Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Haney v. United States

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(\) 20 988 oc 1 2 2000

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CHARLES M. HANEY, JR., Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

PATIENCE E. SCHERMER

Captain, United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

Counsel of Record

STEPHEN P. KELLY

Major, United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

Counsel for Petitioner

Appellate Defense Division

(AFLSA/J AJA)

Air Force Legal Services Agency

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343

Bolling AFB, DC 20332-8000 ~

(202) 767-1562

KEVIN J. BARRY

Counsel for Petitioner

13406 Sand Rock Court

Chantilly, VA 22021

December 2000 (703) 968-7247

4

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free

counsel guaranteed in all twelve federal circuits has been

violated in a prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military

Justice where the senior government prosecuting attorney

who actively moved the case toward trial (1) switched sides

during the pendency of the prosecution, (2) was appointed as

one of petitioner’s two defense counsel, (3) conspired with

petitioner’s co-defense counsel to conceal from the trial judge

both the conflict and his status as an appointed defense

counsel, and (4) testified against his client’s interest at trial.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........ccccccccccccces iv

GPINIOUEBELIOW ... 6. 6 iiidinicnmsie RE. 1

toi dire vesihr eth stant diate nted bose uk 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED .......ccccccccccvcccecs 2

STATEMENT OF THECASE ...................:. 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT .......... 11

REE ACE SSSA AE eae ene Mer Seems 22

APPENDIX A

United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF

ee WN ECON. «5c cckacescecccccscc la

APPENDIX B

United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF

EK a 2a

APPENDIX C

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev)

(AF Ct. Crim App Nov. 4, 1999) ............... 3a

APPENDIX D

United States v. Haney, 45 M.J. 447

ae k da ch ae Bibs pees aot 33a

APPENDIX E

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev)

FR pen & Bo) | eee 47a

iv

APPENDIX F

APPENDIXG

United States v. Haney, 38 M.J. 229

Ces SE chee codsnneussdaniesnsuanan ewe 54a

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000

(A.F.C.MLR. Aug. 26,1992) ..........eeeeeeees 55a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Constitutional Provisions:

U.S. Constitutional Amendment VI ....... passim

Supreme Court Cases:

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) ...... 14

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980) ..... passim

Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60

CREED ib s'vnéa save cnsensdhakcees ccneanean passim

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475

(ROSE vkhdpedwnsdewcbakdaneadsecacaeeees passim

Middendorf v. Henry, 425.U.S. 25 (1976) ........ 11

Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261 (1981) ....... passim

Federal Circuit Cases:

Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865 (8th Cir. 1999) ....... 15

Brien v. United States, 625 F.2d 10

(Ist Cir, 1982) 2... ..... cece cece e cece eee eeee 16

Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296

GR GAY BUN 6 6 iad s Sdgkeeassecarascaeoneeas 15

Dawan v. Lockhart, 31 F.3d 718 (8th Cir. 1994)... 15

Familia-Consoro v. United States, 160 F.3d 761

(Rae Ce EME so aces csacctuncesscsnuabacenas es 16

Vv

Federal Circuit Cases:—Continued

Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839

(Tite Cor, 1908). onc ccciccctecclitin es.

Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775

(Sts Chr. BOGO) ooo cc ccccvsveveneeri Baa:

Riggs v. United States, 209 F.3d 828

Gt Che, BORD. i cictecvccvcecitvenl ei

Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1485

CU Cae BOD ok vv envnccdcnecsue tae oe

United States v. Burney, 756 F.2d 787

(SRR CBE: SOU vos cc ceccccddsac iii.

United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620

CRU A FO ocd vie dee SS eedecedee

United States v. Crespo de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006

GRRE as chasis

United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146

BEER IT COT ge Oe nite

United States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798

kt PRP Sept ee oe aka Bean ee

United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370

i | RM irene eat Scien ity emai 9

United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924

CR I 54 isles dle bald ecient a Ve

Military Cases:

United States v. Breese, 11 M.J. 17

AMMA SUMED bh tics boncbeer sik es ae

United States v. Devitt, 20 M.J. 240

CR TIED ono nkic des ctetvnisx ein.

United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A.

BOC, Se Co. SEE URED ovine vo seivvicecdeckcc.

vi

Military Cases:—Continued

United States v. McClain, 50 M.J. 488

(CA.A.F. 1GBB) 20 cccccccccccccvcccccccesscess

United States v. Murphy, 50 MJ. 4

CCAM. BEG. cccccdcascccccccttsccsedetua

United States v. Scott, 24 M.J. 186

ot ere ay oe

United States v. Smith, 44 M.J. 459

COA RBe BEGG cccccccccccescscccsccsecssen

United States v. Sparks, 29 M.J. 52

oe eee

United States v. Whidbee, 28 M.J. 823

(CLC ELE. GED cccccccccccsisivdctéedcdstes

State Cases: .

Armstrong v. People, 701 P.2d 17

(Wake. 1GGED oo ccccidceddawniccddvassbie decetebs

Lettley v. State, 746 A.2d 392 (Md. 2000) ........

People v. Bonin, 765 P.2d 460 (Cal. 1998) ........

Shongutsie v. State, 827 P.2d 361

CWO. BEBE ccccccccccccccccesedpagecncoenens

State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1997) ......

State v. Crespo, 718 A.2d 925 (Conn. 1998) .......

State v. Mountjoy, 708 A.2d 682 (N.H. 1998) .....

State v. Wallace, 908 P.2d 1267 (Kan. 1995) ......

State v. Wille, 595 So.2d 1149 (La. 1992).........

Federal Statutes:

Art. 22 U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 822

CRBGED xc cccccccccccschsmdedede dt sdeasbecbae<

Federal Statutes:—Continued

Art. 23, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 823

GHEE) cccccsncecedscvtetacutbeeniaeen 4

Art. 24, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 824

GEUGED cvccencccedscnkanacinnscvdehaieaaeue 4

Art. 27(a)(2), U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. §

GUGODNSED cccccvdcduccetuccsstaleset passim

Art. 38, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 838

GUE 0.0.0.404000k4000dsebivandbembaataeeerel 14

Art, 3%a), U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 839(a)

GE Bosco kecccadedodbusetctvdasdicédeceiial 7

Art. 60, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 860

Gee bi Woe pene dbddusd bcedcdsndes bedbtidee )

Art. 60 (d), U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 1J.S.C. § 860

I ih died ind hdd pein od hide bes os 9

Art. 112a, U.C.M.J. (2000), 10 U.S.C. § 912a

GU bh.ccbducaeUsadeetheedaac Ue cvoticectece 3

Military Rules for Courts Martial:

PAA SUID s dncaccciccdocecccscssce 6

—_— ea, ree ze

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 2000

No.

CHARLES M. HANEY, JR., Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Petitioner, Charles M. Haney, Jr., respectfully

prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the order and

judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces entered in his case on September 12, 2000.

OPINIONS BELOW

The order of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces denying reconsideration is reprinted as

Appendix A. United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF

(C.A.A.F. Sep. 12, 2000). The grant of review and summary

affirmance order issued by the United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces is reprinted as Appendix B.

United States v. Haney, No. 93-0157/AF (C.A.A.F. Aug. 17,

2000). The unpublished opinion of the United States Air

Force Court of Criminal Appeals is reprinted as Appendix C.

United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev)(AF Ct. Crim App

Nov. 4, 1999). 3

. 2

Previous opinions and orders, in reverse chronological

order, are as follows: United States v. Haney, 45 M.J. 447

(C.A.A.F. 1996) at Appendix D; United States v. Haney, ACM

29000 (f rev)(A.F.C.M.R. May 26, 1994) at Appendix E;

United States v. Haney, 38 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 1993) at

Appendix F; and, United States v. Haney, ACM 29000

(A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 26, 1992) at Appendix G.

JURISDICTION

The final judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces was entered on September 12,

2000. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28

U.S.C. § 1259(3) (2000) and 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) (2000).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States provides, in relevant part:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for

his defence.

Article 27(a)(2) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

provides:

No person who has acted as investigating officer,

military judge, or court member in any case may

later act as trial counsel, assistant trial counsel, or,

unless expressly requested by the accused, as

defense counsel or assistant or associate defense

counsel in the same case. No person who has acted

for the prosecution may act later in the same case

for the defense, nor may any person who has acted

for the defense act later in the same case for the

prosecution.

Art. 27(a)(2), UCMJ (M.C.M. 2000 ed.), 10 U.S.C. § 827

(a)(2)(2000).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case raises the question whether conflict free defense

counsel is in fact guaranteed in the military justice system, and

whether the standards applied by military appellate courts in

reviewing counsel conflict of interest issues meet constitutional-

norms.

In this general court-martial tried in 1990, the chief

prosecuting attorney spent months personally preparing the

case for trial. Shortly before trial, he switched sides and became

one of two appointed defense counsel. While representing the

government, he had played a substantial role, including drafting

the charges and inducing petitioner’s commander (an official

who had the right to dismiss the charges and who believed

petitioner to be innocent) to commence the formal judicial

process by “preferring” (swearing to) the charges.

After switching to the defense side, the same attorney

played an equally active defense role (including evaluating and

rejecting crucially important defense evidence), although he

never appeared as petitioner’s counsel in court. The conflicted

counsel conspired with his co-counsel to conceal from the trial

judge not only the conflict but even his status as a defense

counsel, first by not entering an appearance or being present

with petitioner and co-counsel at trial, and second by influencing

his co-counsel to. affirmatively misstate the composition of the

defense to the judge, all in direct violation of mandatory court

rules. When the issue as to his role in inducing petitioner’s

commander to prefer the charges arose at trial, he even testified

on behalf of the government and against his client’s interests

without anyone disclosing to the trial judge the former

prosecutor’s current status as an appointed defense counsel.

Statement of Facts

After trial, petitioner was found guilty in 1990 of one

specification of wrongful use of marijuana and one specification

of wrongful use of cocaine in violation of Article 112a, Uniform

Code of Military Justice (“U.C.M.J.”) (10 U.S.C. § 912a (2000)).

He was sentenced to a dismissal, 7 months confinement and

substantial monetary forfeitures.

4

At the time of his trial, Major Haney was an officer

with over 19 years of exemplary, unblemished service in

both the enlisted and officer ranks of the United States Air

Force. His work at the Air Force Space Command at

Peterson Air Force Base, CO, in missile test & evaluation

was extremely challenging, and required the highest levels

of security clearances, including access to several

“compartmentalized” sets of top secret information, and at

the time of the charged offenses he was performing

flawlessly on an extremely complex and demanding mission.

The prosecution was initiated solely on the basis of a

disputed laboratory report of a 1989 random urinalysis test.

There was substantial evidence questioning the validity and

reliability of the report, and substantial evidence of

petitioner’s good military character and character for non-

drug abuse.

Captain Robert Watson, the chief prosecuting attorney

for Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, personally oversaw

the investigation and processing of petitioner’s case from

December 1989 until approximately May 1990. As the base

legal office’s “Chief of Military Justice,”! Captain Watson

was personally and substantialiy involved in investigating

1 The “Chief of Military Justice” is the attorney who has supervisory

responsibility for all military justice matters within the office of the staff

judge advocate (“SJA”), a senior attorney who serves as principal legal

advisor to the “convening authority” (“CA”). The SJA has overall

responsibility for conducting the military justice prosecution function

within that command. Convening authorities are military commanders,

and generally are not lawyers. CAs play a number of critical roles under

the U.C.M.J., the most important of which is to exercise prosecutorial

discretion (similar to that exercised by the United States Attorney).

CAs thus determine, with the advice of their SJAs, whether a matter will

be handled administratively or criminally through trial by court-martial,

who will be prosecuted, for what charges, and at what level of court-mar-

tial. See, e.g., Art. 22-24, U.C.M.J. Normally, the actual in-court

prosecutions are conducted by junior attorneys in the SJA’s office. Thus,

while it is the CA who exercises prosecutorial discretion, the case prepa-

ration is actually done, and the trials are conducted, by more junior

attorneys on the SJA’s staff. Captain Watson was the most senior of

these prosecuting attorneys.

5

and processing the case against the petitioner, including

gathering evidence, coordinating further investigation,

obtaining authorization to prosecute from higher

headquarters, and representing the government in

negotiations with petitioner’s original counsel, about

alternate dispositions of the case other than by general

court-martial. Captain Watson personally drafted the

charges against the petitioner, and he formed a personal

belief that the charges were true and that petitioner was

guilty. He convinced petitioner’s commander, Colonel

Smith, to initiate the judicial processing of the case under

the U.C.M.J. (to swear to and “prefer” the charges), even

though Colonel Smith specifically told Captain Watson that

he did not believe the charges were true and that he

actually believed Major Haney was innocent.

At the time he was initially accused, petitioner was

represented by the only defense counsel at Peterson Air

Force Base, the “Area Defense Counsel,” Captain Brian

Koza, who thus became petitioner’s appointed (or “detailed”)

defense counsel. In April, 1990, aware that he was scheduled

for transfer overseas, Captain Koza arranged for Captain

Israel B. Willner, a “circuit” defense counsel from another

base, to be appointed as a defense co-counsel. In June, 1990,

when Captain Koza departed for a new military assignment

- overseas, Captain Watson was transferred from his position

as Chief of Military Justice into the Area Defense Counsel

position being vacated by Captain Koza, thus becoming the

sole defense counsel on the base.

Upon becoming the area defense counsel, Captain

Watson recognized that there was a conflict of interest issue

if he were to represent petitioner, and he approached his

former supervisor, the base staff judge advocate (“SJA”),

about it. The SJA is the officer with authority to waive any

conflict objections on the part of the government. Based on

Captain Watson’s (erroneous) statements to the SJA that he

had only “minimal” involvement with petitioner’s case, and

had never “acted for the prosecution,” the SJA orally granted

the requested government waiver.

6

After Captain Watson became area defense counsel, he

became an active member of the defense team along with

Captain Willner. He participated in preparation of the

defense case, including taking client confidences,

interviewing potential defense witnesses, investigating and

collecting (and most importantly rejecting) potential defense

evidence, and discussing strategy and tactics with Captain

Willner and petitioner.

In particular, the two defense counsel discussed the

anticipated issue concerning the defective “preferral” of

charges by Colonel Smith. They discussed the fact that

Captain Watson would almost certainly be called as a

witness for the prosecution regarding his role in convincing

Colonel Smith to swear to the charges. They knew this

subject would arise, for they planned to call Colonel Smith

as a defense witness on the merits to testify about

petitioner’s good military character, and about the fact that

he believed petitioner would never abuse drugs. (In the

military justice system, “good military character,” and

“specific trait” character evidence (e.g., for non-drug abuse)

are not only admissible, but may alone be sufficient to raise

a reasonable doubt.) Captain Willner and Captain Watson

decided that it “would look extremely poor to have

somebody called from the defense counsel’s table to the

witness stand to testify for the prosecution.” Their solution

to this “problem” was to agree to a plan under which no one

would learn that Captain Watson was then serving as a

defense counsel. To accomplish this end, they agreed that

Captain Watson would not sit at the defense table at trial

(but would sit in the gallery when he was in court), and they

agreed not to identify him as a defense counsel to the

military judge (at the point in the trial when the defense

was required by Rule for Court-Martial 901(d)(2) to identify

all members of the defense.)

As planned, Captain Watson did not sit at the defense

counsel table at trial. He was never introduced to the

military judge and was never announced on the record or

otherwise identified as a member of the trial defense team.

7

There was absolutely no judicial inquiry into any conflict of

interest at trial, and petitioner never waived any conflict at

trial.

Also as planned, Colonel Smith testified at trial for the

defense that, despite swearing to and preferring the charges,

he always believed petitioner was innocent. In light of this

testimony, the military judge excused the court members

(military jury) and held an Art. 39(a), U.C.MJ., hearing to

inquire into what he and counsel for both sides agreed was a

question of improper preferral of charges. Colonel Smith was

recalled and testified he only signed the charge sheet because

Captain Watson explained to him that it was merely an

administrative command responsibility and guilt or innocence

would be ruled upon in court.

Captain Watson then was called to testify for the

prosecution (against petitioner’s interests) about Colonel

Smith’s swearing to and preferral of the charges. Just before

Captain Watson was called to take the stand, Captain Willner

and the military judge had the following exchange:

Captain Willner: Your Honor, before we do that, I

wanted to point out to the court that since the time

that these charges were preferred, Captain Watson

has been reassigned to the Area Defense Counsel

Office. As the Area Defense Counsel, he has

worked with me in preparing for this case. He has

also taken confidences from Major Haney.

Military Judge: Well, fine. We won't get into his

confidential relationship with the accused. We’ll

discuss only matters pertaining to the advice given

to Colonel Smith at the time of preferral. Captain

Watson?

App. C at 30a.

This is the only information that was given to the

military judge that Captain Watson had worked both sides of

this case. The military judge gave no indication he saw any

issue of conflict or was aware of any requirement for a

judicial inquiry. Despite Captain Watson’s testimony for the

8

government in support of the legality of the preferral, the

military judge found the preferral in this case to be fatally

defective because Colonel Smith did not believe the charges

to be true at the time he signed them. The military judge

found the preferral so flawed that, unless waived by the

defense, a mistrial would be necessary. Thereafter, both

defense counsel (including Captain Watson, but not including

any independent outside counsel), urged petitioner to waive

the defective preferral and proceed with trial, which he did.

Defense counsel were unsuccessful in challenging the

government’s laboratory report, and called few witnesses at

trial, none of whom effectively raised the issue of petitioner's

extraordinary good character, including particularly his

reputation—and the opinions of virtually all who knew him—

that he would never use illegal drugs. The most important of

the potential witnesses for this character trait were never even

interviewed. Petitioner was found guilty. At the sentencing

hearing which followed, counsel called no witnesses, other than

petitioner who read a sworn statement. Petitioner was

sentenced to an unusually severe sentence including monetary

forfeitures amounting to $7000.00, seven months confinement (a

substantial portion of which he served in isolation at the

military’s Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth), and a

dismissal from the service which will, if his conviction becomes

final, terminate all military benefits including his retirement

benefits.

Facts Relative to the Post-trial DuBay

Hearing and Appellate Review

Petitioner three times appealed his case to the Air ~

Force Court of Criminal Appeals (“A.F.C.C.A.”),? and each

time that court affirmed the conviction. Each time he filed a

petition for review by the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces (“C.A.A.F.”),? and each time that court granted

; 2The A.F.C.C.A. was formerly named the Air Force Court of Military

Review.

3 The C.A.A.F. was formerly named the Court of Military Appeals.

9

review. The first time, the C.A.A.F. remanded the case to the

A.F.C.C.A. to consider the conflict of counsel and other.

ineffectiveness of counsel issues that had not been considered

on that court’s first review. The Air Force Court reviewed

the issues and again affirmed the conviction. The second

time the C.A.A.F. considered the case it not only set aside the

decision of the A.F.C.C.A., but also set aside the “action” of

the convening authority approving petitioner’s conviction and

sentence,‘ and remanded the case for submission to a

different convening authority for a new staff judge advocate

recommendation® and a new convening authority action. In

so doing, the court authorized a post-trial evidentiary

hearing, pursuant to United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A.

147, 37 C.M.R. 411 (1967), to resolve the issues related to

defense counsel conflict of interest, “and other

ineffectiveness-of-counsel issues.” See United States v.

Haney, 45 M.J. 447, 452 (C.A.A.F. 1996), App. D. The new

convening authority authorized a DuBay hearing, which was

conducted in October 1997. None of these earlier decisions

(Apps. D, E, F, or G) are at issue in this petition. It is only

the post-trial DuBay hearing and the subsequent decisions

which raise the issues addressed in this petition.

At the 1997 DuBay Hearing, evidence was received on

both conflict of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel

issues.© Among the specific questions that the military judge

was directed to answer was “[d]id the accused know of

4 At the conclusion of trial, after receiving submissions from the defense,

and receiving the Recommendation of his SJA, the CA is required to take

“action” on the findings and sentence, and has complete discretion to

approve, disapprove or modify the findings or sentence. See Art. 60,

UCMJ.

5 Prior to taking action on the findings and sentence, the CA is required to

receive the recommendation of his staff judge advocate. See Art. 60(d),

U.C.M.J. The SJA is an (usually senior) attorney, and is the CA’s principal

legal advisor.

6 The ineffectiveness of counsel issues raised on the record included the

rejection of crucial character evidence, the failure to interview key wit-

nesses, the failure to call available witnesses on findings, and the failure to

call any witnesses other than petitioner on sentencing.

10

Captain Watson’s prior representation of the government in

his case and did he waive this conflict of interest?” See App.

C at 6a (emphasis added). The DuBay hearing judge actually

found very few facts, the majority of his “findings” being no

more than a recitation of portions of the various testimony he

had heard.

At the DuBay hearing, Captain Watson testified he did

not believe there really was a conflict, and that he never

obtained any written waiver from petitioner. Despite this,

both Captain Watson and Captain Willner testified they

“fully informed” petitioner about the conflict. Captain

Willner also testified that, but for the “appearance” issue

related to the defective preferral of charges, and Captain

Watson potentially being a prosecution witness against

petitioner, Captain Watson would have sat at the defense

counsel table and been properly announced to the trial judge

as defense counsel. ;

Petitioner testified at the DuBay hearing that he was

never told any specifics about Captain Watson’s prior

government representation by either Captain Willner or

Captain Watson, and that Captain Watson told him there was

really no conflict because it was just a normal change of duty

assignment within the military system and he had not really

acted in petitioner’s case.

The DuBay judge found there was no judicial inquiry into

whether petitioner waived any potential conflict of interest

with Captain Watson, or into whether petitioner waived

Captain Watson’s presence at trial, because “the court was

never aware that Captain Watson was a detailed counsel” and

“{njo one informed the military judge that Captain Watson was

also detailed as Major Haney’s defense counsel.” App. C at 10a,

12a. Among the facts the DuBay judge did find was that, after

a meeting between Captain Willner, Captain Watson and

petitioner in early June 1990, just prior to Captain Watson

being detailed to the defense, “[n]o one saw a conflict of

interest.” App. C at 9a. At two separate points in his findings,

the DuBay judge also asked the right legal question: “The issue

appears to be whether a waiver requires a judicial inquiry to be

11

valid.” Id. at 10a, 12a. Yet, having specifically asked the

question, the military judge did not answer it.

The A.F.C.C.A. “adopted” the DuBay judge’s findings of

fact as its own (App. C at 6a), incorporated them into its

opinion, and relied on them to resolve the conflict of interest

and ineffectiveness of counsel issue. In its very brief (one

page) section discussing the conflict issue, the A.F.C.C.A.

found that petitioner “was aware of Captain Watson’s prior

participation on the government side and knowingly waived

that participation. ...” App. C at 30a emphasis added). The

court gave no analysis or justification in support of its naked

“knowingly waived” conclusion.

Significantly, the A.F.C.C.A. also found that the military

“trial judge should have made an inquiry into a possible

conflict of interest” (App. C at 30a. (emphasis added)) after the

exchange between Captain Willner and the trial judge prior to

Captain Watson’s testimony. The A.F.C.C.A. then declared

that the DuBay hearing judge “found [that petitioner] clearly

understood Captain Watson’s potential conflict and waived it,”

(App. C at 30a), but gave no citation to the record for this

conclusion. The court finally decided that petitioner had “failed

to meet his burden to show how Captain Watson’s performance

was adversely affected by the perceived conflict of interest, or

how it adversely affected the outcome of the trial,” (App. C at

30a-31a), found no error, and affirmed the conviction.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, without

comment, summarily affirmed the A.F.C.C.A. decision (App. B),

and thereafter denied reconsideration of its decision. App. A.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Although this Court has never determined whether the

Sixth Amendment of the Constitution applies to trials

conducted pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice,’

7 The “question of whether an accused in a court-martial has a constitu-

tional right to counsel has been much debated and never squarely

resolved.” Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 33 (1976) (footnote omitted).

He tin

12

virtually every military case considering the conflict of counsel

issue has taken it as a “given” that the Sixth Amendment is

fully applicable in this system. In law, Sixth Amendment

rights are interwoven into the fabric of military justice at all

levels, and have been recognized since the inception of the

Uniform Code in 1950 when the principle of a conflict-free

defense counsel was written into the public law in Art. 27(a)(2)

of the U.C.M.J. Regarding conflict-free counsel, there is thus

no justification for considering military defendants in any way

different from other defendants in federal criminal cases. In

fact, because of the hierarchical nature of the military

personnel system, where transfers between prosecution and

defense are routine, and other relational conflicts occur,’ the

appellate courts should be particularly diligent in enforcing

this Court’s clear constitutional norms. However, here the

contrary has occurred.

In recent years, the decisions of the C.A.A.F. have

slowly modified the application of this Court’s conflict rules to

the point where the Sixth Amendment guarantee has been

effectively eviscerated. Here the accused had appointed

counsel, but that counsel had an actual conflict which

adversely affected his performance and the outcome of the

trial, and both the post-trial DuBay hearing judge and the

appellate tribunals utterly failed to apply proper norms to

remedy a fundamental constitutional deprivation.

The A.F.C.C.A. specifically recited the information that

Captain Willner gave to the trial judge about Captain Watson

working both sides of the case, and found that the judge

“should have made an inquiry.” In every other federal

(regional) circuit court.of appeals applying the Sixth

Amendment, under these facts, the conviction would be

reversed (in most reversal would be “automatic”) and a new

trial ordered. Only in this “military cireuit” is such a reversal

5 See, e.g., United States v. Whidbee, 28 MJ. (C.G.C.M.R. 1989)(for all

non-military justice duties, the defense counsel was supervised by and

received performance evaluations from the “trial counsel” (in court prose-

cuting attorney)).

13

seemingly not required. Notwithstanding that the C.A.A.F.

has uniformly stated that the Sixth Amendment applies in

this circuit, and that it is Sixth Amendment law it applies in

resolving conflicts issues, C.A.A.F. here affirmed without

comment a lower court decision which completely ignored

this Court’s jurisprudential requirements for evaluating and

deciding Sixth Amendment issues.

The conflict here is compounded by the conduct of the

two appointed defense counsel in conspiring to deceive a trial

judge and in facilitating the testimony by one of those

counsel on behalf of the government and against his client’s

interest, raising a question whether in the military justice

system an utterly different standard now exists both as to

ineffective assistance of counsel and as to adequacy of judicial

review.

The result is that “a United States court of appeals has

entered a decision in conflict with the decision of [every

other] United States court of appeals on the same important

matter,” and has “so far departed from the accepted and

usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a

departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this

Court’s supervisory power.” U.S. Sup. Ct. Rule 10(a). The

deprivation of such a fundamental constitutional right in

conflict with the jurisprudence of every regional circuit

warrants this Court’s intervention.

Background Principles

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution expressly

provides that “in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall

enjoy the right. . . to be have the Assistance of Counsel for

his defense.” The right to effective assistance of counsel

“means the right to counsel who is conflict free.” United

States v. McClain, 50 M.J. 483, 487 (C.A.A.F. 1999), citing

Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345 (1980). The right to

effective assistance of counsel has consistently been held to

apply to military members facing trial by court-martial. See,

e.g., Art. 27(a)(2), U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 827(a)(2) (2000); Art.

14

38, U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 888; United States v. Scott, 24 MW.

186 (C.M.A. 1987).

Conflict of interest claims present mixed questions of

law and fact to be reviewed de novo. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at

342. Ineffective assistance of counsel based on a conflict of

interest is also “among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to

a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harm-

less error” and “nice calculations as to the amount of

prejudice attributable to the conflict” are not to be indulged

in by the court. Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 489

(1978)(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23

(1967)); Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350 (quoting Glasser v. United

States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942)).

This Court squarely addressed the issue of conflict of

interest in Holloway and Sullivan. In Holloway, the Court

held that if the defendant or his attorney raises the issue of-

conflict of interest, or the trial judge otherwise knows or

reasonably should know of the alleged conflict of interest,

the trial judge must inquire into the potential conflict.

Holloway, 435 U.S. at 484-491. Sullivan addressed the con-

flict question where there was no issue raised at trial. The

Court held, “In order to establish a violation of the Sixth

Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial

must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest

adversely affected his lawyer's performance.” Sullivan, 446

U.S. at 348. In such a case, however, once a defendant shows

his counsel had an actual conflict of interest, the conflict

itself demonstrates the denial of the right to have the effec-

tive assistance of counsel and prejudice is presumed.

Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 349.

The following year, the Court clarified Sullivan by not-

ing “Sullivan mandates a reversal when the trial court has

failed to make an inquiry even though it “knows or reason-

ably should know that a particular conflict exists.”” Wood v.

Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272 n. 18. (1981) (emphasis in original).

If the possibility of a conflict of interest is sufficiently appar-

ent from the record of the trial, a duty to recognize and

inquire into the conflict is imposed upon the trial judge.

15

Wood, 450 U.S. at 272 (emphasis in original). To prevail under

Wood, a petitioner must show (1) that the trial court failed to

inquire into the conflict even though it knew or reasonably

should have known about an apparent conflict, (2) that there

was no valid waiver of the right to independent counsel, and

(3) that counsel had an actual conflict of interest. Wood, 450

U.S. at 272-273. In examining the conflict claim, the court

must “indulge every reasonable presumption against the

waiver” of the fundamental right of effective and unimpaired

assistance of counsel. Glasser, 315 U.S. at 70. Once a defen-

dant makes this showing under Wood, prejudice is presumed,

and he is entitled to reversal and a new proceeding with con-

flict-free counsel. Wood, 450 U.S. at 273-274.

Decisions of the Regional Courts of Appeals

The United States (regional) Circuit Courts of Appeals

currently diverge somewhat in their legal tests related to the

Holloway/Sullivan/Wood standard.

One group of seven Circuit Courts of Appeals employs a

Holloway/Sullivan/Wood “automatic reversal rule” to all

conflict of interest cases, even where there is no objection at

trial, if the trial judge knew or reasonably should have known

of the conflict and either failed to inquire or ignored the conflict.

See United States v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 153 (2nd Cir. 1994); Ciak

v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 302 (2nd Cir. 1995); United States

v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 379-380 (4th Cir. 1991); Riggs v. United

States, 209 F.3d 828, 832 n. 1 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.

Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir 1985); See also Spreitzer

v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1450-1452 (7th Cir. 1997); See Dawan v.

Lockhart, 31 F.3d 718, 721 (8th Cir 1994); See also Atley v. Ault,

191 F.3d 865, 869-870 (8th Cir 1999); See United States v. Crespo

de Llano, 838 F.2d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v.

Burney, 756 F.2d 787, 791 (10th Cir. 1985).

In like manner, the highest courts in four states also

employ an “automatic reversal rule” to conflict of interest

cases even where there is no objection at trial, if the trial

judge knew or reasonably should have known of the conflict

and either failed to inquire or ignored the conflict. State v.

16

Wallace, 908 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Kan. 1995)(citing Holloway);

State v. Wille, 595 So.2d 1149, 11538 (La. 1992)(citing

Holloway); Lettley v. State, 746 A.2d 392, 399-400 (Md.

2000)(citing Holloway and Sullivan); Shongutsie v. State, 827

P.2d 361, 365 (Wyo. 1992)(citing Holloway and Sullivan).

Thus, all of these courts view a trial judge’s failure in his

affirmative duty to inquire into a conflict of interest to be

dispositive. These courts automatically reverse and remand

for a new trial with unconflicted counsel to cure this

fundamental error, as they refuse to indulge in nice

calculations into prejudice or adverse effect, and do indulge

every reasonable presumption against the waiver of the

fundamental right to conflict free counsel.

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals implies that it would

use the “automatic reversal rule” of Sullivan/Wood if given

the opportunity, but has not yet decided such a case. United

States v. Morelli, 169 F.3d 798, 812 (3'4 Cir. 1999). The

Supreme Court of Connecticut also indicates it would

probably use the “automatic reversal rule” if the facts

warranted, but has not expressly adopted such a rule. State

v. Crespo, 718 A.2d 925, 941 n. 27 (Conn. 1998).

The remaining circuits take a slightly different

approach. They resolve conflict of interest questions by

applying Sullivan’s actual conflict/adverse effect test to all

cases where there is no objection at trial (minimizing or

ignoring the Wood clarification of Sullivan which required

automatic reversal where the judge knew or should have

known of the conflict and either failed to inquire or ignored

the conflict). See Brien v.. United States, 695 F.2d 10, 15 n.10

(1st Cir. 1982); Familia-Consoro v. United States, 160 F.3d

761, 764 (1st Cir. 1998); Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775 (5th

Cir. 2000); Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 858-862 (11th

Cir. 1999); United States v. Taylor, 139 F.3d 924 (D.C. Cir.

1998). These courts look at every case to ascertain whether

the Sullivan standard of actual conflict/adverse effect has

been met. At least four state high courts follow suit: People

v. Bonin, 765 P.2d 460, 476 (Cal. 1989); Armstrong v. People,

701 P.2d 17, 20 (Colo. 1985); State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d 817

17

(Iowa 1997); State v. Mountjoy, 708 A.2d 682, 684 (N.H. 1998).

Thus, this latter group of courts always examines every

conflict of interest case where the judge knew or should have

known and failed to inquire under the more difficult (for the

defendant) actual conflict/adverse effect standard of

Sullivan. In any of the twelve regional circuits, petitioner

would prevail and be granted a new trial.

Decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

In vivid contrast to the two regional circuit approaches

stands the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces, where there is currently no recognizable standard in

regard to Holloway/Sullivan/Wood either when the trial

judge knew or reasonably should have known of the possible

conflict (and either failed to inquire or ignored the conflict) or

in cases where the trial judge was not so informed. The court

currently applies an inconsistent mix of incorrect legal tests

in conflict of interest cases that fail to meet and uphold

constitutional standards. In effect, the C.A.A.F. seems to

apply a harmiess error analysis.

The Court of Military Appeals (now C.A.A.F.) originally

embraced a version of the Sullivan test in all conflict of

interest cases where there was no objection at trial and the

trial judge knew or reasonably should have known of the

possible conflict and either failed to inquire or ignored the

conflict. See United States v. Breese, 11 M.J. 17, 19-22

(C.M.A. 1981). In such cases, the court imposed an

affirmative duty of inquiry on the trial judge and implied that

a failure to inquire would require reversal. Breese, 11 M.J. at

20, 22-23. The court also established a rebuttable

presumption “that the activity of defense counsel exhibits a

conflict of interest in any case of multiple representation

wherein the military judge has not conducted a suitable

inquiry into a possible conflict.” Breese, 11 M.J. at 23.

Four years later, in United States v. Devitt, the Court

of Military Appeals explained what the Breese test meant in

a case where the trial judge knew of the multiple

representation and failed to inquire. United States v.

18

Devitt, 20 M.J. 240 (C.M.A. 1985). The court said that

Breese established a “rebuttable presumption that an

“actual conflict of interest” exists.” Devitt, 20 M.J. at 244.

The court commented that the Government could rebut the

presumption by demonstrating “either that no actual

conflict of interest existed under the circumstances of the

case, or else that, although a conflict existed, the parties

nonetheless knowingly and voluntarily chose” to waive the

conflict. Devitt, 20 M.J. 243. The court interpreted Wood,

Holloway, Glasser and Sullivan as establishing that “no

way exists for the Government to carry its burden of

disproving prejudice if an ‘actual conflict of interest’

existed.” Jd. The court saw the real question as “whether

the Government can carry its burden of rebutting the

presumption that there was an ‘actual conflict of interest’.” -

Devitt, 20 M.J. at 243-244.

Four years after Devitt, the Court of Military Appeals

addressed another conflict of interest issue in United States

v. Sparks, 29 M.J. 52 (C.M.A. 1989), a case raising not a

multiple representation type conflict, but a switching sides

scenario virtually identical to that presented in the case at

bar. In Sparks, the court again mandated a “bright-line” rule:

whenever a statutorily disqualified/conflicted defense

attorney represents a military accused, without informed

consent by the accused via full disclosure and inquiry by a

military trial judge, the prejudice is automatic, and reversal

is automatic. Sparks, 29 M.J. at 58.

Notwithstanding this early jurisprudence in conformity

with the regional circuits, in the years since Breese, Devitt

and Sparks, the Holloway/Sullivan constitutional standards

have virtually disappeared from the military lexicon. In

United States v. Smith, 44 M.J. 459 (C.A.A.F. 1996), in a 4-1

decision, the court held there was multiple representation

rising to the level of an actual conflict of interest where the

defense counsel had previously represented the witness who

provided the pivotal evidence against the accused. Smith, 44

M.J. at 460-462. The court, however, found that appellant

“knowingly and intelligently waived his right to conflict-free

19

counsel” even when the trial judge had held what the

appellate court described as only a “superficial” inquiry on

the record, because there was “no evidence that the conflict

adversely affected counsel’s representation of appellant,”

despite the fact that defense counsel failed to fully cross-

examine and impeach his previous client about his motive to

lie. Smith, 44 M.J. at 462, 463.

In a dissenting opinion, Judge Gierke argued that the

trial judge’s inquiry was inadequate under constitutional

norms and that appellant’s waiver was not knowing and

intelligent because it was based on inadequate/incompetent

legal advice from his defense counsel, who said he did not

see an actual conflict but perceived only “a possible

appearance.” Smith, 44 M.J. at 462-463. Judge Gierke also

focused on an underlying theme in these types of cases

which is overwhelmingly evident in the case at bar: “[a]

defense counsel who does not understand the problem

cannot competently advise his client regarding it.” Jd.

In the most recent published opinion in this area, the

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has completely

eliminated any requirement for a Holloway/Sullivan/Wood

inquiry and a- knowing waiver at trial. In United States v.

Murphy, 50 M.J. 4 (C.A.A.F. 1998), in a 3-2 decision, the

court found it “arguable” that the military judge knew or

should have known of the potential conflict of interest

between the defense counsel and his client, and found that

the counsel with a conflict (for formerly representing a key

witness for the government) “should have and could have”

facilitated that judicial inquiry by merely informing the

military judge of the prior representation. Murphy, 50

M.J. at 10. Assuming, arguendo, that there had been an

actual conflict, the court nevertheless held that the conflict

had no impact on the merits portion of the trial. Murphy,

50 M.J. at 11 (emphasis added). The court found the

witness’ testimony “mostly cumulative,” that defense

counsel did not object to the “additional facts,” and that

there was overwhelming evidence of guilt which meant

that the witness’ testimony “could not have prejudiced

20

appellant as to the findings of guilt.” Jd. The court even

went so far as to announce it was “convinced beyond a

reasonable doubt that appellant was not prejudiced by the

unresolved conflict of interest because of the admission of

his multiple confessions and the corroborating physical

evidence.” Jd.

Amazingly, the court reached this finding on the merits

even though it found that the testimony in question, which

was allowed in evidence “without objection” by the conflicted

defense counsel, “sealed appellant’s motive for killing his own

son,” and “provided helpful testimony that might show why

appellant would falsely confess to the killings.” Jd. By .

applying what seems to be a “harmless error” analysis, the

C.A.A.F. has totally rejected the rationale of this Court that

“nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice attributable

to the conflict” are not to be indulged in by the court and that

this type of infraction can never be treated as harmless.

Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489. Notwithstanding this finding on

the merits, C.A.A.F. found this very same conflict of counsel

required reversal as to the sentencing portion of the trial,

since it found questions of actual conflict and adverse effect

still unanswered.

In Murphy, the C.A.A.F. effectively did away with this

Court’s entire jurisprudence regarding the analysis of conflict

of interest. There is no Glasser standard, no Holloway

standard, no Sullivan standard, and no Wood standard.

There is only C.A.A.F.’s evaluation of whether the conflict

error was not prejudicial “beyond a reasonable doubt” and an

illogical and constitutionally infirm remedy of requiring a

rehearing on sentence due to the outstanding issue of a

conflict of counsel, but not requiring any remedy as to guilt

based on that same conflict.

The Current Conflict

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces no longer

espouses and enforces any discernable conflict of interest test

which meets constitutional standards as enumerated by this

21

Court and every regional court of appeals. As demonstrated

by the case at bar, the standard is so far in demise that it is

now permissible for an accused to “knowingly waive” an

actual, statutory, conflict of interest with no trial level waiver,

and no trial level judicial inquiry even though the military

judge knew or should have known of the conflict. This is true

even where defense counsel testified against his client, where

neither defense counsel really thought there was a conflict

(though one counsel obtained an oral waiver from his former

client, the government), and where both defense counsel

actively misled the trial judge about the status of the

accused’s representation. This case is even more aggravated

than a typical conflict case as it involves not just joint

representation of a co-accused or representation of a witness;

this case involves an active prosecutor switching sides in the

middle of the prosecution to become an active defense

attorney on the very same case.

In at least seven United States Circuit Courts of Appeal

and four state high courts, this case would be automatically

reversed as constitutionally infirm. In the remaining Circuit

Courts of Appeal and at least four other state high courts,

this case would be examined for actual conflict and for a

determination of adverse effect pursuant to the Sullivan

test, and would then be reversed. In stark contrast, the

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces found

no conflict of interest problem in this case and affirmed it

with neither comment nor analysis.

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces represents a complete departure from this

Court’s Sixth Amendment assistance of counsel/conflict of

interest jurisprudence. The decision of the court below is in

direct violation of Wood v. Georgia, Cuyler v. Sullivan, and

Holloway v. Arkansas, and all the principles for which they

stand. Not only does the decision of the court below fail to

pass constitutional muster, but it highlights the conflict

between the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and all

the other United States Circuit Courts of Appeal on the same

important matter.

December 2000

CONCLUSION

Wherefore, the petitioner respectfully requests that this

Honorable Court grant the petition for a writ of certiorari to

the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.

22

Respectfully submitted,

PATIENCE E. SCHERMER

Captain, United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

Counsel of Record

STEPHEN P. KELLY

Major, United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

Counsel for Petitioner

Appellate Defense Division

(AFLSA/J AJA)

Air Force Legal Services Agency

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343

Bolling AFB, DC 20332-8000

(202) 767-1562

KEVIN J. BARRY

Counsel for Petitioner

13406 Sand Rock Court

Chantilly, VA 22021

(703) 968-7247

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D.C. 20442-0001

USCA Misc. Dkt. No. 93-0157/AF

Crim. App. Dkt. No. 29000

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Charles M. HANEY, Jr. (265-04-8987), Appellant

ORDER

On consideration of appellant’s petition for reconsid-

eration of the order of this Court issued on August 17, 2000,

it is, by the Court, this, 12th day of September, 2000,

ORDERED:

That said petition for reconsideration is hereby denied.

For the Court,

/s/ Thomas F. Granahan

Clerk of the Court

cc: The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Counsel for Appellant (BARRY, Esq.)

Counsel for Appellee (HINDEL)

2a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

Washington, D.C. 20442-0001

USCA Misc. Dkt. No. 93-0157/AF

Crim. App. Dkt. No. 29000

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Charles M. Haney, Jr. (265-04-8987), Appellant

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for grant of review of

the decision of the United States Air Force Court of Criminal

Appeals on further review, it is, by the Court, this 17th day of

August, 2000,

ORDERED:

That said petition is hereby granted; and,

That the decision of the United States Air Force Court

of Criminal Appeals on further review is affirmed.

For the Court,

/s/ Thomas F. Granahan

Clerk of the Court

cece: The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (BARRY, Esq.)

Appellate Government Counsel (HINDE L)

3a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT

OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

V.

Major CHARLES M. HANE Y, JR.

United States Air Force

ACM 29000 (f rev)

4 November 1999

Sentence adjudged 19 July 1990 by GCM at Peterson

Air Force Base. Colorado. Military Judge: Robert N.

Spencer.

Approved sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 8

months, and forfeiture of $750.00 pay per month for

12 months.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Mr. Kevin J. Barry,

Colonel Jeanne M. Rueth, Colonel Douglas H. Kohrt,

Lieutenant Colonel Ray T. Blank, Jr, Major Carol L.

Hubbard, and Captain Patience E. Schermer.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel

Anthony P. Dattilo, Colonel Michael J. Breslin,

Lieutenant Colonel Ronald A. Rodgers, and Major

Bryan T. Wheeler.

‘Before

SENANDER, YOUNG and SPISAK

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

UPON FURTHER REVIEW

SENANDER, Senior Judge

The appellant was convicted, contrary to his pleas, by a

general court-martial, of wrongful use of marijuana and

cocaine. Article 112a, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 912a. His approved

4a

sentence is a dismissal, confinement for 8 months, and

forfeiture of $750.00 pay per month for 12 months. We are

reviewing this case for the third time. The appellant now assets

six errors. We find no error and affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On 15 November 1989, the appellant was randomly

selected to provide a urine sample for drug testing. During

the test procedures the appellant told the drug test monitor he

believed his sample would come back positive because of the

prescribed drugs he was taking. Subsequently, his urinalysis

test report was positive for both marijuana and cocaine. The

appellant has consistently denied the use of illegal drugs. He

has provided different theories as to how his test results could

be positive. He first speculated that the combination of

prescription drugs that he took for pain resulting from a

motorcycle accident might be the cause. When that theory

didn’t find support, he investigated his use of herbal teas, but

could find no evidence to support his theory that the teas he

purchased at local shops contained marijuana or cocaine.

Following his conviction by court-martial, we resolved his

first appeal, alleging 10 errors, adversely to the appellant in an

unpublished opinion on 26 August 1992. United States v.

Haney, ACM 29000 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 26, 1992) (unpub. op.).

On 6 April 1993, the substitute appellate defense counsel, in an

Addendum to the Supplement to Petition for Grant of Review

to the Court of Military Appeals (now United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces) asserted five additional errors plus

an allegation of inadequacy of appellate representation. Because the

Court of Military Appeals viewed the issues raised by substitute

appellate defense counsel as matters that were not raised before this

Court, the Court of Military Appeals set aside our prior affirmance

and remanded the case to us for further review. United States v.

Haney, 38 M.J. 229 (C.M.A. 1993). On 26 May 1994, we

considered the following assignment of errors: (1) ineffective

~assistance of trial defense counsel; (2) an assistant to the defense

team had a conflict of interest; (3) the military judge erred during

instructions; (4) comments by the convening authority constituted

5a

unlawful command influence; (5) the military judge erred in his

finding a court member was not asleep during a portion of the trial;

(6) the military judge was appointed in violation of the

Appointments Clause; and (7) the trial and appellate judges were not

appointed for fixed terms. In an unpublished opinion we found

adversely to the appellant and again affirmed the findings and

sentence. United States v. Haney, ACM 29000 (f rev) (A.F.C.M.R.

May 26, 1994) (unpub. op.).

Because our superior court found that the staff judge advocate

failed to serve substitute defense counsel with the first or second

addenda to the staff judge advocate recommendation (SJAR), both of

which raised new matter, it set aside our opinion and returned the

case to the convening authority for a new SJAR and convening

authority action. United States v. Haney, 45 M.J. 447 (1996). Our

superior court also suggested that the convening authority consider

an evidentiary hearing concerning Captain Watson’s involvement in

the trial and other ineffectiveness of counsel issues.

Il. EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The 14th Air Force Commander, the new designated

convening authority, ordered the evidentiary hearing and

directed that it be conducted in the manner contemplated by

United States v. DuBay, 37 C.M.R. 411 (C.M.A. 1967). He

limited the scope of the hearing to resolving Captain Watson’s

alleged conflict and other ineffectiveness of counsel issues.

Captain (now Lieutenant Colonel) Willner, Circuit Defense

Counsel, served as the detailed military counsel and Captain

Watson, then Peterson Air Force Base Area Defense Counsel,

acted as part of the defense team at the trial. The military

judge for this post-trial Article 39(a) hearing was tasked to

resolve the following questions.

a) When did Captains Willner and Watson become aware

of any complaints concerning allegations of

ineffectiveness-of-counsel and what were their responses?

b) What was Captain Watson’s professional relationship

with the accused and what services did he provide in

defending the accused?

6a

c) Who developed the initial trial strategy in defending

the accused, and why was certain evidence not produced

and witnesses not called? How was the accused involved

in this strategy and did he consent to the defense

strategy?

d) If Captain Watson was a member of the defense team,

why was he not present at the initial trial? Did the

accused waive Captain Watson’s presence at the initial

trial? Did the accused know of Captain Watson’s prior

representation of the government in-his case and did he

waive this conflict of interest?

Judge Howard R. Altschwager was detailed to preside

over the hearing. He made specific findings of fact and

answered the convening authority’s questions in the

chronological order of the events of the trial. We adopt those

findings as our own. They are:

WHAT WAS CAPTAIN WATSON’S PRO-

FESSIONAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE

ACCUSED AND WHAT SERVICES DID HE

PROVIDE IN DEFENDING THE ACCUSED?

DID THE ACCUSED KNOW OF CAPTAIN

WATSON’S PRIOR REPRESENTATION OF THE

GOVERNMENT IN HIS CASE AND DID HE

WAIVE THIS CONFLICT OF INTEREST?

Captain Watson was assigned to Peterson Air Force

Base, Colorado in March 1989, and became the Chief

of Military Justice in July 1989. He became involved

with the [appellant]’s case when he was notified by

the base laboratory of the positive urinalysis results.

Captain Watson described everything he did in this

case for the government as “ministerial” in nature.

Major Haney had security clearances that required

the government to obtain permission before they

could court-martial him. Captain Watson processed

this request. He called the Armstrong Laboratory at

Brooks Air Force Base and requested a litigation

package. He asked AFOSI to check Major Haney’s

Ta

records, and follow-up an old allegation that he had

distributed drugs while at Hanscom Air Force Base.

Massachusetts. Major Haney’s defense counsel,

Captain Koza. approached Captain Watson asking

him to investigate a theory or thesis of Major

Haney’s, which Major Haney had already presented

to the government. Major Haney used a TENS unit,

a small device which created an electrical current to

stimulate his muscles. Major Haney also took

numerous prescription and over-the-counter drugs

for pain, high blood pressure and other ailments. The

thesis was the electric current from the, TENS unit

caused his prescription and over[-]the[-]eounter

drugs to test positive for the marijuana and cocaine

metabolites. Captain Watson said he thought the

thesis was “laughable,” but agreed to ask the

laboratory to review thé theory. The Armstrong

Laboratory would not test the theory because they

viewed it as being baseless.

Captain Watson testified that after he drafted the

charges, he went to Major Haney’s commander,

Colonel Smith, and explained to him the judge

advocate’s recommendation that he prefer the

charges. Colonel Smith was reluctant to prefer them,

because he was not convinced Major Haney was

guilty. Captain Watson explained to Colonel Smith

that in order for him to swear to the charges, Colonel

Smith had to have probable cause to believe that the

offenses were committed by the accused. The

question for Colonel Smith as explained by Captain

Watson was whether he believed the urinalysis

testing program was valid. Captain Watson then

explained to Colonel Smith what he needed to do

when he informed Major Haney of the charges. He

told Colonel Smith that he needed to read the

charges to Major Haney and then give him a copy.

Captain Watson testified that he was present at the

time Colonel Smith read the charges to Major Haney.

8a

Captain Watson said Colonel Smith introduced him to

Major Haney at that time. Major Haney testified

that only Colonel Smith was present when he was

served with the charges. The charge sheet indicates

that Colonel Smith, the accuser, preferred the

charges and informed the accused of them the same

day. The original record of trial is silent on the

circumstances surrounding the service of charges.

I find that Major Haney was aware of Captain

Watson’s prior representation of the government no

later than the first meeting between Captain Watson,

Captain Willner and Major Haney Captain Watson’s

name is on the charge sheet and Major Haney admits

to receiving a copy on 2 April 1990. Major Haney

admits he first met with Captain Willner before

meeting with both of them together, he was informed

Captain Watson had just transferred from the

prosecution team, and Captain Watson described his

involvement with the prosecution, describing it as

minimal. It is more probable that Captain Watson

gave Major Haney a summary of his prior

involvement with the prosecution, rather than a

detailed explanation of everything he did while Chief

of Military Justice. Major Haney early on viewed

having a former member of the prosecution on his

defense team as a distinct tactical advantage.

Captain Watson told Major Haney they would have

to wait and see if he could represent him.

Captain Watson researched conflict of interest cases

and spoke to the base staff judge advocate about

whether they would be willing to waive any potential

conflict in him serving as Major Haney’s defense

counsel. The SJA advised Captain Watson to stay

away from the case because of Major Haney’s

personality, but stated they would have no objections

to him serving as defense counsel. Therefore, the

government was aware that Captain Watson would

be representing Major Haney.

9a

Major Haney testified that Captain Watson was not

present at the time Colonel Smith served a copy of

the charges upon him. He said Colonel Smith did not

read the charges to him, but merely handed him a

copy and said he was sorry. Major Haney said the

first time he met Captain Watson was in early June

1990. He said he was made aware at that time that

Captain Watson had served in some role for the

prosecution in his case, and he asked Captain Watson

at that time if he would be a member of his defense

team. He said he was not aware that the Captain

Watson who swore Colonel Smith to the charges was

the same Captain Watson who was now the new

Area Defense Counsel (ADC). He said he first

became aware of this when the military judge

questioned him about a possible improper preferral

at trial. I do not find Major Haney’s testimony

credible on this issue.

Shortly after the meeting, between Major Haney.

Captain Koza, and Captain Watson. Captain Willner

traveled to Peterson Air Force Base to work on

Major Haney’s case. Captain Willner was aware that

Captain Watson had been the Chief of Military

Justice and had drafted the charges, and knew from

talking with Colonel Smith that Captain Watson had

sworn Colonel Smith to the charges. Captain

Willner recalls being told by the Chief Circuit

Defense Counsel, Lt Col Woodring, to speak with

Captain Watson about his involvement in the case.

After doing this, Captain Willner spoke with Major

Haney alone and told him about Captain Watson’s

involvement with the prosecution on his case.

Captain Willner does not recall the specifics of what

he told Major Haney. All three witnesses testified

that they had a discussion about Captain Watson

formerly being a member of the prosecution. No one

saw a conflict of interest, and Major Haney testified

he concurred.

10a

Captain Willner spoke with the Chief Circuit Defense

Counsel about what he had learned about Captain

Watson’s prior involvement in the case. It was both

Captain Watson’s and Captain Willner’s

understanding that Captain Watson was “detailed” to

the defense team. The “detailing” was not done in

writing, and it was not directly communicated to

Captain Watson by Lt Col Woodring. It was clearly

understood by all of the parties, including Major

Haney, that Captain Willner as the Circuit Defense

Counsel and more experienced counsel would be the

lead counsel. Captain Watson had never prosecuted

or defended a urinalysis case before, so it was not

expected that he would have any active role at the

defense table during the trial.

There was no judicial inquiry into whether Major Haney

waived any potential conflict with Captain Watson,

because the court was never aware that Captain Watson

was a detailed counsel. The record discloses that

Captain Koza was reported as the original detailed coun-

sel, and Major Haney waived any further participation

by him. I find that there is sufficient evidence to show

Major Haney was fully informed of his right to conflict

free counsel by his trial defense counsel. The issue

appears to be whether a waiver requires a judicial

inquiry to be valid.

Captain Watson’s role was to be a local contact point

for Major Haney, Captain Willner, and local

witnesses. Prior to trial, Captain Watson solicited

and collected written witness statements. He

interviewed witnesses with Captain Willner, but does

not recall interviewing any witnesses by himself. He

discussed trial strategies with Captain Willner and

Major Haney, Captain Watson, Captain Willner and

Major Haney all testified that they had numerous

discussions about the trial tactics and strategy.

One of the defense theories investigated before trial

was whether different teas that Major Haney drank

lla

contained ingredients that would result in positive

urinalysis test results for marijuana and/or cocaine.

Captain Watson was primarily responsible for

investigating this theory. Captain Watson told Major

Haney to bring him any teas he had left over, but

Major Haney told him he had already disposed of

them. Major Haney testified he threw them away in

December at the suggestion of a superior officer.

They both went to the stores where he had

purchased the teas. Two of the stores were now

closed. Major Haney could not remember the names

of the teas and they could not find them on the store

shelves. Major Haney told him he also bought tea in

bulk. Captain Watson spoke to the store owners to

see if he could identify the supplier. He contacted

two of the companies and was told they have

botanists on their staffs who do quality control

testing to ensure the teas do not contain any illegal

substances. Major Haney’s recollection was that they

spent several days trying to find the teas, but was

told that the suppliers and source of the tea change

constantly.

WHY WAS CAPTAIN WATSON NOT PRESENT

AT THE INITIAL TRIAL, AND DID THE

ACCUSED WAIVE CAPTAIN WATSON’S

PRESENCE AT THE INITIAL TRIAL?

Major Haney testified that the first he knew that

Captain Watson would not be present at the defense

table as a member of the defense team during the trial

was the morning of trial. He said both defense counsel

told him it would be better if Captain Watson was not

present in court. He said they said it would be easier

for Captain Watson to retrieve documents, and there

was no plan for Captain Watson to question any of the

witnesses. Major Haney concurred with the advice

not to have Captain Watson in the court room.

Both Captain Watson and Captain Willner have a

very different memory of when the question of

12a

whether Captain Watson should be present in court

was discussed with Major Haney. Both say this

discussion first occurred early, shortly after Captain

Watson joined the defense team, and well before the

first day of trial. They explained to Major Haney

that because Captain Watson had no experience in

urinalysis cases, he could not question any witnesses.

Captain Willner had already interviewed Colonel

Smith, and knew he would be a strong witness for the

defense. Captain Willner believed that the trial

counsel would attack Colonel Smith’s strong opinion

of Major Haney by asking him why he preferred the

charges, and the defense counsel were afraid he

would point to Captain Watson and say he did it upon

the advice of Captain Watson. The effect of the court

members wondering about a defense counsel advising

a commander that there was probable cause to

believe the accused committed the offenses would

greatly undermine the impact of his testimony.

Defense counsel say they explained all of this to

Major Haney well before trial, and he concurred in

the strategy. The more credible evidence supports a

knowing waiver of Captain Watson’s presence by

Major Haney, however, the question remains

whether a judicial inquiry was also required. Captain

Willner at the beginning of the trial told the military

judge that Captain Koza was “the original detailed

defense counsel.” No one informed the military judge

that Captain Watson was also detailed as Major

Haney’s defense counsel.

Captain Watson consulted with Captain Willner and

Major Haney during the recesses and discussed trial

strategy issues with them. When the military judge

raised the issue of the possibility of a defective

preferral, both attorneys were involved in discussing

Major Haney’s options with him during the recess.

Major Haney testified that this discussion was the

first time they had informed him about the possibility

13a

of a defective preferral. Major Haney said he did not

know until then that Captain Watson, his defense

counsel, was the same Captain Watson who had

sworn Colonel Smith to the charges. He said his

attorneys told him they were fortunate that Colonei

Smith had blurted out that he did not believe Major

Haney was guilty. He said they told him there was

no way he would now be convicted, even though the

military judge had instructed the members to

disregard the statement. Major Haney said if the

military judge had asked him whether he wanted to

proceed at that time and waive the issue, he would

have said yes. Major Haney was asked this question

by the military judge at pages 264-266 of the record

of trial, he stated he discussed the issue with his

counsel, and waived any issue related to a defective

preferral of charges.

Captain Willner said he recognized defective

preferral as a potential issue after he interviewed

Colonel Smith prior to trial. He recalls discussing

this issue with Major Haney, both before the trial and

during the recess after the issue was raised at trial

by the military judge. Captain Watson was present

during the discussion at trial, and Major Haney also

discussed the issue with Captain Hedgepeth during

the same recess. Captain Hedgepeth was an Air Force

Judge Advocate who testified as a character witness

for Major Haney. Both Captain Willner and Captain

Watson recall telling Major Haney the result of

asserting that the preferral was defective was that he

would gain a short delay in the trial. The charges

would be preferred and referred to trial again, but

would be tried before a different court panel. The

disadvantages discussed were that the government

would now have a better insight into the defense case.

The defense would also lose the effect of the members

hearing Major Haney’s commander state he did not

believe he was guilty, even though he preferred the

l4a

charges. The government would most likely have

someone else prefer the charges, and would move

ahead of time to limit Colonel Smith or any other

witness expressing an opinion as to guilt or innocence

of Major Haney. Both counsel testified that after

discussing the issue with Major Haney, he agreed to

waive the issue and pursue this strategy.

WHO DEVELOPED THE INITIAL TRIAL

STRATEGY IN DEFENDING THE ACCUSED,

AND WHY WAS CERTAIN EVIDENCE NOT

PRODUCED AND WITNESSES CALLED? HOW

WAS THE ACCUSED INVOLVED IN THIS

STRATEGY AND DID HE CONSENT TO THE

DEFENSE STRATEGY?

Captain Willner as the lead defense counsel was

primarily responsible for developing the trial

strategy. Captain Willner discussed all of the

strategies with Major Haney and Captain Watson

both before and during the trial. Both defense

counsel described Major Haney as the most active

client either of them ever had in discussing strategies

to be used in his defense.

The first defense theory was one created by Major

Haney before Captain Willner or Watson ever

became involved in the case. Major Haney had put

together what he called a thesis and had given it to

the government. It is unclear whether this was done

with the knowledge and consent of his first defense

counsel Captain Koza. Captain Watson had been

asked by Captain Koza to explore this thesis for the

defense in January 1990. Captain Watson forwarded

the request to the Armstrong Laboratory, but they

refused to explore the theory, saving it was not

scientifically possible. When Captain Willner was

assigned to the case, he asked Major Haney who

would support this thesis. Major Haney gave him

some names, but when Captain Willner talked with

them they either were not competent to testify about

15a

the theory, or if competent, did not believe the theory

to be true. Major Haney gave him the name of

Hauser Labs who were associated with the

University of Colorado in Boulder, Colorado. Major

Haney had already hired them to explore his theory,

and told Captain Willner that they supported his

theory. Captain Willner reviewed the written report

and discovered the lab did not support Major Haney’s

thesis. Captain Willner spoke to the chemist who had

performed the tests. He told him the electrical

current from the TENS unit would not coalesce into

the metabolites for marijuana and cocaine. He also

told Captain Willner that he had told Major Haney

the lab could not support his theory. Captain Willner

contacted experts in forensic toxicology that he was

familiar with, and could find no one to support the

theory. Captain Willner made a motion at trial to

prevent the government from making any reference

to this thesis of Major Haney’s, but lost the motion.

A variation of this theory was an unknowing and

innocent ingestion defense. The theory was the teas

used by Major Haney contained substances which

unknown to him caused him to test positive for

cocaine and/or marijuana. The steps taken to explore

this theory have been previously discussed.

A second strategy that was explored was to attack

the accuracy of the Armstrong Laboratory results by

comparing them to the toxicology screen results from

Major Haney’s blood. Major Haney had had surgery

on 20 November 1989, five days after submitting his

urine specimen, which tested positive for cocaine and

marijuana. Captain Willner spoke with Major

Haney’s physician who told him the blood toxicology

screen used before surgery does not have the same

sensitivity as the Armstrong Laboratory test. He

told Captain Willner he would not expect to see

evidence of marijuana or cocaine in the blood

toxicology screen unless the patient had used the

drugs between 15 and 20 November 1989. Captain

16a

Willner determined that this had no evidentiary

value to the defense. He does not recall if he

reviewed the medical records or asked to see them

once he found out that they would be of no value.

A third strategy that was explored was the theory

that Major Haney could not have used cocaine and

marijuana during the changed time period because he

was always being observed by other people, none of

whom saw him under the influence of any drug.

During the charged time period, Major Haney was

involved with others in testing the capabilities of the

Global Positioning Satellite (GPS) network. He was

working long hours and was called in at irregular

times. He was required to perform complex tasks at

work. The defense explored this theory and

presented evidence to support it. They called Major

Martel at trial to testify about Major Haney’s busy

schedule, irregular hours, and complex tasks

required to be performed by him. The defense has

criticized the trial defense counsel for not calling

witnesses who also observed Major Haney during his

off-duty time, specifically Lt Col Roe and Major

Haney’s wife. Lt Col Roe submitted a statement

before trial to trial defense counsel telling them he

and his wife had dinner and spent most of the day

with Major Haney and his wife on 7 November 1989.

Lt Col Roe testified at the DuBay hearing that he

just recently has recognized that the date he spent

with Major Haney and his wife was not 7 November

1989, but 12 November 1989. This change in the date

is significant given the testimony of the forensic

toxicologist at trial about the retention time for

cocaine in the urine. The date given to trial defense

counsel was well beyond the time period where

observation of Major Haney in a social setting had

any evidentiary value to rebut the charge of use of

cocaine. Additionally, the error in reporting the date

of the dinner party was never noticed by Lt Col Roe

en ane SER SE

17a

until recently, and the error in the date was never

reported to trial defense counsel.

A corollary to this strategy was to have Major Haney

testify in his defense and deny his use of marijuana

and cocaine, as well as outline his activities during

the charged time period. Major Haney alleges that

his trial defense counsel did not prepare him for his

testimony until the morning before trial, and their

preparation was cursory. Captain Willner testified

that he prepared Major Haney for testifying well

before trial. He discussed the line of questioning he

would pursue. He told him some of the specific

questions he would ask, and elicited Major Haney’s

responses. He also told him other areas he would

cover in his questioning, without telling him the

specific questions he would ask. He told him how he

should conduct himself in court, his demeanor, and to

address his responses to the court members. He told

Major Haney to unconditionally deny his use of

drugs. He did not tell him to qualify his denial by

saying “I did not use them at that time.”

Captain Willner and Captain Watson spoke with Mrs.

Haney a number of times before trial, as well as after

trial. Mrs. Haney testified the first time they spoke

to her was just two days before trial, a statement

both counsel deny as being true. Mrs. Haney said

trial defense counsel told her two days before trial

that her husband was going to be convicted and go to

jail for 7 years. Trial defense counsel deny they said

this, however, they did discuss with her the

possibilities of what could occur. Captain Willner did

not call her as a witness because the disadvantages of

calling her as a witness outweighed any advantage in

calling her. Mrs. Haney had medical problems that

were beginning to be resolved just before trial. Mrs.

Haney was also very emotional. Major Haney told

Captain Willner that he was not able to be honest

with his wife concerning aspects of the trial. Captain

18a

Willner was concerned that if she testified she would

antagonize the court members because she appeared

to have a big chip on her shoulder about the Air

Force. Major Haney and Mrs. Haney had met and

married while both were Air Force enlisted

members. When Major Haney was commissioned,

she believed that she had been forced to get out of

the Air Force after serving over eight years, thus

giving up her right to her own retirement. Mrs.

Haney appeared to be very bitter about this, and

Captain Willner was concerned she would come

across this way. What Mrs. Haney could testify

about during findings was that they had been very

busy the two weeks before 15 November 1989,

because they both had busy jobs and were also

meeting with realtors to try and sell their house.

Captain Willner also felt that court members gave

less weight to the testimony of a spouse than other

witnesses, because next to an accused, she had more

to lose than anyone else. Captain Willner talked

about these issues with Major Haney and he agreed

to this strategy.

A fourth strategy explored by the trial defense

counsel, and one they intended on using until two

weeks before trial, was the theory that the urine

specimen that tested positive either was not Major

Haney’s or the specimen had been adulterated.

Major Haney had a long history of taking

prescription pain medications. If the urine specimen

which tested positive for cocaine and marijuana

metabolities was his, or was not adulterated, the

metabolities for the prescription drugs should be

found in the correct ratio to when he would take

these drugs. If the urine specimen was not his, none

of his prescription drugs would be found in the

specimen, or if found in lower than expected ratios,

would show that the urine had been diluted or

adulterated. The trial defense counsel got the name

19a

of Dr. Levisky from either Major Haney or someone

Captain Willner had spoken to about the TENS

thesis. Dr. Levisky was a toxicologist for the El Paso

County medical examiners office and was an officer in

the Air Force Reserves. Dr. Levisky agreed to help

the defense for free on his own time. This meant that

the defense did not have to notify the government of

Dr. Levisky until they decided they were going to

call him as a witness, and did not have to request

funding for the testing from the convening authority.

However, to test this theory, they had to request an

aliquot of the urine.

Dr. Levisky tested the aliquot for the cocaine and

marijuana metabolities and found them in the same

ratios as the Armstrong Laboratory and Northwest

Toxicology Laboratory. He then tested for the

presence of one or two of the medications being taken

by Major Haney. He found both of them present, but

at levels lower than expected. This supported the

defense theory that Major Haney’s sample had been

adulterated by someone pouring into his specimen

some person[’]s urine which contained the

metabolities for cocaine and marijuana. Two weeks

before trial, Dr. Levisky on his own initiative,

examined the aliquot for the presence of Theopholine,

another drug commonly taken by Major Haney. He

~ found the Theopholine in the ratio he expected. The

most likely explanation that Dr. Levisky had was

that this was Major Haney’s urine, but he had not

taken his prescription medications at either the time

or in the quantity required by the prescription.

Captain Willner explained the damage that would be

caused to the defense case by presenting evidence

that conclusively identified this as Major Haney’s

urine. Major Haney wanted to present this defense,

but in the end, agreed that it made no sense to

positively identify this as his urine. Captain Willner

and Dr. Levisky thought as a corollary to this theory,

20a

they would have a physician review Major Haney’s

medical records to see if there was any medical

reason why he would secrete lower levels of the

other drugs. Dr. Bowerman with the medical

examiners office in E] Paso County reviewed the

records and found no reason why Major Haney would

secrete lower levels. He also told Captain Willner

that Major Haney fit the profile of a drug user and he

thought Major Haney used the marijuana and

cocaine.

A fifth strategy explored and used by the trial

defense counsel was the good military character of

Major Haney. Both trial defense counsel requested

Major Haney to contact potential character witnesses

and ask them to draft character statements. Captain

Willner does not recall whether he gave Major Haney

or potential character witnesses any specific

guidance, either orally or in writing, about what to

include in the character statements. Captain Watson

identified certain parameters, such as not to say “he

did not do it” or “he passed a polygraph,” because

neither was admissible and the second was not true.

The character statements came to Captain Watson

either directly or through Major Haney to review

and edit. Captain Watson edited the witness

statements as they came in, but not all came back in

time to be re-submitted after they had been edited.

Captain Watson believed it was important that the

character statements admitted into evidence not

have any obvious editing gaps. Trial defense counsel

do not remember if everyone who submitted a

statement was interviewed as a potential witness.

Captain Willner interviewed potential witnesses, and

often times Captain Watson was present. Captain

Watson does not recall interviewing any witnesses by

himself. Trial defense counsel talked about which

witnesses to call both among themselves and with

Major Haney. They wanted to present those they

ee i

2la

thought would be most credible and who covered

different time periods. Trial defense counsel knew

that the military judge would place a limit on the

number of witnesses they could call on this issue.

They decided after a certain point, it would be

counter-productive to have repetitive testimony. The

court members would begin to resent it, and the

weaker witnesses would dilute the testimony of the

stronger witnesses. The trial defense counsel

discussed with Major Haney the witnesses they

proposed on calling and the reasons for their decision.

Neither recalls any objections to Captain Willner’s

choices by Major Haney.

Hearing exhibits 30 and 31 look like the lists of

potential witnesses provided by Major Haney to

Captain Willner. Captain Willner has no recollection

as to who or how many of the witnesses he

interviewed, but believes he interviewed most. Some

of the interviews were by phone, but most were in

person. Major Haney did not tell him the number

next to the name on exhibits 30 and 31 were the

desired order in which witnesses be called. Captain

Willner met and spoke with each person that he

called as a defense witness before trial. He does not

remember how long he spoke with each one. He did

not rehearse specific questions and answers with

them, but instead discussed the topic areas he would

ask questions about on direct examination, and what

questions they could anticipate on cross-examination.

Captain Willner testified that he attempted to help

Major Haney prepare an unsworn statement prior to

trial. Major Haney refused to prepare it, and told

Captain Willner it was inconceivable that he would be

convicted. After he was convicted, he once again told

Major Haney to prepare the statement. The next

morning they reviewed the statement before trial. The

defense did not call any witnesses in sentencing

because all of the good character evidence had already

22a

been introduced during findings. The defense did

introduce defense exhibits CC and DD. The problem

for the defense was the members by convicting Major

Haney showed they did not believe his testimony

during findings. The defense had multiple character

statements and testimony already before the members

and it could be used by the members in sentencing as

well. They chose not to call witnesses from his unit to

testify about his rehabilitative potential because they

had already presented their strongest witnesses and

the members would view this as more of the same

evidence they had already heard in findings. The

defense was also concerned about the cross-

examination they would experience about the

rehabilitative potential of a major convicted of drug

offenses. The defense did present to the members

information about Major Haney’s medical problems

and support for his mother through his unsworn

statement. They did not present independent medical

evidence because Major Haney’s doctors did not view

his medical problems as being as serious as Major

Haney did.

After the trial, both trial defense counsel were

involved in preparing clemency matters. They had

read all of the letters submitted before trial, and

chose to use some and not others. Some were not

used at trial because they contained potentially

objectionable material and the edited statements

were not returned in time for use at trial. Other

statements were used only during clemency because

they contained either potentially negative

information, did not add anything, or the court

members could become irritated by their contents.

WHEN DID CAPTAINS WILLNER AND WATSON

BECOME AWARE OF ANY COMPLAINTS

CONCERNING ALLEGATIONS OF INEFFEC-

TIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND WHAT

WERE THEIR RESPONSES?

23a

Major Haney’s first post-trial complaint is that he

was not prepared to immediately go into confinement

once he was sentenced to confinement. He said he

was unaware that he would not be able to go back

and gather his things together. Captain Watson said

this was a detail he would have his defense paralegal

instruct the client on, including giving them a

handout of what to pack for confinement. In my

opinion, there is a probability that this information

was not passed on to Major Haney. Major Haney was

Captain Watson’s first defense client, his first officer

client, and one of his first courts-martial as a defense

counsel. Major Haney did not believe he would be

convicted. There is a low likelihood that he would

have been receptive to any information about

sentencing or post-trial matters from the defense

paralegal, let alone his own attorneys.

Captain Willner as the defense counsel of record was

responsible for all post-trial duties. Captain Watson

assisted him by being a contact point for Major and

Mrs. Haney, and received all matters to be submitted

in clemency. Major Haney said he tried contacting

Captain Watson 20 to 30 times between the time he

was convicted and the time he let anyone officially

know he was dissatisfied with his defense counsel.

He said he was only successful in contacting him

about a dozen times. He said he wanted Captain

Watson to give him more information about his prior

role for the government in his case, his post-trial

rights, and assistance to his wife to explain to her

what was going on. Captain Willner was much

harder to contact. Captain Watson was very active in

gathering clemency matters for Major Haney.

Captain Willner was first aware of Major Haney

having potential concerns about the performance of

military trial defense counsel before the trial.

Captain Willner was aware that Major Haney’s wife

and friends were advising him to obtain civilian

24a

counsel. Captain Willner spoke with Bob Warren, a

civilian attorney contacted by Major Haney before

trial, and answered his questions about the case.

Captain Willner was contacted by two other civilian

defense counsel after the trial sometime before

Captain Willner submitted his R.C.M. 1105 and 1106

materials. Captain Willner had also heard that Major

Haney was making complaints to the jail staff about

his attorneys. Captain Willner spoke to the Chief

Circuit Defense Counsel about this, and he was

advised to talk to Major Haney about any

dissatisfaction he had with them. Captain Willner

spoke with Major Haney and told him he had to feel

completely comfortable with his defense counsel, and

if he was unhappy he needed to release them and get

new counsel. Major Haney denied the allegations

from the jail staff that he was unhappy with his trial

defense counsel, and he said he was satisfied with

their performance. This conversation took place

before Captain Willner submitted his R.C.M. 1105

and 1106 materials.

Captain Willner submitted the defense clemency

matters to the convening authority on 4 October

1990. Captain Willner submitted his R.C.M. 1105 and

1106 matters to the convening authority on 23

October 1990. Major Haney’s undated request for

clemency, which is Hearing Exhibit 34, was

submitted with Captain Willner’s clemency materials

on 4 October 1990. Hearing Exhibit 35, dated

November 16, 1990, says in paragraph 2a that both of

his trial defense counsel quit on 23 October 1990.

However, the testimony of both trial defense counsel

and Major Haney is that Hearing Exhibit 33, dated

25 October 1990, is the first notice either the

convening authority or either trial defense counsel

had that Major Haney was dissatisfied with his trial

defense counsel or that he was alleging ineffective

assistance [of] counsel. Major and Mrs. Haney

——

25a

testified that they had been working on a draft of

Hearing Exhibit 33 for several weeks, but they had

not shared their concerns or a draft with anyone else,

including their trial defense counsel. Major Haney

gave Mrs. Haney what is now Hearing Exhibit 33 on

25 October 1990 to hand deliver to the convening

authority, which she did on the same date. Captain

Watson had never been identified in the record as an

attorney of record, so there never was any formal

release of him by Major Haney or the court. Captain

Willner was formally released by the court at the

post-trial Article 39(a) on 31 October 1990.

III. ERRORS BY THE MILITARY JUDGE DURING

EVIDENTIARY HEARING

The appellant in his first assignment of error asserts the

military judge erred by (1) failing to evaluate the credibility of

the witnesses and evidence; (2) failing to make findings of fact

and conclusions of law; and (8) failing to reopen the hearing to

allow defense cross-examination of a prosecution witness after

discovery of new evidence during the hearing. He asserts

these errors substantially prejudiced him and rendered the

DuBay hearing incomplete, fundamentally unfair, and fatally

flawed.

A military judge in a post-trial hearing has the burden of

providing a record on which the convening authority and

appellate courts can reach a decision on the merits of an

appellant’s claims. We expect the military judge, when necessary,

to subject witnesses to penetrating questioning so that he can

determine their credibility, reconcile inconsistencies in the

testimony, and find facts. United States v. Calamita, 48 M.J. 917

(A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1998). That is precisely what Judge

Altschwager did in this case. He conducted a thorough hearing

and analysis of the credibility of the witness testimony. His

comprehensive findings of fact both answered the questions

posed by the convening authority and created a thorough record

on which we can rely to resolve conflict of interest and

ineffectiveness of counsel issues.

26a

The appellant further asserted that he was prejudiced by

the military judge’s decision not to reopen the hearing for

cross-examination of Lieutenant Colonel (Lt Coil) Willner.

Prior to the hearing the assistant trial counsel asked Lt Co!

Willner to provide the government and defense counsel any

notes he made during his representation Jf the appellant.

However, Lt Col Willner had recently moved and did not have

the notes available. He brought them with him to the hearing.

The appellant’s counsel was mistakenly told there were no

notes because that is what the assistant trial counsel

understood. The parties became aware of the notes during

cross-examination of Lt Col Willner. After assuring that the

appellant waived any privilege he may have had concerning his

defense counsel’s notes, the hearing officer granted a recess to

enable counsel to review the notes. The hearing officer

announced, after the 37 minute recess, that he had been

informed that the defense was prepared to continue their

cross-examination, but wanted some time to review the trial

defense counsel’s notes to determine if it would be necessary to

reconvene at a later date or if they could emphasize the points

they wished to make by written brief. The cross-examination

of Lt Col Willner continued and the hearing was concluded

subject to the defense requesting it be reopened.

Three weeks later the appellant requested the hearing be

reopened to continue cross-examination of Lt Col Willner

based on a review of his file. The hearing officer denied the

request to reopen after determining that all of the areas that

the defense requested to reexamine were covered during Lt

Col Willner’s testimony. The hearing officer’s report discussed

this matter as follows:

Specifically, Lt Col Willner testified with his case file

on his lap so that it was available to jog his memory.

Lt Col Willner testified on each of the areas

requested by defense counsel and said even though

he had reviewed the file, he had no further

recollection of each of these areas of inquiry. Further

inquiry by the defense counsel, with specific

27a

references to his notes, was highly unlikely to result

in more detailed answers.

We review a military judge’s denial of a defense request to

produce a witness under an abuse of discretion standard.

United States v. Miller, 47 M.J. 352, 359 (1997). Testimony of a

witness is necessary when it is not cumulative and when it

would contribute to a party’s presentation of the case in some

positive way on a matter in issue. The appellant conducted

extensive cross-examination of Lt Col Willner and the military

judge did not abuse his discretion when he determined that

reconvening the hearing for further cross-examination would

not be productive. Mil. R. Evid. 611 (b). ‘The appellant’s

assertion that the DuBay hearing was incomplete,

fundamentally unfair, and fatally flawed is without merit.

IV. DEFECTIVE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

RECOMMENDATION AND CONVENING

AUTHORITY ACTION

The appellant asserts the new SJAR and addendum are

defective and void because they (1) are based on conclusions drawn

from a fatally flawed DuBay hearing which failed to adequately

address crucial issues in the case, including the questions set forth

in the convening order, and (2) are made in a vacuum, without the

benefit of any counsel by the staff judge advocate.

The appellant concludes the DuBay hearing was fatally

flawed because he believes the military judge did not answer

two questions: (1) whether the appellant waived Captain

Watson’s presence at the trial, and (2) whether the appellant

knew of Captain Watson’s prior participation on the

government side and waived any conflict. We disagree. The

hearing officer’s findings of fact, which are set out above, fully

answer each of these questions. Based on all of the testimony

it is clear that Major Haney wanted the benefit of having

Captain Watson assisting in his defense. Captain Watson was

careful to ensure there was no conflict of interest. The DuBay

hearing brought out all of the essential facts and is not fatally

flawed as claimed by the appellant.

28a

The appellant next complains because the staff judge

advocate did not include legal arguments, justifications, or

other discussion of the issues in the new SJAR or addendum.

However, the staff judge advocate is only required to state

whether corrective action on the findings or sentence should be

taken when an allegation of legal error is raised in matters

submitted under Rule for Courts-Martial (R.C.M.) 1106(d)(4).

The response may consist of a statement of agreement or

disagreement with the matters raised by the accused. An

analysis or rationale for the staff judge advocate’s statement, if

any, concerning legal errors is not required. R.C.M. 1106(d)(4).

The SJAR and the convening authority action are not

defective. The convening authority had all of the evidence and

legal advice necessary to take action. R.C.M. 1107(b)(3). This

issue has no merit.

V. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

The appellant has again asserted ineffective assistance of

counsel. Although this Court has twice ruled on this issue, we

will once again examine it in light of the evidence obtained

during the DuBay hearing. Appellant apparently has now

narrowed his assertion of ineffective assistance of counsel to

trial defense counsel’s presentation of evidence on good

military character.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

an appellant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action might be considered

sound trial strategy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,

689 (1984) (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).

Strategic or tactical decisions made by a trial defense counsel

will not be second-guessed on appeal unless there was no

reasonable or plausible basis for the defense counsel’s actions.

United States v. Garries, 19 M.J. 845 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985), aff'd,

22 M.J. 288 (C.M.A. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 985 (1986). See

United States v. Mansfield, 24 M.J. 611 (A.F.C.M.R. 1987). A

strategic decision by defense counsel may constitute ineffective

assistance of counsel only if it was so patently unreasonable

that no competent attorney would have made the same

29a

decision. Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1448, 1445 (11th Cir.

1983). The reasonableness of a counsel’s tactical decisions is

determined by examining the facts at trial and the

circumstances under which counsel’s decision was made.

Mansfield, 24 M.J. at 617.

Lt Col Willner explained that he limited the number of

witnesses to call on good military character and presented the

remaining evidence in statement form. He was aware that the

military judge would not allow an unlimited number of

witnesses and he consulted with the appellant and called those

he believed would be most credible and who would cover

different time periods. Lt Col Willner believed it would be

counter-productive to have repetitive testimony and the

members would resent it. The character statements that were

presented were edited so as to show the appellant’s good

military character. The trial defense counsel had the

statements redone to avoid having obvious editing gaps

because many of the witnesses referred to never seeing the

appellant use drugs. Evidence that witnesses had never seen

or known the accused to use drugs was not admissible as

evidence of a character trait. United States v. Schelkle, 47 M.J.

110 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1078 (1998). Trial defense

counsel had a sound tactical reason for editing the statements

and we will not second-guess the editing or presentation of

these statements. Trial defense counsel’s performance was not

deficient. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is

without merit.

VI. CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Once again the appellant asserts he was denied due

process of law and the effective assistance of counsel when

Captain Watson swore his commander to the charges during

the preferral process and then switched sides becoming the

area defense counsel and eventually assisting appellant in the

preparation of his case.

When an alleged conflict of interest is at issue, “a

defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate

30a

‘that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his

laywer’s performance.” Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348

(1980), quoted in United States v. Breese, 11 M.J. 17, 20 (C.M.A.

1981). The burden of proof is on the defense. United States v.

Hicks. M.J.____ No. 97-0432/AR (Sep. 30, 1999); United

States v. Calhoun, 49 M.J. 485, 489 (1998) (citing Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)).

We find that the appellant was aware of Captain Watson’s

prior participation on the government side and knowingly

waived that participation because he believed there would be

an advantage to having Captain Watson on his defense team.

Captain Watson took all appropriate steps to be released by

the staff judge advocate. The facts developed during the

DuBay hearing demonstrate that he was equally careful to

properly inform the appellant so he could make a knowing

waiver of any conflict of interest based on Captain Watson’s

prior participation on the prosecution team.

During the course of the trial an issue arose as to proper

preferral of charges by Colonel Smith. An Article 39(a),

UCMJ, session was held and Captain Watson was called to

testify. Captain Willner stated to the court:

IMC: Your Honor, before we do that, I wanted to

point out to the court that since the time that these

charges were preferred, Captain Watson has been

reassigned to the Area Defense Counsel Office. As

the Area Defense Counsel, he has worked with me in

preparing for this case. He has also taken

confidences from Major Haney.

MJ: Well, fine. We won’t get into his confidential

relationship with the accused. We'll discuss only

matters pertaining to the advice given to Colonel

Smith at the time of preferral. Captain Watson?

Under these circumstances the trial judge should have

made inquiry into a possible conflict of interest. Regardless, as

Judge Altschwager found after the post-trial evidentiary

hearing, the appellant clearly understood Captain Watson’s

potential conflict and waived it. Furthermore, the appellant

3la

failed to meet his burden to show how Captain Watson’s

performance was adversely affected by the perceived conflict

of interest, or how it adversely affected the outcome of his trial.

This asserted error is without merit.

VII. INATTENTIVE COURT MEMBER

The appellant asserts that he was denied his right to

counsel, due process, and a fair trial during the post-trial

Article 39(a) session conducted by the military judge to

resolve allegations that a court member was inattentive or

asleep.

At the post-trial Article 39(a) session the military judge

asked Captain Willner, who no longer was counsel for the

appellant, what he had observed during the trial. Captain

Willner had a duty to truthfully answer questions concerning

his observations in the courtroom. His answers neither

constitute a conflict of interest nor a violation of the attorney-

client privilege. The military judge was not precluded from

conducting this post-trial session any more than he would have

been precluded from making inquiry concerning an inattentive

court member during the trial. We find no basis for changing

our previous opinion that the asserted error is without merit.

VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW UNDER ARTICLE

66(c), UCMJ

The appellant requests that we perform a plenary review

of his case and not limit our review to the specific issues.

Typically, action can only be taken that conforms to the

limitations of the remand. United States v. Smith, 41 M.J. 385,

386 (1995). However, an appellate court may consider closely

related issues(s) where the record is adequately developed.

United States v. Jordan, 38 M.J. 346, 353 (C.M.A. 1993) (Wiss,

J., dissenting). In this case, we disagree with the appellant

that a complete review of this case was required.

Nevertheless, we have considered the entire record, including

the post trial Article 39(a), UCMJ, session record and the

record of the post-trial evidentiary hearing.

32a

IX. CONCLUSION

We conclude the findings and sentence are correct in law

and fact, the sentence is appropriate, and no error prejudicial

to the substantial rights of the appellant was committed.

Accordingly, the findings and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge YOUNG and Judge SPISAK concur.

LAURA L. GREEN

Clerk of Court

33a

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ARMED FORCES

United States, Appellant

v.

Charles M. HANEY, Jr., Major,

U.S. Air Force, Appellee

No. 93-0157

45 M.J. 447; 1996 CAAF LEXIS 118

November 1, 1995, Argued

December 17, 1996, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: CMR No. 29000. Military Judge: Robert

N. Spencer.

CORE TERMS: defense counsel, addendum, convening, post-

trial, recommendation, new matter, sleeping, military, clemency,

staff, confidence, sub-issue, defense team, session, salted,

ineffective assistance of counsel, attachments, substitute counsel,

failure to serve, new issue, court-martial, sentence, new trial,

own work, involvement, prosecutor, invalidate, appearance,

questioned, profferal

COUNSEL: For Appellant: Kevin J. Barry (argued);

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Heimann (on brief).

For Appellee: Major LeEllen Coacher (argued); Colonel J oseph

L. Heimann and Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Breslin (on brief).

Amicus Curiae: Captain Norman R. Zamboni; Colonel Stephen

D. Smith, Lieutenant Colonel John T. Rucker, and Major Roy

H. Hewitt (on brief).

JUDGES: EVERETT, Senior Judge. Judge SULLIVAN

concurs. COX, Chief Judge (concurring). GIERKE, Judge

(concurring in part and in the result). CRAWFORD, Judge

(dissenting).

OPINION BY: EVERETT

OPINION:

Opinion of the Court

EVERETT, Senior Judge:

Appellant was tried by a general court-martial composed of officer

members at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, on July 19, 1990.

Contrary to his pleas, the members found appellant guilty of one

specification each of use of marijuana and cocaine, in violation of

Article 112a, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 912a.

He was sentenced to dismissal, confinement for 8 months, and

forfeiture of $ 750.00 per month for 12 months. After a post-trial

session under Article 39(a), UCMJ, 10 USC § 839(a), had

addressed—and found no merit in—allegations that a member

was sleeping during the trial, the convening authority approved

the sentence. In August 1992, the Court of Military Review!

affirmed the findings and sentence in an unpublished decision.

In our initial review of this case, we set aside the decision

below and remanded it for consideration of new issues raised

initially before this Court. 38 M.J. 229 (1993). In May 1994, the

court below, in another unpublished opinion, reaffirmed the

findings and sentence. Appellant again petitioned this Court,

and we granted review of this issue:

WHETHER THE CONVENING AUTHORITY ACTION

WAS DEFECTIVE AND VOID, WHERE THE CONVENING

AUTHORITY WAS ON NOTICE THAT APPELLANT WAS

NOT REPRESENTED BY CONFLICT-FREE COUNSEL,

DURING MUCH OF THE POST-TRIAL PHASES OF THE

TRIAL, AND WHERE THE STAFF JUDGE ADVOCATE

RECOMMENDATION AND SUBSEQUENT ADDENDA

WERE NEVER SERVED ON APPELLANT'S (CONFLICT

FREE) SUBSTITUTE DETAILED DEFENSE COUNSEL

WHO HAD BEEN APPOINTED TO REPRESENT

APPELLANT AT THE POST-TRIAL 3%a) SESSION.

This granted issue involves questions regarding the

satisfactory service of the initial staff judge advocate’s (SJA)

recommendation on the original defense counsel and the

service of two addenda to this recommendation on the

'See 41 M.J. 213, 229 n.* (1994).

35a

substitute defense counsel. Resolution of these matters

requires this Court to address two sub-issues:

1. WHETHER THE ORIGINAL TRIAL DEFENSE

COUNSEL HAD PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF AN

ALLEGATION OF INEFFECTIVENESS OF COUNSEL, SO

THAT AN ATTORNEY-CLIENT CONFLICT PRECLUDED

COUNSEL FROM RESPONDING TO THE INITIAL SJA’S

RECOMMENDATION AND THEREBY REQUIRED

SERVICE OF THIS RECOMMENDATION ON SUBS.

TITUTE DEFENSE COUNSEL.

2. WHETHER EITHER OF THE TWO ADDENDA TO THE

SJA’S RECOMMENDATION RAISE “NEW MATTER”

THAT REQUIRED SERVICE ON THE SUBSTITUTE

DEFENSE COUNSEL.

Unfortunately, because of a factual gap in the record,

we are unable to resolve the first sub-issue. Senator

Sam Ervin, while serving as a Justice on the North

Carolina Supreme Court, addressed in this manner

an appellate court’s problem in dealing with a

factually deficient record:

The unfortunate turn taken by this case in the court

below calls to mind a bit of advice received by the

writer of this opinion from his father, who was a

member of the North Carolina bar for sixty-five

years. When the writer embarked on the practice of

law, his father gave him this admonition: ‘Always salt

down the facts first; the law will keep.’ The trial

bench and bar would do well to heed this counsel.

In the very nature of things, it is impossible for a

court to enter a valid judgment declaring the rights

of parties to litigation until the facts on which those

rights depend have been ‘salted down’ in a manner

sanctioned by law.

Erickson v. Starling, 235 N.C. 643, 71 8.E.2d 384, 395-96 (1952).

* In the television series of yesteryear, Dragnet, Sgt. Joe Friday used to put

it this way, “Just the facts, ma’am, just the facts!”

36a

Because important facts regarding the first sub-issue are

not “salted down,” a remand to establish a factual record

normally would be required. See United States v. Cornelious,

41 M.J. 397 (1995). However, here this action to resolve the

first sub-issue is unnecessary. Our resolution of the second

sub-issue requires a new SJA recommendation and convening

authority action to remedy the errors in failing to serve the

substitute defense counsel with the first addendum to the

SJA’s recommendation, which raised “new matter,” and in

failing to serve this same counsel with the second addendum,

which discussed a new issue decided in the post-trial hearing.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On November 15, 1989, appellant, an officer with over 19

years of unblemished officer/enlisted service, randomly was

selected to provide a urine sample for drug testing. During

the test procedures, appellant told the drug test monitor that

he believed his sample would come back positive because of

the prescribed drugs he was taking. Subsequently, his

urinalysis test report was positive for marijuana and cocaine.

Before and during trial appellant denied knowing use of

illegal drugs. He asserted that a combination of innocent

circumstances might explain his positive test result.

According to appellant, he took prescription and non-

prescription drugs, including opiates and barbiturates, for the

continuing treatment of effects of injuries he had received in

an accident years earlier, and also he used exotic herbal teas.

The members rejected appellant’s explanation, however, and

convicted him of the alleged drug use. The granted issue

arises primarily from questions about the effectiveness of the

assistance of counsel in light of the possible conflicts of

interest on the part of two lawyers involved in appellant’s

defense.

A

The second Court of Military Review opinion concluded

that “there is some confusion as to whether Captain Watson

37a

was detailed as defense counsel... .” Unpub. op. at 3. This

confusion is quite understandable.

According to the record of trial, Captain Koza alone was

detailed as appellant’s counsel. As Captain Koza had been

transferred prior to trial, the military judge properly informed

appellant of his right to have his detailed counsel present, and

appellant waived Koza’s presence. Captain Willner, the

individual military counsel, appeared alone in court to

represent appellant.

Captain Watson, as the base area defense counsel,

consulted and assisted the defense in trial preparation, took

confidence from appellant, and collected clemency material.

However, he never entered an appearance in court as a

detailed counsel. Nonetheless, Major Willner, who was

promoted to this rank after the trial, states in his affidavit that

“Capt Watson was detailed to the case... .” In his affidavit,

Major Willner also explains that the decision not to have

Captain Watson sit at counsel table during the trial was based

on “our recognition that trial counsel or a court member might

ask Col Smith why he was willing to testify as a character

witness considering that he had preferred the charges. His

answer would have been that one of the defense counsel

[Captain Watson] had advised him to sign the charges.”

(Emphasis added.)

When the prosecution called Captain Watson as a witness

regarding a proper profferal, Captain Willner informed the

judge that Captain Watson “has worked with me in preparing

for this case. He has also taken confidences from Major

Haney.”

In a post-trial letter to the convening authority, appellant

expressly challenged “the trial strategy [Captain Watson]

helped develop or the assistance he provided. . . .” He further

asserted that Captain Watson “was reluctant to invalidate his

own work, since he was the prosecutor in April.”

Notwithstanding this confusion as to Captain Watson’s

professional relationship with appellant, the court below found

that (a) appellant was fully aware of Captain Watson’s prior

involvement as the base chief of military justice and as the

38a

officer before whom appellant’s commander had sworn to the

charges and (b) appellant had expressly requested Captain

Watson to assist his individual military counsel. Accordingly,

the court below ruled that no actual conflict of interest existed

regarding Captain Watson’s performance. Unpub. op. at 4.

B

The events concerning the role of Captain (later Major)

Willner are equally confusing. On September 24, 1990, the SJA

completed his initial recommendation and served appellant. On

September 25, 1990, the SJA served Major Willner.

On October 26, 1990, the SJA prepared and forwarded to

the convening authority the first addendum to his initial

recommendation. Without indicating the date of their receipt in

the SJA’s office, the addendum included these documents that _

the defense had submitted:

1) -Captain Willner’s defense request for clemency, which

included 34 attachments (approximately 59 pages) and

addressed appellant’s claim of innocence, 19 years of

exceptional service, medical problems, and family

stresses. The clemency request is dated October 4.

However, on October 4 and October 12, the defense had

requested extensions to file clemency matters; and the

convening authority had granted the defense until

October 25 for this purpose. Thus, the actual date of

receipt is uncertain.

2) Appellant’s request for release and/or a new trial, dated

October 25, 1990, which included 6 attachments

(approximately 63 pages.) This document questioned the

advice of counsel that Haney waive a proper profferal of

the charges. It asserted that there “were many problems

with the evidence that was presented by my attorney and

the manner in which he presented what was submitted and

what was withheld.” Appellant implied that Watson might

have intentionally failed to present appellant’s evidence of

good character because Captain Watson “was responsible

for bringing charges against me [and] was reluctant to

39a

invalidate his own work since he was the prosecutor in

April. I cannot, now, accept that the trial strategy he

helped develop or the assistance he provided were in good

faith.” Appellant argued that a new trial was required

because of “the possible ineffective counsel provided to

me.” Appellant also referred specifically to a letter, dated

October 24, from his wife to the convening authority,

regarding evidence that had not been used at trial.

3) Appellant’s wife’s letter to the convening authority

(with two attachments, approximately 4 pages), which had

been submitted directly and not through the area defense

counsel. Mrs. Haney alleged that she and appellant had

difficulty in working both with Captain Willner and with

Captain Watson. She asserted that “our defense lawyers

seem to be working harder for the prosecution than for us,

their clients.” She explained that counsel had failed to

introduce evidence and call defense witnesses.

4) Captain Willner’s submission of RCM 1105/1106,

Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1984, matters,

dated October 23, 1990, with three attachments

(approximately 9 pages.) (This is not a quotation.)

In his first addendum, the SJA explained that defense

counsel and appellant had asserted errors, including that

appellant “received ineffective assistance of counsel” and that

“a juror was asleep during a portion of the trial.” As to the

_ former, that addendum concludes, “I find from the record that

Major Haney received a vigorous defense and was competently

represented by Captain Willner, his trial defense counsel.

Captain Watson was not a counsel in the case... .” (Emphasis

added.) Reasoning that the assertion—supported by two

affidavits—that a member of the court-martial had been

sleeping during a portion of the trial “presents a significant

problem,” the SJA recommended that a post-trial session be

convened to address this issue. However, the SJA did not

serve defense counsel with a copy of this addendum to the

recommendation.

On October 29, 1990, the convening authority, in line with

the SJA’s suggestion, ordered a post-trial hearing as to

40a

whether any court member had been sleeping during any

critical portion of the trial.

On October 31, 1990, at the opening of the post-trial hearing,

Captain Willner moved to withdraw because of appellant’s

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Willner asserted

that appellant’s request for release and/or new trial dated

October 24, 1990, appeared to incorporate his wife’s letter of

October 24. After the military judge had appellant affirm his

dissatisfaction with Captain Willner and his loss of confidence in

his attorney’s abilities, the judge ruled that this lack of trust

rendered Captain Willner unable to provide effective advice, so it

was good cause to relieve him as counsel. Captain Reigler

replaced Willner as substitute defense counsel, and the military

judge completed the post-trial session. On November 8, 1990, the

military judge made findings of fact based on the post-trial

hearing and provided Captain Reigler with a copy.

On November 9, 1990, the SJA submitted a second

addendum to his recommendation. He noted that the post-trial

hearing had been completed and that the judge had made

findings of fact that no juror had slept during the trial. Captain

Reigler, the substitute defense counsel, was not served with

this addendum. On November 19, 1990, the substitute defense

counsel examined the post-trial hearing record, some 6 days

after the convening authority took action.

DISCUSSION

A

The rules of law to be applied in this case are clear and

simple. However, because the critical facts in this case are not

“salted down,” we are thwarted in applying those rules.

An allegation that the original detailed defense counsel

had rendered ineffective assistance would have precluded him

from responding to the SJA’s initial recommendation because of

an attorney-client conflict of interest. On the other hand, in

United States v. Carter, 40 M.J. 102 (CMA 1994), we held that

post-trial responses to an SJA’s recommendation made “prior

4la

to notification of a claim of ineffectiveness of defense counsel

are ‘mentally free of competing interest . . . and there [is] not

need for a substitute counsel.” Id. at 105-06.

Here, there is no clear factual record of what the defense

counsel knew and when he knew it as to claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. See United States v. Cornelious, 41 M.J.

397 (1995). The affidavit of Major Willner does not address this

issue, and the record of trial contains no dates concerning the

SJA’s receipt of the defense post-trial submission. Ordinarily, a

remand would be necessary to consider the granted issue in

light of Carter. Id. at 398. However, this relief is not required

because there is an independent basis for requiring a new

convening authority’s action in this case.

B

RCM 1106(f)(7), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States

(1994 ed.), the version in effect at the time of the

recommendation—which authorized the SJA to supplement his

post-trial recommendation after receiving the comments of

defense counsel—required: “When new matter is introduced

after counsel for the accused has examined the

recommendation, however, counsel for the accused must be -

served with the new matter and given a further opportunity to

comment.” According to the Discussion of this Rule, “new

matter” includes “matter from outside the record of trial, and

issues not previously discussed.”

Although he did not enter an appearance as a counsel of

record in this case, Captain Watson’s involvement as defense

counse! in this case is well documented. In his capacity as the

base area defense counsel, he consulted with and assisted the

defense in trial preparation and presentation, took confidences

from appellant, and collected clemency matters (21 letters in

appellant’s clemency package are addressed to Captain Robert

Watson, Area Defense Counsel). In his affidavit, Major Willner

asserts that “Captain Watson was detailed to the case” and

refers to him as “one of the defense counsel.”

Under these circumstances, appellant’s allegation of

ineffective assistance of counsel deserved close scrutiny. See

42a

United States v. Travolilla, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 395, 399, 38 C.M.R.

198, 197 (1968) (each appointed defense counsel is an integral

part of the defense team and could not be absent unless

excused by the accused); see also United States v. Boone, 42

M.J. 308, 313 (1995) (“Where an accused is represented by both

civilian counsel and detailed military counsel, the performance

of defense counsel is measured by the combined efforts of the

defense team as a whole.”). Accordingly, the SJA erred by not

serving the first addendum on appellant’s trial defense counsel.

See United States v. Leal, 44 M.J. 235 (1996); United States v.

Jones, 36 M.J. 488 (CMA 1993); United States v. Norment, 34

M.J. 224 (CMA 1992).

Moreover, the SJA erred by failing to serve on substitute

defense counsel the second addendum, which addressed the

issue of sleeping members. This issue had not been discussed

in the original recommendation and was “new matter.” See

United States v. Leal and United States v. Jones, both supra;

United States v. Narine, 14 M.J. 55 (CMA 1982); RCM

1106(f)(7) Discussion, Manual, supra.

This error is compounded by the convening authority’s

acting on appellant’s case even before the substitute counsel

had reviewed the record of the post-trial proceedings. We

recently reaffirmed that the “essence of post-trial practice is

basic fair play—notice and an opportunity to respond.” United

States v. Leal, supra at 237. The error here denied appellant

these basic rights.

Before the court below on remand, appellant in his fifth

assignment of error specifically challenged the findings of the

military judge regarding the post-trial proceedings. Proper

service of the second addendum on defense counsel would have

afforded appellant the opportunity to present these matters

initially to the convening authority, rather than to raise them

first in an appellate court.

C

In light of these multiple errors, we must address whether

the appellant was prejudiced. See United States v. Hickok, 45

43a

M.J. 142 (1996) (counsel present to protect post-trial interest,

procedural error tested for prejudice). In United States v.

Jones, 44 M.J. 242, 244 (1996), we affirmed the principle that

“injection of Inew matter” is “presumptively prejudicial.”

Here, the Government has not rebutted that presumption.

Accord United States v. Leal, supra.

“Ordinarily, we will not speculate on what the convening

authority might have done if there had been full compliance

with RCM 1106(f)(7).” United States v. Jones, 44 MJ. at 244=cf.

United States v. DeGrocco, 23 M.J. 146 (CMA 1987). Certainly,

we should not speculate that the convening authority would

have granted no relief if he had been able to consider

appellant’s significant and substantive response to the two

addenda to the SJA’s recommendation. On remand appellant

will have the opportunity to assure, that the facts are “salted

down” and that a convening authority will be able to evaluate

objectively the claims he has raised.

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Military Review and the.action of the convening authority are

set aside; the record of trial is returned to the Judge Advocate

General of the Air Force for submission to a different

convening authority for a new recommendation and action. If

necessary to establish facts as to Captain Watson’s

involvement and other ineffectiveness-of-counsel issues, the

convening authority may order an evidentiary hearing. See

United States v. DuBay, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 147, 37 C.M.R. 411

(1967).

Judge SULLIVAN concurs.

CONCUR BY: COX; GIERKE (In Part)

CONCUR: COX, Chief Judge (concurring):

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “addendum” as “{a] thing

that is added or to be added; a list or section consisting of

added material.” Id. at 37 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, in my

view, an “addendum” is either redundant and not necessary, or

is always new matter. See United States v. Leal, 44 M.J. 235,

240 (1996) (Cox, C.3., dissenting in part and concurring in the

result). In this case, the information supplied by the staff

44a

judge advocate was clearly significant; and, thus, the addendum

containing it should have been served on defense counsel.

Accordingly, I concur.

DISSENT BY: CRAWFORD; GIERKE (In Part)

DISSENT: _

GIERKE, Judge (concurring in part and in the result):

I agree with the result reached by the majority but I am

troubled by the majority’s treatment of the question of “new

matter” in the first addendum. The majority does not identify

what part of the staff judge advocate’s [SJA’s] addendum was

“new matter” and fails to articulate a legal basis for concluding

that it was new matter.

Appellant asserted that he was inadequately represented,

and the SJA responded that appellant was ably represented.

This response was not “new matter.” See RCM 1106(f)(7),

Discussion, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1994

ed.) (“‘New matter’ does not ordinarily include any discussion

by the staff judge advocate . . . of the correctness of the initial

defense comments on the recommendation.”).

Appellant also asserted that there was a conflict of

interest caused by Capt Watson’s membership on the defense

team. The SJA responded that “Captain Watson was not a

counsel in the case.” The record does not reflect the basis for

the SJA’s response. If the SJA’s basis for this response was

information from outside the record, the response was “new

matter.” RCM 1106(f)(7), Discussion. If, however, the SJA’s

response was merely a conclusion based on the record, it was

not new matter but merely a comment on the correctness of

the defense assertion. While the record reflects that Capt

Watson did not enter a formal appearance in the case, was not

introduced as a member of the defense during trial, and did not

sit at the counsel table at trial, I cannot determine if that was

the basis for the SJ A’s comment.

Notwithstanding my inability to determine the factual

basis for the SJA’s comment, I believe that his comment was

new matter because it introduced a new issue. Appellant’s

complaint was that he was not competently represented

45a

because Capt Watson “was reluctant to invalidate his own

work.” This complaint was premised on Capt Watson’s dual

role as a member of the defense team, having previously acted

for the prosecution in connection with profferal of charges. The

SIA’s response did not address the quality of Capt Watson’s

performance or the impact of his dual role on the defense

representation, but instead raised a new factual issue: whether

Capt Watson was in fact a member of the team.

This new issue blindsided the defense. Capt Willner (the

individual counsel) had stated on the record that Capt Watson

had assisted in the preparation of appellant’s case and had

“taken confidences” from appellant as part of that preparation.

Many of the documents presented to the convening authority

on clemency were addressed to Capt Watson. The SJA

mentioned none of these indicia of Capt Watson’s participation.

Instead, the SJA made a factual assertion, at odds with the

evidence of record, that appellant’s factual premise for his

claim of ineffective representation was invalid. Since this

addendum was not served, appellant had no opportunity to set

the record straight for the convening authority. For these

reasons I join the majority in holding that the record must be

returned for a new post-trial recommendation and service on

conflict-free defense counsel.

Turning to the second addendum on the issue of the

sleeping court member, I disagree with the majority on the

applicable standard of review as well as its conclusion that the

procedural error was prejudicial. I question whether this was

truly an addendum or an original recommendation. Under

either classification, however, I agree that service on the

defense was required. Since appellant was represented by

conflict-free counsel at this point, however, the SIA’s failure to

serve the second addendum must be tested for prejudice. See

United States v. Hickok, 45 M.J. 142 (1996); United States v.

Pierce, 40 M.J. 149 (CMA 1994); United States v. Moseley, 35

M.J. 481 (CMA 1992). I find no prejudice.

The sleeping-juror issue was an allegation of legal error,

not part of a clemency petition. Thus, the presumption of

prejudice applied in United States v. Leal, 44 M.J. 235, 237

|

46a

(1996), and United States v. Jones, 44 M.J. 242, 244 (1996), does

not apply because this case does not involve the convening

authority’s unfettered prerogative to grant clemency. Instead,

appellant is entitled to relief only if his allegation of legal error

had merit. He is not entitled to an erroneous recommendation

from the SIA or an erroneous decision from the convening

authority. See United States v. Welker, 44 M.J. 85, 88-89 (1996).

The issue of the sleeping court member was thoroughly

investigated at a post-trial evidentiary hearing. Appellant

presented four witnesses who asserted that a member sitting

to the left of the president had been sleeping during the court-

martial. Four of the five court members were questioned. One

court member, who had been sitting to the right of the

president, had been reassigned and was unavailable to testify.

The four court members who were questioned all denied

sleeping or seeing any other member sleeping. Trial counsel

and defense counsel from the original trial both testified that

they saw no members sleeping. The military judge stated on

the record that he had noticed no one sleeping. The Court of

Criminal Appeals reviewed the issue and concluded that it was

without merit. On this record, there is no way I can say that

appellant was entitled to a different result on this issue.

For the foregoing reasons, I disagree with the majority’s

conclusion that failure to serve the second addendum entities

appellant to relief. However, based on the SJA’s failure to

serve his first addendum, I concur in the result reached by the

majority.

CRAWFORD, Judge (dissenting):

The majority concludes that because of “new matter” in

the staff judge advocate’s (SJA) second addendum, “there is an

independent basis for requiring a new convening authority’s

action in this case.” 45 M.J. 447, 451. I agree with the majority

that “the SJA erred by failing to serve on substitute defense

counsel the second addendum, which addressed the issue of

sleeping members.” Jd. at 452. The majority asserts: “This

error is compounded by the convening authority’s acting on

appellant’s case even before the substitute counsel had

reviewed the record of the post-trial proceedings.” Id. at 452.

;

;

|

;

'

’

| ‘

47a

But any error for failing to serve the second addendum

concerning the sleeping court members would not affect the

substantial rights of appellant because both the prosecutor and

the defense counsel agreed with the military judge that such an

allegation was untrue. Thus, service of the second addendum

for a defense response would now be a futile exercise.

Additionally, failure of defense counsel to raise this issue

below constitutes waiver, absent establishing good cause or

manifest injustice. United States v. Townsend, 43 M.J. 205, 212

(1995) (Crawford, J., dissenting). Neither has been shown in

this case.

48a

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

MILITARY REVIEW

UNITED STATES

v.

Major CHARLES M. HANEY, JR., 265-04-8987

United States Air Force

ACM 29000 (f rev)

26 May 1994

Sentence adjudged 19 July 1990 by GCM convened at |

Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Military Judge:

Robert N. Spencer. |

Approved sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 8

months, and forfeiture of $750 pay per month for 12

months.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Kevin J. Barry,

Esq. (argued), Colonel Jay L. Cohen, Lieutenant

Colonel Frank J. Spinner, Lieutenant Colonel G. -

Michael Lennon, and Captain Robert A. Parks.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Major Jules

D. Silberberg (argued), Colonel Jeffery T. Infelise,

and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas E. Schlegel.

Before

DIXON, GRUNICK, and PEARSON

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

UPON FURTHER REVIEW

GRUNICK, Judge:

We are reviewing this case for the second time. Our first

consideration included review of appellant’s ten assignments of

error and oral argument on selected issues. We affirmed

appellant’s conviction in an unpublished opinion on 26 August 1992.

ee

49a

Substitute appellate defense counsel in an Addendum to

the Supplement to Petition for Grant of Review to the Court of

Military Appeals, dated 6 April 1993, asserted five issues plus

an allegation of inadequacy of appellate representation. The

Court of Military Appeals viewed the issues raised by appellate

defense counsel as matters that were not raised before this

Court in our initial consideration of this case. They set aside

our prior affirmance and remanded this case to us for further

review.

Pursuant to the Court of Military Appeals direction, the

case has been returned to this Court for further review. We

again conducted oral arguments and considered appellant’s

seven assignments of error: (1) Ineffective assistance of trial

defense counsel; (2) an assistant to the defense team had a

conflict of interest; (3) the military judge erred during

instructions; (4) comments by the convening authority

constituted unlawful command influence; (5) the military judge

erred in his finding a court member was not asleep during a

portion of the trial; (6) the military judge was appointed in

violation of the appointments clause; and (7) the trial and

appellate judges were not appointed for fixed terms.

FACTS

On 15 November 1989, appellant was randomly selected to

provide a urine sample for drug testing. During the test

procedures, appellant told the drug test monitor he believed

his sample would come back positive because of the prescribed

drugs he was taking. The test results reported appellant’s

sample was positive for marijuana and cocaine. Appellant was

convicted of one specification each of use of marijuana and

cocaine, in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ. Before a panel of

officers he was sentenced to a dismissal, confinement for 8

months, and forfeitures of $750 per month for 12 months. The

convening authority approved the findings and sentence.

During our initial review of appellant’s case, we

considered the ten errors submitted by appellant, four of them

submitted to us pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J.

50a

431 (C.M.A. 1982). Article 66(c), UCMJ, permits the courts of

military review to “affirm only such findings of guilty and the

sentence or such part or amount of the sentence as it finds

correct in law and fact and determines, on the basis of the

entire record, should be approved.” We performed our

statutory duties and rendered a decision on 26 August 1992.

The Court of Military Appeals set aside our decision on 23

June 1993 and returned it to us because substitute appellate

defense counsel, “for the first time on appeal raised five

additional issues.” In fact, many of the issues briefed before

the Court of Military Appeals were raised before us in our

prior review of this case and resolved by our previous decision.

Because appellant did submit several of these alleged errors

during our prior review, we decline to consider these

previously resolved assertions as newly-raised issues. In

setting aside our previous decision, the Court of Military

Appeals cited no error of law. We therefore incorporate, by

reference, our previous decision of 26 August 1992, deciding

our prior review resolves many of the issued raised by

appellant. We confine our discussion in this opinion to the

ineffective assistance of council issues recently briefed and

argued before us.

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

Although we resolved a broad-brush allegation of ineffective

assistance of counsel in our first decision, we will reconsider the

specifics raised by appellant’s assertion. Appellant claims his trial

defense counsel, Major W, never challenged the chain of custody

for handling urine samples, never offered evidence to show the

absence of appellant’s drug abuse, and failed to present available

evidence on good military character.

In his affidavit responding to this complaint, Major W

states he interviewed laboratory personnel to determine if

there was any break in custody or possibility of tampering. He

states that after conducting an extensive investigation he

discovered there was no indication of either tampering or a

break in the chain of custody.

5la

The second area of appellant’s complaint centers on the

failure to call witnesses to raise a reasonable doubt. Trial defense

states he discussed with appellant potential damaging testimony

from a proposed defense expert, Colonel Levisky. Major W also

discusses in great detail the other individuals he interviewed and

the investigation he conducted to explore appellant’s theories on

how his urine sample came to test positive.

The final area of appellant’s complaint concerns the

extensive use of affidavits on good military character and the

failure to call live character witnesses. Major W in his affidavit

states he selected the individuals to call on the issue of good

military character after consulting with his client who agreed

with his analysis. Defense counsel goes into extensive detail in

his affidavit why three potential character witnesses were not

called to testify.

The standard by which effectiveness of counsel is

measured is governed by Strickland v . Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984). Appellant must demonstrate first, that counsel was

deficient, and, second, the claimed deficiency was prejudicial.

Absent either, the claim must fail. 466 U.S. at 697.

We resolve the factual issues against appellant. We believe

the weight of the evidence establishes trial defense counsel did

consult with his client over trial preparation, strategy and made

timely recommendations. Trial defense counsel’s affidavits were

specific and responsive to his preparation and to the

consultations with appellant over trial strategy.

We view trial defense counsel’s decisions not to challenge

the chain of custody, call potential character witnesses, or

present certain evidence as tactical decisions reasonable under

the circumstances then prevailing. United States v. Matthews,

16 M.J. 354, 363-64 (C.M.A. 1983). Applying the Strickland test

to appellant’s arguments, trial defense counsel's affidavits, and

after reviewing the entire record of trial, we are convinced

appellant’s trial defense counsel’s representation was not

deficient and appellant was not deprived of a fair trial.

We hold appellant was not denied the effective assistance

of counsel. |

Sea ale

52a

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Appellant complains he was denied due process of law and

effective assistance of counsel when Captain W swore his

commander to the charges during the preferral process and

then “switched sides” becoming the area defense counsel and

eventually assisting appellant in the preparation of his case.

The affidavits from the trial defense counsel, Major W,

show that appellant was fully aware of Captain W’s prior

involvement as the base chief of military justice and the person

who swore appellant’s commander to the charges. We are

convinced appellant expressly requested the new area defense

counsel, Captain W, who provided assistance to the visiting

circuit defense counsel, Major W. When the military judge

questioned appellant on who represented him, appellant

indicated the circuit defense counsel and not Captain W. Later

in the trial when Captain W was called to testify by the

government on the circumstances of the preferral, Major W

advised the military judge that Captain W had assisted him in

trial preparation and had taken confidences from appellant. (R.

255.) Although there is some confusion as to whether Captain

W was detailed as defense counsel to appellant’s case, it is clear

he did, as the base area defense counsel, consult with and offer

assistance to the defense team. Captain W did not participate

_as a trail defense counsel, but after the trial was completed he

did assist Major W in collecting clemency matters, however,

Major W actually signed and presented appellant’s clemency

package to the convening authority.

Appellant asserts he was never made aware of Captain

W’s potential conflict of interest and the military judge was

never made aware of Captain W’s role in helping the defense.

On both issues the affidavits from counsel and the record of

trial convinces us appellant and the military judge were aware

of his defense participation.

Although appellant would cast a sinister motive for

Captain W assisting Major W, we find appellant knowingly and

intelligently waived any perceived conflict and Captain W’s

assistance to Major W did not prejudice appellant’s

53a

representation. United States v. Smith, 36 M.J. 459 (C.M.A.

1993).

In this case, there was no actual conflict of interest affecting

Captain W’s performance and appellant suffered no prejudice.

REMAINING ISSUES

We have examined the remaining assignments of error

not dispose of by our previous decision and before us for the

first time. Failure to object to an instruction or to omission of

an instruction before the members close to deliberate

constitutes waiver of the objection in the absence of plain

error. R.C.M.920(f). In this case we find waiver and no plain

error.

We also find no merit to appellant’s unsubstantiated

assertion of unlawful command influence. Appellant complains

that Captain W reported to him derogatory remarks about his

case attributed from the convening authority. Captain W in his

affidavit denies hearing or reporting to appellant any

inappropriate comments from the convening authority. During

the trial this issue was never raised by the defense and our

review of the voir dire discloses no mention by any court

member of any prior knowledge of this case or ever hearing

any comments about appellant by the convening authority.

There is insufficient evidence to support the allegation. Mere

assertions are not enough. United States v. Bell, 34 M.J. 937

(A.F.C.M.R. 1992).

The appellant contends he was denied due process and

equal protection since military trial and appellate judges do not

enjoy fixed terms and are selected in violation of the

Appointments Clause. Both of these issues have been resolved

adversely to appellant’s position and they are without merit.

United States v. Graf, 35 M.J. 450 (C.M.A. 1992); United States

v. Weiss, 36 M.J. 224 (C.M.A. 1992), affirmed, __ US. 114

S. Ct. 752, 127 L. Ed. 2d 1, (1994).

The findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, the

sentence is appropriate, and not error prejudicial to the

54a

substantial rights of the appellant was committed. Accordingly,

the findings and sentence are

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge DIXON and Judge PEARSON concur.

55a

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS

UNITED STATES, Appellee

v.

Charles M. HANEY (265-04-8987), Appellant

USCMA Dkt. No. 93-0157/AF

CMR Dkt. No. 29000

ORDER

On consideration of the petition for grant of review of the

decision of the United States Air Force Court of Military

Review, we note that substitute counsel, in his Addendum to

the Supplement to the Petition for Grant of Review dated

April 6, 1993, has for the first time on appeal raised five

additional issues plus an issue alleging inadequacy of

representation on the appellate level since the issues raised

pursuant to United States v. Grostefon, 12 MJ 431 (CMA 1982),

“were neither adequately stated nor briefed” to this Court. In

view of the issues raised by substitute appellate defense

counsel, which matters were not before the Court of Military

Review in its initial consideration of this case, it is by the Court

the 23rd day of June, 1993

ORDERED:

That the decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Military Review is set aside. The record of trial is returned to

the Judge Advocate General of the Air Force for remand to that

court for consideration of the issues raised for the first time

before us. Following these proceedings, Article 67(a), Uniform

Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 867(a) (1989), will apply.

For the Court,

/s/ John A. Cutts, III

Deputy Clerk of the Court

cc: The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel (PARKS)

Appellate Government Counsel (INFELISE)

56a

APPENDIX G

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

MILITARY REVIEW

UNITED STATES

v.

Major CHARLES M. HANEY, JR., 265-04-8987

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

ACM 29000

26 August 1992

Sentence adjudged 19 July 1990 by GCM convened at

Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. Military Judge:

Robert N. Spencer (sitting alone).

Approved sentence: Dismissal, confinement for 8

months, and forfeiture of $750 pay per month for 12

months.

Appellate Counsel for the Appellant: Colonel Jeffrey

R. Owens and Major Ronald G. Morgan.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel

William R. Dugan, Jr., Lieutenant Colonel Brenda J.

Hollis, Major Paul H. Blackwell, Jr., and Major

Morris D. Davis.

Before

O’HAIR, SNYDER, MILLS, and GRUNICK

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

GRUNICK, Judge:

Appellant was convicted of one specification each of use of

marijuana and cocaine, in violation of Article 112a, UCMJ.

Before a panel of officers he was sentenced to a dismissal,

confinement for 8 months, and forfeitures of $750 per month for

12 months. The convening authority approved the findings and

sentence.

57a

Appellant submits ten errors for our review, four of them

being submitted to us pursuant to United States v. Grostefon,

12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982). The facts in this case are relatively

straightforward. On 15 November 1989, appellant was

randomly selected to provide a urine sample for drug testing.

During the test procedures, appellant told the test monitor he

believed his sample would come back positive because of the

prescribed drugs he was taking. The test results for appellant

reported positive for marijuana and cocaine.

In his first assignment of error, appellant attacks the

propriety of the preferral of charges brought against him.

Appellant’s commander testified as a character witness during

findings, and announced that despite his signing the charges

under oath, he did not believe appellant was guilty. The

commander was neither coerced nor forced by anyone to take

the preferral oath or sign appellant’s charges. What was true,

to the accuser’s best knowledge and belief, was the fact there

was a positive urinalysis and he did not equate this with the

appellant’s guilt. When this defective preferral was discovered

during the trial, the military judge did a superb job of

questioning the appellant and his counsel over their desire on

how to proceed. Although the appellant now asserts this was a

jurisdictional defect, we view it as a procedural error that can

be waived by failing to object at trial. We find the appellant

waived this defective preferral and specifically elected to

continue. See United States v. Miller, 31 M.J. 798 (A.F.C.M.R.)

and United States v. Johnson, 72 B.R. 317 (1947) along with the

cases cited therein.

Appellant next complains the military judge erred in

permitting testimony about a previous positive urinalysis

provided over 10 years before the current sample. Had

evidence of a previous positive urinalysis been offered to attack

the appellant’s character for truthfulness or to impeach his

testimony at trial, this issue might have some merit. In this

case, when the sample was being collected, the appellant made

a statement to the test administrator that the current sample

was, “going to come back positive”. As expected, this

generated a dialogue between the appellant and the test

FOGERE AIEN A n De fh m

58a

administrator that included some references by the appellant

to a previous positive test administered against him that was

found to be invalid. No evidence of a previous positive

urinalysis was admitted against appellant. In permitting

testimony from the urinalysis test administrator, the military

judge properly ruled the appellant’s statements were

admissions of a party-opponent, admissible under Mil. R. Evid.

801(d)(2)(A). The limiting instruction properly advised the

court members that there was no evidence of a previous

positive urinalysis or that appellant had ever used a controlled

substance on a previous occasion. We find appellant’s

statements were properly admitted for the limited purpose of

proving his knowledge that he used controlled substances.

Appellant also complains the military judge improperly

denied a pretrial motion and motion at trial to compel the

appearance of two OSI agents from another base that had

recently conducted tests over the integrity of tamper resistant

tape. This issue is similar to the witness determination made

in United States v. Hargove, 33 M.J. 515 (AFCMR 1991). The

military judge properly found the requested witnesses were

not necessary. The defense was able to bring out the evidence

the requested witnesses would have discussed. Upon cross-

examination, SSgt Wallerstedt, the individual responsible for

the collection and chain of custody of appellant’s sample,

testified that removal of the tamper resistant tape, without

detection, was difficult, but not impossible. The appellant was

not denied a fair trial when OSI witnesses were not produced

as requested. See United States v. Jowan, 3 M.J. 136 (C.M.A.

1977); United States v. Daniels, 23 U.S.C.M.A. 94, 96, 48

C.M.R. 655, 657 (1974). -

During cross-examination of appellant, in a duplication of

defense counsel’s direct examination, trial counsel began a

question: “[LJook them in the eyes and tell them ....” This tactic

was a feeble attempt by both counsel to enhance or damage the

appellant’s credibility with eye contact. It is obvious, in context,

that trial counsel’s question was an effort to explore the

appellant’s several theories on how his sample was returned

positive. The military judge properly permitted the question.

59a

A post-trial hearing was conducted on 31 October 1990, to

look into allegations that one or more of the court members

were asleep during appellant’s trial. Appellant alleges the

military judge was in error by requiring appellant’s former

counsel to testify at this hearing on the attentiveness of the

court members. We view this hearing, with the efforts of all

trial participants to reconstruct their observations of court

members during trial, to be similar to the reconstruction of an

incomplete record of trial. Full and complete testimony from

the trial defense counsel did not violate an attorney-client

relationship or create a conflict of interest. The questioned

testimony was limited to the administration of the trial and did

not touch the counsel’s relationship with his client. We find no

error. See United States v. Baca, 27 M.J. 110 (C.M.A. 1988).

The appellant also raises the issue of whether the record of

trial fails to adequately document that the convening authority

considered post-trial defense submissions prior to his taking

action. We are convinced all clemency matters submitted by

appellant were provided to the convening authority, prior to his

taking action on appellant’s case. Although each submission was

not described in the staff judge advocate’s recommendation, the

general nature of the post-trial submissions were described and

the exact number of attachments referenced. The convening

authority was advised that he “must” consider the post-trial

submissions of appellant. We find no need for a new action of the

convening authority in appellant’s case. See United States v.

Craig, 28 M.J. 321 (C.M.A. 1989).

We resolve the remaining four invited assertions of error

adversely to appellant. Having examined the record of trial,

the assignment of errors, and the government’s reply, we have

concluded the complaint of inadequacy of counsel to be devoid

of merit. The allegation of a sleeping court member was

appropriately resolved during the post-trial hearing and we

adopt that determination, finding no error prejudicial to the

substantial rights of the appellant. We also conclude that the

findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and the

sentence is appropriate. Accordingly, the findings of guilty and

sentence are

60a

AFFIRMED.

Senior Judge O’HAIR, and Judge MILLS concur.

Judge SNYDER did not participate.

OFFICIAL

LAURA L. GREEN

Clerk of Court

Air Force Court of Military Review

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Haney v. United States · 531 U.S. 1149 | Frix