Reply Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Whitman

Supreme Court brief2001

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Pie Supreme Court, U.S.

\%/ FILED

No. 99-1431 APR 2 6 2000

IN THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Anited States

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, ef ai.,

Cross-Petitione:s

¥.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, et ai.

Cross-Respondents

On Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

For the District of Columbia Circuit

REPLY BRIEF FOR

CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONERS

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, et al.

DAVID E. MENOTTI HENRY V. NICKEL

WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

JEFFERY A. KNIGHT (COUNSEL OF RECORD)

SHAWPITTMAN LUCINDA MINTON LANGWORTHY

2300 N Street, N.W. HUNTON & WILLIAMS

Washington, D.C. 20037 1900 K Street, N.W.

(202) 663-8675 Washington, D.C. 20006

Counsel for American (202) 955-1500

Forest & Paper Counsel for Appalachian Power

Association and American Co., et al., American Public

Tron & Steel Institute Power Association, and

National Association of

Home Builders

April 26, 2000

“ [Additional Counsel Listed Inside]

AANA EAR AIS ROE LEE I ATI TIN tI LEN IITE LES ME SETAE TEE LD LAER OLE STR MELE SEITE AIELLO EDIE TE

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001

NEWMAN R. PORTER

LEWIS AND ROCA

40 N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 262-5786

Counsel for Nevada Mining

Association, Newmont Gold

Company, and Meridian

Gold Company

RUSSELL S. FRYE

COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &

Scott, PLLC

3050 K Street, N.W., Suite 400

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 342-8878

and

RICHARD WASSERSTROM

AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER

ASSOCIATION, INC.

1111 19th Street, N.W.

8th Floor

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2582

Counsel for American Forest

& Paper Association, Inc.

GRANT CRANDALL

General Counsel

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031

(703) 208-7200

and

EUGENE M. TRISKO

P.O. Box 596

Berkeley Springs, WV 25411

(304) 258-1977

Counsel for United Mine

Workers of America,

AFL-CIO

DavD F. ZOLL

ALEXANDRA DAPOLITO DUNN

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION

1300 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 741-5165

Counsel for Chemical

Manufacturers Association

G. WILLIAM FRICK

M. ELIZABETH Cox

AMERICAN PETROLEUM

INSTITUTE

1220 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005 %

(202) 682-8250

Counsel for American Petroleum

Institute

HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.

NATIONAL MINING

ASSOCIATION

1130 17th Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-9793 j

Counsel for National Mining

Association

MARCELLE SHOOP

Vice President Law and

General Counsel ‘

KENNECOTT CORPORATION

8315 West 3595 South

P.O. Box 6001

Magna, Utah 84044-6001

(801) 252-3000

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, Kennecott

Energy and Coal Company,

and Kennecott Services

Company

PETER S. GLASER

SHOOK, HarDY & BACON

600 14th Street, N.W.

Suite 800

Wasshington, D.C. 20005

(202) 639-5627

Counsel for Western Fuels

Association, Inc.

MAURICE H. MCBRIDE

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL &

REFINERS ASSOCIATION

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for National

Petrochemical & Refiners

Association

" a a ot aa

¥ igi arts PLT. rs er As Spe > 2

sy . aes ee Sx et Vee a ri ae rite toy ee

eo “eke i : « Z q hcg A .

oF 2 “ Bs E

OR ‘ eee 4 : ‘i :

Soin. Retin i Sae h B re z

‘

'

Davi M. FLANNERY

JACKSON & KELLY

P.O. Box 553

1600 Laidley Tower

Charleston, WV 25322

(304) 340-1017

Counsel for Midwest Ozone

Group; and West Virginia

Chamber of Commerce

KURT E. BLASE

O’CONNOR & HANNAN

Suite 500

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-2803

(202) 887-1400

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, Kennecott

Energy and Coal Company,

Kennecott Services Company

and National Stone

Association

TIMOTHY L. HARKER

THE HARKER LAW FIRM

9500 Accord Drive

Potomac, MD 20854

(301) 983-0964

and

THOMAS J. GRAVES

NATIONAL PAINT AND COATINGS

ASSOCIATION, INC.

1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 462-6272

Counsel for National Paint and

Coatings Association

DAVID M. FRIEDLAND

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND

1350 I Street, N.W.

Suite 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

Counsel for Phoenix Cement

Company

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Rule 29.6, CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners

hereby amend the corporate disclosure statement filed with

the conditional cross-petition for a writ of certiorari. (Case

No. 99-1431). The page numbers of the conditional cross-

petition for a writ of certiorari on which CAA Industry

Cross-Petitioners requiring amended statements appear are

provided for convenience.

Carolina Power & Light Co (p. x)

(10% or greater owner: State Street Bank &

Trust Co. Boston)

Detroit Edison Co., The (p. xi)

(a subsidiary of DTE Energy Co.)

Meridian Gold Co. (p. xi)

(a wholly-owned subsidiary of Meridian Gold, Inc.)

Newmont Gold Co. (p. xi)

(10% or greater owner: Newmont Mining Corporation)

Otter Tail Power Co. (p. xi)

(10% or greater owner: Otter Tail Power Co. ESOP)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ....-.cccccccseeeosce-..., 1

CPE GP AIT II visite a Iv

a EDI SE NBDE ot Bs Sate A |

I. THE NATURE OF EPA’S AUTHORITY UNDER

CAA §109 IS CRITICAL TO EVALUATION

OF THE NONDELEGATION ISSUE ........cccccccceecccs-..... 1

I]. THE LOWER COURT’S HOLDING THAT EPA,

IN DEFINING AN INTELLIGIBLE

PRINCIPLE, MUST IGNORE FACTORS

CRITICAL TO SOUND POLICY JUDGMENT

IS. AN ISSUE OF EXCEPTIONAL

i te ag CRETE Sie NEE 4

CI ecivensiitiiinistibanasstisauatumeba. pce ese 10

ill

1V

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,

a A A IROD ssnicnscniciidahiniesanumubiensoniesiscimbiekincn 3

AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, 525 U.S.

PE hiiiciicassisaseanesciouanbacnpadatabtaaaaduiniadiniiniials 3

American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1176

te MS | Rp menesnoareee ern AON? EMR IRE Re |

American Trucking Associations, Inc. v. EPA, 175

F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified 195 F.3d 4

EEE sckicicadabhasdnieekdebiasecnashibeiuleddcitesamasdichths i

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)............. 2

Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir.

Sica ciseneskinslbeeinlh cen buateteplacieda bth doin tevcascakcea Rlaatdaaaratnckuss 2

Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. American

Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).................008 ye

J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276

Os I ies ceed ni sas adduanatumlbamalioicnpens 2

Reet V. EROS, S57 UG. VIG CBSE) vvssiscsissasnsrtsscecscsincsess 3

Lead Industries Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130

cs MTs, WII is hia ianscinies mcs Lia Cacdechaabsanccgbdeandtinni 7

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) .............. 3

National Cable Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United

SN FER ies OR ria cshsccccdinnenscinintoichesinins 3

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

FR ee a ls FD ei ecesssitdvciseasassscrvnes PY

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

ee ee AO A Gl, CIEE Peiniaiccinscscsinpeentsinienanvans 6

Vv

South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S.

ag RNEASY Pe CER OLN OCaD AT EEE EN CON 8

West v. Gilaom, S27 U.S. Z1Z CIGD) occcesccsscasccsnssescrceccases 6

ET i Ts Fee Tits FO i chitin cs nnccsntntnensnanncena 3

FEDERAL STATUTES

Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 ef seq.

(1994)

42 U.S.C. § 7401(b), CAA § 101(D) «0... ee 5

42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1), CAA § 101(b)(1)...... 9

EI. Fs He Oe i iiiincicterccesrscscrrensasnsens 6

42 U.S.C. § 7408, CAA § 1G .n...siciesceccesssccseeses passim

42 U.S.C. § 7409(b), CAA § 109(b) ...... ee 5,6

42 U.S.C. § 7409(d), CAA § 109(d) ....... eee eeeeeees 8

Ge UA. i et eB iiticaricnceccsessrcccnesnees 6-7

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

H.R. Rep. 95-294 (1977) reprinted in 4 Sen.

Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works,

A Legislative History of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1977 (Comm. Print 1978)............. 2,8

FEDERAL REGULATIONS

ee isis riicicssicacnsasnvnerennnsssnenamiensinnaninse’ 6

MISCELLANEOUS

Breyer, Stephen, Breaking the Vicious Circle

ithe ed iemibnainapeniioninnniae 5

Memorandum from Alicia Munnell to Art Fraas,

OMB (December 13, 1996) (EPA-

Docket No. A-95-58, Item IV-H-1)...............ceeee 9-10

ARGUMENT

In its response, EPA describes the “fundamental question”

here as not the constitutionality of the Clean Air Act (““CAA”

or “Act’), but a much narrower issue: whether the

nondelegation doctrine constrains the Agency’s discretion as

it applies the Act. EPA’s re-framing of the issue confirms

that, in any review of the lower court’s non-delegation

holding, this Court must address the nature and scope of the

Agency’s authority to define “intelligible principles” for

making risk management decisions. That is, if certiorari is

granted, the question of whether the nondelegation doctrine

constrains the Agency’s discretion cannot be_ resolved

without this Court examining the nature of the congressional

delegation -- an inquiry that requires review of the issue as

presented by CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners.

I. THE NATURE OF EPA’S AUTHORITY UNDER

CAA § 109 IS CRITICAL TO EVALUATION OF

THE NONDELEGATION ISSUE,

This case concerns EPA’s extraordinary claim of authority

to make risk management decisions without guiding

principles. Based on Lead Industries and cases that have

relied upon it,' EPA argued to the lower court that “nothing

in the statute requires [the Administrator] to make any

specific ‘findings’ or to structure her decisionmaking in any

particular way” when she judges risk under CAA § 109, even

when her choices lie along a continuum of uncertain and

indistinguishable health risks. EPA Resp. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-

' Lead Industries Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1980);

American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 665 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981);

NRDC v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990).

2

1441) 43. Indeed, EPA argued that when confronted with

uncertain and indistinguishable health risks, it may elect to

revise NAAQS as a policy matter even without a finding that

that action is needed to respond to “significant risk.””

It was this interpretation of CAA § 109 that led Non-State

CAA Petitioners (CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners here) to

argue that, because EPA interprets § 109 of the Act to require

no findings that a revised NAAQS will demonstrably

improve the public health, “EPA improperly reads § 109 as a

standardless delegation of authority.” Non-State CAA Pet’rs

and Intervenors Reply Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 17. And it

was this assertion by EPA of unbounded public health policy

judgment that led the lower court to hold that EPA’s

interpretation of the Act raised “nondelegation” concerns.

In its petition for certiorari, EPA claimed that the lower

court’s nondelegation ruling was worthy of certiorari because

it “conflicts with this Court’s decisions upholding

congressional enactments containing far broader grants of

authority” than the CAA and “raises questions respecting the

constitutionality of a broad range of federal statutes.” EPA

Pet. 9. In response, CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners

observed that the lower court “did not question Congress’

> EPA Resp. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 42. While EPA argues that the

significant risk standard of /ndustrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. API, 448

U.S. 607 (1980) is not applicable, the “significant risk” standard has been

endorsed by Congress as the threshold for public health regulation under

the Clean Air Act. See H.R. Rep. 95-294, at 3, 48-49 (1977) reprinted in

4 Sen. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, A Legislative History of the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, at 2470, 2515-16 (Comm. Print

1978) (“1977 Legis. Hist.”); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1063

(D.C. Cir. 1995); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 16, 31-32 (D.C. Cir.

1976).

3

authority to legislate in broad terms,” “[nJor did the court

hold that § 109 is unconstitutional.” CAA Ind. Resp. 13.

EPA now agrees that the lower court did not attack the

constitutionality of the CAA. EPA therefore re-frames the

question as follows:

The fundamental question here’ remains

whether the nondelegation doctrine provides

constitutional limitations on an agency’s

action.

EPA Resp. 20; see also EPA Reply 3-4. The cases cited by

CAA Industry Respondents show that it clearly does.’

In clarifying the issue on which it seeks certiorari, EPA

demonstrates why certiorari, if it is granted, must address the

nondelegation issue as presented by CAA Industry Cross-

Petitioners. As this Court has explained, there is nothing

wrong with broad delegations so long as the agency

articulates the principles by which it exercises its authority.

3 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374 n.7 (1989)

(nondelegation doctrine requires narrow construction of statutes that

might otherwise be unconstitutional); /ndustrial Union Dep't, 448 US. at

646 (plurality opinion) (agency should be allowed to characterize statute

in a way to avoid unconstitutional delegation); National Cable Television

Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) (“the hurdles

revealed in [A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.

495 (1935) and J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394

(1928)] lead us to read the [Independent Offices Appropriation Act] to

avoid constitutional problems”); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1965)

(construing statute so as to avoid an invalid delegation); Kent v. Dulles,

357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (the act in question does “not delegate to the

Secretary the kind of authority exercised”); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils.

Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 388-89, 119 S.Ct. 721, 734-35 (1999); see generally

CAA Ind. Resp. 14-16 (and accompanying notes).

4

And the Agency cannot get those principles right unless it

follows the guidance Congress gave it in making the

delegation. If, as EPA now agrees, the question is whether

nondelegation constrains the Agency’s discretion as it applies

the statute, then the issue can be resolved only by examining

the terms of Congress’ delegation, requiring this Court to

address precisely what those terms are.*

Il. THE LOWER COURT’S HOLDING THAT EPA,

IN DEFINING AN INTELLIGIBLE PRINCIPLE,

MUST IGNORE FACTORS CRITICAL TO

SOUND POLICY JUDGMENT IS AN ISSUE OF

EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE,

In attempting to explain why the issue presented by Cross-

Petitioners is, in its view, not worthy of certiorarl, EPA

mischaracterizes it. EPA argues strenuously that the cost or

technological feasibility of pollution controls should not be

allowed to override protection of public health. See, e.g.,

EPA Resp. 6, 9. But this is not the issue; no one in this case

is arguing that public health protection is not the primary

purpose of NAAQS.

Rather, EPA’s own science advisers have found that

uncertainties in the scientific data related to both particulate

matter and ozone are so large that it is not clear that revising

the NAAQS will improve public health. See CAA Ind.

* For this reason, Massachusetts and New Jersey are incorrect in asserting

that the question presented in our conditional Cross-Petition “is not

properly presented at this time.” See Mass. & NJ Resp. 9-10 n.5. For the

same reason, while EPA acknowledges that the D.C. Circuit would be

required to engage in arbitrary and capricious review on remand, see

EPA Resp. 19, such review is not possible until EPA defines the legal

standard (or “intelligible principle”) governing Agency action. See CAA

Ind. Cross-Pet. 17.

5

Cross-Pet. 11-12. Against this background, Cross-Petitioners

have asked this Court to address whether EPA is constrained

to exercise its discretion in a manner that promotes the

“public health” generally and effectuates the broad

congressional purposes of the Act as enunciated in CAA

§ 101(b), CAA ICP App. la. See CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 6, 21-

23.

EPA fails to address the real issue here -- that it chose

among alternative standards any of which would protect

against small and uncertain health risks with no discernible

principle for choosing. The only thing EPA can tell us

precisely is what principle it did not apply, and that is

consideration of “costs.” Indeed, so devoted is EPA to the

“no cost” principle that it prefers to ignore health “costs”

(i.e., cancer and cataracts) from increased UVB radiation

exposure, hardly a process that promotes the “public” health.

See also EPA App. 15a, n.4.

EPA asserts that it is precluded from considering factors

that one would normally associate with sound risk

management judgment’ by the language of § 109(b), which

requires that NAAQS be “requisite to protect the public

health.” EPA App. 1lla. But EPA completely ignores

> See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle 22-23 (1993).

° EPA now apparently agrees with CAA Industry Respondents, however,

that the “requisite to protect” language of § 109 requires EPA to a

determine that NAAQS revision is “necessary to protect” public health

and welfare. See EPA Resp. at 9. This is not the position EPA took

before the lower court. Compare Ozone Non-State CAA Pet’rs and

Intervenors Pet. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 37-38 (“[T]he plain meaning of the

word ‘requisite’ is ‘indispensable’ or ‘necessary,’ suggesting that the

Administrator must establish a need for the revised standard to avoid

unacceptable health risk.”), with EPA Resp. Br. (D.C. Cir. 97-1441) 42

(Petitioners argue that EPA must “demonstrate that the revised standard

6

other language of § 109 addressed by CAA Industry Cross-

Petitioners, directing that EPA allow an “adequate margin of

safety” in setting NAAQS and that NAAQS be revised only

as the Administrator determines “may be appropriate” in

light of § 109(b) and § 108. EPA App. 11 1la-112a; CAA ICP

App. la-2a.

In accordance with other decisions addressing language

similar to that used in the NAAQS provision, terms such as

“adequate” and “appropriate” on their face do not preclude

consideration of costs; they must be interpreted.’ Interpreting

them, however, is precisely what EPA (with the lower court’s

blessing) has refused to do." Moreover, EPA never explains

why “the ample margin of safety” language of § 112 does not

is ‘needed to improve demonstrably the overall public health’....

Petitioners’ ‘test’ has no basis in the statute.”’).

” NRDC vy. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (“Vinyl

Chloride”) (interpreting the word “ample”); cf West v. Gibson, 527 U.S.

212, --, 119 S.Ct. 1906, 1910 (1999) (addressing the term “appropriate”’).

* See. eg, EPA App. 19a (The nature of EPA’s risk management

authority is resolved under “Chevron step one” because the “statute on its

face does not allow consideration of technological or economic

feasibility” (emphasis added).). Curiously, EPA takes a very different

position regarding what it characterizes as the “detailed statutory

scheme” in CAA Subpart 2, arguing that it must be given discretion to

reach a result different from the result Congress reached in Subpart 2.

See EPA Reply 6. EPA has it backwards — broad delegations must be

interpreted; detailed statutory schemes must be implemented. In this

regard, CAA Industry Cross-Petitioners also note that, contrary to EPA’s

claim, see EPA Reply 8, their petition for review below challenged the

entire ozone NAAQS rule, including 40 C.F.R. § 50.9(b).

7

on its face preclude consideration of costs, yet the “adequate

margin of safety” language of § 109 does.’

Furthermore, the nature of EPA’s authority to make risk

management decisions when confronted with a continuum of

uncertain and indistinguishable health risks has not been

addressed by over 20 years of judicial decisions, as EPA

suggests. See EPA Resp. 7-8. Lead Industries addressed, for

a threshold pollutant, the issue whether EPA was required to

consider the cost and technological feasibility of pollution

controls in setting NAAQS. The D.C. Circuit, the only court

besides this one with authority to review decisions on

NAAQS, has expanded upon that decision since that time

without pausing to reflect upon its applicability to non-

threshold pollutants that call for the exercise of risk

management judgment. See, e.g., NRDC, 902 F.2d 962.

Nor is the issue resolved in EPA’s favor by legislative

history. EPA emphasizes that the CAA is a “technology

forcing” statute. See EPA Resp. 12. But this proves little,

because the CAA would still be technology forcing if

NAAQS were set to reflect sound risk management

principles. Similarly, EPA cites legislative history for the

proposition that sources may have to shut down if they

cannot meet the NAAQS. /d. at 13. But sources would still

have to shut down if they could not meet NAAQS that reflect

sound risk management principles. _

EPA also points to legislative history from the 1977

Amendments to the CAA suggesting that the requirement

that EPA obtain the advice of an independent committee on

adverse health, welfare, social, economic, and energy effects

° Compare EPA Resp. 9 n.6, 17, with CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 9-11 and

Midwest States Br. 13.

8

of a NAAQS revision should not be used to reject state

implementation plans, and that this information “may be of

interest” to Congress in fashioning future legislation. But the

requirement of § 109(d) that this information be developed in

conjunction with decisions on NAAQS revisions suggests

that it is to be considered by EPA, and nothing in the statute

or the legislative history cited by EPA suggests otherwise."°

In light of its understanding that certain pollutants might

present no threshold for health effects, Congress in 1977

ultimately rejected an approach suggested by some that

NAAQS “are to protect against all known or anticipated

effects .. . [since] this no risk philosophy ignores all social

and economic consequences and is impractical.”'' EPA does

not even address this legislative history, which suggests that

'0 See CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 5, 22. Indeed, the Government and CBT’s

citation to Committee Reports, and to provisions of the 1990

Amendments to the Clean Air Act that are separate from § 109, see EPA

Resp. 15; CBT Resp. 2, in order to explicate the intent of the 1970 and

1977 Congresses in enacting the provision at issue here, stretches the

claim that Congress was clear in narrowly prescribing the Agency’s

discretion in setting NAAQS. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522

U.S. 329, 355 (1998) (“[w]e have often observed... that ‘the views of a

subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an

earlier one.’”’) (citation omitted).

'' See H.R. Rep. No. 95-294, at 127, reprinted in 1977 Legis. Hist., at

2594; CAA Ind. Cross-Pet. 5-6, 9, n.30; see also H.R. Rep. No. 95-294,

at 110, reprinted in 1977 Legis. Hist., at 2577 (recognizing unavailability

of thresholds on which to base NAAQS); id. at 106, reprinted in 1977

Legis. Hist., at 2573 (noting that NAAQS are to reduce, but not

eliminate, risk and that the combination of the “Prevention of Significant

Deterioration” and NAAQS programs would serve to provide for

“maximum feasible protection”) (emphasis added).

9

risk management authority should be exercised in light of the

broader purposes of the Act.’

EPA is left with little else except to assert that CAA

Industry Cross-Petitioners’ view of “wise social policy”

differs from that of Congress, EPA Resp. 13, without ever

explaining why Congress’ statement of policy must be

ignored in construing that statute. EPA’s view of “wise

social policy,” of course, precludes consideration of both

direct and indirect public health risks associated with

NAAQS revision (e.g., risks associated with increased UVB

radiation exposure and disruption to the congressional ozone

reduction program). But Congress wrote § 109 to focus on

the “public” health, and these considerations are clearly

relevant to the public health.

Moreover, Congress explained that the purpose of the Act

is to promote health and welfare and the productive capacity

of the population. CAA § 101(b)(1), CAA ICP App. la. If

anything, this statutory language and legislative history

indicate that Congress knew that a profligate commitment of

money and resources to address one set of uncertain risks

could increase, or limit the means to cope with, other more

serious risks."

'? ALA’s extended discussion of legislative history, see ALA Resp. 14-

24, is similarly off the mark because it does not address congressional

intent regarding the exercise of risk management judgment for non-

threshold pollutants.

'? In this regard, EPA does not dispute that its estimate of the costs of

attaining the ozone standard outweighs the benefits, and that the costs of

attaining the PM standards are an extraordinarily-high $37 billion

annually. And while EPA suggests that it has “historically overestimated

the actual cost” of NAAQS implementation, we know in this case that the

Council of Economic Advisers concluded that EPA may well have

substantially underestimated those costs. See Memorandum from Alicia

CONCLUSION

The issue of EPA’s discretion to consider “costs” when

confronted with a continuum of uncertain health risks is one

of great importance. Because EPA’s NAAQS decisions have

such extraordinary impacts on society and the national

economy, and because this Court can evaluate whether the

nondelegation doctrine constrains the Agency’s action here

only by addressing the nature and scope of EPA’s authority

to define “intelligible principles” on remand, CAA Industry

Cross-Petitioners request that the Conditional Cross-Petition

in No. 99-1431 be granted.

DAVID E. MENOTTI

WILLIAM F. PEDERSEN

JEFFERY A. KNIGHT

SHAWPITTMAN

2300 N Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 663-8675

Counsel for American Forest

& Paper Association and

American Iron & Steel

Institute

Respectfully submitted,

HENRY V. NICKEL

F. WILLIAM BROWNELL

(Counsel of Record)

LUCINDA M. LANGWORTHY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

Counsel for Appalachian

Power Co., et al., American

Public Power Association,

and National Association of

Home Builders

Munnell to Art Fraas, OMB (Dec. 13, 1996) (EPA Docket No. A-95-58,

Item IV-H-1).

NEWMAN R. PORTER

LEWIS AND ROCA

_ 40N. Central Avenue

Phoenix, AZ 85004

(602) 262-5786

Counsel for Nevada Mining

Association, Newmont Gold

Company, and Meridian Gold

Company

MAURICE H. MCBRIDE

NATIONAL PETROCHEMICAL

REFINERS ASSOCIATION

1899 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 457-0480

Counsel for National

Petrochemical & Refiners

Association

DAVID M. FLANNERY

JACKSON & KELLY

P.O. Box 553

1600 Laidley Tower

Charleston, WV 25322

(304) 340-1017

Counsel for Midwest Ozone

Group; and West Virginia

Chamber of Commerce

DAVID F. ZOLL

ALEXANDP *. DAPOLITO DUNN

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS

ASSOCIATION

1300 Wilson Boulevard

Arlington, VA 22209

(703) 741-5165

Counsel for Chemical

Manufacturers Association

G. WILLIAM FRICK

M. ELIZABETH COX

AMERICAN PETROLEUM

INSTITUTE

1220 L Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 682-8250

Counsel for American Petroleum

Institute

HAROLD P. QUINN, JR.

NATIONAL MINING

ASSOCIATION

1130 17" Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-9793

Counsel for National Mining

Association

KURT BLASE

O’CONNOR & HANNAN

Suite 500

1666 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006-2803

(202) 887-1400

Counsel for Kennecott

Holdings Corporation,

Kennecott Energy and

Coal Company, Kennecott

Services Company, and

National Stone Association

RUSSELL S. FRYE

COLLIER, SHANNON, RILL &

Scott, PLLC

3050 K Street, N.W., Ste. 400

Washington, D.C. 20007

(202) 342-8878

and

RICHARD WASSERSTROM

AMERICAN FOREST & PAPER

ASSOCIATION, INC.

1111 19" Street, N.W., 8" Flr.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2582

Counsel for American Forest

& Paper Association, Inc.

MARCELLE SHOOP

Vice President Law and

General Counsel

KENNECOTT CORPORATION

8315 West 3595 South

P.O. Box 6001

Magna, Utah 84044-6001

(801) 252-3000

Counsel for Kennecott Holdings

Corporation, Kennecott

Energy and Coal Company,

and Kennecott Services Co.

TIMOTHY L. HARKER

THE HARKER LAW FIRM

9500 Accord Drive

Potomac, MD 20854

(301) 983-0964

and

THOMAS J. GRAVES

NATIONAL PAINT AND

COATINGS ASSOCIATION,

INC.

1500 Rhode Island Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 462-6272

Counsel for National Paint and

Coatings Association

GRANT CRANDALL

General Counsel

UNITED MINE WORKERS OF

AMERICA, AFL-CIO

8315 Lee Highway

Fairfax, VA 22031

(703) 208-7200

and

EUGENE M. TRISKO

P.O. Box 596

Berkeley Springs, WV 25411

(304) 258-1977

Counsel for United Mine

Workers of America, AFL-CIO

April 26, 2000

PETER S. GLASER

SHOOK, HARDY & BACON

600 14" Street, N.W., Ste. 800

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 639-5627

Counsel for Western Fuels

Association, Inc.

DAVID M. FRIEDLAND

BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND

1350 I Street, N.W., Ste. 700

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 789-6000

Counsel for Phoenix Cement Co.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.