Opposition Brief — Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United States

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No. 99-1760 ane e

In the Supreme Court of the Anited States

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SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

JOHN T. STA’ R

JOAN M. PEPIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the United States may bring a civil

enforcement action under the Clean Water Act against

petitioners for violations of a National Pollutant Dis-

charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that con-

tains both federally mandated and state mandated

effluent limitations.

2. Whether Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water

Act, which provides that a person shall not be subject

to a judicial action for civil penalties if a State has

prosecuted an administrative penalty action under

State law that is “comparable” to federal law (33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(6)(A)), precludes the government’s civil penalty

suit in this case.

8. Whether petitioners received fair notice of their

obligation under the Clean Water Act to comply with

the effluent limitations in their NPDES permit.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinions below

Jurisdiction

Statement

Argument

Conclusion

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d

376 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995) ............

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co.,

83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 110

(1997)

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,

Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)

Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th

Cir. 1999)

North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of

Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991)

United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 F.3d

216 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.

SOROS EERERO ETHOS THESES ESSE ESSE ESEEES

§ 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a)

§ 117, 33 U.S.C. 1267

§ 301, 33 U.S.C. 1311

§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. 1311(a)

§ 301(a)-(b), 33 U.S.C. 1311(a)-(b) .....

§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)

§ 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. 1811(b)(1)(C) ....

§ 308, 33 U.S.C. 1318

§ 309, 22 U.S.C. 1319

§ 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)

(IIT)

17

IV

Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page

§ 309(a)(1), 38 U.S.C. 1819(a)(1) 7 Pes 8,11

§ 309(a)(3), 38 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3) 8, 12

§ 309(b), 33 U.S.C. 1819(b) 8,4

§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 1819(d) 38, 4, 19

§ 309(g), 833 U.S.C. 1819(g) ....ccccscscssssesscscseneees 3, 4, 9, 15, 16, 18

§ 309(g)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g)(1)(A) 3

§ 309(g)(2), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(2) .. 16

§ 309(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g)(4) 4

§ 309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g¢)(6) , 4

§ 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g¢)(6)(A) 4, 15, 18

§ 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), 83 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)( A) (ii) «eee 9, 15, 16, 17

§ 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8) ‘ 16

§ 402, 33 U.S.C. 1842 3,11

§ 402(a), 33 U.S.C. 1842(a) 20

§ 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. 1842(a)(5) 20

§ 402(b), 33 U.S.C. 1842(b) 38, 20

§ 402(b)(1)(C), 83 U.S.C. 1842(b)(1)(C) ...... 20

§ 402(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. 1842(b)(3) 20

§ 402(c)-(d), 838 U.S.C. 1842(€)-(d) .....cececeeseee 3

§ 402(d), 833 U.S.C. 1842(d) ........ccccccscscssseresseseee 3

§ 402(i), 33 U.S.C. 1342(i) : 4,15

§ 505, 33 U.S.C. 1365 : 12

§ 510, 33 U.S.C. 1370 9,14

Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. 3701

note (Supp. I'V 1998) ........... 4

Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of

1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note ...........cccceseess 4

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.

6901 et seq. ...... pitaiiehaininaanane 14

42 U.S.C. 6926(b) scelanliiaaiataniiadaiiliaiains 15

UA) Gee eiteiintnenmininmons 15

Ark. Code Ann. § 8-4-103(c) (Michie 2000) ; 17

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21A, § 16 (1996) .............. 17

9 Va. Admin. Code (2000):

DP IU sh cinissibccacieasclaimposaecsenssiiotpeaaapenbenmiaabionmaabiats 5

FEED siictinniriicntinininansiiteitininisiniin 5

V

Statute and regulations—Continued: Page

16

Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15(8d) (Michie 1998)

40 C.F.R.:

Section 19.4

Section 122.62

Section 123.25

Section 124.5(c)(1)

Section 124.6(e)

SSSSa

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 99-1760

SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-28a)

is reported at 191 F.2d 516. The opinion of the district

court granting the United States’ motion for partial

summary judgment on liability (Pet. App. 63a-113a) is

reported at 965 F’. Supp. 769. The opinion of the district

court assessing a penalty (Pet. App. 29a-62a) is re-

ported at 972 F. Supp. 338.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

September 14, 1999. A petition for rehearing was de-

nied on January 6, 2000 (Pet. App. 114a-115a). On

March 27, 2000, the Chief Justice extended the time for

filing a petition for certiorari to and including May 5,

2000, and the petition was filed on that date. The

(1)

2

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

1254(1).

STATEMENT

The United States brought this civil action against

petitioners to enforce provisions of the Clean Water

Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg., which petitioners had fre-

quently violated from 1991 to 1997. The Clean Water

Act generally prohibits any pollutant discharges into

waters of the United States except in compliance with

the Act’s permitting scheme. Petitioners obtained a

Clean Water Act permit, but repeatedly discharged

wastewater containing illegal levels of fecal coliform,

phosphorus, and other pollutants into the Pagan River,

a tributary of the James River, in violation of the

permit conditions. In addition, during the same period,

petitioners submitted false reports and destroyed docu-

ments to hide their unlawful discharges from state and

federal agencies. The district court rejected peti-

tioners’ various arguments in defense of their permit

violations, and the court assessed a civil penalty of $12.6

million. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of

liability but remanded the case for a minor adjustment

in the amount of the penalty.

1. The Clean Water Act is a comprehensive statute,

administered primarily by the Environmenta! Protec-

tion Agency (EPA), that seeks “to restore and maintain

the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the

Nation’s waters” through the reduction and eventual

elimination of the discharge of pollutants into those

waters. 33 U.S.C. 125l(a). The Act’s central mecha-

nism for meeting that objective is Section 301(a), which

prohibits the discharge of pollutants into the waters of

the United States by any person except as authorized

by specified sections of the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).

3

Section 402 of the Act provides one of the primary

means for obtaining authorization to discharge pollu-

tants. Section 402 establishes a permitting program

known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination

System (NPDES). Under the NPDES permitting pro-

gram, persons (including commercial and industrial fa-

cilities) may obtain a permit allowing pollutant

discharges in accordance with prescribed conditions,

including effluent limitations, and monitoring and

reporting requirements. See 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1318, 1342;

see generally Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-

peake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987). EPA

has primary responsibility for administering the

NPDES permit program, but Section 402(b) provides

that a State can establish and administer its own

NPDES program if the state program conforms to

federal guidelines and receives EPA’s approval. Nev-

ertheless, Section 402 requires EPA to exercise con-

tinuing oversight of EPA-approved permitting pro-

grams. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(c)-(d). For example, a State

may not issue a permit if EPA objects. If the State

refuses to issue a permit acceptable to EPA, EPA may

issue an appropriate permit. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(d).

Section 309 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319,

provides a variety of means for the United States and

the States to enforce provisions of the Act, including

provisions authorizing EPA to commence a civil en-

forcement action in court, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b), or to

initiate administrative penalty proceedings, 33 U.S.C.

1319(g). EPA’s enforcement authority is not limited to

EPA-issued permits. EPA may enforce any conditions

of state-issued NPDES permits that implement the

relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.

1319(a)(1) and (8), (b), (d), and (g)(1)(A). See Gwaltney,

484 U.S. at 53 (“The holder of a state NPDES permit is

4

subject to both federal and state enforcement action for

failure to comply.”); see also 33 U.S.C. 1342(i)

(providing that federal enforcement is not limited by

the existence of a state permitting program).

Section 309(b) specifically authorizes the United

States to seek injunctive relief, 33 U.S.C. 1819(b), while

Section 309(d) additionally authorizes the courts to

impose civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day for each

violation, 83 U.S.C. 1819(d).' Section 309(g) authorizes

EPA to assess administrative penalties in substantially

smaller amounts. 33 U.S.C. 1319(g). Section 309(g)(4)

provides extensive and detailed procedures for public

participation in the administrative penalty assessment

process, including a right of public notice and comment,

the right of any interested persons to petition for a

hearing, and the right of interested persons to present

evidence if a hearing is held. 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(4).

Section 309(g¢)(6) of the Clean Water Act addresses

the issue of whether the prosecution of a federal or

state administrative penalty action should preclude a

judicial enforcement action. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6).

Section 309(g)(6)(A) provides that, if EPA or a State

has commenced and is diligently prosecuting, or has

successfully completed, an administrative penalty

action under subsection (g) or a comparable state law,

the violations at issue shall not be the subject of a

citizen suit or a civil penalty action under Section

309(d). 33 U.S.C. 13819(g)(6)(A).

1 For violations occurring after January 30, 1997, the maximum

penalty is $27,500 per day. 40 C.F.R. 19.4 (implementing Debt Col-

lection Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. 3701 note (Supp. IV

1998) (Pub. L. No. 104-184), and Federal Civil Penalties Inflation

Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note (Pub. L. No. 101-410).

RT nr eeemreeee

5

2. Petitioners operate neighboring pork processing

and packing plants in Smithfield, Virginia. The two

plants generate wastewater containing animal blood,

hair, viscera, excrement, flesh, bone, soil particles, and

cleaning materials. The wastewater is high in organic

pollutants, including fecal coliform, ammonia, nitrogen,

and phosphorus. Pet. App. 38a-42a, 45a; PX 2.

Until 1997, petitioners discharged their wastewater

into the Pagan River, a tributary of the James River,

pursuant to an NPDES permit issued by the Common-

wealth of Virginia in 1986, modified in 1990, and reis-

sued in 1992. The 1992 permit contained monthly aver-

age and/or daily maximum effluent limitations on

numerous pollutants. The permit also imposed monitor-

ing, reporting, and record-keeping requirements. Pet.

App. 64a-67a, 72a-73a.

In 1987, Virginia entered into the historic Chesa-

peake Bay Agreement with EPA, Pennsylvania, Mary-

land, and the District of Columbia. See 33 U.S.C. 1267

(establishing Chesapeake Bay Program Office within

EPA). Under that Agreement, Virginia committed to

reduce by 40% the amount of nitrogen and phosphorus

entering the Chesapeake Bay. To fulfill its obligations

under the Agreement, Virginia promulgated a Policy

for Nutrient Enriched Waters, which required that

NPDES permits for facilities discharging into nutrient-

enriched waters (of which the Pagan River is one) be

modified to include phosphorus limits. See 9 Va.

Admin. Code §§ 25-40-10 et seg. (2000); id. § 25-260-

350(18). Petitioners sued Virginia, alleging that the

phosphorus limitation was not technologically achiev-

able. Pet. App. 67a. Virginia nevertheless modified

petitioners’ permit in 1990 to impose discharge and

monitoring requirements on phosphorus and nitrogen.

Petitioners appealed the permit and threatened to

6

move their plants and their 3,000 jobs out of Virginia.

Id. at 67a; PXs 7, 8.

Beginning in 1990, petitioners and the Virginia State

Water Control Board (Board), which administers Vir-

ginia’s NPDES permit program, entered into a series of

agreements, termed “Special Orders,” requiring peti-

tioners to study the costs and feasibility of connecting

their wastewater system to the Hampton Roads Sanita-

tion District (HRSD), rather than discharging directly

to the Pagan River. Pet. App. 3a-8a, 66a-69a. After

petitioners’ consultant found that connecting to HRSD

was the most cost-effective method for petitioners to

meet their current and future pollution control obliga-

tions, petitioners elected to connect to HRSD. PX 21,

§ 6. The Board and petitioners entered into a Special

Order (the May 1991 Order) stating that if petitioners

elected to connect to HRSD, they were to do so within

three months of notification that a sewer line was

available to collect their wastewater. Pet. App. 69a.

The order expressly provided that “[nJothing herein

shall be construed as altering, modifying, or amending

any term or condition contained in” petitioners’

NPDES permit. Jd. at 70a.

Because petitioners’ permit was due to expire in

1991, the Board prepared a draft permit and submitted

it for EPA review and public comment. The draft per-

mit required petitioners, among other things, to come

into compliance with the 2 mg/l phosphorus limitation

by January 4, 1993, and to comply with effluent limits

on ammonia, carbonaceous biological oxygen demand

(CBOD), and cyanide by May 13, 1994. EPA reviewed

and approved the draft permit. Pet. App. 70a, 72a-73a.

Petitioners commented on the draft permit, claiming

that they could not comply with the draft permit’s

deadlines for compliance with effluent limits on

7

phosphorus, CBOD, ammonia, and cyanide, and noting

that “(rjelief from such compliance is not specifically

present or is not apparent in the [May 1991] Consent

Order.” Jd. at Tla. In response, an engineer at a

regional office of the Board wrote to petitioners that

“{a]ny special order agreements relative to compliance

with water quality standards, the Permit regulation

and associated studies that have been approved by the

Board take precedence” over the Permit. Jd. at 72a.

That letter also stated that “(t]he compliance schedules

and related goal dates contained in the permit are there

to afford the permittee necessary time to comply with

the established effluent limitations.” bid.

On January 3, 1992, the Board issued petitioners’

NPDES permit. Despite petitioners’ comments, the

permit still contained effluent limitations on phospho-

rus, CBOD, ammonia, and cyanide. Petitioners did not

appeal the 1992 permit, nor have they ever sought to

modify those requirements to which they had objected.

Pet. App. 72a-74a.

8. Petitioners proceeded to violate every single

effluent limitation in their permit. They violated those

limitations thousands of times and often by extreme

margins. Pet. App. 34a. For example, petitioners’

violations of the fecal coliform limits averaged 1,365% of

the permitted level. For ammonia, the violations aver-

aged 97% above the limit; for cyanide, the exceedences

averaged 168% above the limit. Petitioner’s phosphorus

exceedences were, on average, 1055% above the limit.

Id. at 38a. The district court characterized petitioners’

violations as “frequent and severe.” Id. at 39a.

Petitioners also committed serious violations of the

reporting and recordkeeping requirements of its per-

mit. Petitioners admitted to submitting false monitor-

ing reports on 15 occasions, Pet. App. 30a, and acknowl-

8

edged filing reports late, for a total of 164 days of

violation, id. at 36a. Petitioners were also out of compli-

ance with the record-keeping requirements of their

NPDES permit for 884 days because a Smithfield

employee, witnessed by two other employees, illegally

destroyed petitioners’ pre-1994 required documenta-

tion. Id. at 34a-35a, 55a-56a.

4. The United States filed this enforcement action

against petitioners on December 16, 1996, seeking

injunctive relief and civil penalties. The United States

moved for summary judgment on liability. The United

States pointed out that petitioners’ monitoring reports

established that they had violated their NPDES permit

numerous times. In response, petitioners argued that

they were not in violation of the permit’s phosphorus

limitations because the permit was “conditioned, re-

vised, or superseded” by the Board’s May 1991 Order.

Pet. App. 95a. The district court rejected that argu-

ment.

The district court pointed out that the May 1991

Order explicitly stated that “[nJothing herein shall be

construed as altering, modifying, or amending any term

or condition contained in” petitioners’ permit. Pet.

App. 95a. The court also noted that petitioners’ argu-

ment was inconsistent with the Board’s express

inclusion of phosphorus limitations in the 1992 permit.

“The Board’s Special Orders or letters dated before the

issuance of the 1992 Permit cannot logically change the

terms of a more recent Permit approved by the Board

and the EPA.” Id. at 96a. The court carefully reviewed

the events leading up to the issuance of the 1992 per-

mit, id. at 96a-100a, and it concluded that “the Board’s

Special Orders did not change the terms of the 1992

Permit, nor did the 1992 Permit implicitly incorporate

9

any agreements set forth in the Special Orders,” id. at

100a.

The district court next rejected (Pet. App. 103a-112a)

petitioners’ claim that the Board’s series of administra-

tive orders, permitting petitioners to choose their

method of compliance with the phosphorus limitation,

amounted to an administrative penalty proceeding

under state laws that are “comparable” to Section

309(g) of the Clean Water Act and precluded EPA from

enforcing the phosphorus limitation. See 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). The court noted that, at the time of

the Board’s actions, Virginia law permitted imposition

of administrative penalties only with the consent of the

violator (Pet. App. 104a-106a) and that the state law’s

provisions for public notice and participation did not

permit the public to request a hearing or to be present

if one was held, or to seek judicial review of the result

(id. at 106a-llla). Therefore, the court held, the

state law under which the Board acted was insuffi-

ciently “comparable” to Section 309(g), see 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), to bar the federal government’s civil

enforcement action. Pet. App. 104a-112a.

Finally, the district court rejected (Pet. App. 112a-

113a) petitioners’ argument that Section 510 of the

Clean Water Act, which allows States to impose dis-

charge limitations that are more stringent than federal

law would require, see 33 U.S.C. 1370, prevents federal

enforcement of the phosphorus limitations in peti-

tioners’ NPDES permit. The court explained that “the

plain language of Section 309(a)(1) and (8) * * *

clearly provides that the United States may enforce the

phosphorus standard in [petitioners’] Permit” and that

Section 510 accordingly “does not preclude the United

States from pursuing their phosphorus-based claims

10

\

against [petitioners] in this action.” Pet. App. 112a-

113a.

The district court accordingly granted partial sum-

mary judgment for the United States on the effluent

limitation violations. Pet. App. 113a. The court later

granted partial summary judgment for the United

’ States on two additional counts relating to filing false

reports and destruction of documents. Id. at 29a-30a,

34a-35a. After a bench trial on penalty issues, the court

found petitioners liable for 6,982 days of violation, id. at

36a, and it assessed a penalty of $12.6 million, id. at 62a.

5. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of

liability in a unanimous opinion, but remanded the case

for recalculation of the civil penalty. Pet. App. la-28a.

The court of appeals endorsed and adopted the district

court’s reasoning on liability. Jd. at 1la-16a. The court

of appeals specifically “concur[red] with the district

court that (1) the Board’s Orders were not incorporated

into nor changed the terms of the 1992 Permit; (2)

Virginia’s enforcement scheme is not sufficiently

comparable to § 309(g) to bar the EPA from bringing its

own independent penalty action; and (8) neither the

Supreme Court’s ruling in Gwaltney, nor § 510 of the

[Clean Water Act] preclude the EPA from bringing this

enforcement action.” Jd. at 15a-16a (footnote omitted).

._ The court of appeals extensively discussed petitioners’

numerous challenges to the civil penalty assessment

and rejected all of the claims but one. Jd. at 16a-28a.

The court of appeals remanded the case to the district

court to correct a calculation error that would reduce

the penalty by an amount of less than $200,000. Jd. at

25a-26a. The court, without dissent, denied petitioners’

request for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Id. at

114a-115a.

11

ARGUMENT

Contrary to petitioners’ characterization (see Pet. 3-

4), this case simply involves egregious conduct rather

than momentous legal issues. Petitioners committed

“frequent and severe” violations of their NPDES per-

mit. Pet. App. 39a. The district court, in a comprehen-

sive opinion, rejected petitioners’ justifications for their

numerous and extreme violations, a unanimous court of

appeals panel affirmed, and, in response to petitioners’

request for en banc review, no member of the court of

appeals requested a poll. The court of appeals’ decision

is correct, it does not conflict with the decisions of this

Court or any other court of appeals, and it does not

present any issue of broad public importance requiring

this Court’s resolution. Further review is not war-

ranted.

1. The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to enforce

effluent limitations in NPDES permits, including

effluent limitations contained in state-issued NPDES

permits that are derived from state law. See 33 U.S.C.

1311(a)-(b), 1319(a)(1) and (8).? Petitioners nevertheless

2 The Clean Water Act unambiguously expresses that princi-

ple. Section 301, entitled “F ffluent limitations,” states: “Except as

in compliance with this section and [six other enumerated sections

of the Clean Water Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any

person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). Section 301(b) then

sets a timetable for achievement of federal technology-based efflu-

ent limitations and additionally provides that: “In order to carry

out the objective of this chapter there shall be achieved * * * any

more stringent limitation * * * established pursuant to any State

law or regulations.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(b) and (b)(1)(C). Section 309

provides that the EPA may bring an enforcement action against

“any person [that] is in violation of [Section 301 or other enumer-

ated sections of the Clean Water Act] or is in violation of any

permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in

a permit issued under [Section 402] of this title by [EPA] or by a

12

argue that the plain language of the Act, authorizing

EPA to enforce state-imposed effluent limitations,

should yield to a proposition they derive from this

Court’s decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).

Petitioners contend that “Congress * * * gave the

States primary authority to enforce the limits in the

permits they issue” (Pet. 12) and that this Court’s deci-

sion in Gwaltney “made clear that a penalty action

brought under the [Clean Water Act] should not be

permitted to undermine the efforts of the primary regu-

latory authority” (Pet. 18). Petitioners’ reliance on

Gwaltney is misplaced.

The Court held in Gwaltney that Section 505 of the

Clean Water Act, 38 U.S.C. 1865, which authorizes

private citizens to bring civil enforcement actions

against any person “alleged to be in violation” of the

Act, does not apply to wholly past violations. See 484

U.S. at 56-59. The Court concluded that “(t]he most

natural reading of ‘to be in violation’ is a requirement

that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous

or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likeli-

hood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the

future.” Jd. at 57. The Court determined, from the

language and structure of the citizen suit provisions as

a whole, that “the citizen suit is meant to supplement

rather than to supplant governmental action.” Jd. at

59-60. It hypothesized a situation in which citizens

State.” 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3). EPA’s statutory authority is accord-

ingly quite clear. Indeed, petitioners conceded in their opening

brief in the court of appeals that Section 309(a) “give[s] EPA the

general authority to enforce permits, including, inter alia, permits

containing more stringent standards under state law.” Appellant

C.A. Br. 37-38. They made the same concession to the district

court. See Pet. App. 112a-113a.

13

‘brought suit to obtain civil penalties for wholly past

violations that EPA had abated through a compliance

order in which the government did not seek civil

penalties in exchange for the violator’s agreement to

“take some extreme corrective action, such as to install

particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it

otherwise would not be obliged to take.” Jd. at 61. The

Court concluded that the citizen’s action in such cir-

cumstances would curtail EPA’s ability to enforce the

Act and “could undermine the supplementary role envi-

sioned for the citizen suit.” Jd. at 60.

Petitioners assert, based on those remarks, that

Gwaltney’s reasoning should preclude the United States

from seeking civil penalties for past violations of a

state-issued NPDES permit that imposes more strin-

gent conditions than EPA might require. Pet. 13-14.

Petitioners overlook that the Clean Water Act ex-

pressly authorizes the United States to take such

action, see p. 11 & note 2, supra. The Gwaltney

decision—which discussed the relationship between

governmental and citizen enforceement—does not

address the relationship between federal and state

enforcement. Sections 301 and 309 expressly address

- that issue, they recognize that the federal government

can enforce state-issued NPDES permits, and they

authorize the United States to bring an enforcement

action in this case. See Pet. App. 14a-16a.®

8 Even if Gwaltney had a bearing of the relationship between

federal and state enforcement, the factual situations presented in

the Gwaltney hypothetical and the case presented here are plainly

distinguishable. This case is not one in which petitioners were

pressured by the threat of penalties to choose a more expensive

treatment method than they would otherwise have chosen out of

economic self-interest. The record is quite clear that Virginia

allowed petitioners to choose their method of compliance, and they

14

Petitioners also argue that Section 510 of the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1370, effectively grants the States

the exclusive authority to enforce more stringent state

law standards. Pet. 14-15. As the district court ex-

plained, however, petitioners’ interpretation is “com-

pletely unsupported by the language of Section 510 and

flatly inconsistent with the language, intent, and

structure of Sections 309(a) and 301 of the Clean Water

Act.” Pet. App. 112a.

Section 510 states that “[e]xcept as expressly pro-

vided in this chapter,” the Clean Water Act does not

“preclude or deny the right of any State * * * to

adopt or enforce” its own more stringent effluent limits.

33 U.S.C. 1370. Sections 301(b)(1)(C) and 309(a) ex-

pressly provide that EPA may enforce effluent limita-

tions in NPDES permits that are based on more strin-

gent state standards. See pp. 3-4, 9-10, 11 & note 2,

supra. Therefore, even if petitioners were correct in

characterizing the federal government’s enforcement

action in this case as curtailing Virginia’s discretion not

to enforce the state standards, the Clean Water Act has

“expressly provided” for the federal government to

take that action. The United States’ action in this case

accordingly does not contravene Section 510. See Pet.

App. 14a-16a, 112a-113a.*

chose to connect to HRSD for reasons of cost-effectiveness and

future flexibility. See Pet. App. 3a-8a.

4 Petitioners err in arguing (Pet. 16) that the court of appeals’

decision here is in tension with the Eighth Circuit’s decision

in Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (1999).

Harmon involved a federal enforcement action under a different

statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42

U.S.C. 6901 et seg. RCRA provides for shared federal-state re-

sponsibilities, but its text differs from that of the Clean Water Act

in several respects. For example, RCRA provides that a state

15

2. Petitioners next argue that the Board’s issuance

of a series of Special Orders directing petitioners to

choose a method of compliance with the phosphorus

limitation constitutes an administrative penalty action,

diligently prosecuted under comparable state law, that

bars the United States from bringing this federal

enforcement action. Pet. 17-24. Petitioners base that

argument on Section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) of the Clean Water

Act, which provides that no civil penalty action may be

brought for violations “with respect to which a State

has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action

under a State law comparable to” Section 309(g), which

prescribes the Clean Water Act’s mechanism for EPA

to assess administrative penalties. See 33 U.S.C.

1319(g)(6)(A). The courts below correctly rejected that

argument. See Pet. App. 13a-14a, 15a-16a, 103a-112a.

The district court carefully examined the Virginia

laws in effect at the time that the Board issued its

orders, and it concluded that the state laws under which

the Board acted were not sufficiently comparable to the

Clean Water Act to trigger Section 309(g)($)(A)’s limit-

hazardous waste program operates “in lieu of” a federal hazardous

waste program and that authorized state actions have the “same

force and effect” as actions by EPA. 42 U.S.C. 6926(b) and (d).

The Eighth Circuit decided in Harmon that those RCRA pro-

visions precluded EPA from taking a RCRA enforcement action

under the facts of that case. 191 F.3d at 898. The United States

believes that Harmon was wrongly decided. Regardless of its

merits, however, Harmon is irrelevant to this case because the

Clean Water Act contains different and additional language ex-

pressly stating that state NPDES programs under the Clean

Water Act do not preempt federal enforcement. See 33 U.S.C.

1342(i) (providing that “[nJothing in this section [relating to state

NPDES programs] shall be construed to limit the authority of the

' Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 (“Enforce-

ment”] of this title”).

16

ation. Pet. App. llla-112a. As the district court

pointed out, Section 309(g) authorizes the Administra-

tor of the EPA to assess nonconsensual penalties of up

to $10,000 per day, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(2), and allows both

the violator and other “interested persons” to request

and participate in a hearing or seek judicial review of

the administrative penalty, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8). By

contrast, the Board in this case acted under Virginia

laws that gave the Board no authority to impose admin-

istrative penalties on a violator without the violator’s

consent, Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15(8d) (Michie 1998),

and that did not allow anyone other than the violator to

request a hearing-or to seek judicial review of admin-

istrative penalty actions. See Pet. App. 13a-16a, 104a-

112a.

Given those fundamental differences, the courts be-

low correctly found that Virginia’s law was not “com-

parable” to Section 309(g) of the Clean Water Act, and

therefore held that federal enforcement was not pre-

cluded under Section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii). See Pet. App.

13a-14a, 104a-1ila. Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion,

the court of appeals did not “effectively embrace[]” the

requirement that “state law must ‘mimic’ federal law”

in order to preclude enforcement of the CWA. Pet. 19.

The court of appeals’ decision neither states nor implies

such a requirement. The court of appeals simply agreed

with the district court’s sound conclusion that “Vir-

ginia’s entire enforcement scheme is not comparable to

Section 309(g)” for two quite fundamental reasons: The

Virginia scheme “does not provide authority to issue

administrative penalties,” and “it failed, at the time of

the Special Orders, to provide adequate procedures for

public participation.” Pet. App. 111la.

Petitioners are also mistaken in contending (Pet. 19-

23) that the court of appeals’ application of Section

17

309(g)(6)(A)(ii) conflicts with decisions of the First and

Eighth Circuits. In each of the cases petitioners cite,

the state programs at issue differed in fundamental

ways from Virginia’s program. For example, the First

Circuit concluded in North & South Rivers Watershed

Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 554 (1991), that

a Massachusetts law providing for nonconsensual as-

sessment of administrative penalties and providing for

public participation in the penalty assessment process

“closely parallels” the Clean Water Act’s administrative

penalty program. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21A, § 16

(1996). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit concluded in Ar-

kansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29

F.3d 376, 381 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995),

that an Arkansas statute authorizing administrative

penalties of up to $10,000 per day, which was supported

by regulations allowing public participation, was com-

parable to the Clean Water Act’s administrative pen-

alty program. See Ark. Code Ann. § 8-4-103(c) (Michie

2000).

The court of appeals and the district court in this case

reached a different result than did the First and EKighth

Circuits because the Virginia laws at issue here differed

in fundamental ways from the Massachusetts and Ar-

kansas laws there at issue. See Pet. App. 104a-109a.

Virginia has now revised its laws to expand its admin-

istrative penalty authority, to increase public participa-

tion in the penalty assessment process, and to make its

administrative processes more comparable to those of

EPA and other States. See id. at 13a nn.2-3. There is

accordingly no warrant for this Court to review the

“comparability” of Virginia laws that have been sub-

stantially revised, that do not reflect Virginia’s current

18

administrative process, and that have no continuing

importance beyond the outcome of this particular case.°

3. Petitioners also broadly contend that the court of

appeals’ decision conflicts with the decisions of other

courts of appeals “on the notice required before a party

may be penalized for violating regulatory standards.”

Pet. 24-28. No such conflict exists. The Fourth Circuit,

like other courts of appeals, acknowledges that “[d]ue

process requires that a party must receive fair notice

before being deprived of property.” United States v.

Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 F.3d 216, 224 (1997), cert.

denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998). The courts below properly

rejected petitioners’ fact-specific claim that they did not

receive fair notice of their obligation to comply with

their NPDES permit. Pet. App. 15a, 87a-102a.

5 Petitioners suggest (Pet. 23-24) that a conflict has developed

between the First and Ninth Circuits on the question of whether

preclusion under Section 309(g)(6)(A) arises only from a diligently-

prosecuted administrative penalty action, or whether any

administrative compliance actions will suffice if the State has, but

does not use, administrative penalty authority comparable to that

provided under Section 309(g) of the Clean Water Act. Compare

Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co. (UNOCAL),

83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the “plainest read-

ing of the statutory language” is that only administrative penalty

actions preclude civil penaity actions under Section 309(g)), cert.

denied, 519 U.S. 1101 (1997), with Scitwate, 949 F.2d at 556 (hold-

ing, on policy grounds, that “(t]he state’s decision not to utilize

penalty provisions does not alter the comparability of the State

Act’s statutory scheme to the scheme found in the Federal Act”).

The court of appeals in this case did not address that issue in light

of its holding that “Virginia’s enforcement scheme is not suffi-

ciently comparable to § 309(g) to bar the EPA from bringing its

own independent penalty action.” Pet. App. 15a-16a. Hence, this

case provides no occasion to resolve any conflict that may exist

between the First and Ninth Circuit decisions on which petitioners

rely.

19

Petitioners’ permit imposed a phosphorus limitation

on petitioners with unmistakable clarity. The permit

directed petitioners to achieve compliance with the

total phosphorus limitations in Part I.C.1 of the permit

in accordance with the schedule contained therein. Pet.

App. 72a-78a. The permit specifically directed peti-

tioners to:

(1) “{s]ubmit quarterly progress reports for

achievement of final effluent limitations” for phos-

phorus “[w]ithin 30 days of the effective date of the

permit and each calendar quarter thereafter until

completion of item #2 below” and

(2) “{a]chieve compliance with final effluent limita-

tions” for phosphorus “[b]y January 4, 1993.”

Ibid. Petitioners thus cannot plausibly claim that they

lacked fair notice that their permit contained a limit on

phosphorus discharges. With equal clarity, the Clean

Water Act provides that any person who violates “any

permit condition or limitation” implementing, inter alia,

more stringent state requirements, shall be subject to a

civil penalty. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d). See p. 11 note 2, supra.

Petitioners were therefore on notice that failure to

comply with the terms of their NPDES permit could

subject them to a federal civil enforcement action and

civil penalties.

Petitioners claim that “[tJhe Board and [petitioners]

agreed to a plan that relieved [petitioners] from meet-

ing that state [phosphorus] limit,” thus giving peti-

tioners “every reason to believe” that they were ex-

cused from compliance with the phosphorus effluent

limitation in their NPDES permit. Pet. 25. Petitioners

cannot reasonably claim, however, that their correspon-

dence with the Board relieved them of their obligation

20

to comply with their NPDES permit. As the courts

below comprehensively and correctly explained, neither

the correspondence between petitioners and the Board

nor the Board’s Special Orders modified petitioners’

permit or excused petitioners from the legal duty to

comply with their permit. See Pet. App. 12a, 15a, 66a-

75a, 87a-10la. “The Board’s Special Orders or letters

dated before the issuance of the 1992 Permit cannot

logically change the terms of a more recent Permit

approved by the Board and the EPA.” Id. at 96a. If

petitioners wished to be excused from the unambiguous

terms of the 1992 permit after its issuance, then they

should have applied for a modification of the permit

terms. See id. at 12a, 95a-96a.

The Clean Water Act and its implementing regula-

tions set forth detailed procedures governing modi-

fication of a permit, which are applicable to all approved

state NPDES permitting programs. See 33 U.S.C.

1342(a) and (b)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. 122.62, 123.25,

124.5(c)(1), 124.6(e). Petitioners not only had fair notice

of their permit obligations; they did not take advantage

of the Clean Water Act’s prescribed course for seeking

modification of those obligations. See Pet. App. 95a-

96a.° Moreover, petitioners’ claim that they lacked

notice rests on the specific facts of this case. That

° The Act’s procedures for modification of a permit are not

mere technicalities; they are essential to the preservation of EPA’s

oversight role and the public’s right to participate in the permit-

ting process. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(5) and (b)(3); UNOCAL, 83

F.3d at 1120 (holding that a state order could not modify the

permit because it did not comply with the regulations governing

the modification of NPDES permits; noting that compliance with

procedures is necessary to “ensure that the standards embodied in

an NPDES permit cannot be evaded with the cooperation of

compliant state regulatory authorities”).

21

claim, which has been carefully reviewed and properly

rejected by the district court and a unanimous court of

appeals, presents no legal issue of general importance

warranting this Court’s review.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

; SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

JOHN T. STAHR

JOAN M. PEPIN

Attorneys

JULY 2000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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