Opposition Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

Supreme Court brief2001

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Text

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Nos. 00-445, 00-632 and 00-6

a

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Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

2 4d

dN 4 2B

In

Supreme Court o

The CLERK

f the United States

+

STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,

UNITED STATES

Petitioners,

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

*

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The District Of Columbia Circuit

*

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

OF ENVIRONMENTAL INTERVENORS

¢

Davip W. MARSHALL

(Counsel of Record)

Clean Air Task Force

P.O. Box 950

Henniker, NH-03242

(603) 428-8114

and

ANN BREWSTER WEEKS

Clean Air Task Force

c/o Grants Management

Associates

77 Summer Street, 8th Floor

Boston, MA 02110

(617) 292-0234

Counsel for Environmental

Intervenors

Davip G. HaAwkINs

JoHN D. WALKE

Natural Resources Defense

Council

1200 New York Avenue, NW

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 289-6868

Howarp A. LEARNER

JoHN N. Moore

Environmental Law &

Policy Center of the

Midwest

35 East Wacker Drive,

Suite 1300

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 673-6500

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COL

LECT (402) 342-2831

i

RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether EPA may, under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and

110(k)(5) of the Clean Air Act, consider cost as one of

several factors in determining the amount of emis-

sions reductions that a state must make to adequately

mitigate emissions that are significantly contributing

to another state’s failure to attain a national ambient

air quality standard.

Whether EPA’s action in considering cost as a factor

under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) represents a

constitutionally permissible exercise of the authority

delegated to EPA by Congress.

1.

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

The following Parties were petitioners in the consoli-

dated proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in

which review is sought.

In No. 98-1497, State of Michigan, Michigan

Department of Environmental Quality and State

of West Virginia, Division of Environmental

Protection.

In No. 98-1588, State of Ohio.

In No. 98-1596, Commonwealth of Virginia.

In No. 98-1615, State of Alabama, ex. rel. Bill Pryor,

Attorney General.

In No. 98-1617, State of Indiana and Indiana

Department of Environmental Management.

In No. 98-1619, State of North Carolina.

In No. 98-1621, State of South Carolina.

In No. 98-1499, United Mine Workers of America.

In No. 98-1500, Appalachian Power Company, et al.,

consisting of:

Appalachian Power Company;

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company (now

referred to as Constellation Power Source

Generation, Inc.);

Carolina Power & Light Company;

Central and South West Services, Inc.:

Central Power and Light Company;

Public Service Company of Oklahoma;

Southwestern Electric Power Company;

West Texas Utilities Company;

Central Illinois Light Company;

Central Illinois Public Service Company;

ClINergy;

Columbus Southern Power Company;

iii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Commonwealth Edison Company;

Consumers Energy Company;

Dayton Power and Light Company, The;

Detroit Edison Company, The;

Duke Energy Company;

Florida Power Corporation;

Illinois Power Company;

Indiana Michigan Power Company;

Jacksonville Electric Authority;

Kentucky Power Company;

Kentucky Utilities Company;

Louisville Gas and Electric Company;

Madison Gas and Electric Company;

Minnesota Power Company;

Monongahela Power Company, d/b/a Allegheny

Power System, Inc.

Northern Indiana Public Service Company;

Oglethorpe Power Corporation;

Ohio Power Company;

Ohio Valley Electric Corporation;

Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company;

Otter Tail Power Company;

PacifiCorp Electric Operations;

Plains Electric Generation & Transmission

Cooperative, Inc.;

Potomac Edison Company, The, d/b/a

Allegheny Power System, Inc.;

Potomac Electric Power Company;

Public Service Company of New Mexico;

Salt River Project;

South Carolina Electric & Gas Company;

Southern Company:

Alabama Power Company;

Georgia Power Company;

Gulf Power Company;

iv

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Mississippi Power Company;

Savannah Electric and Power Company;

Tampa Electric Power Company;

Tucson Electric Company;

Union Electric Company;

Virginia Power;

West Penn Power Company, d/b/a Allegheny

Power System, Inc.;

Edison Electric Institute;

National Rural Electric Cooperative Association; and

American Public Power Association.

In No. 98-1500, Duquesne Light Company.

In No. 98-1501, Midwest Ozone Group.

In No. 98-1502, West Virginia Chamber of Commerce.

In No. 98-1504, National Mining Association.

In No. 98-1518, West Virginia Manufacturers

Association.

In No. 98-1556, City of Springfield, Missouri through

the Board of Public Utilities, d/b/a City Utilities

of Springfield, Missouri.

In No. 98-1567, Kansas City Power & Light

Company;

St. Joseph Light & Power Company;

The Empire District Electric Company;

Utilicorp United, Inc.;

City of Independence, Missouri; and

Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc.

In No. 98-1573, Indianapolis Power & Light

Company.

In No. 98-1585, The Alabama Forestry Association,

Inc., by and through its section The Alabama

Pulp and Paper Counsel.

In No. 98-1590, Dairyland Power Cooperative.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

In No. 98-1598, South Carolina Public Service

Authority, d/b/a Santee Cooper.

In No. 98-1601, American Municipal Power-Ohio.

In No. 98-1602, Fort James Operating Company;

Gilman Paper Company;

Rayonier, Inc.;

Savannah Electric & Power Company;

Southeast Paper Manufacturing Company; and

International Paper Company.

In No. 98-1608, PP&L, Inc.

In No. 98-1609, Council of Industrial Boiler Owners.

In No. 98-1611, Network for Workable Air Policies.

In No. 98-1616, Georgia Coalition for Sound

Environmental Policy, Inc.

In No. 98-1618, Interstate Natural Gas Association of

America.

In No. 99-1070, Appalachian Power Company, et al.

In No. 99-1093, Wisconsin Paper Council;

Madison Gas and Electric Company;

Northern States Power Company;

Wisconsin Public Service Corporation; and

Wisconsin Manufacturers & Commerce.

The following Party was a Respondent in the consoli-

dated proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in

which review is sought.

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.

The following Parties were Intervenors in the consoli-

dated proceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for

the District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in

which review is sought.

Natural Resources Defense Council;

Environmental Law & Policy Center of the Midwest;

vi

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

American Lung Association of Metropolitan

Chicago;

Appalachian Mountain Club;

Citizens Action Coalition of Indiana, Inc.;

Clean Air Council;

Environmental Defense Fund (now referred to as

Environmental Defense);

Group Against Smog and Pollution;

Hoosier Environmental Council;

Illinois Environmental Council;

Izaak Walton League of America;

Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation;

Michigan Environmental Council;

National Environmental Trust;

Natural Resources Council of Maine;

New York Public Interest Research Group;

Ohio Citizen Action;

Ohio Environmental Council;

U.S. Public Interest Research Group; and

Wisconsin’s Environmental Decade Institute.

State of New York;

State of Connecticut;

State of Maine;

Commonwealth of Massachusetts

State of New Hampshire;

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;

State of Rhode Island; and

State of Vermont.

State of Maryland.

State of Wisconsin.

Province of Ontario, Canada;

Norman W. Sterling, Minister of the Environment,

Province of Ontario;

i)

vii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Charles A. Harnick, Attorney General of the

Province of Ontario; and

Christopher Carl Haromy.

Appalachian Power Company, et al.

(listed in paragraph 1. supra).

,

Dairyland Power Cooperative.

Virginia Manufacturers Association.

South Carolina Public Service Authority,

d/b/a Santee Cooper.

Detroit Public Lighting;

Grand Haven Board of Light and Power;

Holland Board of Public Works;

Lansing Board of Water and Light;

Marquette Board of Light and Power;

Michigan South Central Power Agency; and

City of Wyandotte Department of Municipal Service.

GPU Generation, Inc.

American Gas Association.

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America.

Network for Workable Air Policies.

Business Council of Alabama.

Michigan Manufacturers Association.

Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc.;

KeySpan Generation LLC;

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation;

PECO Energy Company;

Public Service Electric and Gas Company;

Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation; and

PG&E Generating.

Viii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS - Continued

Natural Gas Supply Association; and

Sempra Energy.

Associated Industries of Massachusetts;

New England Council; and

New Jersey State Chamber of Commerce.

PP&L, Inc.;

Atlantic City Electric Company; and

Delmarva Power & Light Company.

The following were Amici in the consolidated pro-

ceeding before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit, the judgment in which

review is sought.

Government of Canada.

North Carolina Citizens for Business and Industry.

South Carolina Chamber of Commerce;

Environmental Management Association of

South Carolina; and

South Carolina Manufacturers Alliance.

Toledo Metropolitan Area Council of Governments.

Ne

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Page

RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED...... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS. .............:... ii

SEs Ge Reis <hikns Bas dian tains x

DPI oii ss'cnabiah Sucavhdesgeticeen sol 1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......... ee er eee 3

REASONS FOR REJECTING THE PETITIONS FOR

PRET HAEMin id ATR KRW Ans Sie Bb Ae eA RARRAE RRA Ke 8

I. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI ON

THE “SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION” QUES-

po ee Mee cn beeen dnegeankbensoeneka'e Bee 8

A. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding that EPA’s Inter-

pretation of “Significant Contribution” is

Permissible Does Not Conflict with the Deci-

sions of this Court or with Other Decisions

Oe Bnd MU so oa han ovis oe hehe howe xcs 10

B. EPA’s Consideration of Costs Under Sections

110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) Is Permissible

Under Established Case Law............... 18

Il. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR CERTIORARI

ON THE NON-DELEGATION DOCTRINE

GNP PUENTE b i ak sak Nabe 4hn4eo Ri scab ae ie ewauss 22

A. There is No Conflict Between the D.C. Cir-

cuit’s Holding and this Court’s Non-Delega-

tion Doctrine Jurisprudence ............... 23

B. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding Does Not Repre-

sent an Intra-Circuit Conflict............... 26

SINE Sh CCb KS s Ao boeken esse casbidcecceds 30

x :

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases )

A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295

ok gi | . Pee eee eer Tr Per ir Tyr Tr ee ore errr 25, 28

American Lung Ass‘n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 58 (1999) ............ 16

American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176

(D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982) .... 16

American Trucking Ass‘ns v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027,

modified on reh’g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert.

granted, 120 S.Ct. 2003 & 2193 (2000).......... passim |

Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204

IE i is csv ccavisshucst skeen 14

Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)

‘shadacdiugiakay een 8, 18, 19

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1995)..... 17

George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C.

Cir. 1998), amended on other grounds, 164 F.3d 676

i Cie ON os 5 eae ees 13

Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Inst.,

606-115: 6 C0 iin ee ck 14

International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310

i Sk WO, vac seeis ee ee ee 7, 28, 29

].W. Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394

RED arereais ated tr ey gee tee 24

Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) ............... 15, 16 |

Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996)....... 24, 25

NE nen ne |

xi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000)... passim

Order Denying Reh’g En Banc in No. 98-1497

and consolidated cases, June 22, 2000.............. 7

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989)........ 24

National Asphalt Pavement Ass’n v. Train, 539 F.2d

TF Ge Ss EE pbk 5 ede a Re ee 27

National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190

SE anaes dake de Pane kpaa eas vee a eee i ke 25

NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987)..... 16, 19

NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert.

aetee, GOR US. MARE. CURIE oo iv i ncdcncsveaciss 16

NRDC v. EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991)......... 13

New York v. EPA, 852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ...... 27

Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)......... 25

Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.),

aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714

Se ee ae ee ir ep he ae nae 26

Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991)........... 24

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976)

Rp Ph emeHEEE CUE MAReEWS Ld RE TER Cee SS 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, modified on reh’g, 116

ee ee iy SE SO, aio c pics ka ce bs co edananves 3

STATUTES

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq........... passim

FO es Oe Ps oi 6s oes ced caviddvnaens 15

§ 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2)...........0000.. 15

—

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

§ 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409......... LER ee 15, 16

§ 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)...... 20.0. ec eee. 15

§ 110(a)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)....... passim |

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(1) . .passim

§ 110(k)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(k)(5)....2. 2.200. passim

§ 111(a)(1), 42 US.C. § 7411(a)(1).........0cece8e 13

§ 1110b)(1), 42 US.C. § 7AAMD)MA).<...05..0.000003 13

6 24%, 42 USS: 6 AE sas css ee 16

G ak, 2 US: OES i 13

§ 172(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) .......eeeeeeee. a

§ 182(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 751la(c)(2) ...........0c00e. 5

§ 183(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(b)(3)...........0.00e 13

§ 183(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(b)(4).........0. 0000 13

§ 183(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(e)(1)............008- 13

§ 202 (a)(3)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i)....-. 13 |

em, BUS IS. 13

§ 211(c)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(B)......... 26 13

§ 211(£)(4), 42 U.S.C § 7545(f)(4) .... 0. eee eee. 17 |

§ 213(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3)......0.00e ee eee. 13 |

§ 2910), 42 USC 8 PIO 6 5 os Gees 13 |

xiii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

FEDERAL REGISTER

62 Fed. Reg. 60,318 (Nov. 7, 1997) ................ 5, 20

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Ws EE 0 acne ccccccccccscccsccsessesccesscceses 20

ME Sipcae ocenbinbednicssncedscdcccnctevesssee dois 5

63 Fed. Reg. 57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998).............. passim

WR, NT Cap Ubaaccsccasicccccsccsscnnccescosececee 12

TE GH Geer chat ccesss siccancccccescosceceasace 20

PP. 57,376-378 ....ccccscccccccccccscccccsscccccsces 6

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De DG PD oc eccecssccsccncccccccescccssccccecccscce 21

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WD. BIg MOOD 0 on cccccccccccccnssccevccccesescsces 6

BP POUOE occ vcccccccecsescesscecscssccveccsess 5

RL CGP once ccc cccsccscccccvccscccsccccesces 5

pp. 57,394-396, Tables II-4 to II-7................... 4

if SERPS rrr rrr err Peete Eee eee eee eee 27, 28

BD. STAMOS 2.2 cccccccccccccccccccscccccscscccsccssees 12

DD. S7A2Z4-425 2... ccccccccccccccccccccccccscccces 5

ee eee eee 6

Xiv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

MISCELLANEOUS

S. Rep. No. 95-127, reprinted in 3 A Legislative

History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of

ft Pee E OEE, PCTee TTT ET Re TCT TTT Ee re 4, 22

Reply Brief for Cross-Petitioners American Truck-

ing Ass’ns, et al. in No. 99-1426 (Oct. 6, 2000),

filed with this Court in American Trucking Ass’ns

v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, modified on reh’g, 195

F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct.

BEG. SEU GRO sch vaansapanehssdndandwcbasenteas

Brief of Amici Curiae Environmental Defense,

American Public Health Ass’n, et al., on behalf

of Cross-Respondents in No. 99-1426 (Septem-

ber 11, 2000), filed this Court in American Truck-

ing Ass’ns v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, modified on

reh’g, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted,

pe Rte FF 2: gl ec sre

Brief of Cross-Respondent American Lung Ass’n

in No. 99-1426 (September 8, 2000), filed with

this Court in American Trucking Ass’ns v.

Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, modified on reh’g, 195

F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct.

MOO Be TITS CON kn 0c canna ennndeinnakeddaenatees

eae meng gee ein:

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITIONS FOR CERTIORARI

INTRODUCTION

Three petitions for certiorari have been filed seeking

review of portions of a March 3, 2000 decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-

bia (“D.C. Circuit”).1 That decision largely upheld the

Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s” or the

“Agency’s”) 1998 rule requiring reductions in nitrogen

oxide (“NOx”) emissions in 22 states and the District of

Columbia that EPA found to be “contributing signifi-

cantly” to the failure of many states in the Eastern United

States to attain the 1-hour ozone National Ambient Air

Quality Standard (“NAAQS”). “Finding of Significant

Contribution and Rulemaking for Certain States in the

Ozone Transport Assessment Group Region for Purposes

of Reducing Regional Transport of Ozone,” 63 Fed. Reg.

57,356 (Oct. 27, 1998) (hereinafter “NOx SIP Call Rule” or

“Rule”). In particular, the D.C. Circuit held that EPA, in

determining the level of emissions that were contributing

significantly to downwind nonattainment and thus

needed to be reduced, properly considered the costs of

controlling those emissions. All three petitions seek

review of this finding on the grounds that it violates the

Clean Air Act (the “Act”), although Petitioners do not

agree on what approach Congress intended EPA to take.

The States of Michigan, Alabama, West Virginia, Virginia

1 Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

(“Michigan”), reprinted at Appendix of the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari of Appalachian Power Co.., et al. (No. 00-445, Sept. 20,

2000) (“Ind. Pet., App.”)

and South Carolina (“Michigan”) (No. 00-632) assert that

EPA cannot consider costs at all. The States of Ohio and

Indiana (“Ohio”) (No. 00-633), om the other hand, claim

that EPA may consider costs, but only as a “subordinate

factor.”2 Finally, a group of industries and industry trade

associations led by Appalachian Power Company

(“Industry” or “Industry Petitioners”) (No. 00-445) claim

that EPA may not consider costs When determining “sig-

nificant contribution,” but may do so when determining

how much of that contribution must be eliminated.

Industry Petitioners also claim that EPA’s consideration

of cost factors violated the so-called “non-delegation”

doctrine.

Environmental group intervenor-respondents in the

D.C. Circuit case below? respectfully submit that none of

2 State petitioners below were Ohio, Indiana, Michigan,

Alabama, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia and North

Carolina. These states combined their efforts in briefing and

arguing the case before the D.C. Circuit. North Carolina has not

filed a petition for certiorari with this Court, and Ohio and

Indiana have filed a petition separate from that filed by

Michigan, Alabama, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia.

3 Environmental organizations participating as intervenor-

respondents in the case below, and who join in this Opposition

are: American Lung Association Of Metropolitan Chicago,

Appalachian Mountain Club, Citizens Action Coalition of

Indiana, Clean Air Council, Environmental Defense (formerly

known as Environmental Defense Fund), Environmental Law &

Policy Center of the Midwest, Group Against Smog and

Pollution (“GASP”), Hoosier Environmental Council, Illinois

Environmental Council, Izaak Walton League of America,

Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation, Michigan

Environmental Council, National Environmental Trust, Natural

Resources Council of Maine, Natural Resources Defense

these petitions merit this Court’s review. There is no

conflict between the D.C. Circuit’s decision and decisions

of this Court or other federal appellate courts. The D.C.

Circuit’s resolution of the questions presented in the cer-

tiorari petitions is amply supported by applicable prece-

dent and is correct.

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners’ Statements describe EPA’s authority to

implement the NAAQS for ozone through issuance of a

“SIP call” under Clean Air Act Section 110(k)(5), by

which the EPA Administrator may find inadequate state

implementation plans (“SIPs”) and require states to revise

such SIPs to correct the deficiencies. 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(k)(5). One of the possible bases for a SIP call is an

EPA finding under Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) of the Act

that a SIP does not contain adequate provisions to pro-

hibit air pollution in that state “in amounts which will

... contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or inter-

fere with maintenance [of a NAAQS] by, any other State.”

42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(1). These provisions are

designed to ensure that the cumulative impacts of many

states’ upwind air pollution do not foul the air downwind

so badly that any downwind state is forced to bear more

than its share of the burden of ensuring that its air does

not violate the NAAQS; or alternatively, bear more than

Council, New York Public Interest Research Group, Ohio

Citizen Action, Ohio Environmental Council, U.S. Public

Interest Research Group, and Wisconsin’s Environmental

Decade Institute.

its share of the public health consequences of dirty air.

See S.Rep. No. 95-127 at 41-42, reprinted in 3 A Legislative

History of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977 (“1977

Leg. Hist.”) 1415-16 (Comm. Print 1978).

In the case of the ozone NAAQS, each upwind area J

contributes to the total ozone burden in downwind areas

in many states. 63 Fed.Reg. 57,356, 57,394-396, Tables II-4

to II-7. Put another way, because of the nature of ozone

pollution and its transport, the pollution in any upwind

area will impact the area and the state immediately

downwind as well as more distant states.

Ozone is formed when NOx and volatile organic

compounds (“VOCs”) interact in the presence of sunlight.

Once ozone has been created, it drifts downwind, along

with its NOx precursor (VOCs are very localized in their

effects, and are not transported with the air mass to any

great extent). Id. at 57,381. The D.C. Circuit has correctly

recognized that “as the air mass moves [downwind],

ozone levels often continue to increase, in part because

ozone has more time to develop, in part because the air

mass picks up more precursors along the way. Ultimately,

this process can bring high ozone levels to areas hun-

dreds of miles downwind of the pollution sources.” Vir-

ginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1400, modified on reh’g on other

grounds, 116 F.3d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The creation of f

downwind ozone pollution therefore is non-linear and

cumulative.* For each separate meteorological ozone

* Petitioners argue that NOx, the precursor chemical

primarily associated with transported ozone, both creates and

destroys ozone. Ind. Pet. at 8 & n. 4. This statement is incorrect —

although strictly localized increases in ozone can occur in areas

immediately adjacent to facilities which reduce their NOx

event, downwind areas receive ozone and NOx from

many upwind states, and each upwind area contributes

to downwind pollution events in many different states. 63

Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,394-396.

The NOx SIP Call Rule was a partial response — five

years overdue - to the mandate contained in the 1990

Clean Air Act that all states with ozone serious nonattain-

ment areas must adopt plans no later than November

1994 to correct the nonattainment problem. 42 U.S.C

§ 7511a(c)(2). As part of a negotiated stay of litigation

over EPA’s extensions to states of the statutory attain-

ment demonstration deadlines, the Ozone Transport

Assessment Group (“OTAG”) was created. 62 Fed. Reg.

60,318, 60,323 (Nov. 7, 1997). In OTAG, 37 states came

together to complete regional modeling and reach

regional solutions to the interstate ozone transport prob-

lem. The technical work done by OTAG utilized “the

most complete, scientifically-credible tools and data

available” (id. at 60,331), and included state-of-the-art air

quality modeling, at the regional and subregional levels,

to which EPA added state-specific refinements. 63 Fed.

Reg. 57,356, 57,387, 57,390-391.

The combination of the cumulative, nonlinear nature

of ozone production and the Agency’s statutorily-defined

duty under Sections 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) and 110(k)(5) of the

Act meant that EPA, faced with OTAG’s indisputable

emissions, it is not correct to say that NOx “destroys” ozone in

any sense. Indeed, transported ozone — the subject of the EPA

Rule and this case, does not decrease when NOx emissions are

increased; rather transported ozone decreases when NOx

emissions are decreased. See 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,424-425,

57 439-441.

evidence of pollutant transport across state lines, was

required to distribute responsibility among all the

upwind states to adopt controls on sources contributing

to ozone nonattainment and maintenance problems in all

downwind states.

EPA implemented the OTAG findings, making a

state-by-state assessment of emissions contributions to

downwind nonattainment and maintenance problems,

and apportioning responsibility for the needed NOx

reductions based on the emissions modeling and the

availability of additional highly cost-effective controls in

each of the states. Id. at 57,376-378, 57,389-391. From this

multi-faceted analysis, EPA developed state-by-state NOx

emissions “budgets,” which each state may meet by any

means available to it. Id. at 57,426.

State and Industry Petitioners challenged EPA’s

resulting NOx SIP Call Rule in the D.C. Circuit, alleging

that the Agency’s consideration of the availability of cost-

effective control measures in defining significant contri- |

butions from upwind to downwind states violated the |

Clean Air Act. State Petitioners also argued that EPA's

actions violated the Constitutional non-delegation doc-

trine.

The D.C. Circuit upheld the EPA Rule on both counts,

noting that the term “significant” does not require an

unidimensional (health only) analysis, and that the var-

ious petitioners were not only in conflict over this point,

but had “conspicuously fail[ed] to describe the intellec-

tual process by which EPA would determine ‘signifi-

cance’ if it may consider only health.” Ind. Pet., App. at

21a, 22a. The court went on to hold that there is nothing

in the D.C. Circuit's case law, or in “the text, structure, or

erential

history of the Clean Air Act that bars EPA from consider-

ing cost” in this analysis. Ind. Pet., App. at 25a.

On the non-delegation question, the State Petitioners

did not allege that the Clean Air Act itself violated the

non-delegation doctrine, but rather challenged as an

unbounded exercise of Agency discretion the EPA’s

action in selecting the $2000/ton cost-effectiveness point

as an element of the significance determination. The D.C.

Circuit upheld the Agency's action against this charge,

noting that the nor-delegation doctrine is itself limited in

its application. It was significant to the court that the

Agency’s action was both constrained by the statutory

factors of the significance analysis, and limited geograph-

ically, so that the scope of the Rule did not “ ‘encompass

all American enterprise’.” Ind. Pet., App. at 27a-28a (quo-

ting International Union, UAW v. OSHA (“Lockout/Tagout

I"), 938 F.2d 1310, 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). The D.C. Circuit

refused requests for rehearing en banc, over a single dis-

sent.>

5 Judge Sentelle dissented, as he had on the merits. Judges

Tatel and Garland did not participate in considering whether to

grant rehearing en banc. Order Denying Reh’g En Banc in No.

98-1497 and consolidated cases, June 22, 2000, reprinted at Ind.

Pet., App. at 64a.

REASONS FOR REJECTING THE

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW

I. THIS COURT SHOULD DENY CERTIORARI ON

THE “SIGNIFICANT CONTRIBUTION” QUES-

TIONS.

The only question raised by the Petitions of Ohio and

Michigan, and the primary one raised by that of Industry,

is whether - or how much — EPA may consider cost as a

factor in finding that certain sources are producing NOx

emissions that “contribute significantly” to nonattain-

ment in another state within the meaning of Section

110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D of the Act. As discussed infra at Section

I.B., Congress did not define the term “contribute signifi-

cantly.” Therefore, EPA’s interpretation of the term is

entitled to considerable weight under the settled law of

this Court, and should be upheld unless it is impermissi-

ble. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45

(1984) (“Chevron”). In other words, this is a case that is

properly decided under “step two” of the Chevron anal-

ysis, not “step one.” The D.C. Circuit’s decision finding

permissible EPA’s inclusion of cost in the factors consid-

ered in determining the significance level of upwind state

contributions to downwind nonattainment is completely

consistent with the established case law of this Court and

the Courts of Appeals.

As the D.C. Circuit noted, in the proceeding below

neither the State nor Industry Petitioners could make up

their minds as to whether or how Congress intended EPA

to consider cost in determining what contributions to

nonattainment are “significant.” See Ind. Pet., App. at

17a-20a. Initially, the States argued that EPA could con-

sider cost, but could not make it the controlling factor in

determining significance. Id. However, “[a]t oral argu-

ment, counsel for the States abandoned this position and

decided that the statute flatly prohibits EPA from consid-

ering costs at all.” Ind. Pet., App. at 18a-19a. On the other

hand, Industry initially argued below that EPA could

consider only “air quality impacts,” not costs. Industry

presented a different position at oral argument, however,

claiming that while EPA could not consider costs under

Section 110(a)(2)(D) of the Act (in determining whether a

SIP prohibits emissions from sources that “significantly

contribute” to nonattainment), it nevertheless could con-

sider costs under Section 110(k)(5) (in determining

whether a SIP is “adequate”). Ind. Pet., App. at 20a.

Petitioners still do not agree on how Congress

intended EPA to treat costs in issuing a “SIP call” under

Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) of the Act, presenting

three inconsistent positions to this Court. Industry’s Peti-

tion argues that EPA may consider cost in determining

the proper level of emission reductions required to cor-

rect an interstate pollution transport problem, but only

under Section 110(k)(5)’s adequate mitigation language

and not under Section 110(a)(2)(D)’s significant contribu-

tion language. Ind. Pet. at 13, 18. The State Petitions now

contain two distinct variations of the cost argument. The

Michigan Petition argues that EPA cannot consider cost at

all. Michigan Pet. at 12-13, 19. On the other hand, the

Ohio Petition appears to argue that cost may be a factor

in EPA’s determination of what contributions are signifi-

cant, but only a subordinate factor. Ohio Pet. at 11, 15.

Different petitioners have the right, of course, to raise

10

different theories of their case. But in this case these

disparate interpretations raise the obvious question - if

Congressional intent here is so clear, then why can’t

Petitioners agree on what that intent was?

A. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding that EPA’s Inter-

pretation of “Significant Contribution” is Per-

missible Does Not Conflict with the Decisions

of this Court or with Other Decisions of the

D.C. Circuit.

Petitioners claim that the D.C. Circuit’s decision

upholding EPA’s consideration of cost as a factor in deter-

mining when a contribution to downwind nonattainment

is “significant” conflicts with various decisions of this

Court and other decisions of the D.C. Circuit. Petitioners

are wrong.

First, Petitioners claim that the lower court’s decision

conflicts with the decision of this Court in Union Elec. Co.

v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) (“Union Electric”). See Michi-

gan Pet. at 14-19. However, Union Electric is not on point

here. In that case, this Court was faced with a polluter’s

challenge to EPA’s approval of a SIP on the grounds that

EPA was required to consider whether the state’s choice

of controls in the SIP were economically or technologi-

cally infeasible. This Court upheld EPA’s position® that it

was not authorized to reject a SIP on such grounds,

finding that Congress had set out minimum requirements

that a SIP must meet in order to obtain EPA approval, and

6 The Court noted that “we have previously accorded great

deference to the Administrator’s construction of the Clean Air

Act [citations omitted].” Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 256.

11

that the three-year deadline for achieving the NAAQS set

by Congress “leaves no room for claims of technological

or economic infeasibility.” Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 256-260.

The Court stated that the Act’s minimum compliance

requirements are of a “technology-forcing” nature, and

“are expressly designed to force regulated sources to

develop pollution control devices that might at the time

appear to be economically or technologically infeasible.”

Id. at 257. The Court also made clear, however, that as

long as a state plan would achieve attainment and meet

the minimum requirements of the Act, the states were

free to choose particular measures needed to accomplish

that task, and were free to consider infeasibility claims in

so doing. Id. at 260-265. Indeed, the Court stated explic-

itly that “we do not hold that claims of infeasibility are

never of relevance in the formulation of an implementa-

tion plan... .” Id. at 266.

The instant case is entirely different from Union Elec-

tric. Neither the EPA nor the Court is faced here, as the

Court was in Union Electric, with the implications of the

“technology-forcing” character of the Act’s attainment

requirements. We are not concerned here with the ques-

tion of whether all measures that are or could be con-

tained in an implementation plan will in the aggregate be

adequate to achieve timely attainment of the ozone

NAAQS,” or whether additional measures that may not

7 As the Court recognized in Union Electric, “the [Act does]

allow claims of technological and economic infeasibility to be

raised in situations where consideration of such claims will not

substantially interfere with the primary congressional purpose

of prompt attainment of the national standards.” Union Elec.,

427 US. at 266.

Ae aaa

12

be technologically or economically feasible must be

included in such a plan.

Attainment of the NAAQS in a state impacted by

emissions transported across its borders requires a combi-

nation of in-state and upwind state emission control mea-

sures. Section 110(a)(2)(D) does not place the entire

burden of downwind attainment on upwind states,

because it does not require the elimination of all upwind

emissions necessary for a downwind state to achieve

attainment.§ If it did, Union Electric might well prohibit

EPA from considering cost in determining the level of

required upwind emission reductions, at least if the effect

of such consideration would be the failure to achieve

downwind attainment. Here, however, Congress has

authorized EPA to require the elimination of some — but

not all - upwind emissions, specifically those that “con-

tribute significantly” to downwind attainment problems.

In this sense, Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) is similar to other

provisions in the Act that specifically target certain emis-

sions or emission sources that represent but a portion of

the overall reductions necessary to achieve attainment. In

the context of such specific implementation measures,

EPA has often been permitted, and in some cases,

8 EPA so stated in the NOx SIP Call Rule, noting that even

after implementation of its rulemaking reducing upwind

emissions, some downwind areas will require additional local

reductions. See, 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,374, 57,377, 57,403.

13

required, to consider issues of technological and eco-

nomic feasibility, or of cost or cost-effectiveness.?

Furthermore, unlike Union Electric, this case does not

involve a claim that a state’s choice of emission controls

in its implementation plan is technologically or economi-

cally infeasible. Indeed, this case does not deal with a

state’s choice of emission controls at all. Rather, this case

involves EPA’s interpretation of its own authority to find

that a state has failed to control interstate emissions as

mandated by Congress and to impose a remedy for that

failure.!° Finally, the present case does not deal with

claims of technical or economic infeasibility, but rather

® For cases in which the D.C. Circuit has found that EPA can

lawfully consider costs in Clean Air Act rulemaking, see, e.g.,

George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1998),

amended on other grounds, 164 F.3d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

(examining Clean Air Act Section 211, 42 U.S.C. § 7545,

providing for the regulation of reformulated gasoline); NRDC v.

EPA, 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (upholding EPA’s use of cost-

benefit analysis to determine that a particular polluting source ©

should not be classified as “major” under Section 165 of the Act,

42 U.S.C. § 7475).

Congress also has specifically allowed or required EPA to

consider costs in connection with a variety of specific emission

reduction measures; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i) (mobile

source standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(2)(B) (fuel additive

regulation); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1), (b)(1) (certain new stationary

source standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7547(a)(3) (nonroad vehicle

compliance deadlines); 42 U.S.C. § 7571(b) (aircraft compliance

deadlines); and 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(b)(3) and (4), (e)(1) (certain

control techniques guidelines for VOCs).

10 This Court in Union Electric explicitly did not reach the

question of whether EPA could consider factors of economic or

technical infeasibility in drafting its own implementation plan

where a state fails to do so. Union Elec., 427 U.S. at 261, n.7.

14

with issues of cost and cost-effectiveness.!! For all of the

above reasons, Union Electric does not conflict with the

lower court’s holding here.}2

The decision of the D.C. Circuit in this case further-

more does not conflict with other decisions of that

court.!3 First of all, contrary to the claims of Michigan

Petitioners, there is no conflict with American Trucking

Ass‘ns v. Browner, 175 F.3d 1027, modified on reh’g, 195 F.3d

11 In another Clean Air Act case presently before this Court,

American Trucking Ass’ns v. Browner, No. 99-1426, several

industry petitioners recently argued that Union Electric “never

mentions cost-benefit analysis,” and “could not be clearer that it

dealt only with ‘technological and economic infeasibility.’ ”

Reply Brief for Cross-Petitioners (ATA, et al.) in No. 99-1426, at

16-17 (Oct. 6, 2000) (citation omitted).

12 Several other opinions of this Court mentioned in

passing by Industry do not support its arguments here. See Ind.

Pet. at 16-17. First, Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204

(1988) was concerned with retroactive agency rulemaking under

the Medicare program, and is not relevant here because EPA’s

NOx SIP Call Rule is not retroactive rulemaking. Nor is

Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607

(1980) of any assistance to Petitioners. In that case, a divided

Court struck down the Secretary of Labor’s proposed benzene

regulations, finding that “Congress was concerned, not with

absolute safety, but with the elimination of significant harm.” Id.

at 646. Indeed, the Court found that the statutory requirement

that the Secretary conduct “some cost-benefit analysis” prior to

setting a standard manifested the intention of Congress that the

Secretary must find a “significant risk of harm.” Id. at 644. The

Court clearly did not find that the Secretary could not consider

costs in setting a standard.

13 We note that there was not a close split of D.C. Circuit

judges in this case. Indeed, only a single judge would have

granted the petitions for en banc rehearing. Ind. Pet., App. at

64a-65a.

15

4 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 2003, 2193 (2000)

(Nos. 99-1426, 99-1257) (“ATA”), or Lead Indus. Ass’n v.

EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042

(1980) (“Lead Industries”). Neither ATA nor Lead Industries

is relevant to the present case, as both were concerned

with the promulgation of NAAQS under Section 109 of the

Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409, not the implementation of the result-

ing standards.!4 These two cases are part of a long line of

D.C. Circuit cases that have consistently found that “[t]he

statute and its legislative history make clear that economic

considerations play no part in the promulgation of ambi-

ent air quality standards under Section 109.” Lead

14 The plain language of Section 109(b)(1) makes clear that

the NAAQS must be set “based on” “air quality criteria”

established under Section 108, 42 U.S.C. § 7408, and must be

“requisite to protect the public health.” 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1).

The air quality criteria, in turn, “shall accurately reflect the

latest scientific knowledge useful in indicating the kind and

extent of all identifiable effects on public health or welfare

which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in

the ambient air, in varying quantities.” 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(2).

The Act’s legislative history provides clear evidence that

Congress intended EPA to be limited to public health

considerations when setting NAAQS. Thus, both the statute and

legislative history provide that the establishment of the

primary, health-based, NAAQS are confined to public health

considerations. See Brief of Cross-Respondent American Lung

Ass’n in ATA, No. 99-1426 (September 8, 2000). Further,

Congress has ratified this long-standing interpretation of EPA’s

authority to establish NAAQS through repeated legislative

proceedings over the past three decades in which it has

considered and rejected initiatives to provide for the

consideration of costs in establishing the NAAQS. See Brief of

Amici Curiae Environmental Defense, American Public Health

Association, et al. on Behalf of Cross-Respondents, in ATA No.

99-1426, at 5-15 (September 11, 2000).

16

Indus., 647 F.2d at 1148. 5ee also, e.g., American Petroleum

Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert.

denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (19&2); NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962,

973 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991); and

American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir.

1998). Because Congress has often - both explicitly and

implicitly - authorized EPA to consider cost-related fac-

tors in implementing the NAAQS, cases such as ATA and

Lead Industries dealing with the use of such factors in

promulgating the NAAQS are simply not relevant to the

issues raised by Petitioners here.'5 The various D.C. Cir-

cuit opinions addressing when EPA may take cost into

consideration under different Clean Air Act provisions

hardly constitute the “hodge-podge” alleged by Industry.

See Ind. Pet. at 6. Rather, these cases divide along clear

lines - EPA cannot consicer costs when promulgating an

air quality standard, but may, and in some cases, must, do

so in implementing such a standard.'¢

15 See examples cited at footnote 9, supra. We also note that

Michigan, et al., argue that “EPA’s consideration of costs under

§ 110(a)(2)(D) is wholly incensistent with the position the EPA

adopted before this Court in the EPA’s petition for a writ of

certiorari in ATA.” Michigan Pet. at 8. But, in fact, EPA’s

positions in ATA and in this case are perfectly compatible: ATA

deals with the promulgation of the NAAQS under Section 109,

where consideration of costs has long and properly been

excluded, while the instant case deals with the implementation

of the NAAQS, where EPA’: consideration of costs have often

been upheld.

16 The D.C. Circuit’s opition in NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146,

1157 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en anc), referenced in the Industry

Petition at 7, was concerned with EPA’s establishment of limits

on source emissions of hazardous air pollutants under an earlier

version of Section 112 of the Act, not with the promulgation of

ambient air quality standards under Section 109.

17

The D.C. Circuit’s ruling here also does not conflict

with its decision in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) (“Ethyl”), as argued by Industry. Ind. Pet. at

17-18. Ethyl dealt with Section 211(f)(4) of the Act, 42

U.S.C. § 7545(f)(4), authorizing EPA to grant a waiver

from the prohibition on the use of certain fuel additives if

the manufacturer could show that the additive “will not

cause or contribute to a failure of any emission device or

control system . . . to achieve compliance by the vehicle

with the emission standards.” EPA decided that Ethyl

Corporation had made the above showings, but neverthe-

less denied the waiver on the grounds that EPA could

consider other factors such as whether the waiver was

consistent with the public interest and the effects of the

additive on public health. Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1054-55. Not-

ing that EPA had specifically determined that Ethyl Cor-

poration met the explicit statutory criteria, that EPA’s

waiver denial was inconsistent with its published guid-

ance and indeed that this was the first waiver case where

EPA had considered factors other than those set forth in

Section 211(f)(4), the D.C. Circuit held that given the

plain meaning of the statute, EPA erred in considering

those other factors. Ethyl, 51 F.3d at 1056, 1058. In this

case, Section 110(a)(2)(D) does not provide a set of exclu-

sive criteria that controls EPA’s determination of the level

of emissions that “significantly contribute” to downwind

nonattainment and must be “adequately mitigated”

under Section 110(k)(5). The use by Congress of these

undefined terms permits EPA discretion in interpreting

them, unlike the very explicit language in Section

211(f)(4) that the court in Ethyl determined provided EPA

with very little discretion.

18

B. EPA’s Consideration of Costs Under Sections

110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) Is Permissible Under

Established Case Law.

This is not a case where the lower court has commit-

ted a clear error of law on an important or novel legal

question. Rather, the “significant contribution” issue is

easily resolved under the well-established rules of statu-

tory construction set out in Chevron and its progeny. Since

Chevron, federal courts have used a two-part test to

review an agency’s construction of a statute that it

administers. This test is described in Chevron as follows:

If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end

of the matter; for the court, as well as the

agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the

court determines that Congress has not directly

addressed the precise question at issue, the

court does not simply impose its own construc-

tion on the statute. . . . Rather, if the statute is

silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific

issue, the question for the court is whether the

agency’s answer is based on a permissible con-

struction of the statute. [footnotes omitted].

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. Furthermore, in examining

this second question, Chevron provides that the Court has

“long recognized that considerable weight should be

accorded to an executive department’s construction of a

statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. . . . Id. at

844.

The issue raised by Petitioners in this case is whether

EPA may consider costs in carrying out its obligations to

ensure that SIPs adequately address interstate emissions

19

under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) of the Act. Con-

gress has not defined the phrase “contribute signifi-

cantly” in Section 110(a)(2)(D). It has not defined when a

SIP is “substantially inadequate” or when a plan will

“mitigate adequately” interstate pollution transport

within the meaning of Section 110(k)(5). Nor has Con-

gress enumerated the factors that EPA must consider

when determining whether a state’s emissions contribute

significantly to downwind nonattainment or how much

emissions reduction is needed to mitigate adequately

such contributions. Congress clearly has not prohibited

EPA from considering cost factors in making either of

these determinations. As mentioned earlier, Petitioners’

inability to agree on whether and to what extent Con-

gress did intend EPA to consider costs in requiring

interstate emissions reductions pursuant to Sections

110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5) of the Act speaks volumes to

the lack of any clear Congressional direction on this

issue. As the D.C. Circuit observed, “[a]gainst this back-

drop, it would be at the very least ironic for us to say that

there is ‘clear congressional intent to preclude consider-

ation of cost’ under § 110(a)(2)(D)” Ind. Pet., App. at 20a

(quoting NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir.

1987) (en banc)). Because Congress has not directly

addressed the precise question of whether costs may be

considered under Sections 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5),

EPA’s resolution of that question is properly reviewed

under step two of Chevron.

While EPA’s interpretation of Sections 110(a)(2)(D)

and 110(k)(5) may not be the only possible one, it is a

reasonable one and therefore is permissible under Chev-

ron’s second step. 467 U.S. at 837. EPA considered a

20

variety of air-quality related factors,!” based on the most

sophisticated modeling available, in addition to the avail-

ability of cost-effective controls, in its multi-factor

approach to “significant contribution.” See 63 Fed. Reg.

57,356, 57,376-379. Cost was not the sole factor consid-

ered.

Furthermore, no one disputes that the failure of

many areas in the Eastern United States to attain the

ozone standard almost 30 years after it was first promul-

gated is due to contributions from both local (in-state)

and upwind (out-of-state) emissions sources.'* The basic

structure of Section 110(a)(2)(D) requires EPA to include

an assessment of the relative level of control efforts in the

upwind and downwind states as part of its determination

of whether a state’s contribution is significant. Unless

EPA were to interpret Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) as prohib-

iting all upwind emissions that impacted downwind non-

attainment in any way (an interpretation that no party

thus far has advocated in this case), EPA had to interpret

the Congressional prohibition of significantly contribut-

ing emissions in such a way that, among other things,

reasonably allocated responsibility between upwind and

17 EPA considered the following air quality factors:

“[t}he overall nature of the ozone problem .. . ;”

“the extent of the downwind nonattainment problems to

which the upwind State’s emissions are linked, including the

ambient impact of controls required under the CAA or

otherwise implemented in downwind areas;” and

“the ambient impact of the emissions from the upwind

State’s sources on the downwind nonattainment problems.” 63

Fed. Reg. 57,356, 57,376. See also 62 Fed. Reg. 60,318, 60,325.

18 See Ind. Pet. at 8-9; Ohio Pet. at 8.

ee

21

downwind states, and among different upwind states

themselves. EPA’s consideration of cost in this context

was a perfectly reasonable means to equitably allocate the

burden of emissions reductions among the numerous

states contributing to the problem.

If EPA did not consider costs and instead adopted a

“bright-line” emissions contribution test as urged by

some Petitioners,19 the economic burden of compliance

throughout the eastern United States could be quite dis-

parate. Such a test could mean that a downwind state that

had already adopted stringent controls would be forced

to adopt even more stringent controls while upwind

states could escape even basic - and much more cost-

effective — controls.2” On the other hand, if the “bright

line” emissions contribution level were set low enough,

the reverse could occur - that is, upwind states would

bear a disproportionate share of the emissions reductions

burden while downwind states would incur no respon-

sibility. Of course, the same disparities could occur

between different upwind states as well. In addressing

the implications of Petitioners’ arguments below, the D.C.

Circuit noted that “counsel eventually went so far as to

claim that if faced with two states, one of which could

eliminate all relevant emissions at a trivial cost, while the

other could eliminate none at a cost of less than $5000 a

19 See Ohio Pet. at 9.

20 Indeed, EPA found that additional downwind controls

would cost about $4300 per ton of NOx removed, while the

regional reductions required by EPA’s rule would cost only

approximately $1500 per ton removed. 63 Fed. Reg. 57,356,

57,379.

22

ton, EPA must mandate the same cutback for each.” Ind.

Pet., App. at 19a.

Petitioners provide absolutely no evidence that Con-

gress intended that EPA adopt such an approach to

addressing the problem of interstate transport under Sec-

tions 110(a)(2)(D) and 110(k)(5). Rather, Congress

intended quite the opposite. For example, when Congress

added one predecessor to Section 110(a)(2)(D), Senate

commenters noted that the new provisions were

“intended to equalize the positions of the States with

respect to interstate pollution,” and to ameliorate previ-

ously existing “distinct economic and competitive disad-

vantage[s].” S. Rep. No. 95-127 at 41-42, reprinted in 3

1977 Leg. Hist. 1415-16. Thus, factoring cost-effectiveness

into the assessment of significance allowed EPA to

respond to dual directives presented it by Congress: pro-

hibit all significant contribution, and take the equities of

the situation into account in allocating responsibility for

the ozone problem among different states in a region.

II. THERE ARE NO GROUNDS FOR A GRANT OF

CERTIORARI ON THE NON-DELEGATION DOC-

TRINE QUESTION

Industry Petitioners’ argument that this Court should

grant certiorari to review the D.C. Circuit’s decision on

the State Petitioners’ non-delegation doctrine challenge is

meritless. Industry Petitioners fail to identify any conflict

between the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision in Michigan

and the non-delegation jurisprudence of this Court, nor

siciasttasiaamiidaiiliiiliiiiciiial

23

do they identify any conflict within the D.C. Circuit’s

jurisprudence.?! |

A. There is No Conflict Between the D.C. Circuit's

Holding and This Court’s Non-Delegation Doc-

trine Jurisprudence.

Industry Petitioners, for the first time in this case,”

raise their claim that EPA’s analysis of significant contri-

bution is a constitutionally-impermissible exercise by the

Agency of the authority delegated to it by Congress. The

D.C. Circuit determined that EPA’s significant contribu-

tion analysis did not represent a constitutionally imper-

missible exercise of Agency discretion, and therefore did

not run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine, because the

Agency’s assessment of significance was confined by sev-

eral technical threshold determinations, and because the

resulting rule was limited in its scope. Ind. Pet., App. at

27a-28a.

While Industry baldly claims that the D.C. Circuit

has “turned upside-down the principle of unconstitu-

tional delegation,” they completely fail to describe any

conflict between the D.C. Circuit’s ultimate decision on

this point and this Court’s nondelegation jurisprudence.

Indeed, it is Industry Petitioners (and the State Peti-

tioners in the case below) who attempt to “turn the

21 Petitioners do not assert that any conflict exists between

the D.C. Circuit’s Michigan holding and decisions of any other

Circuit Courts of Appeals.

22 Industry Petitioners did not raise their nondelegation

argument before the D.C. Circuit; State Petitioners did raise the

issue below, but do not seek certiorari on that point.

24

nondelegation doctrine on its head” by using it to analyze

Agency actions under delegated authority, rather than to

examine the Congressional delegation of authority itself.

The nondelegation doctrine consistently has been used by

this Court as a constraint on Congressional, not adminis-

trative action.2? Moreover, the Court is currently review-

ing the D.C. Circuit’s application of the non-delegation

doctrine in the context of the Clean Air Act. ATA, No.

99-1257.

Assuming, arguendo, that it was appropriate for the

D.C. Circuit to apply the nondelegation doctrine to

analyze the Agency’s action in issuing the NOx SIP Call,

it is clear that the D.C. Circuit’s Michigan holding is

consistent with this Court’s jurisprudence. This Court’s

nondelegation cases recognize that “in our increasingly

complex society, replete with ever changing and more

technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job

absent an ability to delegate power under broad general

directives.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372

(1989). The interstate transport of ozone pollution and its

NOx precursor absolutely is the kind of complex techni-

cal problem for which the delegation to an agency with

substantial technical and scientific expertise is appropri-

ate.

23 See e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996);

Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991); Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989); J.W. Hampton & Co. v. United

States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (the purpose of the nondelegation

doctrine is to ensure that important policy choices are made by

Congress, and that Congress has provided “intelligible

principles” to guide agency action).

25

Furthermore, this Court’s analysis has never ended at

the question whether the delegation of authority to an

agency is broad or limited — the Court looks to the overall

scope of the delegated authority and the statutory context

in which the rules under it are developed. Indeed, agency

actions under statutes including broad delegations of

authority have consistently been upheld. Loving v. United

States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996) (citing National Broad. Co. v.

United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216-217, 225-26 (1943)). There

have been only two instances in the history of the non-

delegation doctrine in which this Court has struck down

a Congressional delegation of authority, and in each of

those cases the concern was with completely standardless

or limitless delegation, not simply the grant of broad

authority.24 But EPA’s decisionmaking in the NOx SIP

Call was neither standardless nor limitless - the D.C.

Circuit found the Agency had constrained its discretion

both by the factors it used to bound its significance

analysis, and by the limited geographic scope of the Rule.

24 See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 418, 420, 431-32

(1935); A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,

537-542 & 553 (1935) (Cardozo, J. concurring and noting

particular concern where the delegated authority extends “as

wide as the field of industrial regulation.”). And even in Panama

and Schecter, the Court recognized that “legislation must often

be adapted to complex conditions involving a host of details

with which the national legislature cannot deal directly.”

Panama, 293 U.S. at 248; Schecter, 295 U.S. 495, 529-530. That is

precisely the situation presented here — EPA has been delegated

a complex problem to solve - a problem involving a host of

technical details that Congress could not have efficiently or

expertly addressed itself.

‘

26

Moreover, the delegation of authority to EPA under

Sections 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) and 110(k)(5) was specifically

limited by Congress. Clear boundaries confine EPA’s

exercise of its discretion in the NOx SIP Call Rule, includ-

ing the following recognized by the D.C. Circuit: “EPA

must find (1) emissions activity within a state; (2) show

with modeling or other evidence that such emissions are

migrating into other states; and (3) show that the emis-

sions are contributing to nonattainment.” Ind. Pet., App.

at 28a.

The court also found that because the resulting NOx

SIP Call Rule did not “affect the whole economy,” a more

precise set of standards confining the Agency’s action

was unnecessary. Id. Whatever else one may think of this

analysis, it is completely consistent with this Court’s

nondelegation jurisprudence, which examines not only

the standards governing agency action, but the scope of

the delegated power. See, e.g., Synar v. United States, 626

F. Supp. 1374, 1386 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v.

Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (constitutionality of a delega-

tion must be assessed both on the basis of the specificity

of the standards governing its exercise and the overall

scope of the power granted).

B. The D.C. Circuit’s Holding Does Not Represent

an Intra-Circuit Conflict.

Industry Petitioners paint a picture of the D.C. Cir-

cuit in conflict with itself that is simply incorrect. They

allege that the Michigan decision is somehow at odds with

the D.C. Circuit’s previous decisions, particularly ATA.

27

While we disagree strongly with the D. C. Circuit’s deci-

sion in ATA, it certainly is not in conflict with the decision

in Michigan on the grounds asserted by Industry Peti-

tioners.25

The Michigan court upheld the Agency’s exercise of

its authority under a broad delegation not only because

the Agency’s action was confined by articulated stan-

dards,* Ind. Pet., App. at 28a, but also because the

25 In earlier D.C. Circuit decisions upholding previous EPA

significant contribution determinations under the Act, the

nondelegation doctrine was not even at issue. New York v. EPA,

852 F.2d 574 (D.C. Cir. 1988); National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v.

Train, 539 F.2d 775 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

26 This point is ignored by Industry Petitioners, who simply

seize the court’s dicta (namely the statement that the selection

by EPA of the $2000/ton cost-effectiveness cutoff as one element

of the significance analysis “is a radically incomplete line-

drawing device”) to allege an exercise of standardless

discretion. Ind. Pet. at 20. But Industry Petitioners significantly

fail to note that the court went on to find that EPA had properly

limited its action under the statute through three threshold

determinations. Ind. Pet., App. at 28a.

Furthermore, while we agree with the D.C. Circuit that

EPA’s NOx SIP Call Rule was a valid exercise of delegated

Agency authority, we do not agree with the court’s dictum that

EPA “understood that its selection of the [cost] cut-off point was

essentially unbounded.” Ind. Pet., App. at 27a. EPA did not

simply pick the $2000/ton figure out of thin air. Rather, it

evaluated the cost of NOx emission control options, and found

that most “emissions controls that are available and of

comparable cost to other recently undertaken or planned NOx

[controls] . . . fall below $2000/ton.” 63 Fed. Reg: 57,356, 57,400.

EPA further explained that “the cost-effectiveness of measures

that EPA or States have adopted, or proposed to adopt, forms a

good reference point for determining which of the available

additional NOx control measures can most easily be

28

resulting Rule is limited in scope both geographically and

because it does not affect all American enterprise. Id. at

27a-28a. Industry Petitioners erroneously suggest that

this represents a new or different approach taken by the

D.C. Circuit to its analysis of agency action under the

nondelegation doctrine. Ind. Pet. at 20. It is notable that

they provide no citations illustrating the conflict they

suggest.

In fact, the court’s Michigan analysis is completely

consistent with previous cases in which the D.C. Circuit

(wrongly, we believe) has used the nondelegation doc-

trine to analyze agency actions under Congressionally-

delegated authority. In ATA, the court noted its view that

where the Agency “standards in question affect the whole

economy,” a more precise delegation (or more accurately

to the situation, a decisional principle more clearly articu-

lated by the Agency) is required. ATA, 175 F.3d at 1037

(citing Schecter, 295 U.S. 495, 553 (1935)). Similarly, in

Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1991), the

court remanded a rule precisely because the scope of the

agency’s claimed power to roam was “immense, encom-

passing all American enterprise,” and, the D.C. Circuit

believed, this ran afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.

The Michigan court, distinguishing those earlier holdings,

implemented by upwind states whose emissions impact

downwind nonattainment problems.” Id. This approach is

analogous to various provisions in the Act requiring sources to ~

install emission control technology that is “reasonably

available.” See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) (requiring major

sources in ozone nonattainment areas to install “reasonably

available control technology”).

ST ee nee ey

29

held not only that the Agency had constrained its deci-

sionmaking,?” but that the resulting rule does not affect

the whole economy. Ind. Pet., App. 28a. Michigan there-

fore does not represent a new approach by the D.C.

Circuit, nor is it in conflict with its earlier decisions, and

therefore is not worthy of a grant of certiorari by this

Court.

More importantly, as noted supra, this Court cur-

rently is reviewing an important Clean Air Act case in

which both the ultimate results of the D.C. Circuit’s non-

delegation doctrine analysis and its reasoning were

inconsistent with this Court’s non-delegation jurispru-

dence. ATA, No. 99-1257. That case provides this Court

ample opportunity to evaluate how the D.C. Circuit is

applying the non-delegation doctrine, making review of

the instant case unnecessary.

4

v

27 In fact, the court’s concern in Lockout/Tagout I, that the

agency’s asserted power to make a rule so stringent as to risk

taking industry to the verge of economic ruin, see Lockout/Tagout

I, 938 F.2d at 1317, is clearly not at issue here, where EPA has

included the availability of cost-effective NOx controls as one

limiting element in its significance determination.

30

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny

certiorari on the questions presented in the State and

Industry Petitions.

Respectfully submitted,

Davip W. MARSHALL

(Counsel of Record)

Clean Air Task Force

P.O. Box 950

Henniker, NH 03242

(603) 428-8114

and

ANN BREWSTER WEEKS

Clean Air Task Force

c/o Grants Management Associates

77 Summer Street, 8th Floor

Boston, MA 02110

(617) 292-0234

Counsel for Environmental Intervenors

Davip G. HaAwkKINs

Joun D. WALKE

Natural Resources Defense Council

1200 New York Avenue, NW

Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 289-6868

Howarp A. LEARNER

JouN N. Moore

Environmental Law & Policy

Center of the Midwest

35 East Wacker Drive, Suite 1300

Chicago, IL 60601

(312) 673-6500

Dated: January 4, 2001

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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