Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. v. Damon
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Supreme Court, U.S
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«tT LED
Y9I456MAR1 200
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
FLEMING SUPERMARKETS OF FLORIDA, INC.,
Petitioner,
WALTER DAMON AND RICHARD KANAFANI,
Respondents.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Eleventh Circuit Court Of Appeal
¢
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
¢
LAWRENCE A. KELLOGG, Esq.
Counsel of Record
Tew CARDENAS REBAK KELLOGG
LEHMAN DeMaria & Tacue, L.L.P.
Miami Center, Suite 2600
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131-4336
Telephone No.: (305) 536-1112
Facsimile No.: (305) 536-1116
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) Sa: 2831
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Can a five year age difference meet the “substantially
younger” element necessary to establish a prima facie
case under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq.?
ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States, Petitioner, Fleming Super-
markets of Florida, Inc., a Florida corporation, states that
it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Fleming Companies,
Inc., a publicly held Oklahoma corporation. There are no
subsidiaries of Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.
A
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT .......... li
EE Ee NEEDS hv ccc a se csivetdnaawanveness lil
pe ee pa ey | nn ree iv
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI............ 1
i Ms i as whia ks caused uadwdnneaessceae 1
ET ree er ee eer rere 1
STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE............. 2
areemmmees GaP Fite CASE... 2 ince c cece ccasees 2
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 3
I. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion Directly Con-
flicts With Decisions of Other Circuit Courts of
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363 (6th Cir.
i ee IE Re Ree Pr yr ire ype ye er eee 6
Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. :
Se PETE EET OLE OT TE ELE OT POE Ta Oe 5
Carter v. Decision One Corp., 122 F.3d 997 (11th
Ca FED ins Wr 50d Fas pone eke da ee Pe A RA waREES 5
Cramer v. Intelidata Technologies Corp., 168 F.3d
we a peer rer rrr errr rt rere rr ere 6
Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc.,
oes Br Sis Be ae... Serer errr 1, 3, 4,3
Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887 (7th
CA SUE bcs oie dh ons Gacsacedemesencedasnseesenes 7
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
ee ok rrr rer ree rr Try rere rrr ry 3
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.,
S17 U.S. 308 (1996) ....... Sieh Cine eens bas eee sie 4, 6
Richter v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024 (7th
eer eee repre rr err ere Tyee rr Ser errr 5
Schiltz v. Burlington Northern R.R., 115 F.3d 1407
ge fe Pe Tey TTR ee ee ee eer Teer ee 6
STATUTES AND RULES
Bik A NOPE eee eer Ser oro rr re or er Ty 2
BS ee | PEST TE ETT ECE Cr TT Or Certo oC er 1
rk ee | rrr eer ree rrr re rere err 2
CP. BAe. TA Tins ed ned cen n in dwensceusddee ccavns 1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Fleming Companies of Florida, Inc. (“Fleming”)
respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review
the judgment and opinion of the Eleventh Circuit entered
in this proceeding on December 3, 1999, in order to
resolve the conflict between the Eleventh Circuit on the
one hand and the Seventh, Sixth, Eighth and Fourth
Circuit Courts of Appeals on the other hand on the
important issue presented herein.
¢
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit was reported at Damon v. Fleming
Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 1999)
and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto at pages App. 1
through 23.
JURISDICTION
The decision of the Court of Appeals was entered on
December 3, 1999. Petitioner timely files this Petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 1651; U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 10. Review
should be granted pursuant to Rule 10(a) of the United
States Supreme Court because the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit entered an order in
conflict with decisions of other United States courts of
appeals on the same important issue.
¢
ee mn ee
2
STATUTES INVOLVED IN THIS CASE
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29
U.S.C. § 623(a) provides, in pertinent part:
§ 623. Prohibition of age discrimination
(a) Employer practices
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge
any individual or otherwise discriminate
against any individual with respect to his com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employer, because of such individual’s age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his
employees in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual’s age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any
employee in order to comply with this chapter.
*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE!
Plaintiffs below, Walter Damon and Richard Kanafani
(“Kanafani”), are former employees of Fleming Super-
markets of Florida, Inc. Plaintiffs brought an action in the ~
United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida for alleged age discrimination. Jurisdiction in the
District Court was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331. App. 25.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all emphasis is supplied.
|
The District Court granted final summary judgment in
favor of Defendant Fleming. App. 41-42. Plaintiffs
appealed and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed. App. 1-23. Fleming brings this petition for a
writ of certiorari on the single issue of whether Plaintiff
Kanafani presented the District Court with sufficient evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case of age discrimina-
tion, in light of the fact that Kanafani was replaced by
someone only five years younger.
Kanafani was employed by Fleming from September
1993 until his employment was terminated on October 6,
1994. Kanafani was forty-two years old at the time of his
discharge and was replaced by Tony Calveiro who was
thirty-seven years old. See Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets _
of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d 1354 at 1360, App. 7.
¢
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
I. The Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion Directly Conflicts
With Decisions of Other Circuit Courts of Appeal
In evaluating age discrimination claims based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, most circuits apply a variant of the
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.
1817 (1973) analysis similar to that used by the Eleventh
Circuit in this case. Sez Damon at 1359, App. 4, 6-7.
Applying this framework, a plaintiff must satisfy a four-
part test to establish a prima facie case:
(1) that [the plaintiff] was a member of the pro-
tected group of persons between the ages of
forty and seventy; (2) that she was subject to
adverse employment action; (3) that a substan-
tially younger person filled the position that she
sought or from which she was discharged; and
(4) that she was qualified to do the job for which
she was rejected.
Id.
This petition involves the important question: “What
age differential constitutes ‘substantially younger’ under
the third prong of the test?”
This Court in O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers
Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996), stated: “[I]n the age-
discrimination context, [an inference of illegal discrimina-
tion] cannot be drawn from the replacement of one
worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”
The Court explained: “ . . . because the ADEA prohibits
discrimination on the basis of age and not class member-
ship, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger
than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age
discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was
replaced by someone outside the protected class.” Id.
The Court left unresolved, however, the issue of what
age difference constituted “insignificantly younger” or
“substantially younger”, but noted that a three year dif-
ference (sixty-eight versus sixty-five) provided “very thin
evidence” of discrimination. Id. at 312.
Since O’Connor the Circuits have conflicted in their
interpretation of the meaning of “substantially younger.”
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed its position
that a three year age difference is sufficient to establish
the “substantially younger” element and held a five year
difference was sufficient:
5
... both the Appellees and the district court, in
dicta, suggest that Kanafani did not meet [the
“substantially younger”] requirement because,
at the time of Kanafani’s termination, his
replacement was thirty-seven, while Kanafani
was only forty-two. We disagree. Previously, we
have held that a replacement who is only three
years younger is sufficient to establish a prima
facie case. See Carter v. Decision One Corp., 122
_F3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997) (holding that
plaintiff aged 42, who was replaced by
employee aged 39, met the “substantially youn-
ger” replacement requirement under ADEA)
(citing Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578,
582-83 (11th Cir. 1989)). Here, there is a five year
age difference between Kanafani and his
replacement. We therefore find that Kanafani
has satisfied the “substantially younger”
replacement requirement.
See Damon, 196 F.3d at 1360, App. 7.
The Eleventh Circuit’s opinion on this issue is in
direct conflict with decisions from other United States
circuit courts of appeals. The Seventh, Sixth, Eighth, and
Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals have found that an age
difference of five years or more does not meet the “sub-
stantially younger” test. See e.g., Richter v. Hook-SupeRx,
Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1029 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that a
forty-five year old replacement was not “substantially
younger” than the fifty-two year old plaintiff, therefore,
plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case); Hartley
v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a six or seven year age difference did not
demonstrate a prima facie case, stating: “[t]en years is a
reasonable threshold establishing a ‘significant’ and ‘sub-
stantial’ gap, which is what O’Connor demands”); Bush v.
Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 368 (6th Cir. 1999) (affirm-
ing district court decision which held that an employee
failed to establish a prima facie case in a wrongful demo-
tion action where he was forty-six and his replacement
was forty-one); Schiltz v. Burlington Northern R.R., 115
F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding the “largest age
disparity between [Plaintiff] and the individual hired for
the job was five years . . . the age disparities do not raise
an inference of discrimination” in that the individuals
hired were not substantially younger); Cramer v. Intelidata
Technologies Corp., 168 F.3d 481 (4th Cir. 1998) (affirming
the district court’s analysis that, when an employee is
replaced by a person “only five years younger,” that
person, in the absence of additional information, is not
“substantially younger” than the replaced employee).
In fact, since this Court’s decision in O’Connor, only
one circuit, the Eleventh, has held that fewer than ten
years is “sufficiently younger” to establish a prima facie
case for age discrimination. Other circuits (Sixth, Eighth,
and Fourth Circuits) have held that five years or less than
ten years (Seventh Circuit) does not satisfy the “substan-
tially younger” element under the O’Connor analysis to
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. This
conflict among the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals creates the confusing and inequitable situation
in which the outcome of the case is determined by the
Circuit in which the plaintiff files his or her claim.
¢
2 Cramer v. Intelidata Technologies Corp., is an unpublished
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner respectfully
requests this Court grant its Petition for a Writ of Cer-
tiorari so that this conflict among the circuits may be fully
briefed and resolved by the Court.
LawreNcE A. KELLocc, Esa.
Counsel of Record
Tew CarDENAS REBAK KELLOGG
LEHMAN DeMaria & Tacue, L.L.P.
Miami Center, Suite 2600
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131-4336
Telephone No.: (305) 536-1112
Facsimile No.: (305) 536-1116
App. 1
Walter DAMON, Richard Kanafani,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
FLEMING SUPERMARKETS OF FLORIDA,
INC., f.d.b.a. Wooley’s Fine Foods, etc.,
Defendant-Appellee.
No. 98-5554.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eleventh Circuit.
Dec. 3, 1999.
Scott Walter Rothstein, Michael Anthony Pancier, Ft.
Lauderdale, FL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Joseph Lester Rebak, Miami, FL, for Defendant-
Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida.
Before EDMONDSON and MARCUS, Circuit Judges,
and ALARCON*, Senior Circuit Judge.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:
In this age discrimination suit, Appellants Walter
Damon and Richard Kanafani appeal from an order of the
district court granting summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. d/b/a
Hyde Park Markets, f/d/b/a Wooley’s Fine Foods
(“Fleming”). Damon and Kanafani brought this action
* Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge
for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
App. 2
against Fleming, their former employer, alleging viola-
tions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634, and the Florida
Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fl.Stat.Ann. §§ 760.01-760.11.
The district court concluded that neither plaintiff had
established a prima facie case of age discrimination, nor,
in the alternative, had demonstrated that the legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons proffered by Fleming for their
terminations were a pretext for age discrimination. We
disagree, finding material facts in dispute. Accordingly,
we reverse the order of summary judgment and remand
for trial.
a
We review a district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo. Browning v. AT&T Paradyne, 120 F.3d
222 (11th Cir.1997). Summary judgment is appropriate
where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A factual dispute is genuine “if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the non-moving party.” United States v. Four
Parcels of Real Property, 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir.1991)
(en banc) (citation, omitted). In making this determina-
tion, we review the record, drawing all reasonable infer-
ences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th
Cir.1996).
App. 3
II.
The facts presented are reasonably straightforward.
Fleming, a nationwide supermarket chain, acquired
twenty South Florida supermarket stores in September
1993 from Pantry Pride (d/b/a Wooley’s Fine Foods). It
immediately installed Harry Soto as district manager of
seven of the stores. At the time, Appellants Walter
Damon and Richard Kanafani were store managers at two
of the stores acquired by Fleming. Each of their stores
was placed under the direct supervision of Soto. The
undisputed evidence demonstrates that, within a period
of slightly over one year after assuming the position of
district manager, Soto terminated or demoted five older,
more experienced managers, including Damon and Kan-
afani, and replaced them with men who were younger
and less experienced. The older managers were all over
forty, and the younger managers were all under forty.
Soto himself acknowledged that this pattern occurred. No
evidence was presented by Fleming that any younger
managers were terminated by Soto while he was district
manager. Damon was fired for alleged poor performance.
Kanafani was fired for allegedly yelling profanities at an
employee on the sales floor.
Il.
In its September 16, 1998 summary judgment order,
the district court made several pertinent conclusions of
law. First, the district court reasoned that Appellants had
not established all the elements of a prima facie case of
age discrimination. Specifically, the district court found
that Damon and Kanafani neither established that they
App. 4
were qualified for their positions under the McDonnell
Douglas rubric nor proffered direct evidence of discrimi-
nation by Fleming. The district court also suggested in
dicta that Kanafani had failed to establish that he was
replaced by someone substantially younger because, at
the time of his termination, Kanafani was forty-two and
his replacement was thirty-seven. Finally, the district
court concluded that Appellants did not establish that the
nondiscriminatory reasons Fleming offered for the termi-
nations were a pretext for age discrimination. We discuss
each conclusion in turn.
A. Prima Facie Case
In proving an age discrimination claim, a plaintiff
can establish a prima facie case of discrimination through
either direct evidence of discrimination or a variation of
the four-part test outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)
for circumstantial evidence. See Carter v. City of Miami,
870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.1989) Appellants’ claims rely
on both methods.
1. Direct Evidence of Discrimination
We agree with the district court that neither plaintiff
has presented direct evidence of age discrimination. We
have defined direct evidence of discrimination as evi-
dence which reflects “‘a discriminatory or retaliatory
attitude correlating to the discrimination or retaliation
complained of by the employee.’ ” Carter v. Three Springs
Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 641 (11th Cir.1998)
(quoting Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1555 (11th
eo
App. 5
Cir.1990)). In other words, the evidence must indicate
that the complained-of employment decision was moti-
vated by the decision-maker’s ageism. As a result, “only
the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing
other than to discriminate on the basis of age” will consti-
tute direct evidence of discrimination. Earley v. Champion
Int'l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081-82 (11th Cir.1990) (citations
and quotations omitted); see also City of Miami, 870 F.2d at
582. An example of “direct evidence would be a manage-
ment memorandum saying, ‘Fire Earley — he is too old.’ ”
Earley, 907 F.2d at 1082. No evidence presented by Appel-
lants meets this rigorous standard.
The most probative piece of alleged direct evidence
cited by Appellants is a comment by Soto to Dennis
D’Angelo, Kanafani’s replacement, immediately after.
Kanafani’s termination that “what the company needed
was aggressive young men like [D’Angelo] to be pro-
moted.”! While the statement was made right after
! In addition to this comment, Appellants also rely on an
alleged comment by Soto that he wanted “a younger influx of
blood.” There is no record evidence that Soto ever made this
comment. The only evidence of this comment is double hearsay
testimony from a co-worker, Charlie Guerra, that another
employee, Justo Varela, overheard the comment at a store
meeting and told Guerra about it. Varela avers in an affidavit
that he never heard the comment nor told Guerra about the
alleged comment. Guerra did not hear Soto make the comment,
and was not even present at the meeting in question. This
comment is inadmissible double hearsay, and we refuse to
consider it as probative evidence. See Zaben v. Air Products &
Chemicals, Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1455-57 (11th Cir.1997). Finally,
Appellants rely on Soto’s admission that, under his direction,
there was a pattern of firing or demoting older managers, and
replacing them with younger managers. While probative
App. 6
Kanafani’s termination, and it was made by Soto, the
decision-maker, to Kanafani’s younger replacement, the
comment does not amount to direct evidence of discrimi-
nation. Though probative circumstantial evidence of
Soto’s state of mind, the comment still requires us to infer
that Soto’s interest in promoting young men motivated
his decision to terminate Kanafani. In similar instances,
our court has refused to classify such comments as direct
evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Beaver v. Rayonter
Inc., 188 F.3d 1279, 1285-86 (11th Cir.1999) (finding that
decision-maker’s comment that he wanted to attract
“younger, engineer-type employees or supervisors” in
reduction-in-force case did not rise to level of direct
evidence of discrimination); Burrell v. Board of Trustees of
Georgia Military College, 125 F.3d 1390, 1393-94 (11th
Cir.1997) (holding that evidence which suggests, but does
not prove, a discriminatory motive, is circumstantial evi-
dence by definition). We therefore conclude that the dis-
trict court correctly found no direct evidence of age
discrimination.
2. Circumstantial Evidence of Discrimination
In evaluating age discrimination claims based on cir-
cumstantial evidence, we require a plaintiff to initially
satisfy a four-part prima facie requirement: (1) that she
was a member of the protected group of persons between
the ages of forty and seventy; (2) that she was subject to
circumstantial evidence, this pattern is not direct evidence of
discrimination because it does not directly establish that Soto’s
termination decisions were motivated by age bias.
App. 7
adverse employment action; (3) that a substantially youn-
ger person filled the position that she sought or from
which she was discharged; and (4) that she was qualified
to do the job for which she was rejected. See Turlington v.
Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428. 1432 (11th Cir.1998)
(citations omitted).
We conclude that both Appellants established prima
facie cases of age discrimination. First, there is no dispute
that Appellants satisfied the first two requirements. Both
Appellants are members of the protected group and were
subjected to adverse employment actions. As for the third
element, Appellees concede that Damon satisfied the
third requirement in that he was replaced by someone
“substantially younger.” However, both the Appellees
and the district court, in dicta, suggest that Kanafani did
not meet this requirement because, at the time of Kanaf-
ani’s termination, his replacement was thirty-seven, while
Kanafani was only forty-two. We disagree. Previously, we
have held that a replacement who is only three years
younger is sufficient to establish a prima facie case. See
Carter v. DecisionOne Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th
Cir.1997) (holding that plaintiff aged 42, who was
replaced by employee aged 39, met the “substantially
- younger” replacement requirement under ADEA) (citing
Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 582-83 (11th
Cir.1989)). Here, there is a five year age difference
between Kanafani and his replacement. We therefore find
that Kanafani has satisfied the “substantially younger”
replacement requirement.
Finally, we conclude that Kanafani and Damon were
“qualified” for their respective positions, satisfying the
App. 8
fourth and final prima tacie requirement. In age discrimi-
nation cases, our court focuses on a plaintiff's “skills and
background to determine if they were qualified for a
particular position.” Clark v. Coats & Clark, 990 F.2d 1217,
1227 (Lith Cir.1993). Our precedent holds that if a plain-
titf has enjoyed a long tenure at a certain position, we can
inter that he or she ts qualified to hold that particular
position. See ma. (interring a plaintift’s job qualifications
trom his 25 years of experience); Pace v. Southern Railway
System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1386 n. 7 (11th Cir.1983) (finding
that “where a plaintiff has held a position tor a significant
period of time, qualification tor that position, sutficient to
satisty a prima facie case, can be interred”). Based on the
employment history of Damon and Kanatani, we can
inter that they were qualified for their respective posi-
tions. Appellants were store managers tor more than a
decade, and, by all accounts, had pertormed their jobs
with distinction during the bulk of that pertod. Damon
held the position of store manager for 34 years, and
consistently received numerous awards, commendations,
and merit raises. Kanatani was a store manager for 13
years, and also received his share of bonus awards and
merit raises
In tinding the Appellants unqualified, the district
court incorrectly considered Fleming’s allegations of
Appellants’ poor performance. Our caselaw quite clearly
instructs that plaintiffs, who have been discharged from a
previously held position, do not need to satisfy the
McDonnell Douglas prong “ ‘requiring proof of qualifica-
tion. “ Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 830 n. 3
(lith Cir.1988) (quoting Rosenfield v. Wellington Leisure
Products, Inc., 827 F.2d 1493, 1495 n. 2 (11th Cir.1987)). We
App. 9
have explained that the ”
McDonnell Douglas] is that in cases where a plaintiff has
held a position for a significant period of time, qualifica-
‘reason for this modification [of
tion for that position sufficient to satisfy the test of a
prima facie case can be inferred.’ ” Young, 840 F.2d at 830
n. 3 (quoting Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1495 n. 2). We also
have unambiguously held that allegations of poor perfor-
mance against plaintiffs discharged from long-held posi-
tions may be properly considered, only after a prima facie
case has been established, when a court evaluates the
pretextual nature of an employer’s proffered non-
discriminatory reasons for termination. See Clark, 990 F.2d
at 1227 (holding that evidence of employee's performance
reprimands does not establish that employee was unqual-
ified, but may indicate company was legitimately con-
cerned about employee's performance); Young, 840 F.2d at
830 n. 3 (same). The district court therefore erred in
concluding that Appellants were not “qualified” based on
Fleming's allegations of poor performance.
B. Pretext
Having concluded that Appellants met their prima
facie burdens, we turn to the remaining issue of pretext.
Once a prima facie case is established, a defendant must
proffer legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its
employment decision. If such reasons are identified, a
plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving them
to be a pretext for age discrimination. See Turlington, 135
F.3d at 1432. We have repeatedly and emphatically held
that a defendant may terminate an employee for a good
or bad reason without violating federal law. See Elrod v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir.1991).
App. 10
We are not in the business of adjudging whether employ-
ment decisions are prudent or fair. Instead, our sole con-
cern is whether unlawful discriminatory animus
motivates a challenged employment decision. See Nix v.
WLCY Radio/Rahall Communications, 738 F.2d 1181, 1187
(11th Cir.1984). In this case, Fleming clearly offered legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Damon
(poor performance), and Kanafani (yelling vulgarities in
front of customers). Therefore, Appellants bore the bur-
den of offering enough probative evidence so that a rea-
sonable jury might conclude that Fleming’s reasons for
termination were a pretext for age discrimination. See
- Bogle v. Orange County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 162 F.3d
653, 658 (11th Cir.1998). In the summary judgment con-
text, we conduct this inquiry by determining whether a
jury “could reasonably infer discrimination if the facts
presented [by Appellants] remain unrebutted.” Jameson,
75 F.3d at 1531 (citations omitted). We must avoid weigh-
ing conflicting evidence or making credibility determina-
tions. Rather, “ ‘[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in
his favor.’ ” Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 9
F.3d 913, 918 (11th Cir.1993) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d
202 (1986)). After a painstaking review of the entire
record, we find that Appellants have made this requisite
showing.
First, circumstantial evidence was presented of Soto’s
discriminatory animus towards older store managers
under his direct supervision. Within a one-year period,
four older, highly experienced store managers, out of a
total of seven managers under Soto’s direct supervision,
App. 11
were terminated or demoted, and each was replaced by
an employee under forty years old. In addition, Soto also
terminated a highly experienced, older assistant store
manager, during this time period, and replaced him with
an employee under forty years old. As Soto conceded,
“{I]t certainly turns out that what has occurred is that
older managers were either fired or demoted and
replaced by younger people,” and that “in every
instance .. . the older store managers had more years of
experience than the people that replaced them.” While
not direct evidence of discriminatory animus, we believe
that this pattern of firing and demoting so many older
workers and replacing them with younger workers, by
the relevant decision-maker during the same time period,
constitutes probative circumstantial evidence of age dis-
crimination. See Stamey v. Southern Bell Telephone & Tele-
graph Co., 859 F.2d 855, 862 (11th Cir.1988). Moreover, the
probative value of this pattern was underscored by direct
testimony. Kanafani testified that, in January 1994, Flem-
ing began placing advertisements for new store managers
even though there were no managerial vacancies at the
time. According to Kanafani, Harry Soto then began
interviewing younger managerial candidates at Kanaf-
ani’s store. Several of these candidates were later hired
by Soto to replace Kanafani and the other older man-
agers. Record evidence also reveals that shortly thereaf-
ter, older managers with good employment histories,
under Soto’s direct supervision, began receiving written
reprimands for “poor store conditions” or “poor sales.”
Three former managers of Fleming, in addition to
Damon, averred that they were demoted or terminated by
Soto, after receiving written reprimands for “poor store
App. 12
” 4d
conditions,” “poor performance,” or “poor sales,” and
replaced by a substantially younger manager. Each for-
mer manager also disputed the veracity of their -repri-
mands.
Second, Soto’s remark to Kanafani’s younger suc-
cessor, D’Angelo, right after Kanafani was terminated,
that Soto wanted “aggressive, young men” like himself to
be promoted is highly suggestive circumstantial evidence
from which a jury could infer discriminatory animus.? Far
> D’Angelo twice averred that Soto used the term
“aggressive young men,” although D’Angelo, who still works
for Fleming, later stated, under examination by defense counsel,
that he was not sure whether Soto actually used the word
“young.” Kanafani also testified that D’Angelo told him that
Soto had used the term “aggressive young men.” The entire
transcript of D’Angelo’s testimony reads as follows:
Q. [Plaintiff's Attorney]: Did you ever have a one-on-one
conversation with Harry Soto where Mr. Soto told you that what
the company needed was aggressive young men like yourself to
be promoted.
A. [D’Angelo]: Yes.
Q. Why don’t you tell me how this conversation went?
A. This was right after Rick [Kanafani] was terminated and
Harry had brought me up to the main office to explain to me
that he had terminated Rick, and that the company was going in
a new direction, and we had to hold onto our pants, was like the
catch phrase at the time. Things were moving fast.
Q. That’s when he told you that the company needed
aggressive young men like yourself?
A. He included me in - I can’t remember the exact word he
used, but he included me in that mix, because I was in charge of
the store for a week and a half until Tony Calaverio came in.
App. 13
from being a stray remark, the comment may evince
probative evidence of the state of mind of the decision-
Q. But he did tell you that the company needed aggressive
young men?
A. I can’t recall that. I really can’t.
Attorney: Could you read back to me my question?
(Thereupon, a portion of the record was read by the reporter as
follows: Question: Did you ever have a one-on-one conversation
with Harry Soto where Mr. Soto told you that what the company
needed was aggressive young men like yourself to be promoted.
Answer. Yes.) Q. Is that what happened?
[Objection to form}
A. Yes.
Q. [Defendant’s Attorney]:. Do you have a recollection that
these following words came out of Harry Soto, Harry Soto said
the following words: We need aggressive young men like
yourself? Do you have the recollection that he said that to you?
A. [D’Angelo]: It was something similar to that. It could be a
paraphrase, so — I know aggressive was in there. He used me - I
guess it was a motivational tool.
Q. Did he say the word “young”?
That, I can’t recall.
But you can recall that he said aggressive?
Aggressive, yes, yes, aggressive.
And he included yourself?
Yes.
But you’re not sure if he said young?
>O>O>O>
. I’m not sure about that.
We are satisfied that a jury should weigh the credibility of this
circumstantial evidence. See Walker v. NationsBank, 53 F.3d 1548,
1563 (11th Cir.1995) (Johnson, J. specially concurring) (noting
that “the factfinder must evaluate the credibility of the
App. 14
maker at the time of Kanafani’s termination. The com-
ment also arguably suggests that Soto had an ageist pref-
erence for young managers. Given the substance, context,
and timing of Soto’s comment, if credited, we find it to be
a significant piece of circumstantial evidence. See Jones v.
Bessemer Carraway Medical Ctr., 151 F.3d 1321, 1323 n. 11
(11th Cir.1998) (holding that “language not amounting to
direct evidence, but showing some racial animus, may be
significant evidence of pretext once a plaintiff has set out
a prima facie case”) (emphasis added); see also Rayonter,
188 F.3d at 1286 (finding decision-maker’s comment that
he wanted “younger” employees to constitute circum-
stantial evidence of a discriminatory motive); Alphin v.
Sears, Roebuck & Ceo., 940 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir.1991)
(finding remark by supervisor to plaintiff that he had
“been around too long and [was] too old and [was]
making too much money” immediately after a “corrective
interview” to be circumstantial evidence of age discrimi-
nation). Moreover, we also tind Soto’s statement to be
probative as to whether age animus motivated the deci-
sion to terminate Damon because the remark (1) was
allegedly made only three months after Damon was ter-
minated, (2) immediately followed the termination of
someone similarly situated to Damon and in the same
protected- class, and (3) came from the same decision-
maker responsible for Damon's termination. See Ryder v.
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. This task is peculiarly
the province of the jury.”) (citing Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc.,
837 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1988)); see also Combs, 106 F.3d at
1530 (stating, in the summary judgment context, that “[i]ssues
ot fact and sufficiency of evidence are properly reserved for the
jury”) (citation omitted).
App. 15
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 130-133 (3d
Cir.1997) (holding that remarks made one year after ter-
mination, and not directly about plaintiff, could be taken
by a jury as an accurate reflection of the existing manag-
erial attitude toward older workers) (emphasis added).
In addition to this circumstantial evidence, we con-
clude that Appellants have offered evidentiary support
by which a reasonable jury could conclude that the speci-
fic reasons for termination given by Fleming were a pre-
text. Appellants both were terminated for alleged
violations of company work rules. On summary judg-
ment, we have written that the “work rule” defense is
arguably pretextual when a plaintiff submits evidence (1)
that she did not violate the cited work rule, or (2) that if
she did violate the rule, other employees outside the
protected class, who engaged in similar acts, were not
similarly treated. See Alphin, 940 F.2d at 1501 n. 1 (citing
Anderson v. Savage Laboratories, Inc., 675 F.2d 1221, 1224
(11th Cir.1982)). We are satisfied that Appellants have
made this requisite showing.*
2 Of course, this framework is simply used to assess
whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to establish
pretext - that is, the employer has not given an honest
explanation of the employer’s behavior - and thereby reach a
jury on the ultimate question of discrimination. This
framework, however, does not vitiate a plaintiff’s ultimate
burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an
employer terminated the plaintiff based on a discriminatory
motive. An employer who fires an employee under the mistaken
but honest impression that the employee violated a work rule is
not liable for discriminatory conduct. An employer “ ‘may fire
an employee for a good reason, a bad reason, a reason based on
erroneous facts, or for no reason at all, as long as its action is not
App. 16
With respect to Damon, Fleming contends that
Damon was fired for poor performance; specifically, that
over a six month period his store was cited by Fleming
management on four separate occasions for “poor condi-
tions.” Damon flatly denies these allegations, and has
adduced sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute
of material fact as to his job performance.
The first set of relevant allegations involve a Febru-
ary 24, 1994 visit by Soto to Damon’s store. According to
Damon, he and Soto discussed the store’s overall appear-
ance during the visit, but Soto never stated that condi-
tions were below acceptable company standards.
However, a week later, on March 4, 1994, Soto issued a
written reprimand to Damon for store conditions in viola-
tion of company policy. According to Damon, Soto
ordered him to sign the reprimand even though he did
not agree with the reprimand’s charges. Damon also
averred that his store was in good condition on February
24, 1994, that the letter was a “fabrication,” and that at no
time prior to the reprimand did Soto tell him that store
conditions were unacceptable. The reprimand gave
Damon until March 15 to correct the violations. Soto
conducted a tollow-up store inspection on March 12,
1994. In an internal memo of the same day, which appar-
ently was never shown to Damon, Soto found several
uncorrected store violations. However, Soto subsequently
testitied that, by March 15, all of the store’s violations
had been tixed by Damon. Indeed, Soto admitted that
Damon's ability to bring his store into compliance
tor a discriminatory reason.’ ” Jones, 151 F3d at 1324 n. lo
(quoting Nix, 738 B2d at 1187) (emphasis added)
App. 17
showed impressive managerial drive. For the next few
months, Damon received no reprimands.
-
On May 30, 1994, during Memorial Day Weekend,
Mel Beech, Fleming’s Vice President of Store Operations
and Soto’s direct supervisor, visited Damon’s store. On
June 9, 1994, ten days after this visit, Damon received a
written reprimand from Soto for conditions allegedly
found at the store during Beech’s visit. The reprimand
charged that Damon had been warned previously about
performance improvements expected from him, that
Damon was not performing consistently enough to con-
tinue in his position, and that any further operational
problems would result in Damon's immediate termina-
tion. Damon disputes that the store was in poor condition
during Beech’s visit, and denies every single specific
criticism contained in the June reprimand, save one
minor point.* Damon also reiterates that the memoran-
dum was a “fabrication” designed to justify his eventual
firing, and that other older store managers in Soto's dis-
trict received similar letters threatening to terminate or
demote them, while he knew of no younger manager who
received a similar letter.4
* Ot eight specific criticisms, Damon only conceded that
three clerks may have been taking a break in the back room fora
portion of Beech’s visit. Among other things, he disputes that
the meat and seafood cases were empty, that there were
muscellaneous floor displays all over the store, that there was
poor signage, that floor conditions were deplorable, and that
there was poor customer service.
* Damon testified that he personally spoke to several older
managers about their receipt of threat-to-terminate memos in
1994. He also stated that he spoke to several of the younger
App. 18
Finally, on July 1, 1994, at the start of the busy July
4th weekend, Soto revisited Damon's store, and filed
another reprimand of Damon. Five days later, Soto termi-
nated Damon, by letter, tor poor performance. Damon
disputes the specific allegations of his store’s poor condi-
tion, contained in the July reprimand, as well as Soto’s
claim that he had given Damon repeated verbal warnings
about his alleged pertormance deficiencies. Moreover,
Damon asserts that, Soto told him in the course of direct
conversations, that he was doing a good job, and that his
store’s conditions had improved since Damon had
become store manager. Damon also avers that he visited
the stores of younger store managers and tound that their
stores were either in the same or worse shape during this
relevant time period. None of these younger managers
were terminated. Damon's testimony ts corroborated by
Julho Nunez, a former Fleming manager promoted by
Soto, who testified that Damon's store was essentially in
the same condition as the rest of Fleming’s South Florida
stores during the relevant time period. Additionally, Soto _
also conceded that two of Damon's three reprimands for
“poor stere conditions” occurred during busy holiday
weekends - a time, according to Soto, when stores may
well be in poor condition. Finally, evidence was pre-
sented that Luis Requejo, Damon’s younger replacement,
experienced substantially more severe problems in main-
taining proper store conditions, and yet, was not fired. In
addition to receiving two performance reprimands from
managers, including Dave Applebaum, who denied receiving
similar letters despite the fact that their stores were kept in
similar condition to Damon's store.
App. 19
Soto in August and October 1994, Requejo’s meat depart-
ment received several reprimands from state food inspec-
tors beginning in July 1995, one month after Soto was
promoted to another company position. Eventually,
Requejo’s meat department was shut down for failure to
comply with these state reprimands. Although Soto
admitted that this problem was more serious than
Damon's alleged deficiencies, Fleming took no disciplin-
ary action against Requejo.
Based on the totality of this evidence, the age-based
comment allegedly made by Soto to Kanafani’s replace-
ment, and Soto’s purported pattern of demoting and fir-
ing numerous older managers in favor of younger
replacements, we conclude that Damon has introduced
sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on his
age discrimination claim.
We draw a similar conclusion with respect to Kanaf-
ani’s claim. The sole reason advanced by Soto, the actual
decision-maker, for Kanafani’s termination is a yelling
incident involving Kanafani and his seafood department
manager on October 1, 1994.5 Dennis D’Angelo, Kanaf-
ani’s replacement, also testified that Soto told him that
* Fleming now claims, despite repeated statements by Soto, |
the decision-maker, during his deposition that Kanafani was
tired solely because of his yelling vulgarities at an employee on
the sales floor, that Kanafani also was terminated, in part,
because of his “previous disregard of company rules and blatant
unprofessionalism.” As evidence, Fleming introduced a
subsequent affidavit from Soto in its motion for summary
judgment that somewhat broadens Soto’s termination motives.
In the affidavit, Soto claimed that he fired Kanafani after the
yelling incident for his “failure to improve his people skills,”
“{his] disregard of company rules, and his blatant
unprofessionalism.” However, during his earlier deposition,
App. 20
the only reason Kanafani was fired was because he yelled
at a fellow employee on the sales floor. Fleming claims
Soto uncquivocally stated that the sole reason for Kanafani’s
termination was the yelling incident.
Q. What was the basis for his [Kanafani’s] termination?
A. Using profanity on the sales floor where the customers
were out in the open.
Q. Was he terminated because of poor store conditions or was
he terminated because of using vulgarity on the sales floor in
front of customers?
A. He was terminated for using vulgarity on the sales floor in
front of customers.
Q. No other reason?
A. That was the reason for the termination.
Q. So again, the only reason he was terminated was for using
vulgarity on the sales floor, correct?
A. That is correct.
Moreover, Dennis D’Angelo, Kanafani’s replacement, also
testified that Soto told him that Kanafani was fired solely
because of the yelling incident. Based on the repeated
statements by Soto during his deposition that he fired Kanafani
solely for the yelling incident (as well as D’Angelo’s
corroboration of Soto’s termination motive), we find that a jury
could infer that the “inconsistencies” between Soto’s deposition
and affidavit may be evidence of pretext. See Tidwell v. Carter
Products, 135 F.3d 1422, 1427-28 (Lith Cir.1998) (citing Bechtel
Construction Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 50 F.3d 926 (11th Cir. 1995);
Howard v. BP Oil Co., Inc., 32 F.3d 520, 525 (11th Cir. 1994)).
Furthermore, Kanatani has produced sufficient evidence to
create genuine issues of material fact as to his previous
reprimands from Soto. Kanatani received three reprimands
prior to the yelling incident for “poor sales,” “poor store
conditions,” and an altercation with a beer vendor respectively.
First, Kanafani testified that his store had become more
App. 21
that Kanafani uttered several vulgarities on the sales
floor, where customers could overhear, and that this
breach of company policy justified his immediate firing
five days later. Kanafani admitted that he yelled during
the incident, but vehemently denies using any vulgarity
aside from the word “hell” once.® Kanafani’s testimony
profitable since he became store manager, creating a genuine
issue of material fact as to the first reprimand. Second, while
Kanafani received a reprimand for “poor store conditions”
during the busy Memorial Day Holiday Weekend, Fleming does
not directly proffer this reprimand as a basis for Kanafani’s
termination. Even if this reprimand were cited as a termination
factor, we believe Kanatani has presented sufficient evidence
that the reprimand was a pretext. During Memorial Day
weekend, Kanafani was on vacation, and not in charge of the
store. Julio Nunez, a younger assistant manager at the time,
actually was acting store manager for the weekend. Despite this
fact, Kanatani, and not Nunez, was reprimanded for the store’s
“poor condition.” Nunez subsequently was promoted to store
manager by Soto, replacing an older store manager, despite
Soto’s admission that he was aware that Nunez, and not
Kanatani, was primarily responsible for the poor store
conditions during Memorial Day Weekend. Finally, Kanatani
vigorously denies that he upbraided the beer vendor over
complimentary tootball tickets offered to him, or told the
vendor “deliver better tickets or else.” All Kanatani admits to ts
politely returning the tickets because they were not to his
satistaction, creating a genuine issue of material fact as to this
incident. We believe that this evidence, when combined with all
of the previously-cited circumstantial evidence, could convince
a jury that Kanafani’s reprimands were a pretext for his
termination.
° Fleming asserts that Kanatani used the word “fuck”
several times during the incident. Kanafani denies this claim,
admitting only to stating at the end of the incident, “what the
hell do you want me to do?”
App. 22
creates a genuine issue of material fact with respect to
whether he uttered profanities on the sales floor. |
In addition, Kanafani also presented evidence which,
if credited, could convince a jury that the incident was a
pretext for his termination. Kanafani’s replacement,
Dennis D’Angelo, testified that he had observed members
of Fleming management, including Soto himself, yell at
employees in front of store customers. Soto admitted to
yelling at employees with profane language, but claimed
these incidents occurred in employee-only store areas.
Previously, we have held that evidence demonstrating
that the decision-maker engaged in the same policy viola-
tion proffered for an employee’s termination is “espe-
cially compelling” evidence of pretext. Ross v. Rhodes
Furniture, Inc., 146 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir.1998). As a
result, if a jury were to credit D’Angelo’s testimony, they
could reasonably find the yelling incident to be a pretext.
When this testimony is combined with Soto’s comment to
D’Angelo, immediately after Kanafani’s termination, that
Soto wished to promote “younger aggressive men,” and
Soto’s pattern of demoting and firing numerous older
managers in favor of younger replacements, we conclude
that Kanafani too has introduced sufficient circumstantial
evidence to survive summary judgment.
-In short, we find that the circumstantial evidence
presented by Damon and Kanafani, taken as a whole, is
sufficient to make a prima facie showing of age discrimi-
nation, and to rebut the nondiscriminatory reasons prof-
fered by Fleming for their terminations. Material facts
remain in dispute, precluding summary judgment.
App. 23
Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order of sum-
mary judgment and remand the case for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
App. 24
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 97-230-CIV-LENARD
WALTER DAMON and RICHARD
KANAFANI,
Plaintiffs,
VS.
FLEMING SUPERMARKETS OF
FLORIDA, INC. d/b/a
HYDE PARK MARKETS, f/d/b/a
WOOLEY’S FINE FOODS, a
Florida corporation,
Defendant.
/
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(Filed Sep. 16, 1998)
THIS CAUSE came before the Court on Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment (DE33) filed on May 1,
1998. The Court having considered the motion and the
response and reply thereto, and otherwise advised in the
premises, finds as follows.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Richard Kanafani (“Kanafani”) and Walter
Damon (“Damon”) are former store managers of Hyde
Park Market retail grocery stores. Damon and Kanafani
~~
became store managers in 1963 and 1981, respectively.
App. 25
Defendant Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc. (“Flem-
ing”) owns and operates the Hyde Park Market chain of
retail grocery stores which it fully acquired in September
of 1993. Fleming fired Damon on July 6, 1994, and later
fired Kanafani on October 6, 1994. Damon and Kanafani
filed the above-captioned action on January 28, 1997,
alleging that Fleming violated the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (“ADEA”), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A.
§§ 621-34 (West 1985 & Supp. 1998), and the Florida Civil
Rights Act (“FRCA”), Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 760.01-760.11
(West 1997 § Supp. 1998),! when it terminated them on
the basis of their age. In its motion for summary judg-
ment, Fleming argues that the Plaintiffs have failed to
state a prima facie case of age discrimination. In addition,
Fleming asserts that the Plaintiffs have not produced
evidence of pretext sufficient to warrant a trial of this
action. The Court has jurisdiction over this action pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1343 and 1367.
Il. STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
On a motion for summary judgment, the court con-
strues the evidence and factual inferences arising there-
trom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).
Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is
shown “that there is no genuine issue as to any material
tact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
' Claims brought under the FCRA are subject to the same
analysis applicable in ADEA cases. See Florida Dep't of
Community Affairs v. Bryant, 586 So. 2d 1205, 1209 (Fla. Ist DCA
1991).
App. 26
a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The Supreme Court
explained the summary judgment standard as follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation,
there can be no genuine issue as to any material
fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning
an essential element of the non-moving party’s
case necessarily rénders all other facts imma-
terial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The
trial court’s function at this juncture is not “to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986).
A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; see also
Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11 Cir. 1989). The
party seeking summary judgment “always bears the ini-
tial responsibility of informing the district court of the
basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the
‘pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions of file, together with affidavits, if any,’ which
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
material fact.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once this initial
demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of
production, not persuasion, shifts to the non-moving
App. 27
party. The nonmoving party must “go beyond the plead-
ings and by [his] own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ desig-
nate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324; see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e). In meeting this burden the nonmoving party “must
do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical
doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). That party
must demonstrate that there is a “genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. An action is void of a material
issue for trial “[W]here the record taken as a whole could
not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. See also Anderson, 477
U.S. at 249.
III. ANALYSIS
“In an unlawful age discrimination case, the plaintiff
bears the ultimate burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that age was a determining factor in the
employer's decision to dismiss him.” Zaben v. Air Prods. &
Chems., Inc., 129 F.3d 1453, 1457 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing -
Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226 (11th Cir.
1993)). “In order to survive a motion for summary judg-
ment, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case
of age discrimination.” Id. “This may be accomplished by
presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent, such
as age-biased statements made by the decision maker, see
Earley v. Champion International Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081
(11th Cir. 1990); by presenting circumstantial evidence
which complies with the test set forth by the Supreme
App. 28
Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973); or by presenting a statistical pattern of discrimina-
tion, Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081.” Id. “Once the plaintiff
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts tc the
employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the plaintiff's discharge.” Id. (citing Clark, 990
F.2d at 1227). “If the employer does so, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff to ‘introduce significantly probative
evidence showing that the asserted reason is merely a
pretext for discrimination.’ ” Id. (citing Clark, 990 F.2d at
1228). In response to Fleming’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the Plaintiffs argue that the record contains both
direct and circumstantial evidence sufficient to make out
a prima facie case of age discrimination.
A. Direct Evidence
“Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed,
proves the existence of the fact in issue without inference
or presumption.” Jones v. Bessemer Carraway Med. Ctr., No.
97-6076, 1998 WL 526406, at *3 n.11 (11th Cir. Aug. 24,
1998). “So, direct evidence of discrimination is powerful
evidence capable of making out a prima facie case essen-
tially by itself.” Id. Stray remarks in the workplace, state-
ments by nondecisionmakers and statements by decision-
makers unrelated to the decisional process itself do not
constitute direct evidence. See Evans v. McClain of Georgia
Inc., 131 F.3d 957, 962 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Price Water-
house v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
The Plaintiffs first argue that the following deposi-
tion testimony of District Manager Harry Soto, who fired
App. 29
Damon and Kanafani, constitutes direct evidence of age
discrimination:
Q. Itcertainly turns out that what has occurred
is that older managers were either fired or
demoted and replaced with younger people;
correct?
A. That's correct.
Q. And I think in every instance that we’ve
discussed today the older store managers had
more years of experience than the people that
replaced them; correct?
A. That's correct.
(Soto Dep. at 287.) Soto’s testimony that the result of the
terminations and demotions that took place was the
replacement of older employees with younger individ-
uals, however, does not prove that age discrimination
caused such result. As such, Soto’s testimony is not direct
evidence. Next, the Plaintiffs assert that Fleming
employee Dennis D’Angelo’s testimony with respect to a
comment made to him by Soto constitutes direct evidence
of age discrimination:
Q. Did you ever have a one-on-one conversa-
tion with Harry Soto where Mr. Soto told you
that what the company needed was aggressive
young men like yourself to be promoted?
A. Yes.
Q. Why don’t you tell me how this conversa-
tion went?
A. This was right after Rick [Kanafani] was
terminated and Harry had brought me up to the
main office to explain to me that he had termi-
nated Rick, and that the company was going ina
App. 30
new direction, and we had to hold onto our
pants, was like the catch phrase at the time.
Things were moving fast.
Q. That’s when he told you that the company
needed aggressive young men like yourself?
A. He included me in - I can’t remember the
exact word he used, but he included me in that
mix, because I was in charge of the store for a
week and a half until Tony Calaverio [Kanaf-
ani’s replacement] came in.
Q. But he did tell you that the company
needed aggressive young men.
A. I can’t recall that. I really can’t.
(D’Angelo Dep. at 16-17.) D’Angelo then reaffirmed
his initial response to counsel’s question that Soto had
made such statement to him. Id. at 18. However, during
cross-examination, D’Angelo retreated from his testi-
mony that Soto had used the word “young”:
Q. Do you have a recollection that these fol-
lowing words came out of Harry Soto, Harry
Soto said the following words: We need aggres-
sive yong [sic] men like yourself? Do you have
the recollection that he said that to you?
A. It was something similar to that. It could be
a paraphrase, so —- I know aggressive was in
there. He used me - I guess it was a motiva-
tional tool.
Q. Did he say the word “young”?
A. That, I can’t recall.
Q. But you can recall that he said aggressive?
A
Aggressive, yes, yes aggressive.
App. 31
(D’Angelo Dep. at 33.) Thus, D’Angelo testified that Soto
used the word “aggressive” but did not recall whether he
had used the word “young.” As a result, the Court finds
that such statement does not constitute direct evidence of
age discrimination because although said by the relevant
decisionmaker, it was not said in the context of Kanaf-
ani’s termination. See Young v. General Foods Corp., 840
F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding similar comments
“not directly probative of an intent to discriminate”).
Finally, the Plaintiffs assert that the following testimony
of former Hyde Park Market store manager Charlie
Guerra contains direct evidence of age discrimination:
Q. Did you ever have the opportunity to hear
Mr. Soto make any type of remark which could
be considered derogatory to older individuals?
A. I did not hear this myself, but I was told by
a young - by another employee of the Store
Number 9, when Julio Nunez was given the
management position in the Store Number 9,
Mr. Soto held a meeting and he mentioned at the
meeting that we need a younger influx of blood
in this company.
Q. And just so I’m clear, it’s your understand-
ing that at a store managers’ meeting, Mr. Soto
said at this meeting, and I will quote: “We need
a younger influx of blood in the company;” is
that correct?
A. It was not in a store managers’ meeting. It
was in a store meeting.
Q. Let me see if I understand that correctly
then. So it’s your understanding that at a point
in time when Mr. Nunez had assumed the store
manager position at Store Number 9, during a
App. 32
store meeting Mr. Soto said the following: “We
need a younger influx of blood in the com-
pany”? Is that correct, sir?
A. That is more or less correct, the words that I
was told that Mr. Soto mentioned at that meet-
ing.
Q. Do you know the names of the individuals
who were present at this meeting?
A. No, I don’t know. The only person that
mentioned this to me, his name is Justo, who
was I do believe, the grocery manager or groc-
ery clerk at that particular time.
(Guerra Dep. at 36-37.) Soto allegedly made this state-
ment shortly after Damon’s termination. However,
although made by Soto, the relevant decisionmaker, like
the statement discussed above, it was not made in the
context of Damon’s termination and therefore does not
constitute direct evidence of age discrimination. Finally,
Produce Supervisor Sam Bell’s identification of Damon as
“Pops”, see Damon Dep. at 106-07, does not constitute
direct evidence because Bell was not a decisionmaker
with respect to Damon's termination and he did not make
the comment in the context of Damon’s termination. In
sum, the evidence relied on by the Plaintiffs as direct
evidence cannot be so characterized, and the Court must
therefore determine whether they have instead made out
a prima facie case of age discrimination based upon cir-
cumstantial evidence.
App. 33
B. Circumstantial evidence
“In an ADEA case involving discharge, demotion, or
failure to hire, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case
by showing: (1) that he was a member of the protected
group of persons between the ages of forty and seventy;?
(2) that he was subject to adverse employment action; (3)
that a substantially younger person filled the position he
sought or from which he was discharged; and (4) that he
was qualified to do the job for which he was rejected.”
Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1432
(11th Cir. 1998) (citing O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996); Jameson v. Arrow
Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)). Fleming does not
dispute that the Plaintiffs can satisfy the first two (2)
elements of the prima facie case.* Fleming argues, how-
ever, that neither of the Plaintiffs have produced evidence
that they were qualified for the store manager positions
that they held at the time of their termination* and that
2 In 1986, Congress amended the age requirement of the
ADEA to require only that plaintiffs be older than forty (40)
years of age, eliminating the requirement that plaintiffs be
younger than seventy (70) years old. See Pub. L. No. 99-592,
§ 2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3344 (1986).
3 It is undisputed that both Damon and Kanafani were over
forty (40) at the time of their terminations in 1994. See 29
U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West Supp. 1998).
4 Although the Plaintiffs assert that the “Defendant is not
disputing that Damon has clearly satisfied his prima facie case,”
see Pls.’ Resp. at 8 n.5, the Defendant argued in its brief that
“Kanafani and Damon received written and verbal reprimands
relating to their job performance and their inability to perform
as store manager under the new standards instituted by
Fleming supermarkets,” see Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 12-13.
App. 34
Kanafani failed to produce evidence on the fourth ele-
ment.
In Turlington, the Eleventh Circuit noted -that “a
plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case under the
ADEA must show only that he was qualified to do the job
for which he was rejected, see Jameson v. Arrow Co., 75
F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996), and, unlike a Title VII
plaintiff, need not show that a person outside. of the
plaintiff’s class with equal or lesser qualifications
received the job, cf. Roberts v. Gadsen Memorial Hospital,
835 F.2d 793, 796 (11th Cir. 1988).” 135 F.3d at 1433. “In
this circuit, the [qualified element] may be established by
evidence that the plaintiff has performed her respon-
sibilities for several years without complaint.” Baker v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 903 F.2d 1515, 1520 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citing Stanfield v. Answering Service Inc., 867 F.2d 1290,
1293 (11th Cir. 1989)).
Subsequent to Fleming’s takeover of the store man-
aged by Damon in September of 1993, Damon received
several written warnings. On November 24, 1993, the
Metro-Dade County Consumer Services Department
issued a “Compliance Status Report” to Damon indicat-
ing that eighteen (18) packages of turkeys weighed less
than the weight stated on the labels and that packages of
poultry did not contain grading information. (Damon
Dep. at Ex. 1.) In addition, the report indicated that
seventy-five percent (75%) of the meat case items con-
tained extended shelf life dates. Id. On March 3, 1994,
Damon received a memorandum from Soto indicating
that during a walk through of Damon’s store on February
24, 1994 he found that sale signs for the current week had
not been put up in the produce and meat departments,
aoe
App. 35
that there were holes in several sections, that the canopy
tops were a total mess, and that the store was dirty “in
many areas that were very visible to the customer.”
(Damon Dep. at Ex. 2.) Soto further stated: “Walter, we
have spoken about store cleanliness on many occasions
and about the importance of cleaning up our act to keep
the customers we have, as well as get new ones.” Id. Soto
further stated that “[t]he conditions in [Damon’s] store
were totally unacceptable and will not be tolerated,” indi-
cating that Damon would be terminated if six (6) items
outlined in the memorandum were not addressed and
corrected by March 15, 1998. Id. A letter to the file indi-
cated that a subsequent walk through conducted on
March 12, 1994 revealed that Damon had not followed
through on several of the items listed in the March 3, 1994
memorandum. (Damon Dep. at Ex. 3.) On June 9, 1994,
Soto again informed Damon by memorandum that a walk
through of Damon’s store on May 30, 1994 revealed that
(1) “[sJervice meat was empty except for a couple of dark
steaks,” (2) [s]eafood case was empty,” (3) “[t]hree clerks
from respective departments were in the back room tak-
ing breaks,” (4) “[mJerchandising was non-existent,” (5)
“[ml]iscellaneous floor displays all over the floor,” (6)
“[ploor signage,” (7) “[f]loor conditions were deplor-
able,” and (8) “[p]oor customer service.” (Damon Dep. at
Ex. 4.) Soto further indicated that “we find it necessary at
this time to let you know any further operational prob-
lems will result in immediate termination.” Id. On July 5,
1994, Soto wrote a memorandum to Human Resources
employee Steve Abernathy in which he indicated several
problems discovered during a July 1, 1994 walk through
App. 36
of Damon’s store and recommended that Damon be ter-
minated. (Damon Dep. at Ex. 7.) On July 6, 1994, Soto
indicated by memorandum to Damon:
At the beginning of 1994 the company began to
take a direction regarding the type of company
we wanted to become, and had several meetings
with the store managers on things that needed
to be done to get us going in the right direction.
Within the last five months you have been spo-
ken to on many occasions regarding your job
performance, and have also been documented
on March 3rd and June 9th on specific issues.
The follow through on your part has been incon-
sistent in the areas we’ve addressed and find it
necessary at this time to terminate your employ-
ment with the company.
(Damon Dep. at Ex. 8.)
During his deposition, Damon disputed the truth of
some of the contents of the memoranda provided to him
by Soto by asserting that they were “made out just to
eliminate [his] position with the company.” Damon Dep.
at 23; see also id. at 25, 35. He also agreed that some and
denied that other of the conditions reported in the mem-
oranda were accurate with respect to his store. Thus, it is
undisputed that Damon failed to perform at least some of
his duties to the standards imposed by Fleming. In addi-
tion, Damon could not recall any actions of members of
Fleming's management indicative of bias on the basis of
age, other than to state that Soto “seemed to pick on the
older store managers and treated the younger store man-
agers quite differently than he treated the older store
managers” and that he was “jovial when talking to them,
ct dk the NP RAN sti he
App. 37
making jokes with them, and friendly to them, warm,
added some warmth to his voice.” Damon Dep. at 75-76;
see also id. at 78.
Subsequent to Fleming’s takeover of Kanafani’s store
in September of 1993, Kanafani received several written
warnings. On February 8, 1994, Soto wrote in a memoran-
dum to Kanafani:
we are losing tremendous sales in this store. It
seems that customer dissatisfaction is running
high in your store, as evidenced by the letters
and calls received at this office. . . . If the behav-
ior and attitude of this store continues to cost us
customers, I will not have any choice but to take
disciplinary action up to and including termina-
tion.
(Kanafani Dep. at Ex. 2.) On June 9, 1994, Soto reported
by memorandum to Kanafani that he observed the fol-
lowing during a May 30, 1994 walk through: (1) “[s]ervice
counter was not customer friendly, dirty,” (2) “[dleli
department was low and not fresh,” (3) “[b]akery depart-
ment was almost empty - no variety,” and (4) “[t]oo
many excess displays around the store wine section, card
section in particular.” (Kanafani Dep. at Ex. 3.) Soto
stated further:
We have had conversations about the clutter in
certain ares [sic] of the store in the past, and
how we need to keep the floors clear. .. . If you
cannot make the necessary decisions that need
to be made in your store, I will have to find
someone who will. . . . Any future incidents will
result in immediate termination.
App. 38
Id. On September 6, 1994, Soto wrote to Kanafani con-
cerning an incident where Kanafani refused to take foot-
ball tickets offered to him by one of the store’s vendors
because the seats were not to his liking. (Kanafani Dep. at
Ex. 4.) On October 4, 1994, Soto terminated Kanafani after
an incident during which Kanafani, acting out of frustra-
tion, yelled at Seafood Manager Grant White in front of
customers in his store on October 1, 1994. Soto indicated
by memorandum that he had “expressed to [Kanafani] in
past conversations that [he] must learn how to handle
[himself] more professionally and make management
decisions as the Store Manager.” (Kanafani Dep. at Ex. 5.)
Soto further stated: “Rick, you have not responded to this
directive as evidenced by this outburst in your Store, and
I find it necessary at this time to terminate your services
with the company.” Id. Indeed, “[d]iscourteous treatment
toward . . . co-workers” constituted a basis for disciplin-
ary action under Fleming’s rules. (Kanafani Dep. at Ex.
1.)
In his deposition, Kanafani disputed the points
raised by Soto in the memoranda. However, he also
agreed that he had been spoken to with respect to his lack
of professionalism in the past and that he had handled
the vendor issue in the way discussed by Soto in his
memorandum of September 6th. Thus, it is undisputed
that Kanafani failed to perform to at least some of the
standards imposed by Fleming. Like Damon, Kanafani
could not point to particular actions indicating age dis-
crimination on the part of members of Fleming’s manage-
ment.
- Fleming also asserted in its motion that Kanafani is
unable to make out a prima facie case because he is
a ee
‘VEE atte ds
App. 39
unable to show that he was replaced by someone “sub-
stantially younger.” At the time of his termination, Kanaf-
ani was forty-two (42) years old. (Kanafani Dep. at 66.)
His replacement, Tony Calaverio, was thirty-seven (37)
years old. (Soto Dep. at Ex. 5.) In O’Connor v. Consolidated
Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996), the Supreme
Court indicated that a plaintiff cannot proceed beyond
the prima facie case where his replacement is not “sub-
stantially younger” than himself. 517 U.S. at 312.
Although this Circuit has not set forth guidelines for
what age disparity satisfies the “substantially younger”
element in response to O’Connor, but see Carter v. Deci-
sionone Corp., 122 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 1997) (relying
on pre-O’Connor case Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578,
582-83 (11th Cir. 1989) and finding three (3) year disparity
sufficient), other circuits have found a five (5) year dis-
parity insufficient. See, e.g., Fisher v. Wayne Dalton Corp.,
139 F.3d 1137, 1141 (7th Cir. 1998) (ten (10) year disparity
required); Wellman v. Wheeling and Lake Erie Ry. Co., No.
97-3084, 1998 WL 25005, at **4 (6th Cir. Jan. 12, 1998) (five
(5S) years younger not “substantially younger”); Schiltz v.
Burlington N. R.R., 115 F.3d 1407, 1413 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same).
Given that the “plaintiff's burden in proving a prima
facie case is light,” Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135
F.3d 1428, 1432, 1434 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing Isenbergh v.
Knight-Ridder Newspaper sales Inc., 97 F.3d 436, 439 (11th
Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 2511 (1997)), and that
“[w]e ‘generally . . . eschew[ ] an overly strict formulation
of the elements of a prima facie case, particularly in age
discrimination cases,’ ” Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co.,
107 F.3d 846, 851 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Jameson v.
App. 40
Arrow Co., 75 F.3d 1528, 1531 (11th Cir. 1996)), the Court
will consider the other evidence produced by the Plain-
tiffs to determine whether such evidence forms the basis
for an inference that age played a factor in the Defen-
dant’s decision to terminate them. See Clark v. Coats &
Clark Inc., 990 F.2d 1217, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 1993) (stating
that the prima facie case requirements “are not. . .
interpreted strictly if the plaintiff can otherwise provide a
basis for the inference that age was a factor in the
employment decision” and citing Mitchell v. Worldwide
Underwriters Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 565, 567 (11th Cir. 1992))
(footnote omitted).
First, the Plaintiffs rely on the comment evidence
which they characterized as direct evidence. The Court
found above that the alleged statements of Harry Soto
and the excerpt of his deposition testimony did not con-
stitute direct evidence. See supra at 7-11. With respect to
Soto’s deposition testimony to the effect that the result of
certain terminations and demotions at Fleming has been
to replace older more-experienced managers with youn-
ger less-experienced individuals, the Court finds that
such testimony does not constitute circumstantial evi-
dence which in and of itself suffices as a basis for an
inference of age discrimination. Similarly, Soto’s com-
ment to D’Angelo concerning the company’s need to
promote aggressive men is not probative of age discrimi-
nation. Rather, it is a “facially neutral” comment which
was not applied directly to Kanafani. See Young v. General
Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 829 (11th Cir. 1988). As the
Young court stated, such comment “regarding . . . aggress-
iveness, enthusiasm, and vigor [is] hardly surprising” in
App. 41
light of the competitive nature of the retail grocery busi-
ness. Id. With respect to Soto’s comment regarding the
need for a “younger influx of blood,” the Court finds that
such a comment may seem probative of age discrimina-
tion at first blush. However, assuming that the comment
was made, which is not at all clear,> the Court finds that
the context in which the comment was made was not
sufficiently fleshed out in the record to reveal the dis-
criminatory nature of the comment.
IV. CONCLUSION
In sum, the Court has considered the record as sub-
mitted in its entirety® and cannot find that the Plaintiffs
have made out a prima facie case of age discrimination
under the ADEA in that the evidence presented does not
result in the necessary inference. Even if the Court
assumed that the record supports such an inference, the
Court cannot find that the record also contains evidence
of pretext and/or evidence creating a triable issue as to
the Defendant’s proffered explanations for its termination
of the Plaintiffs. Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
> As stated supra pp. 9-10, former Hyde Park Market store
manager Charlie Guerra testified that an eniployee named Justo
relayed the comment at issue to Guerra. With its reply, however,
Fleming provided an affidavit of Justo Varela in which he
denied both having heard and repeated the comment to Guerra.
(Def.’s Reply at Ex. A, ¥ 3.)
6 As part of its consideration of the record, the Court has
specifically examined the “pretext evidence” set forth at pages
13 through 19 of the Plaintiff’s Response and finds that such
evidence is insufficient.
App. 42
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED. All other
pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT, and the Clerk
shall close this case forthwith. It is further
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Defendant
shall file a proposed final judgment within seven (7) days
of the date of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Miami, Flor-
ida, this 16 day of September, 1998.
/s/ Joan A. Lenard
JOAN A. LENARD
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
CC: Scott W. Rothstein, Esq.
Nationsbank Building
One Financial Plaza, Suite 2612
Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33394
Joseph L. Rebak, Esq.
Tew Cardenas et al.
Miami Center 26th Floor
201 South Biscayne Boulevard
Miami, Florida 33131-4336
——— oe
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