Opposition Brief — Appalachian Power Co. v. Whitman

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Nos. 99-1426, 99-

In the Supreme Court of the United States —

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Vv.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

CITIZENS FOR BALANCED TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Vv.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONS FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL CROSS-RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

GARY S. GUZY Department of Justice

General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Environmental Protection (202) 514-2217

Agency

Washington, D.C. 20415

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the court of appeals properly reaffirmed

the long-standing principle that, in setting and revising

National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)

under Section 109 of the Clean Air Act, the Environ-

mental Protection Agency (EPA) may not consider the

costs, technical feasibility, or other alleged effects of

implementing measures to attain the NAAQS (Nos. 99-

1426 and 99-1431).

2. Whether the court of appeals properly resolved

various claims, by postponing decision or rejecting

them outright, that EPA’s primary and secondary

NAAQS for fine particulate matter (PM,,) are inade-

quate to protect public health and welfare (No. 99-

1442).

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Statement 2

Argument 5

Conclusion 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) 8

American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d

1176 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034

(1982) 8

American Petroleum Inst. v. Gorsuch, cert. denied,

455 U.S. 1034 (1982) 8

Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574

(1983) 15

California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement

v. Dillingham Const., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316

(1997) 21

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 3,9

Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum

Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) 14-15

Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980) ............ 3,8,9,12,14

Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307

(9th Cir. 1992; 10

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) ............. 6, 18

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA:

824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 8, 9, 12, 16, 17

902 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

1082 (1991) 3, 8, 12

St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, cert. denied, 449

U.S. 1042 (1980) 8

(IIT)

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility

Management Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775 (D.C.

Cir. 1998) 10

Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367

(1969) 15

Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

421 U.S. 60 (1975) 7, 10, 13, 16

Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246 (1976) ........s00s000ee0e 7 4,

18, 16

Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1997) .........0+ 12

Statutes:

Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 9-148, § 2,

81 Stat. 485 7

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S. 7401 et seq.:

§ 108, 42 U.S.C. 7408 9, 10, 14, 18

§ 108(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2) 10

§ 109, 42 U.S.C. 7409 7,9, 14, 17, 18

§ 109(b), 42 U.S.C. 7409(b) 9

§ 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1) 7,9, 10

§ 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2) 5

§ 109(d)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(B) 14

§ 109(d)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(C) 14

§ 109(d)(2)(C)iv), 42 U.S.C. T409(d (2) CGV) .....secceeeees 4

§ 110, 42 U.S.C. 7410 2B

§ 110(k), 42 U.S.C. 7410(k) 12

§ 112,42 U.S.C. 7412 17

§ 160(1), 42 U.S.C. 7470(1) 23

§ 169A, 42 U.S.C. 7491 5

§§ 181-192, 42 U.S.C. 7511-7514a 15

§ 307(d)9), 42 U.S.C. 7607(d)(9) 19

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.

91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 7,10

§ 110, 84 Stat. 1680 12

§ 111(e)(1), 84 Stat. 1682 10

§ 111(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1683 10

Statutes—Continued: Page

§ 231(b), 84 Stat. 1704 10

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No.

90-95, 91 Stat. 685 14

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.

101-549, Tit. I, 94 Stat. 2399 15

Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. 651

et seq. 16

29 U.S.C. 655(b) 16

29 U.S.C. 655(b)(5) 16

29 U.S.C. 658-659 16

Miscellaneous:

36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971) 8

62 Fed. Reg.:

p. 38,652 5

p. 38,669... 22

pp. 38,669-38,671 22

pp. 38,653-38,688 8

p. 38,671 22

p. 38,676 22

p. 38,683 5

p. 38,685 14

p. 38,702 17

H.R. Rep. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1

(1990) 15

H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977) ...........ss+0+ 14

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) .........+ 12, 13, 16

S. Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) .........ccscseseees 15

—

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 99-1426

AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC., ET AL.,

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Vv.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

No. 99-1431

APPALACHIAN POWER COMPANY, ET AL.,

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY, ET AL.

No. 99-1442

CITIZENS FoR BALANCED TRANSPORTATION, ET AL.,

CROSS-PETITIONERS

Vv.

CAROL M. BROWNER, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON CONDITIONAL CROSS-PETITIONS FOR A WRIT

OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL CROSS-RESPONDENTS

IN OPPOSITION

(1)

2

STATEMENT

The federal government’s petition for a writ of

certiorari (No. 99-1257) seeks review of the court of

appeals’ ruling that the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) has interpreted the Clean Air Act

(CAA) in a way that effects an unconstitutional dele-

gation of legislative power. 99-1257 Pet. I. The petition

also challenges the court of appeals’ premature and

mistaken ruling limiting how EPA may implement one

of the two remanded National Ambient Air Quality

Standards (NAAQS) at issue—the ozone NAAQS.

Ibid. The cross-petitions seek to introduce two sets of

unrelated issues involving particular details of the

underlying rulemakings.

First, two groups of industrial interests, the Ameri-

can Trucking Associations, e¢ al. (ATA), and Appala-

chian Power Company, et al. (APC), ask this Court to

review the court of appeals’ unanimous statutory ruling

that, in setting and revising NAAQS, EPA is precluded

from considering the economic costs and effects of

implementing those standards. ATA Cross-Pet. i; APC

Cross-Pet. i. That ruling reaffirms EPA’s 20-year-old

construction of the CAA and a series of unanimous

judicial decisions stretching over 20 years. See 99-1257

Pet. App. 19a-21a. |

Second, a group of environmental interests, Citizens

for Balanced Transportation, e¢ al. (CBT), seeks review

of particular challenges to EPA’s selection of the 24-

hour primary NAAQS for particulate matter (PM) of

2.5 microns or less (PM,,) and its selection of the

secondary NAAQS for PM,,;. CBT Cross-Pet. i. The

court of appeals concluded that it could not reach most

of those issues in light of its remand to the agency. See

99-1257 Pet. App. 4a-5a.

3

We describe below the court’s reasoning on the

issues raised by the cross-petitions.

1. The court of appeals’ decision in this case ad-

dresses a broad range of industry and environmental

challenges to EPA’s ozone and PM NAAQS. Among

other things, the decision reiterates the long settled

principle that, “in setting NAAQS under § 109(b) of the

Clean Air Act, the EPA is not permitted to consider the

cost of implementing those standards.” 99-1257 Pet.

App. 19a. The court of appeals has consistently held

that EPA must set NAAQS based on the “health

effects relating to pollutants in the air” and not on

alleged costs or other effects that may result from

implementation of the NAAQS. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 973 (D.C.

Cir. 1990) (EPA need not consider alleged health effects

associated with unemployment), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

1082 (1991); see also Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647

F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042

(1980).

The court expressly considered and rejected ATA’s

and APC’s arguments that it should reconsider its

decision in Lead Industries because that case was

decided without the benefit of this Court’s decision in

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). The court explained:

The Lead Industries decision was made in Chevron

step one terms, * * * as the post-Chevron progeny

of Lead Industries have made clear. [Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA], 902 F.2d

[962,] 973 [(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

1082 (1991)] (“Consideration of costs . . . would be

flatly inconsistent with the statute, legislative his-

tory and case law on this point”); NRDC v. EPA,

4

824 F.2d 1146, 1158-59 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (in banc)

(“Vinyl Chloride”) (“[S]tatute on its face does not

allow consideration of technological or economic

feasibility.”).

99-1257 Pet. App. 19a-20a.

The court of appeals additionally considered and

rejected the argument that, even if EPA could not

consider costs in initially setting NAAQS, it could do so

when revising NAAQS. 99-1257 Pet. App. 20a. Finally,

the court rejected the industrial groups’ argument that

Congress’s directions to the Clean Air Scientific Advi-

sory Committee (CASAC) to advise EPA on, among

other things, “any adverse public health, welfare, social,

economic, or energy effects which may result from

various strategies for attainment and maintenance” of

NAAQS, CAA, § 109(d)(2)(C)(iv), 42 U.S.C.

7409(d)(2)(C)(iv), signals that EPA should consider

those factors in revising NAAQS. 99-1257 Pet. App.

Zla. Instead, the CAA directs CASAC to provide that

advice in light of EPA’s separate duty to give the

States information on control strategies. Ibid.

2. CBT challenged as arbitrary and capricious

EPA’s decision not to set a more stringent 24-hour pri-

mary NAAQS and more stringent 24-hour and annual

secondary NAAQS for PM,;. Because the court of

appeals remanded the PM,,; NAAQS on nondelegation

grounds, the court of appeals did not rule on CBT’s

claims except in one narrow respect. 99-1257 Pet. App.

5a, 56a. In the final rule, EPA had announced its deci-

sion to address adverse effects that fine PM may have

on visibility by establishing secondary PM,, NAAQS

(at the same levels as the primary PM,, NAAQS) and

by implementing the Regional Haze Program described

in Section 169A of the CAA, 42 U.S.C 7491. 99-1257

5

Pet. App. 56a; 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,688 (1997). The

court of appeals rejected CBT’s argument that Section

109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(2), requires EPA to set sec-

ondary NAAQS that will eliminate all adverse effects

on visibility and deprives EPA of authority to address

some impairment of visibility through another program.

99-1257 Pet. App. 57a. The court explained that the

CAA included the Regional Haze Program to address

adverse effects on visibility that may persist in areas

such as national parks “notwithstanding attainment and

maintenance of all [NAAQS].” Ibid.

3. Neither ATA, APC, nor any other party sought

rehearing on the cost issue. CBT filed petitions for

rehearing and rehearing en banc as to all of its claims.

CBT’s petitions were denied without dissent. 99-1257

Pet. App. 71a, 101a.

ARGUMENT

As our petition for a writ of certiorari explains, the

court of appeals has erred in two fundamental respects:

(1) it remanded EPA’s revised PM and ozone NAAQS

based on an aberrant notion of the nondelegation doc-

trine (99-1257 Pet. 9-10, 11-19); and (2) it prematurely

and mistakenly decided how EPA should eventually

implement the ozone NAAQS (99-1257 Pet. 19-80). As

our reply brief explains, respondents have failed to

provide persuasive reasons against review. Instead,

they have recharacterized the court of appeals’ decision

in ways that obfuscate the issues. The cross-petitions

at issue here add another layer of complexity and con-

fusion. They raise no issue that would independently

warrant review or that would assist the Court in re-

solving the core nondelegation issue. To the contrary,

the cross-petitions would complicate the case with

issues that, on the one hand, have long been settled or,

6

on the other hand, the court of appeals had no occasion

to reach.

1. The flaws in the court of appeals’ nondelegation

analysis are not difficult to discern. This Court has

developed the nondelegation doctrine to preserve the

Constitution’s separation of governmental powers.

E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-372

(1989). It prohibits Congress from vesting its legislative

power in an executive branch agency. [bid. The court

of appeals erred becouse it misconceived the nondele-

gation doctrine as a ,udicial check on agency discretion.

See 99-1257 Pet. App. 14a. The court of appeals’ deci-

sion confuses two distinct lines of inquiry and, in the

process, wrongly sets aside legitimate agency action.

The Court should therefore correct that fundamental

misconception and remand the case to the court of

appeals with directions to review the EPA’s rules

under the correct standard of review. See 99-1257 EPA

Reply Br. 2-6.

ATA and APC urge a different course. They argue

that the Court should broaden the inquiry and use the

court of appeals’ mistake as a vehicle for setting aside

long-settled statutory principles that have guided

EPA’s implementation of the CAA for 30 years. They

specifically challenge the firmly established principle

that EPA should set NAAQS based on the public health

and welfare effects caused by the pollutant’s presence

in the ambient air and not on the potential economic

costs or other alleged effects of implementing the

NAAQS. See ATA Cross-Pet. 14-27; APC Cross-Pet.

14-25. The court of appeals was divided on the non-

delegation issue, but it unanimously rejected the indus-

trial groups’ arguments on this point and reiterated its

past holding that the CAA directs that questions of

economic costs and the other effects of implementing

7

NAAQS can be considered only as part of the imple-

mentation process. 99-1257 Pet. App. 19a-21a.

The Court should decline ATA’s and APC’s invitation

to complicate consideration of the nondelegation issue.

The court of appeals’ decision is correct as to the issue

they raise. Moreover, it rests on settled law that has

long guided the actions of EPA, Congress, and the

courts. Contrary to ATA’s urgings, the constitutional

question of whether Congress has vested EPA with

legislative power is not “tightly intertwined” (ATA

Cross-Pet. 7) with the statutory issue of whether

Congress directed EPA to set NAAQS based solely on

health and welfare effects of ambient pollution concen-

trations.

a. Congress introduced the NAAQS-based frame-

work through the enactment of the Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1970." Since that time, EPA has

consistently applied Section 109 according to its

terms, which require EPA to set primary NAAQS at

levels “requisite to protect the public health.” CAA

§ 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). EPA has consistently

rejected the notion that, when promulgating NAAQS, it

may consider costs, technical feasibility, or related

factors.” ATA and APC ask this Court to overturn 20

1 As this Court has recognized, Congress was dissatisfied with

progress under the Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 2,

81 Stat. 485, and enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 to

make far-reaching changes in the Nation’s approach to air pollution

control. Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421

U.S. 60, 64 (1975); see Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246,

256-257 (1976).

2 When promulgating the first NAAQS, Administrator Ruck-

elshaus announced that no revisions were made to the proposed

NAAQS in response to comments questioning the feasibility of

their implementation. He stated that the CAA “does not permit

8

years of court of appeals precedent—decided in the

course of reviewing predecessor NAAQS—upholding

that interpretation.’

As ATA acknowledges (Cross-Pet. 5-6), this Court

has repeatedly declined to review the issue that ATA

and APC press here.‘ There is no reason to reach a

different result now. ATA offers no support for its

claim that the court of appeals itself “now lacks confi-

dence” in the holding of Lead Industries (Cross-Pet. 17-

18). To the contrary, the court of appeals has re-

peatedly rejected ATA’s and APC’s principal argu-

ments without a single dissent.’ The cross-petitions do

not raise a controversial issue; the entire District of

any factors other than health to be taken into account in setting

the primary standards.” 36 Fed. Reg. 8186 (1971). See also, e.g., 62

Fed. Reg. at 38,683-38,688 (detailed response to comments on this

issue in the PM rulemaking).

3 American Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir.

1998); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 902 F.2d

962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1082 (1991);

American Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1185 (D.C. Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1034 (1982); Lead Indus. Ass’n v.

EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042

(1980); see also Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA,

824 F.2d 1146, 1158-1159 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc) (Vinyl

Chloride).

4 See Pet. at 8-11, St. Joe Minerals Corp. v. EPA, cert. denied,

449 U.S. 1042 (1980) (No. 80-483); Pet. at 18-23, American Petro-

leum Inst. v. Gorsuch, cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1084 (1982) (No. 80-

871).

5 Since 1980, 15 judges of the District of Columbia Circuit—

including Judge Bork writing for the court en banc in Vinyl

Chloride—have expressed approval of EPA’s interpretation. Con-

trary to APC’s assertion (Cross-Pet. 24), nothing in any of the

decisions after Lead Industries remotely suggests that the court of

appeals felt “its hands were tied” by that decision. See cases cited

in note 3, supra.

9

Columbia Circuit has long viewed the matter as settled.

See 99-1257 Pet. App. 19a. Indeed, if ATA and APC

thought otherwise, they should have challenged the

panel’s unanimous ruling through a petition for re-

hearing en banc.

The court of appeals and EPA have correctly con-

cluded that Congress “has directly spoken to the pre-

cise question at issue.” Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842

(1984). Section 109(b)(1) of the CAA directs EPA to set

primary NAAQS at a level “requisite to protect the

public health.” See 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). It does not

direct EPA to consider economic and other costs when

setting NAAQS, and there is no basis for inferring that

Congress intended those factors to be considered at

that initial stage of the regulatory process. The lan-

guage and structure of the 1970 CAA demonstrate that

the overriding purpose of NAAQS promulgation is to

determine, as the first step of the CAA regulatory

program, the ambient air quality standards that are

necessary to protect the public health and welfare.

Neither Section 108, which specifies the kinds of factual

information upon which NAAQS must be based, nor

Section 109, which contains the legal test NAAQS must

meet, discusses or otherwise suggests any considera-

tion of cost or technical feasibility. See Lead Indus.

Ass'n, 647 F.2d at 1149; Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at

1158.

® The States of Ohio, Michigan, and West Virginia suggest in

their brief supporting the cross-petitions (Midwest States Br. 9-13)

that there is a broader inconsistency in the District of Columbia

Circuit’s case law with respect to whether administrative agencies

ever have authority to consider factors other than those explicitly

mentioned in enabling legislation. This alleged conflict goes

beyond any question presented in a timely petition or cross-peti-

10

Sectior 109(b)(1) specifically requires NAAQS to be

“based on” the air quality “criteria” that EPA issues

under Section 108. 42 U.S.C. 7409(b)(1). Section

108(a)(2), in turn, limits the kind of information to be

included in the “criteria” to “the latest scientific knowl-

edge” about effects on health and welfare “which may

be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the

ambient air.” 42 U.S.C. 7408(a)(2). Section 108(a)(2)

makes no mention whatsoever of effects from imple-

menting the NAAQS—it mentions only effects result-

ing from the presence of a criteria pollutant in the air.

That silence is telling in light of other sections of the

Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 where Congress

expressly provided that EPA should consider costs and

similar factors in making decisions.’

The structure of the CAA also indicates that EPA

should promulgate NAAQS based on health and wel-

fare effects and not on the basis of costs or alleged

adverse effects that may result from their implemen-

tion. Moreover, the question cannot be addressed in such abstract

terms, because the answer depends on the purpose and context of

a particular statute. The principle of expressio unius est exclusio

alterius is merely one tool of statutory construction, not a rule of

law, see Shook v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility & Man-

agement Assistance Auth., 132 F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998);

Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1313 (9th Cir.

1992), and therefore its application can be expected to differ from

one circumstance to another.

7 E.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604,

§ 110(e)(1), 84 Stat. 1682 (authorizing EPA to grant States up to a

two-year extension of a NAAQS attainment date if necessary

technology is not available); § 111(a)(1), 84 Stat. 1683 (requiring

consideration of economic and technological feasibility in establish-

ing standards of performance for new stationary sources); § 231(b),

84 Stat. 1704 (authorizing consideration of economic and technical

feasibility in establishing aircraft emission standards).

11

tation. As this Court recognized long ago, the CAA is a

“technology-forcing” statute that sets ambitious goals

to protect public health and welfare. See Train v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60,

91 (1975). In that respect, Congress has indicated ex-

pressly when and to what extent costs and implementa-

tion effects shall be considered in the regulatory

process. See Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246

(1976).°

For example, States are entitled to develop State

Implementation Plans (SIPs) governing how NAAQS

will be implemented within their borders. See CAA

§ 110, 42 U.S.C. 7410. States may properly consider the

costs of NAAQS implementation when formulating the

SIPs, and EPA may not override those judgments so

long as the SIP will achieve attainment of the NAAQS.

See Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 256-269.° The Court

also recognized that the CAA does not allow a State to

rely on those considerations at the expense of meeting

the statutory deadlines for attaining the national

health-based standards. Id. at 266-269..° The Court’s

8 See 427 U.S. at 269 (“Technology forcing is a concept some-

what new to our national experience and it necessarily entails

certain risks. But Congress considered those risks in passing the

1970 Amendments and decided that the dangers posed by uncon-

trolled air pollution made them worth taking.”).

® See, ¢.g., 427 U.S. at 266 (“Perhaps the most important forum

for consideration of claims of economic and technological infeasibil-

ity is before the state agency formulating the implementation plan.

So long as the national standards are met, the State may select

whatever mix of control devices it desires * * * and industries

with particular economic or technological problems may seek

special treatment in the plan itself.”).

10 See, ¢.g., 427 U.S. at 268-269 (“In short, the [Clean Air Act

Amendments of 1970] offer ample opportunity for consideration of

claims of technological and economic infeasibility. Always, how-

12

longstanding decision in Union Electric, describing the

CAA as a “technology-forcing” statute and explaining

how cost considerations are introduced into the regula-

tory scheme on a State-by-State basis in the imple-

mentation process, would make little sense if EPA had

to promulgate NAAQS based on an analysis of costs

and related implementation factors at the outset of the

regulatory process.”

As the court of appeals has repeatedly noted, the

legislative history of the 1970 Amendments confirms

the paramount importance of setting primary NAAQS

based solely on the health effects posed by the pollutant

in the ambient air. See Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at

1158; Lead Indus. Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1149. For exam-

ple, the Senate report accompanying the 1970 Amend-

ments states:

In the Committee discussions, considerable concern

was expressed regarding the use of the concept of

technical feasibility as the basis of ambient air

standards. The Committee determined that 1) the

health of people is more important than the question

of whether the early achievement of ambient air

quality standards protective of health is technically

feasible; and, 2) the growth of pollution load in many

ever, care is taken that consideration of such claims will not inter-

fere substantially with the primary goal of prompt attainment of

the national standards. * * * Congress plainly left with the

States, so long as the national standards were met, the power to

determine which sources would be burdened by regulation and to

what extent.”).

11 Section 110 of the 1970 CAA, which was construed by the

Court in Union Electric, has since undergone considerable revi-

sion, but the principles set forth above have not been altered. See

Virginia v. EPA, 108 F.3d 1397, 1407-1409 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 42

U.S.C. 7410(k).

13

areas, even with application of available technology,

would still be deleterious to public health.

Therefore, the Committee determined that exist-

ing sources of pollutants either should meet the

standard of the law or be closed down * * *.

S. Rep. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970). In

other words, the primary NAAQS should be based on

health effects rather than economic or technical feasibil-

ity, and as a result, the NAAQS have a “technology-

forcing” effect. See Train, 421 U.S. at 91; Union Elec.

Co., 427 U.S. at 257, 269.

At bottom, APC urges this Court to revisit the long-

settled question of whether EPA should consider costs

and other alleged implementation effects in setting

NAAQS because, in APC’s view, its preferred approach

would be “wise social policy.” See, e.g., APC Cross-Pet.

6-7. But Congress concluded otherwise, and Congress’s

choice was certainly a rational one. Congress reason-

ably concluded that NAAQS should be based on health

and welfare considerations alone so that Congress and

the public know that EPA’s judgments on the health

and welfare threats posed by particular criteria pollut-

ants are not compromised by considerations of eco-

nomic and technical feasibility. As this Court recog-

nized in Union Electric, Congress provided the States

with flexibility in the implementation process to

consider the economic and technical feasibility of

attainment, 427 U.S. at 266-269, but it reserved to itself

the prerogative of deciding — as a matter of legislative

choice — whether and how to alter the statutory scheme

14

if public health needs should prove to conflict with an

industry’s economic viability.”

Congress has since recognized and exercised that

prerogative. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,685. In the course

of formulating the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,

Congress was well aware that some areas of the

country had been unable to attain some of the NAAQS.

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 207-

217 (1977). It was also aware that some of the NAAQS

criteria pollutants might be non-threshold pollutants

and that significant scientific uncertainties are inherent

in setting health-based standards. See id. at 43-51, 110-

112. In response, Congress made significant changes in

the provisions for implementing the NAAQS, including,

for example, an extension of the deadline for attaining

the ozone NAAQS. It also amended Sections 108 and

109 of the Act to require periodic review and revision of

NAAQS and to establish CASAC. Nevertheless, Con-

gress did not change the substantive criteria for setting

and revising NAAQS. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,685 &

n.66 (describing the 1977 Amendments).”

22 See Lead Indus. Ass’n, 647 F.2d at 1150 (“if there is a prob-

lem with the economic or technological feasibility of the lead stan-

dards, * * * any * * * party affected by the standards, must

take its case to Congress, the only institution with the authority to

remedy the problem”); 99-1257 Pet. App. 68a-69a (Tatel, J., in dis-

sent, noting the role of politically accountable States in imple-

menting NAAQS and the availability of congressional relief).

13 In addition to requiring CASAC to advise EPA on issuing

new or revised criteria and NAAQS, 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(B), Con-

gress separately charged CASAC with advising EPA on imple-

mentation effects, 42 U.S.C. 7409(d)(2)(C). But that does not mean,

as APC contends (Cross-Pet. 22), that EPA is to consider these

effects in setting or revising NAAQS. See 99-1257 Pet. App. 21a;

p. 4, supra. The legislative history removes any doubt on that

matter. The House Report indicates that Congress did “not intend

15

Congress exercised that prerogative again in 1990.

The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 responded to

persistent nonattainment problems by adjusting the

scheme for their implementation. See, eg., CAA

§§ 181-192, 42 U.S.C. 7511-7514a. Significantly, Con-

gress was fully aware of how NAAQS are promulgated,

and it did not change the legal standard on which

NAAQS are based. To the contrary, both the House

and Senate Reports accompanying the 1990 Amend-

ments expressly reflect the understanding that primary

NAAQS are to be “set at a level that ‘protects the

public health with an adequate margin of safety,’

without regard to the economic or technical feasibility

of attainment.” H.R. Rep. No. 490, 101st Cong., 2d

Sess., Pt. 1, at 145 (1990) (emphasis added); accord S.

Rep. No. 228, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 5 (1989). Con-

gress’s actions confirm that the court of appeals and

EPA have correctly discerned congressional intent to

preclude consideration of economic and technical fea-

sibility in setting and revising NAAQS. Cf. Bob Jones

Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 600-602 (1983)

(Congress “affirmatively manifested its acquiescence”

in IRS policy by articulating the policy in committee

reports accompanying related legislation); Red Lion

Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969) (“the con-

struction of a statute by those charged with its execu-

tion should be followed unless there are compelling

indications that it is wrong, especially when Congress

has refused to alter the administrative construction”).

this provision to be used as a basis for the Administrator to

disapprove any State’s plan,” but “may be of interest and

assistance to the States and to Congress in fashioning future

le gislation.” H.R. Rep. No. 294, supra, at 183.

16

ATA attempts to overcome the overwhelming evi-

dence of congressional intent by drawing analogies

from this Court’s decision in Industrial Union De-

partment v. American Petroleum Institute., 448 U.S.

607 (1980). See ATA Cross-Pet. 15-16. That case,

however, involves a different statute, with different

language, that creates an entirely different regulatory

program. The Occupational Safety and Health Act

(OSH Act), 29 U.S.C. 651 et seg., directs the Secretary

of Labor to establish “occupational safety and health

standard[s],” 29 U.S.C. 655(b), that are directly

applicable to industrial employers and that are directly

enforced by federal officials. 29 U.S.C. 658-659. The

OSH Act expressly requires the Secretary to consider

whether standards dealing with toxic materials or

harmful physical agents are “feasible.” 29 U.S.C.

655(b)(5).

The CAA’s NAAQS promulgation process, by con-

trast, is simply the first step in a federal-state regula-

tory program and does not create standards that are

themselves directly applicable to any air pollution

source. The CAA directs EPA to set NAAQS at levels

of air quality “requisite” to protect public health and

welfare, but the CAA empowers the States to deter-

mine appropriate emission limitations and other con-

trols on individual air pollution sources. See generally

Train, supra; Union Elec. Co., supra. Unlike the OSH

Act scheme, the CAA requires the Administrator to

determine, as an initial matter, the exposure limitations

necessary to protect health and welfare and leaves to

the States discretion to consider—consistent with their

obligation to meet the attainment deadlines—the eco-

nomic or technological feasibility of compliance. See

Union Elec. Co., 427 U.S. at 259 (quoting S. Rep. No.

1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970)).

17

ATA’s and APC’s reliance on the court of appeals’ en

banc decision in Vinyl Chloride, 824 F.2d at 1158-1159,

is similarly misplaced. See ATA Cross-Pet. 15-18; APC

Cross-Pet. 9-10, 19. That decision in no way “strongly

suggests” that the District of Columbia Circuit “now

lacks confidence” in its Lead Industries decision. ATA

Cross-Pet. 17-18. To the contrary, the court concluded

that EPA should consider economic and technical

feasibility when setting individual emission standards

for specific hazardous air pollutants under Section 112

of the CAA, 42 U.S.C. 7412. It expressly distinguished

Section 109’s method for promulgating NAAQS. Writ-

ing for the en banc court, Judge Bork explained that the

language and structure of the CAA support the conclu-

sion that “Congress simply did not intend the economics

of pollution control to be considered in [Section 109’s]

scheme of ambient air regulations.” 824 F.2d at 1159."

14 We note that EPA attempts to estimate the costs and bene-

fits of implementing NAAQS as part of its Regulatory Impact

Analysis (RIA), but it does so only for informational and imple-

mentation planning purposes and not as a part of its standard

setting process. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,702; C.A. App. (PM) 3461-

3462. ATA and APC rely selectively on those estimates to create a

distorted picture of the potential costs and benefits of the NAAQS

in this case. For example, APC and ATA cite EPA’s estimate of

the cost of fully attaining the revised PM standards ($37 billion)

without mentioning EPA’s estimate that those standards would

produce quantifiable benefits of $20 to $110 billion. Compare APC

Cross-Pet. 13 n.23 and ATA Cross-Pet. 4 with C.A. App. (Ozone)

2925. Nor does either mention EPA’s estimate that the net

quantifiable benefits to be derived from only partial attainment of

the combination of the revised PM and ozone NAAQS would range

from $9.5 to $96 billion. C.A. App. (PM) 3488. Furthermore, it is

difficult, if not impossible, for EPA to account for the future

development of innovative control technologies when it sets or

revises NAAQS. C.A. App. (PM) 3471-3472. Because of the

technology-forcing character of the NAAQS, EPA has historically

18

b. As the foregoing discussion shows, the ATA and

APC cross-petitions do not present an issue that would

warrant review in its own right: The court of appeals

has repeatedly and correctly rejected ATA’s and APC’s

arguments; those rulings have not produced any dis-

sent; this Court.has repeatedly declined to review the

issue; and ATA and APC did not seek relief from the en

banc court before petitioning for a writ of certiorari yet

again. ATA nevertheless argues that this Court should

combine its review of the nondelegation issue and this

particular statutory issue because the issues are

“inextricably intertwined.” ATA Cross-Pet. 7; see also

APC Cross-Pet. 4 (cost issue is “fairly within the scope

of the initial petitions”). That assertion is correct only

in the haphazard sense that a fishing line might become

intertwined with a tree limb. Enlarging the grant

would complicate an already complex case and would

require the Court to disentangle inquiries that are

properly separate and that the court of appeals treated

as distinct. Indeed, the court of appeals panel was

divided on the nondelegation issue, but unanimous on

the supposedly “intertwined” statutory issue that ATA

and APC present.

ATA concedes, in response to our sskiiiess that Sec-

tion 109 of the CAA itself does not violate the nondele-

gation doctrine. 99-1257 ATA Br. 15 (Section 109 is

“undisputedly” constitutional); see also 99-1257 APC

Br. 8 (“The court did not hold the statute itself uncon-

stitutional.”). Significantly, ATA does not contest our

showing (99-1257 Pet. 11-16) that the CAA provides

EPA with sufficient statutory direction to avoid

delegating legislative power. See, e.g., Mistretta v.

overestimated the actual cost of their implementation and attain-

ment. See ibid.

19

United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372-373 (1989). Instead,

ATA defends the court of appeals’ decision on the

ground that EPA’s “interpretation” of the CAA

violates the nondelegation doctrine. See 99-1257 ATA

Br. 11; 99-1257 APC Br. 10-11, 18; see also 99-1257 Pet.

App. 4a (“we find that the construction of the Clean Air

Act on which EPA relied in promulgating the NAAQS

at issue here effects an unconstitutional delegation of

legislative power”).

Our petition takes specific issue with that proposi-

tion. See 99-1257 Pet. 16. The nondelegation doctrine

is a check on Congress’s grant of legislative powers and

not—as the court of appeals and cross-petitioners

would have it—a mechanism for controlling an agency’s

exercise of discretion. See ibid. We are hardly alone in

that view. See, e.g., 99-1257 Pet. App. 94a (Silberman,

J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc)

(“Th{e] purpose [of the nondelegation doctrine] is, of

course, to ensure that Congress makes the crucial

policy choices that are carried into law.”); id. at 98a

(Tatel, J., joined by Edwards, C.J., and Garland, J.,

dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“For

purposes of constitutional analysis, we thus have no

need to require that EPA state ‘a far more determinate

basis for decision’ beyond the intelligible principle

Congress provided in the Clean Air Act”.).

We urge the Court to correct that basic conceptual

error and, in accordance with its usual practice, return

the case to the court of appeals so that the court can

conclude its task of properly evaluating EPA’s rule-

makings under the statutory arbitrary and capricious

standard set out in Section 307(d)(9) of the CAA, 42

U.S.C. 7607(d)(9). The Court has no occasion to venture

further by undertaking belatedly to decide anew a

20

question of statutory construction that the court of

appeals and Congress properly settled long ago.

ATA presses the Court to go further based on its

inaccurate characterization of what the court >f appeals

decided. ATA argues that “the court below was forced

to consider constitutional nondelegation issues because

that court had misconstrued the Clean Air Act in Lead

Industries and subsequent cases.” ATA Cross-Pet. 5.

ATA’s characterization is fantasy. This case generated

six opinions on panel review and petition for rehearing

and rehearing en banc, and not a single judge on the

District of Columbia Circuit expressed ATA’s view of

the case. Rather, the panel majority and dissenting

judges treated the nondelegation issue and ATA’s

statutory issue as distinct and separate questions.

Specifically, the panel majority declared EPA’s ac-

tions unconstitutional without reference to Lead Indus-

tries. 99-1257 Pet. App. 4a. The majority directed EPA

“to develop a construction of the act that satisfies this

constitutional requirement,” ibid., and it offered com-

ment respecting EPA’s options on remand, observing

that “[cjost-benefit analysis * * * is not available un-

der decisions of this court,” id. at 14a-15a. But the

panel considered ATA’s statutory issue as a separate

question, and the panel unanimously reaffirmed the

correctness of Lead Industries, id. at 19a-2la. ATA did

not challenge the panel’s reaffirmation of Lead Indus-

tries through a petition for rehearing en banc. There is

no merit to ATA’s assertion that the nondelegation is-

sue and the Lead Industries issue are “inextricably

intertwined.” ATA Cross-Pet. 7.

The fundamental question here remains whether the

nondelegation doctrine provides a constitutional limita-

tion on an agency’s action. See 99-1257 Pet. App. 4a. If

we are correct that the nondelegation doctrine imposes

21

a separation of powers limitation on Congress — and not

a limitation on an agency’s exercise of administrative

discretion—then this Court should reverse the court of

appeals’ decision and remand the case to that court to

reevaluate EPA’s actions under the proper legal stan-

dard with the care that befits these important rule-

makings. If, to the contrary, the court of appeals cor-

rectly applied the nondelegation doctrine, this Court

should affirm the court’s judgment remanding the cases

to EPA so that the agency can “develop a construction

of the act that satisfies this constitutional requirement.”

Ibid. In either event, there is no reason for this Court

to decide ATA’s statutory challenge. The nondele-

gation ruling and that statutory challenge involve two

distinct issues—one controversial and one not. They

are related only in the inchoate sense that “everything

is related to everything else.” California Div. of Labor

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Const., N.A.,

Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 335 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring).

2. CBT’s challenges to the 24-hour primary NAAQS

for PM,,; should be denied because the issues CBT

raises were not addressed by the court below. The

15 In deference to the Court’s certiorari standards, the federal

petitioners have limited their petition for a writ of certiorari to the

nondelegation and the “Subpart 2” issues. They have not chal-

lenged the court of appeals’ other adverse rulings, even though

those rulings — such as the court’s decision that EPA must evalu-

ate the alleged health benefits of smog (99-1257 Pet. App. 44a-49a)

— stand on a more dubious footing than the settled question that

ATA and APC seek to raise. The federal petitioners, unlike the

cross-petitioners here, have limited their petition to issues that

have broader importance and independently meet this Court’s

standards for certiorari. The constitutional and finality issues that

the federal petition presents raise fundamental issues that arise in

every case in which a court reviews a federal agency’s admini-

stration of a regulatory program.

22

court of app-als concluded that its remand of the ozone

and PM,, NAAQS on nondelegation grounds precluded

resolution of most of the other challenges before it,

including CBT’s challenge to the 24-hour PM,, primary

NAAQS. See 99-1257 Pet. App. 4a-5a. There is no war-

rant for this Court to address an issue that the court of

appeals did not reach.”

CBT’s challenge to the secondary standards for PM,,

should also be denied. The secondary PM,, NAAQS,

like the 24-hour primary PM,, NAAQS, were remanded

to EPA by the court of appeals for reconsideration in

light of that court’s holding on nondelegation. Thus, the

court below did not reach “the main thrust” of CBT’s

challenge, 99-1257 Pet. App. 56a, and there is no reason

16 CBT’s challenges are, in any event, without merit. CBT’s

assertion that the 24-hour PM,, primary NAAQS is inconsistent

with EPA’s risk findings rests on a misunderstanding of those

findings. In challenging the 24-hour PM,, primary NAAQS, CBT

largely assumes that EPA can address the risk from daily or short-

term peak exposures only through a short-term standard. To the

contrary, EPA found that it could most effectively reduce the risks

from both long-term and peak PM,, concentrations through an

annual standard of 15 yg/m*, together with a 24-hour standard to

address unusual circumstances. 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,669. The

studies on which EPA relied in setting the standard demonstrated

a statistically significant correlation between 24-hour PM,, concen-

trations and health effects in cities with annual PM,, concentra-

tions greater than about 16 yg/m’, but did not show such a correla-

tion in cities with annual PM,, concentrations below that level. Jd.

at 38,676. Thus in setting the annual standard just below that

level, i.e., at 15 yg/m*, EPA has addressed the statistically signifi-

cant association between health effects and 24-hour PM,, expo-

sures demonstrated by the studies in the record. Id. at 38,669-

38,671. The 24-hour PM,, primary NAAQS (65 g/m’) serves as an

additional margin of safety for localized or seasonal exposures that

might not be adequately controlled by the annual standard alone.

Id. at 38,671.

23

for this Court to address questions that the court of

appeals did not decide. The court of appeals did decide

one narrow issue that CBT raises here. The court con-

cluded, over CBT’s objection, that EPA may take into

account the mitigating effect of the Regional Haze Pro-

gram in setting the secondary PM,, NAAQS.

The CAA specifically provides that the purpose of

the Regional Haze Program is to address adverse visi-

bility impacts that remain “notwithstanding attainment

and maintenance of all national ambient air quality

standards.” 42 U.S.C. 7470(1) (emphasis added). That

provision makes clear that EPA is not required to set

the secondary NAAQS at a level that eliminates all

adverse effects on visibility. There is no reason for this

Court to review the court of appeals’ ruling, which is

clearly correct. EPA acted within the scope of its

authority in relying on the Regional Haze Program to

mitigate some of the adverse visibility effects associ-

ated with PM,;. 99-1257 Pet. App. 57a.

CONCLUSION

The conditional cross-petitions for a writ of certiorari

should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

GARY S. GUZY

General Counsel

Environmental Protection

Agency

APRIL 2000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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