Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. v. Damon

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Supreme Court, U.S

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Y9I456MAR1 200

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

FLEMING SUPERMARKETS OF FLORIDA, INC.,

Petitioner,

WALTER DAMON AND RICHARD KANAFANI,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Eleventh Circuit Court Of Appeal

¢

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

LAWRENCE A. KELLOGG, Esq.

Counsel of Record

Tew CARDENAS REBAK KELLOGG

LEHMAN DeMaria & Tacue, L.L.P.

Miami Center, Suite 2600

201 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131-4336

Telephone No.: (305) 536-1112

Facsimile No.: (305) 536-1116

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) Sa: 2831

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Can a five year age difference meet the “substantially

younger” element necessary to establish a prima facie

case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,

29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq.?

ii

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States, Petitioner, Fleming Super-

markets of Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation, states that

it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Fleming Companies,

Inc., a publicly held Oklahoma corporation. There are no

subsidiaries of Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.

A

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......... li

EE Ee NEEDS hv ccc a se csivetdnaawanveness lil

pe ee pa ey | nn ree iv

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI............ 1

i Ms i as whia ks caused uadwdnneaessceae 1

ET ree er ee eer rere 1

STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE............. 2

areemmmees GaP Fite CASE... 2 ince c cece ccasees 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 3

I. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion Directly Con-

flicts With Decisions of Other Circuit Courts of

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363 (6th Cir.

i ee IE Re Ree Pr yr ire ype ye er eee 6

Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. :

Se PETE EET OLE OT TE ELE OT POE Ta Oe 5

Carter v. Decision One Corp., 122 F.3d 997 (11th

Ca FED ins Wr 50d Fas pone eke da ee Pe A RA waREES 5

Cramer v. Intelidata Technologies Corp., 168 F.3d

we a peer rer rrr errr rt rere rr ere 6

Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.,

oes Br Sis Be ae... Serer errr 1, 3, 4,3

Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887 (7th

CA SUE bcs oie dh ons Gacsacedemesencedasnseesenes 7

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

ee ok rrr rer ree rr Try rere rrr ry 3

O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,

S17 U.S. 308 (1996) ....... Sieh Cine eens bas eee sie 4, 6

Richter v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024 (7th

eer eee repre rr err ere Tyee rr Ser errr 5

Schiltz v. Burlington Northern R.R., 115 F.3d 1407

ge fe Pe Tey TTR ee ee ee eer Teer ee 6

STATUTES AND RULES

Bik A NOPE eee eer Ser oro rr re or er Ty 2

BS ee | PEST TE ETT ECE Cr TT Or Certo oC er 1

rk ee | rrr eer ree rrr re rere err 2

CP. BAe. TA Tins ed ned cen n in dwensceusddee ccavns 1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Fleming Companies of Florida, Inc. (“Fleming”)

respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review

the judgment and opinion of the Eleventh Circuit entered

in this proceeding on December 3, 1999, in order to

resolve the conflict between the Eleventh Circuit on the

one hand and the Seventh, Sixth, Eighth and Fourth

Circuit Courts of Appeals on the other hand on the

important issue presented herein.

¢

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit was reported at Damon v. Fleming

Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999)

and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at pages App. 1

through 23.

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on

December 3, 1999. Petitioner timely files this Petition

under 28 U.S.C. § 1651; U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10. Review

should be granted pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the United

States Supreme Court because the United States Court of

Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit entered an order in

conflict with decisions of other United States courts of

appeals on the same important issue.

¢

ee mn ee

2

STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29

U.S.C. § 623(a) provides, in pertinent part:

§ 623. Prohibition of age discrimination

(a) Employer practices

It shall be unlawful for an employer -

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge

any individual or otherwise discriminate

against any individual with respect to his com-

pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

employer, because of such individual’s age;

(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his

employees in any way which would deprive or

tend to deprive any individual of employment

opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his

status as an employee, because of such individ-

ual’s age; or

(3) to reduce the wage rate of any

employee in order to comply with this chapter.

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE!

Plaintiffs below, Walter Damon and Richard Kanafani

(“Kanafani”), are former employees of Fleming Super-

markets of Florida, Inc. Plaintiffs brought an action in the ~

United States District Court for the Southern District of

Florida for alleged age discrimination. Jurisdiction in the

District Court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. App. 25.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis is supplied.

|

The District Court granted final summary judgment in

favor of Defendant Fleming. App. 41-42. Plaintiffs

appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

reversed. App. 1-23. Fleming brings this petition for a

writ of certiorari on the single issue of whether Plaintiff

Kanafani presented the District Court with sufficient evi-

dence to establish a prima facie case of age discrimina-

tion, in light of the fact that Kanafani was replaced by

someone only five years younger.

Kanafani was employed by Fleming from September

1993 until his employment was terminated on October 6,

1994. Kanafani was forty-two years old at the time of his

discharge and was replaced by Tony Calveiro who was

thirty-seven years old. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets _

of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 at 1360, App. 7.

¢

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion Directly Conflicts

With Decisions of Other Circuit Courts of Appeal

In evaluating age discrimination claims based on cir-

cumstantial evidence, most circuits apply a variant of the

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.

1817 (1973) analysis similar to that used by the Eleventh

Circuit in this case. Sez Damon at 1359, App. 4, 6-7.

Applying this framework, a plaintiff must satisfy a four-

part test to establish a prima facie case:

(1) that [the plaintiff] was a member of the pro-

tected group of persons between the ages of

forty and seventy; (2) that she was subject to

adverse employment action; (3) that a substan-

tially younger person filled the position that she

sought or from which she was discharged; and

(4) that she was qualified to do the job for which

she was rejected.

Id.

This petition involves the important question: “What

age differential constitutes ‘substantially younger’ under

the third prong of the test?”

This Court in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers

Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996), stated: “[I]n the age-

discrimination context, [an inference of illegal discrimina-

tion] cannot be drawn from the replacement of one

worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”

The Court explained: “ . . . because the ADEA prohibits

discrimination on the basis of age and not class member-

ship, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger

than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age

discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was

replaced by someone outside the protected class.” Id.

The Court left unresolved, however, the issue of what

age difference constituted “insignificantly younger” or

“substantially younger”, but noted that a three year dif-

ference (sixty-eight versus sixty-five) provided “very thin

evidence” of discrimination. Id. at 312.

Since O’Connor the Circuits have conflicted in their

interpretation of the meaning of “substantially younger.”

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its position

that a three year age difference is sufficient to establish

the “substantially younger” element and held a five year

difference was sufficient:

5

... both the Appellees and the district court, in

dicta, suggest that Kanafani did not meet [the

“substantially younger”] requirement because,

at the time of Kanafani’s termination, his

replacement was thirty-seven, while Kanafani

was only forty-two. We disagree. Previously, we

have held that a replacement who is only three

years younger is sufficient to establish a prima

facie case. See Carter v. Decision One Corp., 122

_F3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that

plaintiff aged 42, who was replaced by

employee aged 39, met the “substantially youn-

ger” replacement requirement under ADEA)

(citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578,

582-83 (11th Cir. 1989)). Here, there is a five year

age difference between Kanafani and his

replacement. We therefore find that Kanafani

has satisfied the “substantially younger”

replacement requirement.

See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1360, App. 7.

The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion on this issue is in

direct conflict with decisions from other United States

circuit courts of appeals. The Seventh, Sixth, Eighth, and

Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals have found that an age

difference of five years or more does not meet the “sub-

stantially younger” test. See e.g., Richter v. Hook-SupeRx,

Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a

forty-five year old replacement was not “substantially

younger” than the fifty-two year old plaintiff, therefore,

plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case); Hartley

v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1997)

(holding that a six or seven year age difference did not

demonstrate a prima facie case, stating: “[t]en years is a

reasonable threshold establishing a ‘significant’ and ‘sub-

stantial’ gap, which is what O’Connor demands”); Bush v.

Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirm-

ing district court decision which held that an employee

failed to establish a prima facie case in a wrongful demo-

tion action where he was forty-six and his replacement

was forty-one); Schiltz v. Burlington Northern R.R., 115

F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding the “largest age

disparity between [Plaintiff] and the individual hired for

the job was five years . . . the age disparities do not raise

an inference of discrimination” in that the individuals

hired were not substantially younger); Cramer v. Intelidata

Technologies Corp., 168 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming

the district court’s analysis that, when an employee is

replaced by a person “only five years younger,” that

person, in the absence of additional information, is not

“substantially younger” than the replaced employee).

In fact, since this Court’s decision in O’Connor, only

one circuit, the Eleventh, has held that fewer than ten

years is “sufficiently younger” to establish a prima facie

case for age discrimination. Other circuits (Sixth, Eighth,

and Fourth Circuits) have held that five years or less than

ten years (Seventh Circuit) does not satisfy the “substan-

tially younger” element under the O’Connor analysis to

establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. This

conflict among the United States Circuit Courts of

Appeals creates the confusing and inequitable situation

in which the outcome of the case is determined by the

Circuit in which the plaintiff files his or her claim.

¢

2 Cramer v. Intelidata Technologies Corp., is an unpublished

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully

requests this Court grant its Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari so that this conflict among the circuits may be fully

briefed and resolved by the Court.

LawreNcE A. KELLocc, Esa.

Counsel of Record

Tew CarDENAS REBAK KELLOGG

LEHMAN DeMaria & Tacue, L.L.P.

Miami Center, Suite 2600

201 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131-4336

Telephone No.: (305) 536-1112

Facsimile No.: (305) 536-1116

App. 1

Walter DAMON, Richard Kanafani,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

V.

FLEMING SUPERMARKETS OF FLORIDA,

INC., f.d.b.a. Wooley’s Fine Foods, etc.,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 98-5554.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit.

Dec. 3, 1999.

Scott Walter Rothstein, Michael Anthony Pancier, Ft.

Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Joseph Lester Rebak, Miami, FL, for Defendant-

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges,

and ALARCON*, Senior Circuit Judge.

MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

In this age discrimination suit, Appellants Walter

Damon and Richard Kanafani appeal from an order of the

district court granting summary judgment in favor of the

defendant, Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. d/b/a

Hyde Park Markets, f/d/b/a Wooley’s Fine Foods

(“Fleming”). Damon and Kanafani brought this action

* Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge

for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.

App. 2

against Fleming, their former employer, alleging viola-

tions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of

1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Florida

Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fl.Stat.Ann. §§ 760.01-760.11.

The district court concluded that neither plaintiff had

established a prima facie case of age discrimination, nor,

in the alternative, had demonstrated that the legitimate

nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Fleming for their

terminations were a pretext for age discrimination. We

disagree, finding material facts in dispute. Accordingly,

we reverse the order of summary judgment and remand

for trial.

a

We review a district court’s order granting summary

judgment de novo. Browning v. AT&T Paradyne, 120 F.3d

222 (11th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is appropriate

where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a

verdict for the non-moving party.” United States v. Four

Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991)

(en banc) (citation, omitted). In making this determina-

tion, we review the record, drawing all reasonable infer-

ences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

See Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th

Cir.1996).

App. 3

II.

The facts presented are reasonably straightforward.

Fleming, a nationwide supermarket chain, acquired

twenty South Florida supermarket stores in September

1993 from Pantry Pride (d/b/a Wooley’s Fine Foods). It

immediately installed Harry Soto as district manager of

seven of the stores. At the time, Appellants Walter

Damon and Richard Kanafani were store managers at two

of the stores acquired by Fleming. Each of their stores

was placed under the direct supervision of Soto. The

undisputed evidence demonstrates that, within a period

of slightly over one year after assuming the position of

district manager, Soto terminated or demoted five older,

more experienced managers, including Damon and Kan-

afani, and replaced them with men who were younger

and less experienced. The older managers were all over

forty, and the younger managers were all under forty.

Soto himself acknowledged that this pattern occurred. No

evidence was presented by Fleming that any younger

managers were terminated by Soto while he was district

manager. Damon was fired for alleged poor performance.

Kanafani was fired for allegedly yelling profanities at an

employee on the sales floor.

Il.

In its September 16, 1998 summary judgment order,

the district court made several pertinent conclusions of

law. First, the district court reasoned that Appellants had

not established all the elements of a prima facie case of

age discrimination. Specifically, the district court found

that Damon and Kanafani neither established that they

App. 4

were qualified for their positions under the McDonnell

Douglas rubric nor proffered direct evidence of discrimi-

nation by Fleming. The district court also suggested in

dicta that Kanafani had failed to establish that he was

replaced by someone substantially younger because, at

the time of his termination, Kanafani was forty-two and

his replacement was thirty-seven. Finally, the district

court concluded that Appellants did not establish that the

nondiscriminatory reasons Fleming offered for the termi-

nations were a pretext for age discrimination. We discuss

each conclusion in turn.

A. Prima Facie Case

In proving an age discrimination claim, a plaintiff

can establish a prima facie case of discrimination through

either direct evidence of discrimination or a variation of

the four-part test outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)

for circumstantial evidence. See Carter v. City of Miami,

870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.1989) Appellants’ claims rely

on both methods.

1. Direct Evidence of Discrimination

We agree with the district court that neither plaintiff

has presented direct evidence of age discrimination. We

have defined direct evidence of discrimination as evi-

dence which reflects “‘a discriminatory or retaliatory

attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation

complained of by the employee.’ ” Carter v. Three Springs

Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir.1998)

(quoting Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1555 (11th

eo

App. 5

Cir.1990)). In other words, the evidence must indicate

that the complained-of employment decision was moti-

vated by the decision-maker’s ageism. As a result, “only

the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing

other than to discriminate on the basis of age” will consti-

tute direct evidence of discrimination. Earley v. Champion

Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (11th Cir.1990) (citations

and quotations omitted); see also City of Miami, 870 F.2d at

582. An example of “direct evidence would be a manage-

ment memorandum saying, ‘Fire Earley — he is too old.’ ”

Earley, 907 F.2d at 1082. No evidence presented by Appel-

lants meets this rigorous standard.

The most probative piece of alleged direct evidence

cited by Appellants is a comment by Soto to Dennis

D’Angelo, Kanafani’s replacement, immediately after.

Kanafani’s termination that “what the company needed

was aggressive young men like [D’Angelo] to be pro-

moted.”! While the statement was made right after

! In addition to this comment, Appellants also rely on an

alleged comment by Soto that he wanted “a younger influx of

blood.” There is no record evidence that Soto ever made this

comment. The only evidence of this comment is double hearsay

testimony from a co-worker, Charlie Guerra, that another

employee, Justo Varela, overheard the comment at a store

meeting and told Guerra about it. Varela avers in an affidavit

that he never heard the comment nor told Guerra about the

alleged comment. Guerra did not hear Soto make the comment,

and was not even present at the meeting in question. This

comment is inadmissible double hearsay, and we refuse to

consider it as probative evidence. See Zaben v. Air Products &

Chemicals, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455-57 (11th Cir.1997). Finally,

Appellants rely on Soto’s admission that, under his direction,

there was a pattern of firing or demoting older managers, and

replacing them with younger managers. While probative

App. 6

Kanafani’s termination, and it was made by Soto, the

decision-maker, to Kanafani’s younger replacement, the

comment does not amount to direct evidence of discrimi-

nation. Though probative circumstantial evidence of

Soto’s state of mind, the comment still requires us to infer

that Soto’s interest in promoting young men motivated

his decision to terminate Kanafani. In similar instances,

our court has refused to classify such comments as direct

evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Beaver v. Rayonter

Inc., 188 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (11th Cir.1999) (finding that

decision-maker’s comment that he wanted to attract

“younger, engineer-type employees or supervisors” in

reduction-in-force case did not rise to level of direct

evidence of discrimination); Burrell v. Board of Trustees of

Georgia Military College, 125 F.3d 1390, 1393-94 (11th

Cir.1997) (holding that evidence which suggests, but does

not prove, a discriminatory motive, is circumstantial evi-

dence by definition). We therefore conclude that the dis-

trict court correctly found no direct evidence of age

discrimination.

2. Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination

In evaluating age discrimination claims based on cir-

cumstantial evidence, we require a plaintiff to initially

satisfy a four-part prima facie requirement: (1) that she

was a member of the protected group of persons between

the ages of forty and seventy; (2) that she was subject to

circumstantial evidence, this pattern is not direct evidence of

discrimination because it does not directly establish that Soto’s

termination decisions were motivated by age bias.

App. 7

adverse employment action; (3) that a substantially youn-

ger person filled the position that she sought or from

which she was discharged; and (4) that she was qualified

to do the job for which she was rejected. See Turlington v.

Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428. 1432 (11th Cir.1998)

(citations omitted).

We conclude that both Appellants established prima

facie cases of age discrimination. First, there is no dispute

that Appellants satisfied the first two requirements. Both

Appellants are members of the protected group and were

subjected to adverse employment actions. As for the third

element, Appellees concede that Damon satisfied the

third requirement in that he was replaced by someone

“substantially younger.” However, both the Appellees

and the district court, in dicta, suggest that Kanafani did

not meet this requirement because, at the time of Kanaf-

ani’s termination, his replacement was thirty-seven, while

Kanafani was only forty-two. We disagree. Previously, we

have held that a replacement who is only three years

younger is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See

Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th

Cir.1997) (holding that plaintiff aged 42, who was

replaced by employee aged 39, met the “substantially

- younger” replacement requirement under ADEA) (citing

Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582-83 (11th

Cir.1989)). Here, there is a five year age difference

between Kanafani and his replacement. We therefore find

that Kanafani has satisfied the “substantially younger”

replacement requirement.

Finally, we conclude that Kanafani and Damon were

“qualified” for their respective positions, satisfying the

App. 8

fourth and final prima tacie requirement. In age discrimi-

nation cases, our court focuses on a plaintiff's “skills and

background to determine if they were qualified for a

particular position.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, 990 F.2d 1217,

1227 (Lith Cir.1993). Our precedent holds that if a plain-

titf has enjoyed a long tenure at a certain position, we can

inter that he or she ts qualified to hold that particular

position. See ma. (interring a plaintift’s job qualifications

trom his 25 years of experience); Pace v. Southern Railway

System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1386 n. 7 (11th Cir.1983) (finding

that “where a plaintiff has held a position tor a significant

period of time, qualification tor that position, sutficient to

satisty a prima facie case, can be interred”). Based on the

employment history of Damon and Kanatani, we can

inter that they were qualified for their respective posi-

tions. Appellants were store managers tor more than a

decade, and, by all accounts, had pertormed their jobs

with distinction during the bulk of that pertod. Damon

held the position of store manager for 34 years, and

consistently received numerous awards, commendations,

and merit raises. Kanatani was a store manager for 13

years, and also received his share of bonus awards and

merit raises

In tinding the Appellants unqualified, the district

court incorrectly considered Fleming’s allegations of

Appellants’ poor performance. Our caselaw quite clearly

instructs that plaintiffs, who have been discharged from a

previously held position, do not need to satisfy the

McDonnell Douglas prong “ ‘requiring proof of qualifica-

tion. “ Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 830 n. 3

(lith Cir.1988) (quoting Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure

Products, Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n. 2 (11th Cir.1987)). We

App. 9

have explained that the ”

McDonnell Douglas] is that in cases where a plaintiff has

held a position for a significant period of time, qualifica-

‘reason for this modification [of

tion for that position sufficient to satisfy the test of a

prima facie case can be inferred.’ ” Young, 840 F.2d at 830

n. 3 (quoting Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1495 n. 2). We also

have unambiguously held that allegations of poor perfor-

mance against plaintiffs discharged from long-held posi-

tions may be properly considered, only after a prima facie

case has been established, when a court evaluates the

pretextual nature of an employer’s proffered non-

discriminatory reasons for termination. See Clark, 990 F.2d

at 1227 (holding that evidence of employee's performance

reprimands does not establish that employee was unqual-

ified, but may indicate company was legitimately con-

cerned about employee's performance); Young, 840 F.2d at

830 n. 3 (same). The district court therefore erred in

concluding that Appellants were not “qualified” based on

Fleming's allegations of poor performance.

B. Pretext

Having concluded that Appellants met their prima

facie burdens, we turn to the remaining issue of pretext.

Once a prima facie case is established, a defendant must

proffer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

employment decision. If such reasons are identified, a

plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving them

to be a pretext for age discrimination. See Turlington, 135

F.3d at 1432. We have repeatedly and emphatically held

that a defendant may terminate an employee for a good

or bad reason without violating federal law. See Elrod v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991).

App. 10

We are not in the business of adjudging whether employ-

ment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole con-

cern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus

motivates a challenged employment decision. See Nix v.

WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187

(11th Cir.1984). In this case, Fleming clearly offered legiti-

mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Damon

(poor performance), and Kanafani (yelling vulgarities in

front of customers). Therefore, Appellants bore the bur-

den of offering enough probative evidence so that a rea-

sonable jury might conclude that Fleming’s reasons for

termination were a pretext for age discrimination. See

- Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.3d

653, 658 (11th Cir.1998). In the summary judgment con-

text, we conduct this inquiry by determining whether a

jury “could reasonably infer discrimination if the facts

presented [by Appellants] remain unrebutted.” Jameson,

75 F.3d at 1531 (citations omitted). We must avoid weigh-

ing conflicting evidence or making credibility determina-

tions. Rather, “ ‘[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be

believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in

his favor.’ ” Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9

F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d

202 (1986)). After a painstaking review of the entire

record, we find that Appellants have made this requisite

showing.

First, circumstantial evidence was presented of Soto’s

discriminatory animus towards older store managers

under his direct supervision. Within a one-year period,

four older, highly experienced store managers, out of a

total of seven managers under Soto’s direct supervision,

App. 11

were terminated or demoted, and each was replaced by

an employee under forty years old. In addition, Soto also

terminated a highly experienced, older assistant store

manager, during this time period, and replaced him with

an employee under forty years old. As Soto conceded,

“{I]t certainly turns out that what has occurred is that

older managers were either fired or demoted and

replaced by younger people,” and that “in every

instance .. . the older store managers had more years of

experience than the people that replaced them.” While

not direct evidence of discriminatory animus, we believe

that this pattern of firing and demoting so many older

workers and replacing them with younger workers, by

the relevant decision-maker during the same time period,

constitutes probative circumstantial evidence of age dis-

crimination. See Stamey v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-

graph Co., 859 F.2d 855, 862 (11th Cir.1988). Moreover, the

probative value of this pattern was underscored by direct

testimony. Kanafani testified that, in January 1994, Flem-

ing began placing advertisements for new store managers

even though there were no managerial vacancies at the

time. According to Kanafani, Harry Soto then began

interviewing younger managerial candidates at Kanaf-

ani’s store. Several of these candidates were later hired

by Soto to replace Kanafani and the other older man-

agers. Record evidence also reveals that shortly thereaf-

ter, older managers with good employment histories,

under Soto’s direct supervision, began receiving written

reprimands for “poor store conditions” or “poor sales.”

Three former managers of Fleming, in addition to

Damon, averred that they were demoted or terminated by

Soto, after receiving written reprimands for “poor store

App. 12

” 4d

conditions,” “poor performance,” or “poor sales,” and

replaced by a substantially younger manager. Each for-

mer manager also disputed the veracity of their -repri-

mands.

Second, Soto’s remark to Kanafani’s younger suc-

cessor, D’Angelo, right after Kanafani was terminated,

that Soto wanted “aggressive, young men” like himself to

be promoted is highly suggestive circumstantial evidence

from which a jury could infer discriminatory animus.? Far

> D’Angelo twice averred that Soto used the term

“aggressive young men,” although D’Angelo, who still works

for Fleming, later stated, under examination by defense counsel,

that he was not sure whether Soto actually used the word

“young.” Kanafani also testified that D’Angelo told him that

Soto had used the term “aggressive young men.” The entire

transcript of D’Angelo’s testimony reads as follows:

Q. [Plaintiff's Attorney]: Did you ever have a one-on-one

conversation with Harry Soto where Mr. Soto told you that what

the company needed was aggressive young men like yourself to

be promoted.

A. [D’Angelo]: Yes.

Q. Why don’t you tell me how this conversation went?

A. This was right after Rick [Kanafani] was terminated and

Harry had brought me up to the main office to explain to me

that he had terminated Rick, and that the company was going in

a new direction, and we had to hold onto our pants, was like the

catch phrase at the time. Things were moving fast.

Q. That’s when he told you that the company needed

aggressive young men like yourself?

A. He included me in - I can’t remember the exact word he

used, but he included me in that mix, because I was in charge of

the store for a week and a half until Tony Calaverio came in.

App. 13

from being a stray remark, the comment may evince

probative evidence of the state of mind of the decision-

Q. But he did tell you that the company needed aggressive

young men?

A. I can’t recall that. I really can’t.

Attorney: Could you read back to me my question?

(Thereupon, a portion of the record was read by the reporter as

follows: Question: Did you ever have a one-on-one conversation

with Harry Soto where Mr. Soto told you that what the company

needed was aggressive young men like yourself to be promoted.

Answer. Yes.) Q. Is that what happened?

[Objection to form}

A. Yes.

Q. [Defendant’s Attorney]:. Do you have a recollection that

these following words came out of Harry Soto, Harry Soto said

the following words: We need aggressive young men like

yourself? Do you have the recollection that he said that to you?

A. [D’Angelo]: It was something similar to that. It could be a

paraphrase, so — I know aggressive was in there. He used me - I

guess it was a motivational tool.

Q. Did he say the word “young”?

That, I can’t recall.

But you can recall that he said aggressive?

Aggressive, yes, yes, aggressive.

And he included yourself?

Yes.

But you’re not sure if he said young?

>O>O>O>

. I’m not sure about that.

We are satisfied that a jury should weigh the credibility of this

circumstantial evidence. See Walker v. NationsBank, 53 F.3d 1548,

1563 (11th Cir.1995) (Johnson, J. specially concurring) (noting

that “the factfinder must evaluate the credibility of the

App. 14

maker at the time of Kanafani’s termination. The com-

ment also arguably suggests that Soto had an ageist pref-

erence for young managers. Given the substance, context,

and timing of Soto’s comment, if credited, we find it to be

a significant piece of circumstantial evidence. See Jones v.

Bessemer Carraway Medical Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n. 11

(11th Cir.1998) (holding that “language not amounting to

direct evidence, but showing some racial animus, may be

significant evidence of pretext once a plaintiff has set out

a prima facie case”) (emphasis added); see also Rayonter,

188 F.3d at 1286 (finding decision-maker’s comment that

he wanted “younger” employees to constitute circum-

stantial evidence of a discriminatory motive); Alphin v.

Sears, Roebuck & Ceo., 940 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir.1991)

(finding remark by supervisor to plaintiff that he had

“been around too long and [was] too old and [was]

making too much money” immediately after a “corrective

interview” to be circumstantial evidence of age discrimi-

nation). Moreover, we also tind Soto’s statement to be

probative as to whether age animus motivated the deci-

sion to terminate Damon because the remark (1) was

allegedly made only three months after Damon was ter-

minated, (2) immediately followed the termination of

someone similarly situated to Damon and in the same

protected- class, and (3) came from the same decision-

maker responsible for Damon's termination. See Ryder v.

witnesses and the weight of the evidence. This task is peculiarly

the province of the jury.”) (citing Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc.,

837 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Combs, 106 F.3d at

1530 (stating, in the summary judgment context, that “[i]ssues

ot fact and sufficiency of evidence are properly reserved for the

jury”) (citation omitted).

App. 15

Westinghouse Electric Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 130-133 (3d

Cir.1997) (holding that remarks made one year after ter-

mination, and not directly about plaintiff, could be taken

by a jury as an accurate reflection of the existing manag-

erial attitude toward older workers) (emphasis added).

In addition to this circumstantial evidence, we con-

clude that Appellants have offered evidentiary support

by which a reasonable jury could conclude that the speci-

fic reasons for termination given by Fleming were a pre-

text. Appellants both were terminated for alleged

violations of company work rules. On summary judg-

ment, we have written that the “work rule” defense is

arguably pretextual when a plaintiff submits evidence (1)

that she did not violate the cited work rule, or (2) that if

she did violate the rule, other employees outside the

protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not

similarly treated. See Alphin, 940 F.2d at 1501 n. 1 (citing

Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224

(11th Cir.1982)). We are satisfied that Appellants have

made this requisite showing.*

2 Of course, this framework is simply used to assess

whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish

pretext - that is, the employer has not given an honest

explanation of the employer’s behavior - and thereby reach a

jury on the ultimate question of discrimination. This

framework, however, does not vitiate a plaintiff’s ultimate

burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an

employer terminated the plaintiff based on a discriminatory

motive. An employer who fires an employee under the mistaken

but honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is

not liable for discriminatory conduct. An employer “ ‘may fire

an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on

erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not

App. 16

With respect to Damon, Fleming contends that

Damon was fired for poor performance; specifically, that

over a six month period his store was cited by Fleming

management on four separate occasions for “poor condi-

tions.” Damon flatly denies these allegations, and has

adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute

of material fact as to his job performance.

The first set of relevant allegations involve a Febru-

ary 24, 1994 visit by Soto to Damon’s store. According to

Damon, he and Soto discussed the store’s overall appear-

ance during the visit, but Soto never stated that condi-

tions were below acceptable company standards.

However, a week later, on March 4, 1994, Soto issued a

written reprimand to Damon for store conditions in viola-

tion of company policy. According to Damon, Soto

ordered him to sign the reprimand even though he did

not agree with the reprimand’s charges. Damon also

averred that his store was in good condition on February

24, 1994, that the letter was a “fabrication,” and that at no

time prior to the reprimand did Soto tell him that store

conditions were unacceptable. The reprimand gave

Damon until March 15 to correct the violations. Soto

conducted a tollow-up store inspection on March 12,

1994. In an internal memo of the same day, which appar-

ently was never shown to Damon, Soto found several

uncorrected store violations. However, Soto subsequently

testitied that, by March 15, all of the store’s violations

had been tixed by Damon. Indeed, Soto admitted that

Damon's ability to bring his store into compliance

tor a discriminatory reason.’ ” Jones, 151 F3d at 1324 n. lo

(quoting Nix, 738 B2d at 1187) (emphasis added)

App. 17

showed impressive managerial drive. For the next few

months, Damon received no reprimands.

-

On May 30, 1994, during Memorial Day Weekend,

Mel Beech, Fleming’s Vice President of Store Operations

and Soto’s direct supervisor, visited Damon’s store. On

June 9, 1994, ten days after this visit, Damon received a

written reprimand from Soto for conditions allegedly

found at the store during Beech’s visit. The reprimand

charged that Damon had been warned previously about

performance improvements expected from him, that

Damon was not performing consistently enough to con-

tinue in his position, and that any further operational

problems would result in Damon's immediate termina-

tion. Damon disputes that the store was in poor condition

during Beech’s visit, and denies every single specific

criticism contained in the June reprimand, save one

minor point.* Damon also reiterates that the memoran-

dum was a “fabrication” designed to justify his eventual

firing, and that other older store managers in Soto's dis-

trict received similar letters threatening to terminate or

demote them, while he knew of no younger manager who

received a similar letter.4

* Ot eight specific criticisms, Damon only conceded that

three clerks may have been taking a break in the back room fora

portion of Beech’s visit. Among other things, he disputes that

the meat and seafood cases were empty, that there were

muscellaneous floor displays all over the store, that there was

poor signage, that floor conditions were deplorable, and that

there was poor customer service.

* Damon testified that he personally spoke to several older

managers about their receipt of threat-to-terminate memos in

1994. He also stated that he spoke to several of the younger

App. 18

Finally, on July 1, 1994, at the start of the busy July

4th weekend, Soto revisited Damon's store, and filed

another reprimand of Damon. Five days later, Soto termi-

nated Damon, by letter, tor poor performance. Damon

disputes the specific allegations of his store’s poor condi-

tion, contained in the July reprimand, as well as Soto’s

claim that he had given Damon repeated verbal warnings

about his alleged pertormance deficiencies. Moreover,

Damon asserts that, Soto told him in the course of direct

conversations, that he was doing a good job, and that his

store’s conditions had improved since Damon had

become store manager. Damon also avers that he visited

the stores of younger store managers and tound that their

stores were either in the same or worse shape during this

relevant time period. None of these younger managers

were terminated. Damon's testimony ts corroborated by

Julho Nunez, a former Fleming manager promoted by

Soto, who testified that Damon's store was essentially in

the same condition as the rest of Fleming’s South Florida

stores during the relevant time period. Additionally, Soto _

also conceded that two of Damon's three reprimands for

“poor stere conditions” occurred during busy holiday

weekends - a time, according to Soto, when stores may

well be in poor condition. Finally, evidence was pre-

sented that Luis Requejo, Damon’s younger replacement,

experienced substantially more severe problems in main-

taining proper store conditions, and yet, was not fired. In

addition to receiving two performance reprimands from

managers, including Dave Applebaum, who denied receiving

similar letters despite the fact that their stores were kept in

similar condition to Damon's store.

App. 19

Soto in August and October 1994, Requejo’s meat depart-

ment received several reprimands from state food inspec-

tors beginning in July 1995, one month after Soto was

promoted to another company position. Eventually,

Requejo’s meat department was shut down for failure to

comply with these state reprimands. Although Soto

admitted that this problem was more serious than

Damon's alleged deficiencies, Fleming took no disciplin-

ary action against Requejo.

Based on the totality of this evidence, the age-based

comment allegedly made by Soto to Kanafani’s replace-

ment, and Soto’s purported pattern of demoting and fir-

ing numerous older managers in favor of younger

replacements, we conclude that Damon has introduced

sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on his

age discrimination claim.

We draw a similar conclusion with respect to Kanaf-

ani’s claim. The sole reason advanced by Soto, the actual

decision-maker, for Kanafani’s termination is a yelling

incident involving Kanafani and his seafood department

manager on October 1, 1994.5 Dennis D’Angelo, Kanaf-

ani’s replacement, also testified that Soto told him that

* Fleming now claims, despite repeated statements by Soto, |

the decision-maker, during his deposition that Kanafani was

tired solely because of his yelling vulgarities at an employee on

the sales floor, that Kanafani also was terminated, in part,

because of his “previous disregard of company rules and blatant

unprofessionalism.” As evidence, Fleming introduced a

subsequent affidavit from Soto in its motion for summary

judgment that somewhat broadens Soto’s termination motives.

In the affidavit, Soto claimed that he fired Kanafani after the

yelling incident for his “failure to improve his people skills,”

“{his] disregard of company rules, and his blatant

unprofessionalism.” However, during his earlier deposition,

App. 20

the only reason Kanafani was fired was because he yelled

at a fellow employee on the sales floor. Fleming claims

Soto uncquivocally stated that the sole reason for Kanafani’s

termination was the yelling incident.

Q. What was the basis for his [Kanafani’s] termination?

A. Using profanity on the sales floor where the customers

were out in the open.

Q. Was he terminated because of poor store conditions or was

he terminated because of using vulgarity on the sales floor in

front of customers?

A. He was terminated for using vulgarity on the sales floor in

front of customers.

Q. No other reason?

A. That was the reason for the termination.

Q. So again, the only reason he was terminated was for using

vulgarity on the sales floor, correct?

A. That is correct.

Moreover, Dennis D’Angelo, Kanafani’s replacement, also

testified that Soto told him that Kanafani was fired solely

because of the yelling incident. Based on the repeated

statements by Soto during his deposition that he fired Kanafani

solely for the yelling incident (as well as D’Angelo’s

corroboration of Soto’s termination motive), we find that a jury

could infer that the “inconsistencies” between Soto’s deposition

and affidavit may be evidence of pretext. See Tidwell v. Carter

Products, 135 F.3d 1422, 1427-28 (Lith Cir.1998) (citing Bechtel

Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 1995);

Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 525 (11th Cir. 1994)).

Furthermore, Kanatani has produced sufficient evidence to

create genuine issues of material fact as to his previous

reprimands from Soto. Kanatani received three reprimands

prior to the yelling incident for “poor sales,” “poor store

conditions,” and an altercation with a beer vendor respectively.

First, Kanafani testified that his store had become more

App. 21

that Kanafani uttered several vulgarities on the sales

floor, where customers could overhear, and that this

breach of company policy justified his immediate firing

five days later. Kanafani admitted that he yelled during

the incident, but vehemently denies using any vulgarity

aside from the word “hell” once.® Kanafani’s testimony

profitable since he became store manager, creating a genuine

issue of material fact as to the first reprimand. Second, while

Kanafani received a reprimand for “poor store conditions”

during the busy Memorial Day Holiday Weekend, Fleming does

not directly proffer this reprimand as a basis for Kanafani’s

termination. Even if this reprimand were cited as a termination

factor, we believe Kanatani has presented sufficient evidence

that the reprimand was a pretext. During Memorial Day

weekend, Kanafani was on vacation, and not in charge of the

store. Julio Nunez, a younger assistant manager at the time,

actually was acting store manager for the weekend. Despite this

fact, Kanatani, and not Nunez, was reprimanded for the store’s

“poor condition.” Nunez subsequently was promoted to store

manager by Soto, replacing an older store manager, despite

Soto’s admission that he was aware that Nunez, and not

Kanatani, was primarily responsible for the poor store

conditions during Memorial Day Weekend. Finally, Kanatani

vigorously denies that he upbraided the beer vendor over

complimentary tootball tickets offered to him, or told the

vendor “deliver better tickets or else.” All Kanatani admits to ts

politely returning the tickets because they were not to his

satistaction, creating a genuine issue of material fact as to this

incident. We believe that this evidence, when combined with all

of the previously-cited circumstantial evidence, could convince

a jury that Kanafani’s reprimands were a pretext for his

termination.

° Fleming asserts that Kanatani used the word “fuck”

several times during the incident. Kanafani denies this claim,

admitting only to stating at the end of the incident, “what the

hell do you want me to do?”

App. 22

creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to

whether he uttered profanities on the sales floor. |

In addition, Kanafani also presented evidence which,

if credited, could convince a jury that the incident was a

pretext for his termination. Kanafani’s replacement,

Dennis D’Angelo, testified that he had observed members

of Fleming management, including Soto himself, yell at

employees in front of store customers. Soto admitted to

yelling at employees with profane language, but claimed

these incidents occurred in employee-only store areas.

Previously, we have held that evidence demonstrating

that the decision-maker engaged in the same policy viola-

tion proffered for an employee’s termination is “espe-

cially compelling” evidence of pretext. Ross v. Rhodes

Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir.1998). As a

result, if a jury were to credit D’Angelo’s testimony, they

could reasonably find the yelling incident to be a pretext.

When this testimony is combined with Soto’s comment to

D’Angelo, immediately after Kanafani’s termination, that

Soto wished to promote “younger aggressive men,” and

Soto’s pattern of demoting and firing numerous older

managers in favor of younger replacements, we conclude

that Kanafani too has introduced sufficient circumstantial

evidence to survive summary judgment.

-In short, we find that the circumstantial evidence

presented by Damon and Kanafani, taken as a whole, is

sufficient to make a prima facie showing of age discrimi-

nation, and to rebut the nondiscriminatory reasons prof-

fered by Fleming for their terminations. Material facts

remain in dispute, precluding summary judgment.

App. 23

Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order of sum-

mary judgment and remand the case for further proceed-

ings consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

App. 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 97-230-CIV-LENARD

WALTER DAMON and RICHARD

KANAFANI,

Plaintiffs,

VS.

FLEMING SUPERMARKETS OF

FLORIDA, INC. d/b/a

HYDE PARK MARKETS, f/d/b/a

WOOLEY’S FINE FOODS, a

Florida corporation,

Defendant.

/

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Filed Sep. 16, 1998)

THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment (DE33) filed on May 1,

1998. The Court having considered the motion and the

response and reply thereto, and otherwise advised in the

premises, finds as follows.

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs Richard Kanafani (“Kanafani”) and Walter

Damon (“Damon”) are former store managers of Hyde

Park Market retail grocery stores. Damon and Kanafani

~~

became store managers in 1963 and 1981, respectively.

App. 25

Defendant Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. (“Flem-

ing”) owns and operates the Hyde Park Market chain of

retail grocery stores which it fully acquired in September

of 1993. Fleming fired Damon on July 6, 1994, and later

fired Kanafani on October 6, 1994. Damon and Kanafani

filed the above-captioned action on January 28, 1997,

alleging that Fleming violated the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act (“ADEA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.

§§ 621-34 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998), and the Florida Civil

Rights Act (“FRCA”), Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 760.01-760.11

(West 1997 § Supp. 1998),! when it terminated them on

the basis of their age. In its motion for summary judg-

ment, Fleming argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to

state a prima facie case of age discrimination. In addition,

Fleming asserts that the Plaintiffs have not produced

evidence of pretext sufficient to warrant a trial of this

action. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pur-

suant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367.

Il. STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On a motion for summary judgment, the court con-

strues the evidence and factual inferences arising there-

trom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is

shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material

tact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

' Claims brought under the FCRA are subject to the same

analysis applicable in ADEA cases. See Florida Dep't of

Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. Ist DCA

1991).

App. 26

a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court

explained the summary judgment standard as follows:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment, after adequate time

for discovery and upon motion, against a party

who fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-

lish the existence of an element essential to that

party’s case, and on which that party will bear

the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation,

there can be no genuine issue as to any material

fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning

an essential element of the non-moving party’s

case necessarily rénders all other facts imma-

terial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The

trial court’s function at this juncture is not “to weigh the

evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).

A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence

is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for

the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also

Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11 Cir. 1989). The

party seeking summary judgment “always bears the ini-

tial responsibility of informing the district court of the

basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the

‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions of file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which

it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial

demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of

production, not persuasion, shifts to the non-moving

App. 27

party. The nonmoving party must “go beyond the plead-

ings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,

answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ desig-

nate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue

for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party “must

do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical

doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.

v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That party

must demonstrate that there is a “genuine issue for trial.”

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. An action is void of a material

issue for trial “[W]here the record taken as a whole could

not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving

party.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. See also Anderson, 477

U.S. at 249.

III. ANALYSIS

“In an unlawful age discrimination case, the plaintiff

bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance

of the evidence that age was a determining factor in the

employer's decision to dismiss him.” Zaben v. Air Prods. &

Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing -

Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir.

1993)). “In order to survive a motion for summary judg-

ment, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case

of age discrimination.” Id. “This may be accomplished by

presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such

as age-biased statements made by the decision maker, see

Earley v. Champion International Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081

(11th Cir. 1990); by presenting circumstantial evidence

which complies with the test set forth by the Supreme

App. 28

Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); or by presenting a statistical pattern of discrimina-

tion, Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081.” Id. “Once the plaintiff

establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts tc the

employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the plaintiff's discharge.” Id. (citing Clark, 990

F.2d at 1227). “If the employer does so, the burden shifts

back to the plaintiff to ‘introduce significantly probative

evidence showing that the asserted reason is merely a

pretext for discrimination.’ ” Id. (citing Clark, 990 F.2d at

1228). In response to Fleming’s motion for summary judg-

ment, the Plaintiffs argue that the record contains both

direct and circumstantial evidence sufficient to make out

a prima facie case of age discrimination.

A. Direct Evidence

“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed,

proves the existence of the fact in issue without inference

or presumption.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., No.

97-6076, 1998 WL 526406, at *3 n.11 (11th Cir. Aug. 24,

1998). “So, direct evidence of discrimination is powerful

evidence capable of making out a prima facie case essen-

tially by itself.” Id. Stray remarks in the workplace, state-

ments by nondecisionmakers and statements by decision-

makers unrelated to the decisional process itself do not

constitute direct evidence. See Evans v. McClain of Georgia

Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Price Water-

house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,

concurring)).

The Plaintiffs first argue that the following deposi-

tion testimony of District Manager Harry Soto, who fired

App. 29

Damon and Kanafani, constitutes direct evidence of age

discrimination:

Q. Itcertainly turns out that what has occurred

is that older managers were either fired or

demoted and replaced with younger people;

correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. And I think in every instance that we’ve

discussed today the older store managers had

more years of experience than the people that

replaced them; correct?

A. That's correct.

(Soto Dep. at 287.) Soto’s testimony that the result of the

terminations and demotions that took place was the

replacement of older employees with younger individ-

uals, however, does not prove that age discrimination

caused such result. As such, Soto’s testimony is not direct

evidence. Next, the Plaintiffs assert that Fleming

employee Dennis D’Angelo’s testimony with respect to a

comment made to him by Soto constitutes direct evidence

of age discrimination:

Q. Did you ever have a one-on-one conversa-

tion with Harry Soto where Mr. Soto told you

that what the company needed was aggressive

young men like yourself to be promoted?

A. Yes.

Q. Why don’t you tell me how this conversa-

tion went?

A. This was right after Rick [Kanafani] was

terminated and Harry had brought me up to the

main office to explain to me that he had termi-

nated Rick, and that the company was going ina

App. 30

new direction, and we had to hold onto our

pants, was like the catch phrase at the time.

Things were moving fast.

Q. That’s when he told you that the company

needed aggressive young men like yourself?

A. He included me in - I can’t remember the

exact word he used, but he included me in that

mix, because I was in charge of the store for a

week and a half until Tony Calaverio [Kanaf-

ani’s replacement] came in.

Q. But he did tell you that the company

needed aggressive young men.

A. I can’t recall that. I really can’t.

(D’Angelo Dep. at 16-17.) D’Angelo then reaffirmed

his initial response to counsel’s question that Soto had

made such statement to him. Id. at 18. However, during

cross-examination, D’Angelo retreated from his testi-

mony that Soto had used the word “young”:

Q. Do you have a recollection that these fol-

lowing words came out of Harry Soto, Harry

Soto said the following words: We need aggres-

sive yong [sic] men like yourself? Do you have

the recollection that he said that to you?

A. It was something similar to that. It could be

a paraphrase, so —- I know aggressive was in

there. He used me - I guess it was a motiva-

tional tool.

Q. Did he say the word “young”?

A. That, I can’t recall.

Q. But you can recall that he said aggressive?

A

Aggressive, yes, yes aggressive.

App. 31

(D’Angelo Dep. at 33.) Thus, D’Angelo testified that Soto

used the word “aggressive” but did not recall whether he

had used the word “young.” As a result, the Court finds

that such statement does not constitute direct evidence of

age discrimination because although said by the relevant

decisionmaker, it was not said in the context of Kanaf-

ani’s termination. See Young v. General Foods Corp., 840

F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding similar comments

“not directly probative of an intent to discriminate”).

Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that the following testimony

of former Hyde Park Market store manager Charlie

Guerra contains direct evidence of age discrimination:

Q. Did you ever have the opportunity to hear

Mr. Soto make any type of remark which could

be considered derogatory to older individuals?

A. I did not hear this myself, but I was told by

a young - by another employee of the Store

Number 9, when Julio Nunez was given the

management position in the Store Number 9,

Mr. Soto held a meeting and he mentioned at the

meeting that we need a younger influx of blood

in this company.

Q. And just so I’m clear, it’s your understand-

ing that at a store managers’ meeting, Mr. Soto

said at this meeting, and I will quote: “We need

a younger influx of blood in the company;” is

that correct?

A. It was not in a store managers’ meeting. It

was in a store meeting.

Q. Let me see if I understand that correctly

then. So it’s your understanding that at a point

in time when Mr. Nunez had assumed the store

manager position at Store Number 9, during a

App. 32

store meeting Mr. Soto said the following: “We

need a younger influx of blood in the com-

pany”? Is that correct, sir?

A. That is more or less correct, the words that I

was told that Mr. Soto mentioned at that meet-

ing.

Q. Do you know the names of the individuals

who were present at this meeting?

A. No, I don’t know. The only person that

mentioned this to me, his name is Justo, who

was I do believe, the grocery manager or groc-

ery clerk at that particular time.

(Guerra Dep. at 36-37.) Soto allegedly made this state-

ment shortly after Damon’s termination. However,

although made by Soto, the relevant decisionmaker, like

the statement discussed above, it was not made in the

context of Damon’s termination and therefore does not

constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. Finally,

Produce Supervisor Sam Bell’s identification of Damon as

“Pops”, see Damon Dep. at 106-07, does not constitute

direct evidence because Bell was not a decisionmaker

with respect to Damon's termination and he did not make

the comment in the context of Damon’s termination. In

sum, the evidence relied on by the Plaintiffs as direct

evidence cannot be so characterized, and the Court must

therefore determine whether they have instead made out

a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon cir-

cumstantial evidence.

App. 33

B. Circumstantial evidence

“In an ADEA case involving discharge, demotion, or

failure to hire, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case

by showing: (1) that he was a member of the protected

group of persons between the ages of forty and seventy;?

(2) that he was subject to adverse employment action; (3)

that a substantially younger person filled the position he

sought or from which he was discharged; and (4) that he

was qualified to do the job for which he was rejected.”

Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432

(11th Cir. 1998) (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin

Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996); Jameson v. Arrow

Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)). Fleming does not

dispute that the Plaintiffs can satisfy the first two (2)

elements of the prima facie case.* Fleming argues, how-

ever, that neither of the Plaintiffs have produced evidence

that they were qualified for the store manager positions

that they held at the time of their termination* and that

2 In 1986, Congress amended the age requirement of the

ADEA to require only that plaintiffs be older than forty (40)

years of age, eliminating the requirement that plaintiffs be

younger than seventy (70) years old. See Pub. L. No. 99-592,

§ 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986).

3 It is undisputed that both Damon and Kanafani were over

forty (40) at the time of their terminations in 1994. See 29

U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West Supp. 1998).

4 Although the Plaintiffs assert that the “Defendant is not

disputing that Damon has clearly satisfied his prima facie case,”

see Pls.’ Resp. at 8 n.5, the Defendant argued in its brief that

“Kanafani and Damon received written and verbal reprimands

relating to their job performance and their inability to perform

as store manager under the new standards instituted by

Fleming supermarkets,” see Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 12-13.

App. 34

Kanafani failed to produce evidence on the fourth ele-

ment.

In Turlington, the Eleventh Circuit noted -that “a

plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case under the

ADEA must show only that he was qualified to do the job

for which he was rejected, see Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75

F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996), and, unlike a Title VII

plaintiff, need not show that a person outside. of the

plaintiff’s class with equal or lesser qualifications

received the job, cf. Roberts v. Gadsen Memorial Hospital,

835 F.2d 793, 796 (11th Cir. 1988).” 135 F.3d at 1433. “In

this circuit, the [qualified element] may be established by

evidence that the plaintiff has performed her respon-

sibilities for several years without complaint.” Baker v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990)

(citing Stanfield v. Answering Service Inc., 867 F.2d 1290,

1293 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Subsequent to Fleming’s takeover of the store man-

aged by Damon in September of 1993, Damon received

several written warnings. On November 24, 1993, the

Metro-Dade County Consumer Services Department

issued a “Compliance Status Report” to Damon indicat-

ing that eighteen (18) packages of turkeys weighed less

than the weight stated on the labels and that packages of

poultry did not contain grading information. (Damon

Dep. at Ex. 1.) In addition, the report indicated that

seventy-five percent (75%) of the meat case items con-

tained extended shelf life dates. Id. On March 3, 1994,

Damon received a memorandum from Soto indicating

that during a walk through of Damon’s store on February

24, 1994 he found that sale signs for the current week had

not been put up in the produce and meat departments,

aoe

App. 35

that there were holes in several sections, that the canopy

tops were a total mess, and that the store was dirty “in

many areas that were very visible to the customer.”

(Damon Dep. at Ex. 2.) Soto further stated: “Walter, we

have spoken about store cleanliness on many occasions

and about the importance of cleaning up our act to keep

the customers we have, as well as get new ones.” Id. Soto

further stated that “[t]he conditions in [Damon’s] store

were totally unacceptable and will not be tolerated,” indi-

cating that Damon would be terminated if six (6) items

outlined in the memorandum were not addressed and

corrected by March 15, 1998. Id. A letter to the file indi-

cated that a subsequent walk through conducted on

March 12, 1994 revealed that Damon had not followed

through on several of the items listed in the March 3, 1994

memorandum. (Damon Dep. at Ex. 3.) On June 9, 1994,

Soto again informed Damon by memorandum that a walk

through of Damon’s store on May 30, 1994 revealed that

(1) “[sJervice meat was empty except for a couple of dark

steaks,” (2) [s]eafood case was empty,” (3) “[t]hree clerks

from respective departments were in the back room tak-

ing breaks,” (4) “[mJerchandising was non-existent,” (5)

“[ml]iscellaneous floor displays all over the floor,” (6)

“[ploor signage,” (7) “[f]loor conditions were deplor-

able,” and (8) “[p]oor customer service.” (Damon Dep. at

Ex. 4.) Soto further indicated that “we find it necessary at

this time to let you know any further operational prob-

lems will result in immediate termination.” Id. On July 5,

1994, Soto wrote a memorandum to Human Resources

employee Steve Abernathy in which he indicated several

problems discovered during a July 1, 1994 walk through

App. 36

of Damon’s store and recommended that Damon be ter-

minated. (Damon Dep. at Ex. 7.) On July 6, 1994, Soto

indicated by memorandum to Damon:

At the beginning of 1994 the company began to

take a direction regarding the type of company

we wanted to become, and had several meetings

with the store managers on things that needed

to be done to get us going in the right direction.

Within the last five months you have been spo-

ken to on many occasions regarding your job

performance, and have also been documented

on March 3rd and June 9th on specific issues.

The follow through on your part has been incon-

sistent in the areas we’ve addressed and find it

necessary at this time to terminate your employ-

ment with the company.

(Damon Dep. at Ex. 8.)

During his deposition, Damon disputed the truth of

some of the contents of the memoranda provided to him

by Soto by asserting that they were “made out just to

eliminate [his] position with the company.” Damon Dep.

at 23; see also id. at 25, 35. He also agreed that some and

denied that other of the conditions reported in the mem-

oranda were accurate with respect to his store. Thus, it is

undisputed that Damon failed to perform at least some of

his duties to the standards imposed by Fleming. In addi-

tion, Damon could not recall any actions of members of

Fleming's management indicative of bias on the basis of

age, other than to state that Soto “seemed to pick on the

older store managers and treated the younger store man-

agers quite differently than he treated the older store

managers” and that he was “jovial when talking to them,

ct dk the NP RAN sti he

App. 37

making jokes with them, and friendly to them, warm,

added some warmth to his voice.” Damon Dep. at 75-76;

see also id. at 78.

Subsequent to Fleming’s takeover of Kanafani’s store

in September of 1993, Kanafani received several written

warnings. On February 8, 1994, Soto wrote in a memoran-

dum to Kanafani:

we are losing tremendous sales in this store. It

seems that customer dissatisfaction is running

high in your store, as evidenced by the letters

and calls received at this office. . . . If the behav-

ior and attitude of this store continues to cost us

customers, I will not have any choice but to take

disciplinary action up to and including termina-

tion.

(Kanafani Dep. at Ex. 2.) On June 9, 1994, Soto reported

by memorandum to Kanafani that he observed the fol-

lowing during a May 30, 1994 walk through: (1) “[s]ervice

counter was not customer friendly, dirty,” (2) “[dleli

department was low and not fresh,” (3) “[b]akery depart-

ment was almost empty - no variety,” and (4) “[t]oo

many excess displays around the store wine section, card

section in particular.” (Kanafani Dep. at Ex. 3.) Soto

stated further:

We have had conversations about the clutter in

certain ares [sic] of the store in the past, and

how we need to keep the floors clear. .. . If you

cannot make the necessary decisions that need

to be made in your store, I will have to find

someone who will. . . . Any future incidents will

result in immediate termination.

App. 38

Id. On September 6, 1994, Soto wrote to Kanafani con-

cerning an incident where Kanafani refused to take foot-

ball tickets offered to him by one of the store’s vendors

because the seats were not to his liking. (Kanafani Dep. at

Ex. 4.) On October 4, 1994, Soto terminated Kanafani after

an incident during which Kanafani, acting out of frustra-

tion, yelled at Seafood Manager Grant White in front of

customers in his store on October 1, 1994. Soto indicated

by memorandum that he had “expressed to [Kanafani] in

past conversations that [he] must learn how to handle

[himself] more professionally and make management

decisions as the Store Manager.” (Kanafani Dep. at Ex. 5.)

Soto further stated: “Rick, you have not responded to this

directive as evidenced by this outburst in your Store, and

I find it necessary at this time to terminate your services

with the company.” Id. Indeed, “[d]iscourteous treatment

toward . . . co-workers” constituted a basis for disciplin-

ary action under Fleming’s rules. (Kanafani Dep. at Ex.

1.)

In his deposition, Kanafani disputed the points

raised by Soto in the memoranda. However, he also

agreed that he had been spoken to with respect to his lack

of professionalism in the past and that he had handled

the vendor issue in the way discussed by Soto in his

memorandum of September 6th. Thus, it is undisputed

that Kanafani failed to perform to at least some of the

standards imposed by Fleming. Like Damon, Kanafani

could not point to particular actions indicating age dis-

crimination on the part of members of Fleming’s manage-

ment.

- Fleming also asserted in its motion that Kanafani is

unable to make out a prima facie case because he is

a ee

‘VEE atte ds

App. 39

unable to show that he was replaced by someone “sub-

stantially younger.” At the time of his termination, Kanaf-

ani was forty-two (42) years old. (Kanafani Dep. at 66.)

His replacement, Tony Calaverio, was thirty-seven (37)

years old. (Soto Dep. at Ex. 5.) In O’Connor v. Consolidated

Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), the Supreme

Court indicated that a plaintiff cannot proceed beyond

the prima facie case where his replacement is not “sub-

stantially younger” than himself. 517 U.S. at 312.

Although this Circuit has not set forth guidelines for

what age disparity satisfies the “substantially younger”

element in response to O’Connor, but see Carter v. Deci-

sionone Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997) (relying

on pre-O’Connor case Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578,

582-83 (11th Cir. 1989) and finding three (3) year disparity

sufficient), other circuits have found a five (5) year dis-

parity insufficient. See, e.g., Fisher v. Wayne Dalton Corp.,

139 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1998) (ten (10) year disparity

required); Wellman v. Wheeling and Lake Erie Ry. Co., No.

97-3084, 1998 WL 25005, at **4 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 1998) (five

(5S) years younger not “substantially younger”); Schiltz v.

Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997)

(same).

Given that the “plaintiff's burden in proving a prima

facie case is light,” Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135

F.3d 1428, 1432, 1434 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Isenbergh v.

Knight-Ridder Newspaper sales Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 439 (11th

Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2511 (1997)), and that

“[w]e ‘generally . . . eschew[ ] an overly strict formulation

of the elements of a prima facie case, particularly in age

discrimination cases,’ ” Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co.,

107 F.3d 846, 851 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Jameson v.

App. 40

Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)), the Court

will consider the other evidence produced by the Plain-

tiffs to determine whether such evidence forms the basis

for an inference that age played a factor in the Defen-

dant’s decision to terminate them. See Clark v. Coats &

Clark Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating

that the prima facie case requirements “are not. . .

interpreted strictly if the plaintiff can otherwise provide a

basis for the inference that age was a factor in the

employment decision” and citing Mitchell v. Worldwide

Underwriters Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 565, 567 (11th Cir. 1992))

(footnote omitted).

First, the Plaintiffs rely on the comment evidence

which they characterized as direct evidence. The Court

found above that the alleged statements of Harry Soto

and the excerpt of his deposition testimony did not con-

stitute direct evidence. See supra at 7-11. With respect to

Soto’s deposition testimony to the effect that the result of

certain terminations and demotions at Fleming has been

to replace older more-experienced managers with youn-

ger less-experienced individuals, the Court finds that

such testimony does not constitute circumstantial evi-

dence which in and of itself suffices as a basis for an

inference of age discrimination. Similarly, Soto’s com-

ment to D’Angelo concerning the company’s need to

promote aggressive men is not probative of age discrimi-

nation. Rather, it is a “facially neutral” comment which

was not applied directly to Kanafani. See Young v. General

Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1988). As the

Young court stated, such comment “regarding . . . aggress-

iveness, enthusiasm, and vigor [is] hardly surprising” in

App. 41

light of the competitive nature of the retail grocery busi-

ness. Id. With respect to Soto’s comment regarding the

need for a “younger influx of blood,” the Court finds that

such a comment may seem probative of age discrimina-

tion at first blush. However, assuming that the comment

was made, which is not at all clear,> the Court finds that

the context in which the comment was made was not

sufficiently fleshed out in the record to reveal the dis-

criminatory nature of the comment.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, the Court has considered the record as sub-

mitted in its entirety® and cannot find that the Plaintiffs

have made out a prima facie case of age discrimination

under the ADEA in that the evidence presented does not

result in the necessary inference. Even if the Court

assumed that the record supports such an inference, the

Court cannot find that the record also contains evidence

of pretext and/or evidence creating a triable issue as to

the Defendant’s proffered explanations for its termination

of the Plaintiffs. Based on the foregoing, it is hereby

> As stated supra pp. 9-10, former Hyde Park Market store

manager Charlie Guerra testified that an eniployee named Justo

relayed the comment at issue to Guerra. With its reply, however,

Fleming provided an affidavit of Justo Varela in which he

denied both having heard and repeated the comment to Guerra.

(Def.’s Reply at Ex. A, ¥ 3.)

6 As part of its consideration of the record, the Court has

specifically examined the “pretext evidence” set forth at pages

13 through 19 of the Plaintiff’s Response and finds that such

evidence is insufficient.

App. 42

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. All other

pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and the Clerk

shall close this case forthwith. It is further

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant

shall file a proposed final judgment within seven (7) days

of the date of this Order.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Flor-

ida, this 16 day of September, 1998.

/s/ Joan A. Lenard

JOAN A. LENARD

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

CC: Scott W. Rothstein, Esq.

Nationsbank Building

One Financial Plaza, Suite 2612

Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394

Joseph L. Rebak, Esq.

Tew Cardenas et al.

Miami Center 26th Floor

201 South Biscayne Boulevard

Miami, Florida 33131-4336

——— oe

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