Appendix — Meyer v. Meyer

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Text

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.,

Petitioner,

V.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

~ APPENDICES A-E

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406

(520) 505-2842

See ga

EDITOR'S NOTE

THE FOLLOWING PAGES WERE POOR HARD COPY

AT THE TIME OF FILMING. L* AND WHEN A

BETTER COPY CAN BE OBTAINED, A NEW FICHE

WILL BE ISSUED.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDICES A-EF

PAGE

Appendix Au... ccc... Decision of Divison One

Court of Appeals of the State of Arizona

Appendix B...... Judgment of Mohave County

Appendix C

Decision of the Supreme Court of Arizona............. C-]

Supreme Court of Arizona Refusal to

Review Decision 0.0.0.0... cccosscss....... C-3

Appendix D.... Court Order Being Violated

Appendix E

Other Relevant Court Orders

Mohave County Minute Order - 1/24/2000............. E-]

Mohave County Minute Order - 2/7/2000............... E-3

Mohave County Minute Order - 2/24/2000............. E-5

Court of Appeals Decision - La Paz County............. E-7

SM isdisncisicicenimm te E-16

Roy v. Industrial Commission of Arizona.............. E-24

A OOM ossssicsicctaticinccsancccc E-32

Boddie v. PORNO, sasssesssincesssarsriosireccccs, E-6]

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No.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.,

Petitioner,

¥.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI!

TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX A

DECISION OF DIVISION ONE

COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406

(520) 505-2842

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF ARIZONA

DIVISION ONE.

TANYA MEYER, PH.D. 1 CA-CV 99-0081

Petitioner-Appellant DEPARTMENT B

Vv. MOHAVE County

Superior Court

)

)

)

)

:

) No. NC 98-7002

RONALD ALLEN MEYER, SR.

)

Respondent-Appellee ) ORDER

)

)

The above-entitle matter was duly submitted to the

Court. The Court has this day rendered its

Memorandum Decision. -

IT IS ORDERED that the Memorandum Decision be

filed by the Clerk.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order

together with a copy of the Memorandum Decision

be sent to each party appearing herein or the

attorney for such party and to the Honorable

Randolph A. Bartlett, Judge.

DATED this 16th day of _September _, 1999,

/s/James B. Sult

James B. Sult, Judge

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF ARIZONA

DIVISION ONE

TANYA MEYER, Ph.D. 1 CA-CV 99-0081

DEPARTMENT B

)

)

Petitioner-Appellant )

)

Vv. ) MEMORANDUM

) DECISION

RONALD ALLEN MEYER, SR.) (Not for Publication-

) Rule 28, Arizona

) Rules

) of Civil Appellate

)

)

Procedure)

Respondent-Appellee

Appeal from the Superior Court of Mohave County

Cause No. NC 98-7002

The Honorable Randolph A. Bartlett, Judge

AFFIRMED

Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

In Propria Persona ~ Lake Havasu City

Matthew G. Newman

Attorney for Appellee Parker

SUL

T, Judge

Tanya Meyer, Ph.D., (“Appellant”), also known as

Tanya Zappe, appeals from the trail court’s denial of

A-2

EE

her petition to : (1) declare an alleged marriage

contract between her and Ronald Meyer (Appellee”)

valid, (2) permit a name change from “Tanya Zappe”

to “Tanya Meyer,” and (3) order the placement of

Ronald Meyer’s name onto the birth certificate of her

child. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

We construe the trial court’s procedure as the

granting of a motion for judgment on the pleadings in

favor of Appellee pursuant to Arizona Rules of Civil

Procedure Rule 12(c). Consequently, we assume as

true all Appellant’s well-pleaded facts and must limit

review to those facts asserted by Appellant in the

pleadings.1 In re 15453 N. Second Ave., 185 Ariz..

35, 36 n.1, 912 P.2d 39, 40n.1 (App. 1996).

Appellant and Appellee were involved ina

thirteen-year relationship. Appellant alleges that the

relationship resulted in a marriage contract and the

birth of a child, Ronald Meyer, Jr. Appellant claims

that the marriage contract allotted child rearing

responsibilities, financial support obligations, and

dissolution rights. Furthermore, Appellant alleges

that the marriage contract functioned in Arizona,

California, Nevada, and Mexico. Notwithstanding the

alleged existence of this contract, and in violation

there, Appellee ended the relationship.

1.In her brief, Appellant recites facts not contained

in either her original petition or the “motion to

decide” which precipitated the trial court’s ruling.

However, these asserted facts were not before the

trail court at the time of its December 15, 1998 order

A-3

and it is this order from which the appeal is taken.

Therefore, we do not include or rely on those

additional allegations of fact.

On October 23, 1998 Appellant petitioned the

superior court to: (1) recognize the contractual

marriage entered into by Appellant and Appellee,

(2) permit her to change her name from “Tanya

Zappe” to “Tanya Meyer, “ and (3) order the addition

of Appellee 's name to the birth certificate of Ronald

Meyer, Jr. On October 29, 1998, Appellee

responded to the petition and denied the allegation

of a contractual marriage. On November 30, 1998,

Appellant filed a “motion to decide” with the

superior court and on December 15, 1998, acting on

the motion, the court denied relief to the Appellant

finding she did not state a legal claim as there is no

provision for a “contractual marriage” under Arizona

law. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.

ISSUES

Appellant has raised seven issues on appeal. For

the purposes of clarity we have reduced the issues to

four:

I. Whether the failure of the trail court to notify

Appellant of Appellee’s response violated

procedural due process?

II. Whether the trail court erred in finding that

Appellant failed to plead sufficiently a

marriage contract under Arizona Revised

Statutes Annotated (“A.R.S.”) sections 25-11

and 25-112 (Supp. 1998)?

III. Whether Arizona's requirements for marriage

pursuant to A.R.5. violated constitutionally

protected rights?

IV. Whether Appellee may be estopped from

denying the existence of a marriage contract?

A-4

Pes. ee Te

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We will uphold an order granting judgment on the

pleadings only if the moving party is clearly entitled

to judgment; that is, if the claimant is not entitled to

relief under any facts susceptible of proof under the

claims pleaded. In re 15453 N. Second Ave., 185

Ariz.. at 36n.1, 912 P. 2d at 40n.1; Brosie v. Stockton,

105 Ariz.. 575, 577, 468 P.2d 933, 935 (1970).

Furthermore, because the matter hinges upon the

interpretation of the facts pleaded, this court’s review

is do novo. See PNL Asset Management Co., v.

Brendgen & Taylor Partnership, 193 Ariz.. 126, 130,

970 P.2d 958, 961 (App. 1998).

Appellant’s arguments based on constitutional

violations and estoppel are raised for the first tume on

appeal. We have discretion to address these issues

and have elected to do so. See Hawkins v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 152 Ariz. 490, 503, 733 P.2d 1073, 1086

(1987).2

ANALYSIS

I. Violation of Procedural Due Process

Appellant contends that the failure to receive

notice of Appellee’s response to her petition violated

her procedural due process rights under the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Assuming Appellee did fail to properiy

serve a copy of the response on her, Appellant still is

not entitled to any relief.

2Appellee has failed to file an answering brief.

We may, but are not required, to treat a failure to file

an answering brief as a confession of reversible

A-5 /

error. Bugh v. Bugh, 125 Ariz.. 190, 191, 608 P.2d 329,

330 (App. 1980). In this case, we elect to address the

merit of the issues raised by Appellant. Hoffman v.

Hoffman, 4 Ariz.. App. 83, 85, 417 P.2d 717, 719 (App.

1966) (noting the discretion to review in spite of a

failure to file an answering brief).

She claims she was deprived of an opportunity to

obtain a hearing because she never knew Appellee

filed a response. However, a hearing is not

necessary for a trail court to judge the sufficiency of

the pleadings under Rule 12(c). If her petition did

not state a legally cognizable claim, the trail court

was entitled to determine this as a matter of law and

no evidence was required or permitted. Thus,

Appellant’s only allegation of prejudice from

Appellee’s failure to serve, namely the inability to

obtain a hearing, is irrelevant.

II. Application of A.R.S. sections 25-11 and 25-112

Arizona law recognizes two methods for creating a

valid marriage contract. The first method is pursuant

to A. R. S. 25-111(B) which set forth two requirements

for a valid marriage contract:

1. A license is issued as provided in this title, and

2. The marriage is solemnized by a person

- authorized by law to solemnize marriages, or

by a person purporting to act in such capacity

as believed in good faith by at least one of the

parties to be so authorized.

Here, neither requirement was met. Consequently,

the marriage contract allegedly entered into by

Appellant and Appellee is not valid under A.R.S.

section 25-111. See Moran v. Moran, 188 Ariz.. 139,

143, 933 P.2d 1207, 1211 (App. 1996).

A-6

The second methods, A.R.S. section 25-112(A) in

essence recognizes marriages that are valid under

the laws of the place where contracted. By this

statute, Arizona allows for the recognition of

marriages that fail to meet the Arizona statutory

requirements, and this would include common law

marriages so long as they are recognized in the

jurisdiction where the parties resided. Even

construing Appellant’s pleading liberally, we find

i that Appellant failed to adequately plead a common

law marriage in another jurisdiction. While

| Appellant insists on the existence or impliedly toa

common law marriage in another jurisdiction.

Therefore, the trail court was correct in finding the

pleadings insufficient to support a claim for a

marriage which could be recognized under Arizona

law.

ao alas He OE

\

III. Validity of A.R.S., section 25-111

Appellant argues that the requirements of A. R.S.,

section 25-111 are unconstitutional under Article 1,

section 10, clause 1 of the United States Constitution

and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Further,

Appellant argues that the requirements are

unconstitutional under Article 2, Section 25 of the

Arizona Constitution. This court has previously

addressed these challenges to A.R.S. section 25-111

and found them meritless in light of Arizona’s police

powers and vital interest in marriage. Moran, 188

Ariz.. at 143-45, 933 P.2d at 1211-13. Appellant has

presented no reasons why reconsideration of Moran

is appropriate here.

RS PN AAD a he SSP OI. ik Nate TE Oe lS ae a Ne

IV. Marriage by Estoppel

Appellant argues that Appellee should be

estopped from denying the existence of the marriage

A-7

a -

contract. Appellant's pleadings are completely

insufficient to allege a claim of estoppel. See Toy

v.Katz, 192 Ariz.. 73, 86, 961 P.2d 1021, 1034

(App.1997). In any event, we would not recognize

estoppel as a means of validating a marriage in

Arizona that was not entered into in this state in

compliance with A.R.S. section 25-111. To do so

would have the effect of permitting common law

marriages in Arizona and would thereby contravene

the public policy of this state.

CONCLUSION

The superior court was correct in granting

judgment on the pleading. We therefore affirm the

judgment.

/ .

James B. Sult, Judge

A-8

ee ee ee ee eV on

No.

— LLL ————

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.,

Petitioner,

V.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX B

JUDGEMENT OF MOHAVE COUNTY

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406

(520) 505-2842

Hit NA, Nasal titans a ot

CR. ete ssn ht cals 0A Oa LBA. Pk

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

ARIZONA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE

Honorable Randolph A. Bartlett, Judge Virnlynn

Division II Tinnell,

Date: May 25, 1999 Clerk

MINUTE ORDER

In re the Marriage of

Tanya Meyer, Ph.D., NO. NC-98-7002

STATE OF ARIZONA

COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner,

and

Ronald A. Meyer, Sr., _

ee ee ee ee a

=

Respondent.

SS

Pursuant to the Court of Appeals Order, the Court

has this date signed the Plaintiff's Order submitted

with her Application. The Court, sua sponte, has

modified the submitted Order by delineating that

portion of the Order regarding the consolidation of

this matter with Mohave County cause

No.PA-97-4010, pursuant to Judge Pro Tempore

Roth’s January 5, 1999,

oc:

Tanya Meyer

2533 Fremont Place

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86403

Petitioner

B-1

NO. 1 CA-CV 99-0081 -

Matthew G. Newman

P. O. Box 1352

Parker, AZ 85344

Attorney for the Respondent

Honorable Rebecca White Berch

Division I

Arizona Court of Appeals

1501 Washington Street

Phoenix, AZ 85007

Honorable Julie Sydney Rothe

Judge Pro Tempore

Honorable Randolph A. Bartlett

Division II

ER RAN RENEE vit oe RRNA LC OS

ZAPPE-MEYER VS. MEYER

Case NC 98-7002

ORDER

Pursuant to State of Arizona Court of Appeals,

Order dated May 17, 1999 and good cause appearing

therefore,

IT IS ORDERED the petitioner’s “petition to change

name and recognize a contractual marriage:as a legal

marriage and order addition of respondent's name to

birth certificate” and respondent's response thereto,

and his request for attorney’s fees having been

reviewed by the court and the court recognizing a

separate matter 97 PA-4010 Zappe-Meyer VS Meyer

is pending before commissioner Julie Rothe, the

court finds that the petitioner’s reasons alleging a

“contractual marriage” are not justifiable under

Arizona Law, and therefore, It is ordered denying

Petitioner’s Petition. It is furthered ordered denying

Respondents request for Attorney’s fees.

/s/ R.A. Bartlett 25 May 99

Honorable Judge Bartlett

A copy of the foregoing mailed this

day of , 1999 to

Tanya Meyer

P. O. Box 3103

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86405

Matthew Newman

P. O. Box 1532

Parker, AZ 85344

Attorney for the Defendent

B-3

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF

ARIZONA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE

Honorable Randolph A. Bartlett, Judge Linda

Division II Seapy,

Date: December 15, 1998 Clerk

MINUTE ORDER

In re the Marriage of

Tanya Meyer, Ph.D., NO. NC-98-7002

Petitioner,

and

Ronald A. Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent.

Nee Ne Nee Nee ee ee Ne ee ee a eS

The Petitioner’s ‘Petition to Change Name and

Recognize 13 Year Contractual Marriage as a Legal

Marriage and Order the Addition of Respondent’s

Name to Birth Certificate” and the Respondent's

Response thereto and his Request for Attorney’s

Fees, having been reviewed by the Court and, the

Court recognizing a separate matter, 97-PA-4010,

Zappe-Meyer v. Meyer is pending before

Commissioner Julie Sydney Rothe, this Court finds

that the Petitioner’s Reasons, alleging a “contractual

marriage” are not justifiable under Arizona law; and

therefore,

IT IS ORDERED denying Petitioner’s Petition.

B-4

Pe ee ee

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED denying Respondent's

request for Attorney’s fees.

Upon the Court’s own motion,

_ Itis ordered consolidating this matter and PA

97-96-4010, Zappe-Meyer vs. Meyer. Both files are

assigned to Commissioner Roth for all further

proceedings.

cc:

Tanya Zappa

2533 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86403

Petitioner

B-5

vei scotia

a)

No.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D., \

Petitioner,

V.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX C

‘DECISION

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406

(520) 505-2842

=e is

Supreme Court

STATE OF ARIZONA

402 Arizona State Courts Building

1501 W. Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3231

Telephone: (602) 542-9396

December 14, 1999

RE: TANYA MEYER vs. RONALD A. MEYER, SR.

Supreme Court No. CV-0398-PR

Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 99-0081

Mohave County No. NC 98-7002

GREETINGS:

The following action was taken by the Supreme Court

of the State of Arizona on December 9, 1999, in

regard to the above-referenced cause:

ORDERED: Petition to Transfer to Supreme Court -

Appeal of Decision Court of Appeals September 16,

1999 [Petition for Review] = DENIED.

A panel composed of Chief Justice Zlaket, Justice

Feldman, and Justice McGregor participated in the

determination of this matter.

Record returned to the Court of Appeals, Division

One, Phoenix this 14th day of December, 1999.

Noel K. Dessaint, Clerk

TO:

C-]

Tanya Meyer, PO Box 3103, Lake Havasu City, AZ

86403-3103

Matthew G. Newman, Esq., PO Box 1532, Parker, AZ

85344-1532

Glen D. Clark, Clerk, Court of Appeals, Division

One, Phoenix, Lexis-Nexis

West Publishing Company

C-2

; nt Rd is Xt Eat lt SN Lat LIE A ig RRL AL IO A Ca

Supreme Court

STATE OF ARIZONA

402 Arizona State Courts Building

1501 W. Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007-3231

Telephone: (602) 542-9396

December 29, 1999

Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

P. O. Box 3103

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86403-3103

Re: Tanya Meyer v. Ronald A. Meyer, Sr.

Supreme Court No. CV-99-0398-PR

Court of Appeals No. 1 CA-CV 99-0081

Dear Dr. Meyer:

On December 23, 1999, you presented, at our

counter, a “Motion to Reconsider or Notice of

Appeal” along with a money order in the amount of

$71.00. Pursuant to your request, I am providing this

letter confirming that I rejected this document for

filing and your money order at our filing counter on

December 23, 1999.

As I told you, I am authorized by the Arizona

Supreme Court to reject for filing documents that do

not comply with Court Rules or are prohibited by

Court Rules. Rule 22(d) does not permit the filing of a

motion for reconsideration from an order denying a

petition for review unless permitted by specific order

of the Court.

C-3

You further indicated that you thought that some type

of notice of appeal was necessary or required in

order to pursue your case in the United States

Supreme Court. This will further confirm that I

advised you that you were not correct and that you

must file any petition for certiorari pursuant to United

Supreme Court Rules with the United States Supreme

Court.

For your additional information, filing fees in the

Arizona Supreme Court are set by statute. There is

no $71.00 fee.

Despite our discussion on December 23, 1999, you

delivered by Express Mail, an original and seven

copies of the same document crossing out the words

“Motion to Reconsider or” leaving the “Notice of

Appeal”. You also included the $71.00 money order.

The package was received on December 27, 1999.

Once again, this document will not be filed nor

processed in the Arizona Supreme Court since it is

not authorized by law or court rule. If you are

seeking review in the United States Supreme Court,

you must follow the rule of that court.

Iam also returning and enclosing with this letter your

money order dated December 23, 1999, No.

6070018057 in the amount of $71.00. Your original

document will be maintained with our copy of this

letter.

. Very truly yours,

/s/ Noel K. Dessaint

Noel K. Dessaint

Clerk of the Court

C-4

NKD:dk

encl.

cc: Glen D. Clark, Clerk, Court of Appeals, Division

One, Phoenix

Matthew Newman, Esq.

P. O. Box 1532

Parker, AZ 85344-1532

No.

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.,

Petitioner,

Vv.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX D

COURT ORDER BEING VIOLATED

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406

(520) 505-2842

Babbitt and Bartlett, P. C.

Attorney at Law

McCulloch Blvd., Suite

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86403

(602) 855-8 104(?)

Attorney for the Petitioner

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

FOR THE COUNTY OF MOHAVE

In re the Marriage of _)

) CASE NO. 17601

Tanya Helen Zappe, +)

)

Petitioner, ) DECREE OF

) DISSOLUTION

AND ) OF MARRIAGE

)

Fréderick C. Zappe, __i+)

)

Respondent. )

)

The above entitled matter having come as

regularly for hearing before the Court and Petitioner,

Tanya Helen Zappe apearing in person and with

counsel, D. S. BABBITT, and Respondent having failed

to appear or respond in this motion an Affidavit of

Default and Entry of Default having been entered on

November 6, 1981, and testimony is wise best

offered,

The Court finds that Respondent herein was a

resident of Mohave County for more than ninety days

D-1

prior to the filing of the Petition, that the Property

Settlement Agreement entered into by the parties

and as file here in, has been examined by the court

as far as it has jurisdiction to do .. and it has been

found that the provisions therein are by these term,

not unfair or unjust, that Petitioner is a fit and proper

person to have the care, custody and control of the

parties’ minor child, Jamie Jay Zappe, that Petitioner,

Tanya Helen Zappe desires the return of her maiden

name, Tanya Helen Field, that the marriage is

irretrievably broken and that there is no reasonable ~

prospect of reconciliation.

IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND

DECREED:

1. The marriage previously existing between the

parties is dissolved;

2. That the care, custody and control of the parties’

minor child, JAMIE JAY ZAPPE, is awarded to

Petitioner, TANYA HELEN ZAPPE, without visitation

rights to Respondent.

3. That no child support be awarded.

4. That the Property Assignment Agreement

entered into by the parties is approved and

incorporated and .....with this Decree.

5. That TANYA HELEN ZAPPE, shall henceforth be

known as TANYA HELEN FIELD.

DONE IN OPEN COURT this 17th day of November,

1981.

/s/ m.

Judge of the Superior Court

D-2

PP SOOT eT Se ee

State of Arizona

County of Mohave

I, Linda Seapy, Clerk of the Superior Court of the

State of Arizona in and for the County of Mohave do

hereby certify the foregoing to be a full, true and

correct copy of the original on file in my office.

Witness my hand and seal of said Court this 20th day

of January, 1989.

/s/ Lister Foster

Clerk/Deputy Clerk

~ (Please note: This is a transcription of the original

document which is difficult to read in parts. A copy

of the original is included in this appendix on the

next two pages.)

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The above eatitie® setter haviag enmp an segulasiy

hes Buesiog Belere the Court end Petitioners, TANYA BELET

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tweideat of Beheve County fer ase thes Biawty (06) éaye

priec to the Ciliag ef the Petition, thet the Preperty

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be" 0B, Bes Boon enemiecds by the Court as fer es it bes

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testeia ese, by thele Gaeme, apt wulell oF unust, thet

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< of hes melden name, TANVA MOLEM PIED, that tne herrioge be

wo brietriovesly broken and that the « be no Peagonable prosge.t

oot ceounsiisation. a

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In the

Supreme Court of the United States

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.,

Petitioner,

V.

Ronald Allen Meyer, Sr.,

Respondent,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPENDIX E

OTHER RELEVANT COURT ORDERS

Mrs. Tanya Meyer, Ph.D.

2581 Fremont Drive

Lake Havasu City, AZ 86406

(520) 505-2842

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR COUNTY OF MOHAVE

HONORABLE JULIE SYDNEY ROTH, VIRLYNN

JUDGE PRO TEMPORE MOHAVE VALLEY- TINNELL,

BULLHEAD CITY JUDICIAL DISTRICT CLERK

DATE: JANUARY 24, 2000

eee

TANYA MEYER, Ph.D.,

Petitioner, NO. PA-97-4010

v.

RONALD A. MEYER, SR.,

Respondent.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Petitioner has filed a pleading entitled ‘Petition for

Specific Performance:.

Inasmuch as this case involves a Lake Havasu City

party or parties, and pursuant to telephone conference

call with Division II, this file is ORDERED reassigned to

Judge Randolph A. Bartlett, Division II, for all further

handling.

ce:

TANYA MEYER PHD

PO BOX 3103

LAKE HAVASU CITY, AZ 86405

Petitioner

MATTHEW G. NEWMAN

PO BOX 1532

PARKER AZ 85344

Honorable Randolph A. Bartlett

Division II

Honorable Gary R. Pope

Presiding Judge

E-1

(informational copy)

Honorable Julie Sydney Roth

Judge Pro Tempore

ee aol, TOME ae. © Cee Sr

Oe a, a ee ee eee

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR COUNTY OF MOHAVE

HONORABLE RANDOLPH A. BARTLETT, VIRLYNN

JUDGE TINNELL,

DIVISION II CLERK

DATE: FEBRUARY 7, 2000

_____MINUTEORDER

TANYA MEYER, Ph.D.,

Petitioner, NO. PA-97-4010

)

)

)

Vv. )

)

RONALD A. MEYER, SR., _)

)

Respondent. )

Guana

Pursuant to a telephone conference call with Judge Pro

Tempore Julie S. Roth, this file is ORDERED reassigned

back to Judge Roth for all further proceedings.

cc:

TANYA MEYER PHD

PO BOX 3103

LAKE HAVASU CITY, AZ 86405

Petitioner

MATTHEW G. NEWMAN

PO BOX 1532

PARKER AZ 85344

Honorable Gary R. Pope

Presiding Judge

(informational copy)

Honorable Julie Sydney Roth

Judge Pro Tempore

Honorable Randolph A. Bartlett

Division II

E-3

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

IN AND FOR COUNTY OF MOHAVE

HONORABLE JULIE SYDNEY ROTH, VIRLYNN

JUDGE PRO TEMPORE MOHAVE VALLEY- TINNELL,

BULLHEAD CITY JUDICIAL DISTRICT CLERK

DATE: FEBRUARY 28, 2000

MINUTE ORDER

TANYA MEYER, Ph.D.,

Petitioner, NO. PA-97-4010

)

)

)

Vv. )

)

RONALD A. MEYER, SR., +)

)

Respondent. )

)

This Judge Pro Tempore has reviewed this file upon

reassignment of the case back to me.

Petitioner’s Petition for Specific Performance requests

improper relief. The Court takes no action on that

pleading.

As to Petitioner's Petition for Correction of Birth

Certificate, to the extent this is a request that Mr. Meyer's

name be added to Ronald Jr.’s birth certificate as the

legal father,

ORDERED granting this Motion based upon the DNA

results and ORDERING that Ronald Al. Meyer, Sr. be

added as the legal father to the birth certificate for Ronald

Meyer, Jr., born September 28, 1989. The Court signs this

Minute Order this date and directs the Clerk to provide a

certified copy to the Office of Vital Records in Phoenix,

Arizona.

Dated: February 28, 2000 /s/JulieS.Roth __

JULIE S. ROTH,

JUDGE PRO TEMPORE

cc:

E-4

i ABE tad Mok NY

ONDE Sa LA Eli id GONE Psat APD ia Net Os i,

See Lae Vee tee

TANYA MEYER PHD

PO BOX 3103

LAKE HAVASU CITY, AZ 86408

Petitioner

MATTHEW G. NEWMAN

PO BOX 1532

PARKER AZ 85344

Darci D. Farrell

Assistant Attorney General

Division of Child Support Enforcement

Attorney for the State

Atlas No. 0001476792-00

MANAGER

OFFICE OF VITAL RECORDS

2727 WEST GLENDALE AVENUE

PHOENIX AZ 85051

Honorable Julie Sydney Roth

Judge Pro Tempore

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF ARIZONA

DIVISION ONE

RONALD ALLEN MEYER, SR., ) 1CA-CV 99-0329

)

Petitioner-Appellee, ) DEPARTMENTA

)

v. ) MEMORANDUM

) DECISION

TANYA ZAPPE (FIELD) MEYER, ) (Not for Publication-

) Rule 28, Arizona

Respondent-Appellant. ) Rules of Civil

) Appellate Procedure

Appeal for the Superior Court of La Paz County

Cause Nos. LC-98000024 and DO-99000028

The Honorable Michael Irwin, Judge

AFFIRMED

Matthew G. Newman

Attorney for Appellee Parker

Tanya Zappe (Field) Meyer, In Propria Person

Appellant Lake Havasu

FIDEL, Presiding Judge

1 This appeal concerns two orders of protection, both of

which were entered on behalf of Appellee Ron Meyer

(“Ron”) against Appellant Tanya Zappe (Field) Meyer

(“Tanya”). The first order was entered in November 1998

in Parker Justice Court. Tanya moved to dismiss, her

motion was denied, and she appealed to the superior

court. There, the first order was vacated when Ron failed

to pay the filing fee; Ron responded by letter, which the

court treated as a motion for new trial; and on March 12,

1999, the court denied Ron's motion for new trial. On the

same date, however, the superior court issued Ron the

second order of protection. Tanya objected to the second

E-6

a di ase Pa A Na

order and was denied relief at a March 29 hearing. Ina

timely notice of appeal, Tanya identified two issues: (1)

lack of notice of the motion for new trial that Ron filed

when the first order was vacated, and (2) that the second

order of protection should not have been entered.

2. Inbriefs filed with this court, Tanya addresses two

issues and many others. We do not consider the other

issues, however, for they are outside the scope of her

notice of appeal and outside the scope of the trail court

orders from which the appeal arises.

3. We first consider Tanya’s argument that she did not

receive timely notice of Ron’s letter requesting a new trial

or of the court’s minute entry treating the letter as a

motion for new trial. Although both documents bear

notations that they were mailed to Tanya at the post office

box address that she had filed with the court, we do not

dispose of this issue on that basis. It suffices, instead to

reiterate that Ron’s motion for new trial was denied. By

that motion, Ron south and failed to revive the first,

vacated, order of protection. That order, accordingly

remained vacated. When Ron obtained a second order of

protection, Tanya sought and received a hearing on the

second order. Accordingly, she was not aggrieved by

any absence of notice concerning Ron’s unsuccessful

attempt to revive the first, vacated, order.

4. We turn to the question whether the trail court erred

in entering the second order of protection. We review for

abuse of discretion and to determine whether the order

was supported by the evidence. See State v. Reinhardt,

190 Ariz. 579, 951 P.2d 454 (1997). Under Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann. (“A.R.S.”) section 13-3602 (G)(6)(1998), the trial

court may “[g]rant” relief that is necessary for the

protection of the alleged victim and ...that is proper

under the circumstances.” The order of protection

directs Tanya to not contact or go near Ron at his

residence and business, and to keep a distance of 200

feet at any other time. Ron testified that he is an

insurance broker and that Tanya called him at home and

at his office at all hours of the day and night, disrupting

his business, harassing business associates, and

disrupting his sleep. “She calls hundreds of times and

she hangs up...in the middle of the night...She comes to

my office.” This evidence support the trail court’s grant

of protective relief pursuant to A.R.S. section

13-3602(G)(6).

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EEE eee

5. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

/s/NOEL FIDEL

NOEL FIDEL, Presiding Judge

. CONCURRING:

/S/THOMAS C. KLEINSCHMIDT

/S/THOMAS C. KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge

_ /s/REBECCA WHITE BERCH

/s/REBECCA WHITE BERCH, Judge

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Sheri Newman

Superior Court Clerk

(520) 669-6131

TDD (520) 669-8400)

FAX (520) 669-2186

Futu re

Unlimited

1316 Kofa Avenue, Suite 607

Parker, Arizona 85344

E-15

STATE OF ARIZONA

DEPARTMENT OF REAL ESTATE 596368

REAL ESTATE SALESPERSON LICENSE

This is to certify that the person named below has fulfilled the requirements of

Arizona laws governing the licensing of

A REAL ESTATE SALESPERSON

TANYA Z MEYER ie

LAKE HAVASU CITY, AZ 86403

| License No. sa117882000

TS LICENSE MUST GE AVAILABLE FOR PUBLIC INSPECTION

_ E-16

Document 900003637 State of California

Name Change of Doc 4980007619

Commission on Teacher Credentialing

issues this document to

TANYA ZAPPE MEYER

Clear Adminsstrative Services Credential

Ks Dias credentun avthonzes the bokier to serve as & su JerWwHeNdeN, MSCOsIE aupenntenden. deputy sare mienden:. Poncipel, aise ant principal super sor

consultant, coorcinater, Of in an cyuralent of smermediate kel cominetrat ve postion m grades tweve and below. mokding orexchoot, ord 11 classes

Organised promanily for actules

Vahd: October 7, 1997 to November 1, 2002

Ro To eaew dus credential, te hoder nerds fo wort only on apebicascn form and fee to the Com nisaon within at mon-hs ser to he export On date pomed

above The onewal penal os fine year

Aa JTF tt org

E-17

_~ FPO RAN ABE ERE AMOR ENE ELE OS COE EER AAAS OEE ED OE dace eeanane een eerie

CERTIFICA 4

ory

TANYA Z MEYER

Ae a A ee olegae

+ ment ary

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: ——s

i i

E-18

198 P. 1105, 22 Ariz. 490, Horton v. Horton, (Ariz.

1921)

1105 198 P. 1105

22 Ariz. 490

Horton

Vv.

Horton

No. 1893.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

July 5, 1921

Action by L. J. Horton against Annie Horton, for

annulment of marriage. Judgment for plaintiff, and

defendant appeals.

Reversed, with directions to dismiss.

1. Divorce k 320

Marriage in foreign state to evade restrictions of

state of domicile held not invalid. Where parties

domiciled in Arizona went to New Mexico for the

purpose of evading the restrictions provided by Civ.

Code 1913, par. 3864, as amended by Laws 1917, c.

54, forbidding remarriage for one year after divorce,

and were there married, such marriage was not

thereby rendered invalid in Arizona, the statute not in

terms or by necessary implication declaring such

marriage void.

2. Marriage k 3

Marriage valid according to lex loci valid

everywhere at common law. Marriage is primarily a

contract and under the common-law rule is valid

everywhere if entered into according to lex loci.

3. Marriage k 3

Legislature may determine what marriages shall be

void, notwithstanding they are valid in state where

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celebrated. It is within the power of the legislature to

enact what marriages shall be void within the state,

notwithstanding they are valid in the state where

celebrated, whether contracted between parties who

were in good faith domiciled within the state where

the ceremony was performed or between parties

who left the state for the purpose of avoiding its

statutes.

1. DIVORCE 320

134 ---

134 VII Operation and Effect of Divorce, and Rights

to Divorced Persons

134k319 Right to Marry

134k320 In general.

Ariz., 1921

Where parties domiciled in Arizona went to New

Mexico for the purpose of evading the restrictions

provided by Civ. Code 1913, par 2864, as amended

by laws 1917, c. 54 (A.R.S. section 25-320),

forbidding remarriage for one year after divorce,

and were there married, such marriage was not

thereby rendered invalid in Arizona, the statute not in

terms or by necessary implication declaring such

marriage void.

2. MARRIAGE 3

253

253k3 What law governs.

Ariz. 1921

Marriage is primarily a contract and under the

common-law rule is valid everywhere if entered into

according to the lex loci.

3. MARRIAGE 2

253 ----

253k2 Power to regulate and control.

Ariz. 1921

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- | =

It is within the power of the Legislature to enact what

marriages shall be void within the state,

notwithstanding they are valid in the state where

celebrated, whether contracted between parties who

were in good faith domiciled within the state where

the ceremony was performed or between parties

who left the state for the purpose of avoiding its

statutes.

*1106 Appeal from Superior Court, Maricopa

County; F. H. Lyman, judge.

Phillips, Cox & Phillips and C. F. Ainsworth, all of

Phoenix, for appellant.

Earl Anderson of Phoenix, for appellee.

[22 Ariz. 491] Baker, J.

This action was brought by the plaintiff (the parties

will be designated in this court as they were in the

court below) to obtain a judgment annulling the

marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant,

celebrated in Deming, N. M., on the 12th day of

September, 1918, on the ground that such marriage

was void. It appears from the finding s of the lower

court that the parties both resided in the state of

Arizona at the time they contracted the marriage in

New Mexico, and that they have ever since retained

such residence. It further appears that the defendant

was formerly married to one William Crawford, but

on the Ist day of August, 1918, she was granted an

absolute divorce from her husband by the superior

court of Maricopa county, Ariz. For the purpose of

avoiding the restrictions of the laws of Arizona,

prohibiting the marriage of a divorced person until

after the expiration of one year from the time the

divorce is granted, the parties went to Demin, N. M.

and were there married. They immediately returned

to this state and lived together as husband and wife

until about the 26th day of February, 1920, when the

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defendant drove plaintiff from the house, since which

time the parties have lived separate and apart.

The lower court determined that the marriage in

Deming, N. M., was void and entered a judgment

annulling it for the reason and on the ground that

such marriage was consummated prior to the

expiration of one year from the date of the divorce

granted to the defendant.

The provisions of the statutes of this state on the

subject are contained in section 3839, Revised

Statutes 1913, and section 3864, as amended by

chapter 54, Sessions Laws 1917, p. 75:

‘3839. All marriages valid by the laws of the place

where contracted, shall be valid in this state; [22

Ariz. 492] provided, that all marriages solemnized in

any other state or country by parties intending at the

time to reside in this state shall have the same legal

consequences and effect as if solemnized in this

state; parties residing in this state cannot evade any

of the provisions of its laws as to marriage by

going into another state or country for the

solemnization of the marriage ceremony.’

‘3864. A divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall

notin any wise affect the legitimacy of the children

thereof; and either party may, after the dissolution of

the marriage, marry again only after one year shall

have elapsed from the date of judgment of such

divorce; provided however, that if proceedings are

begun prior to the expiration of the said one year to

set aside said judgment of divorce, or either of them,

may not marry again until the said proceedings shall

have been determined.’

[1] It is conceded that by the laws of New Mexico the

marriage between the parties when consummated

there was lawful in that state. Does the fact that the

parties, being domiciled in this state, lett here and

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went to New Mexico for the purpose of evading the

restrictions provided in section 3864 and were there

married, render such marriage invalid in this state?

We do not think so. It will be observed that the

statutes above cited do not in terms, or by necessary

implication, declare such a marriage void. The

statutes merely in general terms prohibit such a

marriage. No penalty is affixed for disobedience.

There is some conflict of authority as stated in 5

R.C.L. 1001----

‘Upon the question whether the courts of the state

which has enacted such a statute merely in general

terms prohibiting such marriage of such person

occurring out of the state while he is still domiciled

within the state. The weight of authority is that if the

marriage is valid according to lex loci, it will be

upheld even [22 Ariz. 493] by the courts of the state

which enacted the statute, and in which theparties to

the remarriage are domiciled, even though the

parties went out of the state to solemnize the second

marriage for the express purpose of evading the law

of the domicile and of the forum’

In Com. v. Lane, 113 Mass. 458, 18 Am. Rep. 509, the

Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in an opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice Gray, says:

‘A marriage which is prohibited here by statute

because contrary to policy of our laws, is yet valid if

celebrated elsewhere according to the law of the

place, even if the parties are citizens and residents of

this commonwealth, and have gone abroad for the

purpose of evading our laws, unless the Legislature

has clearly enacted that such marriages out of the

state shall have no validity here. This has been

repeatedly affirmed by well considered decisions.’

And this seems to be the overwhelming weight of

the better reasoned cases on the subject. Medway v.

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Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 8 AM. Dec. 131; Van Voorhis

v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18, 37, 40 Am. Rep. 505; Thorp v.

Thorp, 90 N. Y. 602, 43 Am.Rep. 189; Griswold v.

Griswold, 23 Colo. App. 365, 129 Pac. 560; Phillips v.

Madrid, 83 Me. 205, 22 Atl. 114,12 L. R. A. 862;, 23

Am. St. Rep. 770 State v. Shattuck, 69 Vt. 403, 38 Atl.

81,40 L. R. A. 428, 60 Am. St. Rep. 936, and notes;

State v. Hand, 87 Nrb. 189, 126 N. W. 1002, 28 L. R.A.

(N.S.) 753; Conn *1107 v. Conn, 2 Kan. App. 419, 42

Pac. 1006; Dudley v. Dudley, 151 Iowa, 142, 130 N. W.

785, 32 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1170; Hoagland v. Hoagland

(Wyo.) 193 Pac. 843; Hilton v. Stewart, 15 Idaho, 150,

96 Pac. 579, 128 Am. St. Rep. 48.

A number of cases take a contrary view, but an

examination of these cases will show that they were

based upon statutes expressly declaring the

marriages (1) void, or (2) declaring incapacity to

contract, [22 Ariz. 94] or (3) which by express terms

suspended the operation of decrees of divorce, or

were held to suspend it by necessary implication, or

(4) such statutes were held to be declarations of

public policy, superseding the jus gentium that a

marriage valid where performed is valid

everywhere. This distinction is pointed out in

Griswold v. Griswold, supra. The cases we refer to

are collated in 19 C. J. 183, and footnotes, the

principal ones being Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis.

360, 117 N. W. 787, 17 L. R. A. (N.S.) 804, 128 Am. St.

Rep. 1085; Pennegar v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10S. W.

305, 2L. R.A. 703, 10 Am. St. Rep. 648; McLennan v.

McLennan, 31 Or. 480, 50 Pac. 802, 38 L. R. A. 863, 65

Am. St. 835; In re Stul’s Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 Atl. 16,

39 L. R. A. 539, 63 Am. St. Rep. 776.

, i

[2] Marriage is primarily a contract. In its

constitution it is purely personal and consensual.

Considered merely as a contract, it is valid

~ everywhere if entered into according to the lex loci.

This is the common-law rule. The statute recognizes

the common-law rule, ‘all marriages valid by the laws

E-24

a

of the place where contracted shall be valid in this

state.’ The reason for this rule is clearly stated by Mr.

Justice Story in his Conflict of Laws (7th Ed.) par. 121,

where he quotes from the opinion of Sir Edward

Simpson in the historic case of Scrimshire v.

Scrimshire, 2 Hagg. Const. 395;

‘All civilized nations allow marriage contracts. They

are juris gentium, and the subjects of all nations are

equally concerned in them. Infinite mischief and

confusion must necessarily arise to the subjects of all

nations with respect to legitimacy, succession, and

other rights, if the respective laws of different

countries were only to be observed as to

marriages contracted by the subjects of those

countries abroad; and therefore all nations have

consented, or are presumed to consent, for the

common [22 Ariz. 495] benefit and advantage, that

such marriages shall be good or not according to the

laws of the country where they are celebrated. By

observing this rule few, if any, inconveniences can

arise. By disregarding it, infinite mischiefs must

ensue.’

[3] The Legislature undoubtedly had the power to

enact what marriages shall be void in this state,

notwithstanding their validity in the state where

celebrated, whether contracted between parties who

were in good faith domiciled in the state where the

ceremony was performed, or between parties who,

being domiciled in this state, left the state for the

purpose of avoiding it statutes and married. But the

Legislature has not seen fit to do so. Ifthe Legislature

in so many words had said that, if persons residing in

this state, in order to avoid the restrictions contained

in section 3864, and with the intention of returning to

reside in this state, go into another state and there

have their marriage solemnized, and after return and

reside here, their marriage shall be deemed void in

this state, and entirely different state of matters would

exist. .

E-25

The decree of divorce granted by the superior court

of Maricopa county to the defendant, Annie Horton,

was absolute. Essentially it undid the marriage, and

those who were united in it were disunited. The

prohibition contained in the statute did not render

the judgment intermediate or interlocutory, nor did it

impair its integrity. She went into another state and

there married. The prohibition contained in the

statute was without effect outside the territorial limits

of this state.

‘It is almost universally conceded that statutes

prohibiting the guilty party to a judgment of divorce

from marrying again, either for a certain period, or

while the other party to the former marriage lives,

are without effect outside the territorial limits of the

prohibiting state. Since sucha prohibition is in the

[22 Ariz. 496] nature of a penalty it does not apply to

divorces granted outside of the state, nor does it

carry any disability beyond the borders of the state

where in force.’ 5 R. C. L. 1004.

In view of all the facts and circumstances disclosed

by the record, we are of the opinion that the

marriage in New Mexico was not void. While the

defendant was forbidden to marry again in this state

until after the expiration of one year from the time the

divorce was granted, she could contract a marriage

in New Mexico which, if valid there, will be

recognized by the courts of this state. To hold

otherwise would render a number of marriages in

this state void, and possibly cast an ugly suspicion

upon the legitimacy of innocent children.

*]107_ If our views shall be found inconvenient or

repugnant to sound principles, it may be expected

that the succeeding Legislature will explicitly enact

that marriage contracted within another state by

parties who have left this state for the purpose of

avoiding its laws, and who return and lie here, shall

be of no force in this state.

E-26

The judgment of the lower court is reversed, with

instructions to dismiss the action.

ROSS, C. J., and McALISTER, J., concur.

397 P.2d 211, 97 Ariz. 98, Roy V. Industrial

Commission,

(Ariz. 1964)

*211 397 P.2d 211

97 Ariz. 98

Johnnie May ROY, Petitioner,

Vv.

The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of Arizona

and the Howard P. Foley Company and Jelco,

Inc. (Foley-Jelco), Respondents.

No. 8212.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division.

Dec. 10, 1964.

Certiorari proceeding to review award denying

alleged common-law wife death benefits under the

workmen’s compensation law. The Supreme Court,

Udall, C. J., held that common-law marriage was

valid under law of Texas, and where presumption

that marriage continued until decedent’s death was

not rebutted by evidence in record the presumption

that marriage continued until decedent’s death was

not rebutted by evidence in record the presumption

controlled and sufficed as basis on which predicate

award of death benefits to her.

Award set aside.

1. MARRIAGE 51

253 ----

253k51 Questions for jury.

Ariz. 1964

E-27

Under Texas law, question whether a common-law

marriage exists is a legal question.

2. MARRIAGE 13

253 ----

253K12 essentials

253K13 common-law REQUISITES.

Ariz. 1964

Under Texas law, requisites of a common-law

marriage are express or implied agreement between

parties to become husband and wife, cohabitation in

pursuance of such agreement, and holding out by

parties that they are husband and wife.

3. MARRIAGE 40(1)

253

253k40 Presumptions be

253k40(1) In general.

Ariz. 1964

When a showirg is made that a marriage has been

celebrated, every act necessary to validity of that

marriage will be presumed in absence of proof to the

contrary.

4 MARRIAGE 40(10)

253 ----

253k40 Presumptions

253k40(10) Rebuttal of presumptions.

Ariz. 1964

Evidence to rebut validity of a marriage must be

sufficiently clear and conclusive as fairly to preclude

any other result.

5 MARRIAGE 40(10)

253 ---

253K40 Presumptions

253K40(10) Rebuttal of presumptions.

E-28

Ariz. 1964

While presumption of marriage is very powerful,

evidence in opposition to presumption need not be

conclusive to overcome it.

6. WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 1474

413 ----

413XVI Proceeding to Secure Compensation

413XVI(N) Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

413XVI(N)6 Dependency and Relationship

413K1472 Husband and Wife

413K1474 Existence and validity of marriage

relations; common-law marriages.

Ariz. 1964

Where facts gave rise to inescapable legal

conclusion that common-law marriage of alleged

common-law wife and decedent was valid under law

of Texas, and strong presumption that marriage

continued was not rebutted, presumption that

marriage continued until decedent’s death controlled

and sufficed as base on which to predicate award of

death benefits under workmen’s compensation law to

widow.

*212 Joe H. Tonahill, Jasper, Tex., Kenneth S.

Scoville and LeRoy Hofmann, Phoenix, for Johnnie

May Roy

[97 Ariz. 99] Edgar M. Delaney, Phoenix, for

respondent Industrial Commission of Arizona;

Richard J. Daniels, Frank E. Murphy, Jr., James S.

Tegart, Robert A. Slonake, Ralph E. Mahowald, Jr.,

Phoenix, of counsel.

UDALL, Chief Justice.

Petitioner, Johnnie Mae (Reeves) Roy, brings this

matter before us by means of certiorari to review an

award of the Industrial Commission denying her

death benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation

Law. Her claim arises out of the death of Harold Lee

E-29

Roy, to whom it is alleged she was married at the

time of his demise.

No issue is raised regarding the death of Harold Lee

Roy being the proximate result of an accidental

injury sustained in the course of and arising out of his

employment. Decedent was a lineman working for

Foley-Jelco Company and was killed almost

instantaneously May 9, 1962, while working on the

construction of an electrical transmission line tower.

The only dispute involved herein lies in the marital

status of decedent and petitioner. Petitioner alleges

she and decedent consummated a common law

marriage in Texas in the latter part of 1959 or early

1960, and it is admitted that such a marriage is

entirely legal in that state. A thorough interstate

investigation of this matter was conducted by the

Industrial Commission which was assisted in its

endeavors by counsel representing two children of

the deceased. The children were issue of two

previous marriages previously entered into and

dissolved in accordance with the prescribed

solemnities. Having been born under such

circumstances their rights as surviving dependents of

decedent have been recognized.

The sole question for our determination is whether

the conclusion of the Industrial Commission, that

petitioner was not the lawful wife of decedent at the

time of his death, is sustained by competent evidence

in the record.

*213 [1] [2] Although our statutes require the

solemnization of marriages contracted within our

state, A.R.S. section 25-111, they specifically provide

for recognition of the validity of marriages valid by

the laws of the place where contracted, A. R. S.

section 25-112. It therefore must be determined

whether under Texas law petitioner and the

deceased achieved the marriage status. Respondent

E-30

concluded that such a status had not been reached

and accordingly denied petitioner's claim for death

benefits.

Whether a common-law marriage exists has been

held by the Texas courts to be a legal question.

Moore b. Jordan, 328 S. W. 2.d 343 (Tex.Civ.App.).

The requisites of such a marriage are: (1) An

agreement express Or implied between the parties to

become husband and wife; (2) cohabitation [97 Ariz.

100] in pursuance of such agreement, and (3) a

holding out by the parties that they are husband and

wife. Ex Parte Threet, 160 Tex. 482, 333 S. W. 2d 361;

Shelton v. Belknap, 155 Tex. 37, 282 S. W. 2d 682

[3] [4] [5] A number of years ago this Court had

occasion to deal with the presumption of the validity

of marriage and stated:

‘Both the law and public policy favor matrimony and

when it is once shown that a marriage has been

celebrated, the contract, the parties’ capacity to

enter into it, and in fact every act necessary to it

validity will be presumed, in the absence of proof to

the contrary. The presumption that it was legal and

valid in all respects is one of the strongest known to

the law, * * *. ‘ Kolombatovich v. Magma Copper

Co., 43 Ariz. 314, 318, 30 P.2d 832, 834.

It was pointed out in the Kolombatovich decision,

supra, that the evidence to rebut the validity of the

marriage must be sufficiently clear and conclusive as

fairly to preclude any other result. A more recent

decision recognizes the presumption as being very

powerful but rejected the argument that the evidence

in opposition thereto must be conclusive to overcome

it. Hodges v. Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 326,

241 P.2d 431. See also Texas Employers’ Insurance

Association v. Elder, 155 Tex. 27, 282 S. W. 2d 371.

As the only issue involved herein is the question of

whether petitioner and decedent were married we

must look to the record to determine whether the

evidence before respondent was sufficient to

establish a prima facie case of such marriage,

thereby giving rise to the presumption of its validity.

[6] The record herein indicates that early in the

investigation of this matter respondent secured and

had before it for consideration a certified copy of the

death certificate which contains the information that

decedent was married at the time of his death and

petitioner’s name as spouse. It indicates that

decedent’s brother Ivey signed as informant

Upon rehearing of this matte by the respondent the

testimony of seven witnesses was taken. The

petitioner testified in essence that she and decedent

visited a Justice of the Peace in Orange, Texas,

intending to have a ceremonial marriage. Although

she was unsure of the exact date she thought it was

on or about March 18m 1960. They were informed

that a three day waiting period was necessary. Upon

further inquiry the Justice of the Peace informed them

of the legality of so-called common-law marriages

and they then agreed to be married in that manner.

Decedent on that day place on petitioner’s finger a

wedding band which she wore until Christmas of

1961 when decedent gave [97 Ariz. 101] her a set of

rings consisting of both an engagement and wedding

ring.

On the day they entered into this agreement they

had occasion to be an establishment in Buna, Texas,

owned by a friend of decedent, Anthony Scalisi. Mr

Scalisi testified that he recalled the visit and that

decedent told him they had been married that day.

He further corroborated petitioner’s claim that from

that day forward they held themselves out to the

public generally as husband and wife. He also had

occasion to visit them while they were *214. staying

E-32

at decedent’s father’s home in Livingston, Texas,

where they presented themselves as husband and

wife; and it was not until after decedent’s death that

he learned they had not been ceremonially joined in

matrimony.

The secretary of the union local in Beaumont, Texas,

of which decedent was a member during 1960 and

1961, testified that during this period the couple held

themselves as husband and wife; and, it was not until

after decedent’s death that he learned they had not

been ceremonially joined in matrimony.

The secretary of the union local in Beaumont, Texas,

of which decedent was a member during 1960 and

1961, testified that during this period the couple held

themselves out to the public generally as husband

and wife.

Decedent’s brother Emory testified that when

visiting his home in Erath, Louisiana, the couple slept

together and otherwise conducted themselves as

husband and wife. Three other witnesses testified: -

one of the decedent’s ex-wives; a former co-worker

of petitioner; and a former co-worker of decedent. In

summation it can be said that their testimony, along

with that of Emory, indicated that all was not blissful

between the parties, that decedent drank quite

heavily and on several occasions physically beat the

petitioner. She apparently threatened to leave after

these incidents and stated that she and the decedent

were not married; however, these statements could

not change the past and if in fact a valid marriage had

been entered into they could not destroy its validity.

The evidence indicates that this couple resided

together as husband and wife in approximately

twelve communities located in Texas, Louisiana,

Kansas, New Mexico, and Arizona. This is certainly

consistent with a marriage relationship.

E-33

Decedent’s brother Ivey did not testify; however, in

addition to being informant for the death certificate

he submitted two affidavits. In the first one he

reiterated the fact that they were married but in the

second he repudiates the first to some extent.

Respondent’s investigation disclosed that on August

22, 1960, decedent applied for credit in Erath,

Louisiana, listing petitioner as his wife, and again,

February 9, 1962, he obtained a loan for the purchase

of an automobile in Mesa, Arizona, listing petitioner

as his spouse. It is also unrefuted in the record that

petitioner was paid as surviving spouse on a life

insurance policy taken through the labor union.

It is our opinion that the above facts give rise to the

inescapable legal conclusion that under the law of

Texas a valid common-law [97 Ariz. 102] marriage

between petitioner and decedent was consummated.

Once established there is a strong presumption that

the marriage continued, and this record does not

contain sufficient evidence to rebut it. Therefore, the

presumption is controlling and sufficient upon which

to predicate an award. Respondent was bound

thereby, and must give it effect. See Martin v.

Industrial Commission, 73 Ariz. 401, 242 P.2d 286.

Award set aside.

LOCKWOOD, V. C. J., SCRUGGS, J., concurring.

418 F. Supp. 1061

(Cite as: 418 F.Supp.1061)

Roger G. Redhail et al., Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Thomas E. ZABLOCKI et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 74-C-624.

United States District Court, E. D. Wisconsin

Aug. 31, 1976

E-34

Aclass action was brought, under federal civil rights

statute proscribing the deprivatior. of rights, and

against defendant class of county clerks, challenging

constitutionality of statute which requires residents,

who have minor issue not in their custody whom they

are under an obligation to support by a court order

or judgment, to obtain a court order granting them

permission to marry in order to obtain a marriage

license. A declaratory judgment and an injunction ©

were sought. The three-judge District Court,

Reynold, J., held that action was entitled to be

maintained as a class action against class of

defendants consisting of 72 county clerks; that no pre

judgment notice to class members was required; and

that statute is invalid as violative of equal protection.

Order accordingly.

[1] DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 123

118Ak123

In the absence of a pending state criminal

prosecution, both declaratory judgments and

injunctions may be issued by federal court with

respect to constitutionality of state statute.

[1] INJUNCTION 105(2)

212k105(2)

In the absence of a pending state criminal

prosecution, both declaratory judgments and

injunctions may be issued by federal court with

respect to constitutionality of state statute.

[2] CIVIL RIGHTS 209 i"

78k209

Formerly 78k13.9

Exhaustion of state remedies is not a prerequisite to

commencing an action under federal civil rights

statute proscribing the deprivation of rights. 42

U.S.C.A. section 1983.

[3] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 181

E-35

170 Ak181

Action, brought under federal civil rights statute,

challenging constitutionality of state statute requiring

certain residents to obtain court permission before

they can marry was entitled to be maintained as a

class action against class of defendants consisting of

72 county clerks. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 23 (a),

(a)(1, 3, 4), (b), , (b)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; W.S.A.

245.10(1).

[4] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309(1.5)

92k309(1.5)

Formerly 92k309(1)

Due process does not require notice to absent

members of a class within rule 23(b)(2).

Fed.RulesCiv.Proc. rules 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.

[5] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48(4.1)

92k48(4.1)

Formerly 92k48(4)

The discretionary notice provisions of class action

rule 23(d)(2) are at least presumptively valid as

complying with due process. Fed.Rules

Civ.Proc.rule 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.

[6] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309(1)

92k309(1)

Due Process requires only that “interested parties”

be given notice.

[7] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 309(1.5)

92k309(1.5)

Formerly 92k309(1)

In class action, brought under federal civil rights

statute, challenging constitutionality of state statute

which requires certain residents to obtain court

permission before they can marry, brought against

defendant class of county clerks, all of whom were

required by state statute to refuse to issue marriage

licenses to members of class of plaintiffs without

E-36

: ‘as —

court order, no pre judgment notice to members of

either class was required by either rule 23 or due

process; however, notice of judgment would be

provided to members of defendant class.

Fed.Rules.Civ.Proc. rule 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; W.S.A.

245.10(1, 4, 5).

[7] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 177.1

170Ak177.1

Formerly 170Ak177, 170 Ak161

In class action, brought under federal civil right

statute, challenging constitutionality of state statute

which requires certain residents to obtain court

permission before they can marry, brought against

defendant class of county clerks, all of whom were

required by state statute to refuse to issue marriage

licenses to members of class of plaintiffs without

court order, no pre judgment notice to members of

either class was required by either rule 23 or due

process; however, notice of judgment would be

provided to members of defendant class.

Fed.RulesCiv.Proc. rule 23(d)(2), 28 U.S.C.A.; W.S.A.

245.10(1, 4, 5).

[8] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208(1)

92k208(1)

Statutory classifications are generally measured

against the rational relationship test and are upheld if

they are rationally related to some legitimate

government interest. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 14.

[9] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208(1)

92K208(1)

If statutory classification impinges upon fundamental

rights or constitutes a suspect classification, it is

subjected to strict scrutiny and can be upheld only if

it is necessary to promote compelling governmental

interests and is narrowly drawn to express only such

interests. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

[10] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82(10)

E-37

92k82

Individual interests involved in marriage are within

the constitutional right of privacy.

[11] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 82(10)

92k82(10)

Formerly 92k82

There is a constitutionally protected right to marry

which occupies status of a fundamental right.

[12] DIVORCE 34

134k34

Classification created by statute placed substantial

burdens on ability of class members to marry and

’ thus affected their fundamental rights and was

required to be subjected to strict scrutiny. W.S.A.

245.10(1,4,5).

[13] DIVORCE 34

134k34

Wealth discrimination inherent in statute requiring

certain residents to obtain permission before they

can marry provided additional justification for

applying strict scrutiny test.

[14] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225.1

92k225.1

A sliding scale equal protection analysis was not

appropriate in case involving validity of state statute

which requires certain residents to obtain court

permission before they can marry. W.S.A.

245.10(1,4,5); U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14

[15] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 208(1)

92k208(1)

Where a statutory classification is tested against

requirements of strict scrutiny test, state bears

burden of showing how compelling its interest may

be.

E-38

[16] DIVORCE 321

134k321

State’s interest in counseling persons who had failed

to fulfill support obligations arising from a previous

marriage was insufficient to justify restriction on such

persons’ marital rights under statute which prohibits

remarriage without court permission. W.S.A.

245.10(1,4,5).

[17] DIVORCE 321

134k321

Interest in state in safeguarding welfare of children

could not justify restriction on rights of persons under

statute which prohibits marriage without court

permission, since statute was not necessary to

achievement of such interest. W.S.A. 245.10(1,4,5)

[18 DIVORCE 321

134k321 -

State has legitimate and substantial interests in

regulating the domestic relations of its residents.

[19] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 225.1

92k225.1

Formerly 92k225.2

Statute which requires residents, who have minor

issue not in their custody whom they are under an

obligation to support by a court order or judgment,

to obtain a court order granting them permission to

marry in order to obtain a marriage license is invalid

as violative of equal protection. W.S.A. 245.10(1,4,5);

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

[19] DIVORCE 4

134k4

Statute which requires residents, who have minor

issue not in their custody whom they are under an

obligation to support by a court order or judgment,

to obtain a court order granting them permission to

marry in order to obtain a marriage license is invalid

E-39

as violative of equal protection. W.S.A. 245.10(1,4,5); -

U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

*1062 Georgia Lutze, Paticia Nelson and Robert H.

Blondis, Milwaukee Legal services, Inc., Milwaukee,

Wis., for plaintiffs.

Robert P. Russel, Corp. Counsel, and David J. Siler,

Asst. Corp. Counsel, Milwaukee, Wis., for

defendants.

Before TONE, Circuit Judge, and REYNOLDS and

Warren, District Judges.

REYNOLDS, District Judge.

This is a class action challenging the constitutionality

of a Wisconsin statute, s 245.10(1), (4), and (5) (1973),

[FN1] which requires certain residents to obtain court

permission before they can marry. The action is

brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s 1983, and *1063

jurisdiction is conferred by 28 U.S.C. s 1343(3).

Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92

S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 822 (1972). The statute is

attacked on the grounds that it conflicts with rights

secured by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. The

relief sought includes a declaratory judgment that the

statute is unconstitutional as well as an injunction

restraining it enforcement. We hold that the statute

violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal

_ protection clause and that the relief requested should

be granted.

FN 1. ‘245.10 Permission of court required for

certain marriages (1) No Wisconsin resident having

minor issue not in his custody and which he is under

obligation to support by any court order or

judgment, may marry in this state or elsewhere,

without the order of either the court of this state

which granted such judgment or support order, or

the court having divorce jurisdiction in the county of

E-40

this state where such minor issue resides or where

the marriage license application is made. No

marriage license shall be issued to any such person

except upon court order. The court, within 5 days

after such permission is sought by verified petition in

a special proceeding, shall direct a court hearing to

be held in the matter to allow said person to submit

proof of his compliance with such prior court

obligation. No such order shall be granted, or

hearing held, unless both parties to the intended

marriage appear, and unless the person, agency,

institution, welfare department or other entity

having the legal or actual custody of such minor issue

is given notice of such proceeding by personal

service of a copy of the petition at least 5 days prior

to the hearing, except that such appearance or

notice may be waived by the court upon good cause

shown, and, if the minor issue were of a prior

marriage, unless a 5-day notice thereof is given to

the family court commissioner of the county where

such permission is sought, who shall attend such

hearing, except that such appearance or notice may

be waived by the court upon good cause shown, an if

the minor issue were of a prior marriage, unless a 5

day notice thereof is given to the family court

commissioner of the county where such permission is

sought, who shall attend such hearing, and to the

family court commissioner of the court which granted

such divorce judgment. If the divorce judgment was

granted in a foreign court, service shall be made on

the clerk of that court. Upon the hearing, if said

person submits such proff and makes a showing that

such children are not then and are not likely

thereafter to become public charges, the court shall

grant such order, a copy of which shall be filed in any

prior proceeding under s. 52.37 or divorce action of

such person in this state affected thereby;otherwise

permission for a license shall be withheld until such

proof is submitted and such showing is made, but

any court order withholding such permission is an

appealable order. Any hearing under this section

E-41

may be waived by the court if the court is satisfied

from an examination of the court records in the case 7

and the family support records in the office of the

clerk of court as well as from disclosure by said

person of his financial resources that the latter has

complied with prior court orders or judgments

affecting his minor children, an also has shown that

such children are not then and are not likely

thereafter to become public charges. No county

clerk in this state shall issue such license to any

person required to comply with this section unless a

certified copy of a court order permitting such

marriage is filed with said county clerk.‘‘(4) Ifa

Wisconsin resident having such support obligations

of a minor, as stated in sub. (1), wishes to marry in

another state, he must, prior to such marriage, obtain

permission of the court under sub. (1), except that in

a hearing ordered or held by the court, the other

party to the proposed marriage, if domiciled in

another state, need not be present at the hearing, the

judge shall within 5 days, send a copy of the order of

permission to marry, stating the obligations of

support, to such part not present. (5) This section

shall have extraterritorial effect outside the state;

and s. 245.04(1) and (2) are applicable hereto. Any

marriage contracted without compliance with this

section, where such compliance is required, shall be

void, whether entered into in this state or elsewhere.

I.

In January of 1972, a paternity action was

commenced in the County Court, Civil Division, of

Milwaukee County, Wisconsin, against plaintiff

Roger G. Redhail in which it was alleged that he was

the father of a baby girl born out of wedlock on July

5, 1971. On February 23, 1972, Redhail appeared

and admitted that he was the father of the child. On

May 12, 1972, Redhail was adjudged the father of the

child born on July 5,1971, and was ordered to pay

$109 per month as support for the child until she

E-42

|

reached eighteen years of age, and was also ordered

to pay court costs.

At the time of his admission of paternity, Redhail was

a minor and a high school student. From May of 1972

until August of 1974, he was unemployed, indigent,

and.unable to pay any support obligation. No

payments were, therefore, made, and as of

December 24, 1974, there was an arrearage in

excess of $3,732.

Redhail’s child has been a public charge since her

birth and is currently receiving benefits under the

Aid to Families with Dependent Children (“AFDC”)

program in excess of $109 per month. Thus, the child

would be a public charge even if Redhail were

current! the payment of support in the paternity

action.

On September 27, 1974, Redhail filed an application

for a marriage license with defendant *1064 Thomas

E. Zablocki. Zablocki is the County Clerk of

Milwaukee County and is responsible for the

issuance of marriage licenses in Milwaukee County

pursuant to s 245.05, Wis.Stat. On September 30,

1974, an agent of Zablocki denied Redhail’s

application for a marriage license and refused to

issue a marriage license solely because Redhail

failed to comply with s 245.10(1), Wis.Stats., in that he

did not have a court order granting him permission

to marry.

This complaint in this action was filed on December

24, 1974. Since a permanent injunction restraining

the enforcement of a state statute was requested the

action was one requiring a three-judge district court,

28 U.S.C. s 2281. Designation of a three-judge court

was requested, and on January 6, 1975, the Chief

Judge of the Seventh Circuit entered an order

designating this three-judge court pursuant to 28

U.S.C. s 2284. Defendant subsequently filed his

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answer. Notice was given to the governor and the

attorney general pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2284 (2).

On February 18, 1975, plaintiff filed a motion for a

class action. The motion sought to have the action

maintained as a class action on behalf of all

Wisconsin residents subject to the provisions of s

245.10(1) and against a class consisting of all the

county clerks within Wisconsin. By order dated

February 20, 1975, Judge Reynolds ordered that the

action proceed as a class action pursuant to Rule

23(b)(2), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on behalf

of a class of plaintiffs defined as follows:

‘All Wisconsin residents who have minor issue not in

their-custody and who are under an obligation to

support such minor issue by any court order or

judgment and to whom the county clerk has refused

to issue a marriage license without a court order,

pursuant to s 245.01(1), Wis.Stats.(1971).”

The order also established a briefing schedule in the

event plaintiffs desired to maintain the action against

a class consisting of all the county clerks. While

plaintiffs filed a briefin support of the motion,

defendant Zablocki has never filed a brief in

opposition.

Following the filing of a stipulation of facts and

briefs, oral argument was held on June 23, 1975, in

which a representative from the Wisconsin attorney

general’s office participated. The Court requested

the parties to discuss the applicability of Huffman v

Pursue, Lt.., 420 U.S. 592, 95S. Ct. 1200, 43 L. Ed.2d

482 (1975), and plaintiffs later filed a memorandum

on this issue.

II.

Before reaching the merits, it is necessary to discuss

_ the Huffman issue as well as to decide whether the

action should be maintained against a class of

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OO

defendants consisting of all the county clerks in the

State of Wisconsin.

A.

In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27

L.Ed. ed 669 (1971), the Court held that federal

courts must refrain from granting injunctions which

would interfere with pending state criminal

proceedings in the absence of extraordinary

circumstances such as when there is a showing of

“bad faith” or harassment” by the state officials

responsible for the prosecution, supra at 54, 91S. Ct,

746, or where the state law to be applied is “

‘flagrantly and patently violative of express

constitutional prohibitions,’” supra at 53, 91 S.Ct. at

755, In a companion case, Samuels v. Mackell, 40]

U.S. 66, 91S. Ct. 764, 27 L. Ed.2d 688 (1971), the

same abstention doctrine was held to apply to

granting declaratory judgments. [FN2] .

FN2. Companion cases to Younger and

Samuels were: Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77, 91 S. Ct.

758, 27 L.Ed.2d 696 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401

U.S. 82, 91 S.Ct. 674, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971); Dyson v.

Stein, 401 U.S. 200, 91 S.Ct. 769, 27 L.Ed.2d 781

(1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216, 91 S. Ct. 777,

27 L. Ed.2d 792 (1971).

Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., supra, extended Younger to

a situation where the state court action, although

nominally civil rather *1065 than criminal, was “in

important respects *** more akin to a criminal

prosecution than are most civil cases. The State is a

party *** and the proceeding is both in aid of an

closely related to criminal statutes which prohibit the

dissemination of obscene materials. ***”Supra 420

U.S. at 604, 95 S. Ct at 1208. Huffman also held that

the federal plaintiff who has lost at the state court trial

“must exhaust his state appellate remedies before

seeking relief in the District Court, unless he can

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bring himself within one of the exceptions specified

in Younger.” Supra 420 U.S. at 608, 95S. Ct. at 1210.

The Court did not, however, decide whether Younger

applies to any type of state court proceeding. Supra

at 607, 95S. Ct. at 1200.

[1] In the circumstances of this action, it is

unnecessary to decide whether Younger should be

further extended. Plaintiff Redhail did not petition a

state court for permission to marry under the

provisions of s 245.10(1) after he was denied a

marriage license. There is, therefore no pending

state proceeding which would be frustrated by

granting the relief requested. In the absence of

pending state criminal prosecution, both declaratory

judgments and injunctions may be issued. Steffel v.

Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 945. Ct. 1209, 49 L.Ed.2d

505 (1974); Doran Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95S.

Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). Thus, even assuming

that Younger should be held to apply to any type of

state court proceeding, since plaintiff Redhail never

initiated a proceeding under s 245.10(1), there is no

threat to the principle underlying Younger and

Samuels *** that state courts are fully competent to

adjudicate constitutional-claims ***.” Doran v. Salem

Inn, Inc., supra, at 930, 95 S. Ct. at 2567.

[2] Nor is there any requirements that a federal

plaintiff in an action under 42 U.S.C. s 1983, such as

Redhail, first apply to state courts for relief. Monroe

v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81S. Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492

(1961), established the principle that exhaustion of

state remedies is not a prerequisite to commencing a

s 1983 action. See also, Wilwording v. Swenson, 404

U.S. 249, 92S. Ct 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971);

McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 83 S.

Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1961).

There is, therefore, no barrier to consideration of

plaintiffs’ claims on the merits even if the principles

E-46

of Younger and Huffman are held to apply to any

state court proceeding. [FN3]

FN3. There may be members of the plaintiff

class who have applied to state courts for permission

to marry and whose petitions may be said to be

“pending” in those courts. But since the relief

requested is prospective in nature and operates

against county clerks rather than judges, granting the

plaintiff class relief will not occasion “interference”

with state court proceedings.

B.

Plaintiffs seek to have this action maintained as a

class action as to defendants under Rule 23(b)(2) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defenant

class is defined in the complaint as “all county clerks

of counties within the State of Wisconsin, all of whom

are required by s 245.10(1) Wis.Stats. (1971) to

refuse to issue marriage licenses to members of the

class of plaintiffs without a court order.” As stated

above, defendant Zablocki has not filed a brief

indicating why this action should not be allowed to

proceed against a class of defendants.

Rule 23(a) prescribes the essential prerequisites that

must be satisfied for any class action. They are

satisfied here. First, the class of defendants,

consisting of the seventy-two county clerks in

Wisconsin, is “so numerous that joinder of all

members is impracticable.” Rule 23(a)(1). Next,

there is a question of law common to all the members

of the class the constitutionality of the challenged

statute. Thirdly, the claims and defenses of the

representative party, defendant Zablocki, are

“typical of the claims or defenses of the class,” Rule

23(a)(3), since Zablocki’s contention that his action in

refusing a marriage license to Redhail was justified

by the statute would undoubtedly be asserted by the

other county clerks. Finally, defendant Zablocki is a

E-47

*1066 representative party who “will fairly and

adequately protect the interests of the class.” Rule

23(a)(4). Not only is defendant Zablocki’s interest

identical to that of the other county clerks, but the

attorney representing him is from the Milwaukee

County Corporation Counsel’s office which is

experienced in conducting federal litigation.

Furthermore, the Attorney General of Wisconsin has

taken an active part in this action, urging that the

challenged statute be upheld.

Besides fulfilling the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), a

class action must fit within one of the three types of

class actions established by Rule 23(b). Plaintiffs

seek to have the action proceed under Rule 23(b)(2):

“(T)he party opposing the class has acted or refiised

toact onthe ground generally applicable to the

class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive

relief or corresponding declaratory relief with

respect to the class as a whole; ***.”

[3] A Rule 23(b)(2) class action is particularly

appropriate in civil rights cases, although the rule is

not so limited. 3B Moore’s Federal Practice P 23.40,

at 23-654 (2d ed. 1974); C. Wright, Law of Federal

Courts, s 72, at 312 (2d ed. 1970); Advisory

Committee’s Note to 1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 102

(1966). While the language of Rule 23(b)(2) does not

expressly provide for its use where declaratory or

injunctive relief is sought against a class, such class

actions have been ordered. Danforth v. Christian,

351 F.Supp. 287 (W.D.Mo. 1972); Rakes v. Coleman,

318 F.Supp. 181 (E.D.Va. 1970); Washington v. Lee,

263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.Ala.1966), aff'd sub nom. Lee

v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88S. Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d

1212 (1968). See, 3B Moore’s Federal Practice P

23.40, 1974 Supplement, at 86. Where as here, a

statute with statewide application is challenged on

the ground of its unconstitutionality allowing the

action to proceed against the class of officials

charged with its enforcement is in accordance with

E-48

the interest of judicial administration and justice

which Rule 23 is meant to further.

At oral argument, it was pointed out that the

members of the defendant class of county clerks

have never been given notice of the pendency of this

action. Indeed, no notice, either individual or

otherwise, has been directed at the members of the

plaintiff class. Rule 23 itself does not require notice to

the members of a (b)(2) class, since the mandatory

notice provisions of Rule 23 (c)(2) are by their terms

applicable, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.

156, 177 n. 14, 9458. Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974),

and the notice provision of Rule 23(d)(2) is

discretionary with the Court. Advisory Committee’s

Note to 1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 106. The

question thus presented is whether due process

requires notice to the absent members of a (b)(2)

class.

On this question there exists a split of authority,

Some courts have ruled that due process requires

notice to the members of a (b)(2) class if the

judgment is to be binding on the. See, e.g., Zeilstra

v. Tarr, 466 F. 2d 11] (6th Cir. 1972); Schrader v.

Selective Service System Local Board No. 76

Wisconsin, 470 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409

U.S. 1085, 93 S. Ct. 689, 34 L.Ed.2d 672 (1972); [FN3a]

Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.

1968), on remand, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.1971); 54

F.R.D. 565 (S.D.N.Y.1972); reversed, 479 F.2d 1005

(2nd Cir. 1973); vacated and remanded, 417 U.S. 156,

94S. Ct. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974); Pasquier v.

Tarr, 318 F. Supp. 1350 (E.D.La. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d

116 (Sth Cir. 1971). Other courts have heldthatno

notice need be given to the class members because

due process is satisfied when the class is adequately

represented by counsel. See, e.g., Hammond v.

Powell, 462 F.2d 1053 (4th Cir. 1972); Yaffe v. Powrs,

454 F. 2d 1362 (lst Cir. 1972); Lund v. Affleck, 388

F.Supp. 137

E-49

(D.R.I.1975); White v. Local No.207 of Laborer’s Intl.

Union, 387 F.Supp. 53(W.D.La. 1974); Mazer v.

Weinberger, 385 *1067 F. Supp. 1321 (E.D.Pa.1974);

Souza v. Scalone, 64 F.R.D. 654 (N.D. Calif. 1974);

American Finance System, Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D.

94 (D.Md.1972); Watson v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94

(D.Md. 1972); Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F.

Supp. 945 (W.D.Mich.1974); Lynch v. Household

Finance Corp., 360 F. Supp. 720 (D. Conn. 1973);

Hooks v. Wainwright, 352 F.Supp. 163

(M.D.Fla.1972). The commentators have been critical

of the line of cases requiring notice to (b)(2) class

members. 3B Moore’s Federal Practice P 23.55, at

23-1132 23-1153; 7A Wright and Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure, s 1786, 1793, at 142-144,

203-205; Miller, “Problems of Giving Notice in Class

Actions.” 1973, 58 F.R.D. 313, 313-316.

FN3a. The Seventh Circuit has stated that in

light of n. 14 in Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177, 94S.Ct. 2140,

the holding in Schrade “will presumably have to be

reexamined at an appropriate time.” Bijeol v.

Benson, 513 F.2d 965, 968 n.3 (7th Cir. 1975).

[4][5][6] The most extensive treatment of the

problem is by Chief Judge Fox in Watson v. Branch

County Bank, supra, at 956-960. We are in general

agreement with the conclusions stated therein. An

ironclad rule requiring individual notice to members

of a (b)(2) class would significantly frustrate use of

(b)(2) class actions. It has been pointed out that

when members of a (b)(2) class are in the role of

plaintiffs, notice would not serve a useful purpose

since members of such a class may not “opt out” and

thereby prevent an adjudication of their legal

interests. Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Assn.,

Local 550 v. American Airline, Inc., 490 F.2d 636, 642

(7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct.

2406, 40 L.Ed.2d 773(1974). Furthermore, where the

(b)(2) class includes a large number of persons

whose identities and whereabouts are unknown,

E-50

individually mailed notices may well be impossible

and notice by publication similarly futile. While we

are mindful of the Court’s statement in Eisen v.

Carlisle & Jacquelin. 417 U.S. 156, 176, 94S. Ct. 2140,

2152, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974), that “(t)here is noting in

Rule 23 to suggest that the notice requirements can

be tailored to fit the pocketbooks of particular

plaintiffs, “imposition of a notice requirement can be

tailored to fit the pocketbook of particular plaintiffs,”

imposition of a notice requirement on )b)(2) class

actions as a matter of due process should be avoided

since “the named plaintiffs in class actions raising

broad constitutional or statutory questions simply

cannot afford to pay for notice to absent class

members, and (such) a requirement *** prevents the

suit from being maintained as a class action.” Watson

v. Branch County Bank, 380 F.Supp. 945, 959

(W.D.Mich.1974). We agree with Chief Judge Fox that

the discretionary notice provisions of Rule 23 (d)(2)

are at least presumptively valid as complying with

due process, which must be tailored to the

“character of the proceedings and the nature of the

interests *** involved***.” Mullane v. Central

Hanover Bank and Trust Co., Trustee, 339 U. S. 306,

317, 70S. Ct. 652, 659, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), [FN3b]

FN3b. Due process requires only that

“interested parties” be given notice. Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., Trustee, supra,

339 U.S. at 314, 70S.Ct.652. We doubt that the

members of the defendant class are interested

persons in any realistic sense. While the state cannot

involuntarily be made a party because of it sovereign

immunity, and the plaintiff’s rights can be asserted

only against the agents of the state under the

authority of Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. 123, 28S. Ct.

441, 52 L.Ed 714 (1908), it is the state’s interest, not

that of the county clerks, that is in reality involved.

The state’s interest is represented and protected by

it chief legal officer, the Attorney General of

Wisconsin, who represents the named defendant and

E-51

who would also be representing the other members

of the defendant class whether or not notice is given.

If the suit had been brought against the state

(following a valid Eleventh Amendment waiver), only

notice to the state itself would have been required,

yet the injunction could still have run against the

individual county clerks as agents of the state. See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d); Harrington v. Colquitt Country

Board of Education, 449 F.2d 161 (Sth Cir. 1971)

(per curiam). Their interest I the suit is not greater in

the instant case, and their due process rights should

also be no greater.

[7] The remaining question is, therefore, whether

there are special circumstances in this action which

require notice to the members of either the plaintiff

or defendant class. Rule 23(d)(2) sets forth a list of the

‘special circumstances which might require notice:

“In the conduct of actions to which this rule applies,

the court may make appropriate orders: *** (2)

requiring, for the protection of the members of the

*1068 class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the

action, that notice be given in such manner as the

court may direct tosome orall ofthe members of

any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of

the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to

signify whether they consider the representation fair

and adequate, to intervene and present claims or

defense, or otherwise to come into the action; ***.”

*1069 The effects of the statute on plaintiff Redhail

should be carefully noted. He is unable to marry

anywhere without a court order so long as he

maintains his Wisconsin residency. Were he to

petition a court for permission to marry, the court

would have to deny the petition since Redhail’s

indigency has made it impossible for him to satisfy

the support obligation ordered in the paternity

action. Furthermore, even if he could somehow pay

the arrearage, because his child receives AFDC

E-52

benefits in excess of the $109 per month support

obligation, the child would still be a public charge.

In determining whether the classification created by

the statute complies with the requirements of equal

protection, it is necessary to first decide what

intensity of scrutiny it must be subjected to and then

to examine the interests arguably furthered by the

statute.

B.

[8][9] Under the equal protection approach currently

utilized by the Court, statutory classifications utilized

by the Court, statutory classifications are generally

measured against the rational relationship test and

are upheld if they are rationally related to some

legitmate governmental interest. United States

Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528,

93 S. Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); San Antonio

School District v. Rodriques, 411 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1278,

36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). If, however, the classification

impinges upon the fundamental rights or constitutes

a suspect classification, it is subjected to strict

scrutiny and can be upheld only if it is necessary to

promote compelling governmental interests and is

narrowly drawn to express only such interests. Roe

v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93S. Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d

147 (173); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89

S. Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

[10][11] In our society, marriage has long been

regarded as one of the most basic social institutions,

and the corresponding individual interest involved

have been recognized as within the constitutional

rights of privacy as enunciated in Roe v. Wade,

supra, 410 U.S. at 152-153, 93S. Ct. 705. As Mr.

Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1682,

14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), stated:

E-53

“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of

Rights older than our political parties, older than our

school system. Marriage is a coming together for

better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to

the degree of being sacred. It is an association that

promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in

living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not

commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association

for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior

decision.”

A long line of decisions make it evident that although

not explicitly set forth in the constitution, there is a

constitutionally protected right to marry which

occupies the status of being a fundamental right. Roe

v. Wade, supra 410 U.S. at 152, 93 S.Ct. 705; United

States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444, 93S. Ct 631, 34

L.Ed.ed 626 (1973); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.

371, 376, 91S. Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971) Loving

v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 18 L.Ed.2d

1010 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, supra, 381 U.S.

at 486, 495, 85 S.Ct. 1678; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316

U.S. 535, 541, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655, (1942);

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67

L.Ed. 1042 (1923). Lower federal courts have also

recognized the importance of the interests associated

with marriage and have afforded them constitutional

protection. See, e.g., O’Neil v. Dent, 364 F.Supp. 565,

568-569 (E.D.N.Y.1973); Holt v. Shelton, 341 F.Supp.

821, 822-823 (M.D.Tenn.1972); Wymelenberg v.

Syman, 328 F.Supp. 1353, 1354 (E.D.Wis.1971).

[12] It is apparent that the challenged statute

infringes upon plaintiff Redhail’s ability to marry. In

contrast to all other Wisconsin residents, he, and all

the members of the class he represents, must obtain

court permission before any county clerk in

Wisconsin will issue a marriage license.

Furthermore, other provisions of the statute give it

extraterritorial effect, making *1070 it impossible for

Redhail, or anyone in the plaintiff class, to enter into a.

valid marriage anywhere without a court order. The

E-54

. sia

oe ee

PE ATONE ATOR ELAN RS A Wi aE Urnith SPA oa hor g

ah Se ROR

statute's requirement that all members of the plaintiff

class obtain court permission to marry does, in a very

concrete way, limit their right to marry in a manner

not visited upon all other residents of Wisconsin.

Since the classification created by the statute places

substantial burdens on the ability of the class

members to marry, it affects their fundamental rights

and must be subjected to strict scrutiny. ~

Additionally, the statute places a special burden on

some members of the plaintiff class. In Redhail’s

case, because of his poverty he has been unable to

satisfy the support obligation ordered in the

paternity action, and, hence, a state court could not

grant him permission to marry. Other members of

the plaintiff class are barred from obtaining court

permission because although they have fulfilled their

support obligations, their minor issue are public

charges or likely to become such. [FN5] These

members of the plaintiff class would not usually have

the financial resources to voluntarily obviate any

necessity for governmental aid to their children and

to further assure that such aid would not be

necessary in the future.

FNS. Vernon T. Leipzig, Jr. the plaintiff in the

companion case entitled Leipzig v. Pallamolla, D.C.,

418 F. Supp 1073, had fully satisfied his child support

obligations at the time he petitioned for permission

to remarry. Nevertheless, Branch 2 of the County

Court, Kenosha County, Wisconsin, denied

permission because the four minor children of

Leipzig’s first marriage were then receiving

AFDC benefits.

While wealth discrimination alone has not been held

by the Court to be an adequate basis for involving

strict scrutiny, San Antonio School District v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16

(1973), classifications based on wealth have been

overturned in the area of voting, see, e.g., Bullock v.

E-55

Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct.849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92

(1972) (primary filing fee requirement); Harper v.

Virginia State Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86

S.Ct. 1079, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966) (poll tax); criminal

procedure, see, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S.

353, 83 S. Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (counsel on

direct appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct.

585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (transcripts); and

incarceration, Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S. ct.

668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971); William v. Illinois, 399

U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970). The

Court in Rodriguez noted at 411 U.S. at page 20, 93

S.Ct. at page 1290:

‘“*** The individuals, or groups of individuals, who

constituted the class discriminated against in our

prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics:

because of their impecunity they were completely

unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a

consequence, they sustained an absolute

deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to enjoy

that benefit. ***”

[13] The characteristics identified by the Court in

Rodriguez are present here with respect to some

members of the plaintiff class. Because they lack

sufficient financial resources, some of them are

unable to fulfill support obligations, while others who

have satisfied their support obligations lack the

additional wealth required to insure threat their

minor issue are not public charges nor likely to

become such. In both instances, these class

members cannot obtain permission to marry. The

wealth discrimination inherent in the statute thus

provides an additional justification for applying the

strict scrutiny test.

Defendant Zablocki and the state have urged that

instead of the strict scrutiny test, a more flexible

“sliding scale” equal protection approach should be

utilized here. See, Rodriguez, supra, at 98-110, 93

S.Ct. at 1278 (Marshall, Jr., dissenting); Borass v.

= E-56

Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973),

reversed, sub nom. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,

416 US. 1,945S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974);

Women’s Liberation Union of Rhode Island, Inc. v.

Israel, 379 F.Supp. 44, 49-50 (D.R.1.1974), aff'd, 512

F.2d 106 (lst Cir. 1975); Timberlake v. Kenkel. 369

F.Supp. 456 (E.D.Wis.1974) (Reynold, J.), vacated and

remanded, 510 *1071 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1975). See

generally, Gunther, The Supreme Court 197] Term,

Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine ona

Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection,

86 Harv.L.Rev. 1(1972).

[14] There are several reasons, however, why a

sliding scale equal protection analysis is not

appropriate in this case. First, it is not apparent

which contexts require application of the more

flexible equal protection approach. Contrast, San

Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S.

at 30-31, 93 S.Ct. at 1278, and Village of Belle Terre v.

Boraas, supra, with Jimenz v. Weinberger, 417 U.S.

628, 94S. Ct. 2496, 41 L.Ed.2d 363 (1974); United

States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S.

528, 93 S.Ct. 2821, 37 L.Ed.2d 782 (1973); Weber v.

Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S.Ct.

1400, 31 L.Ed.2d 768 (1972); Reed v Reed, 404 U.S.

71, 928.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). Moreover,

despite the concern voiced by Mr. Justice Marshall in

his dissent in Sosno v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 418-419, 95

S.Ct. 553, 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), the opinion of the

Court in that case is devoid of language indicating

that strict scrutiny is no longer to be applied to

classifications which infringe upon fundamental

rights, such as marriage, and the result in Sosna does

not vitiate earlier decisions mandating use of the

strict scrutiny test. [FN6] Additionally, it is very

questionable whether the statue could be upheld by

using a sliding scale analysis, since less restrictive

means exist by which the governmental interests

may be furthered. See, United States Department of

Agriculture v. Moreno, supra, 413 U.S. at 536-537, 93

E-57

S.Ct. at 2821 (1973); Timberlake v. Kenkel, supra at

466-468. The classification created by the

challenged statute must, therefore, be measured

against the requirements of the strict scrutiny test.

FN6. In Sosna v. Iowa, supra a one-year

durational residency requirement for divorce was

upheld against attacks based on the rights to

interstate travel and to due process. The substance

of the court’s approach defies simple

characterization, although it did state that the

residency requirement “may reasonable be justified

on ground other than purely budgetary

considerations or administrative convenience,”

supra, at 406, 95 S.Ct. at 561, and that the plaintiff

therein “was not irretrievable foreclosed from

obtaining some part of what she sought.” Id., at 406,

95 S.Ct. at 561. Whether Sosna foreshadows a new

approach to statutes restricting “fundamental rights”

remains uncertain.

C.

[15] Where a statutory classification is tested against

the requirements of the strict scrutiny test “***the

state bears the burden of showing how compelling its

interest may be; depending upon how compelling its

interest may be, showing that the specific measure is

necessary to its achievement; and showing that the

specific measure is sufficiently narrowly drawn to

achieve the state's interest. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.

113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); Shapiro

v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22

L.Ed.2d 600(1969); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,

378 U.S. 500, 508, 84 S.Ct.1659, 12 L.Ed.2d 992

(1964).” Baird v.Lynch, 390 F.Supp. 740, 749

(W.D.Wis.1974).

Defendant Zablocki and the state have urged that

there are two interests furthered by the statute: (1)

providing counseling to the prospective marriage

partners emphasizing the necessity of fulfilling

E-58

preexisting child support obligations, and (2)

protecting the welfare of the children whom

members of the plaintiff class are under a court

determined obligation to support. [FN7]

FN7. While in Beberfall v. Beberfall, 54 Wis.2d

329, 195 N.W.2d 625 (1972), the Wisconsin court

stated that the policy behind s 245.10(1) “is to make

certain that the children of the first marriage are not

to become public charges,” supra at 335, 195 N.W.2d

at 629, the state's interest in saving welfare costs is

not a compelling one, Shapiro v. Thompson, supra,

394 U.S. at 633, 89 S.Ct. at 1322, and both defendant

Zablocki and the state have conceded this.

Additionally, there are other statutory tools which

they state may use to enforce child welfare support

obligations and avoid increased welfare expenses.

*1072 [16] There is some evidence that one of the

chief purposes of s 245.10(1) was to insure that

persons who had failed to fulfill support obligations

arising from a previous marriage be counseled

before they incurred new obligations. See, 28 W.S.A

s 245.10 Legislative Council Notes, 1959, 1975 pocket

part, at 36; Wisconsin Legislative Council General

Report, Vol.5, at 68 (1959). The state’s interest in

such counseling is not, however, of sufficient

importance to justify s 245.10(1). The statute doe not

simply provide for mandatory counseling before a

second marriage, but prohibits remarriage without

court permission which can be granted only if the

license applicant has fulfilled support obligations and

if the minor children are not public charges or likely

to become such. The state’s interest in counseling is

not, therefore, sufficient to justify the restriction on

plaintiff's marital rights because it is not a sufficiently

“compelling” state interest and the statute is also not

“narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state

interests at stake.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155,

93 S.Ct. 705, 728, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

E-59

[17] The second state interest assertedly furthered

by the state statute safeguarding the welfare of

children might conceivable be termed both a

legitimate and “compelling” governmental interest.

It does not, however, justify the restriction on the

rights of plaintiff class imposed by s 245.10(1), since

the statute is not necessary to the achievement of this

interest.

Wisconsin law already has several statutory means

whereby support obligations may be enforced

without restricting the right to marry. If the children

are issue of a previous marriage, s 247.232 and s

247.265 give the judge and family court

commissioner power to order the parent to make a

wage assignment, and under s 295.03 disobedience

of a court order to pay child support may be

punished as civil contempt without proof of personal

demand for payment and refusal to pay. If the

support obligation arises through a paternity action,

the court can order the parent to execute a wage

assignment, s 52.21(2), order commitment to the

county jail, s 52.39, or subject the parent to civil

contempt proceedings, s 52.40. Besides these civil

remedies, the state may charge a nonsupporting

parent with the felony of abandonment of a minor

child, s 52.05, or the misdemeanor offense of failure

to support a minor child under s 52.055. By adroit

use of probation and the Huber law, s 56.08, it can be

assured that parents found guilty of these criminal

penalties will comply with their support obligations.

These statutory provisions give the state alternative

means of enforcing the child support obligations of

the plaintiff class members which do not abridge

their rights to marry.

Furthermore, for those members of the plaintiff class

who children are public charges, allowing their

marriage will have not effect on the children’s

welfare, since AFDC and other welfare programs will

continue to provide support for the children. It is

E-60

eel

also reasonable to believe that at least some

members of the plaintiff class will better their

financial circumstances by marriage due to the

likelihood of a working spouse. [FN8]

FN8. As the Court noted in Taylor v. Louisiana,

419 US. 522, 535 n. 17, 95S. Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690

(1975), Department of Labor statistics indicate that as

of October 1974, 54.2% of all women between ages

18 and 64 were in the labor force.

[18][19] Application of the strict scrutiny test thus

leads inexorably to the conclusion that the

challenged statute cannot stand. While it is true that

the state has legitimate and substantial interests in

regulating the domestic relations of its residents,

Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404, 95 S.Ct. 553, 42

L.Ed.2d 532 (1975), the statute at issue here does not

deal with areas such as the age, health, and

competency which may be required by legislation of

persons desirous of contracting marriage. The

interference with the constitutionally protected right

to marry caused by the challenged statute cannot

withstand close scrutiny, and it therefore runs afoul of

the equal protection clause.

For the foregoing reason,

*1073 IT IS ORDERED that the clerk of court enter

judgment in favor of the plaintiff Roger G. Redhail

and the class he represents, and against defendant

Thomas E. Zablocki and the class he represents

declaring s 245.10(1), (4), and (5), Wis.Stats. (1973),

unconstitutional under the equal protection clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution and invalid, void, and of no effect.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendant Thomas E.

Zablocki, the class he represents, and their officers,

agents, servants, employees, and their successors

and those persons in active concert or participation

with them who receive actual notice of the judgment

E-61

be permanently enjoined from denying applications

for marriage licenses on the ground that the

applicant has failed to comply with the class he

represents.

END OF DOCUMENT

E-62

U.S. Supreme Court

BODDIE v. CONNECTICUT,

401 U.S. 371 (1971)

401 US. 37]

BODDIE ET AL. v. CONNECTICUT ET AL. ,

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

No. 27.

Argued December 8, 1969

Reargued November 17, 1970

Decided March 2, 1971

In view of the basic position of the marriage

relationship in our society and the state

monopolization of the means for dissolving that

relationship, due process of law prohibits a State

from denying, solely because of inability to pay court

fees and costs, access to its courts to indigents who,

in good faith, seek judicial dissolution of their

marriage. Pp. 374-383.286 F. Supp. 968, reversed.

HARLAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Ceurt, in

which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE,

MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined. DOUGLAS,

J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p.

383. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion concurring in part,

Post, p. 386. BLACK, J., filed a dissenting opinion,

post, p. 389.

Arthur B. LaFrance reargued the cause and filed

briefs for appellants.Raymond J. Cannon, Assistant

Attorney General of Connecticut, reargued the cause

for appellees. With him on the brief were Robert K.

Killian, Attorney General, and William S. Kaplan.

Allan Ashman filed a brief for the National Legal Aid

and Defender Association as amicus curiae urging

reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed by

Francis B. Burch, Attorney General of Maryland, and

J. Michael McWilliams, Assistant Attorney General,

E-63

joined by George F. Kugler, Jr., Attorney General of

New Jersey, and Stephen Skillman, Assistant Attorney

General, and by the following Attorneys General:

David P. [401 U.S. 371, 372] Buckson of Delaware,

Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Clarence A. H.

Meyer of Nebraska, Harvey Dickerson of Nevada,

Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, and Lee Johnson

of Oregon.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the

Court.

Appellants, welfare recipients residing in the State of

Connecticut, brought this action in the Federal

District Court for the District of Connecticut on behalf

of themselves and others similarly situated,

challenging, as applied to them, certain state

procedures for the commencement of litigation,

including requirements for payment of court fees and

costs for service of process, that restrict their access

to the courts in their effort to bring an action for

divorce.

It appears from the briefs and oral argument that the

average cost to a litigant for bringing an action for

divorce is $60. Section 52-259 of the Connecticut

General Statutes provides:

"There shall be paid to the clerks of the supreme

court or the superior court, for entering each civil

cause, forty-five dollars... ."

An additional $15 is usually required for the service

of process by the sheriff, although as much as $40 or

$50 may be necessary where notice must be

accomplished by publication. 1

There is no dispute as to the inability of the named

appellants in the present case to pay either the court

fees required by statute or the cost incurred for

the service of process. The affidavits in the record

establish that appellants' welfare income in each

instance barely suffices [401 U.S. 371, 373] to meet

the costs of the daily essentials of life and includes no

E-64 ,

allotment that could be budgeted for the expense to

gain access to the courts in order to obtain a divorce.

Also undisputed is appellants’ "good faith" in seeking

a divorce.Assuming, as we must on this motion to

dismiss the complaint, the truth of the undisputed

allegations made by the appellants, it appears that

they were unsuccessful in their attempt to bring their

divorce actions in the Connecticut courts, simply by

reason of their indigency. The clerk of the Superior

Court returned their papers "on the ground that he

could not accept them until an entry fee had been

paid." App. 8-9. Subsequent efforts to obtain a

judicial waiver of the fee requirement and to have the

court effect service of process were to no avail. Id., at

9.Appellants thereafter commenced this action in the

Federal District Court seeking a judgment declaring

that Connecticut's statute and service of process

provisions, "requiring payment of court fees and

expenses as a condition precedent to obtaining court

relief [are] unconstitutional [as] applied to these

indigent [appellants] and all other members of the

class which they represent."

As further relief, appellants requested the entry of an

injunction ordering the appropriate officials to permit

them "to proceed with their divorce actions without

payment of fees and costs." A three-judge court was

convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2281, and on July 16,

1968, that court concluded that "a state [may]

limit access to its civil courts and particularly in this

instance, to its divorce courts, by the requirement of

a filing fee or other fees which effectively bar

persons on relief from commencing actions therein."

286 F. Supp. 968, 972.

We noted probable jurisdiction, 395 U.S. 974 (1969).

The case was heard at the 1969 Term and thereafter

was [401 U.S. 371, 374] set for reargument at the

present Term. 399 U.S. 922 (1970). We now reverse.2

Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the

E-65

marriage relationship in this society's hierarchy of

values and the concomitant state monopolization of

the means for legally dissolving this relationship, due

process does prohibit a State from denying, solely

because of inability to pay, access to its courts to

individuals who seek judicial dissolution of their

marriages.

I

At its core, the right to due process reflects a

fundamental value in our American constitutional

system. Our understanding of that value is the basis

upon which we have resolved this case.Perhaps no

characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is

more fundamental than its erection and enforcement

of a system of rules defining the various rights and

duties of its members, enabling them to govern their

affairs and definitively settle their differences in an

orderly, predictable manner.

Without such a "legal system," social organization

and cohesion are virtuallyimpossible; with the ability

to seek regularized resolution of conflicts individuals

are capable of interdependent action that enables

them to strive for achievements without the anxieties

that would beset them in a disorganized society. Put

more succinctly, it is this injection of the rule of law

that allows society to reap the benefits of rejecting

what political theorists call the "state of nature." [401

U.S. 371, 375]

American society, of course, bottoms its systematic

definition of individual rights and duties, as well as its

machinery for dispute settlement, not on custom or

the will of strategically placed individuals, but on the

common-law model. It is to courts, or other

quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look

for the implementation of a regularized, orderly

process of dispute settlement. Within this framework,

those who wrote our original Constitution, in the Fifth

Amendment, and later those who drafted the

E-66

Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the centrality of

the concept of due process in the operation of this

system. Without this guarantee that one may not be

deprived of his rights, neither liberty nor property,

without due process of law, the State's monopoly over

techniques for binding conflict resolution could

hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of

things. Only by providing that the social enforcement

mechanism must function strictly within these bounds

can we hope to maintain an ordered society that is

also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has

through years of adjudication put flesh upon the due

process principle. Such litigation has, however,

typically involved rights of defendants - not, as here,

persons seeking access to the judicial process in the

first instance. This is because our society has been so

structured that resort to the courts is not usually the

only available, legitimate means of resolving private

disputes. Indeed, private structuring of individual

relationships and repair of their breach is largely

encouraged in American life, subject only to the

-caveat that the formal judicial process, if resorted to,

is paramount. Thus, this Court has seldom been

asked to view access to the courts as an element of

due process. The legitimacy of the State's monopoly

over techniques of final dispute settlement, even

where [401 U.S. 371, 376] some are denied access to

its use, stands unimpaired where recognized,

effective alternatives for the adjustment of

differences remain. But the successful invocation of

this governmental power by plaintiffs has often

created serious problems for defendants' rights. For

at that point, the judicial proceeding becomes the

only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand

and denial of a defendant's full access to that

process raises grave problems for its legitimacy.

Recognition of this theoretical framework illuminates

the precise issue presented in this case. As this Court

E-67

on more than one occasion has recognized, marriage

involves interests of basic importance in our society.

See, e. g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967);

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Meyer v.

Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). It is not surprising,

then, that the States have seen fit to oversee many

aspects of that institution. Without a prior judicial

imprimatur, individuals may freely enter into and

rescind commercial contracts, for example, but we

are unaware of any jurisdiction where private citizens

may covenant for or dissolve marriages without state

approval.

Even where all substantive requirements are

concededly met, we know of no instance where two

consenting adults may divorce and mutually liberate

themselves from the constraints of legal obligations

that go with marriage, and more fundamentally the

prohibition against remarriage, without invoking the

State's judicial machinery.

Thus, although they assert here due process rights

as would-be plaintiffs, we think appellants’ plight,

because resort to the state courts is the only avenue

to dissolution of their marriages, is akin to that of

defendants faced with exclusion from the only forum

effectively empowered to settle their disputes. Resort

to the judicial process by these plaintiffs is no more

voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the

defendant called upon to [401 U.S. 371, 377] defend

his interests in court. For both groups this process is

not only the paramount dispute-settlement technique,

but, in fact, the only available one. In this posture we

think that this appeal is properly to be resolved in

light of the principles enunciated in our due process

decisions that delimit rights of defendants compelled

to litigate their differences in the judicial forum.

II

These due process decisions, representing over a

hundred years of effort by this Court to give concrete

E-68

embodiment to this concept, provide, we think,

complete vindication for appellants’ contentions. In

particular, precedent has firmly embedded in our

due process jurisprudence two important principles

upon whose application we rest our decision in the

case before us.

A

Prior cases establish, first, that due process requires,

at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state

interest of overriding significance, persons forced to

settle their claims of right and duty through the

judicial process must be given a meaningful

opportunity to be heard. Early in our jurisprudence,

this Court voiced the doctrine that " [w]herever one is

assailed in his person or his property, there he may

defend," Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277

(1876). See Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223 (1864);

Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897).

The theme that "due process of law signifies a right to

be heard in one's defense," Hovey v. Elliott, supra, at

417, has continually recurred in the years since

Baldwin, Windsor, and Hovey. 3 Although "[mJany

controversies [401 U.S. 371, 378] have raged about

the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process

Clause," as Mr. Justice Jackson wrote for the Court in

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306

(1950), "there can be no doubt that at a minimum

they require that deprivation of life, liberty or

property by adjudication be preceded by notice and

opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of

the case." Id., at 313.

Due process does not, of course, require that the

defendant in every civil case actually have a hearing

on the merits. A State, can, for example, enter a

default judgment against a defendant who, after

adequate notice, fails to make a timely appearance,

see Windsor, supra, at 278, or who, without justifiable

excuse, violates a procedural rule requiring the

E-69

J

production of evidence necessary for orderly

adjudication, Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212

U.S. 322, 351 (1909). What the Constitution does

require is "an opportunity . . . granted ata

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,"

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)

(emphasis added), "for [a] hearing appropriate to the

nature of the case," Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr.

Co., supra, at 313. The formality and procedural

requisites for the hearing can vary, depending upon

the importance of the interests involved and the

nature of the subsequent proceedings. 4 That the

hearing required by due process [401 U.S. 371, 379]

is subject to waiver, and is not fixed in form does not

affect its root requirement that an individual be given

an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of

any significant property interest, 5 except for

extraordinary situations where some valid

governmental interest is at stake that justifies

postponing the hearing until after the event.6 In

short, "within the limits of practicability," id., at 318, a

State must afford to all individuals a meaningful

opportunity to be heard if it is to fulfill the promise of

the Due Process Clause.

B

Our cases further establish that a statute or a rule

may be held constitutionally invalid as applied when

it operates to deprive an individual of a protected

right although its general validity as a measure

enacted in the legitimate exercise of state power is

beyond question. Thus, in cases involving religious

freedom, free speech or assembly, this Court has

often held that a valid statute was unconstitutionally

applied in particular circumstances because it

interfered with an individual's exercise of those

rights. 7 No less than these rights, the right to a

meaningful opportunity to be heard within the limits

of practicality, must be protected against denial by

E-70

particular laws [401 U.S. 371, 380] that operate to

jeopardize it for particular individuals. See Mullane

v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra; Covey v. Town of

Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956). In Mullane this Court

held that the statutory provision for notice by

publication in a local newspaper, although sufficient

as to beneficiaries of a trust whose interests or

addresses were unknown to the trustee, was not

sufficient notice under the Due Process Clause for

known beneficiaries. Similarly, Covey held that

notice by publication in a foreclosure action, even

though sufficient to provide a normal person with an

opportunity for a hearing, was not sufficient where

the defendant was a known iacompetent. The Court

expressly rejected an argument that "the Fourteenth

Amendment does not require the State to take

measures in giving notice to an incompetent beyond

those deemed sufficient in the case of the ordinary

taxpayer." Id., at 146. Just as a generally valid notice

procedure may fail to satisfy due process because of

the circumstances of the defendant, so too a cost

requirement, valid on its face, may offend due

process because it operates to foreclose a particular

party's opportunity to be heard. The State's

obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment are not

simply generalized ones; rather, the State owes to

each individual that process which, in light of the

values of a free society, can be characterized as due.

Il

Drawing upon the principles established by the

cases just canvassed, we conclude that the State's

refusal to admit these appellants to its courts, the sole

means in Connecticut for obtaining a divorce, must

be regarded as the equivalent of denying them an

opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right to a

dissolution of their marriages, and, in the absence of

a sufficient countervailing [401 U.S. 371, 381]

justification for the State's action, a denial of due

E-7]

process. 8 The arguments for this kind of fee and cost

requirement are that the State's interest in the

prevention of frivolous litigation is substantial, its use

of court fees and process costs to allocate scarce

resources is rational, and its balance between the

defendant's right to notice and the plaintiff's right to

access is reasonable.In our opinion, none of these

considerations is sufficient to override the interest of

these plaintiff-appellants in having access to the only

avenue open for dissolving their allegedly untenable

marriages. Not only is there no necessary connection

between a litigant's assets and the seriousness of his

motives in bringing suit,9 but it is here beyond

present dispute that appellants bring these actions in

good faith. Moreover, other alternatives exist to fees

and cost requirements as a means for conserving the

time of courts and protecting parties from frivolous

litigation, [401 U.S. 371, 382] such as penalties for

false pleadings or affidavits, and actions for malicious

prosecution or abuse of process, to mention only a

few. In the same vein we think that reliable

alternatives exist to service of process by a state-paid

sheriff if the State is unwilling to assume the cost of

official service. This is perforce true of service by

publication which is the method of notice least

calculated to bring to a potential defendant's

attention the pendency of judicial proceedings. See

Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., supra. We think

in this case service at defendant's last known address

by mail and posted notice is equally effective as

publication in a newspaper. We are thus left to

evaluate the State's asserted interest in its fee and

cost requirements as a mechanism of resource

allocation or cost recoupment. Such a justification

was offered and rejected in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.

12 (1956). In Griffin it was the requirement of a

transcript beyond the means of the indigent that

blocked access to the judicial process. While in

E-72

Griffin the transcript could be waived as a convenient

but not necessary predicate to court access, here the

State invariably imposes the costs as a measure of

allocating its judicial resources. Surely, then, the

rationale of Griffin covers this case.

IV

In concluding that the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment requires that these

appellants be afforded an opportunity to go into

court to obtain a divorce, we wish to re-emphasize

that we go no further than necessary to dispose of the

case before us, a case where the bona fides of both

appellants’ indigency and desire for divorce are here

beyond dispute. We do not decide that access for all

individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all

circumstances, guaranteed by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so that its

exercise may not be placed beyond the reach of any

individual, [401 U.S. 371, 383] for, as we have already

noted, in the case before us this right is the

exclusive precondition to the adjustment of a

fundamental human relationship. The requirement

that these appellants resort to the judicial process is

entirely a state-created matter. Thus we hold only

that a State may not, consistent with the obligations

imposed on it by the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment, pre-empt the right to

dissolve this legal relationship without affording all

citizens access to the means it has prescribed for

doing so.

Reversed.

Footnotes

[Footnote 1] App. 9. The dollar figures are averages

taken from the undisputed allegations of the

complaint. The particular fee the sheriff receives

from the plaintiff for service of process in any one

case depends on the distance he must travel to

E-73

effectuate service of process. Conn. Gen. Stat. Rev.

52-261 (1968).

[Footnote 2] Following colloquy at the oral

reargument as to the possible availability of public or

private funds to enable plaintiffs-appellants to defray

the expense requirements at issue in this case, the

parties submitted further papers on this score.

Nothing in these materials would justify our declining

- to adjudicate the constitutional question squarely

presented by this record.

[Footnote 3] See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254

(1970); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.

337 (1969); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);

Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962); Best

v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 338

[401 U.S. 371, 378] (1963); Covey v. Town of Somers,

351 U.S. 141 (1956); Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr.

Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950);Anderson Nat. Bank v.

Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Opp Cotton Mills v.

Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 152-153 (1941); Morgan

v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938); United States v.

Illinois Central R. Co., 291 U.S. 457, 463 (1934);

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673 (1930); Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S.

413, 423 (1915); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.

373, 385-386 (1908); Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v.

Schmidt, 177 U.S. 230, 236 (1900).

[Footnote 4] Compare Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, with

In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See also Bowles v.

Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 520-521 (1944).

[Footnote 5] Goldberg v. Kelly, supra; Sniadach v.

Family Finance Corp., supra; Opp Cotton Mills v.

Administrator, supra, at 152-153; United States v.

Illinois Central R. Co., supra, at 463; Coe v. Armour

Fertilizer Works, supra.

[Footnote 6] Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. |

McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Ewing v. Mytinger &

Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Fahey v.

E-74

Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Bowles v. Willingham,

supra; Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).

[Footnote 7] E. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147

(1939); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940);

Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 527 (1960); Sherbert

v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[Footnote 8] At least one court has already

recognized the special nature of the divorce action.

Justice Sobel in a case like that before us took note of

the State's involvement in the marital relationship:

"Marriage is clearly marked with the public interest.

In this State, a marriage cannot be dissolved except

by ‘due judicial proceedings... .' We have erected

by statute a money hurdle to such dissolution by

requiring in many circumstances the service of a

summons by publication... . This hurdle is an

effective barrier to [plaintiffs] access to the courts.

The loss of access to the courts in an action for

divorce is a right of substantial magnitude when only

through the courts may redress or relief be

obtained." Jeffreys v. Jeffreys, 58 Misc. 2d 1045, 1056,

296 N. Y.S. 2d 74, 87 (1968). See also Brown v.

Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1014 (CAS 1969)

(Rives, J., dissenting).

[Footnote 9] We think Cohen v. Beneficial Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), has no bearing on this

case. Differences between divorce actions and

derivative actions aside, unlike Cohen, where we

considered merely a statute on its face, the

application of this statute here operates to cut off

entirely access to the courts.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, concurring in the result.

I believe this case should be decided upon the

principles developed in the line of cases marked by

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. There we considered a

state law which denied persons convicted of a crime

full appellate review if they were unable to pay fora

transcript of the trial. MR. JUSTICE BLACK's opinion

E-75

announcing the judgment of the Court stated:

"Such a denial is a misfit in a country dedicated to

affording equal justiceto all and special privileges

to none in the administration of its criminal law.

There can be no equal justice where the kind ofa

trial a man gets depends on the amount of money

he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as

adequate appellate review as defendants who have

money enough to buy transcripts.” Id., at 19.

Griffin has had a sturdy growth. "Our decisions for 4

more than a decade now have made clear that

differences in access to the instruments needed to

vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial

situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the

Constitution." Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42.

See also Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. 458;

Long v. District Court of lowa, 385 U.S. 192; Draper v.

Washington, 372 U.S. 487. But [401 U.S. 371, 384] :

Griffin has not been limited to securing a record for

indigents who appeal their convictions. If the more

affluent have counsel on appeal, then counsel for :

indigents must be provided on appeal of a criminal Ei

conviction. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353. The ;

tie to Griffin was explicit. "In either case [Griffin or :

Douglas] the evil is the same: discrimination against

the indigent.” Id., at 355.

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, we invalidated a

procedure whereby cases within the jurisdiction of

the state supreme court would not be considered if a

person could not pay the filing fee. In Smith v.

Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, we held that requiring .

indigents to pay filing fees before a writ of habeas

corpus could be considered in state court was invalid

under the Equal Protection Clause. Here Connecticut

has provided requirements for married couples to

obtain divorces and because of filing fees and

service of process one of the requirements is having

the necessary money. The more affluent can obtain a

E-76

divorce; the indigent cannot. This situation is

comparable to Burns v. Ohio, and Smith v. Bennett.

The Due Process Clause on which the Court relies

has proven very elastic in the hands of judges. "The

doctrine that prevailed in Lochner [v. New York, 198

U.S. 45], Coppage [v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1], Adkins [v.

Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525], [Jay] Burns [Baking

Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504], and like cases - that due

process authorizes courts to hold laws

unconstitutional when they believe the legislature

has acted unwisely - has long since been discarded."

Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730. I would not

invite its revival.

Whatever residual element of substantive law the

Due Process Clause may still have (Thompson v.

Louisville, 362 U.S. 199), it essentially regulates

procedure.

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337;

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433. The Court

today puts [401 U.S. 371, 385] "flesh" upon the Due

Process Clause by concluding that marriage and its

dissolution are so important that an unhappy couple

who are indigent should have access to the divorce

courts free of charge. Fishing may be equally

important to some communities. May an indigent be

excused if he does not obtain a license which

requires payment of money that he does not have?

How about a requirement of an onerous bond to

prevent summary eviction from rented property? The

affluent can put up the bond, though the indigent may

not be able to do so. See Williams v. Shaffer, 385 U.S.

1037. Is housing less important to the mucilage

holding society together than marriage?

The examples could be multiplied. I do not see the

length of the road we must follow if we accept my

Brother HARLAN'S invitation. The question

historically

E-77

has been whether the right claimed is "of the very

essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." Palko v.

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325. That makes the test

highly subjective and dependent on the

idiosyncrasies of individual judges as Lochner,

Coppage, and Adkins illustrate.

The reach of the Equal Protection Clause is not

definable with mathematical precision. But in spite of

doubts by some,* as it has been construed, rather

definite guidelines have been developed: race is one

(Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303; McLaughlin

v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184); alienage is another

(Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410);

religion is another (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398);

poverty is still another (Griffin v. Illinois, supra); and

class or caste yet another (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316

U.S. 535).

The power of the States over marriage and divorce

is, of course, complete except as limited by specific

~ constitutional provisions. But could a State deny

divorces to domiciliaries who were Negroes and

grant them to whites? [401 U.S. 371, 386] Deny them

to resident aliens and grant them to citizens? Deny

them to Catholics and grant them to Protestants?

Deny them to those convicted of larceny and grant

them to those convicted of embezzlement?

Here the invidious discrimination is based on one of

the guidelines: poverty. An invidious discrimination

based on poverty is adequate for this case. While

Connecticut has provided a procedure for severing

the bonds of marriage, a person can meet every

requirement save court fees or the cost of service of

process and be denied a divorce. Connecticut says in

its brief that this is justified because "the State does

not favor divorces; and only permits a divorce to be

granted when those conditions are found to exist, in

respect to one or the other of the named parties,

which seem to the legislature to make it probable

E-78

that the interests of society will be better served and

that parties will be happier, and so the better

citizens, separate, than if compelled to remain

together."

Thus, under Connecticut law divorces may be

denied or granted solely on the basis of wealth. Just

as denying further judicial review in Burns and Smith,

appellate counsel in Douglas, and a transcript in

Griffin created an invidious distinction based on

wealth, so, too, does making the grant or denial of a

divorce to turn on the wealth of the parties. Affluence

does not pass muster under the Equal Protection

Clause for determining who must remain married

and who shall be a!lowed to separate.

[Footnote *] See Karst, Invidious Discrimination, 16 U.

C.L. A. L. Rev. 716 (1969).

MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in part.

I join the Court's opinion to the extent that it holds

that Connecticut denies procedural due process in

denying the indigent appellants access to its courts

for the sole reason that they cannot pay a required

fee.

"[C]onsideration of what procedures due process

may require under any given set of circumstances

must begin with [401 U.S. 371, 387] a

determination of the precise nature of the

government function involved as well as of the

private interest that has been affected by

governmental action." Cafeteria & Restaurant

Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895

(1961); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263

(1970).

When a State's interest in imposing a fee

requirement on an indigent is compared to the

indigent's interest in being heard, it is clear that the

latter is the weightier. It is an unjustifiable denial of a

hearing, and therefore a denial of due process, to

E-79

\

-

close the courts to an indigent on the ground of

nonpayment of a fee.

But I cannot join the Court's opinion insofar as today's

holding is made to depend upon the factor that only

the State can grant a divorce and that an indigent

would be locked into a marriage if unable to pay the

fees required to obtain a divorce. A State has an

ultimate monopoly of all judicial process and

attendant enforcement machinery. As a practical

matter, if disputes cannot be successfully settled

between the parties, the court system is usually

"the only forum effectively empowered to settle

their disputes. Resort to the judicial process by these

plaintiffs is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than

that of the defendant called upon to defend his

interests in court." Ante, at 376-377.

In this case, the Court holds that Connecticut's

unyielding fee requirement violates the Due Process

Clause by denying appellants "an opportunity to be

heard upon their claimed right to a dissolution of

their marriages" without a sufficient countervailing

justification. Ante, at 380. I see no constitutional

distinction between appellants' attempt to enforce

this state statutory right and an attempt to vindicate

any other right arising under federal or state law. If

fee requirements close the courts to an indigent he

can no more invoke the aid of the courts for other

forms of relief than he can escape the legal incidents

of a marriage. The right to be heard in some way at

some time extends [401 U.S. 371, 388] to all

proceedings entertained by courts.

The possible distinctions suggested by the Court

today will not withstand analysis. In addition, this

case presents a classic problem of equal protection

of the laws. The question that the Court treats

exclusively as one of due process inevitably

implicates considerations of both due process and

equal protection. Certainly, there is at issue the

E-80

denial of a hearing, a matter for analysis under the

Due Process Clause. But Connecticut does not deny a

hearing to everyone in these circumstances; it denies

it only to people who fail to pay certain fees. The

validity of this partial denial, or differentiation in

treatment, can be tested as well under the Equal

Protection Clause.

In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), we held

under the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Due

Process Clause that a State may not deny a free

transcript to an indigent, where the transcript is

necessary for a direct appeal from his conviction.

Subsequently, we have applied and extended that

principle in numerous criminal cases. See, e. g.,

Eskridge v. Washington State Board of Prison Terms

& Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S.

252 (1959); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961);

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962); Lane

v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Draper v. Washington,

372 U.S. 487 (1963); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305

(1966); Long v. District Court of lowa, 385 U.S. 192

(1966); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967);

Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969). The

rationale of Griffin covers the present case. Courts

are the central dispute-settling institutions in our

society. They are bound to do equal justice under

law, to rich and poor alike. They fail to perform their

function in accordance with the Equal Protection

Clause if they shut their doors to indigent [401 U.S.

371, 389] plaintiffs altogether. Where money

determines not merely "the kind of trial a man gets,"

Griffin v. Illinois, supra, at 19, but whether he gets

into court at all, the great principle of equal

protection becomes a mockery. A State may not

make its judicial processes available to some but

deny them to others simply because they cannot pay

a fee. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383

U.S. 663 (1966). In my view, Connecticut's fee

E-81

requirement, as applied to an indigent, is a denial of

equal protection.

MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

This is a strange case and a strange holding. Absent

some specific federal constitutional or statutory

provision, marriage in this country is completely

under state control, and so is divorce. When the first

settlers arrived here the power to grant divorces in

Great Britain was not vested in that country's courts

but in its Parliament. And as recently as 1888 this

Court in Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, upheld a

divorce granted by the Legislature of the Territory of

Oregon. Since that time the power of state

legislatures to grant divorces or vest that power in

their courts seems not to have been questioned. It is

not by accident that marriage and divorce have

always been considered to be under state control.

The institution of marriage is of peculiar importance

to the people of the States. It is within the States that

they live and vote and rear their children under laws

passed by their elected representatives. The States

provide for the stability of their social order, for the

good morals of all their citizens, and for the needs of

children from broken homes. The States, therefore,

have particular interests in the kinds of laws

regulating their citizens when they enter into,

maintain, and dissolve marriages. The power of the

States over marriage and [401 U.S. 371, 390] divorce

is complete except as limited by specific

constitutional provisions. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.

1, 7-12 (1967).

The Court here holds, however, that the State of

Connecticut has so little control over marriages and

divorces of its own citizens that it is without power

to charge them practically nominal initial court costs

when they are without ready money to put up those

costs. The Court holds that the state law requiring

ieaneemel E-82

payment of costs is barred by the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal

Constitution. Two members of the majority believe

that the Equal Protection Clause also applies. I think

the Connecticut court costs law is barred by neither

of those clauses.

It is true, as the majority points out, that the Court did

hold in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), that

indigent defendants in criminal cases must be

afforded the same right to appeal their convictions as

is afforded to a defendant who has ample funds to

pay his own costs. But in Griffin the Court studiously

and carefully refrained from saying one word or one

sentence suggesting that the rule there announced to

control rights of criminal defendants would control in

the quite different field of civil cases. And there

are strong reasons for eee between the

two types of cases.

Criminal defendants are brought into court by the

State or Federal Government to defend themselves

against charges of crime. They go into court knowing

that they may be convicted, and condemned to lose

their lives, their liberty, or their property, as a

penalty for their crimes. Because of this great

governmental power the United States Constitution

has provided special protections for people charged

with crime. They cannot be convicted under bills of

attainder or ex post facto laws. And numerous

provisions of the Bill of Rights - the right to counsel,

the right to be free from coerced [401 U.S. 371, 391]

confessions, and other rights - shield defendants in

state courts as well as federal courts. See, e. g.,

Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v.

Louisiana, 391 U.S.145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378

U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335

(1963). With all of these protections safeguarding

defendants charged by government with crime, we

quite naturally and quite properly held in Griffin that

E-83

the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses both

barred any discrimination in criminal trials against

poor defendants who are unable to defend

themselves against the State. Had we not so held we

would have been unfaithful to the explicit commands

of the Bill of Rights, designed to wrap the protections

of the Constitution around all defendants upon whom

the mighty powers of government are hurled to

punish for crime. .

Civil lawsuits, however, are not like government

prosecutions for crime. Civil courts are set up by

government to give people who have quarrels with

their neighbors the chance to use a neutral

governmental agency to adjust their differences. In

such cases the government is not usually involved as

a party, and there is no deprivation of life, liberty, or

property as punishment for crime. Our Federal

Constitution, therefore, does not place such private

disputes on the same high level as it places criminal

trials and punishment. There is consequently no

necessity, no reason, why government should in civil

trials be hampered or handicapped by the strict and

rigid due process rules the Constitution has provided

to protect people charged with crime.

This distinction between civil and criminal

proceedings is implicit in Cohen v. Beneficial Loan

Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), where we held that a

statute requiring some, but not all, plaintiffs in

stockholder derivative actions to post a bond did not

violate the Due Process or the Equal Protection

Clause. The Cohen case is indistinguishable [401 U.S.

371, 392] from the one before us. In Cohen, as here,

the statute applied to plaintiffs. In both situations the

legal relationships involved are creatures of the

State, extensively governed by state law. The effect

of both statutes may be to deter frivolous or

ill-considered suits, and in both instances the State

has a considerable interest in the prevention of such

E-84

suits, which might harm the very relationship the

State created and fostered. Finally, the effect of both

Statutes may be to close the state courts entirely to

certain plaintiffs, a result the Court explicitly

accepted in Cohen. See id., at 552. I believe the

present case should be controlled by the Court's

thorough opinion in Cohen.

The Court's suggested distinction of Cohen on the

ground that the Court there dealt only with the

validity of the statute on its face ignores the following

pertinent language:

"It is urged that such a requirement will foreclose

resort by most stockholders to the only available

judicial remedy for the protection of their rights. Of

course, to require security for the payment of any

kind of costs, or the necessity for bearing any kind

of expense of litigation, has a deterring effect. But

we deal with power, not wisdom; and we think,

notwithstanding this tendency, it is within the

power of a state to close its courts to this type of

litigation if the condition of reasonable security is

not met." Id., at 552. (Emphasis added.)

Rather, Cohen can only be distinguished on the

ground that it involved a stockholders’ suit, while this

case involves marriage, an interest "of basic

importance in our society." Thus the Court's opinion

appears to rest solely on a philosophy that any law

violates due process if it is unreasonable, arbitrary,

indecent, deviates from the fundamental, is shocking

to the conscience, or fails to meet [401 U.S. 371, 393]

other tests composed of similar words or phrases

equally lacking in any possible constitutional

precision. These concepts, of course, mark no

constitutional boundaries and cannot possibly

depend upon anything but the belief of particular

judges, at particular times, concerning particular

interests which those judges have divined to be of

"basic importance."

E-85

I do not believe the wise men who sought to draw a

written constitution to protect the people from

governmental harassment and oppression, who

feared alike the king and the king's judges, would

have used any such words or phrases. Such

unbounded authority in any group of politically

appointed or elected judges would unquestionably

be sufficient to classify our Nation as a government of |

men, not the government of laws of which we boast.

With a "shock the conscience"

test of constitutionality, citizens must guess what is

the law, guess what a majority of nine judges will

believe fair and reasonable. Such a test wilfully

throws away the certainty and security that lies in a

written constitution, one that does not alter with a

judge's health, belief, or his politics. I believe the

only way to steer this country towards its great

destiny is to follow what our Constitution says, not

what judges think it should h

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