Opposition Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency

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No. 00-632 /

INTHE . Pens

Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vu

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC HOWARD E, SHAPIRO

SERVICE AUTHORITY Counsel of Record

JOHN WEST STEPHEN C. FOTIS

Executive Vice President VAN NESS FELDMAN,

and Chief Legal Officer | A Professional Corporation

ELIZABETH H. WARNER 1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.

Associate General Counsel 7th Floor

CATHERINE P. BLACK Washington, D.C. 20007-3877

Senior Attorney (202) 298-1800

P.O. Box 2946101 Attorneys for South Carolina

Moncks Corner, SC 29461 Public Service Authority

(843) 761-8000

WILSON-EPES PRINTING Co., INC. — (202) 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under § 110 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410, the cost of reducing air pollutant emissions is a rele-

vant and proper factor for the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (“EPA”) to use in determining whether a

state is significantly contributing to another state’s failure to

attain a national ambient air quality standard.

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

American Textile Manufacturers Institute v.

Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981).................. 7

Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837

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STATUTES

Clean Air Act

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§ 110(aX(2)(D)i(D, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)

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§ 307 (d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (d)(1) ..... ee eeeeeeeees 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

American Trucking Associations. v. U.S. EPA,

PRs Se aD asicshccacnibditiannssaehecinanendancenicaiiieantiiiniliien 2, 6,8

Appalachian Power Co., et al. v. US.

Environmental Protection Agency, 00-445......... 2

The States of Ohio and Indiana v. US.

Environmental Protection Agency, et al., No.

IEE nccssticcestadaiscesihiaindiniadtebhens aniaatabapaintasehianiaiees rae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,

. Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC SERVICE AUTHORITY

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

STATEMENT

South Carolina Public Service Authority d/b/a/ Santee

Cooper adopts the Statement set forth in the Petition of the

State of Michigan et al. (Mich. Pet. 3-7). Santee Cooper is a

state-owned electric and water utility, and the nation’s fourth

largest public power system. It operates a number of large

electric generating facilities, including coal-fired units di-

rectly affected by the NOx SIP Call. Santee Cooper was a pe-

titioner in the court of appeals. It joined the consolidated

brief of parties in the court of appeals who unsuccess-

2

fully challenged EPA’s use of cost factors under

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)) (1994).

ARGUMENT

Santee Cooper urges the Court to grant the writ of certio-

rari sought in this case” by Michigan and four other States.

One of the petitioners is Santee Cooper’s home state, South

Carolina. Santee Cooper fully supports South Carolina and

the other States petitioning in this docket.

The court of appeals has _ seriously misconstrued

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), 42 U.S.C.

§ 7410(a)(2)(D)(iXD, by allowing the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency (“EPA”) to use the cost of reducing air pollutant

emissions to determine whether a state is “contributing sig-

nificantly” to nonattainment of the National Ambient Air

Quality Standards (NAAQS) in another state. The language

in § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D) speaks directly to “significant contri-

bution.” That language permits only a quantitative air quality

approach, not a cost approach, when EPA determines whether

upwind states “contribute significantly” to nonattainment in

downwind states. Because §110(a)(2)(D)(I)(i) is clear and

unambiguous, even if the Court were to hold in American

Trucking Associations. v. U.S. EPA, No. 99-1426 (argued

November 7, 2000), that costs may be considered by EPA

when setting NAAQS under § 109(b) of the CAA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 7409(b), that holding would not apply to the plainly differ-

ent language of § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D. Since the District of

' Joint Common Issues Brief of Industry Labor Petitioners, D.C. Cir.

No. 98-1497 (and consolidated cases).

? If the Court grants the petition in this case, it should also grant the

two other petitions seeking review of the Court of Appeals’ ruling on the

“significant contribution” issue: The States of Ohio and Indiana v. US.

Environmental Protection Agency, et al., No. 00-633 and Appalachian

Power Co., et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 00-445

2

Columbia Circuit is the premier appellate forum for resolu-

tion of issues under the CAA (42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(1)), and

since the court of appeals’ determination in this case affects

strongly conflicting interests among states across the entire

Eastern half of the nation, there are compelling reasons for

the Court to grant the writ.

1. The D.C. Circuit’s construction of § 110(a)(2)(D)(iXD

permits the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to

make a “significant contribution” determination that is not

based on air quality factors. The statute, however, expressly

confines “significant contribution” to the emission of “any air

pollutant in amounts which will contribute significantly to

nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other

State” (emphasis added). Under the court of appeals’

reading, the ultimate determination of contribution to nonat-

tainment may be made by EPA on the basis of what the court

described as essentially unbounded discretion to decide the

appropriate costs for controlling the interstate transport of

pollutants. (Mich. Pet. App. 23a).

The D.C. Circuit’s endorsement of EPA’s construction is

inconsistent with the description, elsewhere in its opinion, of

the requirements of the statute. The majority expressly ruled

that under § 110(a)(2)(D)(i), “EPA must find (1) emissions

activities within a state; (2) show with modeling or other evi-

dence that such emissions are migrating into other states; and

(3) show that the emissions are contributing to nonattain-

ment.” (Mich. Pet. App. 24a). Under the majority’s read-

ing, however, the third factor—which is the crux of

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D)-—depends on the costs of controlling

emissions as determined by EPA, rather than on air quality,

i.e., the quantitative “amount” of any air pollutant that

reaches downwind states. In effect, the statute’s quantitative

air quality requirement is reduced to a mere preliminary

“nominal” determination. The real determination of signifi-

cance turns on EPA’s view of the costs of control. The ma-

jority concedes as much. It said:

4

EPA’s design was to have a lot of states make what it

considered modest NOx reductions, uniformly limited to

one that could be achieved (in EPA’s estimate) for less

than $2,000 a ton. (Mich. Pet. at 15a) (emphasis added).

The court also conceded that EPA’s approach produces

variations among states as to the threshold for “contribut[ing]

significantly.” It observed:

As a result, naturally, the ultimate line of “significance,”

whether measured in volume of NOx emitted or arriving

in nonattainment areas, would vary from state to state

depending on variations in cutback costs. (Mich. Pet. at

15a).

Further, the court acknowledged that EPA’s use of costs,

rather than “amounts of pollutants,” as the measure of “sig-

nificant contribution” forces states to order reductions of

emissions on the basis of EPA’s cost test, not the actual NOx

amounts contributing significantly to downwind non-

attainment. It ruled:

Petitioners claim that . . . where two states differ consid-

erably in the amount of their respective NOx contribu-

tions to downwind nonattainment, under the EPA rule

even the small contributors must make reductions

equivalent to those achievable by highly-effective meas-

ures. This of course flows ineluctably from the EPA’s

decision to draw the “significant contribution” line on a

basis of cost differentials. (Mich. Pet. at 22a).

Treating upwind states that contribute only small amounts

of pollutants to downwind nonattainment the same as states

that contribute large amounts is flatly inconsistent with the

exclusive focus of § 110(a)(2)(D)(I)(i) on air quality factors,

through the quantitative term “amounts.” Such a construction

irrationally permits the large contributors to continue contrib-

uting significant amounts to downwind nonattainment to the

extent that the costs of reducing such pollution exceed

5

$2,000. The court’s decision to uphold EPA’s construction

converts the statute’s provision for quantity-based variations

among upwind states into a one-size-fits-all formula. This

revision of Congress’ intent can be explained only by the ma-

jority’s eagerness to advance the proposition that costs should

be considered under any regulatory statute unless there is a

clear legislative expression to the contrary.

As the petitioning States demonstrate, the plain language in

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D is such a clear expression to the contrary.

Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i) literally requires that states include in

their State Implementation Plans (“SIPs”) restrictions on the

quantity of pollutants adversely affecting other states. SIPs

must prohibit emissions of “any air pollutant in amounts

which will contribute significantly to nonattainment,” in other

states. This plain language should have disposed of the entire

case, for the reasons set forth in Judge Santelle’s dissent.

And, as he also showed, Congress left no room for deference

to EPA’s construction under Chevron USA, Inc. v. NRDC,

467 U.S. 837 (1984). (Mich. Pet. 51a-53a).

By allowing EPA to consider cost factors in its

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i) determination, the court of appeals effec-

tively authorizes an extraneous, nonstatutory factor in the

agency’s “significant contribution” equation. It imposes an

irrational uniformity on states regardless of their level of in-

terstate emissions. The decision allows EPA to usurp state

authority by shifting to itself initial authority to determine

control strategies for achieving compliance with NAAQS.

Such a shift is contrary to the fundamental scheme of the

CAA. That scheme vests in the states primary responsibility

for implementing National Ambient Air Quality Standards

(“NAAQS”) developed by EPA under § 109, 42 U.S.C. 7409.

They must apply the federal NAAQS to emission sources

within their borders. Section 110(a)(2) calls on the states to

include in their SIPs “adequate provisions” prohibiting

sources within the state from emitting pollutants in amounts

6

that will contribute significantly to nonattainment or interfere

with maintenance of NAAQS in other states. In implement-

ing the NAAQS, the states must, in effect, undertake a triage

that allocates the costs and burdens of compliance among the

various categories of emission sources they requlate. EPA’s

reading of § 110(a)(2)(D)(i) as sustained by the court, how-

ever, arrogates to the federal government a fundamental ele-

ment of pollution control strategy—costs—that Congress in-

tended the states to determine and allocate.

The error of the court of appeals’ construction of

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) extends beyond interstate transport pre-

vention under that provision. EPA could, with the D.C. Cir-

cuit’s blessing, apply its version of “highly effective cost

controls” to set aside any state’s determination of the extent

that particular in-state sources, or categories of in-state

sources, must reduce emissions in order to attain or maintain

NAAQS.

2. Whatever the outcome of the cross-petition in Ameri-

can Trucking, the D.C. Circuit’s misconstruction of

§ 110(a)(2)(D)(i) is an issue of compelling public importance

that independently warrants review by this Court. It involves

the core of the CAA’s scheme of cooperative federalism. It

also involves the crucial question of when costs may be con-

sidered by EPA when it implements the various, and differ-

ing, provisions of the CAA.

The D.C. Circuit resolves these issues by allowing EPA to

use a cost test even where Congress clearly indicates the con-

trary. Yet EPA takes a different, and inconsistent, approach

to § 109 in its merits brief before this Court in the American

Trucking cross-petition. EPA there argues that costs can be

considered “in the NAAQS-implementation process, but not

in the NAAQ3S-setting process.” (Br. for Fed. Resp., No. 99-

1426 at 16). EPA fails to recognize, however, that the factors

within the general category of “implementation” depend on

the language of each specific provision within that category.

4

Some implementation provisions include only air quality fac-

tors, while other include cost, technological feasibility, or

other considerations as well. Thus, EPA errs in American

Trucking when it describes the court of appeals’ decision in

this case as an example of an “appropriate” consideration of

costs in the implementation process. Such a use of costs is

appropriate, it contends, because “Congress has not expressly

prescribed what factors [EPA] should consider in making

regulatory determinations.” (/d. at 41). Nevertheless in the

same brief EPA insists that “[w]hen Congress has intended

that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly

indicated such intent on the face of the statute.” (Br. for Fed.

Resp. at 43, citing American Textile Manufacturers Institute

v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 510 (1981)).

The American Textile principle applies to the CAA. Where

Congress intends costs to be considered at a particular stage

of “implementation” or other processes under the CAA, it has

so specified. See e.g., § 109(d)(2) (advice of adverse eco-

nomic effects to be included in CASAC reports); § 112(d) 42

U.S.C. § 7412 (d) (emission standards for hazardous pollut-

ants shall take into consideration the cost of achieving emis-

sion reductions). There is no basis for applying a different

principle to § 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(D.?

3. Michigan, South Carolina and the other States have

shown in their petition that the consequences of the court of

appeals decision are of enormous public importance to up-

wind and downwind states. Those consequences are also of

enormous economic significance to sources of emissions like

Santee Cooper, which must bear the actual costs of compli-

ance. This Court should clarify the standard for deciding

> Because § 110(a)(2)(D)(2)(i)() clearly excludes costs, costs cannot

be even a “secondary factor” for determining significant contribution,

contrary to the contention in the petition of States of Ohio and indiana in

their petition in No. 00-633.

8

when costs may be considered under the CAA in general, and

under §110(a)(2)(D)(i) in particular; and the extent to which

the American Textile principle applies to the varied provisions

of this exceedingly complex statute.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in the Petition of the State of Michi-

gan et al., and in this response, the petition for a writ of cer-

tiorari should be granted regardless of the outcome of the

cross-petition granted in No. 99-1426.

SOUTH CAROLINA PUBLIC

SERVICE AUTHORITY

JOHN WEST

Executive Vice President

and Chief Legal Officer

ELIZABETH H. WARNER

Associate General Counsel

CATHERINE P. BLACK

Senior Attorney

P.O. Box 2946101

Moncks Corner, SC 29461

(843) 761-8000

Respectfully submitted,

HOWARD E. SHAPIRO

Counsel of Record

STEPHEN C. FOTIS

VAN NESS FELDMAN,

A Professional Corporation

1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, N.W.

7th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20007-3877

(202) 298-1800

Attorneys for South Carolina

Public Service Authority

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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