Opposition Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency
Supreme Court brief2001
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Nos. 00-445, 00-632, and 04-633 JAN 4 2001
IN THE | CLERK
Supreme Court of the Anited States
APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petitions for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ONTARIO
(PROVINCE OF ONTARIO, CANADA)
IN OPPOSITION
BRUCE J. TERRIS
KATHLEEN L. MILLIAN *
KEVIN O. LESKE
TERRIS, PRAVLIK &
MILLIAN, LLP
1121 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-2100
Counsel for Respondent
* Counsel of Record
TROT AACR ATEN | PAERERIRR IRATE ESPEN NCS PR SRM
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
i
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded
that the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
acted reasonably and in accordance with Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(1) of the Clean Air Act when it |
relied on its general rulemaking authority to
consider cost-effectiveness in ascertaining the |
amount of emissions from upwind states which
"contribute significantly" to non-attainment of
ozone pollution standards in downwind states.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES ....... iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......-seeeeeeeces 1
1. NOx EMISSIONS FROM THE UNITED
STATES CAUSE INCREASED GROUND-
LEVEL OZONE IN ONTARIO ............ 1
2. GROUND-LEVEL OZONE HARMS
HUMAN HEALTH AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT IN ONTARIO ........cccecececece 3
3. ONTARIO HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL
EFFORTS TO CONTROL ITS OWN
NOx EMISSIONS ........ccccecccceceees 5
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ......... 8
THE PETITIONS SHOULD BE DENIED
BECAUSE THERE IS NO CONFLICT
BETWEEN THE DECISION BELOW
AND ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT
OR ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS
ET a cée agen es ca beaeeseedeeses Linaaen ee 8
a onilict
w . isio i
EE cc oki dace eussereesenenés 9
b. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict
with Prior Decisi f the District of
n in vy.
iV
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE
American Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v. EPA,
17S F.34.1027 (DC, Cle I9O9) scnticivctinie deities 12
Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC,
GGT ULE B57 CAFS ssctctsncentinciessnisestsssstmneoepibioata 17, 19
Trastes-v. PRIDE, 423 TB. GO CUGTIS) scnsnicccsstvissithanmsatasesins 18
Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA,
647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) .................. 12, 13, 14, 15
Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) ........... 9,10, 11
STATUTES
UE ee ics sensipinabieniichtadibetdtdanidaatniabdanacaaaaaiaan ie
GUD PED sittietcstdocaknenieaine 12
GS UIA. FD einsns<iiisnsnisosnsintibibivendilesinibatiaeiicaniawaniaies passim
RULES AND REGULATIONS
G2 Fed. Rom. GOES Caw: F, VOGT) icssncssosssssssviscasverssaneanes 11
G3 FOd. Ham, 37.350 CO, 275 UG IOD scctcnicrnssccssetantaves passim
l
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Province of Ontario will adopt the Statement of the
Case in the Brief in Opposition filed by Respondent EPA. In
addition, Ontario presents the following suppiementary facts.
I. NOx EMISSIONS FROM THE UNITED STATES
CAUSE INCREASED GROUND-LEVEL OZONE IN
ONTARIO
The NOx SIP Call Rule upheld by the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit in this case (63 Fed. Reg.
57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998)) will have the effect of reducing
nitrogen oxide ("NOx") emissions and ground-level ozone
transported within the United States and, because of prevailing
winds, also transported to the United States’ neighbor, the
Province of Ontario, Canada.
Ontario has the largest population of any of the
Canadian provinces, and the majority of the Ontario population
is concentrated in the southern part of the Province, in the Great
Lakes region. This region receives the most transported NOx
and ozone from the United States.
Ontario and the states subject to the NOx SIP Call share
a common airshed. The airshed observes no state or
international boundaries. The United States contributes
91 percent of the NOx emissions to our common airshed, while
Canadian sources contribute only 9 percent. J.A. 2615.
A significant portion of ground-level ozone in Ontario
originates from emissions from the United States. The Ozone
Transport Assessment Group ("OTAG"), which was composed
of the 37 easternmost states, and industry and environmental
stakeholders, modeled the transport of air pollution in North
2
America. OTAG’s modeling shows that weather and wind
patterns in the ozone season result in NOx emissions and ozone
formed in the United States being transported to Ontario. J.A.
2620. In fact, 50 percent or more of Ontario’s ozone problem
originates in the United States. J.A. 3563.
The only locations in Ontario at which ground-level
ozone consistently exceeds the 120 parts per billion level (ppb)
(which is the United States one-hour ozone national ambient air
quality standard ("NAAQS")), are sites in the southern part of
the Province along the Great Lakes.” J.A. 2621. These high
ozone levels are caused by transport of ozone and its precursors
from the United States across Lake Erie and Lake Huron. Jbid.
Morever, modeling conducted by the State of Michigan shows
that the Toronto/London corridor in Ontario receives
significant contributions of ozone and ozone precursors from
southeastern Michigan. J.A. 2672.
Ozone problems in Ontario cannot be solved without
major reductions in NOx emissions from the United States.
Studies by Ontario scientists have shown that NOx and volatile
organic compound emissions originating in the United States
can, by themselves, cause Ontario's ambient air quality
criterion for ozone to be exceeded. Brief of Intervenor
Respondent Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario
(Province of Ontario, Canada), August 27, 1999, D.C. Cir.,
Nos. 98-1497, ef al., Attachment 1, p. 5. Thus, even if all of
Ontario’s industries and utilities were not operating and no
automobiles were being driven in Ontario, ground level ozone
problems in Ontario would still exist because of transboundary
pollution from the United States.
‘We note that Ontario’s own ground-level ozone standard is more stringent
at 80 ppb. J.A. 2672.
3
2. GROUND-LEVEL OZONE HARMS HUMAN
HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN ONTARIO
NOx emissions harm human health and cause
environmental damage. NOx emissions and volatile organic
compounds react in the presence of sunlight to form ground-
level ozone. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,359. There does not appear to
be a "threshold level" for ground-level ozone below which no
health effects are observed. J.A. 3566.
The Ontario Medical Association summarized recent
research findings concerning the health effects of ground-level
ozone as follows (J.A. 3565):
In a review of available evidence for the
Canadian Smog Advisory Program, two expert
panels concluded that health and health-care
system effects of ground-level ozone at levels
that occur in Canada include lung
inflammation, decreased lung function, airway
hyper-reactivity, respiratory symptoms,
possible increased medication use and
physician/emergency room visits among
individuals with heart or lung disease, reduced
exercise capacity, increased hospital admissions
and possible increased mortality. [footnote
omitted]
Elevated levels of ground-level ozone, which occur on
hot, humid days, are a major ingredient of smog. Ozone in
smog has been shown to cause airway inflammation in both
healthy individuals, and those who suffer from respiratory
ailments such as asthma. J.A. 3553, 3568. Studies have shown
that even healthy outdoor workers have a measurable decrease
4
in lung function when exposed to low levels of ozone. J.A.
3566. In those who suffer from asthma, elevated ozone levels
cause increased frequency of asthma attacks, emergency room
visits, and hospital admissions. J.A. 3568. A study in Toronto,
Ontario, showed that increased ozone levels were associated
with increased mortality due to respiratory disease in those who
suffer from cardio-respiratory illness. J.A. 3569.
Two independent studies in Ontario show that there is
a correlation between elevated ozone levels and hospital
admissions for acute respiratory disease. J.A. 3574. Asthma
hospital admissions for children on the day after Ontario’s
ozone levels had exceeded the 80 ppb standard were
consistently higher than such admissions on other summer
days. /bid.
Children are particularly at risk from ground-level
ozone and are, in fact, the largest group sensitive to ozone air
pollution. Children tend to be active outdoors in the summer
when ground-level ozone levels are highest. J.A. 3570. The
breathing pattern of children is different from that of adults,
causing them to inhale and retain greater quantities per unit
body weight than adults. Jbid Studies, including those
conducted in Ontario, show a measurable decrease in lung
function of healthy children exposed to ozone. J.A. 3570-3571.
"Ozone makes asthmatics more responsive to an allergen." J.A.
3571. Further, a six-year study in Ontario found that 15
percent of summer respiratory hospital admissions for infants
were pollutant-associated. J.A. 3574.
Ground-level ozone also damages the environment.
EPA has found that ground-level ozone causes "significant
agricultural crop yield losses" and visible damage to the foliage
of many crops, trees, and ornamental plants. 63 Fed. Reg. at
5
57,359. Current ambient ground-level ozone levels are causing
harm to forests and ecosystems. Ibid.
b ONTARIO HAS MADE SUBSTANTIAL EFFORTS
TO CONTROL ITS OWN NOx EMISSIONS
Ontario’s air quality standard for ozone is 80 ppb (one-
hour average) (J.A. 2672), which is more stringent than the
United States’ one-hour ozone standard of 120 ppb. In a June
2000 agreement among the federal, provincial, and territorial
governments of Canada, Ontario agreed to a Canada-Wide
Standard of 65 ppb (eight-hour average) air quality standard for
ozone to be achieved by 2010.7
Ontario’s emissions of NOx for 1998, the most recent
year for which data are available, were less than 1990 levels by
17.4 percent.*
)
Ontario has also set 2 goal to reduce projected
emissions of NOx by 25 percent from 1990 levels by 2005.“
As just stated, by 1998, Ontario had already achieved a 17.4
percent reduction in NOx emissions from 1990 levels. By
comparison, Ontario scientists expect the NOx SIP Call Rule
to reduce NOx emissions in the covered states by
approximately 25 percent on average from 1990 levels by 2007.
See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,450.% Ontario has further pledged to
achieve a 45 percent reduction in NOx emissions from 1990
levels by 2015.
2/See http://www.ec.gc.ca/special/aqa_2000_e.pdf.
*/See http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/factnoxvoc.htm.
“’/See http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/00600MB.html.
*/See http://www.ec.gc.ca/special/aqa_2000 e.pdf.
_
6
Under the NOx SIP Call Rule, the states are free to
choose their own methods of meeting the requirements of the
Rule. See 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,358-57,359. Ontario understands
that most NOx emissions reductions in the midwestern states
will come from the electrical generating sector.” The average
rate of NOx emissions per megawatt hour ("MWH") of
electricity produced in 1996 was 2.6 pounds for the
northeastern states and 6.6 pounds for the midwestern states.
J.A. 2650. Since the record closed below, NOx emissions data
for 1998 have become available. The 1998 data show that
Ontario’s electricity sector emits less than one (1) pound of
NOx per megawatt hour of electricity produced” In 1998,
Ontario emitted less NOx per megawatt hour of electricity
produced than the States of Michigan (3.85 Ibs./MWH), Ohio
(4.71 Ibs..MWH), Indiana (5.46 Ibs./MWH), Illinois (3.43
lbs./MWH), and even New York (1.67 Ibs./MWH). In 1998,
Ontario emitted less than a pound (0.96 Ibs.) of NOx per
megawatt hour of electricity produced. /hid.
Ontario’s total NOx emissions from electrical |
generation in 1998 were also significantly less than emissions
from the electricity sector in each of the five states just
mentioned. In comparison to Ohio, Ontario’s NOx emissions |
are less by a factor of 5.7; in comparison to Michigan,
Ontario’s emissions are less by a factor of 3.2; in comparison
to Indiana, Ontario’s emissions are less by a factor of 5.2; in
comparison to Illinois, Ontario’s emissions are less by a factor
“We note that petitioners Appalachian Power Company, ef al., are
comprised almost exclusively of electrical power companies. See Petition
for a Writ of Certiorari, October Term 2000, No. 00-445, "Disclosure
Statement,” pp. x-xiii.
See data summarized at http://www.ene.gov.on.ca.envision/new Vv
3charts2.pdf. The website reports emissions in kilograms. One kilogram
is approximately 2.2 pounds.
i ct i i RN
7
of 3.9; and in comparison to New York, Ontario’s emissions
are less by a factor of 1.4. Jbid.
Thus, the most recent data available show that Ontario’s
NOx emissions are less than emissions from each of the five
States discussed above per megawatt hour of electricity
produced and less than the identified states on an absolute
basis. Nonetheless, Ontario has also committed to adopt the
EPA standards for fossil-fueled electricity generating plants
when they are implemented, if their adoption will result in
lower emissions in Ontario.”
Since 50 percent of Ontario’s ozone originates in the
United States, controls on NOx emissions from the midwestern
states are critical in order for Ontario to improve its air quality
with respect to smog. Thus, Ontario strongly supports EPA’s
NOx SIP Call Rule, which will result in reduced NOx
emissions being transported as NOx and ozone to Ontario, as
part of an overall program to reduce ground-level ozone and
smog in Ontario.
The control of air pollution emissions in an airshed
which extends beyond state and international boundaries poses
extremely complex regulatory issues. Ontario had observer
status with OTAG, and scientists with Ontario’s Ministry of the
Environment have analyzed the technical basis of EPA’s NOx
SIP Call Rule, which was based closely on the work of OTAG.
Ontario’s scientists have concluded that the Rule is the result
of comprehensive scientific analysis of an extremely complex
air pollution problem and that it reflects sound policy choices.
Ontario submits that the NOx SIP Call Rule will lead to cleaner
air in both the United States and Ontario, Canada, and should
be allowed to take effect.
"See http://www.ene.gov.on.ca/envision/news/01400mb.html.
8
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
THE PETITIONS SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE
THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION
BELOW AND ANY DECISION OF THIS COURT OR
ANY OTHER COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
Section 109 of the Clean Air Act requires the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") to set National Ambient Air Quality Standards
("NAAQS") for air pollutants in order to protect human health
and welfare. 42 U.S.C. 7409. Section 110(a) of the Act
provides that, after EPA promulgates these NAAQS, each state
is required to prepare a State Implementation Plan ("SIP")
which implements the NAAQS. 42 U.S.C. 7410(a). The SIP
is reviewed by EPA under Section 110. 42 U.S.C. 7410.
Section 110(a)(2) of the Act sets forth criteria that a SIP must
satisfy and provides that, if these criteria are met, EPA must
approve the proposed plan. 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2).
Section 110(k)(5) of the Act provides that, once EPA
determines that the "implementation plan for any area is
substantially inadequate to attain or maintain the relevant
national ambient air quality standard, to mitigate adequately the
interstate pollutant transport * * * or to otherwise comply with
any requirement of this chapter * * *," EPA must issue a rule
("SIP Call") that orders the state to revise and correct its SIP as
necessary. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k)(5). Section 307(d) of the Act
requires EPA, in issuing a SIP Call under Section | 10(k)(5) of
the Act, to adhere to its rulemaking procedures, including a
formal notice and comment procedure. Section 307(d), 42
U.S.C. 7607(d).
T . . . ¢@ . io
In Union Electric v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1976), in
considering the requirements for SIP’s under Section 1 10(a)(2)
of the Clean Air Act, this Court held:
After surveying the relevant provisions of the
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 and their
legislative history, we agree that Congress
intended claims of economic and technological
infeasibility to be wholly foreign to the
Administrator’s consideration of a_ state
implementation plan.
The court of appeals concluded in this case that "[i]n sum, there
is nothing in the text, structure, or history of Section
110(a)(2)(D) that bars EPA from considering cost in its
application." 213 F.3d at 679. Petitioners Michigan, Alabama,
West Virginia, South Carolina, and Virginia (hereafter
"Michigan") argue that the decision below conflicts with Union
Electric because, "in the absence of congressional intent,
economic and technological infeasibility shall not be
considered by the EPA under section 110(a)(2)." Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari, Oct. Term 2000, No. 00-632 (hereafter
"Mich. Pet."), p. 14.2
*/Michigan is the only petitioner who argues that EPA should be precluded
from using cost in Section 1 10(a)(2). See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
Oct. Term 2000, No. 00-633 of the States of Ohio and indiana (hereafter
"Ohio Pet."), p. 15 ("we argue that considerations of cost-effectiveness
should be a secondary factor to * * * air-quality factors under Section
110"); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Oct. Term 2000, No. 00-445 of the
Appalachian Power Company, ef a/., p. 12 ("Industry Petitioners do not
question that cost is to play a key role in the implementation of the CAA in
general and the implementation of the interstate pollutant transport
10
There is no conflict between Union Electric and the
decision below.’ Michigan incorrectly concludes that "if the
EPA was barred from reading cost considerations into the
original section 110(a)(2)(E) when approving SIP’s, it also
must be barred from injecting cost considerations into today’s
section 110(a)(2)(D)." Mich. Pet. 16. Michigan attempts to
extend broadly the Union Electric holding to cover any EPA
action that relates to Section 110(a)(2) in an attempt to
establish a conflict. Michigan’s attempt to extend the Court’s
holding is unpersuasive because both the function that EPA is
performing and the issues that are involved in this case are
completely different from those in Union Electric.
In Union Electric, this Court was called upon to
examine EPA’s approval of a SIP under Section 110(a)(2) of
the Act. The Court examined Section 110(a)(2) to decide
"whether the operator of a regulated emission source, in a
petition for review of an EPA-approved state plan filed after the
original 30-day appeal period, can raise the claim that it is
economically or technologically infeasible to comply with the
plan." 427 U.S. at 249. The Court concluded, based on the
"relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1970
and their legislative history," that EPA could not consider
claims of economic or technological infeasibility when it
reviewed a plan. 427 U.S. at 256. Thus, Union Electric
addressed only whether a state’s SIP met the criteria of Section
110(a)(2).
The present case involves EPA rulemaking under
Section 110(k)(5) of the Act, rather than EPA’s consideration
of a SIP under Section 110(a)(2). Consistent with its
provisions in particular").
“Significantly, Michigan did not even rely on Union Electric in its opening
or reply briefs in the court of appeals.
1]
rulemaking authority, EPA first issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking that found that emissions from 22 states and the
District of Columbia "significantly contribute" to downwind air
pollution problems. 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318 (Nov. 7, 1997). EPA
required these states to revise their SIP’s to "contain adequate
provisions" to prevent the emission of pollutants that contribute
significantly to the noncompliance of NAAQS’ in other states.
Ibid. The rule proposed that each state was required to
eliminate the NOx emission that could be reduced by highly
cost-effective measures. /bid. After an extensive notice and
comment period, including the issuance of revised and
supplemental public notices, EPA issued the finai rule on
October 27, 1998. 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,356. As the court of
appeals noted, "the fundamental dispute [in this case] is over
the clarity of the phrase ‘contribute significantly’" in Section
110(a)(2)(D) and how it was defined by EPA in its final rule.
213 F.3d at 679.
Michigan’s challenge is not affected by the Union
Electric holding that EPA cannot consider claims of economic
and technological infeasibility when it reviews SIP’s. The
approval or rejection of SIP’s involves an entirely different
function and is performed under an entirely different statutory
provision than the issuance of a SIP call, such as is involved in
this case.
Morever, while EPA considered cost in promulgating
the NOx SIP Call Rule, it did not consider any claim of
"technological or economic infeasibility." To the contrary, the
types of emission control relied upon by EPA in making its
determinations in the rule-making were economically and
technically feasible. In fact, EPA found them to be “highly
cost-effective." 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,377. Thus, the cost issues
in the two cases are entirely different.
12
b. The Decision Below Does Not Conflict wit
Prior Decisions of the District of Columbia
Circuit
Michigan further asserts that the decision of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit conflicts with
its prior decision in Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d
1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980), and its recent decision in American
Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Mich. Pet. 19. However, both of those cases involved Section
109 of the Act, not Section 110, which is the section at issue
here. The Clean Air Act is a highly complex statute. The fact
that in analyzing the statute, the court of appeals concluded that
costs may not be considered in setting NAAQS under Section
109, but may be considered in implementing Section 110,
creates no conflict among decisions of the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit.
In Lead Industries and American Trucking, which were
decided nearly 20 years apart, the court of appeals concluded,
based on the plain language of the "statute and its legislative
history[,] * * * [that] economic considerations play no part in
the promulgation of ambient air quality standards under Section
109." Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, supra, 647 F.2d at 1148;
accord American Trucking Ass'ns Inc. v. EPA, supra, 175 F.3d
at 1040 ("As this court long ago made clear, in setting NAAQS
under §109(b) of the Clean Air Act, the EPA is not permitted
to consider the cost of implementing those standards" (citing
Lead Industries and other cases)).
Section 109(b)(1) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1),
requires EPA to set national ambient air quality standards
“which{[,] in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such
criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite
13
to protect the public health." That statutory provision is not at
issue in this case. Therefore, the court of appeals’ conclusions
that the statutory language of Section 109, along with its
legislative history (Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, supra, 647
F.2d at 1149-1150), preclude EPA from considering costs in
setting NAAQS, is irrelevant to the statutory interpretation of
Section 110 of the Act, which is at issue here. Michigan can
point to no statutory language or legislative history which
would prohibit EPA from considering costs under Section
110(a)(2)(D)(i)(1) of the Act.
In attempting to show a conflict between the decision
here and Lead Industries, Michigan asserts that, in Lead
Industries, the court "reviewed Section 110" and stated that, "if
Congress had wanted the economics of pollution control
considered[,] it would have so provided in Section 110." Mich.
Pet. 20, citing Lead Industries, 647 F.2d at 1149, n. 37.
However, this statement in a footnote does not show any
conflict between Lead Industries and the decision here.
First, the footnote is dictum. Section 110 of the Clean
Air Act was not under consideration by the Court in Lead
Industries.
Second, even if the footnote were not dictum, taken in
context, it does not conflict with the decision below. In
relevant part, the footnote states (647 F.2d at 1149, n. 37):
Similarly, § 110, 42 U.S.C. 7410, provides that
once ambient air quality standards have been
promulgated, each state must prepare and
submit an implementation plan outlining the
measures to be taken to ensure that the
standards are met. It is these state
14
implementation plans which actually impose
pollution control requirements and,
consequently, if Congress had wanted the
economics of pollution control considered it
would have so provided in § 110. While states
id | technolosical
feasibility j lecting {1 af
levi ' ' ty inact hi
nterf itl
leadii ; x lard
Section 110(aX(2), 42 U.S.C. 7410(a)(2).
[emphasis added]
Michigan’s citation of the footnote from Lead Industries omits
the last sentence, which is emphasized above. This sentence is
obviously critical. The court of appeals explicitly stated that
under Section 110, “states may consider economic and
technological feasibility in selecting the mix of control devices
* * * only insofar as this does not interfere with meeting the
strict deadlines for attainment of the standards." 647 F.2d at
1149, n. 37.
In this case, the strict deadlines for attainment of the
NAAQS requirement for ozone have not been met. 63 Fed.
Reg. at 57,446-57,447 (1998). EPA issued the NOx SIP Call
Rule because the states had failed in their existing SIP’s to
control adequately NOx emissions which prevent attainment of
the ozone NAAQS in downwind states. Thus, the very purpose
of the NOx SIP Call Rule is to ensure compliance with the
ozone NAAQS. Here, EPA’s use of cost considerations was
not in setting ambient air quality standards, but in determining
how the standards will be implemented.
15
There is nothing in Lead Industries to support
Michigan’s view that, after EPA has identified the states whose
NOx emissions are harming other states, EPA may not use cost
considerations in setting the level of controls to be applied.
EPA has concluded that applying the level of controls called
for in the NOx SIP Call Rule will have an “appreciable impact"
on downwind nonattainment, and that the required reductions
in NOx emissions are not "more than is necessary to ameliorate
downwind nonattainment." 63 Fed. Reg. 57, 403, 57,446-
57,447 (1998). EPA’s actions under Section 110 in this case
are therefore consistent with the dictum in Lead Industries.
Michigan makes no claim that the American Trucking
case even discusses Section 110 of the Clean Air Act. Mich.
Pet. 19-21. Instead, Michigan alleges that a conflict exists
because the court of appeals held that EPA may not consider
costs in setting standards to protect public health and welfare
under Section 109(d) of the Act in American Trucking, but that
it may consider costs in the context of Section 110 in this case.
Mich. Pet. 19-20. However, as we have seen, in Lead
Industries, supra, 647 F.2d at 1149-1150, which has been
consistently followed in the District of Columbia Circuit, the
court of appeals based its conclusion that costs may not be
considered in setting NAAQS under Section 109 on the
statute's plain language and legislative history. Michigan
makes no showing that Section 110’s plain language and
legislative history compel the same result. Therefore, no
conflict exists between this case under Section 110 and Lead
Industries and American Trucking under Section 109.
In any event, a conflict of decisions within a Circuit,
even if it existed, would be no basis for granting a writ of
certiorari. Such conflicts can be corrected by rehearings en
banc within the Circuit. Petitioners, in fact, asked for rehearing
16
en banc, but did not rely on the alleged intra-circuit conflict.
There is certainly no reason for a writ of certiorari to be granted
on this basis.
The Michigan and Ohio petitioners also argue broadly
that EPA intruded on state sovereignty and cooperative
federalism when it issued the NOx budget program in its Final
Rule. Mich. Pet. 22; Ohio Pet. 9.
Michigan and Ohio claim that state sovereignty and
cooperative federalism are offended because the NOx SIP Call
Rule may cause a state, which contributes less to a particular
area’s ozone nonattainment than another state, to have to
reduce more NOx emissions than the state which has
contributed more. Michigan and Ohio use the example that
Indiana contributes less than Pennsylvania to New York City’s
ozone nonattainment. Mich. Pet. 22-23; Ohio Pet. 12-13.
Indiana, whose NOx emitters have not applied the same level
of pollution control devices to their smokestacks as have
Pennsylvania’s emitters, will be able to achieve more highly
cost-effective reductions in NOx emissions than Pennsylvania.
Thus, under the budget set by EPA in the Rule, Indiana will be
required to reduce its NOx emissions more than Pennsylvania.
Michigan and Ohio argue that this effect on Indiana
offends state sovereignty and the system of cooperative
federalism set forth by Congress in the Clean Air Act. Since
Pennsylvania contributes more to New York City’s
nonattainment than does Indiana, Michigan and Ohio argue that
17
Pennsylvania should be required to reduce its emissions more.
Mich. Pet. 24-25; Ohio Pet. 12-13. Michigan bases its
argument on Section 110(k)(5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
7410(k)(5), which requires that once EPA has concluded that
a SIP is inadequate, "the Administrator shall require the State
as necessary to correct such inadequacies." Mich. Pet. 24.
Michigan asserts that EPA’s regulatory choices are "illogical"
because, under the budgets set in the NOx SIP Call Rule with
respect to New York City, Indiana will be controlling more
NOx than is "necessary" and Pennsylvania will be controlling
less NOx than is "necessary." /bid.
Although Michigan and Ohio cast their argument as one
of state sovereignty and cooperative federalism, it is really an
argument concerning the wisdom of EPA’s regulatory
approach. In addressing the complicated problem of interstate
ozone transport, where each state’s NOx emissions have effects
on the attainment of ozone air quality standards in numerous
other states, it was appropriate for EPA to make the
determination of the amount of NOx emissions from a state
which "contribute significantly" and are necessary to be
reduced to correct the inadequacy of the state’s SIP. Under
Chevron USA Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984), the
courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the agency,
but must determine "whether the Administrator’s view that [the
regulatory choice] is appropriate in the context of this particular
program is a reasonable one." The court of appeals properly
concluded here that it had "no basis to upset EPA’s judgment."
213 F.3d at 680.
The well-established law concerning the federal-state
division of responsibilities under the Clean Air Act shows that
EPA has acted fully within that authority in issuing the NOx
SIP Call Rule. In 7rain v. NRDC, 421 U.S. 60, 79 (1975), this
18
Court recognized that EPA is "plainly charged by the Act with
responsibility for setting the national ambient air standards,"
but was "relegated by the Act to a secondary role in the process
of determining and enforcing the specific, source-by-source
emission limitations." The Court further stated that "so long as
the ultimate effect of a State’s choice of limitation is
compliance with the national standards for ambient air, the
State is at liberty to adopt whatever mix of emission limitations
it deems best suited to its particular situation." /bid. This is
exactly what EPA has allowed states to do in the NOx SIP Call
Rule.
EPA made clear that a state could use any emissions
control measure it wanted to achieve the NOx budget
requirement. See Final Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. at 57,368. Under
the budget plan, a state "may choose from a broader menu of
cost-effective, reasonable alternatives" including alternatives
that "may even be more advantageous in light of local
concerns." /d., pp. 57,369-57,370. Furthermore, EPA stated
that the states have "full discretion in selecting the controls, so
that [the states] may choose any set of controls that would
assure achievement of the budget." /d., p. 57, 378. Finally,
each state has the option to adopt an interstate trading program
that allows it to purchase NOx "allowances" from sources that
have elected to over-control, as well as the option, under certain
circumstances, of "banking" allowances from prior years so
that it can meet emissions limits. /d., p. 57,430. Thus, EPA
allowed the states substantial discretion in carrying out their
responsibilities under the Act.
Michigan argues in conclusion that certiorari should be
granted because, in its view, there are other ways to improve
public heath and the nation’s air quality than those to be
implemented under the NOx SIP Call Rule. Mich. Pet. 28.
19
Michigan is making a policy argument. This Court has made
clear that such arguments must be addressed to Congress or to
the agency, and not to the courts (Chevron v. NRDC, supra,
467 US. at 865):
In these cases, the Administrator’s
interpretation represents a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing
interests and is entitled to deference: the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the
agency considered the matter in a detailed and
reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
reconciling conflicting policies. [footnotes
omitted]
This is exactly the situation presented here and concerns the
same statute the Court considered in Chevron v. NRDC, supra.
The petitioners have presented no grounds for a grant of
certiorari.
Ontario and the majority of the states subject to the
NOx SIP Call Rule share a common airshed. Because of
geography, chemistry, and weather, Ontario is directly affected
by NOx emissions and ozone transported from the subject
states. While no government can change geography, chemistry
or weather, governments can work together to reduce emissions
of NOx into our common airshed and protect health and the
environment. The NOx SIP Call Rule is an important step for
such purposes. The Rule reflects sound and sensible policy
choices designed to ameliorate a complex air pollution
problem. Ontario strongly supports the Rule before this Court.
20
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, and for those set forth by the other
respondents, Ontario respectfully submits that the petitions
for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
BRUCE J. TERRIS
KATHLEEN L. MILLIAN *
KEVIN O. LESKE
TERRIS, PRAVLIK &
MILLIAN, LLP
1121 12th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 682-2100
Counsel for Respondent
January 4, 2001 * Counsel of Record
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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.