Opposition Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency
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No. 00-632 /
INTHE . Pens
Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vu
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC HOWARD E, SHAPIRO
SERVICE AUTHORITY Counsel of Record
JOHN WEST STEPHEN C. FOTIS
Executive Vice President VAN NESS FELDMAN,
and Chief Legal Officer | A Professional Corporation
ELIZABETH H. WARNER 1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
Associate General Counsel 7th Floor
CATHERINE P. BLACK Washington, D.C. 20007-3877
Senior Attorney (202) 298-1800
P.O. Box 2946101 Attorneys for South Carolina
Moncks Corner, SC 29461 Public Service Authority
(843) 761-8000
WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether, under § 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410, the cost of reducing air pollutant emissions is a rele-
vant and proper factor for the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) to use in determining whether a
state is significantly contributing to another state’s failure to
attain a national ambient air quality standard.
(i)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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(iii)
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES Page
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981).................. 7
Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837
CRIT nx.saniseciioniintiniiinicinnpitabicticancisuantiathaiataaiah initia 5
STATUTES
Clean Air Act
© OE Re SIA. BP ceteisecnesssnsnsntininninctoesnitnanonnen 6,7
§ 110(aX(2)(D)i(D, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)
CRD Sit nsainn to vsineonbndiionsipndicddiiciinnaidianeaushabienaiaiinigaadia passim
S RES GE), 42 UA. OFS ES OD vcecicsnsissncciseccsmnetoses 7
§ 307 (d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (d)(1) ..... ee eeeeeeeees 3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
American Trucking Associations. v. U.S. EPA,
PRs Se aD asicshccacnibditiannssaehecinanendancenicaiiieantiiiniliien 2, 6,8
Appalachian Power Co., et al. v. US.
Environmental Protection Agency, 00-445......... 2
The States of Ohio and Indiana v. US.
Environmental Protection Agency, et al., No.
IEE nccssticcestadaiscesihiaindiniadtebhens aniaatabapaintasehianiaiees rae
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
. Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
STATEMENT
South Carolina Public Service Authority d/b/a/ Santee
Cooper adopts the Statement set forth in the Petition of the
State of Michigan et al. (Mich. Pet. 3-7). Santee Cooper is a
state-owned electric and water utility, and the nation’s fourth
largest public power system. It operates a number of large
electric generating facilities, including coal-fired units di-
rectly affected by the NOx SIP Call. Santee Cooper was a pe-
titioner in the court of appeals. It joined the consolidated
brief of parties in the court of appeals who unsuccess-
2
fully challenged EPA’s use of cost factors under
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)) (1994).
ARGUMENT
Santee Cooper urges the Court to grant the writ of certio-
rari sought in this case” by Michigan and four other States.
One of the petitioners is Santee Cooper’s home state, South
Carolina. Santee Cooper fully supports South Carolina and
the other States petitioning in this docket.
The court of appeals has _ seriously misconstrued
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(iXD, by allowing the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) to use the cost of reducing air pollutant
emissions to determine whether a state is “contributing sig-
nificantly” to nonattainment of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS) in another state. The language
in § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D) speaks directly to “significant contri-
bution.” That language permits only a quantitative air quality
approach, not a cost approach, when EPA determines whether
upwind states “contribute significantly” to nonattainment in
downwind states. Because §110(a)(2)(D)(I)(i) is clear and
unambiguous, even if the Court were to hold in American
Trucking Associations. v. U.S. EPA, No. 99-1426 (argued
November 7, 2000), that costs may be considered by EPA
when setting NAAQS under § 109(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7409(b), that holding would not apply to the plainly differ-
ent language of § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D. Since the District of
' Joint Common Issues Brief of Industry Labor Petitioners, D.C. Cir.
No. 98-1497 (and consolidated cases).
? If the Court grants the petition in this case, it should also grant the
two other petitions seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the
“significant contribution” issue: The States of Ohio and Indiana v. US.
Environmental Protection Agency, et al., No. 00-633 and Appalachian
Power Co., et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 00-445
2
Columbia Circuit is the premier appellate forum for resolu-
tion of issues under the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1)), and
since the court of appeals’ determination in this case affects
strongly conflicting interests among states across the entire
Eastern half of the nation, there are compelling reasons for
the Court to grant the writ.
1. The D.C. Circuit’s construction of § 110(a)(2)(D)(iXD
permits the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to
make a “significant contribution” determination that is not
based on air quality factors. The statute, however, expressly
confines “significant contribution” to the emission of “any air
pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to
nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other
State” (emphasis added). Under the court of appeals’
reading, the ultimate determination of contribution to nonat-
tainment may be made by EPA on the basis of what the court
described as essentially unbounded discretion to decide the
appropriate costs for controlling the interstate transport of
pollutants. (Mich. Pet. App. 23a).
The D.C. Circuit’s endorsement of EPA’s construction is
inconsistent with the description, elsewhere in its opinion, of
the requirements of the statute. The majority expressly ruled
that under § 110(a)(2)(D)(i), “EPA must find (1) emissions
activities within a state; (2) show with modeling or other evi-
dence that such emissions are migrating into other states; and
(3) show that the emissions are contributing to nonattain-
ment.” (Mich. Pet. App. 24a). Under the majority’s read-
ing, however, the third factor—which is the crux of
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D)-—depends on the costs of controlling
emissions as determined by EPA, rather than on air quality,
i.e., the quantitative “amount” of any air pollutant that
reaches downwind states. In effect, the statute’s quantitative
air quality requirement is reduced to a mere preliminary
“nominal” determination. The real determination of signifi-
cance turns on EPA’s view of the costs of control. The ma-
jority concedes as much. It said:
4
EPA’s design was to have a lot of states make what it
considered modest NOx reductions, uniformly limited to
one that could be achieved (in EPA’s estimate) for less
than $2,000 a ton. (Mich. Pet. at 15a) (emphasis added).
The court also conceded that EPA’s approach produces
variations among states as to the threshold for “contribut[ing]
significantly.” It observed:
As a result, naturally, the ultimate line of “significance,”
whether measured in volume of NOx emitted or arriving
in nonattainment areas, would vary from state to state
depending on variations in cutback costs. (Mich. Pet. at
15a).
Further, the court acknowledged that EPA’s use of costs,
rather than “amounts of pollutants,” as the measure of “sig-
nificant contribution” forces states to order reductions of
emissions on the basis of EPA’s cost test, not the actual NOx
amounts contributing significantly to downwind non-
attainment. It ruled:
Petitioners claim that . . . where two states differ consid-
erably in the amount of their respective NOx contribu-
tions to downwind nonattainment, under the EPA rule
even the small contributors must make reductions
equivalent to those achievable by highly-effective meas-
ures. This of course flows ineluctably from the EPA’s
decision to draw the “significant contribution” line on a
basis of cost differentials. (Mich. Pet. at 22a).
Treating upwind states that contribute only small amounts
of pollutants to downwind nonattainment the same as states
that contribute large amounts is flatly inconsistent with the
exclusive focus of § 110(a)(2)(D)(I)(i) on air quality factors,
through the quantitative term “amounts.” Such a construction
irrationally permits the large contributors to continue contrib-
uting significant amounts to downwind nonattainment to the
extent that the costs of reducing such pollution exceed
5
$2,000. The court’s decision to uphold EPA’s construction
converts the statute’s provision for quantity-based variations
among upwind states into a one-size-fits-all formula. This
revision of Congress’ intent can be explained only by the ma-
jority’s eagerness to advance the proposition that costs should
be considered under any regulatory statute unless there is a
clear legislative expression to the contrary.
As the petitioning States demonstrate, the plain language in
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D is such a clear expression to the contrary.
Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i) literally requires that states include in
their State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) restrictions on the
quantity of pollutants adversely affecting other states. SIPs
must prohibit emissions of “any air pollutant in amounts
which will contribute significantly to nonattainment,” in other
states. This plain language should have disposed of the entire
case, for the reasons set forth in Judge Santelle’s dissent.
And, as he also showed, Congress left no room for deference
to EPA’s construction under Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). (Mich. Pet. 51a-53a).
By allowing EPA to consider cost factors in its
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i) determination, the court of appeals effec-
tively authorizes an extraneous, nonstatutory factor in the
agency’s “significant contribution” equation. It imposes an
irrational uniformity on states regardless of their level of in-
terstate emissions. The decision allows EPA to usurp state
authority by shifting to itself initial authority to determine
control strategies for achieving compliance with NAAQS.
Such a shift is contrary to the fundamental scheme of the
CAA. That scheme vests in the states primary responsibility
for implementing National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(“NAAQS”) developed by EPA under § 109, 42 U.S.C. 7409.
They must apply the federal NAAQS to emission sources
within their borders. Section 110(a)(2) calls on the states to
include in their SIPs “adequate provisions” prohibiting
sources within the state from emitting pollutants in amounts
6
that will contribute significantly to nonattainment or interfere
with maintenance of NAAQS in other states. In implement-
ing the NAAQS, the states must, in effect, undertake a triage
that allocates the costs and burdens of compliance among the
various categories of emission sources they requlate. EPA’s
reading of § 110(a)(2)(D)(i) as sustained by the court, how-
ever, arrogates to the federal government a fundamental ele-
ment of pollution control strategy—costs—that Congress in-
tended the states to determine and allocate.
The error of the court of appeals’ construction of
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) extends beyond interstate transport pre-
vention under that provision. EPA could, with the D.C. Cir-
cuit’s blessing, apply its version of “highly effective cost
controls” to set aside any state’s determination of the extent
that particular in-state sources, or categories of in-state
sources, must reduce emissions in order to attain or maintain
NAAQS.
2. Whatever the outcome of the cross-petition in Ameri-
can Trucking, the D.C. Circuit’s misconstruction of
§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i) is an issue of compelling public importance
that independently warrants review by this Court. It involves
the core of the CAA’s scheme of cooperative federalism. It
also involves the crucial question of when costs may be con-
sidered by EPA when it implements the various, and differ-
ing, provisions of the CAA.
The D.C. Circuit resolves these issues by allowing EPA to
use a cost test even where Congress clearly indicates the con-
trary. Yet EPA takes a different, and inconsistent, approach
to § 109 in its merits brief before this Court in the American
Trucking cross-petition. EPA there argues that costs can be
considered “in the NAAQS-implementation process, but not
in the NAAQ3S-setting process.” (Br. for Fed. Resp., No. 99-
1426 at 16). EPA fails to recognize, however, that the factors
within the general category of “implementation” depend on
the language of each specific provision within that category.
4
Some implementation provisions include only air quality fac-
tors, while other include cost, technological feasibility, or
other considerations as well. Thus, EPA errs in American
Trucking when it describes the court of appeals’ decision in
this case as an example of an “appropriate” consideration of
costs in the implementation process. Such a use of costs is
appropriate, it contends, because “Congress has not expressly
prescribed what factors [EPA] should consider in making
regulatory determinations.” (/d. at 41). Nevertheless in the
same brief EPA insists that “[w]hen Congress has intended
that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly
indicated such intent on the face of the statute.” (Br. for Fed.
Resp. at 43, citing American Textile Manufacturers Institute
v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981)).
The American Textile principle applies to the CAA. Where
Congress intends costs to be considered at a particular stage
of “implementation” or other processes under the CAA, it has
so specified. See e.g., § 109(d)(2) (advice of adverse eco-
nomic effects to be included in CASAC reports); § 112(d) 42
U.S.C. § 7412 (d) (emission standards for hazardous pollut-
ants shall take into consideration the cost of achieving emis-
sion reductions). There is no basis for applying a different
principle to § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D.?
3. Michigan, South Carolina and the other States have
shown in their petition that the consequences of the court of
appeals decision are of enormous public importance to up-
wind and downwind states. Those consequences are also of
enormous economic significance to sources of emissions like
Santee Cooper, which must bear the actual costs of compli-
ance. This Court should clarify the standard for deciding
> Because § 110(a)(2)(D)(2)(i)() clearly excludes costs, costs cannot
be even a “secondary factor” for determining significant contribution,
contrary to the contention in the petition of States of Ohio and indiana in
their petition in No. 00-633.
8
when costs may be considered under the CAA in general, and
under §110(a)(2)(D)(i) in particular; and the extent to which
the American Textile principle applies to the varied provisions
of this exceedingly complex statute.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in the Petition of the State of Michi-
gan et al., and in this response, the petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari should be granted regardless of the outcome of the
cross-petition granted in No. 99-1426.
SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC
SERVICE AUTHORITY
JOHN WEST
Executive Vice President
and Chief Legal Officer
ELIZABETH H. WARNER
Associate General Counsel
CATHERINE P. BLACK
Senior Attorney
P.O. Box 2946101
Moncks Corner, SC 29461
(843) 761-8000
Respectfully submitted,
HOWARD E. SHAPIRO
Counsel of Record
STEPHEN C. FOTIS
VAN NESS FELDMAN,
A Professional Corporation
1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.
7th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20007-3877
(202) 298-1800
Attorneys for South Carolina
Public Service Authority
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