Opposition Brief — Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency

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Text

No. 00-746

Jn the Supreme Court of the GnitesStates—

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

»ARI . U

Act N ri

“ i PR

RUDE}

1 ) Ass }

'p rd

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Environmental Protection Agency

has reasonably interpreted the term “reservation” in

Section 301(d)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42

U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B), to include trust lands validly set

apart for the use of an Indian Tribe as well as formally

designated reservations.

2. Whether Section 301(d)(2) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.

7601(d), delegates to eligible Indian Tribes the author-

ity to administer programs for the management of air

resources in all areas within the exterior boundaries of

their reservations, including lands owned in fee by non-

Indians.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arizona vy. EPA, 151 F.3d 1205 (1998), as amended,

NTO F 2d STO (Oths Cir. 1908) nics cccaccsccesscsscsscesssssceccssasseseces

Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292 (1956) .00.0...cccccccccceeee

Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210

(9th Cir. 2000), reh’g en banc granted (Feb. 28, 2001) ....

California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,

chal dcaccknathccesdnsbhaiecsinidntesmaneencacons

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council,

ON, GF CGT CIE) ances ccensesevcsnsncrtsassocnsoneves salaloniel

Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 519

ESE SEE Ae OR

Florida Dep't of Business Regulation v. Department

of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (11th Cir. 1985),

cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011 (1986) .0.........cccccscecsessecessseseeees

McAlpine v. United States, 112 F.3d i429 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 984 (1997) .0...000000 ccc. ae

Montana vy. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) ................

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawa-

tomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991) ........ccccccccceseseseeee

Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac & Fox Nation,

508 U.S. 114 (1993) ........... ieinmuneiinaichaaaieddaiionsote ecbatslbitalinipnind

(IIT)

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

South Dakota v. Department of the Interior, 69

Fe EI Ns I spas icciciicsislaniatiieienscctladsciiananiddnadstnani 13

United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336 (8th Cir.

ITD sceeiistdatistape beeaaiahigiseashitbaisaidaid bighaiimaatehaaninesdaeieensabibthnidiamanie 9

United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) wo. 9

United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) ........... 7, 14,15

United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir.

1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1960 (2000) oo... 13

United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986) oo... eee g

White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S.

I siditeanithesk aia eaiadhceicactinacti lain aaiminamincidachasaubaapaalinsisiebiadsen 17

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq. .........ccccccscsssssssseseseseseees 2

OR CR, FS oo ees 2 {

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Fe Ae NI ha cicitanisebaietinsnieniaccdescinaianisientetn 2,3, 16,17

§§ 160-169B, 42 U.S.C. 7470-7492 ..........ccccccssssscssessssssssesees 2

§§ 162-164, 42 U.S.C. 7472-7474 ou... eccccsssesesseceesseees ASSP 2

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Os ee tas I Sa niiicnias icaticcrencctidaensctssedesnianes 2,12

Fs Hie a a, HID acta itttaccnscndecsiceteeteptemctnicabnisies 4,11, 12

Dy Fs POD eiretniceainpnierpnaccnncnsindnanchebasisenasnianii 11

$ 179(aN(4), 42 U.S.C. T509(a)(4) ............cscesscosecssesecesesesseesees 2

§ 301(d), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d) oo... 3,7, 11, 14, 15, 16

§ 301(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. T601(A)(1) ..........cececesscssessecesecscececeees 3

§ 301(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2) ceesecccsssssen 3, 4,5, 7, 14, 16, 18

§ 301(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B) oe 4,5,12, 14

§ 301(d)(4), 42 U.S.C. T601(A)(4) cccsessssssssssssssssssseseeeeeees 4,11,17

§ SOTA), 4B UBC. TODA) onnncasccccsscnsscsceccscsascsesscseseses 18

SD, Ge ES, FG: cena sass scctonncntnsnnnctanrnssesnciit 17

7 U.S.C. 1985(e)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999)... 9

LF Tk, Sea aNRe cen een aCe ee 9

V

Statutes and regulations—Continued:

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a RE Bs, Fa ictictccnivserastpcehtaacdenaestcndnsi adc dibiidinedacnadiueaitatasaditaiaeh

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WCF Bs FAD scnciliiusncervctisatonaiiouieioaeae

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Miscellaneous:

196 Comage. Bee: SEITE (RIG) esecericesisesitscsicnisinsicservasininmnntenasanni

59 Fed. Reg. (1994):

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S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) .........::cscecee

Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1993) .....

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 00-746

STATE OF MICHIGAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS

v.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENT IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-49a)

is reported at 211 F.3d 1280.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 139a)

was entered on May 5, 2000. A petition for rehearing

was denied on July 12, 2000. Pet. App. 135a-136a. On

September 27, 2000, the Chief Justice extended the

time within which to file a petition for a writ of

certiorari to and including November 9, 2000, and the

petition was filed on that date. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

1. The Clean Air Act (CAA or Act), 42 U.S.C. 7401- -

et seq., establishes an intergovernmental partnership to

regulate air quality throughout the Nation. This case

involves the proper interpretation of amendments to

the Act enacted in 1990 in order to increase the role of

Indian Tribes in that partnership.

a. The CAA gives the States primary responsibility

for ensuring that ambient air meets federally estab-

lished standards. See 42 U.S.C. 7407(a). The States

discharge that responsibility by developing State

Implementation Plans (SIPs) that “provide[] for imple-

mentation, maintenance, and enforcement” of those air

quality standards. 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(1). Once SIPs

have been approved by the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA), they are federally enforceable. 42

U.S.C. 7509(a\(4).

The CAA also establishes several other programs

designed to protect and enhance the quality of the

Nation’s air resources. For example, Part C of Title I

of the CAA creates a program for the “prevention of

significant deterioration” (PSD) of air quality in areas

where the air is cleaner than required by federal stan-

dards. 42 U.S.C. 7470-7492. Areas subject to the PSD

program receive one of three classifications (Class I, II,

or III) that specify the maximum amount of air quality

deterioration allowable in the areas. 42 U.S.C. 7472-

7474. The least deterioration is permitted in Class I

areas. 42 U.S.C. 7473. Section 164(a) of the CAA

authorizes the States to redesignate areas under their

jurisdiction as Class I. 42 U.S.C. 7474(a).

Section 116 of the CAA generally preserves the

authority of the States to regulate air pollution under

their own laws. 42 U.S.C. 7416. Those state regu-

3

lations, however, must be at least as stringent as appli-

cable federal requirements. 42 U.S.C. 7416.

b. In 1990, Congress passed a compendium of

amendments to the CAA, several of which addressed

the role of Indian Tribes under the Act. Most signifi-

cant for this case, the 1990 Amendments added Section

301(d), which grants EPA the “author[ity] to treat

Indian tribes as States” under the Act, 42 U.S.C.

7601(d)(1), subject to the following requirements:

(A) the Indian tribe has a governing body carry-

ing out substantial governmental duties and

powers;

(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian

tribe pertain to the management and protection of

air resources within the extericr houndaries of the

reservation or other areas within the tribe’s juris-

diction; and

(C) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be

capable, in the judgment of the Administrator, of

carrying out the functions to be exercised in a man-

ner consistent with the terms and purposes of [the

CAA\] and all applicable regulations.

42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2).

Section 301(d)(2) directs the EPA to promulgate

regulations “specifying those provisions of this chapter

for which it is appropriate to treat Indian tribes as

States.” 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2). “In any case in which the

[EPA] determines that the treatment of Indian tribes

as identical to States is inappropriate or administra-

tively infeasible, the [EPA] may provide, by regulation,

other means by which the Administrator will directly

administer [the applicable provisions of the Act] so

4

as to achieve the appropriate purpose.” 42 U.S.C.

7601(d)(4).

The 1990 Amendments also revised Section 110 of the

Act, which governs SIPs, to address Tribal Imple-

mentation Plans (TIPs). 42 U.S.C. 7410(0). Tribes are

not required to submit TIPs, but, if a Tribe submits a

plan, the EPA reviews the plan in accordance with the

provisions for review of state plans, except as the EPA

has otherwise provided in the regulations promulgated

under Section 301(d)(2). If the EPA approves a TIP,

“the plan shall become applicable to all areas (except as

expressly provided otherwise in the plan) located with-

in the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwith-

standing the issuance of any patent and including

rights-of-way running through the reservation.” 42

U.S.C. 7410(0).

Finally, the 1990 Amendments left in place Section

164(c), which was enacted in 1977. That Section pro-

vides, in relevant part, that “[lJands within the exterior

boundaries of reservations of federally recognized

Indian tribes may be redesignated [pursuant to the

PSD program} only by the appropriate Indian govern-

ing body.” 42 U.S.C. 7474(c).

2. In 1998, the EPA promulgated the Tribal Author-

ity Rule (TAR), 40 C.F.R. Pt. 49, which implements the

directive in Section 301(d)(2) of the CAA that the EPA

promulgate regulations addressing how Tribes may be

treated as States under the Act. See Pet. App. 50a-

134a. Under the TAR, a Tribe may be treated in the

same manner as a State for all of the core CAA pro-

grams, including the establishment of TIPs and

redesignations under the PSD program. As provided in

Section 301(d)(2)(B), a Tribe may implement a CAA

program only “within the exterior boundaries of the

reservation” or “other areas within the tribe’s juris-

5

diction.” 40 C.F.R. 49.6(c). The EPA determined that

Section 301(d)(2), viewed in the context of the CAA as a

whole, “is a delegation of federal authority, to tribes

approved by EPA to administer CAA programs in the

same manner as states, over all air resources within the

exterior boundaries of a reservation.” Pet. App. 53a-

54a. That grant of authority, the EPA concluded,

embodies “a territorial view of tribal jurisdiction” and

does not “distinguish[{] among various categories of on-

reservation land” but allows eligible Tribes “to address

conduct relating to air quality on all lands, includ-

ing non-Indian-owned fee lands, within the exterior

boundaries of a reservation.” Jd. at 54a. The EPA

reasoned that its interpretation of the scope of tribal

authority is supported by the language and legislative

history of Section 301(d)(2)(B), id. at 54a-62a, and that

a “territorial approach to air quality regulation best

advances rational, sound air quality management” be-

cause of the “high mobility” and “areawide effects” of

air pollutants (59 Fed. Reg. 43,956, 43,959 (1994)).

The EPA also concluded that the term “reservation”

in Section 301(d)(2)(B) includes Pueblos and “trust land

that has been validly set apart for use by a tribe, even

though that land has not been formally designated as

a ‘reservation.’” Pet. App. 66a. In reaching the con-

clusion that the term “reservation” includes trustlands,

the EPA relied on the meaning given to “reservation”

in cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. 1151, the Indian country

statute, because the CAA does not define

the term. Pet. App. 66a-67a (citing Oklahoma Tax

Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498

U.S. 505, 511 (1991)).

Finally, the EPA determined that Section

301(d)(2)(B)’s reference to “other areas within the

tribe’s jurisdiction” authorizes Tribes to implement

6

CAA programs in non-reservation areas over which

they can demonstrate jurisdiction under general

principles of federal Indian law. Pet. App. 70a. The

EPA explained that disputes about a Tribe’s juris-

diction over particular non-reservation areas would be

addressed “on a case-by-case basis in the context of

particular tribal applications.” Jd. at 71a.

3. Petitioners and others sought review of the TAR

in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia Circuit. As relevant to the claims before this

Court, the court of appeals denied the petitions for

review. Pet. App. la-49a.’

The court of appeals first upheld the EPA’s con-

clusion that the CAA delegates authority to eligible

Tribes to regulate air resources on all land within

reservations, including fee land owned by non-Indians.

Pet. App. lla-2la. The court noted that the “EPA sug-

gests, not implausibly,” thet Tribes might have “in-

herent sovereign power” to regulate air pollution on

non-Indian-owned fee lands within reservation bounda-

ries under the principle, recognized in Montana v.

United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981), that Tribes may

exercise authority over non-Indians on fee lands if their

behavior “has some direct effect on * * * the health or

welfare of the tribe.” Pet. App. lla-12a. The court did

not address that question, however, because it upheld

the EPA’s conclusion that the CAA contains a delega-

tion of authority. The court explained that the

“statute’s clear distinction between areas ‘within the

exterior boundaries of the reservation’ and ‘other areas

within the tribe’s jurisdiction’ carries with it the

implication that Congress considered the areas within

! The court of appeals also dismissed other challenges on other

grounds, but petitioners do not renew those claims in this Court.

7

the exterior boundaries of a tribe’s reservation to be

per se within the tribe’s jurisdiction.” Jd. at 13a. The

court noted that this appreach furthers the CAA’s

purpose “to ensure effective enforcement of clean air

standards” by avoiding a “‘checkerboard’ pattern of

regulation within a reservation’s boundaries,” which

would be problematic because of the high mobility and

area-wide effects of air pollutants. Jd. at 13a-14a. The

court also found support for the EPA’s conclusion in the

drafting history of Section 301(d), because the phrase

“within the exterior boundaries of the reservation” was

substituted for the language in the bill as originally

introdueceed—“within the area of the tribal government’s

jurisdiction.” Jd. at 14a-15a. Finally, the court noted

that the EPA’s conclusion is consistent with cases in

which this Court has found congressional delegations of

authority to Tribes over non-Indian lands within reser-

vation boundaries. Jd. at 17a-19a (citing United States

v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975), and Rice v. Rehner, 463

U.S. 713 (1988)).”

The court of appeals also upheld as reasonable the

EPA’s construction of “reservation” to include trust

lands and Pueblos as well as formally designated

reservations. Pet. App. 2la-26a. The court explained

that “the Act nowhere defines ‘reservation.’” Jd. at

2 Judge Ginsburg dissented from this portion of the court’s

opinion. Pet. App. 38a-49a. He concluded that Section 301(d)(2) is

not an express delegation of authority for Indian Tribes to regulate

the conduct of non-Indians on fee land within reservation boun-

daries. /d. at 49a. He further concluded, however, that Section

110(0) is such an express delegation, although the authority it

provides extends only to the promulgation of TIPs and not to other

powers under the CAA. /d. at 42a. He also explained that Tribes

might, under Montana, have inherent authority to exercise those

other powers. /d. at 49a.

8

22a. The court concluded that the interpretation given

the term by the EPA is consistent with its dictionary

definition, its use in various federal statutes, the legis-

lative history, and judicial precedent. Jd. at 23a-25a.

Finally, the court of appeals held that the EPA reason-

ably concluded that Tribes may propose TIPs and make

redesignations under the PSD program with respect to

non-reservation lands over which the Tribes demon-

strate that they possess authority under ordinary

principles of federal Indian law. /d. at 26a-28a.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct and

does not conflict with the decision of any other court of

appeals. This Court’s review is therefore not war-

ranted.

1. a. Contrary to petitioner’s contention (Pet. 14-

21), the court of appeals correctly concluded that the

EPA reasonably interpreted “reservation” to include

trust lands “validly set apart for use by a tribe, even

though that land has not been formally designated as a

‘reservation’” (Pet. App. 66a). See id. at 22a-26a

(applying Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

As the court of appeals explained (Pet. App. 22a-25a),

the CAA does not define “reservation,” and that term is

ambiguous. Although “reservation” is sometimes used

to refer to formally-designated reservations, it is also

frequently used in the broader sense adopted by the

EPA. In still other instances, the term “reservation”

refers to even broader classes of Indian lands. See, e.g.,

25 U.S.C. 3202 (includes lands held by Alaska Native

Corporations under the Alaska Native Claims Settle-

ment Act). As the court further noted, the dictionary

definition of the term and its use in various federal

9

statutes comports with the EPA’s interpretation. See

Pet. App. 23a-24a (citing inter alia Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary 1930 (1993); 7 U.S.C.

1985(e)(1)(A)(ii) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 7 U.S.C. 2012();

25 U.S.C. 1452(d); 25 U.S.C. 1903(10)). Statements in

the Senate Committee report referring to tribal author-

ity to administer and enforce the CAA “in Indian lands”

and in “Indian country” also support EPA’s interpreta-

tion. See S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 79, 80

(1989); 18 U.S.C. 1151 (defining “Indian country” to

include more than just formally designated reserva-

tions). As the court of appeals concluded (Pet. App.

25a), given the ambiguity of the term “reservation,” the

EPA reasonably interpreted that term, as this Court

and the courts of appeals have interpreted it in related

contexts, to include both formal and informal reserva-

tions, the latter including trust lands outside of formal

reservations. See ibid. (citing Oklahoma Tax Comm’n,

498 U.S. at 511; United States v. John, 487 U.S. 634, 649

(1978); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336, 339 (8th

Cir. 1986); United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 822-

823 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906 (1986)).

See also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox Nation,

508 U.S. 114, 123 (1993).

Petitioners err in contending (Pet. 16) that the court

of appeals relied solely on the absence of an express

definition in the Act and the dictionary to determine

the scope of the term “reservation.” As we have de-

scribed, the court of appeals concluded that the EPA

reasonably interpreted the term “reservation” only

after reviewing the use of the term in a variety of other

federal statutes, as well as the text of the Act and the

term’s “ordinary or natural meaning,” Smith v. United

States, 508 U.S. 228, 228 (1993). See Pet. App. 22a-24a.

The court correctly concluded that the varying defini-

10

tions of “reservation” in the U.S. Code “lay to waste

petitioners’ argument” that the term is susceptible of

only one meaning. /d. at 24a. Further, noting the many

statutory provisions in whick Congress has expressly

defined the term “reservation,” the court of appeals

properly reasoned that Congress could have limited the

term as petitioners suggest, but did not do so. /bid.

Petitioners’ argument (Pet. 17) that “reservation”

must be given the meaning that the EPA had pre-

viously given the term under the PSD program is also

off the mark. Petitioners argue that Congress was

presumably aware of the definition used under that

program and implicitly adopted that definition by not

expressly rejecting it. That argument stands Con-

gress’s decision not to define “reservation” on its head.

If Congress had wanted to mandate a particular de-

finition of reservation, it could have done so; instead,

Congress chose to entrust the EPA with that task.

Moreover, to the extent Congress should be presumed

to have been aware of the definition that the EPA had

given “reservation” under the PSD program, Congress

also should be presumed to have been aware of the

broader definition that Congress and the courts had

given the term in a variety of contexts, see pp. 8-9,

supra. There is no reason to assume that Congress by

its silence intended to adopt the narrower definition

rather than the broader one.

Petitioners are also mistaken in asserting (Pet. 17-18)

that the court of appeals’ holding regarding the mean-

ing of “reservation” must be rejected because it is

“tantamount” to a conclusion that Congress gave the

EPA discretion to decide what lands Tribes could re-

designate. Congress, not the EPA, endowed both

States and Tribes with the redesignation power, which

Tribes can exercise for reservations and for other areas

1]

over which they can show jurisdiction. See, e.g., 42

U.S.C. 7474(c), 7601(d). To the extent that petitioners

quarrel with the “authority that the CAA grants to

states and tribes to redesignate clean air areas within

their respective jurisdictions” (Pet. 14-15), their quarrel

is not with the EPA but with Congress.*

Petitioners’ contention that the EPA’s interpretation

of “reservation” has “stripped from the states the

authority they previously possessed to redesignate

[trust] lands” (Pet. 13) is also incorrect. As the court of

appeals recognized (Pet. App. 25a), trust lands are

Indian country, and federal law generally prohibits

States from exercising regulatory authority in Indian

country unless Congress has specifically authorized

such action, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission

Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 216 & n.18 (1987). Thus,

even if Tribes could not redesignate trust lands, States

generally would not have the authority to do so.* See

42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(4) (EPA may directly administer

provisions of the Act for which it determines that

Indian Tribes should not be treated as identical to

° Petitioners’ related assertion (Pet. 15) that the EPA’s inter-

pretation gives “tribal governments unbridled ability to impose

Class I standards affecting vast areas of a sovereign state” is like-

wise misdirected. Air pollution regulation necessarily has extra-

territorial effects. Just as actions by Tribes may affect adjacent

States, actions by States may affect both adjacent tribal lands and

other States. Congress recognized those facts and expressly

provided a process under which the EPA would resolve dis-

putes between Tribes and States over proposed redesignatiens. 42

U.S.C, 7474(e).

4 Indeed, petitioners acknowledge that “the Act has never been

understood as granting to states regulatory authority over sources

within their boundaries that states could not otherwise regulate

under state law.” Pet. 23.

12

States). Moreover, because trust lands ordinarily are

subject to tribal jurisdiction under general principles of

federal Indian law, they would be “other areas within

the tribe’s jurisdiction” under Section 301(d)(2)(B) if

they were not “reservation[s].” Consequently, eligible

Tribes would have authority to administer the Act in

trust lands even if petitioners were correct that trust

lands are not properly considered “reservation{s].’”

Finally, petitioners erroneously argue (Pet. 18-19)

that the court of appeals should not have accorded

Chevron deference to the EPA’s interpretation of

“reservation” because the interpretation raises consti-

tutional problems. That argument is based on peti-

tioners’ mistaken assertion that the Secretary of the

Interior has “unreviewable discretion” to take lands

into trust. As an initial matter, any constitutional pro-

blem that might be raised by the Secretary’s authority

to take land into trust has no bearing on the wholly

separate question whether the EPA has properly

interpreted “reservation” in the CAA. In any event,

there is no constitutional problem, because the Secre-

tary does not have “unreviewable discretion” to take

° Petitioners label as “inexplicable” (Pet. 18 n.13) the court

of appeals’ conclusion that Tribes are authorized by Section

301(d)(2)(B) to administer the Act with respect to lands under

their jurisdiction that are located outside reservation boundaries.

Section 301(d)(2)(B), however, plainly provides that Tribes may be

treated as States with respect to both lands “within the exterior

boundaries of the reservation” and “other areas within the tribe’s

jurisdiction.” 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(2)(B). As the court of appeals

explained (Pet. App. 26a-28a), and petitioners now appear to

acknowledge (Pet. 18 n.13), Section 164(c), 42 U.S.C. 7474(c), does

not provide otherwise. Petitioners’ current argument, which relies

on Section 164(a), 42 U.S.C. 7474(a), is also misplaced, because it

rests on the incorrect premise that States have general authority

over Indian lands.

13

land into trust. The Secretary’s discretion is con-

strained by constitutionally adequate standards. See

United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125, 1136-1137 (10th

Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1960 (2000). And

Interior Department regulations expressly “permit[]

judicial review [of the Secretary’s decision] before

transfer of title to the United States.” 61 Fed. Reg.

18,082 (1996); see 25 C.F.R. 151.12. See also McAlpine

v. United States, 112 F.3d 1429, 1482-1435 (10th Cir.)

(Secretary’s decision to take land into trust is subject to

judicial review under the Administrative Procedure

Act (APA) because the standards set out in 25 C.F.R.

151.10 provide adequate law to apply), cert. denied, 522

U.S. 984 (1997)."

b. Petitioners also err in contending (Pet. 21-22) that

the holding of the court of appeals conflicts with the

6 Petitioners rely (Pet. 16) on South Dakota v. Department of

the Interior, 69 F.3d 878 (8th Cir. 1995), which held Section 5 of the

Indian Reorganization Act unconstitutional under the nondelega-

tion doctrine. That decision, however, was vacated by this Court

and remanded to the Secretary in light of the regulations cited in

the text following this note. See Department of the Interior v.

South Dakota, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).

7 In Florida Department of Business Regulation v. Depart-

ment of the Interior, 768 F.2d 1248 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.

1011 (1986), the Eleventh Circuit held that the Secretary’s decision

to take land into trust was not reviewable under the APA, but that

decision predates the current regulatory scheme, which (as we

have explained above) provides additional standards to guide the

Secretary’s discretion and expressly notes that there is judicial

review of the Secretary’s decision. The regulatory framework is

currently in the process of further refinement: The Department of

the Interior has issued a proposed rule to revise 25 C.F.R. Part 151

to clarify further the process and standards that the Secretary

applies in implementing her authority to accept title to land in

trust. See 64 Fed. Reg. 17,574 (1999).

14

decision of the Ninth Circuit in Arizona v. EPA, 151

F.3d 1205 (1998), as amended, 170 F.3d 870 (1999). The

Arizona case did not address either the validity of the

TAR or the proper interpretation of Section 301(d).

Nor did the court of appeals in Arizona hold that

tribal trust lands could not constitute “reservation(s]”

under the CAA. The court held only that there

was insufficient evidence in the record to determine

whether certain parcels of land had been “declared to

be reservations by Act of Congress or that these par-

cels ha{d] been added to the Middle Verde reservation

by proclamation of the Secretary of the Interior pur-

suant to the Indian Reorganization Act.” 151 F.3d at

1210-1211. The court said nothing about whether those

parcels might otherwise be reservations and, indeed,

“remand[ed] to EPA, without prejudice to the parties,

to determine whether the parcels are reservations for

purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c).” 170 F.3d at 870.

2. a. Contrary to petitioners’ further contention

(Pet. 22-26), the court of appeals correctly determined

that Section 301(d)(2) delegates authority to eligible

Tribes to administer the CAA on fee lands within reser-

vation boundaries.

This Court has made clear that Congress may, by

statute, delegate federal authority to a Tribe. Mazurie,

419 U.S. at 554. The first clause of the second sentence

of Section 301(d)(2) (which authorizes the EPA to treat

eligible Tribes as States), together with Section

301(d)(2)(B) (which establishes Tribai authority over air

resources on all lands within the exterior boundaries of

a reservation), make clear the meaning of Section

301(d)(2): The EPA is authorized to treat an otherwise

eligible Indian Tribe as a State for programs governing

any air resources within the exterior boundaries of a

reservation, without the need for further inquiry by

15

EPA into the Tribe’s inherent authority over those re-

sources. See 42 U.S.C. 7601(d). As the court of appeals

explained (Pet. App. 13a), the “statute’s clear distinc-

tion between areas ‘within the exterior boundaries of

the reservation’ and ‘other areas within the tribe’s

jurisdiction’ carries with it the implication that Con-

gress considered the areas within the exterior boun-

daries of a tribe’s reservation to be per se within the

tribe’s jurisdiction.”

As the court of appeals also noted (Pet. App. 13a-

14a), this interpretation furthers the CAA’s purpose “to

ensure effective enforcement of clean air standards” by

avoiding a “‘checkerboard’ pattern of regulation within

a reservation’s boundaries,” which would be proble-

matic because of the high mobility and area-wide effects

of air pollutants. See also 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959. The

court of appeals’ conclusion is further supported by the

drafting history of Section 301(d), because the phrase

“within the exterior boundaries of the reservation” was

substituted for the language in the bill as originally

introduced—“within the area of the tribal government’s

jurisdiction.” See Pet. App. 14a-15a.

In reaching its conclusion, the court of appeals cor-

rectly relied on this Court’s decisions in Mazurie, 419

U.S. at 556-557, and Rehner, 463 U.S. at 728-729, in

which this Court “found an express delegation despite

the absence of any ‘we hereby delegate’ language in the

statute.” Pet. App. 18a. In Mazurie and Rehner, this

Court “did not find any precise language of delegation

in the disputed statute, but, rather, rested on the impli-

cation inherent in recognizing the power of tribes to

adopt an ordinance pertinent to liquor transactions on

Indian country.” Jbid. Similarly, in reliance on those

cases, the court of appeals here properly found in the

CAA “an express congressivnal delegation from the

16

implication inherent in the distinction between areas

‘within the exterior boundaries of the reservation’ and

‘other areas within the tribe’s jurisdiction.’” Jbid. The

contrary reading advanced by petitioners would render

this careful formulation superfluous. Had Congress

intended that Tribes have jurisdiction only where they

could demonstrate inherent jurisdiction, Congress could

easily have so provided, without resort to the more

complex either/or formulation employed in Section

301(d). Indeed, as we have noted, that formulation was

substituted for one based on “the tribal government’s

jurisdiction” that was in an earlier version of the bill.

Petitioners incorrectly contend (Pet. 22-23, 26) that

CAA Section 116, 42 U.S.C. 7416, precludes Section

301(d)(2) from constituting a delegation to eligible

Tribes of authority over fee lands within reservation

boundaries.* Section 116 preserves the ability of States

to adopt and enforce under state law air pollution

standards that are more stringent than those required

under the CAA. Section 116 thus serves the dual

purpose of preserving state police power to protect

public health and welfare and ensuring that state

exercise of that power is consistent with otherwise

8 42 U.S.C. 7416 provides, in relevant part, that “nothing

in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State

* * * to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting

emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement respecting

control or abatement of air pollution; except that if an emission

standard or limitation is in effect under an applicable imple-

mentation plan or under section 7411 or section 7412 of this title,

such State * * * may not adopt or enforce any emission standard

or limitation which is less stringent than the standard or limitation

under such plan or section.”

17

applicable federal law.’ Section 116, however, does not

grant States authority to regulate air pollution activity

in Indian country, which includes fee lands within re-

servation boundaries.

Section 116 is silent on the question of geographical

jurisdiction. Thus, Section 116 assumes and is subject

to the same geographic jurisdictional limitations on

state authority that apply to other provisions of the

Act. Nothing in the Act gives States authority over

lands within Indian country. And, as we have ex-

plained, absent delegation by Congress, States do not

generally have comprehensive authority over such

lands. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 207, 216 n.18; White

Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980);

p. 11, supra. In situations in which a Tribe does not

have EPA approval to implement the Act, the

KPA—not the State—generally implements the CAA

in Indian country. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 7601(d)(4).”

b. Finally, petitioners argue (Pet. 24) that the Ninth

Circuit has, in their view, “embraced an approach” to

delegation questions that “conflicts with the approach”

taken by the court of appeals in this case. Petitioners

assert (Pet. 25) that, if the Ninth Circuit were faced

9 See 136 Cong. Rec. 36,077 (1990) (“Consistent with the

general provisions of section 116 of the Clean Air Act, the con-

ferees understand that a State may establish additional more

stringent permitting requirements, but a State may not establish

permit requirements that are inconsistent with the national per-

mitting requirements of this act, including this title.”) (discussing

Section 506(a), an analogous provision within the Title V operating

permit program added by the 1990 Amendments).

10 We recognize that, in some situations, States may exercise

regulatory authority in Indian country under state law. If a State

has such authority, Section 116 preserves the State’s ability to

implement more stringent air pollution controls.

18

with the question whether Section 301(d)(2) constitutes

a delegation to Tribes, the Ninth Circuit “would dis-

agree” with the conclusion by the D.C. Circuit that it

does.

The Ninth Circuit, however, has granted rehearing

en banc in the case on which petitioners rely, Bugenig

v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210 (2000), rehearing

en banc granted (Feb. 28, 2001). In any event, that

case concerns the question whether the Hoopa-Yurok

Settlement Act of 1988 granted the Hoopa Valley Tribe

authority over a particular parcel of reservation land

that was owned in fee by a non-Indian. The question

whether CAA Section 301(d)(2) constitutes a delegation

to Tribes is not before the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, as

petitioners themselves point out (Pet. 12 n.9), the

Section 301(d)(2) question could not come before the

Ninth Circuit. See 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1). Thus, there is

no present conflict of decisions, and the Ninth Circuit’s

resolution of Bugenig, whatever its result, will not

create a conflict that warrants this Court’s review. See

Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1956) (Court |

“reviews judgments, not statements in opinions”).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD

Acting Solicitor General

JOHN CRUDEN

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

CYNTHIA A. DREW

Attorney

MARCH 2001

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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