Appendix — Hopkins v. Saunders

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Text

~ FIL ED

00 4'7 APR 25 2000

Lt

DOCKET No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

——

TOMMY D. HOPKINS,

Petitioner,

V.

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, KYLE VICKERS, CHARLES

AUSFAHL, ROY TEMPLE AND BETH M. WHEELER,

Respondents.

—

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To the United States Court of

Appeals For the Eighth Circuit

—~—

APPENDIX TO |

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

<_<

* TOMMY D. HOPKINS

2408 Oakview Dr.

Jefferson City, Missouri 65109-0738

(573) 636-9534

* Pro Se Petitioner

\“/GA ny

S ae ee

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

denying rehearing entered on January 26, 2000 l

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

entered on December 16, 1999 2-21

Order of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri on Rule 60(b) Motion entered on

June 16, 1998 22-23

Order of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri on Rule 59 Motion entered on

April 22, 1998 24-25

Judgment of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri entered on February 27, 1998 26-30

Order of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri Setting Hearing Schedule entered on

November 7, 1997 31

Order of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri entered on September 30, 1997__ 32-40

Order of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

denying rehearing entered on January 23, 1996 4]

Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

entered on August 23, 1996 42-51

Order of the United States District Court for the Western

District of Missouri entered on January 9, 1996 52-78

Judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri

entered on May 4, 1995 __ 79-80

Order of the Personnel Advisory Board of the State of

Missouri entered on October 18, 1994 81-84

Text of First Amendment to U.S. Constitution 85

Text of Fifth Amendment to U.S. Constitution 85

Text of Eleventh Amendment to U.S. Constitution _—_—&5

Text of Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution 85

Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 74 86

Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 79 86-90

Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 84.(g) 90

Text of 7 U.S.C. Section 87.(f) 91

Text of 28 U.S.C. Section 1254 91

Text of 28 U.S.C. Section 1738 91

Text of 28 U.S.C. Section 1746 92

Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 92-93

Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 93-94

Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e 94-96

Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-2 96

Text of 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-3(a) 97

Text of 7 CFR Section 800.0 98-101

Text of 7 CFR Section 800.1 101

Text of 7 CFR Section 800.196 101-106

Text of Article I Section 2 to Missouri Constitution 107

Text of Article I Section 8 to Missouri Constitution 107

Text of Article I Section 10 to Missouri Constitution 107

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.030 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 108-110

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.031 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 110-111

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.350 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 111-112

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.380 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 112

Text of Chapter 36 Section 36.390 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 113-114

Text of Chapter 105 Section 105.055 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 115-116

Text of Chapter 411 Section 411.145 of Missouri Revised

Statutes 116-117

Text of Rule Number VI (1)(A) of the Merit System Rules

and Regulations for the Division of Grain Inspection 118

Text of Rule Number VI (2)(A) of the Merit System Rules

and Regulations for the Division of Grain Inspection 118

ili

Text of Rule Number VIII (5)of the Merit System Rules and

Regulations for the Division of Grain Inspection 118-119

Text of Rule Number XIV (1)(D) of the Merit System

Rules and Regulations for the Division of Grain

Inspection 119-120

Executive Order of the Governor of the State of Missouri

entered February 1, 1978 121-122 .

Letter of Termination issued by John L. Saunders to

Tommy D. Hopkins on June 10, 1994 123

Tommy D. Hopkins’ Request for Jury Trial submitted to

the United States District Court for the Western District

of Missouri on October 27, 1994 and entered as District

Court Document #2 124

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2803 WHJC

Tommy D. Hopkins,

Appellant,

Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing and for Rehearing

En Banc

v.

John L. Saunders, et al.,

~~ we KM KK mM KM

Appellees.

The petition for rehearing en banc is denied. The

petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

(5128-010199)

January 26, 2000

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2803

Tommy D. Hopkins, ’

Plaintiff/Appellant, :

*

V. °

Mm

John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, °

Charles Ausfahl, Roy Temple, °

Beth M. Wheeler, *

Defendants/Appellees. °

Appeals from

the United

No. 98-2948 States District

Court for the

Western District

of Missouri.

Tommy D. Hopkins,

*

Plaintiff/Appellee, °

*~

V. *

* 7

John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, as

Defendants/Appellants, °

*

Charles Ausfahl, *

Defendant, :

x

Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler,

Defendants/Appellants. ”

Submitted: | September 14, 1999

Filed: December 16, 1999

Before WOLLMAN, Chief Judge, HEANEY and BEAM,

Circuit Judges.

WOLLMAN, Chief Judge.

Tommy D. Hopkins appeals from the district court's

denial of his claim for reinstatement and from the court's

failure to rule on his claims that John L. Saunders and other

state officials (collectively, the officials) violated his rights

under the First Amendment and Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (Title VII). 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17.' The

officials cross-appeal, contending that the district court erred

in finding that Hopkins had a property interest in his job and

in awarding Hopkins nominal damages and attorney fees.

We affirm in part and reverse in part.

I.

This case comes before us for the second time. We

outline only those facts relevant to this appeal, referring the

reader to a more complete recitation of the facts found in our

first opinion, Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 524-25 (8th

Cir. 1996) (Hopkins I). On June 10, 1994, Hopkins was

'We grant Hopkins’ motion to supplement the record.

3

dismissed from his position as director of the Division of

Grain Inspection and Warehousing (the Division) of the

Missouri Department of Agriculture (the Department)

without receiving prior notice or a hearing. Hopkins sought

review of his dismissal by filing an appeal with the

Agriculture Personnel Review Board (APRB), an entity

formed pursuant to a merit system plan adopted by the

Department in 1978 (1978 plan). The purpose of this plan

and the APRB was to ensure that Division employees were

employed on the basis of job qualifications rather than

political affiliations. The Department responded to Hopkins'

appeal with a letter explaining that the 1978 plan was void

and that the APRB no longer existed.

Hopkins then filed an appeal with the Personnel

Advisory Board (PAB), an employment termination review

board established under Chapter 36 of the Missouri Revised

Statutes. Chapter 36 is a state merit system law that was

enacted by the Missouri legislature in 1979; the Department

formally adopted the PAB dismissal procedures in 1982.

Following a hearing, the PAB found that Missouri Revised

Statute section 36.030.1(1) expressly excludes division.

directors, such as Hopkins, from the PAB's appeal

procedures, and, furthermore, that the 1978 plan remained

applicable to those employees who were excepted from the

PAB's procedures. The PAB therefore dismissed Hopkins'

claim, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal

and that the proper forum for such an appeal was the APRB.

Hopkins then brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in

federal district court against Saunders, Director of the

Department, and several other state officials, alleging that he

was dismissed in violation of his due process rights and in

violation of Missouri's whistleblower statute. The officials

moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity and

Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. The district court

denied the motion, whereupon the officials took an

4

interlocutory appeal to this court on the question of

immunity. We reversed, finding that the officials were

entitled to both qualified and Eleventh Amendment

immunity, and remanded the case to the district court for

further proceedings regarding Hopkins’ claim for equitable

relief. See Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. On remand, the

district court found by way of cross motions for summary

judgment that Hopkins had a property interest in his position

as Division director under the 1978 plan and that he had been

dismissed in violation of his procedural due process rights.

Following a hearing, the district court also found that

Hopkins would have been dismissed from his position even if

he had received due process. The court therefore awarded

Hopkins nominal damages only, along with attorney fees,

and entered a final judgment on all of Hopkins' claims.

Il.

Hopkins first argues that the district court denied him

the opportunity to pursue claims that he was discharged in

_violation of the First Amendment and Title Vil.2 He

contends that these claims were sufficiently raised in his

second amended complaint but were never properly resolved,

inasmuch as we did not dispose of them on immunity

grounds in Hopkins I and the district court failed to rule on

them on remand. Thus, Hopkins contends that the district

court, by entering a final judgement in Hopkins' action

against the officials, wrongly foreclosed his ability to pursue

these claims and that we should therefore reinstate them.

? Hopkins also contends that he was improperly foreclosed from

asserting a claim based upon the Missouri Constitution's counterpart to

the First Amendment. For the sake of brevity and clarity, the phrase

"First Amendment" as used in this opinion refers to both Hopkins' federal

and state constitutional speech claims.

3

Our determination whether to reinstate Hopkins' First

Amendment and Title VII claims rests upon three key

inquiries. First, we must determine whether Hopkins

sufficiently raised First Amendment and Title VII claims in

his complaint. The essential function of a complaint under

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing

party "fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a

claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation

involved." Redland Ins. Co. v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 121

F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Oglala Sioux Tribe of

Indians v. Andrus, 603 F.2d 707, 714 (8th Cir. 1979)). "[I]t is

the facts well pleaded, not the theory of recovery or legal

conclusions," that state a cause of action and put a party on

notice. Economy Housing Co. v. Continental Forest

Products, Inc., 757 F.2d 200, 203 (8th Cir. 1985) (quoting

Moore v. Puget Sound Plywood Inc., 332 N.W.2d 212, 215

(1983)).

We conclude that Hopkins' second amended

complaint, while not a model of clarity, alleged facts

sufficient to put the officials on notice of Hopkins' First

Amendment and Title VII claims. Hopkins' complaint does

not assert First Amendment and Title VII claims in

separately numbered counts, as it does his due process and

whistleblower claims. It does, however, list the First

Amendment as a basis for the district court's jurisdiction and,

more importantly, generally alleges in its due process count

that Hopkins was dismissed because of statements he made

regarding an employee's sexual harassment complaint and the

Department's hiring practices. These factual allegations

suggest First Amendment and Title VII claims and thus are

sufficient, albeit perhaps marginally so, to satisfy the liberal

pleading requirements of the federal rules.

Second, we must determine whether Hopkins' First

Amendment and Title VII claims were encompassed within

our qualified immunity ruling in Hopkins I. Our jurisdiction

over an interlocutory appeal challenging a district court's

denial of qualified immunity "is limited to the resolution of

the issue of qualified immunity." Mettler v. Whitledge, 165

F.3d 1197, 1202 (8th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, we have held

that where a district court's summary judgment order-

addresses qualified immunity only as it relates to some of a

plaintiff's claims and not to others, even though all such

claims are part of a single action, we have jurisdiction only

over those claims to which the district court expressly

applied the principle of qualified immunity. See Jones Vv.

Coonce, 7 F.3d 1359, 1365 (8th Cir. 1993).

The district court's summary judgment order

considered the officials’ qualified immunity only as it related

to Hopkins' due process and whistleblower claims. See

Hopkins v. Saunders, No. 94-4458, slip op. at 23-27

(W.D.Mo. Jan. 9, 1996). Our jurisdiction in Hopkins I was

therefore limited to these claims and did not extend to

Hopkins' First Amendment and Title VII claims. As a result,

Hopkins I did not dispose of Hopkins' First Amendment and

Title VII claims.

Finally, we must decide whether Hopkins waived his

right to pursue his First Amendment and Title VII claims. "It

is an axiom of trial procedure that counsel must take the

initiative in protecting the rights of his clients." McNeely v.

United States, 353 F.2d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 1965). "To obtain

appellate review of a trial court's acts or omissions a party

must have made known to the trial court the action which the

party desires the court to take... ." Porterco, Inc. v. Igloo

Products Corp., 955 F.2d 1164, 1173 (8th Cir. 1992)

(citations omitted).

We recently applied these principles in Becker v.

University of Nebraska at Omaha, 191 F.3d 904 (8th Cir.

1999). There, Becker asserted in his trial brief to the district

court that the defendant university had expressly consented to

7

waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity to Becker's ADEA

claim. Id. at 909 n.4. The district court, however, dismissed

Becker's ADEA claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds

without ever ruling on Becker's waiver argument. Id at 907,

909 n.4. On appeal, Becker reasserted his waiver argument,

but we refused to reach the merits of this issue, finding that

Becker had failed to preserve it for appellate review. Id. at

909 n.4. We noted that although Becker had asserted this

argument in his trial brief, this alone was insufficient to

preserve it for appeal where the district court never ruled on

the issue. Id. Rather, we explained that to preserve his

waiver argument for appeal Becker “should have called the

district court's attention to its failure to decide the waiver

issue." Id. Because Becker failed to actively assert this

argument to the district court, we refused to consider it on

appeal.

As in Becker, Hopkins failed to adequately assert his

First Amendment and Title VII claims to the district court.

Although Hopkins' second amended complaint marginally set

forth these claims, the record is devoid of any evidence that

Hopkins otherwise asserted them to the district court. At oral

argument, Hopkins attempted to explain his failure to

actively assert these claims by stating that he believed that

the district court was first going to deal with his due process

claim alone and then move on to his other claims. Although

this may explain Hopkins' inactivity prior to the court's entry

of a final judgment, it does not explain why he took no

affirmative action immediately following the entry of

judgment to call the district court's attention to the fact that it

had not ruled on his First Amendment and Title VII claims.

Hopkins challenged the district court's final judgment in two

separate motions, but in neither motion did he raise his First

Amendment or Title VII claims.

Therefore, although we believe that Hopkins

sufficiently asserted First Amendment and Title VII claims in

his complaint and that these claims were not resolved by

either this court or the district court, we nevertheless

conclude that Hopkins waived his right to assert these

arguments on appeal. "A party may not stand idly by,

watching the proceedings and allowing the district court to

commit error on which the party subsequently complains."

Becker, 191 F.3d at 909 n.4 (quoting McNeely, 3 53 F.2d at

917). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's entry of a

final judgment on all of Hopkins' claims, including his First

Amendment and Title VII claims.

Il.

We turn next to issues regarding Hopkins’ section

1983 procedural due process claim. The district court found

that Hopkins had a property interest in his job under the 1978

plan and that his due process rights were violated when he

did not receive notice or a hearing prior to his dismissal. The

court also found, however, that Hopkins was dismissed for

cause and therefore refused to reinstate him, instead

awarding him only nominal damages. Both parties challenge

aspects of this ruling. Hopkins contends that the court's

failure to order reinstatement is erroneous as a matter of law,

fact, and procedure. The officials, in their cross-appeal,

contend that the court erred in finding that Hopkins

possessed a property interest in his job. The officials also

argue that, even if the court was correct in its property

interest finding, it erred in awarding Hopkins nominal

damages and attorney fees.

A.

For the sake of analytical clarity, we turn first to the

officials' claims on cross-appeal. The officials first assert that

the district court erred in finding that Hopkins possessed a

9

recognized property interest in his position as Division

director under the 1978 plan. We review this finding de

novo, made as it was on cross-motions for summary

judgment. Hossaini y. Western Mo. Med. Ctr., 140 F.3d

1140, 1142 (8th Cir.1998) (reviewing grant of summary

judgment de novo).

To establish a procedural due process violation, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that he has a protected property or

liberty interest at stake and that he was deprived of that

interest without due process of law. See Marler v. Mo. State

Bd. of Optometry, 102 F.3d 1453, 1456 (8th Cir. 1996). A

protected property interest exists where a plaintiff has a

"legitimate claim of entitlement" to a benefit that is derived

from a source such as state law. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A plaintiff has a protected

property interest in his employment if he can show "that he

could have been fired only for good cause." Spitzmiller v.

Hawkins, 183 F.3d 912, 916 (8th Cir. 1999).

To determine whether Hopkins had a protected

property interest in his position as Division director, we must

answer three questions. First, we must determine whether

the 1978 plan applied to Hopkins in his capacity as Division

director. Section BII of the plan, which is entitled "Coverage

of the System," states that "the [merit] system established by

this plan shall apply to, all offices, positions and employees

of the Division of Grain Inspection, Weighing and

Warehousing." This section then sets forth in detail the

employees excluded from the coverage of the plan, listing six

divisions within the Department and the staff of the

Department's director as among those employees excepted

from the plan.

Section BII therefore lends substantial support to the

district court's conclusion that the 1978 plan was intended to

apply to Hopkins. Section BII's reference to "all offices,

10

positions and employees" is sufficiently broad to encompass

Hopkins' position as director of the Division. Furthermore,

Section BII carefully defines those positions that are not

covered by the plan, yet it fails to denote Hopkins' office as

such a position. To be sure, Section BII is not entirely

consistent with other language within the 1978 plan. Most

notably, the plan's appeal procedures require Hopkins, in his

capacity as director, to sit on the APRB to review employee

terminations, which, if followed literally, would require

Hopkins to review his own termination. While this result

may be unorthodox (and there is no indication that recusal

would not be permitted, if indeed not required, in that

situation), we do not believe that it is sufficient to overcome

the clear language of Section BII. Therefore, we find that the

1978 plan applied to Hopkins in his capacity as Division

director.

Second, we must determine whether the 1978 plan

was in effect at the time of Hopkins' dismissal. In adopting

the appeal procedures of Chapter 36, the Department made

clear that division directors and other specified Department

employees were excluded from those procedures. There is

no evidence, however, that the Department intended to

abrogate existing merit systems governing those employees

excluded from Chapter 36's coverage, nor does Chapter 36

itself suggest such an effect. Absent a clear intent to repeal

existing merit systems, such as the 1978 plan, we cannot say

that the district court erred in finding that the 1978 plan

remained in effect at the time of Hopkins' discharge. Cf.

United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439,453 (1988) ("[A] later

statute will not be held to have implicitly repealed an earlier

one unless there is a clear repugnancy between the two,");

Nichols v. Rysavy, 809 F.2d 1317, 1331 (8th Cir. 1987).

Finally, we must determine whether Hopkins had a

legitimate entitlement to continued employment under the

1979 plan. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. Rule Number VI(1)(A)

11

of the plan states that "dismissals from employment shall be

made for cause under rules uniformly applicable to all

positions of employment," and that "[n]Jo ... dismissal shall be

made because of favoritism, prejudice or discrimination."

Rule Number V1(2)(A) reiterates this position by stating that

management may not use "nonmerit factors" in deciding

whether to retain an employee. The clear import of these and

other provisions of the 1978 plan is that division directors

such as Hopkins are not employees-at-will but may be

dismissed only for cause, creating in the division directors a

property interest protected by the rights guaranteed by the

Due Process Clause. See Spitzmiller, 183 F.3d at 916; Pace

v. Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 262-63 (8th Cir. t 996).

Accordingly, the district court correctly found that Hopkins

had a protected property interest in his position as Division

director under the 1978 plan.

The officials’ second contention on cross-appeal is

that the district court erred in awarding Hopkins nominal

damages and attorney fees for the officials' violation of

Hopkins' procedural due process rights. The propriety of the

district court's nominal damage award, and derivatively its

fee award, rests upon one issue: Whether a nominal damage

award in a section 1983 action for the violation of procedural

due process rights is legal or equitable in nature. In Hopkins

I, we held that the officials were entitled to both qualified

immunity and Eleventh Amendment immunity.’ See

Hopkins I, 93 F.3d at 527. Qualified immunity insulates a

tides site!

> Despite our rulings in Hopkins I, Hopkins reasserts his

contention that the officials are not entitled to qualified or Eleventh

Amendment immunity. Because these arguments are precluded by the

law of the case doctrine, we need not reconsider them. See Kinman v.

Omaha Public School Dist., 171 F-3d 607, 610 (8th Cir 1999).

12

defendant from all claims for legal damages, but it does not

shield a defendant from claims for equitable relief. See Pace,

83 F.3d at 263. The Eleventh Amendment protects a state

official sued in his official capacity from all claims except for

certain forms of prospective equitable relief, such as

reinstatement. See Campbell v. Arkansas Dep't of

Correction, 155 F.3d 950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998). Recognizing

that our immunity rulings had foreclosed all legal remedies,

we concluded Hopkins I by instructing the district court to

rule only on Hopkins' "claim for equitable relief." Hopkins

I, 93 F.3d at 527. Thus, Hopkins I, by both its remand

instruction and its holdings, prohibited the district court from

awarding Hopkins any form of legal relief. Therefore, if the

nominal damage award is found to be legal in nature, it must

be vacated.

The fact that a remedy may require one party to pay

money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the

remedy as "legal relief." Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers,

Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 570 (1990); see also

Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 894 (1988).

However, because money damages was the traditional form

of relief offered in the courts of law, "federal law has

consistently held that money damages are generally

characterized as a legal remedy." Kampa v. White

Consolidated Indus., Inc., 115 F.3d 585, 586 (1997) (citing

Terry, 494 U.S. at 570). Accordingly, a monetary award will

be characterized as equitable only if it possesses one of the

two fundamental attributes of an equitable remedy. Terry,

494 U.S. at 570, see also County Music Co. v. C.H.L.R., Inc.,

88 F.3d 635, 642 (8tb Cir. 1996).

First, a monetary award may be an equitable remedy

if the award is “restitutionary" in nature, "such as in actions

for disgorgement of improper profits.” Terry, 494 U.S. at 470

(citations omitted); see also Cass County, 88 F.3d at 642.

Here, the district court's nominal damage award was not in

13

the form of restitution. By ordering the officials to pay $1.00

to Hopkins, the court was not restoring to Hopkins anything

that was rightfully his, nor was it putting him in the position

_ he would have been in had his due process rights been

observed. See Black's Law Dictionary 1313 (6th ed. 1990)

(defining restitution). Rather, the court's nominal damage

award, like all nominal damages awarded for violations of

procedural due process rights, merely signified that "the law

recognizes the importance to organized society that

[procedural due process] rights be scrupulously observed."

Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).

Second, a monetary award may be deemed an

equitable remedy if the award is “incidental to or intertwined

with injunctive relief." Terry, 494 U.S. at 571; see also Cass

County, 88 F.3d at 643. Because the district court refused to

grant Hopkins reinstatement or any other injunctive relief,

the damage award was neither incidental to nor intertwined

with any other relief.

Under the Supreme Court's framework in Terry,

therefore, the district court's nominal damage award was

legal in nature. This conclusion is consistent with rulings

from other circuits that have expressly held that nominal

damages are inherently a legal remedy, regardless of the

context in which they are awarded. See, e.g., United States

v. Marolf, 173 F.3d 1213, 1219-20, n.5 (9th Cir, 1999);

Griffith v. Col. Div. of Youth Servs., 17 F.3d 1323, 1327

(10th Cir. 1994); Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 968 F.2d

427, 431 (Sth Cir. 1992), aff'd in part, 511 U.S. 244 (1994);

Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth. Inc., 882 F.2d

1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989).

We have analyzed the nature of nominal damages in

two contexts. In White v. Armontrout, we affirmed the

district court's vacation of a nominal damage award on

qualified immunity grounds. 29 F.3d 357, 359, 361 (8th Cir.

14

1994); see also Hartley v. Fine, 780 F.2d 1383, 1388 (8th Cir.

1985). In doing so, we intimated that nominal damages are

legal in nature, because qualified immunity erects a barrier to

legal remedies only. See Pace, 83 F.3d at 263. Several other

circuits have also implicitly recognized the legal nature of

nominal damages by finding them to be barred by qualified

immunity. See, e.g., Ruvalcaba v. Los Angeles, 167 F.3d

514, 524 (9th Cir. 1999); Cummins v. Campbell, 44 F.3d

847, 849 (10th Cir. 1994); Fox v. Board of Trustees of State

Univ. of N.Y., 42 F.3d 135, 141 (2nd Cir. 1994), Hicks v,

Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 155 n.4 (3rd Cir. 1988); Rheuark v.

Shaw, 628 F-2d 297, 299 (Sth Cir. 1980).

We have implied a contrary view of nominal damages

in the context of a Title VII action. Prior to 1991, Title VII's

remedies were statutorily limited to injunctions and "such

affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include

_. . reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without

back pay, or any other equitable relief as the court deems

appropriate.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(1). Despite this

limitation, we held in Dean v. Civiletti that a plaintiff who

had established all the elements of a Title VII claim but was

unable to show actual damages could recover nominal

damages. 670 F.2d 99, 101 (8tb Cir. 1982) (per curiam); see

also Parton v. GTE North, Inc., 971 F.2d 150, 154 (8th Cir.

1992); Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks & Sewer Dep’t.,

802 F.2d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir, 1986). Dean thus implied that,

at least under Title VII, nominal damages are equitable in

nature.

However ambiguous our earlier holdings, we are

convinced that the court's damage award in the present case

constitutes legal relief. First, the court's damage award does

not possess either of the attributes of equitable relief set forth

by the Supreme Court in Terry. Second, the majority of

circuits have characterized nominal damages as legal in

nature, either expressly or implicitly through rulings in

15

qualified immunity cases. Finally, we believe that White and

its view of nominal damages is more apposite to the present

case than the view intimated in Dean. White involved a

section 1983 claim and the assertion of qualified immunity as

a defense to that claim, see White, 29 F.3d at 360-61,

whereas Dean involved a claim under Title VII and its

narrow pre-1991 remedial framework, see Dean, 670 F.2d at

100. Hopkins’ claim has much in common with the claim in

White: it is based on section 1983 and is being challenged, at

least in part, on qualified immunity grounds, In contrast,

Hopkins’ claim differs significantly from the claim in Dean:

it does not implicate a statutory limitation on damages, such

as that which existed under pre-1991 Title VII, or the

concerns raised by such a limitation. Thus, we believe that

White's suggestion that nominal damages are legal in nature

applies in this case; and we see no reason to expand Dean's

implicit view of nominal damages beyond the context of

Title V11.

In summary, then, we conclude that because the

award of nominal damages to Hopkins constitutes legal

rather than equitable relief, it runs counter to our remand

instructions and our immunity holdings in Hopkins I and

therefore must be reversed.

Likewise, we must also vacate the award of attorney

fees to Hopkins. Section 1988 of Title 42 provides that the

court, in its discretion, may grant "the prevailing party"

reasonable attorney fees. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). "[T]o qualify

as a prevailing party, a civil rights plaintiff must obtain at

least some relief on the merits of his claim." Farrar v.

Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111 (1992). Absent the nominal

damage award, Hopkins has obtained no relief on the merits

of his claim, Hopkins received only a declaration that his

procedural due process rights were violated. The "moral

satisfaction" of such a declaration, without more, is not

16

sufficient to confer prevailing party status on a plaintiff. See

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1987).

C.

We turn next to Hopkins' challenges to the district

court's resolution of his procedural due process claim, all of

which attack the court's refusal to reinstate Hopkins to his

position as Division director. First, Hopkins argues that

Missouri law, not federal law, establishes the appropriate

remedy for the procedural due process deprivation that he

suffered and that the remedy required by Missouri law is

reinstatement. Thus, according to Hopkins, the district court

erred by refusing to look to Missouri law in fashioning a

remedy. Because the decision whether to follow state law

involves a question of law, we review the district court's

ruling de novo. See McCuskey v. Central Trailer Serv., Ltd.,

37 F.3d 1329, 1330-31 (8th Cir. 1994) (reviewing district

court's legal conclusions de novo).

The Supreme Court defined the proper remedy for the

denial of procedural due process in Carey v. Piphus, holding

that the remedy for a procedural due process violation is

defined by the extent of the injury that resulted from the

denial of constitutionally required process. ‘435 U.S. at

263-64; see also Perry v. Brakke, 826 F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir.

1987). Thus, in the context of public employment,

reinstatement is proper only where a tenured employee would

not have been dismissed if his procedural due process rights

had been observed. See Brewer v. Chauvin, 938 F,2d 860,

864 (8th Cir. 1991). Where an employee would have been

discharged even if he had received due process, i.e. was

discharged for cause, his sole injury is the lack of process and

only nominal damages are proper. See id.

17

Carey therefore makes clear that federal law defines

the proper remedy for a procedural due process violation.

See Brewer, 938 F.2d at 863 (quoting Peery v. Brakke, 826

F.2d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 1987)). Carey looks solely to the

process to which a plaintiff is entitled, which is also defined

by federal law, see Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill

470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985), and determines the degree of

injury that occurred because of the denial of that

constitutionally mandated process. See Brewer, 938 F.2d at

863-64. State law is irrelevant to this analysis. Therefore,

the district court properly looked to federal law, rather than

Missouri law, in determining the proper remedy for Hopkins'

procedural due process deprivation.

D.

Hopkins also contends that, even if the district court

was correct in applying the Carey remedial framework, there

was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that

Hopkins was dismissed for cause. Whether an employee

"would have been fired even if he had been accorded due

process is a finding of fact, which we may not set aside

unless clearly erroneous." Rogers v. Kelly, 866 F-2d 997,

1000 (8th Cir. 1989). We therefore must affirm the court's

finding if its "account of the evidence is plausible in light of

the record viewed in its entirety." Id. (quoting Anderson v.

City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).

Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court

found that Hopkins was discharged because his

confrontational and autonomous managerial style conflicted

with the cooperative, consensus-based form of management

that Saunders was attempting to create within the

Department. The court thus found that Hopkins would have

been dismissed even if he had received due process. This

finding is supported by evidence that Hopkins repeatedly

18

resisted Saunders’ attempts to coordinate matters at the

director level. For example, Hopkins refused to rely on the

central personnel office, instead maintaining his own

employee files, and disregarded Saunders' attempt to

coordinate certain functions through the Department's

Administrative Services. In addition, there was testimony

that Hopkins-managed his own division through intimidation

and fear. This dictatorial managerial style both conflicted

with Saunders’ approach and harmed employee morale within

the Division. Accordingly, we can not say that the district

court committed clear error in finding that Hopkins would

have been dismissed even if he had received due process.

E.

Finally, Hopkins argues that the district court's

evidentiary hearing regarding the cause of his dismissal was

procedurally defective in several respects. First, Hopkins

contends that he was denied procedural due process at the

hearing itself because he was never given a written notice

prior to the hearing setting forth the officials' alleged basis

for his dismissal. Although it is not clear that no such notice

was provided to Hopkins prior to the hearing, we believe that

even if he never received a formal notice, Hopkins was not

denied due process because the fundamental purposes of due

process--"notice and an opportunity to respond"--were

served. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; see also Heinen v.

Brewer, 171 F. 3 d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1999). Hopkins had

the benefit of and utilized discovery and the power of

subpoena to prepare for the hearing. He was therefore able to

fully apprise himself of the officials' asserted grounds for

dismissal and could adequately present a defense at the

hearing.

Second, Hopkins contends that the district court

incorrectly denied his Rule 60(b) motion for relief, in which

19

he alleged that defense witnesses "systematically

manipulated" their testimony by conversing in the hallway

prior to testifying at the hearing. We review the district

court's ruling on this issue for abuse of discretion. See

United States v. Covington, 133 F.3d 639, 645 (8th Cir.

1998) (applying abuse of discretion review to the district

court's refusal to grant a mistrial because of communication

between witnesses). No such abuse exists here. Hopkins

supports his claim of witness misconduct with five affidavits

that assert that several defense witnesses conversed in the

hallway outside of the courtroom. However, evidence of

communication between witnesses, by itself, is insufficient to

warrant relief under Rule 60(b) for improper witness

communication. See id. In order to obtain Rule 60(b) relief,

Hopkins must also demonstrate that the contact between

witnesses "resulted in the tailoring of witness testimony . . .

or the development of less than candid testimony."

Covington, 133 F.3d at 645 (quoting United States v. Kindle,

925 F.2d 272, 276 (8th Cir. 1991). Hopkins has made no

such showing.

Third, Hopkins asserts that the district court

improperly permitted Carol Heminghaus, a defense witness,

to be present 'in the courtroom prior to her testifying. The

decision whether to exclude a witness from the courtroom is

"committed to the sound discretion of the trial court."

United States v. Wilson, 103 F.3d 1402, 1406 (8th Cir.

1997). Here, the court acted well within its discretion.

Heminghaus was a member of the APRB that would have

heard Hopkins' appeal in 1994 had a hearing been held, and

her testimony at trial concerned whether she would have

affirmed Hopkins' dismissal at that time. Thus, Heminghaus

was "a person whose presence. . . [was] essential to the

presentation of the party's cause," Fed. R. of Evid. 615,

because in order to credibly testify regarding how she would

have ruled in 1994, it was necessary that Heminghaus first

hear the evidence that she would have heard in 1994. Thus,

20

Nate re tsi 2 atic aera canine tan

ee

not only was Heminghaus's presence in the courtroom

permissible, it may have been essential.

IV.

We reverse that portion of the district court's

judgment which awards Hopkins nominal damages and

attorney fees. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

21

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al-,

)

vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW

)

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before this Court are plaintiff's Motion ior Relief

Under Rule 60(b). Defendants failed to file a response.

Plaintiff asserts that the defense violated this Court's

order that witnesses not discuss their testimony with other

witnesses. Plaintiff argues that the appropriate sanction is to

disqualify the witnesses involved in this miscarriage of

justice. Plaintiff states that this Court should either (a) reopen

the hearing and disqualify these defense witnesses from

testifying, or (b) reconsider the evidence presented at trial,

disregarding evidence of these witnesses.

This Court would have made the same findings had it

only considered the testimony of defendant John Saunders

and plaintiff Tommy Hopkins. Defendant Saunders was the

first witness to testify and, therefore, the alleged misconduct

would not have influenced his testimony,

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's Motion for Relief Under

Rule 60(b) (doc. #144) is denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright

SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

June 16", 1998.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )

Plaintiff, )

Vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW

)

)

)

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Before this Court is plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion to

Reconsider and Set Aside a Portion of the Order and

Judgment Entered on February 27, 1998, and defendants'

Opposition.

On February 27, 1998, this Court held that:

(1) because plaintiff's procedural due process

rights were violated, plaintiff shall be awarded

nominal damages in the amount of $1.00; and

(2) plaintiff is not entitled to reinstatement,

because he would have been fired even if he

had received due process.

Plaintiff requests a hearing regarding the mental and

emotional distress he suffered as a result of his firing and the

amount of back pay he should be awarded. Plaintiff asserts

that he should be awarded back pay from the date of his

24

firing, June 10, 1994, until the date the Court held its hearing

on December 17-18, 1997.

Plaintiff's claims for back pay and damages for

mental or emotional distress are barred by the Eleventh

Amendment. Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 526-27 (8"

Cir. 1996). Plaintiff is not requesting, and is not entitled to,

back pay for the post-order period. See Barnes v. Bosley,

828 F.2d 1258 (8" Cir. 1987). Additionally, plaintiff is

asserting that the mental and emotional distress he suffered

was a result of his firing, not lack of a hearing.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that plaintiff's Rule 59 Motion to

Reconsider and Set Aside a Portion of the Order and

Judgment Entered on February 27, 1998 (doc. #139) is

denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright

SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

April 22, 1998

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

In an order dated September 30, 1997, this Court held

the following: '

(1) the Merit System Plan and Rules and -

Regulations apply to plaintiff as the Director of

the Division;

(2) based on the Merit System Rules and

Regulations, plaintiff had a property interest, or

a legitimate claim of entitlement, in continued

employment unless dismissed for cause; and

(3) because plaintiff had a property interest in

continued employment unless dismissed for

cause and plaintiff was terminated from his

position as Director of the Division by

Department Director Saunders without receiving

26

prior notice or a hearing, plaintiff's procedural

- due process rights were violated.

This Court held an evidentiary hearing December

17-18, 1997, to determine whether plaintiff would have been

fired even if he had received due process. This Court finds

that plaintiff was fired for cause. Specifically, plaintiff was

fired for the good of the service and because his management

style conflicted with the management style of Deputy

Director Saunders. As Division Director, plaintiff exhibited

behavior in his management style that adversely affected

employee job performance, the atmosphere in his Division

and the quality of work performed in the Department as a

whole. Plaintiff displayed a management style that indicated

he was not willing to accept suggestions or directions in

operating his division more effectively and efficiently.

Plaintiff maintained an autonomous form of management

which was directly contrary to Director Saunders' style of

management and adverse to the team approach that Director

Saunders strongly encouraged in the Department.

Because plaintiff's procedural due process rights were

violated, plaintiff is entitled to nominal damages. Brewer v.

Chauvin, 938 F.2d 860, 862-64 (8th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff is

not entitled to reinstatement, because he would have been

fired even if he had received due process. Rogers v. Kelly,

866 F.2d 997, 1000-1001 (8th Cir. 1989)

Also before this Court is plaintiff's Motion for

Attorney's Fees and Costs (doc. #132). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1988, plaintiff is seeking attorney's fees and costs as the

prevailing party. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "a

plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party

under §1988.” Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992). In

her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor enumerated three

factors that should be considered in determining whether and

how much a prevailing party should be awarded in attorney's

27

ee

fees: (1) the difference between the amount recovered and

the damages sought; (2) the significance of the legal issue on

which the plaintiff prevailed; and any public goal or purpose

the litigation might have served. Id. at 116-122; Jones v.

Lockhart, 29 F.3d 422, 423-24 (8th Cir. 1994).

Taking these factors into consideration, this Court

finds that plaintiff's counsel is entitled to attorney's fees. Not

only did plaintiff establish that his procedural due process

rights were violated, but he also furthered the public policies

that require the employees of the Division of Grain

Inspection, Weighing and Warehousing be employed based

on job qualifications rather than political affiliations.

Additionally, plaintiff's counsel represented plaintiff in an

efficient manner and requested a modest hourly rate. Based

on counsel's itemization of his fees and expenses, this Court

finds that plaintiff's counsel should be awarded $43,764.00

for attorney's fees (364.7* hours @ $120.00/hour) and

$6,236.41 for expenses.

Plaintiff's counsel has also requested leave to

withdraw as counsel for plaintiff. Local Rule 83.5(0) states

the following:

Counsel may not be relieved from further

representation of a client without obtaining leave of

Court. Such leave will ordinarily be denied unless

entry of appearance by substitute counsel is assured

or has occurred.

Accordingly, Venters' Motion to Withdraw (doc. #135) is

denied and may be refiled after substitute counsel has entered

an appearance.

* Counsel requested compensation for 393.4 hours but only provided

itemized times for 364.7 hours.

28

It is hereby

ORDERED that, pursuant to an evidentiary hearing

held December 17-18, 1997, this Court finds that plaintiff

was fired for cause. Specifically, plaintiff was fired for the

good of the service and because his management style

conflicted with the management style of Deputy Director

Saunders. As Division Director, plaintiff exhibited behavior

in his management style that adversely affected employee job

performance; the atmosphere in his Division and the quality

of work performed in the Department as a whole. Plaintiff

displayed a management style that indicated he was not

willing to accept suggestions or directions in operating his

Division more effectively and efficiently. Plaintiff

maintained an autonomous form of management which was

directly contrary to Director Saunders' style of management

and adverse to the team approach that Director Saunders

strongly encouraged in the Department. It is further

ORDERED that because plaintiff's procedural due

process rights were violated, plaintiff shall be awarded

nominal damages in the amount of $1.00. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff is not entitled to

reinstatement, because he would have been fired even if he

had received due process. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees

and costs (doc. #132) is granted. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's counsel shall be awarded

$43,764.00 for attorney's fees (364.7 hours @ $120.00/hour).

It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's counsel shall be awarded

$6,236.41 for expenses. It is further

ORDERED that Venters' Motion to Withdraw (doc.

#135) is denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright

SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

February 27, 1998.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS,

Plaintiff,

VS. No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al.,

Defendants.

)

)

)

)

)

)

ORDER

Pursuant to a telephone conference held October 31,

1997, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendants shall file the notice

required by the Merit System Plan and Rules and Regulations

by November 19, 1997. It is further

ORDERED that witness and exhibit lists and findings

of fact and conclusions of law shall be filed by December 8,

1997. It is further

ORDERED that an evidentiary hearing on the issue

of whether Hopkins would have been fired even if procedural

due process had been observed shall be held at the U.S.

District Courthouse in Jefferson City, Missouri on December

17, 1997, at 9:00 a.m.

/s/ Scott O.Wright

SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

November 7", 1997.

31

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, +)

Plaintiff, )

vs. ) No. 94-4458- CV-C-SOW.

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al., )

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before this Court are defendants' Second Motion for

Summary Judgment, plaintiff's Opposition and

Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment, and defendants'

Reply. For the following reasons, defendants’ Motion will be

denied and plaintiff's Motion will be granted.

I. Background

Plaintiff Tommy D. Hopkins ("plaintiff") was the

Director of the Division of Grain Inspection and

Warehousing (“the Division”) in the Missouri Department of

Agriculture ("the Department") from approximately August

1981 until June 10, 1994. On June 10, 1994, plaintiff was

terminated from his position as Division Director by

Department Director Saunders without receiving prior notice

or a hearing.

Plaintiff sought review of the decision by filing an

appeal with the Agriculture Personnel Review Board

32

("APRB"). The Department responded with a letter

explaining that the APRB did not exist.

Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Personnel Advisory

Board ("PAB"). The PAB dismissed plaintiffs appeal,

holding that the Department had adopted the PAB's appeal

procedures for most of its employees but not for its division

directors.

The Department agreed with the PAB's result, but not

its rationale, and appealed to the Circuit Court. Plaintiff

successfully moved to dismiss the appeal on the theory that

the state was the prevailing party below.

Plaintiff filed the present complaint seeking $6

million in compensatory damages, $3 million in punitive

damages and injunctive relief. The Department moved for

summary judgment on the basis of qualified and Eleventh

Amendment Immunity. This court denied the Department's

motion.

The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded, granting

defendants immunity from damages on the issue of plaintiff's

due process claim. The Eighth Circuit remanded plaintiff's

claim for equitable relief for further proceedings.

II. Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c); Rafos v. Outboard

Marine Corp., 1 F. 3d 707, 708 (8" Cir. 1993) (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)). A defendant

who moves for summary judgment has the burden of

showing that there is no genuine issue of fact for trial.

Be:

33

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 (1986).

A plaintiff opposing a properly supported motion for

summary judgment may not rest upon the allegations of his

pleadings, ‘but must set forth specific facts showing them is a

genuine issue for trial." Id.

III. Discussion

Defendants argue that the Court of Appeals

recognized that plaintiff failed to prove he had a property

right in continued employment and the Court of Appeals'

ruling should, therefore, end this litigation. Plaintiff argues

this court previously decided plaintiff had a property interest

in his continued employment and, based on the doctrine of

the law of the case, this issue should not be relitigated.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that:

After a careful reading of the plan itself, we are

unable to determine whether it grants Hopkins a

property right. Although the plan states that it shall

apply to ‘all offices, positions and employees’ of the

Division, the general language in the plan indicates

that it does not apply to the division director but is to

be used by the division director in dealing with his

subordinates. . .. Clearly, there was confusion when

Hopkins was dismissed as to whether a division

director had a continued right of employment, and the

officials are thus entitled to qualified immunity on

Hopkins, due process claim.

Hopkins v. Saunders, 93 F.3d 522, 526 (8th Cir. 1996). The

Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals did not determine whether

plaintiff had a continued right of employment. The Eighth

Circuit held that the officials were entitled to qualified

immunity because it was unclear when plaintiff was

dismissed whether plaintiff had a continued right of

34

employment. Whether plaintiff had a property interest in

continued employment is the issue that is now before this

Court.

Defendants argue that Hopkins did not have a

property interest in his position as a Division Director and,

therefore, he cannot state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

Plaintiff asserts that he had a property interest in continued

employment by virtue of the U.S. Grain Standards Act and

the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to the federal

law, the February 1, 1978, Executive Order, and the Merit

System Plan and Rules and Regulations published by the

Missouri Department of Agriculture.

To have a property interest, plaintiff must have “a

legitimate claim of entitlement" in a benefit. Board of

Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.' 564, 577 (1972). This "legitimate

claim of entitlement" is created and defined "by existing

rules or understandings that stem from an independent source

such as state law." Id.; Perry v. Sinderman 408 U.S. 593, 601

(1972) (citing Roth, 408 U. S. at 577) ("A person’s interest in

a benefit is a ‘property’ interest for due process purposes if

there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that

support his claim of entitlement to the benefit and that he

may invoke at a hearing."). If a property interest exists,

plaintiff would be “entitled to a hearing or some related form

of due process prior to termination.” Packett v. Stenberg,

969 F.2d 721, 725 (8" Cir. 1992) (citing Cleveland Bd. Of

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)).

On February 15, 1978, the Director of the Department

filed with the Secretary of State a plan to establish a system

of personnel administration based on merit principles for the

employees of the Division ("Merit System Plan") as required

by the Governor's Executive Order of February 1, 1978.

Section A of the Merit System Plan, entitled Basis for the

Plan, states that:

[t]he United States Grain Standards Act (As

Amended) requires that a state agency must

employ personnel on the basis of job

qualifications, rather than political affiliations,

in order to qualify for designation as an official

agency to perform official inspection and

weighing services or to give official supervision

of weighing functions; .. .

July18, 1978, the Department filed with the Secretary of

State Merit System Rules and Regulations for the Division.

The Merit System Plan and Rules and Regulations

established the APRB to conduct appeal hearings. Plaintiff

sought review of his termination by filing an appeal with the

APRB, but the Department responded with a letter explaining

that the APRB did not exist. The first question is whether

plaintiff, as the Director of the Division, held a position

within the classified service category and whether the Merit

System Plan and Rules and Regulations, therefore, applied to

plaintiff. Section BII, entitled Coverage of the System, states

that (emphasis added):

All employees of the Missouri Department of

Agriculture shall be divided into the following

services:

1. Classified Service. The classified services shall

consist of, and the provision of the Governor's

Executive Order and the system established by this

plan shall apply to, all offices, positions, and

employees of the Division of Grain Inspection,

Weighing and Warehousing, that are existing now

or hereafter created. “SN

2. Unclassified Service. The unclassified service

shall consist of, and the provisions of the Governor's

Executive Order and of the system established by this

36

ee ee ean neeeeeeeee

plan shall not apply to, all offices, positions and

employees of the Division of Administrative

Services, Division of Animal Health, Division of

Plant Industries, Division of Audits and Compliance,

Division of Weights and Measures, Division of Fairs,

Division of Agricultural Development, Fiscal Office,

and the office and staff of the Director and Deputy

Director of the Missouri Department of Agriculture,

that are existing now or hereafter created.

"All offices, positions and employees" is broad

language that would include the Director of the Division of

Grain Inspection, Weighing and Warehousing. Additionally,

the language clearly states when the plan shall not apply. If

the Division Director was not to be covered by the Merit

System Plan, the drafters could have listed it as one of offices

or positions the plan would not apply to.

It is true, as the Eighth Circuit noted, ‘at the general

language of the Merit System Plan indicates that the plan is

to be used by the Division Director in dealing with

subordinates. Court finds, however, that the fact the Merit

System Plan is to be used by the Division Director in dealing

with subordinates is insufficient to overcome the clear

language that makes the Merit System Plan also applicable to

the Division Director.

This Court also finds that the Merit System Plan is

still in effect as to plaintiff even though the Department

adopted the appeal procedures under Chapter 36 for most of

its employees because the Department expressly excluded

division directors from coverage. Accordingly, this Court

finds that the Merit System Plan and Rules and Regulations

apply to plaintiff as the Division Director.

The next question is whether plaintiff had a legitimate

claim of entitlement to continued employment unless

37

a

dismissed for cause because of the Merit System Plan and

Rules and Regulations. Were there rules or mutually explicit

understandings that support plaintiff's claim of continued

employment unless dismissed for cause and that plaintiff may

invoke at a hearing?

Rule Number VI (1)(A) states in part (emphasis added):

Demotions in, and dismissals from employment

shall be made for cause under rules uniformly

applicable to all positions of employment. No

appointment, promotion, demotion, or dismissal shall

be made because of favoritism, prejudice or

discrimination.

Rule Number VI (2)(A) states in part (emphasis added):

Discrimination against any person in recruitment,

examination, appointment, training, promotion,

retention, discipline, or any other aspect of personnel

administration, because of political or religious

opinions or affiliations or because of race, national

origin, or any other non-merit factors is prohibited.

Rule Number VI (2)(B) states in part:

An applicant or employee who feels himself

adversely affected in his opportunity for employment,

in his status as an employee, or in his condition of

employment because of discrimination may under this

rule appeal to the board for a review of the alledged

(sic) discriminatory action or practice.

The causes for suspension, demotion and dismissal of any

employee in the classified service are enumerated in Rule

Number VIII(2) and under Rule Number VIII(5) an

38

employee in the classified service can be dismissed when the

good of the service will be served thereby.

Based on these Merit System Rules and Regulations,

plaintiff had a property interest, or legitimate claim of

entitlement, in continued employment unless dismissed for

cause. Plaintiff's property interest in continued employment

is further reinforced by the Employee Information Handbook

for the Department and by various agreements entered

between the United States Department of Agriculture and the

Missouri Department of Agriculture. See plaintiff's exhibits

6-8, 11 and 13.

Because a property interest existed, plaintiff was

entitled to a hearing or some related form of due process

prior to termination." Packett, 969 F.2d at 725 (citing

Cleveland Bd. Of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542

(1985)). Both plaintiff and defendants agree that plaintiff was

terminated from his position as Director of the Division by

Department Director Saunders without receiving prior notice

or a hearing. Accordingly, plaintiff's procedural due process

rights were violated.

IV. Conclusion

This Court finds that the Merit System Plan and Rules

and Regulations apply to the plaintiff as the Director of the

Division. Based on the Merit System Rules and Regulations,

plaintiff had a property interest, or a legitimate claim of

entitlement, in continued employment unless dismissed for

cause. Because plaintiff had a property interest in continued

employment unless dismissed for cause and plaintiff was

terminated from his position as Director of the Division by

Department Director Saunders without receiving prior notice

or a hearing, plaintiff's procedural due process rights were

violated.

The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that

defendants are immune from damages on the issue of

plaintiff's due process claim. Both parties shall file briefs by

October 5, 1997, that address the appropriate equitable relief

plaintiff should be awarded.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendants’ Second Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. #90) is denied. It is further

ORDERED that plaintiff's Counter-Motion for

Summary Judgment (doc. #98) is granted. It is further

ORDERED that both plaintiff and defendants shall

file briefs addressing the issue of equitable relief by October

5, 1997. :

/s/ Scott O. Wright

SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

September 30, 1997.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

NO. 96-1174WMJC

Tommy D. Hopkins,

Order Denying

Petition for Rehearing

and Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc

‘e Appellee,

v.

John L. Saunders, et al.,

a ¢ «2 2 @.e 2 6

Appellants

The suggestion for rehearing en banc is denied. The

petition for rehearing by the panel is also denied.

September 23, 1996

Order Entered at the Direction of the Court:

/s/ Michael E. Gans

Clerk, U.S. Court Of Appeals , Eighth Circuit

41

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Roy Temple, Beth M. Wheeler,

Defendants/Appellants.

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-1174

Tommy D. Hopkins, a

_ Plaintiff/Appellee, °

*

V. * Appeal from the United

* States District Court for

John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, * the Western District of

Defendants/Appellants, * Missouri.

ok

Charles Ausfahl, °

Defendant, *

ae

*

*

Submitted: — 1996

Filed: August 23, 1996

Before WOLLMAN , Circuit Judge, HENLEY, Senior Circuit

Judge, and DOTY, District Judge.

WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

After Tommy D. Hopkins was terminated from his

job as Director of the Division of Grain Inspection and

* The HONORABLE DAVID S. DOTY, United States District Judge for

the District of Minnesota, sitting by designation.

42

er ereemnrmninnnnmnideiiaiinensiatiins

Warehousing (the Division) of the Missouri Department of

Agriculture (the Department), he brought this 42 U.S.C. §

1983 action against John L. Saunders, Director of the

Department, and others, in their individual and official

capacities, (collectively, the officials), alleging that he had

been dismissed in violation of his due process rights and in

violation of Missouri's whistleblower statute. The officials

appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary

judgment based on qualified and Eleventh Amendment

immunity. We reverse and remand.

I.

Prior to the enactment of the 1976 United States

Grain Standards Act, the Division was operating as a

patronage organization. The Grain Standards Act, and the

regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, required the

Division to instead "employ personnel on the basis of job

qualifications rather than political affiliations." 7 U.S. C. § 79

(f) (1) (A) (ix) ; see also 7 C.F.R. § 800.195(f) (2) ; 7 C.F.R.

§ 800.196(g) (3) (ii) . In response to the Grain Standards Act,

the governor of Missouri issued an executive order in 1978

requiring the Department to establish a formal merit system

for its Division employees. Pursuant to the executive order,

the Department drafted a merit system plan (the plan), which

was submitted to the United States Department of

Agriculture for approval. The plan established an Agriculture

Personnel Review Board (APRB) to conduct appeal hearings

for Division employees.

In 1979, the Missouri legislature enacted a state merit

system law, found in Chapter 36 of the Missouri Revised

Statutes. The law established a Personnel Advisory Board

(PAB) to hear appeals of merit system employee dismissals.

Some merit employees were not covered by the law. For

example, Chapter 36 expressly excluded division directors

from its coverage. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 36.030.1(1). On May

43

28, 1982, the Department adopted the PAB dismissal

procedures for most of its employees. Division directors were

among the employees the Department excluded from

coverage. In a letter adopting the PAB procedures, the

Department agreed, however, to provide "substantially

similar" appeal procedures for the excluded employees

pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute section 36.390.8 if such

procedures were legally required.”

On June 10, 1994, Hopkins was terminated from his

position as division director by the Department without

receiving prior notice or a hearing. He sought review of the

decision by filing an appeal with the APRB, the board

established pursuant to the plan. The Department responded

with a letter explaining that the plan was void and that the

APRB no longer existed.

Hopkins then filed an appeal with the PAB. The

Department moved to dismiss the appeal, arguing that

Hopkins was specifically excluded from Chapter 36 coverage

and that he failed to state a claim under Missouri's

whistleblower law. Hopkins urged the PAB to determine that

it lacked jurisdiction over his claim because the APRB still

existed and was the proper forum. He requested that the

matter be remanded to the APRB. After conducting a hearing

to determine whether it had jurisdiction, the PAB dismissed

the case, holding that the Department had adopted the PAB's

appeal procedures for its regular employees but not for its

division directors. It held that the plan's appeal procedures

still applied to dismissals of regular Division employees who

were excepted from the PAB's appeal procedures. The

Department agreed with the PAB's result but not with its

rationale and sought review in Missouri state court. Hopkins

* Section 36.390.8 provides that non-merit agencies “shall adopt

- dismissal procedures substantially similar to those provided for merit

employees.”

successfully moved to dismiss the appeal because the

Department was the prevailing party before the PAB.

Hopkins then filed the present complaint in district court,

seeking $6 million in compensatory damages, $3 million in

punitive damages, and injunctive relief in the form of

reinstatement.

Il.

We review the trial court's denial of a motion for

summary judgment de novo. Get Away Club, Inc. v.

Coleman, 969 F.2d 664, 666 (8th Cir. 1992). Summary

judgment should be granted if there is no genuine issue of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

A. Qualified Immunity

Under the doctrine of qualified immunity,

government officials are generally immune from suit in

performing discretionary duties if "their conduct does not

violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of

which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). "(Qualified immunity

is more than a defense to suit; it grants government officials

the right not to be subject to the burden of trial at all."

Billingsley v. St. Louis County, 70 F.3d 61, 63 (8th Cir.

1995) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 ( 1985)).

Whether a government official is entitied to qualified

immunity is a question of law. Engle v. Townsley, 49 F.3d

1321, 1323 (8th Cir. 1995).

To prove that a clearly established right has been

infringed upon, a plaintiff must do more than allege that an

abstract right has been violated. Runge v. Dove, 857 F.2d

469, 472 (8th Cir. 1988). Instead, a plaintiff "must make a

"particularized showing’ that a "reasonable official would

45

understand that what he is doing violated that right’ or that ‘in

the light of preexisting law the unlawfulness' of the action

was ‘apparent.’ Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640 (1987)).

The officials argue that Hopkins did not have a

constitutionally protected right to continued employment.

They allege that even if the initial plan applied to Hopkins as

division director, Hopkins lost any entitlement to a right of

continued employment when the Department adopted the

PAB's dismissal procedures. Hopkins, on the other hand,

alleges that the Department adopted the PAB procedures for

its regular employees only -- thus, the appeal procedures

established by the plan are still in effect as to him.

In denying the officials' claim of qualified immunity,

the district court agreed with Hopkins and held that “[w]hile

the specific procedures to be followed might have been

debatable at the time of plaintiff's termination, the fact that he

was entitled to some due process was well established[.]"

The district court pointed to the Grain Standards Act and to

the plan itself, which provided that employees of the Division

be employed on the basis of qualifications rather than

political affiliations. It held that a reasonable official should

have been aware of the laws governing the dismissal of

employees_and accordingly refused to grant immunity.

Contrary to the district court's conclusion, we find no

violation of clearly established law. Hopkins clearly had no

continued right of employment under the state merit system

law. Although the Department adopted the PAB's appeal

procedures under Chapter 36 in 1982, both chapter 36 and

the Department itself expressly excluded division directors

from coverage. Moreover, in Brown v. Personnel Advisory

Bd., 879 S.W.2d 581, 584-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), the

Missouri Court of Appeals rejected a part-time employee's

argument that the Grain Standards Act required the

46

j

i

:

|

Department to use the PAB procedures for all employee

dismissals.

Although the Department agreed to adopt similar

dismissal procedures for division directors if required by law

under section 36.390.8, the officials are nevertheless entitled

to qualified immunity. Missouri courts have not yet decided

whether section 36.390.8 confers a property interest in

continued employment or whether it merely gives employees

a right to receive review procedures. Thus, in Pace v.

Moriarty, 83 F.3d 261, 263 (8th Cir. 1996), we held that state

officials were entitled to qualified immunity on an

employee's claim for damages based on section 36.390.8.

Likewise the officials in the present case cannot be held to

have violated a clearly established right when it is unclear

whether section 36.390.8 bestows such a right.

Having concluded that Hopkins had no clearly

established right to continued employment under the state

merit system law, we turn to the question whether he had

such a right under the Department of Agriculture merit plan.

After a careful reading of the plan itself, we are unable to

determine whether it grants Hopkins a property right.

Although the plan states that it shall apply to "all offices,

positions and employees" of the Division,, the general

language in the plan indicates that it does not apply to the

division director but is to be used by the division director in

dealing with his subordinates. In fact, under the plan, the

division director was a member of the APRB and would thus

be entitled to hear his own appeal.

Clearly, there was confusion when Hopkins was

dismissed as to whether a division director had a continued

right of employment, and the officials are thus entitled to

qualified immunity on Hopkins' due process claim. See

Tubbesing v. Amold, 742 F.2d 401, 406-07 (8th Cir. 1984)

(commissioners entitled to qualified immunity when it was

not clear whether employee policy manual establishing a

property right in employment applied to director). Moreover,

it was unclear whether Hopkins was subject to either the

plan's dismissal procedures or those provided pursuant to

section 36.390.8. Our review of the record leads us to the

conclusion that the only thing that is clear in this case is that

the law was unsettled at the time of Hopkins' dismissal.

The officials further claim that they are entitled to

qualified immunity on Hopkins' claim that he was denied a

right to a post-termination hearing under Missouri's

whistleblower statute. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 105.055.° The

Missouri courts have not yet interpreted this statute. The

district court determined, however, that the right to such a

hearing was clearly established by section 105.055 and thus

denied the officials qualified immunity. We disagree. The

relevant issue for qualified immunity purposes is whether-the

officials violated clearly established law when they refused to

grant Hopkins a hearing on his section 105.055 claim before ~

the APRB. Because it was not clearly established that the

plan's appeal procedures applied to Hopkins as division

director at the time of-his dismissal, the officials were not

violating any clearly established right when they denied him

a hearing before the APRB. See Warmer v. Graham, 845 F.2d

179, 182 (8th Cir. 1988) ("official may not be charged with

knowledge that his conduct was unlawful unless it has been

previously identified as such"). Accordingly, the officials are

also entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

* Section 105.055(5) states, in relevant part:

Any employee may file an administrative appeal whenever the

employee alleges that disciplinary action was taken against the employee

in violation of this section. The appeal shall be filed with the state

personnel advisory board; the provided that the appeal shall be filed with

the appropriate agency review board or body of nonmerit agency

employers which have established appeal procedures substantially similar

to those provided for merit employees . . .

48

B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Because they were sued in their official capacities, the

officials also seek Eleventh Amendment immunity from

Hopkins' request for money damages. The Eleventh

Amendment prohibits a citizen from suing a state for money

damages in federal court. Welch v. Texas Dep't of Hwys. &

Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 472 (1987). Even when a state

is not named as a party to the act on, the suit may still be

barred by the Eleventh Amendment. A state official is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity if immunity will

"protect the state treasury from liability that would have had

essentially the same practical consequences as a judgement

against the State itself." Hadley v. North Ark. Community

Technical College, 76 F.3d 1437, 1438 (8th Cir. 1996),

petition for cert filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 24, 1996)

(No. 95-2060) (citations omitted); see also Ford Motor Co. v.

Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945) ("when the

action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the

State, the state . . . is entitled to invoke is sovereign immunity

from suit even though individual officials are nominal

defendants").

In considering whether the officials were entitled to

Eleventh Amendment immunity, the district court noted that

a critical factor was whether any judgment "would ultimately

come out of state funds or whether a judgment could be paid

out of non-state funds under the agency's discretionary

control." The district court then refused to grant immunity,

holding that Hopkins had raised a valid claim as to whether

any money damages could be paid from non-state funds.

Hopkins suggested that any monetary award could

be paid out of the grain inspection fee fund, which is separate

from the state's general revenue fund. It is true that Missouri

law requires grain inspection fees to be kept in a separate

account. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 411.151. However, under

section 411.151.1 the account is considered part of the state

treasury. In fact, section 411.1,31.2 authorizes the legislature

to transfer money from the general revenue fund to the grain

inspection fee fund as needed "to enable the director to

continue operations[.]" Furthermore, no expenditures could

be made from the grain inspection fee fund until after the

money was appropriated by the legislature. § 411.151.1.

The grain inspection fee fund is also subject to

several restrictions under state and federal law. Under

section 411.151.1, the money in the fund is restricted “for the

payment of salaries and expenses . . . necessary for carrying

out the provisions consistent with the grain inspection and

weighing services of [the Grain Warehouse Law.]” The

Grain Standards Act further forbids the Division from using

“any moneys collected pursuant to the charging of fees for

any purpose other than the maintenance of the official

inspection operation or other agricultural programs operated

by the state or local governmental agency.” 7 U.S.C. §

79(f(1(A)(vi).

In summary, section 411.151 makes clear that

money in the grain inspection fee fund is part of the state

treasury. They money in the fund is restricted by both state

and federal law and cannot be expended without

appropriation by the state legislature. See Dover Elevator

Co. v. Arkansas State Univ., 64 F.3d 442, 447 (8° Cir. 1995)

(university which could not spend money unless appropriated

by state assembly was entitled to Eleventh Amendment

immunity); Hadley, 76 F.3d at 1441 (Eleventh Amendment

immunity extended to college when its daily operations were

dependent upon state treasury). Because any judgment

would ultimately come out of state funds, the officials are

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.

III. Conclusion

We reverse the denial of immunity for the officials ©

in their individual and official capacities, and remand

Hopkins’ claim for equitable relief for further proceeding.

See Treleven v. Univ. of Minnesota, 73 F.3d 816, 819 (8"

Cir. 1996) (state official may be sued in official capacity for

prospective injunctive relief); Grantham v. Trickey, 21 F.3d

289, 295 (8"" Cir. 1°994) (qualified immunity does not bar

plaintiff's equitable claim for reinstatement).

A true copy.

Attest: /s/ Michael E. Gans

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS,

EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

51

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI

-~ CENTRAL DIVISION

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )

Plaintiff, '

vs : No. 94-4458-CV-C-5

JOHN L. SAUNDERS, et al., :

Defendants.

Order

Before this Court are defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

or, in the alternative, for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's

response. For the following reasons defendants' motion is

granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Plaintiff, Tommy D. Hopkins, brings the above cause

against John L. Saunders, Kyle Vickers, Charles Ausfahl,

Roy Temple, and Beth M. Wheeler in their individual and

official capacities alleging violations of due process and

Missouri's whistleblower statute. On June 10, 1994, Hopkins

was fired as Director of the Division of Grain Inspection and

Warehousing (Division) of the Missouri Department of

Agriculture (Department), a position he had held for thirteen

years. Hopkins received no notice or hearing prior to

termination. Hopkins filed a Notice of Appeal with the

Agriculture Personnel Review Board (APRB) on June 30,

1994. This board was created pursuant to a 1978 Executive

52

order by the governor of Missouri calling for the

establishment of a personnel administration system based on

merit for the Division.

In response, the Department informed Hopkins that

the APRB no longer existed and that the merit system plan

was "void and inoperative." Hopkins next filed a Petition for

Review in the Circuit Court of Cole County seeking review

of the Department's response. That petition for review was

later dismissed at Hopkins' suggestion. Additionally, in an

attempt to preserve any appeal rights, Hopkins filed a Notice

of Appeal with the state Personnel Advisory Board (PAB), a

board that hears appeals of merit system employee

dismissals. Defendants challenged the PAB's jurisdiction by

filing a motion to dismiss which was denied. As a result,

~~ Defendants filed a Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Cole

County Circuit Court seeking to prohibit the PAB from

proceeding with an evidentiary hearing. A hearing, however,

was conducted solely to determine what personnel provisions

applied to Hopkins. Both Hopkins and the Department then

asked for the PAB to dismiss the case on different grounds.

Hopkins maintained that the PAB had no jurisdiction over

the case because he was covered by the plan created in

compliance with the Executive Order, and therefore, the

APRB had proper jurisdiction. The Department claimed that

the PAB was the right forum but that the Missouri Merit

System Law removed division directors from protection.

The PAB dismissed the case on the grounds set forth

by Hopkins. They found that the Department had adopted the

PAB's procedures for its regular employees but not for

directors. In addition, the PAB found that the Department

had established appeal procedures similar to those afforded

merit employees pursuant to the Executive Order and that

any appeal was to be presented to the APRB. ~

53

The Department appealed the PAB's findings by

filing suit in the Circuit Court of Cole County. The Circuit

Court dismissed the Department's petition for review as moot

because the Department had received a dismissal as it had

requested.

This Court originally granted Defendants' motion to

dismiss on abstention grounds, choosing to "permit state

courts to try state cases free from interference by federal

courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36, 43, 91 S.Ct. 746,

750, L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). However, since the state courts

have refused to hear this case, the cause must be dealt with

by this Court.

Standard

A motion for summary judgment should be granted if,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c) ; Rafos v. Outboard

Marine Corp., 1 F. 3d 707, 708 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct.

2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). A defendant who

moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that

there is no genuine issue of fact for trial. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91

L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A plaintiff opposing a properly

supported motion for summary judgment, however, may not

rest upon the allegations of his pleadings, "but must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."

Id.

Analysis

; Statutes

In bringing this motion, Defendants first assert that

Hopkins is not entitled to remedy as a matter of Missouri

law. Defendants maintain that the Executive Order system,

the APRB, was superseded either by the enactment of the

State Merit System Law or by the subsequent adoption by the

Department of its appeals process. Under the Merit System

Law, for agencies covered by the statute, Division Directors

of merit agencies are expressly excluded from the merit

system. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 36.030 (Vernon 1994). This Court

holds that Hopkins is not subject to the Merit System Law

because of both collateral estoppel and the supremacy of the

federal Grain Standards Act.

A. The Enactment of Chapter 36

After examining Chapter 36, Missouri's Merit System

Law, this Court cannot Say as a matter of law that Chapter 36

was meant to include the Division at the time of its

amendment in 1979. When a federal court is faced with a

lack of controlling state judicial authority, it must determine

the law as the state court would determine it, guided by

reason and sound judicial analysis. Morton v. Texas Welding

And Manufacturing Co., 408 F -Supp. 7, 10 (S.D.Tex. 1976):

The primary rule of Statutory construction is to ascertain the

intent of the legislature from the language used and to give

effect to that intent if possible. Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of

Revenxie, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). Words must

be accorded their plain and ordinary meaning, id,, and, if the

wording of a statute is plain, simple, and straightforward, it is

appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of those

words accurately expresses the legislative purpose. United

States v. Jones, 811 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1987). While the

first source in determining legislative intent is to examine the

55

words used in the statute, a proper analysis also considers the

context in which the words are used. Fowler v. Director of

Revenue, 823 S.W.2d 134, 135 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).

Section 36.030 of the Merit System Law, which lists

those governmental units included in the act's coverage, fails

to explicitly name the Division or the Department while

specifically naming many other governmental units at the

division level or smaller.’ The fact that the Executive Order

was issued in order to comply with federal standards shows

that the government was well aware that Division needed to

have a merit system. This court finds that had the legislature

intended for Division to be included under the State

Personnel Law, it would have specifically named it.

Defendants contend that the Division was included

through the catch-all provision at the end of the section, “.. .

and such other agencies as may be required to maintain

personnel standards on a merit basis by federal law or

regulation for grant-in-aid programs.” Mo. Ann. Stat. §

36.030(1). However, the Division received no grant money

and cannot be considered a “grant-in-aid program” within the

plain meaning of the statute.

' A system of personnel administration based on merit principles and

designed to secure efficient administration is established for all offices,

positions and employees, except attorneys, of the department of social

services, the department of corrections, the department ofhealth , the

department of natural resources, the department of mental health, the

personne] division and other divisions and units of the office of

administration, the division of employment security of the department of

labor and industrial relations, the division of industrial inspection, the

tourism commission, environmental improvement authority, Missouri

housing development commission, the Missouri state water patrol, the

Missouri veterans commission, such other agencies as may be designated

by law, and such other agencies as may be required to maintain personnel

standards on a merit basis by federal law or regulation for grant-in-aid

programs.” Mo. Ann. Stat. §36.030 (1994)

56

Furthermore, both the executive and judicial branches >

of Missouri have interpreted the statute as not including the

Division as a merit agency under its coverage. On November

13, 1979, the director of the Department signed a cooperative

agreement with the United States Department of Agriculture

stating that personnel in the Division were covered by the

Executive Order plan rather than Chapter 36; this was over

three months after Chapter 36 had taken effect. This

agreement had also been approved by the Missouri Attorney

General.

Moreover, the Missouri Court of Appeals ruled in

Brown v. Personnel Advisory Bd. of State of Mo., 879

S.W.2d 581 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994), that the Department was a

non-merit agency that had adopted the appeals procedure of

Chapter 36 for at least some of the personnel of the Division

on April 22, 1981. If the Department had this option at that ~

time, it necessarily follows that the Division was not included

in the original act,

B. Collateral Estoppel

Since this Court cannot rule as a matter of law that

the Division was included as a merit agency within Chapter

36, the issue of which procedures the state of Missouri meant

to apply to the Division turns on a factual determination of

whether the Department later adopted Chapter 36 and to

which personnel that adoption would apply. That issue has

already been adjudicated before the PAB, and relitigation by

this court is barred by collateral estoppel.

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1738 "requires federal courts to give

the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those

judgments would be given in the courts of the state from

which the judgments emerged." Kremer v. Chemical Const.

Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1889, 72 L.Ed.2d

262 (1982). Accordingly, federal courts have consistently

57

applied res judicata and collateral estoppel to causes of action

and issues decided by state courts. Id. Under collateral

estoppel, once a court decides an issue of fact or law

necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation

of the same issue on a different cause of action between the

same parties. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153,

99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). So long as

opposing parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate

disputed issues of fact, res judicata is properly applied to

decisions of an administrative agency acting in a "judicial

capacity." United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384

U.S. 394, 422, 86 S.Ct. 1545, 1559, 16 L.Ed.2d 642 (1966)

(citations omitted). When a federal court is bound by the

statutory directive of §1738, state proceedings need do no

more than satisfy the minimum requirements of the

Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to

qualify for full faith and credit. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 482, 102

S.Ct. at 1897.

This Court then must first decide whether the courts

of Missouri would give preclusive effect to the judgment of

the PAB. Section 36.390(9) requires that a decision by the

PAB be final and binding subject to appeal. Mo. Ann. Stat.

§36.390(9). Further, collateral estoppel has been "applied by

Missouri courts in situations where the fact issue was raised

and decided in an administrative proceeding and relitigation

later attempted in a circuit court action." Bresnahan v. May

Dept. Stores Co., 726 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Mo. banc 1987). In

Bresnahan, the Missouri Supreme Court held that a decision

by an appeals referee with the Appeals Tribunal of the

Division of Employment Security determining that the

? See Butcher v. Ramsey, 628 S.W.2d 912, 914 (Mo.Ct.App. 1982), “the

unappealed final administrative determination in a workman’s

compensation proceeding upon a fact issue within the jurisdiction of the

administrative body is not subject to collateral attack and constitutes a bar

to relitigation of the same fact issue in a subsequent common law action.”

(see also Scannell v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 289 S.W.2d 122 (1956).

58

a

plaintiff had tried to steal from her employer precluded the

plaintiff from relitigating that fact in a civil trial in circuit

court. 726 S.W.2d at 330. The court said that parties may not

relitigate the issues raised and decided adversely to them in

an administrative proceeding if those proceedings met a

four-pronged test: 1) the issue decided was identical to the

issue presented in the present action; 2) the prior adjudication”

resulted in a judgment on the merits; 3) the party against

whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior

adjudication; 4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is

asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in

the prior suit. Id.,. at 330 (citing Oates v. Safeco Ins. Co. of

Am., 583 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Mo. banc 1979)).

In the current cause, the parties are identical, and the

issue is the same. The prior adjudication was held solely to

determine the factual issue of what procedure had been

adopted by the Department. That hearing resulted in a

judgment for the plaintiff on the merits. This Court further

finds that Defendants had a "full and fair opportunity" to

litigate the issue. Both sides were afforded a chance to be

heard and present evidence at a hearing. The hearing was

held in front of a three person board and treated as a

contested case. Section 36.390 required the PAB to use the

official procedures and rules set out in Chapter 536 allowing

parties to call and examine witnesses, to introduce exhibits,

to cross-examine and impeach opposing witnesses, and rebut

the evidence against them. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.070(2).

Section 36.390(9) provides for judicial review for a party

aggrieved by a final decision.

Since all four prongs of the test are met, Missouri

courts would recognize the preclusive effect of the PAB's

decision. That being the case, this court must next determine

whether the PAB proceedings met the minimum

requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Clause. No single model of procedural fairness, let alone a

59

particular form of procedure, is dictated by the Due Process

Clause. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610, 94

S.Ct. 1895, 1901, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974). The procedures

afforded in the PAB appeals process are virtually identical to

those held to be sufficient in Kremer. 456 U.S. at 484, 102

S.Ct. at 1898. The state was allowed to submit all exhibits

and the testimony of any witnesses, to rebut the evidence

submitted by Hopkins, and allowed to be represented by

counsel. Judicial review was allowed to extend to a

determination of whether the action of the PAB:

(1) Is in violation of constitutional provisions;

(2) Is in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction

of the agency;

(3) Is unsupported by competent and substantial evidence

upon the whole record;

(4) Is, for any reason, unauthorized by law;

(5) Is made upon unlawful procedure or without fair trial;

(6) Is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable;

(7) Involves an abuse of discretion.

Mo. Ann. Stat. § 536.140(2).° The procedures provided

certainly satisfied the requirements of the Due Process

Clause. As Defendants have been afforded a full and fair

opportunity to litigate this factual issue of whether the

Department adopted the PAB procedure for Division, its

relitigation is barred by collateral estoppel.

> This Court has no appellate jurisdiction over the decision by the

Missouri circuit court to dismiss the state’s appeal. Federal courts, with

the exception of the United States Supreme Court, do not possess

appellate jurisdiction over state court proceedings.

RR. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 90 S.Ct.

1739, 1747, 26 L.Ed. 362 (1923) (district courts may not exercise

appellate jurisdiction over state courts); Williams v. McKenzie, 834 F.2d

152, 153 (8 Cir. 1987) (federal courts are not empowered to review state

court proceedings even if a federal claim has been asserted therein).

60

The Supremacy Clause and the Grain Standards Act

Defendants' position that Hopkins was removed from

the merit system as a matter of Missouri law is further flawed

because such an action would be counter to the Grain

Standards Act and void under the Supremacy Clause.

Defendants stated that following the passage of the 1976

Grain Standards Act the "Division was required to maintain a

merit personnel system." (Defs. Supp. at 20). This Court

agrees with the parties on this point. Congress may, pursuant

to its power to regulate Commerce, U. S. Const. Art. 1 §8,

prohibit state regulation in the same area. United States v.

City of St. Louis, 452 F. Supp. 1147, 1150 (1978). State laws

can be preempted by federal regulations as well as federal

statutes. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Auto. Med. Labs.. 47]

U.S. 707, 714, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 2375, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985).

"State law is preempted where the state law ‘stands as an

obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full

purposes and objectives of Congress.’”” English v. Gen. Elec.

Co., 496 U.S. 72, 80, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 2275, 110 L.Ed.2d 65

(1990) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz. 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61

S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941)).

It is axiomatic that congressional intent is the

guidepost to judicial interpretation of federal statutes.

Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 82 S.Ct. 1328, 8

L.Ed.2d 440 (1962); Kansas City.Mo. v. Fed. Pac. Elec. Co.,

310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912, 83 S.Ct.

256, 9 L.Ed.2d 171 (1962). The issue turns on the language

of the statute and, where the language is not dispositive, on

the intent of Congress as revealed in the history and purposes

of the statutory scheme. See, Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n

v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051,

2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980) ("the starting point for

interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself");

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct.

2890, 2898, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) ("in deciding whether a

61

federal law pre-empts a state statute, our task is to ascertain

Congress’ intention in enacting the federal statute at issue").

As a general rule of statutory construction, where the

terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial inquiry is

complete. Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101

S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). The language of the

Grain Standards Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 71-87, and of the

regulations promulgated thereunder are straight-forward and

unambiguous with regard to "official personnel" of

designated state agencies. The Act provides that state

agencies are required to employ personnel on the basis of job

qualification rather than political affiliation in order to be

designated an "official agency” under the act. 7 U.S. C. §79

(f) (1) (A) (ix). Section 84(g) provides that the "the

Secretary shall develop and effectuate standards for the

recruiting, training, and supervising of official inspection

personnel and appropriate work production standards for

such personnel, which shall be applicable to . . . all state

agencies under delegation of authority pursuant to this

section." 7 U.S.C. § 84(g). These regulations promulgated by

the Secretary of Agriculture clearly state that "state agencies

shall employ official personnel on the basis of job

qualification rather than political affiliation." 7 C.F.R.

§800.196(g)(3)(ii).

"Official inspection personnel" means persons

- licensed or otherwise authorized by the Secretary pursuant to

section 84 to perform all or specified functions involved in

official inspection, official weighing, or supervision of

weighing or supervision of official inspection. 7 U. S. C. §75

(j). The regulations define "official personnel" in the same

way. 7 C.F.R. § 800.0(b)(70). Since Plaintiff was licensed by

the Secretary of Agriculture to perform the above functions

at the time of his dismissal, he qualifies as inspection

personnel under the Act and the regulations, both of which

62

require the state to employ him based on personal

qualifications rather than political affiliation.

Pre-emption "is compelled whether Congress’

command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or

implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." Jones v.

Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309,

51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). One of the stated purposes of

Congress in adopting the Grain Standards Act of 1976 was to

"provide for the establishment of official United States

standards for grain [and] to promote the uniform application

thereof by inspection personnel." 7 U.S.C. §74. Legislative

history almost solely reflects the concern that corruption and

incompetence had permeated the grain grading system as it

existed prior to 1976. S. Rep. No. 747, 94TH Cong., 2ND.

Sess. 1976, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6522, 1976 WL 14076

(Leg.Hist.), H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1722, 94TH Cong., 2ND

Sess. 1976, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6522, 1976 WL 14076

(Leg.Hist.). Obviously, one of Congress' objectives in

requiring that "official personnel" be employed based on job

qualification rather than political affiliation was to avoid the

corruption and incompetence in the application of its grain

standards which might arise if state agencies were allowed to

operate in a patronage fashion. This Court cannot interpret

this statute as allowing states to exclude from these standards

the highest ranking manager in the officially designated state

agency.

The Supremacy Clause dictates that any provision

made by Missouri which allowed any "official personnel" to

be employed on the basis of political affiliation would be

void.

D. ___ Missouri Statute § 105.055

Defendants next ask this court to dismiss Hopkins'

claims under §105.055, Missouri's "Whistleblower” Statute,

63

for failure to state a case under which relief may be granted.

As this statute has not yet been interpreted by Missouri case

law, this Court must again determine the meaning of a

Missouri statute. Once again, when a federal court is faced

with a lack of controlling state judicial authority, it must

determine the law as the state court would determine it,

guided by reason and sound judicial analysis. Morton, 408 F.

Supp. at 10. The primary rule of statutory construction is to

ascertain the intent of the legislature from the language used

and to give effect to that intent if possible. Wolff Shoe, 762

S.W.2d at 3. Words must be accorded their plain and

ordinary meaning, Id., and, if the wording of a statute is

plain, simple, and straightforward, it is appropriate to assume

that the ordinary meaning of those words accurately

expresses the legislative purpose. Jones, 811 F.2d at 447.

Section 105.055 is a “whistleblower” statute whose

clear purpose is to encourage the reporting of wrong-doing

and prohibit supervisors from firing underlings for making

such reports. The Statute plainly states that “[n]o supervisor

or appointing authority shall . . . take any disciplinary action

whatsoever against a state employee . . . for the disclosure of

information which the employee reasonably believes

evidences a violation of any law, rule or regulation.” Mo.

Ann. Stat. § 105.055(2)(1).

Defendants claim that since § 105.055(1) applies only

to disclosures to the state legislature or state auditor and since

§ 105.055(3) in part addresses issues relating to legislative

requests, the entire statute applies only to reports made to the

legislature or auditor. This Court cannot accept that

interpretation. The language of subsection (1) protects

employees discussing any aspect of agency operation with

the state legislature or state auditor. Mo. Ann. Stat. §

105.055(1). Under Defendants’ interpretation, subsection (2)

would serve no purpose because violations of law and

regulations certainly are already included within discussions

64

of the operations of the agency addressed in subsection (1).

The legislature must be presumed not to enact meaningless

provisions. Wollard v. City of Kansas City, 831 S.W.2d 200,

203 (Mo. banc 1992) (citing City of Willow Springs v.

Missouri State Librarian, 596 S.W.2d 441,446 (Mo. banc

1980). Further, had the legislature intended to limit

subsection (2) to disclosures made to the state legislature or

state auditor it would have so specified, as it did in

subsection (1). While the legislature and auditor might

occasionally be appropriate forums for disclosure of

violations of law and regulations, they certainly are not

always the most appropriate or the most obvious to an

employee wanting to report such activity. This Court cannot

accept that the Missouri state legislature intended this

legislation to be so neutered by such a limitation.

Defendants also claim that the termination of Hopkins

was not a "disciplinary action" within the statute. The statute

clearly defines "disciplinary action" as "any dismissal,

demotion, transfer, reassignment, suspension, reprimand,

warning of possible dismissal or withholding of work." Mo.

Ann. Stat. § 105.055(4). Defendants contend that this

definition only includes low level merit employees and that a

"failure to reappoint" is not a dismissal or withholding of

work. Once again this Court cannot agree with the

defendant's interpretation. Viewing the evidence and

inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable jury could conclude

that Hopkins was terminated in retribution for reporting

violations of reguiations and the law within Division. This is

exactly the type of retaliation that § 105.055 was enacted to

prevent and is clearly a disciplinary action within the statute.

Subsection (5) provides that "any employee" may file an

appeal under the act. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 105.055(5). Even were

Hopkins not required to be employed based on qualifications,

this Court could not view his termination under these

circumstances as falling outside the coverage of this statute.

65

The statute by its plain language applies to employees at all _

levels. To deny coverage to management personnel within

the state government would be te deny coverage to those

most likely to recognize when a law or regulation was being

violated. This Court is not persuaded that that was the intent

of the Missouri legislature.

Section 105.055(5) provides that appeals under the

act be filed with the appropriate agency review board. As

discussed above, collateral estoppel afforded the decision of

the PAB dictates that the appropriate agency review board

would be the APRB.* Defendants have claimed that this

board does not exist, and thus barred the plaintiff from the

hearing allowed him under §105.055. Viewing the evidence

in the manner most favorable to the plaintiff, Defendants'

refusal to allow Hopkins a hearing before the APRB could

constitute a denial of Due Process and therefore be actionable

under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. Defendants are not entitled to

summary judgment as a matter of law on this issue.

I. 11th Amendment Immunity

Defendants have claimed that because they have been

sued in their official capacity, they are entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity’ from the monetary awards requested

by Hopkins.° In the absence of consent, a suit in which the

* Even were the APRB not the appropriate forum and the PAB was,

Hopkins might be entitled to a hearing under §105.055 because

subsection (5) only adopts the appeals provisions of §36.390 which does

not expressly exclude division directors. See, Laws v. Secretary of State,

895 S.W.2d 43 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).

* Defendants have not claimed, and would clearly not be entitled to,

sovereign immunity. Under Missouri law, a public entity is deprived of

sovereign immunity when it performs a proprietary function. Johnson v.

i- Vv 793 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Mo. Banc 1990).

Defendant does not challenge the authority of this Court to grant

injunctive relief. It is well-settled that “a federal court, consistent with

the Eleventh Amendment, may enjoin state officials to conform their

66

BPE cmon i Ne th Re raceme tia

aa a ore Birra ranivresnmme ——* gansient ran weeps gail

State or one of its agencies or departments is named as the

defendant is proscribed by the Eleventh Amendment.’ See,

e.g., Florida Dept, of Health v. Florida Nursing Home Assn.,

450 U.S. 147, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (per

curiam); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57

L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam). Certain well-established

exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity have been

established. A state may waive its sovereign immunity and

consent to suit in federal court, or Congress may, by

legislation, abrogate immunity without the state's consent in

order to effectuate the provisions of the Fourteenth

Amendment. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.

234, 238, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 3145, 87 L.Ed.2d 17] (1985).

This Court agrees with Defendants that neither of these

exceptions is met in this case. Congress did not abrogate

- constitutional sovereign immunity when enacting § 1983 or

the Grain Standards Act. See, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,

342, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1146, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979). As for

waiver by the state, waiver can only be found where stated

"by the most express language or by such overwhelming

implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any

other reasonable construction." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.

651, 673, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1361, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)

(quoting Murray v. Wilson Distillin Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171,

29 S.Ct. 458, 464, 53 L.Ed. 742 (1909)). The Supreme Court

added in Edelman that the "mere fact that a State participates

in a program through which the F ederal Government

provides assistance for the operation by the State of a system

future conduct to the requirements of federal law, even though such an

injunction may have an ancillary effect on the state treasury.” Quern v.

Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)

(citations omitted).

’ The eleventh amendment provides, “The Judicial power of the United

States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity

commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of

another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const.

amend. XI].

67

of public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part

of the State to be sued in the federal courts." Id., 415 U.S. at

673, 94 S.Ct. at 1361. This Court cannot find that Missouri

intended to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. The

fact that the Department agreed explicitly to obey federal law

in administering the program can hardly be deemed an

express waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Florida

Dept. of Health and Rehabilitative Serv., 450 U.S. 147, 149,

101 S.Ct. 1032, 1034, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981).

However, when a suit is brought only against state

officials, as is the case here, the court must decide whether

the suit is actually one against the state. "When the action is

in essence one for the recovery of money from the state, the

state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to

invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though

individual officials are nominal defendants." Ford Motor

Corp. v. Dept. of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347,

350, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945).

While the Eleventh Amendment bars private parties

from suing a state in federal court, state-connected entities or

subdivisions do not always share in their state's immunity.

See, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429

U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568,,572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).

Courts considering an entity's claim of Eleventh Amendment

immunity must determine "whether the suit is in reality a suit

against the state." Sherman v, Curators of Univ, of Mo., 16

F.3d 860, 864 (8th Cir. 1994). (quoting Greenwood v. Ross,

778 F.2d 448, 453 (8th Cir. 1985)). In making this

determination courts consider as a critical factor whether any

judgment rendered against the entity would ultimately come

out of state funds or whether a judgment could be paid out of

non-state funds under the agency's discretionary control. Id,

(citing Edelman V. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668, 94 S.Ct. 1347,

1358, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)).

68

eteeserereerernesreesemmmeenmnnniteteesiiiaiinasieii dilate io

Cases in other Circuits have examined this challenge

to the Eleventh Amendment defense in Bowen and Schiff.

Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.1. 1975), Schiff v.

Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975). Bowen is an :

example of the careful scrutiny required to determine

Eleventh Amendment issues. That case involved the question

whether an order directing payments to be made from a

state's Employment Security Fund and Temporary Disability

Insurance Fund was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. In

denying immunity, the District Court noted that the money in

the funds was not a product of legislative appropriations but

was revenue collected from a limited class of persons

through an-administrative process and segregated from the

general revenues of the state. Id. at 1220. Schiff involved the

question whether a judgment against a state university for

back pay to the plaintiffs who were wrongfully discharged

from their positions as editors of the student paper was barred

by the Eleventh Amendment. In that case, the Fifth Circuit

found that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar recovery

where the judgment could be paid from a fund generated by

student activities fees which were collected for the purposes

of operating the newspaper, including paying the salaries of

the editors. Id. at 262. Hopkins claims that any award he

received could be paid from a fund similar to those in Bowen

and Schiff.

Hopkins has therefore called into dispute whether or

not a monetary award would necessarily have to be paid from

State funds. Sherman, 16 F.3d at 864. He has submitted

evidence that Division is run in a corporate fashion and

generates a profit. Indeed, the majority of grading and

weighing conducted under the Grain Standards Act across the

country is done by corporations rather than state agencies.

The Division is clearly involved in interstate commerce and

is authorized by the Missouri Legislature to operate outside

the state of Missouri. Defendants have produced no evidence

as to how much control the state actually exerts over

69

Division, which is largely controlled by federal regulation.

Division receives no tax monies for its operations and

generates a profit through fees charged to grain shippers and

producers. Plaintiff claims that the monies generated through

fees are held separately from the state treasury and that

restrictions have been placed on their use. This Court holds

that there is a dispute as to a material fact as to whether a

damage award "must inevitably come from the general

revenues of the State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 665,

94 S.Ct. at 1357. Thus, it would be pre-mature to grant

Eleventh Amendment immunity to Defendants at this time.

Il. Qualified Immunity

Defendants have also claimed that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. The standard for determining whether

defendants are entitled to qualified immunity is well

established. "[G]overnment officials performing

discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which

a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v.

Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73

L.Ed.2d 39 (1982). The Supreme Court has made it clear that

a plaintiff cannot defeat an official's claim of qualified

immunity "simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract

rights." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct.

3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed. 523 (1987). There must be a

"particularized” showing that "a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right." Id. A

court must first determine whether a violation of a

constitutional right has been alleged; second, whether the

alleged violation was clearly established; and third, whether

given the facts most favorable to the plaintiff, there are no

genuine issues of material fact as to whether a reasonable

official would have known that the alleged actions violated

70

ieee

that right. Foulks v. Cole County, Mo., 991 F.2d 454, 456

(8th Cir. 1993).

Hopkins claims that Defendants denied him due

process rights granted him by statutes and regulations. In

order to avoid qualified immunity on the due process claims,

a plaintiff must first show that he was deprived of a liberty or

property interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has

recognized that “[t]o have a property interest in employment,

a person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 -

L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). Typically, this property interest arises

from regulatory or contractual limitations on the employer's

ability to terminate an employee. Blankenbaker v. McCook

Pub. Power Dist., 940 F.2d 384, 385 (8th Cir. 1991). When

such a property interest exists, the employee is entitled to a

hearing or some related form of due process prior to

termination. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 ( 1985).

As discussed in Part I of this Order, both the Grain

Standards Act and the regulations complying with the

governor’s executive order provide that employees of the

Division be employed on the basis of qualifications rather

than political affiliation. The Division regulations

promulgated under the Executive order provided for a pre-

termination hearing. These regulations created a property

interest for Hopkins in his employment. See, Bishop v.

Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 2074 n. 8, 48 L.Ed.2d

684 (1976) (because a [federal] employee could only be

discharged for cause, he had a property interest which was

entitled to constitutional protection) (citing Arnett, 416 U.S.

at 151-152, 94 S.Ct. at 1642-1643).

That Hopkins was terminated is undisputed. That

Hopkins received no process prior to or subsequent to his

71

termination is also conceded. Therefore, this Court holds

that Hopkins has alleged a violation of an established right by

the Defendants.

The only remaining issue that must be addressed then

is whether “the contours of this right [are] sufficiently clear

that a reasonable official would understand that what his is

doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The

official is presumed to know the preexisting law governing

his conduct, (see, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-

19, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)), and his

conduct is to be evaluated under the Harlow standard of

“ “objective legal reasonableness’ of the action . . .” assessed

in light of the legal rules that were ‘clearly established’ at the

time it was taken . . .” Anderson, 107 S.Ct. at 3038 [citations

omitted]. The law is well established that employees with a

property interest in their job are entitled to some due process.

See, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. at 1493

(well-established law declares that a public employee with a

constitutionally protected property interest in that

employment is entitled to a pre-termination hearing

consisting of notice and an opportunity to respond). While

the specific procedures to be followed might have been

debatable at the time of plaintiff's termination, the fact that he

was entitled to some due process was well established under

case law and the Grain Standards Act, both of which a

reasonable official would have been aware. A reasonably

competent director of a state department should be aware of

federal laws governing the actions of his department. Jackson

V. Rapp, 746 F. Supp. 934, 945 (W.D.Mo. 1990). This Court

need not analyze the amount of process that should have been

afforded in deciding this motion because it is undisputed that

absolutely no process was afforded Hopkins, and some was

certainly required. Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot

be granted on this issue.

72

As established earlier in this order, Plaintiff was also

entitled to a post-termination hearing under § 105.055. This

right was clearly established by statute. That statute requires

that "each state agency shall prominently post a copy of this

section in locations where it can reasonably be expected to

come to the attention of all employees of the agency." Mo.

Ann. Stat. §1057055(6). This Court holds that the meaning of

that statute is clear and that any reasonable official would be

aware of the rights it afforded to state employees.

Accordingly, qualified immunity cannot be granted with

respect to any of the defendants on this issue.

IV. Official Immunity

Defendants' make a footnote argument that they are

entitled to official immunity. This Court finds this claim to

be entirely without merit. The doctrine of official immunity

is well established in Missouri law. Jackson v. City of

Wentzville, 844 S.W.2d 585, 586 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993). The

general rule of official immunity is that public officers acting

within the scope of their authority are not liable for injuries

arising from their discretionary acts or omissions, but may be

held liable for torts committed when acting in a ministerial

capacity. Kanagawa v. State, 685 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Mo. banc

1985). In this regard, it is commonly stated that where the

law imposes on the officer the performance of ministerial

duties in which a private individual has a special, direct, and

distinctive interest, the officer is liable to such individual for

any injury which he may proximately sustain in consequence

of the failure to perform the duty at all, or to perform it

properly. State ex rel. Twiehaus v. Adolf, 706 S.W.2d 443

(Mo. banc 1986). Whether an act is discretionary depends on

whether the act "necessarily requires the exercise of reason in

the adaptation of means to an end, and discretion in

determining how or whether an act should be done ora

course pursued.” Rustici v. Weidemever, 673 S.W.2d 762,

769 (Mo. banc 1984) (citation omitted). This is opposed to an

73

act that is ministerial, which an officer is required to perform

in a prescribed manner, as mandated by legal authority,

without regard to his own judgment. Id. at 769. In the present

case, Defendants had no discretionary authority to do the acts

alleged by the Plaintiff. Defendants were required by law to

employ Hopkins on the basis of qualification rather than

political affiliation. Defendants were obligated to provide

Hopkins with a hearing under both department regulations

and §105.055. In disregarding these requirements,

Defendants have failed to perform ministerial functions and

are not entitled to official immunity.

Moreover, official immunity as applied to § 1983

claims is not an absolute immunity, but a qualified immunity

to which an official is not entitled unless his conduct was

objectively reasonable with reference to clearly established

law. Smith v. Copelenand, 892 F.Supp. 1218, 1225 (E.D.Mo.

1995) (citing Vieira v. Presley, 988 F.2d 850, 852 (8th Cir.

1993)). As stated earlier in this opinion, Defendants' alleged

conduct was not objectively reasonable with reference to

clearly established law, and thus Defendants are not entitled

to official immunity.

— V. The Public Policy Exception to the At-will

Employment Doctrine and Contract Claims

Hopkins has failed to support his claims with regard

to the public policy exception to the at-will employment

doctrine and to his contract violation claims. He has not

provided this Court with any case law or analysis with regard

to these claims. Plaintiff fails to assert on his contract claim

any standing to sue on those contracts. Defendants have

properly challenged these claims in their motion for summary

judgment. A plaintiff opposing a properly supported motion

for summary judgment may not rest upon the allegations of

his pleadings, "but must set forth specific facts showing that

there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. As Plaintiff has failed to

74

a ernest

cintibninaitetc wise ek ee a

CSS re eS Se See ter ean ener eae ea

show that there is a genuine issue for trial, summary

judgment is granted to Defendants as it relates to these two

claims.

VI. Sufficiency of the pleadings against defendants

Wheeler, Temple and Ausfah!

Defendants also ask this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's

claims against defendants Ausfahl, Temple, and Wheeler for

failure to state a claim against them under § 1983. When

considering a motion to dismiss, an assumption must be

made that all the facts alleged in the complaint are true and a

dismissal may be granted “only if it is clear that no relief can

be granted under any set of facts that could be proved

consistent with the allegations." Alexander v. Peffer, 993

F.2d 1348, 1349 (8th Cir. 1993); Fusco v. Xerox Corp.. 676

F.2d 332, 334 (8th Cir. 1982). A motion to dismiss should

not be granted unless it appears beyond a doubt that the

plaintiff can prove no set of facts which would entitle

plaintiff to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 255 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957).

Contrary to the Defendants' assertions, pleadings

under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure need not be

specific. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a short

and plain statement of the claim Showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 8(a) (2). While "[dJamage

actions against government officials are subject to a

heightened standard of pleading with sufficient precision ‘to

put defendants on notice of the nature of the claims and

enable them to prepare a response, '" Brown v. Frey, 889 F.

2d 159, 170 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted), cert denied,

493 U.S. 1088, 110 S.Ct. 1156, 107 L.Ed.2d 1059 (1990),

Hopkins' pleadings were sufficient to place defendants

Temple and Wheeler on notice of the nature of his claims.

Defendants are correct in asserting that "a defendant

will not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983 unless he was

personally involved in causing the deprivation of a

constitutional right or he either has or is charged with having

actual knowledge that his subordinates are causing

deprivations of constitutional rights." Triplett v. Azordegan,

570 F.2d 819, 823 (8th Cir. 1978). However, Plaintiff alleges

that Temple and Wheeler had supervisory authority over

Saunders and Vickers and that they actively approved

Hopkins' firing and the subsequent denial of his hearing.

Plaintiff further alleges that Temple and Wheeler had actual

knowledge that his constitutional rights were being denied.

While these allegations will need to be proven at trial for

Temple and Wheeler to be held liable, the pleadings are

sufficient to place Defendants on notice, and this Court must

deny Defendant's motion to dismiss Temple and Wheeler.

This Court does, however, grant defendants' motion

to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against defendant Ausfahl. To

establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 two elements must

exist. First, the plaintiff must have suffered the deprivation of

federally protected rights, privileges or immunities as the

result of action taken, and second, such deprivation must

have been caused by a person acting under color of state law.

Triplett v. Azordegan, 570 F.2d 819 (8th Cir. 1978) (citations |

omitted). To establish that an act was performed under color

of state law, there must exist some authority vested by the

state in the official to act in regard to the constitutional right

of which appellant contends he has been denied. Id. (citing

Potts v. Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215, 219 (E.D.Pa. 1973)).

Hopkins has failed to allege any authority vested in

defendant Ausfahl in regard to his constitutional rights.

Ausfahl was Plaintiff's subordinate. Nowhere in his pleadings

does Plaintiff allege that Ausfahl had any authority to fire

him or to deny him a hearing. Nowhere does Plaintiff allege

any action by Ausfahl which caused Plaintiff to be denied

due process.

76

Plaintiff has also made a civil conspiracy claim

against Ausfahl. A claim of civil conspiracy to violate a

person's constitutional rights is actionable under §1983.

Putman v Gerloff, 701 F.2d 63, 65 (8th Cir. 1983); Simpson

v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240, 242-43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,

443 U.S. 911 (1979). The doctrine of civil conspiracy

extends liability for a tort, here the deprivation of a

constitutional right, to persons other than the actual

wrongdoer. A plaintiff must, however, plead two separate

elements to state a claim of civil conspiracy under §1983.

First, a plaintiff must allege with "sufficient particularity"

and demonstrate with "specific material facts" that the

defendants reached some agreement or mutual understanding

and conspired together to violate one of plaintiff's

constitutional rights. Nelson v. City of McGehee, 876 F.2d

56, 59 (8th Cir. 1989); Gometz v. Culwell, 850 F.2d 461, 464

(8th Cir. 1988); Myers v. Morris, 810 F.2d 1437, 1454 (8th

Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 97 (1987). Second, the

plaintiff must allege an overt act performed by one of the

co-conspirators that results in damage. Gometz, 850 F.2d at

464. While Hopkins has satisfied this latter requirement, he

has failed to allege with sufficient particularity facts

suggesting that defendant Ausfahl reached an agreement or

mutual understanding with any of the other defendants to

violate his due process rights. Hopkins' conspiracy

allegations are vague and conclusory. Even viewing the

allegations set out in the pleadings in the light most favorable

to Hopkins, this Court is convinced that he has failed to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted and that defendant

Ausfahl is entitled to dismissal of the complaint against him.

Conclusions

Assuming the allegations of Plaintiff to be true,

Plaintiff has failed to state a case under which relief may be

granted as against defendant Ausfahl. With regard to

defendants Temple and Wheeler, this court determines that

77

Plaintiff has alleged a set of facts which could entitle him to

relief. As to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,

genuine issues of material fact remain, and defendant is not

entitled judgment as a matter of law.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant Ausfahl's supplemental

motion to dismiss (doc. #8) (re-instated by doc. #44) is

granted. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion to dismiss

defendants Temple and Wheeler (doc. #44) is denied. It is

further

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment (doc. #44) is granted with regard to Plaintiff's

claim as to the public policy exception to the at-will

employment doctrine and with regard to Plaintiff's contract

claims. It is further

ORDERED that the remainder of Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment (doc. #44) is denied. It is further

ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for continuance

(doc. #68) is denied.

/s/ Scott O. Wright

SCOTT O. WRIGHT

Senior United States District Judge

January 9, 1996.

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COLE

COUNTY

STATE OF MISSOURI

TOMMY D. HOPKINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No.

“) CV 194-1028CC

MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF __ )

AGRICULTURE, )

)

Defendant. ) -

JUDGMENT

This is a proceeding seeking review of an

administrative proceeding before the Missouri Department of

Agriculture, concerning the Plaintiff's dismissal from his

employment. This action is brought pursuant to the

provisions of Chapter 536, RSMo, specifically §§536.110, et

seg. After reviewing the record and hearing arguments of

counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff Tommy D. Hopkins

was not afforded a hearing before he was dismissed on June

10, 1994, as the Director of the Division of Grain Inspection

and Warehousing, Missouri Department of Agriculture, and

that he has not received any hearing since his dismissal.

Plaintiff filed an appeal with the Agriculture Personnel

Review Board (in care of the Director of the Department of

Agriculture) in reliance on an Executive Order issued by

Governor Joseph P. Teasdale on February 1, 1973 and

pursuant to §105.055, RSMo. Plaintiff was advised by an

attorney for the Defendant Department of Agriculture that no

len

79

such board existed and that the appeal procedure Plaintiff

sought to invoke was "void and inoperative." In the absence

of any hearing, there is no record for this Court to review.

This Court has no authority to now conduct an evidentiary

hearing and therefore is without jurisdiction to grant Plaintiff

any relief sought, and finds that Plaintiff has exhausted his

available remedies in this matter. Defendant has moved for

dismissal. Therefore, it is

ORDERED that Plaintiffs Petition for Review be and

is hereby dismissed as requested by Defendant for the

reasons stated hereinabove.

Costs taxed to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED this 4th day of May, 1995.

/s/ Byron L. Kinder

BYRON L. KINDER, CIRCUIT JUDGE

80

a

BEFORE THE

PERSONNEL ADVISORY BOARD

STATE OF MISSOURI

TOMMY D. HOPKINS

3732 ROCK RIDGE ROAD

JEFFERSON CITY MO 65109

APPELLANT,

)

)

)

)

)

)

) CASE NO:

) NM95-001

)

JOHN SAUNDERS, DIR. )

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE )

)

)

)

)

1616 MISSOURI BOULEVARD

JEFFERSON CITY MO 65101

APPOINTING AUTHORITY.

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL

This case is the appeal by Tommy D. Hopkins of his

dismissal from his position as Director, Division of Grain

Inspection and Warehousing, by the Department of

Agriculture effective June 10, 1994. In his filing with the

Personnel Advisory Board on July 8, 1994, the Appellant

asserted that he had rights to appeal to the Board from that

dismissal under 36.390, RSMo 1986, and under 105.055,

RSMo 1986.

The Board, by its Hearing Officer, Gene W.

Spitzmiller, held a hearing on September 21, 1994, in

Jefferson City, Missouri. Prior to the hearing the Hearing

Officer restricted the presentation of evidence to the

following issues: a) Whether or not the Department of

Agriculture, a non merit agency, had adopted the Board's

81

appeal procedures, under 36.390.7, RSMo 1986, for

employment dismissals from the Appellant's former position,

and b) Whether or not the Department of Agriculture had

established appeal procedures substantially similar to those

provided for merit employees under 36.390.5, RSMo 1986. _

Jerry Venters, counsel, represented the Appellant, who was

present. June Doughty, counsel and John Saunders, the

Appointing Authority, were present.

After considering all the evidence, the Board finds

that the competent and substantial evidence, the evidence as a

whole, and the preponderance thereof, does not support a

finding that the Department of Agriculture had adopted the

Board's appeal procedures, under 36.390.7, RSMo 1986, for

dismissals from the position of Director, Division of Grain

Inspection and Warehousing. The Department of Agriculture

had adopted the Board's appeal procedures for dismissals of

regular employees in most positions of the Division of Grain

Inspection and Warehousing but had not adopted the Board's

appeal procedures for the Director and other excepted

positions.

The Board also finds that the Department of

Agriculture, in compliance with an Executive Order of the

Governor that was filed with the Missouri Secretary of State

in 1978, established appeal procedures for all regular

employees of the Division of Grain Inspection and

Warehousing substantially similar to those afforded merit

employees under 36.390.5, RSMo 1986. Those appeal

procedures, although infrequently used during the interim

period, still existed in force and effect at the time of the

Appellant's dismissal. The appeal procedures applied to

dismissals of regular employees of the Division of Grain

Inspection and Warehousing holding positions excepted from

the adoption of the Board's appeal procedures.

Section 36.390.7, RSMo 1986, provides in part:

82

"7. The provisions for appeals provided in subsection

5 for dismissals of regular merit employees may be

adopted by nonmerit agencies of the state for any or

all employees of such agencies."

Section 105.055., RSMo 1986, as amended, provides

in part:

"5. Any employee may file an administrative appeal

whenever the employee alleges that disciplinary

action was taken against the employee in violation of

this section. The appeal shall be filed with the state

personnel advisory board; provided that the appeal

shall be filed with the appropriate agency review

board or body of nonmerit agency employers which

have established appeal procedures substantially

similar to those provided for merit employees in

subsection 5 of section 36.390, RSMo.”

Since the Department of Agriculture had not adopted

the Board's appeal procedures under 36.390.7, RSMo 1986,

for dismissals of the Director, Division of Grain Inspection

and Warehousing, the Board concludes that it has no

authority under Chapter 36, RSMo 1986, to hear the

Appellant's appeal.

The Board concludes that it could hear the

Appellant's asserted cause for action arising under 105.055,

RSMo 1986, as amended, only if the Department of

Agriculture had not established appeal procedures

substantially similar to those procedures provided for merit

employees in 36.390, RSMo 1986. The Board considered the

arguments presented by the Department of Agriculture that

the Executive Order in 1978 and the procedures established

by the Department of-Agriculture thereafter did not support

the Appellant's cause for action because the procedures were

not promulgated as rules pursuant to Chapter 536, RSMo

83

1986. The Board concludes, however, that the procedures so

established were valid for internal management of employee

appeals arising by authority of 105.055, RSMo 1986, as

amended, even if they were insufficient by themselves to

grant to the Appellant a legal right of appeal. Therefore, the

appropriate review board or body identified by the

Department of Agriculture's established procedures has the

authority to receive and hear the Appellant's appeal, and the

Board has no such authority under 105.055, RSMo 1986, as

amended. Since the Board has no jurisdiction to hear the

appeal under 36.390, RSMo 1986, or under 105.055, RSMo

1986, as amended, the appeal should be dismissed.

ORDER

IT IS, THEREFORE, THE ORDER OF THE

BOARD that the appeal of Tommy D. Hopkins, in this matter

be, and is, hereby dismissed.

DATED: October 18,1994

/s/ Milton P. Goldfarb

MILTON P. GOLDFARB, CHAIRMAN

/s/ Judy A. Hawkins

JUDY A. HAWKINGS, MEMBER

/s/ Gail E. Sphar

GAIL E. SPHAR, MEMBER

sil

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. Constitution: First Amendment: Article I.

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging

the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the

people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the

Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. Constitution: Fifth Amendment: Article V.

No person shall . . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; . . .

U.S. Constitution: Eleventh Amendment. Article XI.

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed

to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or

prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of

another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

U.S. Constitution: Fourteenth Amendment: Article XIV.

Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United

States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of

the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

85

FEDERAL STATUTES

7 U.S.C. Sec. 74. Congressional findings and declaration

of policy.

(a) Grain is an essential source of the world's total supply of

human food and animal feed and is merchandised in

interstate and foreign commerce. It is declared to be the

policy of the Congress, for the promotion and protection

of such commerce in the interests of producers,

merchandisers, warehousemen, processors, and

consumers of grain, and the general welfare of the people

of the United States, to provide for the establishment of

official United States standards for grain, to promote the

uniform application thereof by official inspection

personnel, to provide for an official inspection system for

grain, and to regulate the weighing and the certification

of the weight of grain shipped in interstate or foreign

commerce in the manner hereinafter provided; with the

objectives that grain may be marketed in an orderly and

timely manner and that trading in grain may be

facilitated. It is hereby found that all grain and other

articles and transactions in grain regulated under this ~

chapter are either in interstate or foreign commerce or

substantially affect such commerce and that regulation

thereof as provided in this chapter is necessary to prevent

or eliminate burdens on such commerce and to regulate

effectively such commerce.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 79. Official inspection.

(a) Grain required to be officially inspected.

The Secretary is authorized to cause official inspection

under the standards provided for in section 76 of this title

to be made of all grain required to be officially inspected

as provided in section 77 of this title, in accordance with

such regulations as the Secretary may prescribe.

86

(b) Inspections made pursuant to request of interested

persons.

The Secretary is further authorized, upon request of any

interested person, and under such regulations as the

Secretary may prescribe, to cause official inspection to be

made with respect to any grain whether by official

sample, submitted sample, or otherwise within the

United States under standards provided for in section 76

of this title, or, upon request of the interested person,

under other criteria approved by the Secretary for

determining the kind, class, quality, or condition of grain,

or other facts relating to grain, whenever in the judgment

of the Secretary providing such service will effectuate any

of the objectives stated in section 74 of this title.

« ok * * * * *

(f) Official inspections at other than export port locations;

designation of agencies or persons to conduct official

inspections

(1) With respect to official inspections other than at

export port locations, the Secretary is authorized,

upon application by any State or local governmental

agency, or any person, to designate such agency or

person as an official agency for the conduct of all or

specified functions involved in official inspection

(other than appeal inspection) at locations where the

Secretary determines official inspection is needed,

if -

(A) the agency or person shows to the satisfaction

of the Secretary that such agency or person -

(i) has adequate facilities and qualified

personnel for the performance of such official

inspection functions;

(ii) will provide for the periodic rotation of

official inspection personnel among the grain

elevators, warehouses, or other storage or

handling facilities at which the State or

87

person provides official inspection, as is

necessary to preserve the integrity of the

official inspection service;

(iii) will meet training requirements and

personnel standards established by the

Secretary under section 84(g) of this title;

(iv) will otherwise conduct such training and

provide such supervision of its personnel as

are necessary to assure that they will provide

official inspection in accordance with this

chapter and the regulations and instructions

thereunder;

(v) will not charge official inspection fees that

are discriminatory or unreasonable;

(vi) if a State or local governmental agency,

will not use any moneys collected pursuant to

the charging of fees for any purpose other than

the maintenance of the official inspection

operation of the State or local governmental

agency;

(vii) and any related entities do not have a

conflict of interest prohibited by section 87 of

this title;

(viii) will maintain complete and accurate

records of its organization, staffing, official

activities, and fiscal operations, and such other

records as the Secretary may require by

regulation;

(ix) if a State or local governmental agency,

will employ personnel on the basis of job

qualifications rather than political affiliations;

(x) will comply with all provisions of this

chapter and the regulations and instructions

thereunder; and

(xi) meets other criteria established in

regulations issued under this chapter relating

to official functions under this chapter; and

88

(B) the Secretary determines that the applicant is

better able than any other applicant to provide official

inspection service.

(2) Not more than one official agency or State

delegated authority pursuant to subsection (e)(2) of

this section for carrying out the inspection provisions

of this chapter shall be operative at one time for any

geographic area as determined by the Secretary to

effectuate the objectives stated in section 74 of this

title, except that the Secretary may conduct pilot ,

programs to allow more than | official agency to

Carry out inspections within a single geographical

area without undermining the policy stated in section

74 of this title.

(3) Except as authorized by the Secretary, no official

agency or State delegated authority pursuant to

- subsection (e)(2) of this section shall officially

inspect under this chapter any official or other sample

drawn from a lot of grain and submitted for

inspection unless such lot of grain is physically

located within the geographic area assigned to the

agency by the Secretary at the time such sample is

drawn.

(4) No State or local governmental agency or person

shall provide any official inspection for the purposes

of this chapter except pursuant to an unsuspended and

unrevoked delegation of authority or designation by

the Secretary, as provided in this section, or as

provided in section 84(a) of this title.

(g) Termination, renewal, amendment, cancellation, and

revocation of designations of official agencies

(1) Designations of official agencies shall terminate at

such time as specified by the Secretary but not later

\

89

than triennially and may be renewed in accordance

with the criteria and procedure prescribed in subsection

(f) of this section.

(2) A designation of an official agency may be

amended at any time upon application by the official

agency if the Secretary determines that the amendment

will be consistent with the provisions and objectives of

this chapter; and a designation will be cancelled upon

request by the official agency with ninety days written

notice to the Secretary. A fee as prescribed by

regulations of the Secretary shall be paid by the

official agency to the Secretary for each such

amendment, to cover the costs incurred by the

Secretary in connection therewith, and it shall be

deposited in the fund created in subsection (j) of this

section.

(8) The Secretary may revoke a designation of an official

agency whenever, after opportunity for hearing is

afforded the agency, . .

oe

7 U.S.C. Sec. 84.(g) Recruitment, training, and

supervision of personnel; work production standards;

exemption for certain personnel.

The Secretary shall develop and effectuate standards for the

recruiting, training, and supervising of official inspection

personnel and appropriate work production standards for

such personnel, which shall be applicable to the Secretary, all

State agencies under delegation of authority pursuant to this

chapter, and all official agencies and all persons licensed or

authorized to perform functions under this chapter.

7 U.S.C. Sec. 87f. Enforcement provisions

(h) District court jurisdiction. The United States district

courts, the District Court of Guam, the District Court of the

Virgin Islands, the highest court of American Samoa, and the

United States courts of the other territories and posse:sions

of the United States shall have jurisdiction in cases arising

under this chapter.

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari;

certified questions.

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by the following methods:

(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any

party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of

judgment or decree; .. . .

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738. State and Territorial statutes and

judicial proceedings; full faith and credit .

The Acts of the legislature of any State, Territory, or

Possession of the United States, or copies thereof, shall be

authenticated by affixing the seal of such State, Territory or

Possession thereto. The records and judicial proceedings of

any court of any such State, Territory or Possession, or

copies thereof, shall be proved or admitted in other courts

within the United States and its Territories and Possessions

by the attestation of the clerk and seal of the court annexed, if

a seal exists, together with a certificate of a judge of the court

that the said attestation is in proper form. Such Acts, records

and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated,

shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within

the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they

have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or

Possession from which they are taken.

91

28 U.S.C. Sec. 1746. Unsworn declarations under penalty

of perjury.

Wherever, under any law of the United States or under any

rule, regulation, order, or requirement made pursuant to law,

any matter is required or permitted to be supported,

evidenced, established, or proved by the sworn declaration,

verification, certificate, statement, oath, or affidavit, in

writing of the person making the same (other than a

deposition, or an oath of office, or an oath required to be

taken before a specified official other than a notary public),

such matter may, with like force and effect, be supported,

evidenced, established, or proved by the unswom

declaration, certificate, verification, or statement, in writing

of such person which is subscribed by him, as true under

penalty of perjury, and dated, in substantially the following

form:

“ * oe * * *

(4) If executed within the United States, its

territories, possessions, or commonwealths: "I

declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty

of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed on (date). (Signature)".

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights.

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except

that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act

or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory

decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For

92

the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to

be a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Proceedings in vindication of civil

rights.

(a) Applicability of statutory and common law

The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters

conferred on the district courts by the provisions

of titles 13, 24, and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the

protection of all persons in the United States in their

civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be

exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of

the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to

carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they

are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the

provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and

punish offenses against law, the common law, as

modified and changed by the constitution and statutes

of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of

such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same

is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of

the United States, shall be extended to and govern the

said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause,

and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of

punishment on the party found guilty.

(b) Attorney's fees.

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of

sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of

this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 (20 U.S.C.

1681 et seq.), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act

of 1993 (42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq.), title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), or

section 13981 of this title,, [1] the court, in its

discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than

93

the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part

of the costs, except that in any action brought against

a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer's judicial capacity such officer shall not be

held liable for any costs, including attorney's fees,

unless such action was clearly in excess of such

officer's jurisdiction.

(c) Expert fees

In awarding an attorney's fee under subsection (b) of

this section in any action or proceeding to enforce a

provision of section 1981 or 1981a of this title, the

court, in its discretion, may include expert fees as part

of the attorney's fee.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e. Definitions.

For the purposes of this subchapter —

(a) The term "person" includes one or more individuals,

governments, governmental agencies, political subdivisions,

labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal

representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock companies,

trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in

cases under title 11, or receivers.

(b) The term "employer" means a person engaged in an

industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more

employees for each working day in each of twenty or more

calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and

any agent of such a person, but such term does not include

(1) the United States, a corporation wholly owned by the

Government of the United States, an Indian tribe, or any

department or agency of the District of Columbia subject by

statute to procedures of the competitive service (as defined in

section 2102 of title 5), or (2) a bona fide private membership

club (other than a labor organization) which is exempt from

4

taxation under section 501(c) of title 26, except that during

the first year after March 24, 1972, persons having fewer

than twenty-five employees (and their agents) shall not be

considered employers.

* * o x * *

(f) The term "employee" means an individual employed by an

employer, except that the term "employee" shall not include

any person elected to public office in any State or political

subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or

any person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's

personal Saff, or an appointee on the policy making level or

an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the

constitutional or legal powers of the office. The exemption

set forth in the preceding sentence shall not include

employees subject to the civil service laws of a State

government, governmental agency or political subdivision.

With respect to employment in a foreign country, such term

includes an individual who is a citizen of the United States.

(g) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce,

transportation, transmission, or communication among the

several States; or between a State and any place outside

thereof; or within the District of Columbia, or a possession of

the United States; or between points in the same State but

through a point outside thereof.

(h) The term “industry affecting commerce" means any

activity, business, or industry in commerce or in which a

labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce or the free

flow of commerce and includes any activity or industry

"affecting commerce" within the meaning of the Labor-

Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29

U.S.C. 401 et seq.), and further includes any governmental

industry, business, or activity.

(i) The term "State" includes a State of the United States,

the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,

95

American Samoa, Guam, Wake Island, the Canal Zone, and

ter Continental Shelf lands defined in the Outer

Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.).

a * * * * *

(k) The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex"

include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of

pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and

women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-

related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe

benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar

in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in section

2000e-2(h) of this title shall be interpreted to permit

otherwise. —~

aa * * - * *

(m) The term "demonstrates" means meets the burdens of

production and persuasion.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-2. Unlawful employment practices.

(a) Employer practices.

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an

employer - |

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any

individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any

individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment, because of

such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin; or :

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or

applicants for employment in any way which would

deprive or tend to deprive any individual of

employment opportunities or otherwise adversely

affect his status as an employee, because of such

individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin.

42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3. Other unlawful employment

practices.

(a) Discrimination for making charges, testifying

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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