinion,

Greenspring “cannot, on the one hand, demand due pro-

cess in the review of County decisions, and on the other

hand, claim that the time it would take to provide this

process renders it unconstitutional.” See Greenspring Rac-

quet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135 at *5. Likewise, Green-

spring’s substantive due process claim fell undeniably

and woefully short of the type of state action which is

““so arbitrary or irrational, so unjustified by any circum-

stance or governmental interest’ that the ‘residual protec-

tions’ of the equal protection clause are invoked.” See

Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135 at *6

(quoting Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, 135 F.3d 275,

288 (4th Cir. 1998)).

Any minimally attentive law student could have told

Greenspring that its equal protection claims lacked legal

App. 56

basis. It did not allege any basis for heightened scrutiny

of the County’s actions, and those actions were clearly

justified as rationally related to legitimate land use con-

cerns. See Greenspring Racquet Club, Inc., 1999 WL 1005135

at *4-*5.

At bottom, none of Greenspring’s confused bluster

about abstention could obscure the fact that its federal

lawsuit was “frivolous, unreasonable, . . . [and] without

foundation.” The mere fact that in other cases complaints

alleging materially dissimilar facts survived motions to dis-

miss (or supported reasonable requests for temporary

federal court abstention), when they were alleged in sup-

port of legal claims like those Greenspring undertook to

assert here, does not militate in favor of a finding that

Greenspring’s claims were substantially justified as rea-

sonable and non-frivolous. Accordingly, the County is

entitled to an award of reasonable attorney’s fees as a

prevailing defendant in a case asserting “frivolous [and]

unreasonable [claims, wholly] without foundation.”

(iv)

The County requests attorney’s fees in the amount of

$36,829.7 In accordance with the local rules of this Court,

7 Greenspring has limited its challenge to the fees request

to the grounds discussed in the text and it has not objected in

any manner to the bona fides or genuineness of the affidavits

submitted by counsel spelling out their work in this case or the

reasonableness and necessity for the work that the County’s

attorneys performed on the County’s behalf. Furthermore,

Greenspring has not objected to the fact - and therefore I deem

Greenspring to have waived the issue — that the County has

App. 57

the County provided to Greenspring quarterly statements

documenting its intention to seek attorney’s fees at the

conclusion of the case. See Rules of the United States

District Court (Md.), Appendix B, Rules and Guidelines for

Determining Lodestar Attorneys’ Fees in Civil Rights and

Discrimination Cases, l(c). These statements indicated the

County would seek $25,605 in fees for the first quarter of

litigation, and $18,000 for the second quarter.

Though attorneys employed by the Office of the

County Attorney do not normally maintain time sheets,

the attorneys handling this case recorded their time

because, from the start, they perceived Greenspring’s

claims to be frivolous, and they decided they would lay

the foundation for the unusual measure of seeking defen-

dants’ attorney’s fees. Motion for Attorney’s Fees at 7-8.

According to these time sheets, the lead attorney on the

case, Jeffrey Grant Cook, Esq., devoted 97.4 hours to the

case during the first quarter, and 70 hours during the

second quarter of litigation. The County Attorney, Vir-

ginia W. Barnhart, Esq., a more senior member of the Bar,

expended 13.7 hours conferencing with Cook and review-

ing his papers during the first quarter.

Pursuant to local rule “only one lawyer is to be

compensated for intra-office conferences . . . [except more

used a market-rate compensation formula in its motion for

attorney’s fees, notwithstanding the fact that each of the

attorneys representing the County is one of its own salaried

employees. Cf. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL

~ CIO, Local 3882 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 944 F.2d

922, 934-38 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (using market-rate compensation

formula in awarding fees to salaried attorneys of union in Back

Pay Act case).

App. 58

than one. lawyer may be compensated for] periodic con-

ferences [that] are reasonably necessary for the proper

management of the litigation.” Accordingly, both Cook

and Barnhart shall be credited for the 0.8 hour strategy

conference held on February 3, 1999, at the commence-

ment of the federal litigation, and both shall be credited

for the 0.4 hour strategy conference held on March 12,

1999. The award for Cook’s time is reduced by 12.5 hours

for the additional time spent conferencing with Barnhart,

because Barnhart will be credited for that time. Thus,

Barnhart shall be credited for a total of 13.7 hours, and

Cook for 84.9 for the first quarter and 70 for the second

quarter, or a total of 154.9 hours.

John Beverungen, Esq., worked 15 hours during the

first quarter and 10 hours in the second quarter. Four

hours in the first quarter are subtracted because Cook

was already credited for attending the hearing on April

21, 1999, and local rules allow for the compensation of

only one attorney at a hearing. Id., Appendix B, 2(d).

Thus, Beverungen shall be credited for 11 hours in the

first quarter and 10 hours in the second, or 21 total hours.

Pursuant to Local Rule 109.2b, the County submitted

an affidavit to support its request for $190.00 per hour for

all attorneys, as the “the customary fee for such work in

the local community.”® That affidavit was authored by K.

8 This fee request is consistent with the guidelines in the

appendix to the local rules stating that for lawyers of more than

eight years experience, which each of these lawyers have, the

permitted hourly rate is between $190 and $225. Appendix B,

Rule 3(b). However, I grant Cook and Beverungen the lower

amount of $175 per hour in accordance with the County’s

App. 59

Donald Proctor, Esq., an attorney in private practice in

Towson, who is well-acquainted with the quality of work

performed by the County’s attorneys, and who was also

well-qualified to offer an opinion as to the prevailing

attorney’s fees in the Towson market. He attested that an

attorney of Barnhart’s experience and background would

customarily charge between $200 and $225 for her time.

Attorneys of Cook’s and Beverungen’s experience and

background would customarily charge between $175 and

$190 per hour. Motion for Attorney’s Fees, Ex. 6 p. 3. This

evidence is unrebutted. Accordingly, I calculate the

County’s fee award based upon an hourly rate for Barn-

hart of $200 and for Cook and Beverungen of $175, as

follows:

Attorney Compensable Hourly Fees

Hours Rate Awarded

Jeffrey Grant

Cook 154.9 $175 $27,107.50

John

Beverungen 21 $175 $3,675.00

Virginia

Barnhart 13.7 $200 $2,740.00

Total $33,522.50

affidavit concerning customary fees in the Towson market. I

depart from the guidelines, in part, because these rates are set

for attorney’s fees awards to plaintiffs, not defendants, in civil

rights cases, and they are based upon a survey of local attorneys

concerning “the hourly rates paid on the defense side . . . adding

an upward adjustment to account for the risk of nonpayment

faced by a plaintiff’s lawyer in the event her client does not

prevail.” Id. n. 5. Clearly, as the defendant's attorneys, Cook,

Beverungen and Barnhart are not entitled to an upward

adjustment.

App. 60

(v)

For the foregoing reasons, I grant the County’s

Motion for Attorney’s Fees and make an award in the

amount of $33,522.50. A separate order follows.

Filed: November 30, 1999 /s/ Andre M. Davis

ANDRE M. DAVIS -

United States District

Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, :

INC., et al., ~

Plaintiffs Civil No.

AMD 99-469

v.

BALTIMORE COUNTY,

MARYLAND

Defendant :

» OO....

- ORDER

(Filed Nov. 30, 1999)

In accordance with the foregoing Memorandum, it is

this 30th day of November, 1999, by the United States

District Court for the District of Maryland ORDERED

(1) That the defendant’s motion for attorney’s fees

is GRANTED; and it is further ORDERED

App. 61

(2) That Defendant Baltimore County is AWARDED

attorney's fees in the amount of $33,522.50, AND JUDG-

MENT FOR THAT AMOUNT, THIRTY-THREE THOU-

SAND, FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY-TWO AND 50/100

DOLLARS, IS HEREBY ENTERED IN FAVOR OF BAL-

TIMORE COUNTY, MARYLAND AGAINST PLAINTIFF

GREENSPRING RACQUET CLUB, INC., ONLY; and it is

further ORDERED

(3) That the Clerk TRANSMIT copies of the forego-

ing Memorandum and this Order to all counsel of record.

/s/ Andre M. Davis

ANDRE M. DAVIS

United States District Judge

App. 62

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, NORTHERN DIVISION

GREENSPRING RACQUET

CLUB, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

BALTIMORE COUNTY,

MARYLAND,

)

)

)

)

) Case No. AMD99-469

)

)

)

Defendant. )

PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STAY

Come now plaintiffs, pursuant to the Court’s Order

entered on April 22, 1999, and move that the Court enter

its Order staying all proceedings on plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint until the further order of the court,

except as set forth in plaintiffs’ supporting Memorandum

of Law filed concurrently herewith which is made a part

hereof by reference.

Respectfully submitted,

FREILICH, LEITNER & CARLISLE

By: /s/ Robert H. Freilich

Robert H. Freilich

4600 Madison, Suite 1000

Kansas City, MO 64112-3012

Telephone: (816) 561-4414

Facsimile: (816) 561-7931

and

App. 63

LAW OFFICES OF

PETER G. ANEGLOS, P.C.

By: /s/ H. Russell Smouse

H. Russell Smouse

Suite 300, Court Towers

Towson, Maryland 21204

Telephone: (410) 825-7300

Facsimile: (410) 296-2541

Federal Bar Number: 01367

ATTORNEYS FOR

PLAINTIFFS

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 14th day of May, 1999,

copies of plaintiffs’ above and foregoing Motion to Stay,

were mailed by United States mail, first class postage

prepaid, addressed to defendant's following attorneys:

Virginia W. Barnhart

County Attorney

Courthouse, Second Floor

400 Washington Avenue

Towson, Maryland 21204

Jeffrey Grant Cook

Assistant County Attorney

Courthouse, Second Floor

400 Washington Avenue

Towson, Maryland 21204

App. 64

John E. Beverungen

Assistant County Attorney

Courthouse, Second Floor

400 Washington Avenue

Towson, Maryland 21204

/s/ Robert H. Freilich

Attorney for Plaintiffs

PU eT ry

App. 65

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, NORTHERN DIVISION

GREENSPRING RACQUET

CLUB, INC., et al.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

BALTIMORE COUNTY,

MARYLAND,

)

)

)

)

) Case No. AMD99-469

)

)

)

Defendant. )

PLAINTIFFS’ MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT

OF MOTION TO STAY

Introduction

Concurrently with the filing of plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint in this action, and as suggested by

the Court at the hearing held on April 21, 1999, plaintiffs

have also filed a new state court action in the Circuit

Court for Baltimore County, Maryland, which sets forth

causes of action solely under the laws and Constitution of

the State of Maryland. A copy of that state court com-

plaint is attached hereto as Exhibit A.

As an Examination of plaintiffs’ respective new state

complaint and federal complaint will confirm, and again

being responsive to the Court’s suggestion, it is plaintiffs’

intention (1) first to litigate to a conclusion all of its

claims under Maryland law in the state court, and (2)

only then, after exhausting all of its state court remedies,

to litigate its instant federal claims of facial, as applied

and ripe Constitutional violations, if it is still necessary to

do so.

App. 66

The Court will note that the same fact issues are

involved in both pending proceedings. This is precisely

why Your Honor dismissed without prejudice Case No.

AMD 99-231. See, Order dated April 22, 1999, and partial

transcript of the April 21, 1999 hearing, p. 9, attached

hereto as Exhibit B*.

As the Court informed counsel at the time, Exhibit B,

p. 8:

... [P}laintiff will be given leave to institute an

action in state court in the nature of inverse

condemnation, or whatever they want to call it.

... And you will proceed in state court with an

express reservation so you don’t run into a res

judicata or a collateral estoppel bar — well, col-

lateral estoppel maybe, but you won’t run into a

res judicata bar. An then, when all is said and done

in state court, then you will come back, and we will

proceed with your facial claim, your as-applied

claim, and your now ripe takings claim. (Emphasis

supplied)

Discussion

Although the Court contemplated that some of plain-

tiffs’ federal claims might be challenged pursuant to a

Rule 12(b) (6) motion, it acknowledged that “other fed-

eral claims will be stayed” pending the outcome of the

state court action which has now been filed. Exhibit B, p.

* During the hearing, the Court inadvertently referred to

its intended dismissal without prejudice of Case No. AMD

99-469 when it meant Case No. 99-231. Exhibit B, p. 9.

Presumably, the correct reference is reflected in the Order as

entered.

eared

App. 67

8. Plaintiffs submit, however, that an order staying fur-

ther proceedings on all of plaintiffs’ federal claims, not

just some of them, should be entered.

Without reiterating all of the arguments advanced by

the parties previously, it is evident that it is the Court's

hope that, as a result of the concurrent state court litiga-

tion, it may become unnecessary to proceed with the

instant action at all. If plaintiffs do prevail in the state

court action, that will certainly be the case.

Given the non-prejudicial nature of the dismissal of

Case No. AMD 99-231, it is equally evident that the Court

desires to stay further proceedings in this case or, stated

otherwise, to abstain from addressing plaintiffs’ federal

claims consistent with a so-called Pullman abstention. In

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Puilman Co. 312 U.S. 496, 61

S. Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941), the Supreme Court ruled

that such an abstention is indeed proper where, as here,

(1) a sensitive area of social policy is involved that the

district court does not want to consider if avoidable; (2) a

state court ruling could obviate the need for such a fed-

eral adjudication; and (3) the proper resolution of the

state court issues remains uncertain pending the outcome

of the state court action.

As noted in Northern Virginia Law School, Inc. v. City of

Alexandria, 680 F.Supp. 222, 225 (E.D. Va. 1988), a Pullman

abstention “is closely related to the ripeness issue,” the

very thing this Court expressed its concern about. Cf,,

Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton

Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985).

App. 68

In indicating its willingness to consider a stay, the

Court was obviously mindful, as noted in Northwest For-

est Resource Council v. Robertson, 711 F.Supp. 1039 (D.Or.

1989), that whether to stay an action, until the resolution

of a similar action in another court, is a matter committed

to the sound discretion of the trial court. Where many of

the identical issues are involved, Northwest Forest notes, a

stay is appropriate. See also, EFCO Corp. v. Aluma Sys-

tems, USA; Inc., 983 F.Supp. 816 (S.D.lowa 1997)

Evergreen Marine Corp. v. Welgrow Intern. Inc., 954

F.Supp. 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1197) also ruled that a stay was

within the inherent power of the court based on the

pendency of a related proceeding in another jurisdiction.

Among the relevant factors enumerated in Evergreen

which support the granting of a stay are: the similarity of

parties and issues; the promotion of judicial efficiency;

the adequacy of relief available in other forum; fairness to

and convenience of the parties and counsel; the possi-

bility of prejudice to the parties; and the temporal

sequence of the filing of the actions. Although no one

factor is dispositive, it is apparent that virtually all of

them are present in the instant case.

Cited in Evergreen, is the seminal case of Colorado

River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,

814, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483, 496 (1973), where the

Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of federal absten-

tion is particularly appropriate in cases involving, as does

the instant case, federal constitutional issues which might

be mooted or later presented in a different posture by

reason of a state court determination of pertinent state

law.

App. 69

I. was further ruled in Colorado River that in deciding

whether to stay an action in favor of parallel litigation in

a state court, “a federal court should consider ‘wise judi-

cial administration, .. . conservation of judicial

resources, and comprehensive disposition of litigation.”

Id. at 424 U.S. 817, 96 S.Ct. 1246.

In short, the sound exercise of the Court’s discretion

in this case clearly justifies the entry of a stay for all of

the above cited reasons.

Where state administrative or judicial remedies need

to be exhausted to pursue 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions for as

applied land use claims alleging the violation of federal

due process and equal protection rights, a federal court

can enter a stay to await the conclusion of state court

proceedings. Front Royal v. Town of Front Royal, Virginia,

135 F.3d 275, 282 (4th Cir. 1998). At that time, a plaintiff's

federal claims can be litigated, if necessary, where, as

here, an England reservation has been asserted.

About one thing the parties will not doubt agree.

Given the unsettled posture of both the state and federal

actions, no useful purpose will be served by rehashing

issues that might not have to be addressed. More than

enough time and “lawyering” have already been invested

by both sides. Therefore, plaintiffs submit that a review

of all federal issues in the instant case should be stayed

pending the outcome of the state court litigation, includ-

ing a review of plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim

regarding which the Court expressed skepticism.

Defendant should, of course, be required to file its

answer or otherwise timely respond to plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint. If it so elects, it might even be

App. 70

allowed to file a Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss. Plain-

tiffs suggest, however, that supporting and opposing

Memoranda of Law should not be required at this time,

pending the outcome of the state court litigation. In the

event the necessity of ruling on any of the federal issues

is hereafter obviated, there is no reason to further impose

on the Court’s time now.

Conclusion

For each of the above reasons, all further proceedings

herein should be stayed, provided, however, defendant

should be required to file its Answer or otherwise

respond to plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint with

the understanding that (1) supporting and opposing

Memoranda of Law, and (2) consideration by the Court of

any Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss will also be stayed

until further Order of th

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