Reply Brief — Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment

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Supreme Court, 8S.

7 FILED

a | APR 4 2008

No. 00-1146 !

CLERK

IN THE L

Supreme Court of the United States

| THE STEEL COMPANY, a/k/a CHICAGO STEEL

AND PICKLING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

V.

CITIZENS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENT,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Sanford M. Stein Daniel J. Popeo

Leo P. Dombrowski Richard A. Samp

WILDMAN, HARROLD, (Counsel of Record)

ALLEN & DIXON WASHINGTON LEGAL

225 West Wacker Drive FOUNDATION

Chicago, IL 60606-1229 2009 Massachusetts Ave, NW

(312) 201-2000 Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

Date: April 4, 2001

AMERICAN FINANCIAL PRINTERS ¢ WASHINGTON, DC ®* (202) 457-0030

See

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ARGUMENT

I.

II.

Ill.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CBE’S EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH FOGERTY

ARE UNAVAILING ..................

BOTH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ENVIRON-

MENTAL FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS

SUPPORT THE STEEL COMPANY’S CON-

TENTION THAT PREVAILING DEFENDANTS

ARE TO BE PLACED ON AN EQUAL

FOOTING WITH PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS . .

UNDER THE DUAL FEE-AWARD STAN-

DARD, THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FACES

ENORMOUS FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO

SETTLE ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS

WITHOUT REGARD TO THE MERITS OF

ENE Se a

AER i ek ok ek ee oo es

ee A a ve ow ar a or a a ee” a oe

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

ee Se et AO i Pa ee es 4,3, 4%, 35

Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., :

Sa ee ee a eae 1, 3, 4,5

Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake - Found.,

ee Ce 5 Oe ee eee 5

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County,

ee ee as a kk a oe eee 5

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,

ee ae Oe a ls Ek i ve ee ee 7

Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council

for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986) ..... ay ee

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club,

Spe U.S. Ge times) oe es Corea eee 7

Willy v. Coastal Corp.,

ee Ok CE 8k oe Oe ee ee 10

Statutes and Miscellaneous:

EEE, i ho wk ae Oe ea 6, 7

§ 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604) ............ 6

GS SE PD 6k. rae Geen ee ee ee ae re

Oe rae A ak ns ee he ae ee eee |

Emergency Planning and Community

Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) ............ 2, 6,9

Se te. Se PE ho a es ee es a

Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Envir-

onmental Law, 65 TUL. L. REV. 339 (1990) ...... 9

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ... 6,7

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

Respondent Citizens for a Better Environment (“CBE”)

does not take issue with the principal contentions made in the

Petition. It does not contest that the fee-shifting provision of

the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act

of 1986 (“EPCRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f), does not

distinguish between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing

defendants and contains no language suggesting that

prevailing defendants are any less deserving of fees than

prevailing plaintiffs. Nor does CBE dispute that the Court,

when faced with virtually identical language in the fee-

shifting provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C.

§ 505, held that prevailing defendants should be placed on an

equal footing with prevailing plaintiffs in determining

whether an award of fees is warranted. Fogerty v. Fantasy,

510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994). CBE does not dispute that the

Court decision upon which the Seventh Circuit principally

relied, Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for

Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986), involved a prevailing

plaintiff, not a prevailing defendant; addressed the proper

size of the plaintiff's fee award, not the issue whether an

award was warranted; and is silent on the issue of whether

prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants in environ-

mental cases should be treated differently with respect to fee

requests. Finally, CBE does not deny that, in sharp contrast

to the pattern under civil rights statutes, a substantial

majority of suits filed under environmental citizen-suit

provisions is filed by well-established environmental groups

that tend to file many such cases.

Because it cannot avoid making those concessions, CBE

attempts simply to foreclose any consideration of The Steel

Company’s claims by asserting that the Question Presented

by the Petition has already been decided against The Steel

Company. Opp. Br. 11-18. But as noted above and in the

Petition, the facts in Delaware Valley are so far afield from

2

the facts here that that case cannot reasonably be viewed as

having decided the Question Presented. CBE’s reliance on

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978),

is similarly misplaced. Christiansburg adopted a “dual

standard” in civil rights fee-award cases: prevailing civil

rights plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to fee awards,

while prevailing defendants are entitled to fees only if they

can demonstrate that the plaintiff's suit was “frivolous,

unreasonable, or without foundation.” Christiansburg, 434

U.S. at 421. But CBE errs in asserting that Christiansburg

established a general approach for determining fee awards

under all federal fee-shifting statutes; the Court’s decision in

Fogerty makes clear that the Christiansburg approach is not

necessarily applicable outside the context of civil rights

cases.

CBE also relies on the absence of any direct conflict

among the federal appeals courts regarding the Question

Presented. CBE is correct, as we recognized in the Petition,

that the Seventh Circuit’s approach is consistent with that of

the only other circuit to have addressed that question directly

-- the Ninth Circuit. But as we explained in the Petition, the

Seventh and Ninth Circuits reached their conclusions not on

the basis of any legal analysis, but because they have been

confused by the Court’s decision in Delaware Valley. Both

appeals courts have erroneously interpreted Delaware Valley

as precluding them from considering any arguments against

application of the Christiansburg dual standard in environ-

mental citizen suits. Because, for whatever reason, the

appeals courts do not feel at liberty to address the issue

themselves, this Court is the only possible source of guidance

on the issue.

The exceptional importance of the Question Presented

is demonstrated by the filing of amicus curiae briefs in

a

3

support of the Petition by the State of California Auto

Dismantlers Association, the Pacific Legal Foundation, the

Chemical Industries Council of Illinois, the Mid-America

Legal Foundation, and the Illinois Manufacturers Associa-

tion. Thousands of businesses each year find themselves the

target of citizen suits filed under the federal environmental

laws; whether fees are to be awarded in such cases on an

even-handed basis to prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing

defendants plays a substantial role in the disposition of such

suits. This Court has not previously supplied an answer;

review is warranted to provide the business and environ-

mental communities with the answer they so desperately

need.

I. CBE’S EFFORTS TO DISTINGUISH FOGERTY

ARE UNAVAILING

The decision below directly conflicts with this Court’s

decision in Fogerty. In construing fee-shifting language in

the Copyright Act that is virtually identical to the fee-shifting

language at issue here, the Court held that the Copyright

Act’s fee-shifting language "gives no hint that successful

plaintiffs are to be treated differently from successful defen-

dants." Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 522. Based on that language,

the Court held that the Copyright Act required fee petitions

from prevailing defendants and fee petitions from prevailing

plaintiffs to be placed on an equal footing. 7d. at 534.

CBE’s efforts to distinguish Fogerty are unavailing.

CBE disputes our assertion that the relative wealth of

Copyright Act plaintiffs (in relation to civil rights plaintiffs)

played a significant role in Fogerty’s decision not to extend

the Christiansburg dual fee-award standard outside the

context of civil rights cases. Opp. Br. 17-18. But CBE fails

to address the relevant language from Fogerty that we cited

4

in the Petition. For example, Fogerty explained that

Christiansburg adopted a dual standard in civil rights fee-

shifting cases in substantial part because many civil rights

plaintiffs are "impecunious” and because Congress intended

to "redress the balance in part" between poor plaintiffs and

"defendants with more resources" “by treating successful

plaintiffs more favorably than successful defendants in terms

of the award of attorney fees" -- and thereby encourage the

filing of more civil rights suits. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 524.

In contrast, the Court noted, Copyright Act plaintiffs are far

less likely than civil rights plaintiffs to be poor; "[e]ntities

which sue for copyright infringement as plaintiffs can run the

gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists." Jd.

CBE does not seriously challenge our assertion that the

financial profile of the typical plaintiff in environmental

citizen-suit litigation has far more in common with the

typical Copyright Act plaintiff than the typical civil rights

plaintiff. As we demonstrated in the Petition, virtually all

environmental citizen-suit litigation is initiated by relatively

large environmental organizations. Indeed, CBE -- one of

the smaller organizations that regularly engages in such

litigation -- admits to annual revenues in the $2 million

range. Opp. Br. 18.'

CBE’s only response is to note that its annual revenues

are less than those of The Steel Company. Opp. Br. 17-18.

' According to its IRS (Form 990) filing for fiscal year 1999,

CBE had revenues in excess of $2 million. See Brief of amici curiae

Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF"), er al., at 18. PLF also inspected

the Form 990s of four other environmental groups that play a promi-

nent role in environmental citizen-suit litigation; their annual revenues

ranged from $18 million to $111 million, and their net assets ranged

from $14 million to $133 million. /d. at 18-19.

<>

5

But that response does not address Fogerty’s rationale, which

is that there is no reason to presume that Congress intended

to create a dual fee-award standard in favor of prevailing

plaintiffs if the financial resources of the. typical plaintiff

bringing suit under the statute at issue are such that an even-

handed fee-award standard would not unduly discourage that

plaintiff from filing suit.

CBE also attempts to distinguish Fogerty on the ground

that, in terms of goals and objectives being served, environ-

mental citizen suits have far more in common with the civil

rights suits at issue in Christiansburg than the Copyright Act

Suits at issue in Fogerty. Opp. Br. 12-14. But CBE fails to

address the decisions of this Court, cited in the Petition, that

indicate that the role of the plaintiff in an environmental citi-

zen suit is far different from the role of the plaintiff in a civil

rights suit. See Pet. 22-24 (discussing Gwaltney of Smith-

field, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987),

and Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989)).

The decision below cannot be squared with this Court’s

decision in Fogerty. Review is warranted to resolve that

conflict.

Il. BOTH THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND THE

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL

FEE-SHIFTING PROVISIONS SUPPORT THE

STEEL COMPANY’S CONTENTION THAT

PREVAILING DEFENDANTS ARE TO BE

PLACED ON AN EQUAL FOOTING WITH

PREVAILING PLAINTIFFS

Perhaps the most striking feature of CBE’s opposition

brief is that it contains absolutely no discussion of the

Statutory language at issue. Section 11046(f) provides that in

6

an EPCRA case, a district court "may award costs of

litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness

fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party

whenever the court determines such an award is appro-

priate.” Review is warranted in order to-resolve whether the

Seventh Circuit was justified in reading a dual fee-award

standard into the party-neutral language of § 11046(f).

CBE makes no attempt to explain the Seventh Circuit’s

decision in terms of the language of § 11046(f). Rather,

CBE presents a selective reading of the legislative history of

other environmental statutes in support of its counter-textual

assertion that Congress intended to create a dual fee-award

standard under EPCRA. Opp. Br. 16. For example, CBE

relies on a snippet from the legislative history of the Clean

Air Act in support of its position:

[T]he Senate Report on the Clean Air Act, which

provides for fee awards to “any party, whenever the

court determines such award is appropriate" (Section

304(d); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d)), explains that this section

allows courts to award fees "to defendants where the

litigation was obviously frivolous and harassing. This

should . . . discourag[e] abuse of this provision, while

at the same time encouraging the quality of the actions

that will be brought." S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong.,

2d Sess. 38-39 (1970).

Id. CBE has distorted the meaning of the passage in the

Senate Report by providing only a partial quotation. When

read in its entirety, the passage makes clear that a lawsuit

that was "frivolous and harassing” was one instance in which

a court "could" award fees to a prevailing defendant, not (as

CBE suggests) that such suits were the only instance in which

such a fee award would be appropriate:

4

The Committee has added a key element in providing

that the courts may award costs of litigation, including

reasonable attorney and expert witness fees, whenever

the court determines that such action is in the public

interest. The court could thus award costs of litigation

to defendants where the litigation was obviously

frivolous or harassing.

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 36-39 (1970) (quoted

in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510

F.2d 692, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).

Indeed, as we pointed out in the Petition (at 20-21) and

as the Court has found (in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463

U.S. 680, 692-93 (1983)), the legislative history of the Clean

Air Act indicates that the Act’s fee-shifting provision was

added as a means of assisting prospective defendants, not

prospective plaintiffs. Because the "central purpose” (id.) of

fee-shifting provisions in environmental statutes is to cut

down on the number of meritless citizen suits being filed,

such provisions cannot fairly be interpreted as favoring

plaintiffs over defendants. CBE’s efforts to distinguish

Ruckelshaus (Opp. Br. 14-15) are unavailing. Ruckelshaus

was unequivocal in finding that the primary reason for

adding a fee-shifting provision to the Clean Air Act was to

protect defendants from meritless suits. Jd. at 692-93. CBE

is correct, of course, that the provision had the additional

purpose of encouraging the filing of meritorious citizen suits

(Opp. Br. 20); otherwise, there would have been no reason

to permit the award of fees to prevailing environmental

plaintiffs. But there can be no justification for interpreting

a fee-shifting statute as favoring plaintiffs over defendants

when it was adopted at the insistence of those who sought to

provide a benefit to defendants.

8

Ill. UNDER THE DUAL FEE-AWARD STANDARD,

THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY FACES

ENORMOUS FINANCIAL PRESSURE TO SETTLE

ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS WITHOUT

REGARD TO THE MERITS OF SUCH SUITS

The Petition explains at length how lower courts’

adoption of a dual fee-award standard in environmental

citizen suits has transformed such suits from the supplemental

enforcement mechanism envisioned by Congress into a

shakedown system under which companies must pay tribute

to environmental groups as a cost of doing business. Pet.

28-30.

In response, CBE suggests that The Steel Company has

exaggerated the burden imposed on the business community

by environmental citizen suits. Opp. Br. 18-20. CBE notes,

for example, that the number of environmental citizen suits

filed against private entities has actually declined somewhat

over the past six years. /d. at 18-19 n.4. But that trend is

of little consolation to the business community if, as The

Steel Company asserts, the level of environmental litigation

against private companies has been at a very high level

throughout the past decade. CBE does not challenge The

Steel Company’s assertions that environmental citizen suits

did not exist at all prior to 1970, and that there has been an

"explosion" in the number of such suits as compared to

litigation levels in the early 1980s.

Moreover, the number of suits actually filed does not

begin to tell the whole story. Many companies pay

substantial settlements to environmental groups that send

them the required 60-day advance notice of intent to sue,

even without any lawsuit being filed. Such settlements,

which are not reflected in the litigation figures cited by CBE,

9

impose a significant burden on the business community. See

Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental

Law, 65 TuL. L. REV. 339 (1990).

CBE does not contest The Steel Company’s assertion

that in all but one of the reported decisions involving citizen

suits brought under EPCRA against non-governmental defen-

dants, the plaintiff was an environmental group, not an

individual. Pet. 25. CBE responds by pointing to the

number of reported decisions identified by The Steel

Company (nine) as evidence that we have exaggerated the

burden imposed on the business community by environmental

citizen suits. But the number of reported decisions obviously

bears little relation to the total number of EPCRA cases that

have been filed. Many lawsuits do not result in any written

decision; and even when the presiding judge writes a decision

(s)he more often than not will decide not to publish the

decision in an official reporter. As noted in the Petition, one

environmental group, the Atlantic States Legal Foundation,

claims to have litigated "hundreds of successful EPCRA and

Clean Water Act cases." Pet. 25 n.10. Moreover, as noted

above, as is true of other environmental statutes, the number

of lawsuits filed under EPCRA does not reflect the burdens

imposed on companies forced to enter into settlements with

environmental groups after receiving a 60-day notice-of-

intent-to-sue letter but before suit is actually filed.

CBE also contends that the situation faced by environ-

mental citizen suit defendants is no different from the

situation faced by all other civil defendants: "{AJll civil

defendants can claim that their inability to recover attorney’s

fees under the ordinary "American Rule" creates settlement

pressure, even in cases they might consider to be winnable."

Opp. Br. 20. But as we explain in the Petition, it is not

merely the inability to recover fees that creates the pressure

10

for defendants to settle. Under the dual fee-award standard

endorsed by the Seventh Circuit, environmental defendants

must also factor in the possibility (no matter how slight) that

the plaintiff will prevail -- thereby exposing the defendant to

substantial fines and the prospect of paying the plaintiff’s

attorney fees as well as his own.”

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Sanford M. Stein Daniel J. Popeo

Leo P. Dombrowski Richard A. Samp

WILDMAN, HARROLD, (Counsel of Record)

ALLEN & DIXON WASHINGTON LEGAL

225 West Wacker Drive FOUNDATION

Chicago, IL 60606-1229 2009 Massachusetts Ave, NW

(312) 201-2000 Washington, DC 20036

(202) 588-0302

Dated: April 4, 2001

? CBE also argues that review should be denied because there is

no subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts to hear The Steel

Company’s fee petition. Opp. Br. 20-22. The Seventh Circuit quite

rightly rejected that contention, basing its decision on this Court’s

decision in Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138 (1992). CBE

is quite correct that there is a circuit split on this jurisdictional issue

and that the Seventh Circuit arrived at its decision after explicitly

rejecting the holdings of three other circuits. Pet. App. 8a-9a. But

that split in authority does not render this case any less worthy of re-

view; to the contrary, it provides an additional reason for review if the

Court is inclined to resolve the conflict over the jurisdictional issue.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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