Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Lennix v. Halter

PILED

OFFICE OF JHE G&ERK

In The

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{ Supreme Court of the United States

Cecile A. Lennix

Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of Social Security

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

In The U.S. Court of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

j Cecile A. Lennix

: Pro Se

1817 Armant Ct.

LaPlace, LA 70068

(504) 652-2268

* i

Questions Presented for Review

1. May the judicial system of the State of Louisiana deny a

_ Claimant a day in court to defend himself?

2. May a claimant have the privilege to submit evidence to

the court system that was not given to the A.L.J. Adrian

Pedron when ordered in a court hearing on 12/09/1996

but never received?

3. Does a claimant have the opportunity to be examined by a

Social Security disability physician for a work related

hung injury before the courts make final decisions?

4. May an employer elect not to complete an accident report

on an employee who is injured while at work but

completed sheet as personal injury?

Parties to the Proceeding

Cheryl Chapman

Assistant Regional Counse!

1301 Young Street, Suite 430

Dallas, Texas 75202-5433

Phone# - 204-767-2921

Fax Number - 214-767-9189

(ii)

Table of Contents

Title

Citation of Opinions and Orders in the Case

Basis for Jurisdiction

Constitutional Provision

Statement of the Case

Arguments

Listing of Appendix Items

Appendix Item 1

Appendix Item 2

(iti)

Statute of the Case

Elliot L. Richardson v. Pedro Perales 402 US 389, 28 L Ed 2d

842, 91S Ct 1420

Citation of Opinions and Orders in the Case

Complaint filed August 04, 1998. Civil action 98-2296 Sect. T

Mag. 5 ‘

October 14, 1999 United States District Court Eastern District

of Louisiana Civil Action No. 98-2296 Section “LLM” (1)

Notice of Appeal Civil Action No. 98-2296 Section “LLM” (1)

on November 09, a

01/22/00 Additional Extension of Time Case #99-31244

01/24/00 Motion to Supplement Record on Appeal

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

No. 99-31244

USDC - 98-2296 Sec.”LLM” (1)

Received 10/07/98 Motion for Extension of Time wrong

name and case number

Earline Jackson for Leanna Jackson

Civil Action No. 98-2156 Section “C” (3)

Letter of April 11, 2000 from Attorney Cheryl Chapman,

Office of the General Counsel

August 04, 2000 United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit No. 99-31244

Basis for Jurisdiction

The merits of the Social Security Disability claim

have not been addressed in any lower court proceeding.

Constitutional Provision

The Constitution of the United States of America, Article

XIV, which provides in pertinent part: “Nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law.”

Statement of the Case

I would like to appeal the decision rendered by

Circuit Judges Higginbotham, Duhe’, and Wiener in case

#99-31244.

On Sunday, June 27, 1993, while performing duties

an an assistant operator at Big Three Industries, now Air

Liquide of America, anhydrous ammonia, 95% or better

purity, was inhaled by claimant Cecile A. Lennix. The

required Supervision Investigation of Accident form was

never signed and executed. Compensation was not paid or

ordered by the court system of the State of Louisiana. Merits

of the case were never addressed and considered.

Claimant asked to address compliance in reporting

accidents, but received judgment relative to personal injury

for compensation.

Claimant is asking this court to see if her records

have been misfiled or overlooked because claimant feels that

the accident of Sunday, June 27, 1993, has caused her mental

and medical problems.

Argument

Merits of case not heard in lower courts, therefore need

Federal relief.

On Sunday, June 27, 1993, claimant had an accident inhaling

anhydrous ammonia, 95% pure or better.

Lionel Comeaux, supervision, filled out a Supervision

Investigation of accident form, which he did not sign. Gave

copy to claimant on fax paper. Information fades. Ex. A

Monday, June 28, 1993, claimant visited the company

doctor, Christy Montegut, with a return visit on Wednesday,

July 27 and July 30, 1993, Office visits to Dr. John Theile,

Lung Specialist. Ex. C

July 30, 1993, received Dr. Montegut’s office visits and

Highland papers from Houston office. Supervision

Investigation of Accident report ommited. Ex. D

Claimant continued to work with residual medical

problems.

Merger of Big Three Industries and Air Liquide of America.

Ex. E ;

Thursday, January 13, 1994, claimant walked into company

control room, which had an unusual odor, compounded by

Sup. Gaubert, who began to repeatedly flick a butane

lighter. Reported incident to Plant Manager. Ex:F

January 15 and 16, 1994, claimant's family reported

claimant's strange and unusual behavior to company doctor

(Christy Montegut).

Monday, January 17, 1994, family received order of

protective custody, and claimant was admitted to DePaul

Psychiatric Hospital. Discharged on January 25, 1994. Ex. G

Claimant received 26 weeks pay from group policy through

company. Ex. H

July 31, 1994 Air Liquide Insurance Company informed

claimant of termination. Ex. I

September 1994 started treatment with Dr. Charles Chester.

Ex. J

Claimant applied for C.O.B.R.A. and received checks from

ITT Hartford, an individual policy held and paid for by

claimant. Ex. K e

September 11, 1995 appeal ITT Hartford decision. Ex. L

Letter dated September 08, 1995 received September 13, 1995

from Don Bobo, Human Resource. Ex. M

September 1995 started medical treatment at Louisiana

Medical Center. Ex.N

1996 Started treatment with Dr. Robert Ellis, River Parish

Mental Health.

Monday, December 09, 1996 hearing Judge Adrian Pedron

(ALJ). Advocate Ison was given thirty (30) additional days

to get medical records to Judge Pedron. I was not aware of

what was sent to Judge Pedron by Advocate Ison. Claimant

is submitting attending physician's Statement of Disability

sheets from Dr. Christy Montegut. Received partial

disability from Social Security. May 19, 1997 appealed

decision. Ex. O

Complaint filed August 4, 1998. Civil Action 98-2296 Sect. T

Mag. 5. Ex. P

February 4, 1998 certified letter #Z039176419 Mr. Patrick

Verschelde. Ex. Q

Medical records of October 02, & 03, 2000. Ex. R

Affidavits of Kenneth Pelham and Ferrell Yarbrough. Ex.S

Claimant believes that just too long delayéd is justice

denied.

After doing all the leg work, paperwork, utilitizing the

public library, and asking others for help, claimant is asking

this court to please hear her case. ~

I hope, pray, and keep the faith that I would be rewarded

with any and everything that is due me, including filing

fees.

Appendix

United States District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana

Cecile A. Lennix versus Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner of

Social Security; Civil Action No. 98-2296, Section “LLM” (1)

Dismissed with Prejudice

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Cecile

A. Lennix, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus Kenneth S. Apfel,

Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Louisiana USDC No. 98-CV-2296-LLM, No. 99-

31244, Summary Calendar. Affirmed

Item 1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CECILE A. LENNIX CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 98-2296

KENNETH S. APFEL, SECTION “LLM” (1)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY

ORDER AND REASONS

Plaintiff Cecile A. Lennix seeks judicial review pursuant to

Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act (the “Act”) of the

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security

Administration (the “Commissioner” ), which denied her

claim for disability income benefits (“DIB”) and

supplemental security income benefits (“SSI”) under Title II,

§§ 216(1) and 223 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(I) and 423, and

under Title XVI , §§ 1602 and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Act, 42

U.S.C. §1381(a).’ Plaintiff and defendant filed timely cross-

motions for summary judgment. Record Doc. Nos. 6, 7.

1. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Lennix applied for DIB on June 20, 1994, alleging disability since

January 13, 1994, because of stress and depression.” (Tr.34). The

' Plaintiff incorrectly cited ”Part A of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act,

as presently amended.” (Tr.29). She is actually seeking disability income

benefits (“DIB”) under Title II and supplemental security income benefits

(“SST”) under Title XVI.

? At the hearing before the AU, however, Lennix alleged she was also

disabled due to diabetes, a respiratory impairment, and shoulder, heart

and back pain. (Tr.315-334).

Commissioner denied her application initially and on reconsider-

ation. (Tr.33-47, 55-70). Plaintiff requested a hearing before an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was held on December 9,

1996. The ALJ partially granted Lennix’s application on March 21,

1997. (Tr. 14-17). He found that she was entitled to a period of

disability insurance benefits commencing on January 13, 1994 ,

under §§ 216(I) and 223 of the SSA. However, he found that

pursuant to those same sections of the SSA, her entitlement to

disability benefits ended on September 30, 1995, “the last day of

the second month after the month of the disability cessation.” (Tr.

17). After the Appeals Council denied review on June 11, 1998

(Tr. 5-6), the ALJ’s decision became the final decision of the

Commissioner for purposes of this Court’s review.

2. STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL

Plaintiff’s request for judicial review raises the following

issue: whether the Commissioner erred in concluding that

she was no longer disabled.*

3. AU'S FINDINGS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON

APPEAL

The Commissioner made the following findings relevant to

the issues on appeal:

A. The claimant has had a “severe” impairment or

combination of impairments consisting of depression.

Specifically, she was under a disability beginning with her

alleged onset date and ending July 11, 1995. During that

time, she suffered from a major depression that precluded

her ability to perform even simple unskilled work.

B. She has no severe physical impairments. The record

as a whole shows that her diabetes and respiratory

impairments are well controlled by medications and that

these impairments do not result in more than minimal limitations in

> Plaintiff is filing pro se in this matter.

10

hers o perform basic work vis. ee Sime edie,

752 F.2d 1099 (Sth Cir. 1985).

q As of July 11, 1995, claimant had a good mood and

fairly normal sleep and appetite. Her Zoloft was decreased

to 50 mg. On July 31, 1995, she had experienced even more

of a decrease in her daytime sleepiness, Her mood, sleep,

and appetite were within normal limits and she had no

suicidal, assaultive or psychotic illness. She was to continue

to take Zoloft at 50 mg. a day for the next six months. Dr.

Chester, her treating physician, did not think she was

disabled anymore. (Tr. 15, 231).

D. Claimant gave exaggerated testimony of symptoms

and functional limitations for the period after the time she

was actually disabled. Owing to medical improvement

related to the ability to work, the claimant, since July 11,

1995, has regained a residual functional capacity consistent

with at least an ability to perform her past relevant semi-

skilled work as an assistant operator at an air separation

plant.

4. ANALYSIS

A. Standards of Review

The function of this Court on judicial review is limited to

determining whether there is substantial evidence in the

record to support the final decision of the Commissioner as

trier of fact and whether the Commissioner applied the

appropriate legal standards in evaluating the evidence.

Spellman v. Shalala, 1 F.3d 357, 360 (5th Cir. 1993); Villa v.

Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1990). Substantial

evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a prepon-

derance and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richard-

son y, Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Spellman, 1 F.3d at

360. This Court may not reweigh the evidence, try the issues ~

de novo or substitute its judgment for the Commissioner’s.

Id; Selders v, Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 617 (Sth Cir. 1990).

11

The Commissioner is entitled to make any finding that is

supported by substantial evidence, regardless whether other

conclusions are also permissible. See Arkansas v, Oklahoma

503 U.S. 91 (1992). Despite this Court's limited function, it

must scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the

reasonableness of the decision reached and whether

substantial evidence exists to support it. Villa, 895 F.2d at

1022; Johnson v, Bowen, 864 F.2d 340, 343-44 (Sth Cir. 1988).

Any findings of fact by the Commissioner that are

supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Ripley v.

Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (Sth Cir. 1995).

To be considered disabled and eligible for DIB, plaintiff

must show that she is unable “to engage in any substantial

gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to

result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last

for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42

US.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). The Commissioner

has promulgated regulations that provide procedures for

evaluating a claim and determining disability. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1501 to 404.1599 & Appendices, §§ 416.901 to 416.998

(1995). The regulations include a five-step evaluation

process for determining whether an impairment prevents a

person from engaging in any substantial gainful activity.

ID. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232,

236 (5th Cir. 1994); Moore v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1065, 1068

(6th Cir. 1990). The five-step inquiry terminates if

“The five-step analysis requires consideration of the following:

First, if the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful employ-

ment, he or she is found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. $§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

Second, if it is determined that, although the claimant is not engaged in

substantial employment, he or she has no severe mental or physical

impairment which would limit the ability to perform basic work-related

functions, the claimant is found not disabled. ID. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c).

12

the Commissioner finds at any step that the claimant is or is

not disabled. Leggett v. Chater, 67 F.3d 558, 564 (Sth Cir.

1995).

The claimant has the burden of proof under the first four

parts of the inquiry. Id. If she successfully carries this

burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that

other substantial gainful employment is available in the

national economy, which the claimant is capable of

performing. Greenspan, 38 F.3d at 236; Kraemer v. Sullivan,

885 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1989). When the Commissioner

shows that the claimant is capable of engaging in alternative

“the ultimate burden of persuasion shifts back

to the claimant.” I[d.; accord Selders, 914 F.2d at 618.

The Court “weigh{s} four elements of proof when

determining whether there is substantial evidence of

Third, if an individual’s impairment has lasted or can be expected to last

patchy sear) cteap ibsnar emma pheno 0-8 eat

serious impairments in the regulations or is medically equivalent to a

listed impairment, he or she is considered disabled without consideration

of vocational evidence. Id. 8§ 404.1520(d), 4 16.920(d).

Fourth, if a determination of disabled or not disabled cannot be made by

these steps and the claimant has a severe impairment, the claimants

residual functional capacity and its effect on the claimant's past relevant

work are evaluated. If the impairment does not prohibit the claimant from

returning to his or her former employment, the claimant is not disabled.

Id. $8 404.1520(e), 416.920(e).

Fifth, if it is determined that the claimant cannot return to his or her

former employment, then the claimant's age, education and work

experience are considered to see whether he or she can meet the physical

and mental demands of a significant number of jobs in the national

economy. If the claimant cannot meet the demands, he or she will be

found disabled. [d. $$ 404.1520(f)(1), 416.920(f)(1). To assist the

Commissioner at this stage, the regulations provide certain tables that

reflect major functional and vocational patterns. When the findings made

with respect to claimant's vocational factors and residual functional

capacity coincide, the rules direct a determination of disabled or not

disabled. Id. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, $8 200.00-204.00, 416.969 (1994)

(“Medical-Vocational Guidelines”).

13

disability: (1) objective medical facts; (2) diagnoses and

opinions of treating and examining physicians; (3) the

claimant’s subjective evidence of pain and disability; and (4)

_ {her] age, education, and work history.” Martinez v. Chater, 64

F.3d 172, 174 (Sth Cir. 1995). “The Commissioner, rather than the

courts, must resolve conflicts in the evidence.” Id.

B. Factual Background

Plaintiff Cede A. Lennix and her daughter were the only

witnesses testifying at the hearing on December 9, 1996,

before the ALJ. (Tr. 315-355). It is clear from a review of the

entire transcript that plaintiff was no longer basing her claim

for disability on depression and stress, but mainly on

respiratory problems she was experiencing. She alleged that

the problems began after she “inhaled pure ammonia from a

tank. A relieve valve went off on me and it was pure

ammonia that got into my system.” (Tr.319). This occurred

on June 27, 1993. (See Plaintiff's Mem. in Support, p.1.)

Since that time, she alleges that she suffers from exposure to

any sort of chemical, including those in household cleaners

like bleach, chlorine and aerosol spray, sulfur, dust and

tobacco. She is taking medication for her “airways,” called

Proventil, an inhalant, which she has to use approximately

twice a day. She stated that Proventil did relieve her

condition, “because it relieves the water” and it takes the

pain away from around her heart. (Tr.336). She described

suffering from pain, mostly around her heart area, which

she attributes to the buildup of fluids due to her inability to

properly release moisture through her “airways.” (Tr.320-

329). She also testified that she is being treated for diabetes,

for which she is taking pills, not insulin, and vaginitis, a

recurring bacterial infection, at Charity Hospital. (Tr. 332-

334).

C. Medical Evidence

This Court has reviewed the medical records in evidence

and the ALJ’s summary of the medical evidence (Tr. 19-21),

and finds the ALJ’s thorough summary of the evidence was

14

substantially correct and incorporates it herein by reference.

In her Motion for Summary Judgment and Incorporated

Statement of Material Facts, Lennix makes very little

reference to her mental or psychological condition. She

concentrates mainly on her physical symptoms, although

she does mention her stay in DePaul Hospital in January of

1994; she also mentions that she was placed in an area with

Alcoholic and Drug Dependency patients, “was very afraid

and asked my daughter to bring my Prevential Inhaler

pump.” (Plaintiff's Mem. pp. 3-4). She also states that the

accident on June 27, 1993 “has and is causing me physical

and emotional stress “ Id. p.6.

Lennix refers in her memorandum to having two liver tests

performed. She claims she is diabetic and is receiving

treatment for that as well as for her respiratory problems.

(See Tr.264 showing abnormal liver profile results, dated

7/31/95; see also Plaintiff's Mem.pp.5-6 and Ex.I/1 attached

[exhibit appears to be copy of same test taken on 7/31/95,

with added notation “Dr. Charles Chester ordered this test.

7/31/95 - Return to work.”}).

The ALJ found that the plaintiffs testimony of subjective

severe breathing problems, were not supported by the

evidence as a whole in the disabling degree alleged, and

therefore lacked credibility. (Tr. 15). He thoroughly

reviewed the medical evidence presented at the hearing,

along with additional medical evidence which he ordered

submitted after the hearing. (Tr. 353).

Whether pain is disabling is an issue for the ALJ, who has

the primary responsibility for resolving conflicts in the

evidence. Carrier v. Sullivan, 944 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir.

1991). It is within the ALJ’s discretion to determine the

disabling nature of a claimant’s pain, and the AL]’s

determination is entitled to considerable deference. Wren v.

Sullivan, 925 F.2d 123, 128 (Sth Cir. 1991); James v. Bowen,

793 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1986). The determination whether an

15

applicant is able to work despite some pain is within the

province of the administrative agency and should be upheld

if supported by substantial evidence. Jones v. Heckler, 702

F.2d 616 (Sth Cir. 1983); Epps v. Harris, 624 F.2d 1267 (Sth

Cir. 1980).

Subjective complaints must be corroborated by objective

medical evidence. Houston v. Sullivan, 895 F.2d 1012, 1016

(5th Cir. 1989). When the medical signs or laboratory

findings show that the claimant has medically determinable

impairments that could reasonably be expected to produce

the alleged symptoms, the Commissioner must evaluate the

intensity and persistence of the symptoms, so that he can

determine how the symptoms limit the claimant’s capacity

for work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).

The Commissioner found, and his conclusion is substantially

supported by the medical records, that although plaintiff

testified she had crying spells daily, she also stated that she

was handling them. (Tr. 17). Additionally, as noted above,

he found that her testimony regarding symptoms and

functional limitations since July 11, 1995, the date he found

her disability had ended, was exaggerated. (Tr. 15). This

Court finds there was substantial evidence in the record to

support the ALJ's findings that Lennix’s disability, as such is

defined by the Act, ended on July 11, 1995.

Although the plaintiff did not specifically argue that her

combined impairments prohibited her from performing any

type of work, the Commissioner nevertheless properly

considered plaintiff's combined impairments. An

individual's combined impairments can prohibit substantial

gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1523, 416.923; Owens v.

Heckler, 770 F.2d 1276, 1282 (Sth Cir. 1985). It is well settled

that “the Commissioner must analyze both the disabling

effect of each of the claimant's ailments and the combined

effect of all of these impairments.” Fraga vy, Bowen, 810 F.2d

1296, 1305 (Sth Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted). However, an

ALJ's finding that multiple impairments do not render a

plaintiff disabled will be upheld unless the Commissioner

“so fragmentized [plaintiff's] several ailments” that he failed

properly to evaluate their combined effect upon plaintiff. Jd.

In the instant case, the ALJ properly found that since July 11,

1995, the plaintiff had no disorder or combination of

disorders meeting or equaling in severity any of the

disorders described in the Listing of Impairments, Subpart

P, Appendix 1, Social Security Regulations No. 4. Since at

least July 11, 1995, she had not met or equaled Listing

Section 12.04,° dealing with depression. (Tr. 15) With regard

to her respiratory problems and her diabetes, there was

* Under Listing 12.04, an affective disorder is “[cJharacterized by a

disturbance of mood, accompanied by a full or partial manic or depressive

syndrome. Mood refers to a prolonged emotion that colors the whole

psychic life; it generally involves either depression or elation.” 20 C.F.R.

Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 12.04 (1995). To satisfy the listing, plaintiff

must show that she meets the requirements of both subparagraphs A and

B of the listing.

To meet subparagraph A of Listing 12.04 for depression, Lennix

must prove: [mjedically documented persistence, either

continuous or intermittent, of...[djepressive syndrome

characterized by at least four of the following:

a. Anhedonia or pervasive loss of interest in almost all

activities; or

b. Appetite disturbance with change in weight; or

c. Sleep disturbance; or

17

substantial evidence that these problems were controlled

with medication, and that they did not produce, either alone

or in combination with any remaining emotional symptoms,

any disability that would render her incapable of perform-

ing at least her past relevant semi-skilled work. In other

= words, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports

the ALJ's conclusion.

In the instant case, this Court’s review of the record reveals

the ALJ did “not simply [make] a rote statement” that he

had evaluated plaintiff's impairments in combination.

Fraga, 810 F.2d at 1305; accord Tamez v, Sullivan, 888 F.2d

334, 336 (5th Cir. 1989). The ALJ clearly evaluated the

medical evidence carefully. See Fraga, 810 F.2d at 1305; see

Harrell v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 471, 482 (5th Cir. 1988). He

differentiated her condition between January 14, 1995 and

July 11, 1995, during which time he found she was disabled

due to severe depression, and her condition after July 11,

1995, from which time he found that she no longer suffered

from a disability, as that term is defined under the Act.

In addition, plaintiff must also meet the identical paragraph B require-

ments of either Listing 12.04 or 12.06 by showing that her disorder results

in at least two of the following:

1. Marked restriction of activities-of daily living; or

2. Marked ditficulties in maintaining social functioning; or

3. Deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in

frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner (in work

settings or elsewhere); or

4. Repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in

work or work-like settings which cause the individual to

withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation of

signs and symptoms (which may include deterioration of

adaptive behaviors).

Id. $§ 12.04(B), 12.06(B). “Marked” means “more than moderate, but

less than extreme.”

ee a eee

18

“The Commissioner, rather than the courts, must resolve

conflicts in the evidence.” Martinez v. Chater, 64 F.3d 172,

174 (Sth Cir. 1995). As stated earlier, the Commissioner is

entitled to make any finding that is supported by substantial

evidence, regardless whether other conclusions are also

permissible. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 US. 91 (1992).

Despite this Court’s limited function, it must scrutinize the

record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the

decision reached and whether substantial evidence exists to

support it. Villa, 895 F.2d at 1022; Johnson v. Bowen, 864

F.2d 340, 343-44 (Sth Cir. 1988). Any findings of fact by the

Commissioner that are supported by substantial evidence

are conclusive. Ripley v. Chater, 67 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir.

1995). Actually, this Court does not find any signifi

conflicts in the evidence in this case. After scrutinizing the

record in its entirety, the Court finds the ALJ’s decision to be

entirely reasonable, and finds his finding of facts to be

substantially supported by the evidence of record.

CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence in the record supports the AL]’s

decision that plaintiff Lennix was entitled to a period of

disability insurance benefits commencing on January 13,

1994, and ending on September 30, 1995, “the last day of the

second month after the month of the disability cessation.”

Supra, p.2. In addition, substantial evidence in the record

supports the ALJ’ s decision that Lennix has regained a

residual functional capacity consistent with at least an ability

to perform her past relevant semi-skilled work.

Accordingly, FF IS ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint be

and is hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 14th day of October, 1999.

Lansing L. Mitchell”

UNITED STATES SENIOR DISTRICT JUDGE

19

Item Z

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-31244

Summary Calendar

CECILE A. LENNIX,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant-A ppellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

USDC No. 98-CV-2296-LLM

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, DUHE, and WIENER, Circuit

Judges. PER CURIAM:’

Cecile A. Lennix appeals from the grant of summarv judgment f or

the Commissioner of Social Se urity in her action for judicial

review of the Commissioner’s decision denying her application for

disability benefits for the period after July 11, 1995. Lennix

contends that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by

substantial evidence; that the Administrative Law Judge (AU)

ignored evidence she submitted; and that she was deprived of due

process.

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion

should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited

circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.R.47.5.4.

20

The Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial

evidence. Richardson v. Pe.rales, 402 US. 389, 390 (1971).

Lennix’s depression (the basis for an award of benefits for

the period ending July 11, 1995) had been treated success-

fully by July 11, 1995, and her medication ultimately was

complains. That document added no support to Lennix’s

disability claim. Finally, the Due Process Clause does not

require that each and every claim receive a full hearing

before a judge at each step of review.

AFFIRMED.

21