Opposition Brief — Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United States
Supreme Court brief2000
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
No. 99-1760 ane e
In the Supreme Court of the Anited States
ry, > "”
Lt ee
4
4
bee ere
SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN T. STA’ R
JOAN M. PEPIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the United States may bring a civil
enforcement action under the Clean Water Act against
petitioners for violations of a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit that con-
tains both federally mandated and state mandated
effluent limitations.
2. Whether Section 309(g)(6)(A) of the Clean Water
Act, which provides that a person shall not be subject
to a judicial action for civil penalties if a State has
prosecuted an administrative penalty action under
State law that is “comparable” to federal law (33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(6)(A)), precludes the government’s civil penalty
suit in this case.
8. Whether petitioners received fair notice of their
obligation under the Clean Water Act to comply with
the effluent limitations in their NPDES permit.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinions below
Jurisdiction
Statement
Argument
Conclusion
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Arkansas Wildlife Fed’n v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29 F.3d
376 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995) ............
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co.,
83 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 110
(1997)
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987)
Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (8th
Cir. 1999)
North & S. Rivers Watershed Ass’n v. Town of
Scituate, 949 F.2d 552 (1st Cir. 1991)
United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 F.3d
216 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998)
Statutes and regulations:
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq.
SOROS EERERO ETHOS THESES ESSE ESSE ESEEES
§ 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a)
§ 117, 33 U.S.C. 1267
§ 301, 33 U.S.C. 1311
§ 301(a), 33 U.S.C. 1311(a)
§ 301(a)-(b), 33 U.S.C. 1311(a)-(b) .....
§ 301(b), 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)
§ 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. 1811(b)(1)(C) ....
§ 308, 33 U.S.C. 1318
§ 309, 22 U.S.C. 1319
§ 309(a), 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)
(IIT)
17
IV
Statutes and regulations—Continued: Page
§ 309(a)(1), 38 U.S.C. 1819(a)(1) 7 Pes 8,11
§ 309(a)(3), 38 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3) 8, 12
§ 309(b), 33 U.S.C. 1819(b) 8,4
§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. 1819(d) 38, 4, 19
§ 309(g), 833 U.S.C. 1819(g) ....ccccscscssssesscscseneees 3, 4, 9, 15, 16, 18
§ 309(g)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g)(1)(A) 3
§ 309(g)(2), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(2) .. 16
§ 309(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g)(4) 4
§ 309(g)(6), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g¢)(6) , 4
§ 309(g)(6)(A), 33 U.S.C. 1819(g¢)(6)(A) 4, 15, 18
§ 309(g)(6)(A)(ii), 83 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6)( A) (ii) «eee 9, 15, 16, 17
§ 309(g)(8), 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8) ‘ 16
§ 402, 33 U.S.C. 1842 3,11
§ 402(a), 33 U.S.C. 1842(a) 20
§ 402(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. 1842(a)(5) 20
§ 402(b), 33 U.S.C. 1842(b) 38, 20
§ 402(b)(1)(C), 83 U.S.C. 1842(b)(1)(C) ...... 20
§ 402(b)(8), 33 U.S.C. 1842(b)(3) 20
§ 402(c)-(d), 838 U.S.C. 1842(€)-(d) .....cececeeseee 3
§ 402(d), 833 U.S.C. 1842(d) ........ccccccscscssseresseseee 3
§ 402(i), 33 U.S.C. 1342(i) : 4,15
§ 505, 33 U.S.C. 1365 : 12
§ 510, 33 U.S.C. 1370 9,14
Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. 3701
note (Supp. I'V 1998) ........... 4
Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of
1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note ...........cccceseess 4
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
6901 et seq. ...... pitaiiehaininaanane 14
42 U.S.C. 6926(b) scelanliiaaiataniiadaiiliaiains 15
UA) Gee eiteiintnenmininmons 15
Ark. Code Ann. § 8-4-103(c) (Michie 2000) ; 17
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21A, § 16 (1996) .............. 17
9 Va. Admin. Code (2000):
DP IU sh cinissibccacieasclaimposaecsenssiiotpeaaapenbenmiaabionmaabiats 5
FEED siictinniriicntinininansiiteitininisiniin 5
V
Statute and regulations—Continued: Page
16
Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15(8d) (Michie 1998)
40 C.F.R.:
Section 19.4
Section 122.62
Section 123.25
Section 124.5(c)(1)
Section 124.6(e)
SSSSa
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
No. 99-1760
SMITHFIELD FOODS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS
Vv.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-28a)
is reported at 191 F.2d 516. The opinion of the district
court granting the United States’ motion for partial
summary judgment on liability (Pet. App. 63a-113a) is
reported at 965 F’. Supp. 769. The opinion of the district
court assessing a penalty (Pet. App. 29a-62a) is re-
ported at 972 F. Supp. 338.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
September 14, 1999. A petition for rehearing was de-
nied on January 6, 2000 (Pet. App. 114a-115a). On
March 27, 2000, the Chief Justice extended the time for
filing a petition for certiorari to and including May 5,
2000, and the petition was filed on that date. The
(1)
2
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
1254(1).
STATEMENT
The United States brought this civil action against
petitioners to enforce provisions of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg., which petitioners had fre-
quently violated from 1991 to 1997. The Clean Water
Act generally prohibits any pollutant discharges into
waters of the United States except in compliance with
the Act’s permitting scheme. Petitioners obtained a
Clean Water Act permit, but repeatedly discharged
wastewater containing illegal levels of fecal coliform,
phosphorus, and other pollutants into the Pagan River,
a tributary of the James River, in violation of the
permit conditions. In addition, during the same period,
petitioners submitted false reports and destroyed docu-
ments to hide their unlawful discharges from state and
federal agencies. The district court rejected peti-
tioners’ various arguments in defense of their permit
violations, and the court assessed a civil penalty of $12.6
million. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of
liability but remanded the case for a minor adjustment
in the amount of the penalty.
1. The Clean Water Act is a comprehensive statute,
administered primarily by the Environmenta! Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), that seeks “to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters” through the reduction and eventual
elimination of the discharge of pollutants into those
waters. 33 U.S.C. 125l(a). The Act’s central mecha-
nism for meeting that objective is Section 301(a), which
prohibits the discharge of pollutants into the waters of
the United States by any person except as authorized
by specified sections of the Act. 33 U.S.C. 1311(a).
3
Section 402 of the Act provides one of the primary
means for obtaining authorization to discharge pollu-
tants. Section 402 establishes a permitting program
known as the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES). Under the NPDES permitting pro-
gram, persons (including commercial and industrial fa-
cilities) may obtain a permit allowing pollutant
discharges in accordance with prescribed conditions,
including effluent limitations, and monitoring and
reporting requirements. See 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1318, 1342;
see generally Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesa-
peake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 52 (1987). EPA
has primary responsibility for administering the
NPDES permit program, but Section 402(b) provides
that a State can establish and administer its own
NPDES program if the state program conforms to
federal guidelines and receives EPA’s approval. Nev-
ertheless, Section 402 requires EPA to exercise con-
tinuing oversight of EPA-approved permitting pro-
grams. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(c)-(d). For example, a State
may not issue a permit if EPA objects. If the State
refuses to issue a permit acceptable to EPA, EPA may
issue an appropriate permit. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(d).
Section 309 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1319,
provides a variety of means for the United States and
the States to enforce provisions of the Act, including
provisions authorizing EPA to commence a civil en-
forcement action in court, 33 U.S.C. 1319(b), or to
initiate administrative penalty proceedings, 33 U.S.C.
1319(g). EPA’s enforcement authority is not limited to
EPA-issued permits. EPA may enforce any conditions
of state-issued NPDES permits that implement the
relevant provisions of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C.
1319(a)(1) and (8), (b), (d), and (g)(1)(A). See Gwaltney,
484 U.S. at 53 (“The holder of a state NPDES permit is
4
subject to both federal and state enforcement action for
failure to comply.”); see also 33 U.S.C. 1342(i)
(providing that federal enforcement is not limited by
the existence of a state permitting program).
Section 309(b) specifically authorizes the United
States to seek injunctive relief, 33 U.S.C. 1819(b), while
Section 309(d) additionally authorizes the courts to
impose civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day for each
violation, 83 U.S.C. 1819(d).' Section 309(g) authorizes
EPA to assess administrative penalties in substantially
smaller amounts. 33 U.S.C. 1319(g). Section 309(g)(4)
provides extensive and detailed procedures for public
participation in the administrative penalty assessment
process, including a right of public notice and comment,
the right of any interested persons to petition for a
hearing, and the right of interested persons to present
evidence if a hearing is held. 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(4).
Section 309(g¢)(6) of the Clean Water Act addresses
the issue of whether the prosecution of a federal or
state administrative penalty action should preclude a
judicial enforcement action. See 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(6).
Section 309(g)(6)(A) provides that, if EPA or a State
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting, or has
successfully completed, an administrative penalty
action under subsection (g) or a comparable state law,
the violations at issue shall not be the subject of a
citizen suit or a civil penalty action under Section
309(d). 33 U.S.C. 13819(g)(6)(A).
1 For violations occurring after January 30, 1997, the maximum
penalty is $27,500 per day. 40 C.F.R. 19.4 (implementing Debt Col-
lection Improvement Act of 1996, 31 U.S.C. 3701 note (Supp. IV
1998) (Pub. L. No. 104-184), and Federal Civil Penalties Inflation
Adjustment Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note (Pub. L. No. 101-410).
RT nr eeemreeee
5
2. Petitioners operate neighboring pork processing
and packing plants in Smithfield, Virginia. The two
plants generate wastewater containing animal blood,
hair, viscera, excrement, flesh, bone, soil particles, and
cleaning materials. The wastewater is high in organic
pollutants, including fecal coliform, ammonia, nitrogen,
and phosphorus. Pet. App. 38a-42a, 45a; PX 2.
Until 1997, petitioners discharged their wastewater
into the Pagan River, a tributary of the James River,
pursuant to an NPDES permit issued by the Common-
wealth of Virginia in 1986, modified in 1990, and reis-
sued in 1992. The 1992 permit contained monthly aver-
age and/or daily maximum effluent limitations on
numerous pollutants. The permit also imposed monitor-
ing, reporting, and record-keeping requirements. Pet.
App. 64a-67a, 72a-73a.
In 1987, Virginia entered into the historic Chesa-
peake Bay Agreement with EPA, Pennsylvania, Mary-
land, and the District of Columbia. See 33 U.S.C. 1267
(establishing Chesapeake Bay Program Office within
EPA). Under that Agreement, Virginia committed to
reduce by 40% the amount of nitrogen and phosphorus
entering the Chesapeake Bay. To fulfill its obligations
under the Agreement, Virginia promulgated a Policy
for Nutrient Enriched Waters, which required that
NPDES permits for facilities discharging into nutrient-
enriched waters (of which the Pagan River is one) be
modified to include phosphorus limits. See 9 Va.
Admin. Code §§ 25-40-10 et seg. (2000); id. § 25-260-
350(18). Petitioners sued Virginia, alleging that the
phosphorus limitation was not technologically achiev-
able. Pet. App. 67a. Virginia nevertheless modified
petitioners’ permit in 1990 to impose discharge and
monitoring requirements on phosphorus and nitrogen.
Petitioners appealed the permit and threatened to
6
move their plants and their 3,000 jobs out of Virginia.
Id. at 67a; PXs 7, 8.
Beginning in 1990, petitioners and the Virginia State
Water Control Board (Board), which administers Vir-
ginia’s NPDES permit program, entered into a series of
agreements, termed “Special Orders,” requiring peti-
tioners to study the costs and feasibility of connecting
their wastewater system to the Hampton Roads Sanita-
tion District (HRSD), rather than discharging directly
to the Pagan River. Pet. App. 3a-8a, 66a-69a. After
petitioners’ consultant found that connecting to HRSD
was the most cost-effective method for petitioners to
meet their current and future pollution control obliga-
tions, petitioners elected to connect to HRSD. PX 21,
§ 6. The Board and petitioners entered into a Special
Order (the May 1991 Order) stating that if petitioners
elected to connect to HRSD, they were to do so within
three months of notification that a sewer line was
available to collect their wastewater. Pet. App. 69a.
The order expressly provided that “[nJothing herein
shall be construed as altering, modifying, or amending
any term or condition contained in” petitioners’
NPDES permit. Jd. at 70a.
Because petitioners’ permit was due to expire in
1991, the Board prepared a draft permit and submitted
it for EPA review and public comment. The draft per-
mit required petitioners, among other things, to come
into compliance with the 2 mg/l phosphorus limitation
by January 4, 1993, and to comply with effluent limits
on ammonia, carbonaceous biological oxygen demand
(CBOD), and cyanide by May 13, 1994. EPA reviewed
and approved the draft permit. Pet. App. 70a, 72a-73a.
Petitioners commented on the draft permit, claiming
that they could not comply with the draft permit’s
deadlines for compliance with effluent limits on
7
phosphorus, CBOD, ammonia, and cyanide, and noting
that “(rjelief from such compliance is not specifically
present or is not apparent in the [May 1991] Consent
Order.” Jd. at Tla. In response, an engineer at a
regional office of the Board wrote to petitioners that
“{a]ny special order agreements relative to compliance
with water quality standards, the Permit regulation
and associated studies that have been approved by the
Board take precedence” over the Permit. Jd. at 72a.
That letter also stated that “(t]he compliance schedules
and related goal dates contained in the permit are there
to afford the permittee necessary time to comply with
the established effluent limitations.” bid.
On January 3, 1992, the Board issued petitioners’
NPDES permit. Despite petitioners’ comments, the
permit still contained effluent limitations on phospho-
rus, CBOD, ammonia, and cyanide. Petitioners did not
appeal the 1992 permit, nor have they ever sought to
modify those requirements to which they had objected.
Pet. App. 72a-74a.
8. Petitioners proceeded to violate every single
effluent limitation in their permit. They violated those
limitations thousands of times and often by extreme
margins. Pet. App. 34a. For example, petitioners’
violations of the fecal coliform limits averaged 1,365% of
the permitted level. For ammonia, the violations aver-
aged 97% above the limit; for cyanide, the exceedences
averaged 168% above the limit. Petitioner’s phosphorus
exceedences were, on average, 1055% above the limit.
Id. at 38a. The district court characterized petitioners’
violations as “frequent and severe.” Id. at 39a.
Petitioners also committed serious violations of the
reporting and recordkeeping requirements of its per-
mit. Petitioners admitted to submitting false monitor-
ing reports on 15 occasions, Pet. App. 30a, and acknowl-
8
edged filing reports late, for a total of 164 days of
violation, id. at 36a. Petitioners were also out of compli-
ance with the record-keeping requirements of their
NPDES permit for 884 days because a Smithfield
employee, witnessed by two other employees, illegally
destroyed petitioners’ pre-1994 required documenta-
tion. Id. at 34a-35a, 55a-56a.
4. The United States filed this enforcement action
against petitioners on December 16, 1996, seeking
injunctive relief and civil penalties. The United States
moved for summary judgment on liability. The United
States pointed out that petitioners’ monitoring reports
established that they had violated their NPDES permit
numerous times. In response, petitioners argued that
they were not in violation of the permit’s phosphorus
limitations because the permit was “conditioned, re-
vised, or superseded” by the Board’s May 1991 Order.
Pet. App. 95a. The district court rejected that argu-
ment.
The district court pointed out that the May 1991
Order explicitly stated that “[nJothing herein shall be
construed as altering, modifying, or amending any term
or condition contained in” petitioners’ permit. Pet.
App. 95a. The court also noted that petitioners’ argu-
ment was inconsistent with the Board’s express
inclusion of phosphorus limitations in the 1992 permit.
“The Board’s Special Orders or letters dated before the
issuance of the 1992 Permit cannot logically change the
terms of a more recent Permit approved by the Board
and the EPA.” Id. at 96a. The court carefully reviewed
the events leading up to the issuance of the 1992 per-
mit, id. at 96a-100a, and it concluded that “the Board’s
Special Orders did not change the terms of the 1992
Permit, nor did the 1992 Permit implicitly incorporate
9
any agreements set forth in the Special Orders,” id. at
100a.
The district court next rejected (Pet. App. 103a-112a)
petitioners’ claim that the Board’s series of administra-
tive orders, permitting petitioners to choose their
method of compliance with the phosphorus limitation,
amounted to an administrative penalty proceeding
under state laws that are “comparable” to Section
309(g) of the Clean Water Act and precluded EPA from
enforcing the phosphorus limitation. See 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii). The court noted that, at the time of
the Board’s actions, Virginia law permitted imposition
of administrative penalties only with the consent of the
violator (Pet. App. 104a-106a) and that the state law’s
provisions for public notice and participation did not
permit the public to request a hearing or to be present
if one was held, or to seek judicial review of the result
(id. at 106a-llla). Therefore, the court held, the
state law under which the Board acted was insuffi-
ciently “comparable” to Section 309(g), see 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(6)(A)(ii), to bar the federal government’s civil
enforcement action. Pet. App. 104a-112a.
Finally, the district court rejected (Pet. App. 112a-
113a) petitioners’ argument that Section 510 of the
Clean Water Act, which allows States to impose dis-
charge limitations that are more stringent than federal
law would require, see 33 U.S.C. 1370, prevents federal
enforcement of the phosphorus limitations in peti-
tioners’ NPDES permit. The court explained that “the
plain language of Section 309(a)(1) and (8) * * *
clearly provides that the United States may enforce the
phosphorus standard in [petitioners’] Permit” and that
Section 510 accordingly “does not preclude the United
States from pursuing their phosphorus-based claims
10
\
against [petitioners] in this action.” Pet. App. 112a-
113a.
The district court accordingly granted partial sum-
mary judgment for the United States on the effluent
limitation violations. Pet. App. 113a. The court later
granted partial summary judgment for the United
’ States on two additional counts relating to filing false
reports and destruction of documents. Id. at 29a-30a,
34a-35a. After a bench trial on penalty issues, the court
found petitioners liable for 6,982 days of violation, id. at
36a, and it assessed a penalty of $12.6 million, id. at 62a.
5. The court of appeals affirmed the finding of
liability in a unanimous opinion, but remanded the case
for recalculation of the civil penalty. Pet. App. la-28a.
The court of appeals endorsed and adopted the district
court’s reasoning on liability. Jd. at 1la-16a. The court
of appeals specifically “concur[red] with the district
court that (1) the Board’s Orders were not incorporated
into nor changed the terms of the 1992 Permit; (2)
Virginia’s enforcement scheme is not sufficiently
comparable to § 309(g) to bar the EPA from bringing its
own independent penalty action; and (8) neither the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gwaltney, nor § 510 of the
[Clean Water Act] preclude the EPA from bringing this
enforcement action.” Jd. at 15a-16a (footnote omitted).
._ The court of appeals extensively discussed petitioners’
numerous challenges to the civil penalty assessment
and rejected all of the claims but one. Jd. at 16a-28a.
The court of appeals remanded the case to the district
court to correct a calculation error that would reduce
the penalty by an amount of less than $200,000. Jd. at
25a-26a. The court, without dissent, denied petitioners’
request for rehearing and rehearing en banc. Id. at
114a-115a.
11
ARGUMENT
Contrary to petitioners’ characterization (see Pet. 3-
4), this case simply involves egregious conduct rather
than momentous legal issues. Petitioners committed
“frequent and severe” violations of their NPDES per-
mit. Pet. App. 39a. The district court, in a comprehen-
sive opinion, rejected petitioners’ justifications for their
numerous and extreme violations, a unanimous court of
appeals panel affirmed, and, in response to petitioners’
request for en banc review, no member of the court of
appeals requested a poll. The court of appeals’ decision
is correct, it does not conflict with the decisions of this
Court or any other court of appeals, and it does not
present any issue of broad public importance requiring
this Court’s resolution. Further review is not war-
ranted.
1. The Clean Water Act authorizes EPA to enforce
effluent limitations in NPDES permits, including
effluent limitations contained in state-issued NPDES
permits that are derived from state law. See 33 U.S.C.
1311(a)-(b), 1319(a)(1) and (8).? Petitioners nevertheless
2 The Clean Water Act unambiguously expresses that princi-
ple. Section 301, entitled “F ffluent limitations,” states: “Except as
in compliance with this section and [six other enumerated sections
of the Clean Water Act], the discharge of any pollutant by any
person shall be unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(a). Section 301(b) then
sets a timetable for achievement of federal technology-based efflu-
ent limitations and additionally provides that: “In order to carry
out the objective of this chapter there shall be achieved * * * any
more stringent limitation * * * established pursuant to any State
law or regulations.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(b) and (b)(1)(C). Section 309
provides that the EPA may bring an enforcement action against
“any person [that] is in violation of [Section 301 or other enumer-
ated sections of the Clean Water Act] or is in violation of any
permit condition or limitation implementing any of such sections in
a permit issued under [Section 402] of this title by [EPA] or by a
12
argue that the plain language of the Act, authorizing
EPA to enforce state-imposed effluent limitations,
should yield to a proposition they derive from this
Court’s decision in Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
Petitioners contend that “Congress * * * gave the
States primary authority to enforce the limits in the
permits they issue” (Pet. 12) and that this Court’s deci-
sion in Gwaltney “made clear that a penalty action
brought under the [Clean Water Act] should not be
permitted to undermine the efforts of the primary regu-
latory authority” (Pet. 18). Petitioners’ reliance on
Gwaltney is misplaced.
The Court held in Gwaltney that Section 505 of the
Clean Water Act, 38 U.S.C. 1865, which authorizes
private citizens to bring civil enforcement actions
against any person “alleged to be in violation” of the
Act, does not apply to wholly past violations. See 484
U.S. at 56-59. The Court concluded that “(t]he most
natural reading of ‘to be in violation’ is a requirement
that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous
or intermittent violation—that is, a reasonable likeli-
hood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the
future.” Jd. at 57. The Court determined, from the
language and structure of the citizen suit provisions as
a whole, that “the citizen suit is meant to supplement
rather than to supplant governmental action.” Jd. at
59-60. It hypothesized a situation in which citizens
State.” 33 U.S.C. 1319(a)(3). EPA’s statutory authority is accord-
ingly quite clear. Indeed, petitioners conceded in their opening
brief in the court of appeals that Section 309(a) “give[s] EPA the
general authority to enforce permits, including, inter alia, permits
containing more stringent standards under state law.” Appellant
C.A. Br. 37-38. They made the same concession to the district
court. See Pet. App. 112a-113a.
13
‘brought suit to obtain civil penalties for wholly past
violations that EPA had abated through a compliance
order in which the government did not seek civil
penalties in exchange for the violator’s agreement to
“take some extreme corrective action, such as to install
particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it
otherwise would not be obliged to take.” Jd. at 61. The
Court concluded that the citizen’s action in such cir-
cumstances would curtail EPA’s ability to enforce the
Act and “could undermine the supplementary role envi-
sioned for the citizen suit.” Jd. at 60.
Petitioners assert, based on those remarks, that
Gwaltney’s reasoning should preclude the United States
from seeking civil penalties for past violations of a
state-issued NPDES permit that imposes more strin-
gent conditions than EPA might require. Pet. 13-14.
Petitioners overlook that the Clean Water Act ex-
pressly authorizes the United States to take such
action, see p. 11 & note 2, supra. The Gwaltney
decision—which discussed the relationship between
governmental and citizen enforceement—does not
address the relationship between federal and state
enforcement. Sections 301 and 309 expressly address
- that issue, they recognize that the federal government
can enforce state-issued NPDES permits, and they
authorize the United States to bring an enforcement
action in this case. See Pet. App. 14a-16a.®
8 Even if Gwaltney had a bearing of the relationship between
federal and state enforcement, the factual situations presented in
the Gwaltney hypothetical and the case presented here are plainly
distinguishable. This case is not one in which petitioners were
pressured by the threat of penalties to choose a more expensive
treatment method than they would otherwise have chosen out of
economic self-interest. The record is quite clear that Virginia
allowed petitioners to choose their method of compliance, and they
14
Petitioners also argue that Section 510 of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1370, effectively grants the States
the exclusive authority to enforce more stringent state
law standards. Pet. 14-15. As the district court ex-
plained, however, petitioners’ interpretation is “com-
pletely unsupported by the language of Section 510 and
flatly inconsistent with the language, intent, and
structure of Sections 309(a) and 301 of the Clean Water
Act.” Pet. App. 112a.
Section 510 states that “[e]xcept as expressly pro-
vided in this chapter,” the Clean Water Act does not
“preclude or deny the right of any State * * * to
adopt or enforce” its own more stringent effluent limits.
33 U.S.C. 1370. Sections 301(b)(1)(C) and 309(a) ex-
pressly provide that EPA may enforce effluent limita-
tions in NPDES permits that are based on more strin-
gent state standards. See pp. 3-4, 9-10, 11 & note 2,
supra. Therefore, even if petitioners were correct in
characterizing the federal government’s enforcement
action in this case as curtailing Virginia’s discretion not
to enforce the state standards, the Clean Water Act has
“expressly provided” for the federal government to
take that action. The United States’ action in this case
accordingly does not contravene Section 510. See Pet.
App. 14a-16a, 112a-113a.*
chose to connect to HRSD for reasons of cost-effectiveness and
future flexibility. See Pet. App. 3a-8a.
4 Petitioners err in arguing (Pet. 16) that the court of appeals’
decision here is in tension with the Eighth Circuit’s decision
in Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 191 F.3d 894 (1999).
Harmon involved a federal enforcement action under a different
statute, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42
U.S.C. 6901 et seg. RCRA provides for shared federal-state re-
sponsibilities, but its text differs from that of the Clean Water Act
in several respects. For example, RCRA provides that a state
15
2. Petitioners next argue that the Board’s issuance
of a series of Special Orders directing petitioners to
choose a method of compliance with the phosphorus
limitation constitutes an administrative penalty action,
diligently prosecuted under comparable state law, that
bars the United States from bringing this federal
enforcement action. Pet. 17-24. Petitioners base that
argument on Section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii) of the Clean Water
Act, which provides that no civil penalty action may be
brought for violations “with respect to which a State
has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action
under a State law comparable to” Section 309(g), which
prescribes the Clean Water Act’s mechanism for EPA
to assess administrative penalties. See 33 U.S.C.
1319(g)(6)(A). The courts below correctly rejected that
argument. See Pet. App. 13a-14a, 15a-16a, 103a-112a.
The district court carefully examined the Virginia
laws in effect at the time that the Board issued its
orders, and it concluded that the state laws under which
the Board acted were not sufficiently comparable to the
Clean Water Act to trigger Section 309(g)($)(A)’s limit-
hazardous waste program operates “in lieu of” a federal hazardous
waste program and that authorized state actions have the “same
force and effect” as actions by EPA. 42 U.S.C. 6926(b) and (d).
The Eighth Circuit decided in Harmon that those RCRA pro-
visions precluded EPA from taking a RCRA enforcement action
under the facts of that case. 191 F.3d at 898. The United States
believes that Harmon was wrongly decided. Regardless of its
merits, however, Harmon is irrelevant to this case because the
Clean Water Act contains different and additional language ex-
pressly stating that state NPDES programs under the Clean
Water Act do not preempt federal enforcement. See 33 U.S.C.
1342(i) (providing that “[nJothing in this section [relating to state
NPDES programs] shall be construed to limit the authority of the
' Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 (“Enforce-
ment”] of this title”).
16
ation. Pet. App. llla-112a. As the district court
pointed out, Section 309(g) authorizes the Administra-
tor of the EPA to assess nonconsensual penalties of up
to $10,000 per day, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(2), and allows both
the violator and other “interested persons” to request
and participate in a hearing or seek judicial review of
the administrative penalty, 33 U.S.C. 1319(g)(8). By
contrast, the Board in this case acted under Virginia
laws that gave the Board no authority to impose admin-
istrative penalties on a violator without the violator’s
consent, Va. Code Ann. § 62.1-44.15(8d) (Michie 1998),
and that did not allow anyone other than the violator to
request a hearing-or to seek judicial review of admin-
istrative penalty actions. See Pet. App. 13a-16a, 104a-
112a.
Given those fundamental differences, the courts be-
low correctly found that Virginia’s law was not “com-
parable” to Section 309(g) of the Clean Water Act, and
therefore held that federal enforcement was not pre-
cluded under Section 309(g)(6)(A)(ii). See Pet. App.
13a-14a, 104a-1ila. Contrary to petitioners’ suggestion,
the court of appeals did not “effectively embrace[]” the
requirement that “state law must ‘mimic’ federal law”
in order to preclude enforcement of the CWA. Pet. 19.
The court of appeals’ decision neither states nor implies
such a requirement. The court of appeals simply agreed
with the district court’s sound conclusion that “Vir-
ginia’s entire enforcement scheme is not comparable to
Section 309(g)” for two quite fundamental reasons: The
Virginia scheme “does not provide authority to issue
administrative penalties,” and “it failed, at the time of
the Special Orders, to provide adequate procedures for
public participation.” Pet. App. 111la.
Petitioners are also mistaken in contending (Pet. 19-
23) that the court of appeals’ application of Section
17
309(g)(6)(A)(ii) conflicts with decisions of the First and
Eighth Circuits. In each of the cases petitioners cite,
the state programs at issue differed in fundamental
ways from Virginia’s program. For example, the First
Circuit concluded in North & South Rivers Watershed
Ass’n v. Town of Scituate, 949 F.2d 552, 554 (1991), that
a Massachusetts law providing for nonconsensual as-
sessment of administrative penalties and providing for
public participation in the penalty assessment process
“closely parallels” the Clean Water Act’s administrative
penalty program. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21A, § 16
(1996). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit concluded in Ar-
kansas Wildlife Federation v. ICI Americas, Inc., 29
F.3d 376, 381 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1147 (1995),
that an Arkansas statute authorizing administrative
penalties of up to $10,000 per day, which was supported
by regulations allowing public participation, was com-
parable to the Clean Water Act’s administrative pen-
alty program. See Ark. Code Ann. § 8-4-103(c) (Michie
2000).
The court of appeals and the district court in this case
reached a different result than did the First and EKighth
Circuits because the Virginia laws at issue here differed
in fundamental ways from the Massachusetts and Ar-
kansas laws there at issue. See Pet. App. 104a-109a.
Virginia has now revised its laws to expand its admin-
istrative penalty authority, to increase public participa-
tion in the penalty assessment process, and to make its
administrative processes more comparable to those of
EPA and other States. See id. at 13a nn.2-3. There is
accordingly no warrant for this Court to review the
“comparability” of Virginia laws that have been sub-
stantially revised, that do not reflect Virginia’s current
18
administrative process, and that have no continuing
importance beyond the outcome of this particular case.°
3. Petitioners also broadly contend that the court of
appeals’ decision conflicts with the decisions of other
courts of appeals “on the notice required before a party
may be penalized for violating regulatory standards.”
Pet. 24-28. No such conflict exists. The Fourth Circuit,
like other courts of appeals, acknowledges that “[d]ue
process requires that a party must receive fair notice
before being deprived of property.” United States v.
Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 F.3d 216, 224 (1997), cert.
denied, 524 U.S. 952 (1998). The courts below properly
rejected petitioners’ fact-specific claim that they did not
receive fair notice of their obligation to comply with
their NPDES permit. Pet. App. 15a, 87a-102a.
5 Petitioners suggest (Pet. 23-24) that a conflict has developed
between the First and Ninth Circuits on the question of whether
preclusion under Section 309(g)(6)(A) arises only from a diligently-
prosecuted administrative penalty action, or whether any
administrative compliance actions will suffice if the State has, but
does not use, administrative penalty authority comparable to that
provided under Section 309(g) of the Clean Water Act. Compare
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Union Oil Co. (UNOCAL),
83 F.3d 1111, 1118 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the “plainest read-
ing of the statutory language” is that only administrative penalty
actions preclude civil penaity actions under Section 309(g)), cert.
denied, 519 U.S. 1101 (1997), with Scitwate, 949 F.2d at 556 (hold-
ing, on policy grounds, that “(t]he state’s decision not to utilize
penalty provisions does not alter the comparability of the State
Act’s statutory scheme to the scheme found in the Federal Act”).
The court of appeals in this case did not address that issue in light
of its holding that “Virginia’s enforcement scheme is not suffi-
ciently comparable to § 309(g) to bar the EPA from bringing its
own independent penalty action.” Pet. App. 15a-16a. Hence, this
case provides no occasion to resolve any conflict that may exist
between the First and Ninth Circuit decisions on which petitioners
rely.
19
Petitioners’ permit imposed a phosphorus limitation
on petitioners with unmistakable clarity. The permit
directed petitioners to achieve compliance with the
total phosphorus limitations in Part I.C.1 of the permit
in accordance with the schedule contained therein. Pet.
App. 72a-78a. The permit specifically directed peti-
tioners to:
(1) “{s]ubmit quarterly progress reports for
achievement of final effluent limitations” for phos-
phorus “[w]ithin 30 days of the effective date of the
permit and each calendar quarter thereafter until
completion of item #2 below” and
(2) “{a]chieve compliance with final effluent limita-
tions” for phosphorus “[b]y January 4, 1993.”
Ibid. Petitioners thus cannot plausibly claim that they
lacked fair notice that their permit contained a limit on
phosphorus discharges. With equal clarity, the Clean
Water Act provides that any person who violates “any
permit condition or limitation” implementing, inter alia,
more stringent state requirements, shall be subject to a
civil penalty. 33 U.S.C. 1319(d). See p. 11 note 2, supra.
Petitioners were therefore on notice that failure to
comply with the terms of their NPDES permit could
subject them to a federal civil enforcement action and
civil penalties.
Petitioners claim that “[tJhe Board and [petitioners]
agreed to a plan that relieved [petitioners] from meet-
ing that state [phosphorus] limit,” thus giving peti-
tioners “every reason to believe” that they were ex-
cused from compliance with the phosphorus effluent
limitation in their NPDES permit. Pet. 25. Petitioners
cannot reasonably claim, however, that their correspon-
dence with the Board relieved them of their obligation
20
to comply with their NPDES permit. As the courts
below comprehensively and correctly explained, neither
the correspondence between petitioners and the Board
nor the Board’s Special Orders modified petitioners’
permit or excused petitioners from the legal duty to
comply with their permit. See Pet. App. 12a, 15a, 66a-
75a, 87a-10la. “The Board’s Special Orders or letters
dated before the issuance of the 1992 Permit cannot
logically change the terms of a more recent Permit
approved by the Board and the EPA.” Id. at 96a. If
petitioners wished to be excused from the unambiguous
terms of the 1992 permit after its issuance, then they
should have applied for a modification of the permit
terms. See id. at 12a, 95a-96a.
The Clean Water Act and its implementing regula-
tions set forth detailed procedures governing modi-
fication of a permit, which are applicable to all approved
state NPDES permitting programs. See 33 U.S.C.
1342(a) and (b)(1)(C); 40 C.F.R. 122.62, 123.25,
124.5(c)(1), 124.6(e). Petitioners not only had fair notice
of their permit obligations; they did not take advantage
of the Clean Water Act’s prescribed course for seeking
modification of those obligations. See Pet. App. 95a-
96a.° Moreover, petitioners’ claim that they lacked
notice rests on the specific facts of this case. That
° The Act’s procedures for modification of a permit are not
mere technicalities; they are essential to the preservation of EPA’s
oversight role and the public’s right to participate in the permit-
ting process. See 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(5) and (b)(3); UNOCAL, 83
F.3d at 1120 (holding that a state order could not modify the
permit because it did not comply with the regulations governing
the modification of NPDES permits; noting that compliance with
procedures is necessary to “ensure that the standards embodied in
an NPDES permit cannot be evaded with the cooperation of
compliant state regulatory authorities”).
21
claim, which has been carefully reviewed and properly
rejected by the district court and a unanimous court of
appeals, presents no legal issue of general importance
warranting this Court’s review.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
; SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN T. STAHR
JOAN M. PEPIN
Attorneys
JULY 2000
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.