Opposition Brief — Citizens for Balanced Transportation v. Whitman (No. 99-1442)
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Supreme Court, U.S.
4) FILED
No. 99-1442 APR 1 2 9900
Supreme Court of the Whiten SARK
OCTOBER TERM, 1999
CITIZENS FOR BALANCED TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.
Cross-Petitioners,
Vv.
CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.,
Cross-Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF RESPONDENTS
AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., CHAMBER
OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL.*
-ROBIN S. CONRAD EDWARD W. WARREN
NATIONAL CHAMBER Counsel of Record
LITIGATION CENTER, INC. ROBERT R. GASAWAY
1615 H Street, N.W. JEFFREY B. CLARK
Washington, D.C. 20062 DARYL JOSEFFER
(202) 463-5337 KIRKLAND & ELLIS
Counsel for Cross-Respondent 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Chamber of Commerce of the Washington, D.C. 20005
United States (202) 879-5000
Counsel for Cross-Respondents
American Trucking Associations,
Inc. and Chamber of Commerce of
the United States
* Additional Parties and Counsel Listed on Inside Cover
April 12, 2000 _
BETH L. LAW
ROBERT S. DIGGES
ATA LITIGATION CENTER
2200 Mill Road
Alexandria, VA 22314
Counsel for American Trucking
Associations, Inc., Burns Motor
Freight, Inc., Garner Trucking,
Inc., and Genie Trucking Line, Inc.
GARY H. BAISE
ELIZABETH S. POLINER
BAISE, MILLER & FREER, P.C.
1020 19th Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
Counsel for Equipment
Manufacturers Institute
DAVID M. FRIEDLAND
BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND
1350 I Street, N.W.
Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20005
Counsel for National Small
Business United, The American
Portland Cement Alliance, and The
Glouster Company, Inc.
ERIKA Z. JONES
TIMOTHY S. BISHOP
ADAM C. SLOANE
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT
1909 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
Counsel for American Farm Bureau
Federation
ROBERT R. GASAWAY
KIRKLAND & ELLIS
655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 1200
Washington, D.C. 20005
Counsel for American Road and
Transportation Builders
Association
JAN S. AMUNDSON
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Counsel for National Association
of Manufacturers
DIMETRIA G. (JIM) DASKAL
THE DASKAL LAW GROUP
3 Church Circle
Suite 500
Annapolis, MD 21401
Counsel for National Coalition of
Petroleum Retailers
DOUGLAS I. GREENHAUS
NATIONAL AUTOMOBILE
DEALERS ASSOCIATION
8400 Westpark Drive
McLean, VA 22102
Counsel for National Automobile
Dealers Association
JEFFREY L. LEITER
CHET M. THOMPSON
COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &
SCOTT
3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20007
Counsel for Non-Ferrous
Founders’ Society
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Respondents are: American Trucking Associations, Inc.,
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, National Coalition
of Petroleum Retailers, Burns Motor Freight, Inc., Garner
Trucking, Inc., Genie Trucking Line, Inc., National Automobile
Dealers Association, National Association of Manufacturers,
National Small Business United, The American Portland
Cement Alliance, The Glouster Company, Inc., Non-Ferrous
Founders’ Society, Equipment Manufacturers Institute,
American Farm Bureau Federation, and American Road and
Transportation Builders Association.
None of these respondents (collectively “ATA”) has any
parent corporations, and no publicly traded company owns 10
percent or more of any of these respondents’ stock.
(ii)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ................-2000 i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..................00008 iii
TRO i ie dS 1
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE ............. 1
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .............. 3
I. ON THEIR FACE, THE FIRST TWO
QUESTIONS ARE UNWORTHY OF
CO oc ce oo eh aes cs i hea 3
Il. THE THIRD QUESTION IS EQUALLY
UNWORTHY OF CERTIORARI .............. 5
CONOCT TIN ohh 52 2h A a ces 7
(iii)
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases:
Mobil Oil oe. v. FPC,
SAT Shs Wee CREA os ha x hae Ea ee 4
Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana,
RTS ULE Zot COO os Fo cs oka eres eas A ORE aS 6
United States v. Johnston,
De Ue Cs ad bo a a EE i ch coe 3
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
SOO Ui OCP eo ks 8555 8d OR ee 4
4
Statutes:
Clean Air Act § 109(b), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) ........... 5
Clean Air Act § 169A, 42 U.S.C. § 7491 .............. 6
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century,
Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 6102, 112 Stat. 107 (1998) ..... 3
Miscellaneous:
Ge Pk. TU, Fee CEE hak 5 Sich ve ilv ences aeeaedeue 3
GE ed. Te: DES CANT) 655 hho ek 2, 6
I Rate es WU ae 5 a ob bs oH ee eae 3
Robert L. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice
CPU GR: SHR aS cis icarccnankeknene ua chee 4
INTRODUCTION
The Court should deny the cross-petition filed by Citizens
for Balanced Transportation, et al. (“CBT’’) because it has no
bearing on the important statutory interpretation questions
presented in the Government’s first question and ATA’s cross-
petition. CBT raises only collateral factual matters — matters
that are mere alternative grounds for invalidating EPA’s 1997
air-quality rules, would have no immediate impact on EPA’s
administration of the Clean Air Act (“CAA” or “Act”), are
based primarily on misrepresentations of the record, and were
not even squarely addressed below. To grant review of CBT’s
unworthy petition would serve only to further complicate what,
if the Court elects to review the decision below, would already
be an extraordinarily complex case.
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE
ATA provided a full and appropriate statement of the case in
its brief in opposition to the Government’s petition. By
contrast, CBT’s so-called “statement of the case” largely defies
rebuttal in light of its sheer length (23 pages) and penchant for
exaggeration. This counterstatement is accordingly limited to
the two most important points CBT raises: the Environmental
Protection Agency’s (“EPA’s” or “the Agency’s”) rejection of
CBT’s factual arguments regarding the proper level of the
24-hour primary National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(“NAAQS”) for fine particulate matter (“PM, ,”); and EPA’s
rejection of CBT’s ultimately factual arguments regarding the
proper level of the secondary NAAQS for PM, ,.
The gist of CBT’s argument on the first point is that a Risk
Assessment (“RA”) prepared by an outside consultant for the
Agency “unequivocally demonstrated” that the primary
standard selected by EPA is insufficient. See CBT Pet. at 7; see
also id. at 5-6. CBT asserts further that the Administrator
“provided no candid discussion of the results of her RA in the
final rule,” but instead “disingenuously dismissed with a single
sentence the evidence from her RA.” /d. at 6, 7. :
2
In fact, the Administrator discussed at length the various risk
assessments in the record, and explained that these
“quantitative risk estimates include significant uncertainty and,
therefore, should not be viewed as demonstrated health
impacts.” 62 Fed. Reg 38,652, 38,656 (1997) (emphasis
added). Indeed, “the inherent scientific uncertainties are too
great to support standards based on the lowest concentrations
measured in such studies.” Jd. at 38,675. The Agency’s Clean
Air Scientific Advisory Committee agreed: “[C]urrently the
risk assessments are of limited value ... .” JA(PM) 3163.
Based on this record, and its invalidation of EPA’s air-quality
standards on other grounds, the D.C. Circuit unanimously
deemed CBT’s arguments unworthy of discussion in its
published opinion. No D.C. Circuit judge voted to grant CBT’s
petition for rehearing on this issue.
With respect to the secondary NAAQS, CBT claims that
“EPA admitted that the level of the standard would continue to
allow adverse effects on . . . visibility.” CBT Pet. at 3. In
reality, the Agency concluded that the secondary standard
would remedy such adverse effects when considered “in
conjunction with” additional regional programs. See 62 Fed.
Reg. at 38,679 (emphasis added). EPA explained that reliance
on regional programs (in addition to the secondary NAAQS) is
appropriate in light of natural differences in visibility across the
various regions of the nation. See id. at 38,679-82. Indeed, a
NAAQS “intended to maintain or improve visibility conditions
[in] . . . parts of the West would have to be set at or even below
natural background levels in the East... .” Jd. at 38,680.
The court of appeals unanimously determined that it “need
not reach the main thrust of the petitioners’ challenge to the
secondary NAAQS” because it was already remanding that
NAAQS based on the statutory interpretation questions
presented in the Government’s petition and ATA’s cross-
petition. U.S. App. at 56a. No D.C. Circuit judge voted to
rehcar this issue either.
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————
3
On the same day that EPA issued its air-quality rules, the
President ordered the Agency to address the “remain{ing]
scientific uncertainties” by “promptly initiat[ing] anew review”
of the primary and secondary PM,, standards. 62 Fed. Reg.
38,421, 38,427 (1997). The President stressed that EPA must
conclude this review by July 2002, and must not “impos[e] . . .
any new controls related to the PM,, standards” before that
time. Jd. Shortly thereafter, Congress made this pledge
binding by enacting legislation delaying implementation of the
revised PM, ; NAAQS until PM, monitors have been put in
place and three years’ worth of data have been gathered. See
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No.
105-178, § 6102, 112 Stat. 107 (1998). Those events cannot
possibly occur anytime before the presidentially mandated
review is complete in 2002.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. ON THEIR FACE, THE FIRST TWO
QUESTIONS ARE UNWORTHY OF
CERTIORARI.
CBT’s first two questions do not even pretend to satisfy this
Court’s criteria for certiorari. The first question asserts that
EPA did not “‘articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action’”” in light of the record evidence, while the second
asserts that the 24-hour primary standard is contrary to that
record evidence. Both those questions involve one-case-only
issues that are facially unworthy of review. As this Court has
often stated, it “do[es] not grant certiorari to review evidence
and discuss specific facts.” United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S.
220, 227 (1925). Indeed, protecting the Court’s scarce
resources against dissipation in fact-bound cases is of sufficient
importance that the practice of denying certiorari in such cases
has been codified in the Court’s rules: “A petition for a writ of
certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of
erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.” Sup. Ct. R. 10. The Court thus will
“**intervene only in what ought to be the rare instance when the
4
[legal] standard appears to have been misapprehended or
grossly misapplied.” Mobil Oil Corp. v. FPC, 417 U.S. 283,
310 (1974) (emphasis added) (quoting Universal Camera Corp.
v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 491 (1951)).
This case surely is not the highly exceptional case in which
Supreme Court review of factual evidence is warranted. CBT
itself appears to sense as much, as it offers a conclusory
statement that CBT is also seeking “‘a writ addressed to the
proper standard for review that the court of appeals should have
applied.” CBT Pet. at 26. But that statement is mystifying.
The D.C. Circuit’s extensive opinion, far from applying an
incorrect standard of review, chose not to address CBT’s
meritless factual contentions at all.
Moreover, because the court of appeals remanded the EPA
rules that CBT challenges, CBT’s petition presents only
alternative grounds for affirmance of the judgment below.
Those grounds might theoretically become relevant if EPA
employs similar reasoning on a similar record on remand. But
that entirely hypothetical turn of events could occur several
years from now at the very earliest, given that Congress and the
President have effectively precluded EPA from impiemerting
any revised PM,; NAAQS before 2002, regardless of what
action, if any, this Court might take. See supra, at 3. In the
meantime, there clearly is no need for this Court to consider
CBT’s claims. See, e.g., Robert L. Stern, et al., Supreme Court
Practice § 4.16, at 196 (7th ed. 1993) (interlocutory certiorari
proper only for “important and clear-cut issue of /aw that is
fundamental to the further conduct of the case”) (emphasis
added; citing cases).
CBT’s extravagant assertion that this Court should
nonetheless grant certiorari because “millions of children, the
elderly, and [others] are at significant risk,” CBT Pet. at 25, is
also spurious. As noted in other filings in this case, the record
evidence simply does not support such assertions of a looming
health crisis. See, e.g., ATA Brief in Response at 4-7. Even if
it did, however, Congress and the President have authoritatively
5
prohibited EPA from responding. CBT’s first two questions
therefore present issues that not only are purely factual and
record-based, but also are, by law, of little or no real-world
importance. Such issues clearly do not warrant this Court’s
attention.
Il. THE THIRD QUESTION IS EQUALLY
UNWORTHY OF CERTIORARI.
Although CBT packages its third question as a legal issue,
that question too is ultimately fact-based and entirely unworthy
of review. CBT’s third question requests that this Court
consider whether “EPA may establish secondary national
ambient air quality standards for PM,, that fail to protect
against all known or anticipated adverse effects on public
welfare, including visibility.” CBT Pet. at i (emphasis added).
Even assuming that this question is a properly framed legal
issue, it plainly fails the criteria for certiorari. First, the court
of appeals’ decision undisputedly does not conflict with
decisions of this Court, another court of appeals, or even
another panel of the D.C. Circuit. Second, this issue was
decided unanimously by the D.C. Circuit and attracted no
interest by any member of that court on rehearing. Third, far
from being a matter of exceptional importance, the protections
of the secondary NAAQS are by definition not “requisite to
protect the public health” — the primary purpose of the statutory
protections of the Clean Air Act. See CAA § 109(b)(1, 2),
42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1, 2).
The court of appeals largely restricted itself to CBT’s
technical argument that EPA has “no discretion to decide that
some visibility impairment is better remedied through [a]
program” other than the secondary NAAQS, while declining to
reach “the main thrust of [CBT’s] challenge” because it had
invalidated the secondary NAAQS on other grounds. U.S.
App. at 56a, 57a. CBT’s third question therefore seeks
certiorari so that this Court may consider alternative grounds
for affirmance not fully considered below. Likewise, as with
6
CBT’s first two questions presented, the President and the
Congress have delayed implementation of the NAAQS at issue
—the secondary PM, , NAAQS — guaranteeing that any decision
by this Court will be devoid of real-world impact for years to
come.
But in addition to flunking the Court’s traditional criteria for
cert-worthy legal issues, CBT’s supposed legal claim simply
makes no sense. On one hand, CBT argues that EPA must
remedy “all adverse visibility effects through promulgation of
the secondary NAAQS,” rather than “through other means.”
CBT Pet. at 24 (emphasis added). On the other hand, it
contends that Section 169A, a subsequently-enacted provision
of the Act, “aims higher than the NAAQS” by requiring EPA
to impose additional visibility restrictions in certain specific
areas. See id. at 29 (citing CAA § 169A, 42 U.S.C. § 7491).
But if CBT’s interpretation of the secondary NAAQS
provisions were correct, “all adverse visibility effects” would
be required by law to be remedied by the secondary NAAQS,
and there would be no “additional” protection for Section 169A
or any other law to provide. CBT thus reads section 169A as
a statutory nullity — in contravention of the fundamental canon
that statutes must be read as a whole so as to give meaning to
each of their parts. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 249 (1985).
Not surprisingly, CBT ultimately retreats to yet another
purely factual contention — namely, that EPA’s Section 169A
program will prove insufficient to remedy adverse visibility
effects. See CBT Pet. at 28 (claiming “there is absolutely no
evidence in the record to support EPA’s assumption that the
regional haze program will eliminate adverse effects on
visibility”). That factual contention, like CBT’s other two
factual claims, is one that the court of appeals specifically
declined to reach. See U.S. App. at 56a. And besides being
incorrect, see 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,681-82, it is no more worthy
of certiorari than the other two unworthy issues that CBT also
presents. 3
7
CONCLUSION
There is no reason to complicate this case by granting
certiorari on collateral, fact-bound, and ultimately meritless
issues that generated no controversy below and will have no
practical effect for years to come. This Court should deny
CBT’s cross-petition. 3
Respectfully submitted,
ROBIN S. CONRAD EDWARD W. WARREN
NATIONAL CHAMBER Counsel of Record
LITIGATION CENTER, INC. ROBERT R. GASAWAY
1615 H Street, N.W. JEFFREY B. CLARK
Washington, D.C. 20062 DARYL JOSEFFER
(202) 463-5337 KIRKLAND & ELLIS
Counsel for Chamber of 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Commerce of the Washington, D.C. 20005
United States (202) 879-5000
Counsel for American
Trucking Associations, Inc.
and Chamber of Commerce of
the United States
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