Reply Brief — Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment
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Supreme Court, 8S.
7 FILED
a | APR 4 2008
No. 00-1146 !
CLERK
IN THE L
Supreme Court of the United States
| THE STEEL COMPANY, a/k/a CHICAGO STEEL
AND PICKLING COMPANY,
Petitioner,
V.
CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Sanford M. Stein Daniel J. Popeo
Leo P. Dombrowski Richard A. Samp
WILDMAN, HARROLD, (Counsel of Record)
ALLEN & DIXON WASHINGTON LEGAL
225 West Wacker Drive FOUNDATION
Chicago, IL 60606-1229 2009 Massachusetts Ave, NW
(312) 201-2000 Washington, DC 20036
(202) 588-0302
Date: April 4, 2001
AMERICAN FINANCIAL PRINTERS ¢ WASHINGTON, DC ®* (202) 457-0030
See
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ARGUMENT
I.
II.
Ill.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CBE’S EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH FOGERTY
ARE UNAVAILING ..................
BOTH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ENVIRON-
MENTAL FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS
SUPPORT THE STEEL COMPANY’S CON-
TENTION THAT PREVAILING DEFENDANTS
ARE TO BE PLACED ON AN EQUAL
FOOTING WITH PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS . .
UNDER THE DUAL FEE-AWARD STAN-
DARD, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FACES
ENORMOUS FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO
SETTLE ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
WITHOUT REGARD TO THE MERITS OF
ENE Se a
AER i ek ok ek ee oo es
ee A a ve ow ar a or a a ee” a oe
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
ee Se et AO i Pa ee es 4,3, 4%, 35
Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., :
Sa ee ee a eae 1, 3, 4,5
Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake - Found.,
ee Ce 5 Oe ee eee 5
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,
ee ee as a kk a oe eee 5
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,
ee ae Oe a ls Ek i ve ee ee 7
Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council
for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) ..... ay ee
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,
Spe U.S. Ge times) oe es Corea eee 7
Willy v. Coastal Corp.,
ee Ok CE 8k oe Oe ee ee 10
Statutes and Miscellaneous:
EEE, i ho wk ae Oe ea 6, 7
§ 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604) ............ 6
GS SE PD 6k. rae Geen ee ee ee ae re
Oe rae A ak ns ee he ae ee eee |
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) ............ 2, 6,9
Se te. Se PE ho a es ee es a
Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Envir-
onmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990) ...... 9
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ... 6,7
REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER
Respondent Citizens for a Better Environment (“CBE”)
does not take issue with the principal contentions made in the
Petition. It does not contest that the fee-shifting provision of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
of 1986 (“EPCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f), does not
distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants and contains no language suggesting that
prevailing defendants are any less deserving of fees than
prevailing plaintiffs. Nor does CBE dispute that the Court,
when faced with virtually identical language in the fee-
shifting provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.
§ 505, held that prevailing defendants should be placed on an
equal footing with prevailing plaintiffs in determining
whether an award of fees is warranted. Fogerty v. Fantasy,
510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). CBE does not dispute that the
Court decision upon which the Seventh Circuit principally
relied, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for
Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), involved a prevailing
plaintiff, not a prevailing defendant; addressed the proper
size of the plaintiff's fee award, not the issue whether an
award was warranted; and is silent on the issue of whether
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants in environ-
mental cases should be treated differently with respect to fee
requests. Finally, CBE does not deny that, in sharp contrast
to the pattern under civil rights statutes, a substantial
majority of suits filed under environmental citizen-suit
provisions is filed by well-established environmental groups
that tend to file many such cases.
Because it cannot avoid making those concessions, CBE
attempts simply to foreclose any consideration of The Steel
Company’s claims by asserting that the Question Presented
by the Petition has already been decided against The Steel
Company. Opp. Br. 11-18. But as noted above and in the
Petition, the facts in Delaware Valley are so far afield from
2
the facts here that that case cannot reasonably be viewed as
having decided the Question Presented. CBE’s reliance on
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978),
is similarly misplaced. Christiansburg adopted a “dual
standard” in civil rights fee-award cases: prevailing civil
rights plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to fee awards,
while prevailing defendants are entitled to fees only if they
can demonstrate that the plaintiff's suit was “frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434
U.S. at 421. But CBE errs in asserting that Christiansburg
established a general approach for determining fee awards
under all federal fee-shifting statutes; the Court’s decision in
Fogerty makes clear that the Christiansburg approach is not
necessarily applicable outside the context of civil rights
cases.
CBE also relies on the absence of any direct conflict
among the federal appeals courts regarding the Question
Presented. CBE is correct, as we recognized in the Petition,
that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is consistent with that of
the only other circuit to have addressed that question directly
-- the Ninth Circuit. But as we explained in the Petition, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits reached their conclusions not on
the basis of any legal analysis, but because they have been
confused by the Court’s decision in Delaware Valley. Both
appeals courts have erroneously interpreted Delaware Valley
as precluding them from considering any arguments against
application of the Christiansburg dual standard in environ-
mental citizen suits. Because, for whatever reason, the
appeals courts do not feel at liberty to address the issue
themselves, this Court is the only possible source of guidance
on the issue.
The exceptional importance of the Question Presented
is demonstrated by the filing of amicus curiae briefs in
a
3
support of the Petition by the State of California Auto
Dismantlers Association, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the
Chemical Industries Council of Illinois, the Mid-America
Legal Foundation, and the Illinois Manufacturers Associa-
tion. Thousands of businesses each year find themselves the
target of citizen suits filed under the federal environmental
laws; whether fees are to be awarded in such cases on an
even-handed basis to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing
defendants plays a substantial role in the disposition of such
suits. This Court has not previously supplied an answer;
review is warranted to provide the business and environ-
mental communities with the answer they so desperately
need.
I. CBE’S EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH FOGERTY
ARE UNAVAILING
The decision below directly conflicts with this Court’s
decision in Fogerty. In construing fee-shifting language in
the Copyright Act that is virtually identical to the fee-shifting
language at issue here, the Court held that the Copyright
Act’s fee-shifting language "gives no hint that successful
plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defen-
dants." Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 522. Based on that language,
the Court held that the Copyright Act required fee petitions
from prevailing defendants and fee petitions from prevailing
plaintiffs to be placed on an equal footing. 7d. at 534.
CBE’s efforts to distinguish Fogerty are unavailing.
CBE disputes our assertion that the relative wealth of
Copyright Act plaintiffs (in relation to civil rights plaintiffs)
played a significant role in Fogerty’s decision not to extend
the Christiansburg dual fee-award standard outside the
context of civil rights cases. Opp. Br. 17-18. But CBE fails
to address the relevant language from Fogerty that we cited
4
in the Petition. For example, Fogerty explained that
Christiansburg adopted a dual standard in civil rights fee-
shifting cases in substantial part because many civil rights
plaintiffs are "impecunious” and because Congress intended
to "redress the balance in part" between poor plaintiffs and
"defendants with more resources" “by treating successful
plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms
of the award of attorney fees" -- and thereby encourage the
filing of more civil rights suits. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524.
In contrast, the Court noted, Copyright Act plaintiffs are far
less likely than civil rights plaintiffs to be poor; "[e]ntities
which sue for copyright infringement as plaintiffs can run the
gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists." Jd.
CBE does not seriously challenge our assertion that the
financial profile of the typical plaintiff in environmental
citizen-suit litigation has far more in common with the
typical Copyright Act plaintiff than the typical civil rights
plaintiff. As we demonstrated in the Petition, virtually all
environmental citizen-suit litigation is initiated by relatively
large environmental organizations. Indeed, CBE -- one of
the smaller organizations that regularly engages in such
litigation -- admits to annual revenues in the $2 million
range. Opp. Br. 18.'
CBE’s only response is to note that its annual revenues
are less than those of The Steel Company. Opp. Br. 17-18.
' According to its IRS (Form 990) filing for fiscal year 1999,
CBE had revenues in excess of $2 million. See Brief of amici curiae
Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF"), er al., at 18. PLF also inspected
the Form 990s of four other environmental groups that play a promi-
nent role in environmental citizen-suit litigation; their annual revenues
ranged from $18 million to $111 million, and their net assets ranged
from $14 million to $133 million. /d. at 18-19.
<>
5
But that response does not address Fogerty’s rationale, which
is that there is no reason to presume that Congress intended
to create a dual fee-award standard in favor of prevailing
plaintiffs if the financial resources of the. typical plaintiff
bringing suit under the statute at issue are such that an even-
handed fee-award standard would not unduly discourage that
plaintiff from filing suit.
CBE also attempts to distinguish Fogerty on the ground
that, in terms of goals and objectives being served, environ-
mental citizen suits have far more in common with the civil
rights suits at issue in Christiansburg than the Copyright Act
Suits at issue in Fogerty. Opp. Br. 12-14. But CBE fails to
address the decisions of this Court, cited in the Petition, that
indicate that the role of the plaintiff in an environmental citi-
zen suit is far different from the role of the plaintiff in a civil
rights suit. See Pet. 22-24 (discussing Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987),
and Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989)).
The decision below cannot be squared with this Court’s
decision in Fogerty. Review is warranted to resolve that
conflict.
Il. BOTH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND THE
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL
FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS SUPPORT THE
STEEL COMPANY’S CONTENTION THAT
PREVAILING DEFENDANTS ARE TO BE
PLACED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH
PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS
Perhaps the most striking feature of CBE’s opposition
brief is that it contains absolutely no discussion of the
Statutory language at issue. Section 11046(f) provides that in
6
an EPCRA case, a district court "may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness
fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party
whenever the court determines such an award is appro-
priate.” Review is warranted in order to-resolve whether the
Seventh Circuit was justified in reading a dual fee-award
standard into the party-neutral language of § 11046(f).
CBE makes no attempt to explain the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in terms of the language of § 11046(f). Rather,
CBE presents a selective reading of the legislative history of
other environmental statutes in support of its counter-textual
assertion that Congress intended to create a dual fee-award
standard under EPCRA. Opp. Br. 16. For example, CBE
relies on a snippet from the legislative history of the Clean
Air Act in support of its position:
[T]he Senate Report on the Clean Air Act, which
provides for fee awards to “any party, whenever the
court determines such award is appropriate" (Section
304(d); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)), explains that this section
allows courts to award fees "to defendants where the
litigation was obviously frivolous and harassing. This
should . . . discourag[e] abuse of this provision, while
at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions
that will be brought." S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 38-39 (1970).
Id. CBE has distorted the meaning of the passage in the
Senate Report by providing only a partial quotation. When
read in its entirety, the passage makes clear that a lawsuit
that was "frivolous and harassing” was one instance in which
a court "could" award fees to a prevailing defendant, not (as
CBE suggests) that such suits were the only instance in which
such a fee award would be appropriate:
4
The Committee has added a key element in providing
that the courts may award costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, whenever
the court determines that such action is in the public
interest. The court could thus award costs of litigation
to defendants where the litigation was obviously
frivolous or harassing.
S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970) (quoted
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510
F.2d 692, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
Indeed, as we pointed out in the Petition (at 20-21) and
as the Court has found (in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463
U.S. 680, 692-93 (1983)), the legislative history of the Clean
Air Act indicates that the Act’s fee-shifting provision was
added as a means of assisting prospective defendants, not
prospective plaintiffs. Because the "central purpose” (id.) of
fee-shifting provisions in environmental statutes is to cut
down on the number of meritless citizen suits being filed,
such provisions cannot fairly be interpreted as favoring
plaintiffs over defendants. CBE’s efforts to distinguish
Ruckelshaus (Opp. Br. 14-15) are unavailing. Ruckelshaus
was unequivocal in finding that the primary reason for
adding a fee-shifting provision to the Clean Air Act was to
protect defendants from meritless suits. Jd. at 692-93. CBE
is correct, of course, that the provision had the additional
purpose of encouraging the filing of meritorious citizen suits
(Opp. Br. 20); otherwise, there would have been no reason
to permit the award of fees to prevailing environmental
plaintiffs. But there can be no justification for interpreting
a fee-shifting statute as favoring plaintiffs over defendants
when it was adopted at the insistence of those who sought to
provide a benefit to defendants.
8
Ill. UNDER THE DUAL FEE-AWARD STANDARD,
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FACES
ENORMOUS FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO SETTLE
ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS WITHOUT
REGARD TO THE MERITS OF SUCH SUITS
The Petition explains at length how lower courts’
adoption of a dual fee-award standard in environmental
citizen suits has transformed such suits from the supplemental
enforcement mechanism envisioned by Congress into a
shakedown system under which companies must pay tribute
to environmental groups as a cost of doing business. Pet.
28-30.
In response, CBE suggests that The Steel Company has
exaggerated the burden imposed on the business community
by environmental citizen suits. Opp. Br. 18-20. CBE notes,
for example, that the number of environmental citizen suits
filed against private entities has actually declined somewhat
over the past six years. /d. at 18-19 n.4. But that trend is
of little consolation to the business community if, as The
Steel Company asserts, the level of environmental litigation
against private companies has been at a very high level
throughout the past decade. CBE does not challenge The
Steel Company’s assertions that environmental citizen suits
did not exist at all prior to 1970, and that there has been an
"explosion" in the number of such suits as compared to
litigation levels in the early 1980s.
Moreover, the number of suits actually filed does not
begin to tell the whole story. Many companies pay
substantial settlements to environmental groups that send
them the required 60-day advance notice of intent to sue,
even without any lawsuit being filed. Such settlements,
which are not reflected in the litigation figures cited by CBE,
9
impose a significant burden on the business community. See
Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental
Law, 65 TuL. L. REV. 339 (1990).
CBE does not contest The Steel Company’s assertion
that in all but one of the reported decisions involving citizen
suits brought under EPCRA against non-governmental defen-
dants, the plaintiff was an environmental group, not an
individual. Pet. 25. CBE responds by pointing to the
number of reported decisions identified by The Steel
Company (nine) as evidence that we have exaggerated the
burden imposed on the business community by environmental
citizen suits. But the number of reported decisions obviously
bears little relation to the total number of EPCRA cases that
have been filed. Many lawsuits do not result in any written
decision; and even when the presiding judge writes a decision
(s)he more often than not will decide not to publish the
decision in an official reporter. As noted in the Petition, one
environmental group, the Atlantic States Legal Foundation,
claims to have litigated "hundreds of successful EPCRA and
Clean Water Act cases." Pet. 25 n.10. Moreover, as noted
above, as is true of other environmental statutes, the number
of lawsuits filed under EPCRA does not reflect the burdens
imposed on companies forced to enter into settlements with
environmental groups after receiving a 60-day notice-of-
intent-to-sue letter but before suit is actually filed.
CBE also contends that the situation faced by environ-
mental citizen suit defendants is no different from the
situation faced by all other civil defendants: "{AJll civil
defendants can claim that their inability to recover attorney’s
fees under the ordinary "American Rule" creates settlement
pressure, even in cases they might consider to be winnable."
Opp. Br. 20. But as we explain in the Petition, it is not
merely the inability to recover fees that creates the pressure
10
for defendants to settle. Under the dual fee-award standard
endorsed by the Seventh Circuit, environmental defendants
must also factor in the possibility (no matter how slight) that
the plaintiff will prevail -- thereby exposing the defendant to
substantial fines and the prospect of paying the plaintiff’s
attorney fees as well as his own.”
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
Sanford M. Stein Daniel J. Popeo
Leo P. Dombrowski Richard A. Samp
WILDMAN, HARROLD, (Counsel of Record)
ALLEN & DIXON WASHINGTON LEGAL
225 West Wacker Drive FOUNDATION
Chicago, IL 60606-1229 2009 Massachusetts Ave, NW
(312) 201-2000 Washington, DC 20036
(202) 588-0302
Dated: April 4, 2001
? CBE also argues that review should be denied because there is
no subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear The Steel
Company’s fee petition. Opp. Br. 20-22. The Seventh Circuit quite
rightly rejected that contention, basing its decision on this Court’s
decision in Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992). CBE
is quite correct that there is a circuit split on this jurisdictional issue
and that the Seventh Circuit arrived at its decision after explicitly
rejecting the holdings of three other circuits. Pet. App. 8a-9a. But
that split in authority does not render this case any less worthy of re-
view; to the contrary, it provides an additional reason for review if the
Court is inclined to resolve the conflict over the jurisdictional issue.
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