Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ter Maat v. Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.

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99141 8 FER 2 5 2000

No. —erice oF THE cirex

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

RICHARD TER MAAT, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES

OF ILLINOIS, INC., et al.

Respondents.

On PETITION For Writ OF CERTIORARI

To Tue UNITED STATES CouRT OF APPEALS

For THe SEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

EDWARD M. MAHER *

GUYER & ENICHEN

PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

SuITE B

2601 REID FARM Roap

ROCKFORD, ILLINOIS 61114

(815) 636-9600

Counsel for Petitioners

* Counsel of Record

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,

CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

|OSpP

* ills Hat on nae

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether a corporate officer becomes personally liable

under CERCLA as an “operator” of a landfill when the

corporation by which he is employed has been granted an

exclusive operating permit by state regulatory authorities.

Stated differently, may a corporate officer who has

attempted to comply with environmental laws and regulations,

and for whom no evidence was produced to the contrary at

trial, be termed an “operator” for the mere performance of his

duties as an officer.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioners

The Petitioners are AAA Disposal Services, Inc., a

former Illinois corporation, M.I.G. Investments, Inc:, a

former Illinois corporation, and Richard Ter Maat. AAA

Disposal Services, Inc. and M.1.G. Investments, Inc. are both

dissolved corporations. Neither had any parent corporations

nor any wholly owned subsidiaries when they were in

existence.

Respondents

The Respondents are:

Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc., a

Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

Illinois. The parent company of Browning-Ferris Industries

of Illinois, Inc. is Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., a publicly

traded corporation.

Apache Products Company, a South Carolina

corporation with its principal place of business in Anderson,

South Carolina. The parent company of Apache Products

Company is Jasper Corporation.

Tamms Industries, a Delaware corporation with its

principal place of business in Kirkland, Illinois.

DaimlerChrysler Corporation (f/k/a Chrysler

Corporation), a Delaware corporation with its principal place

of business in Auburn Hills, Michigan. The parent company

of DaimlerChrysler Corporation is DaimlerChrysler AG, a

publicly traded corporation.

pte ae ARK eee A Alan rin ata ene be re

The Ingersoll Milling Machine Company, an Illinois

corporation with its principal place of business in Rockford,

Illinois. The parent company of Ingersoll Milling Machine

Company is Ingersoll International, Inc.

Newell Operating Co. (f/k/a Amerock Corporation),

a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in

[llinois. The parent company of Newell Operating Company

is Newell Co., a publicly traded corporation.

Camcar Division of Textron, Inc., a Delaware

corporation with its principal place of business in Rockford,

Illinois. The parent company of Camcar Division of Textron

Inc. is Textron, Inc., a publicly traded corporation.

Twin Disc, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation with its

principal place of business in Racine, Wisconsin. Fidelity

Management & Resources Corp., a publicly traded company,

owns 10% or more of the stock of Twin Disc, Inc.

No other respondent has a parent corporation, nor

does any publicly held company own 10% or more of any

Respondent’s stock.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .......... i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ...........4.. il

DAME NE GAMES 6 oe WA ei ween iv

SAG A RASTER kk ee Fa ba ee dae Vi

eR soa ee he es 1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........005.. ]

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ......... l

>rAtumenees OF TRE CARE 6 ick ie cea wees 4

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT......... 7

eres 5s each Aste es bos Re ek eee ee 18

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Seventh Circuit Opinion of

SO Ou RUE ao nw ke a ee A ee la

Appendix B

Seventh Circuit Judgment of

PUNE 3, TO on sa oe ees a we ee 18a

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BIR GCOS 0 Sy POAT ROS SN

Appendix C

District Court Memorandum and Order of

ily Th, TORO ka eee ee ae 20a

Appendix D

Seventh Circuit Order Denying Petition for

Rehearing of November 30, 1999 ......... 75a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.

v. Ter Maat

195 F.3d 953 (7" Cir. 1999) ......... 1, 15-16

FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc.

998 F.2d 842 (10" Cir. 1993) .......... 10, 14

Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co. |

966 F.2d 837 (4" Cir. 1992) 2.2.2.0... 8,9, 10

Riverside Market Development Corp. v.

International Building Products, Inc. }

931 F.2d 327 6" Ce: TO a aa 14 i

Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare

Education Fund

25 F.38 497 CCE: TS =. se passim

U.S. v. Bestfoods

SGN U.S. 24 CED ia wee ee 12, 16, 17 !

U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co. |

978 F.2d 032 10" Ce. TOD on. A ee 10

U.S. v. Gurley

43 F.3d 1188 (8" Cir. 1994) 2. ......00.... LI 7

U.S. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical

& Chemical Co., Inc. ;

810 F.2d 726 (8" Cir. 1986) ............. 10

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Statutes and Other Authorities

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OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit is reported at 195 F.3d 953 (7" Cir.

1999). A copy of the opinion is included in the Appendix at

Appendix A. The Opinion of the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, is

published at 13 F.Supp.2d 756 (N.D. Ill. 1998). A copy of

the opinion is included in the Appendix at Appendix C.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States-Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit issued its Final Judgment on November 1, 1999. One

of the Appellants, Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc.,

filed a Petition for Rehearing on November 15, 1999. The

Petition for Rehearing was denied on November 30, 1999.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within 90 days of

the denial of the Petition for Rehearing. The Court’s

jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1254(1) and

2106.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act

42 U.S.C. §9607(a)

§9607. Liability

(a) Covered persons;

2 casi ola

i a SLI Sate Sg nates

PON ee MS SOR ee Oe Ts here ne ah Gc SORT

sao Set Rtas. Aeneid Dreads aden kei 2 I ACS a Peel eR Gc Rehan RY,

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and

subject only to the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this

section—

(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any

hazardous substance owned or operated any

facility at which such hazardous substances

were disposed of,

shall be liable for—

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action

incurred by the United States Government or a State

or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national

contingency plan;

(B) any other necessary costs of response

incurred by any other person consistent with the

national contingency plan;

(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or

loss of natural resources, including the reasonable

costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss

resulting from such a release; and

(D) the costs of any health assessment or health

effects study carried out under section 9604(i) of this

title.

42 U.S.C. §9601(9)

and §9601(20)(A)

§9601. Definitions

For purposes of this subchapter—

(9) The term “facility” means (A) any building,

structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline (including

any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment

works), well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill,

storage container, motor vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft, or

(B) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been

deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come

to be located; but does not include any consumer product in

consumer use or any vessel.

(20)(A) The term “owner or operator” means (i) in the

case of a vessel, any person owning, operating, or chartering

by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case of an onshore facility

or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating such

facility, and (iil) in the case of any facility, title or control of

which was conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax

delinquency, abandonment, or similar means to a unit of State

or local government, any person who owned, operated, or

otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately

beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who,

without participating in the management of a vessel or

facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his

security interest in the vessel or facility.

3

:

3

;

:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The material facts for purposes of this appeal relate to

the involvement of an officer, director and shareholder in the

affairs of a corporation. The corporation, M.I.G.

Investments, Inc., (MIG) was issued a permit to operate a

sanitary landfill by the State of Illinois.

The landfill in question, known as the MIG/DeWane

Landfill, is located in north central Illinois. It was located on

a farm owned by the DeWane family. The landfill began as

a rock quarry. A small operator began limited landfilling in

the quarry in 1968 pursuant to local permits. A predecessor

of Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. (BFI) leased the

property in 1970 and thereafter undertook development of the

landfill. BFI ceased landfilling operations in 1975.

AAA Disposal Systems, Inc. (AAA) was an

established waste hauler in the northern Illinois area when BFI

withdrew from the MIG/DeWane Landfill. The stock of that

corporation was owned in equal shares by the Appellant

Richard Ter Maat, his father Jack Ter Maat, and a third

individual, Edward Foerster. The DeWanes offered the lease

of the landfill to the AAA shareholders following the

cessation of operations by BFI. The two Ter Maats and

Foerster incorporated MIG for the sole purpose of operating

the landfill. MIG was granted an operating permit from the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency and began accepting

waste. Slightly before the landfill closed one of the

shareholders, Mr. Foerster, retired. His shares of AAA

stock were purchased equally by the other two shareholders.

His shares of MIG were transferred to AAA.

Philip Stephenson was hired as the controller of both

AAA and MIG. He was instructed by the shareholders, who

4

also comprised the board of directors, to maintain each

corporation as a separate entity. To that end, Stephenson kept

separate books, checking accounts, addresses, post office

boxes, annual reports, and financial statements for each

corporation. An independent accounting firm prepared the tax

returns for each corporation.

The three shareholders incorporated two other waste

hauling companies. Saturn Disposal, Inc. (Saturn) operated

in the area northwest of Chicago. Economy Disposal, Inc.

(Economy) operated in southern Wisconsin. The shareholders

and Stephenson met every Friday to review the affairs of

AAA, MIG, Saturn, and Economy. Richard Ter Maat was

the president of AAA and MIG. The other two shareholders

held other offices in the corporations. The shareholders had -

a rule that a single shareholder could not act on behalf of any

of the corporations. Any action to be taken required an

unanimous vote.

Each of the officers had a separate area of

responsibility. Stephenson had an accounting background.

He was responsible for all financial matters and for keeping

the books of the corporations.

Richard Ter Maat was primarily responsible for AAA,

the largest of the hauling companies, devoting approximately

98% of his time to that endeavor. His emphasis was on

developing new business for the hauling companies. In the

mid-1980s Richard Ter Maat devoted additional time to MIG

in his capacity as its president. MIG and the DeWanes sought

a new permit to increase the acreage and the height of the

landfill. He became MIG’s principle spokesman with the

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency in Springfield and

with local officials. Richard Ter Maat signed correspondence

on behalf of MIG as well as its tax returns. He attended to

5

other such administrative matters. He also issued general

directives that anyone working on the waste disposal routes or

at the landfill was to adhere to all environmental laws and

regulations.

Jack Ter Maat was résponsible for servicing the

municipal contracts of all three haulers. He was also closely

involved in the management of Economy and Saturn.

The third shareholder, Mr. Foerster, was responsible

for maintaining the vehicles owned by the corporations. His

principal activities, though, were at the landfill where he was

responsible for day to day operations. Mr. Foerster was a

heavy equipment operator who prepared the liner of the

landfill. He was also responsible for applying intermediate

cover throughout the landfilling process.

Philip Stephenson maintained the books so that the

profits of the business were routed through AAA. This was

done for tax purposes. The books reflected that MIG was

technically insolvent. Nevertheless, Stephenson provided for

a sufficient cash flow through MIG so that it could meet its

obligations. The landfill approached the maximum Capacity

allowed by its permit during the attempts to obtain a vertical

and horizontal expansion. The Illinois Appellate Court

ordered the Illinois Pollution Control Board to issue the

vertical expansion requested by MIG and the DeWanes. The

officers of MIG assumed that the landfill’s existence was

assured for several years. The Illinois Supreme Court,

however, precipitously reversed the appellate court. That

action came so quickly that the corporation did not have

adequate funds for closure. The remaining assets of MIG

were devoted to applying a final cover. When those funds

were exhausted, the landfill was abandoned and the

corporation was dissolved. Over the Succeeding years the

6

landfill collapsed, forming a crater which collected rainwater

and exacerbated the flow of leachate (water mixed with

contaminants from the disposed material) from the landfill.

The landfill was eventually placed on the National Priorities

List.

The Appellants entered into an Administrative Order

on Consent to remedy the problems at the landfill. They

subsequently filed an action for contribution against AAA,

MIG, and Richard Ter Maat. Jack Ter Maat was also named

as a defendant during one portion of the proceedings in the

district court but was dismissed following his death. Edward

Foerster was not a party.

ARGUMENT FOR ISSUANCE OF

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

This Court should grant certiorari because of the

hopeless confusion existing in the District and Circuit Courts

regarding the issue of personal liability under CERCLA (42

U.S.C. §9601 et seq.). The general issue for this Court’s

consideration is a determination of when an individual will be

held responsible for pollutional activities that are attributable

to acorporation. The specific issue presented by this appeal

is whether an individual may be deemed a co-operator under

CERCLA, and therefore liable with a corporation, when only

the corporation was issued an operating permit by a state.

The resolution of this issue in the Circuit Courts falls

into three broad categories. The first approach imposes

liability on any person who had the “authority to control” the

activities of the corporation, principally activities that could

involve waste disposal. The second approach imposes

liability on an individual who exercises “actual control” over

7

such activities. A third line of cases seems to suggest that

individual liability should be imposed only if the person

engaged in wrongful conduct that directly results in

environmental damage. To compound the confusion, many

cases seem to fall into a given category but borrow language

from a case that espouses a differing analysis of liability.

A dangerous undercurrent exists in these cases that is

implicit, although not specifically articulated. The cases seem

to assume that, whenever a corporation 1s liable under

CERCLA, an individual must also be liable. Perhaps that

bias is based on hornbook law holding that a corporation can

only act through its agents and employees. Consequently, if

a corporation is an operator under CERCLA, and if the

corporation can only act through its agents and employees, it

follows that an identifiable agent or employee must also be

liable as a co-operator. If that is indeed the manner in which

CERCLA is to be interpreted, this Court should

unambiguously make that pronouncement. However,

CERCLA should not be interpreted in that manner. If this

Court agrees that the interpretation of “operator” as used in

CERCLA should not result in the automatic imposition of

personal liability, an unambiguous line should be drawn

between conduct or status that will, or will not, result in such

liability.

The Circuits adopting the “authority to control”

analysis have imposed draconian results on individuals caught

within its net. The “authority to control” analysis holds that

anyone who has the authority to control a company’s waste

disposal activities, whether or not that authority is ever

exercised, is personally liable under CERCLA as an

“operator.” Representative of this approach is Nurad, Inc. v.

William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837 (4" Cir. 1992).

In Nurad, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the potential liability of

former tenants at a site that included polluting underground

storage tanks. The decision also discussed the liability of the

(wo surviving sons of the majority stockholder and president

of the corporation that owned the site. The Fourth Circuit

agreed with the expansive test utilized by the district court:

We do not agree with Nurad that the

district court applied an improper standard.

The district court applied the correct standard

in holding that the tenant defendants need not

have exercised actual control in order to

qualify as operators under §9607(a)(2), so long

as the authority to control the facility was

present. Although the court did note that the

tenant defendants “never actively participated

in the disposal of hazardous substances” at the

site, the court’s decision quite properly turned

on the fact that they lacked “authority to

control the operations or decisions involving

the disposal of hazardous substances at the Site

or the contents of the USTs.” Indeed, the

district court's examination of the terms of the

various leases in question indicated that it

recognized that authority to control—not actual

control—was_ the appropriate — standard.

(Nurad, pg. 842).

The Nurad Court also declined to impose individual

liability on the two sons of the former majority shareholder

under the same rationale. Those defendants did not have the

authority to control the underground storage tanks because

their father had totally subordinated their role in the exercise

of his ultimate control over all aspects of the site. The

implication was clear, though, that the father would have been

9

liable, had he survived, due to his degree of control over the

affairs of the corporation.

The rationale of Nurad was again used by the Fourth

Circuit in U.S. v. Carolina Transformer Co. 978 F.2d 832 (4"

Cir. 1992). The Fourth Circuit in that case imposed liability

on two officers and shareholders of a corporation based on the

general control they exerted over it. The opinion is silent

about any specific activities in which either of them may have

engaged that contributed to the leeching of PCBs at the

processing plant.

The second approach to the issue of individual liability

under CERCLA has been referred to as the “actual control”

test. That is, liability is predicated on a showing that the

individual exerted actual control over the affairs of the

corporation rather than merely possessing the authority to do

so. Again, the emphasis is not placed on the actual

pollutional activity at issue but rather fixes on managerial

activities. A case regarded as one of the leading authorities

on the “actual control” test is U.S. v. Northeastern

Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726 (8" Cir.

1986) (commonly cited as “NEPACCO”). Even though

NEPACCO is routinely cited as an “actual control” case {see

FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842 (10" Cir.

1993)} it clearly applies the “authority to control” standard in

its analysis. The case is further evidence of the manner in

which the lines for imposing liability have become blurred.

The result is that individuals are left with no standards against

which to measure their conduct.

In NEPACCO, two individuals named Lee and Mills

concocted a plan for the surreptitious disposal of toxic

chemicals produced at a factory by dumping them on a near-

by farm. NEPACCO is cited as an “actual control” case

10

primarily because the liability of these two defendants was

predicated on their “actual control” of the wastes. The Eighth

Circuit rejected the argument that the men had to “possess”

the waste, rather than merely controlling it, for liability to

attach. Lee and Mills, however, were not the only ones found

liable for the illegal dumping. The major shareholder and

president of the company, Michaels, was also held liable.

The Eighth Circuit specifically noted that Michaels “was not

personally involved in the actual decision to transport and

dispose of the hazardous substances." (NEPACCO pg.745) To

reach that result, the Eighth Circuit implicitly invoked the

“authority to control” test to affirm Michaels’ liability:

As NEPACCO’s corporate president and as a

major NEPACCO shareholder, however,

Michaels was the individual in charge of and

directly responsible for all of NEPACCO’s

operations, including those at the Verona

plant, and he had the ultimate authority to

control the disposal of NEPACCO’s hazardous

substances. (NEPACCO pg.745)

While purporting to be a more lenient standard, the

“actual control” cases do not offer much solace to. private

individuals. In U.S. v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8" Cir. 1994)

two employees were deemed jointly and severally liable for a

site which a corporation operated. Unfortunately, that court

offered little guidance to similarly employed individuals as to

their potential liability exposure. One of the individuals was

described as the principle shareholder and president of the

corporation. His liability was virtually assumed, and the

judgment against him was affirmed without discussion. The

Eighth Circuit's analysis instead centered on the liability of an

employee who was not a shareholder or officer. He, too, was

held jointly and severally liable with little more than a

1]

discussion of statements he had made in an unrelated

proceeding concerning his day to day activities on behalf of

the company.

The “actual control” and the “authority to control”

lests essentially develop a new legal doctrine: Reverse

respondeat superior. Under either approach there seems to be

4 presumption that an identifiable person will ultimately be

held responsible for the acts of a corporation. Unfortunately,

none of these courts appears to have recognized that this

would be the logical extension of their decisions. One cannot

overly-emphasized the impact of this problem. This is an

issue of financial survival for those employed throughout the

waste disposal industry. Virtually every Superfund site

results in a remediation plan that runs into the millions, if not

tens of millions, of dollars. To impose such devastating

_ personal liability, without clearly setting forth the proscribed

conduct, is fundamentally unfair. Nevertheless, corporate

employees have been held responsible for the waste practices

of their employer, even when the person has done nothing

which directly caused any pollution.

At one point the Seventh Circuit seemed to advance a

more equitable standard for analyzing personal liability. That

Circuit seemed to say that such secondary liability would be

predicated on a fault concept. The case announcing this

concept was Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare

Education Fund, 25 F.3d 417 (7" Cir. 1994). The United

States Supreme Court recently decided a comparable issue on

secondary liability in U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. >i, 118 8.

Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998) in which Arst was cited with

approval.

The issue in Arst arose from the dismissal of a

complaint against two corporate officers. A transformer had

12

been cut open, and the PCB laden fluids within it had spilled.

The plaintiff alleged that the officers personally supervised the

activity that resulted in toxic waste entering the environment.

The Seventh Circuit expressed doubt that the company’s

president and vice president ‘had supervised such a routine

task, but accepted the pleadings as true. In discussing

whether there would be ultimate liability, however, the

Seventh Circuit seemed to advance a “fault” basis that would

be more equitable than the current collection of cases:

Yet even under these liberal pleading

standards, a complaint does not automatically

state a Claim for CERCLA “operator” liability

merely by being directed against persons

holding management or like positions.

To survive a motion to dismiss a plaintiff must

allege that persons associated with the

corporation directly and personally engaged in

conduct that led to the specific environmental

damage at issue in the case. Without such

direct, personal involvement, the corporation

and not the associated individuals must be

\ regarded as owning or operating the hazardous

waste site in question.

Thus, a plaintiff does not state a claim for

owner or operator liability if she merely

alleges that certain individuals had general

corporate authority or served generally in a

supervisory capacity. Active participation in,

or exercise of specific control of, the activities

13

in question must be shown. (Arst pgs. 421-

422, emphasis added.)

An earlier case also implied that the liability of a

corporate officer would be based on specific actions that

caused pollution rather than general actions taken on behalf of

a corporation. See Riverside Market Development C. Orp. V.

International Building Products, Inc., 931 F.2d 327 (Sth Cir.

1991). Riverside Market has been termed an “actual control” -

case. {See FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc.. id.)} The

language of the case, however, suggests that liability should

rest on wrongful conduct and not mere “actual control” of the

corporation:

Under traditional concepts of corporate

law, the principle of limited liability would

protect officers or employees like Prescott

from being held responsible for the acts of a

valid corporation. However, CERCLA ;

prevents individuals from hiding behind the

corporate shield when, as “operators,” they

themselves actually participate in the wrongful

conduct prohibited by the Act. (Riverside

Market pg. 330, emphasis added.)

As if to emphasize this apparent fault standard, the Fifth

Circuit again noted:

In determining liability in cases like the one

now before us, we must look to the extent of

the defendant’s personal participation in the

alleged wrongful conduct. (Id. at 330.

emphasis added.)

The crucial distinction of this appeal is that the Court

is asked to decide issues of secondary liability. Here, the

“operator” of the landfill was designated by law. MIG was

granted the operating permit by the Illinois Environmental

Protection Agency. MIG had the exclusive right to operate

the landfill under state law. Accordingly, MIG was found

liable by the district court and a judgment was entered against

it. The issue presented by this appeal, however, is whether

an individual must also be found liable in addition to MIG.

Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit seems to have retreated

from the principles of Arst.

A brief review of the facts in this case is important to

an understanding of this issue. Richard Ter Maat was only

one of three investors who held an equal number of MIG’s

shares (subject to the exception noted in the Statement of the

Case following the retirement of one shareholder). His

connection with the landfill was essentially limited to dealing

with state regulators and carrying out the administrative

functions of the corporation. Another shareholder, Edward

Foerster, was responsible for constructing the landfill

consistent with the specifications of the state issued operating

permit. Mr. Foerster testified that he was responsible for the

day to day activities of the site. Yet itis Mr. Ter Maat, as the

president of the corporation, who is vulnerable to a finding of

liability. The three shareholders owned the stock of three

hauling companies: AAA, Saturn, and Economy. They also

owned the shares of the landfill company, MIG. To the

extent that Mr. Ter Maat had input into the landfill end of the

overall waste disposal business, it was to express a policy of

strict adherence to all environmental laws. Absolutely no

evidence was presented in the district court that Mr. Ter Maat

engaged in any conduct that resulted in contamination of the

environment. Nevertheless, the Court in Browning-Ferris

Industries of Illinois, Inc. v. Ter Maat, 195 F.3d 953 (7" Cir.

15

1999) imposed a standard that would virtually demand the

imposition of liability on Mr. Ter Maat:

If Ter Maat did not merely direct the general

operations of M.I.G. and AAA, as in id. at

330 (referring to Arst), or specific operations

unrelated to pollution, United States y.

Bestfoods, supra, 524 U.S. at 66-67, 118 S.Ct.

1876; United States v. Township of Brighton,

153 F.3d 307, 313-15 (6" Cir. 1998), but

supervised the day-to-day operations of the

landfill—for example, negotiating waste-

dumping contracts with the owners of the

wastes or directing where the wastes were to

be dumped or designing or directing measures

for preventing toxic substances in the wastes

from leeching into the ground and thence into

the groundwater—then he would be deemed

the operator, jointly with his companies, of the

Site itself.

(Ter Maat pg. 956, emphasis added.)

The Seventh Circuit has thus advanced the proposition

that, if one seeks compliance with the law, he can be found

guilty of violating CERCLA. Incredibly, if Mr. Ter Maat is

found to have “design(ed) or direct(ed) measures for

preventing toxic” contamination, he must share in the several

millions of dollars of liability assessed against the two

corporate defendants. In no other setting can someone be

shown to have followed the law, or at least not have been

shown to have violated it, and be punished so severely.

The Seventh Circuit in Ter Maat used an analogy to

describe the circumstances under which a corporate president

would be held liable. The Seventh Circuit stated that, if one

16

is hit by.a train, only the company would be liable. If the

president was driving the train, however, or ordered the

engineer to violate the law, the president would also be liable.

The language quoted above is not so restrictive, though. If

the president of the company issued a directive on how the

train was to be operated, he would be personally liable under

the Seventh Circuit's analysis because he had involved himself

in train “operation.” Even if the president issued a directive

that the cngineer was to operate the train safely and in accord

with all applicable laws, the president would become liable

because he had “design(ed) or direct(ed) measures for

preventing” trains from striking individuals. Mr. Ter Maat,

to the extent that he even became involved in such issues, did -

nothing more than direct compliance with the law.

Unfortunately, under the Seventh Circuit's rationale, he now

faces onerous liability for taking that stance.

This Court should grant certiorari so that it can

formulate the broad principles applicable to issues of

secondary liability. Clearly there was a discernible legal

operator of this landfill. That operator was MIG, the holder

of the operating permit issued by the State of Illinois. Mr.

Ter Maat was never an “operator” under Illinois law. He

could not have dispossessed MIG of the landfill. He could

not have operated it in his own name. He could not transfer

or assign the operating permit, except to approve such a

disposition in his capacity as president, Mr. Ter Maat’s

liability, if it exists at all, comes only through his actions on

behalf of the corporation.

This Court was recently confronted with a similar

issue regarding the liability of a corporate parent. U.S. v.

Bestfoods, id. Bestfoods answered the liability question in

relation to an entity that was located above the legal operator

on the ladder of responsibility. This case presents the same

17

issue, but for an entity that is located immediately below the

legal operator. Given the disarray of the Circuit Courts in

responding to the problem, only the Supreme Court is in a

position to develop coherent, uniform, rules. Without this

Court's intervention, one’s liability exposure will continue to

be subject to the vagaries of the jurisdiction in which he

resides.

CONCLUSION

The courts below have created a tangled web of

liability that ensnares individuals unevenly and erratically.

This Court should grant ceriiorari for two reasons. First, a

response is required to the implicit holdings of the lower

courts that an individual must be iiable whenever a

corporation has been found guilty of violating CERCLA. The

Petitioner urges this Court to reject that proposition.

Secondly, assuming the Court agrees with the Petitioner on

that point, uniform rules of personal liability should be

established for all courts to follow.

In the specific context of this case, the Supreme Court

should reject the Seventh Circuit’s requirement that a

corporate officer becomes liable when he takes steps to

comply with environmental laws. Corporate managers should

not be punished for such activities. In considzring the issue

of secondary liability which is presented here, this Court

should impose liability only if the individual has committed a

knowing violation of. the law or otherwise acted in an

environmentally reckless manner. To impose liability on any

other basis will allow the current injustices to continue. This

is the only Court that can provide such clarity and uniformity

of outcome below.

18

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Edward M. Maher

Counsel for Petitioner

Guyer & Enichen, P.C.

2601 Reid Farm Road

Rockford, IL 61114

(815)636-9600

19

APPENDIX A

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[Filed November 1, 1999]

Nos. 98-3204 and 99-1360

BROWNING-FERRIS

INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,

INC., et al.,

Plaintijfs-Appellants,

We

RICHARD TER MAAT, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.

No. 92 C 20259--Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 8, 1999

DECIDED NOVEMBER 1, 1999

Before POSNER, Chief Judge, and BAUER and

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

POSNER, Chief Judge. Browning-Ferris and several

other companies have brought a suit for contribution under the

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Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act (CERCLA-the Superfund statute). The suit is

against Richard Ter Maat and two corporations of which he

is (or was - one of the corporations has been sold) the

president and principal sharcholder; they are M.I.G.

Investments, Inc. and AAA Disposal Systems, Inc.

Back in 1971 the owners of a landfill had leased it to

a predecessor of Browning-Ferris, which operated it until the

fall of 1975. Between then and 1988 it was operated by

M.1.G. and AAA. In June of that year, after AAA was sold

and Ter Maat moved to Florida, M.I.G. abandoned the

landfill without covering it properly. For tax reasons, M.1.G.

had been operated with very little capital, and it lacked funds

for a proper cover. Two years after the abandonment, the

EPA placed the site on the National Priorities List, the list of

the toxic waste sites that the Superfund statute requires be

cleaned up, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(8)(B), 9616(d), (¢), and

Shortly afterward Browning-Ferris and the other plainuffs,

which shared responsibility for some of the pollution at the

site, agreed to clean it up.

Section 113(f)(1) of the Superfund law authorizes any

person who incurs costs in cleaning up a toxic-waste site to

“seek contribution from any other person who its liable or

potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title... . In

resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response

costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the

court determines are appropriate.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1).

Section 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1), a part of the

Statutory provision to which section 113(f)(1) refers, includes

in the set of potentially liable persons anyone who owned or

operated a landfill when a hazardous substance was deposited

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in it, and this set is conceded to include both M.I.G. and

AAA. The district judge held, however, that Ter Maat was

not himself a potentially liable person, because he had done

nothing that would subject him to liability on a “piercing the

corporate veil” theory for the actions of the two corporations.

So far as corporate liability for clean-up costs was concerned,

the judge ruled that of the’ 55 percent of those costs that he

deemed allocable to transporters and operators (the other 45

percent he allocated to the owners of the landfill and the

generators of the toxic wastes dumped in it), 40 percent was

the responsibility of Browning-Ferris and the other 60 percent

the responsibility of M.I.G. and AAA. As between those

two, the judge allocated responsibility equally, holding that,

although the two corporations had operated the landfill

jointly, the statute required him to allocate liability severally

rather than jointly.

Browning-Ferris and the other companies that have

incurred clean-up costs at the site of the former landfill have

appealed. All of them join in making the following three

arguments: the corporate veil should be pierced two ways,

one to make Richard Ter Maat liable for the conduct of both

“his” corporations, AAA and M.I.G., and the other to make

AAA liable for M.I.G.’s conduct as an affiliate; in any event

Ter Maat is directly as distinct from derivatively liable for

contribution, as he was persona!ly an operator of the landfill;

the Superfund statute does permit joint liability in a

contribution suit and it would be equitable to make AAA pay

for the whole amount allocated to the two corporations, since

they were jointly liable and M.I.G. is assetless (or may be -

it has some insurance). Finally, Browning-Ferris argues that

the district court allocated too much of the liability for the

pollution at the site to it relative to M.I.G. and AAA.

3a

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

Two issues are relatively simple and we address them

first. One is whether an individual can shield himself from

liability for operating a hazardous-waste facility mérely by

being an officer or shareholder of a corporation that also

operates the facility. The answer is no. The principle of

limited liability shields a shareholder from liability for the

debts (including debts arising from tortious conduct) of the

corporation in which he owns shares (with the exception

discussed later for “veil piercing” situations), but not for his

personal debts, including debts arising from torts that he

commits himself. In other words, the status of being a

Shareholder does not immunize a person for liability for his,

as distinct from the corporation's, acts. E.g., Sidney S. Arst

Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Education Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420

(7th Cir. 1994); Spartech Corp. v. Opper, 890 F.2d 949, 953

(7th Cir. 1989); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland

Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1503 (11th Cir. 1996); Aronson

v. Price, 644 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ind. 1994). There is no

liability shield at all for an officer. If he commits an act that

is Outside the scope of his official duties, his employer may

not be liable; but he is whether or not the act was within that

scope. E.g., /tofca, Inc. v. Hellhake, 8 F.3d 1202, 1204 (7th

Cir. 1993); Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing

Co., 166 F.3d 840, 846-47 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.

Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., 810 F.2d 726,

744 (8th Cir. 1986). Which is not to say, however, that the

officer is automatically liable for the acts of the corporation;

there is no doctrine of “superiors” liability,” comparable to

the doctrine of respondeat superior, that is, the employer's

Strict liability for torts of the employee committed within the

scope of his employment.

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

So if Ter Maat operated the landfill personally, rather

than merely directing the business of the corporations of

which he was the president and which either formally, or

jointly with him (as well as with each other), operated it, he

is personally liable. E.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 524

U.S. 51, 55 (1998); Sidney S. Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare

Education Fund, supra, 25 F.3d at 421-22; Riverside Market

Development Corp. v. International Bidg. Products, Inc., 931

F.2d 327, 330 (Sth Cir. 1991) (per curiam). The line between

a personal act and an act that is purely an act of the

corporation (or of some other employee) and so not imputed

to the president or to other corporate officers is sometimes a

fine one, but often it is clear on which side of the line a

particular act falls. If an individual is hit by a negligently

operated train, the railroad is liable in tort to him but the

president of the railroad is not. Or rather, not usually; had

the president been driving the train when it hit the plaintiff, or

had been sitting beside the driver and ordered him to exceed

the speed limit, he would be jointly liable with the railroad.

If Ter Maat did not merely direct the general operations of

M.I.G. and AAA, as in id. at 330, or specific operations

unrelated tu pullution, United States v. Bestfoods, supra, 524

U.S. at 66-67; United States v. Township of Brighton, 153

F.3d 307, 313-15 (6th Cir. 1998), but supervised the day-to-

day operations of the landfill - for example, negotiating

waste-dumping contracts with the owners of the wastes or

directing where the wastes were to bedumped or designing or

directing measures for preventing toxic substances in the

wastes from leeching into the ground and thence into the

groundwater - then he would be deemed the operator, jointly

with his companies, of the site itself. E.g., Control Data

€orp. v. $.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 937 (8th Cir. 1995);

Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682, 692 (3d Cir. 1994);

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

FMC Corp. v. Aero Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 842, 846 (10th

Cir. 1993); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &

Chemical Co., supra, 810 F.2d at 743. Unfortunately the

district court did not consider this possibility, although urged

to do so by the plaintiffs, and so a remand is necessary to

determine Ter Maat’s status.

It is also clear we think that CERCLA does not

preclude the imposition of joint as distinct from several

liability in a suit for contribution. This is, or at least should

be considered, a case of first impression at the appellate level.

Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing Co., supra,

166 F.3d at 847-48, does hold that CERCLA permits joint

liability in a contribution suit, but on the unsatisfactory

ground that state law so required, when it is plain that actions

for CERCLA contribution are governed by federal law.

Section 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1), the CERCLA

contribution provision, provides expressly that actions under

it are to be governed by federal law, with the federal court to

“allocate response costs among liable parties using such

equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate.”

There is a savings provision in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9652(d), but the plaintiffs’ claims in this case are based

exclusively on the federal contribution provision, and not on

state law.

An earlier Sixth Circuit case had tossed off a casual

dictum that contribution liability under CERCLA is several,

not joint, Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal

Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 348 (6th Cir. 1998), but the dictum is

defunct after Carter-Jones. A similar dictum in Pinal Creek

Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th

Cir. 1997), is, when read in context, limited to cases in which

6a

Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

potentially responsible parties are suing under a provision of

CERCLA, § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), that imposes —

automatic joint liability on defendants; the cases hold that the

parties’ rights are nevertheless subject to allocation under

section 113(f), which does not include that automatic feature.

See id. at 1306; Akzo Coatings, Inc. v. Aigner Corp., 30 F.3d

761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994); Centerior Service Co. v. Acme

Scrap fron & Metal Corp:, supra, 153 F.3d at 349-53. Joint

liability thus is optional, rather than unavailable.

In traditional common law, when two or more persons

inflict an indivisible injury each is fully liable for the injury.

That is, the plaintiff can if he wants sue one of the tortfeasors

for the entire damages and let the other go, and the one who

is sued has no remedy against the one who got off scot-free.

CERCLA modifies the traditional common law rule (as many

other statutes do and as many state courts have done by

modifying the common law) by allowing one liable party to

sue another for contribution. It does not follow that if, as in

this case, contribution is sought from more than one party, the

defendants cannot be held jointly liable. It is up to the district

Judge, guided only by equitable considerations - a broad and

loose standard, see Kerr-McGee Chemical Corp. v. Lefton

Iron & Metal Co., 14 F.3d 321, 326 (7th Cir. 1994):

Environmental Transportation Systems, Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc.,

969 F.2d 503, 509 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Colorado

& Eastern R.R., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir. 1995) - to

decide, and it is easy to imagine cases, of which this may be

one, where such considerations weigh heavily in favor of joint

liability.

Suppose, to alter the facts for simplicity’s sake, that

Browning-Ferris had been made to clean up the entire site

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

even though it had made only a small (say, 1 percent)

contribution to its toxicity. Suppose M.I.G. and AAA were

the bad actors jointly responsible for the other 99 percent.

Suppose that for tax or other reasons M.1.G. had no assets.

Under the view of the district court, even though M.1.G. and

AAA had combined to inflict an indivisible injury (the

contamination for which they were jointly responsible as joint

operators), AAA would have to pay only 50 percent of the

contamination for which it and M.I.G. were jointly liable, or

49.5 percent of the total clean-up cost (remember that we’re

assuming that the two corporations are jointly responsible for

99 percent of the total contamination), while Browning-Ferris

would have to pay 50.5 percent of the total clean-up cost even

though it was responsible for only 1 percent of that cost. Cf.

Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distributing Co., supra.

These are not our facts, but they show that a rule against ever

holding contribution defendants jointly liable would be

inconsistent with the statutory direction that the district court

allocate liability equitably among the liable parties. Cf.

Centerior Service Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp.,

supra, 153 F.3d at 354 n. 12; Sun Co. v. Browning-Ferris,

Inc., 124 F.3d 1187, 1193 (10th Cir. 1997); Pinal Creek

Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., supra, 118 F.3d at 1303.

The judge did not make such an allocation, mistakenly

believing himself constrained to allocate liability equally

among joint polluters, and so this is another issue requiring

further consideration on remand.

The next issue is whether the district judge allocated

too large a share (40 percent) of responsibility for the cost of

the clean up to Browning-Ferris relative to the defendants,

who had operated the landfill for a lot longer time and had

dumped a much larger quantity of wastes in it. The judge

8a

Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

allocated as large a share as he did to Browning-Ferris

because he found that it had operated the landfill poorly and

had dumped particularly toxic wastes from a nearby Chrysler

plant in violation of its operating permit, and the liquid

character of the wastes had hastened their absorption into

groundwater. Browning-Ferris argues both that these findings

are erroneous and that, in any event, there is no evidence that

the wastes from the Chrysler plant increased the cost of

cleaning up the site and anyway the amount dumped in the

landfill was not as great as the district judge found. From

evidence that a considerable portion of the Chrysler wastes

were dumped elsewhere, Browning-Ferris argues that

defendants’ expert had exaggerated the amount deposited in

the landfill. Browning-Ferris may be correct on all these

factual points, but we cannot say that the district court

committed any clear errors in finding as it did, and that of

course is our criterion.

The trickier question, which returns us to the issue of

the district court’s equitable discretion in allocating liability

among polluters, is whether the court must find a causal

relation between a party’s pollution and the actual cost of

cleaning up the site. To answer this question we have to

distinguish between a necessary condition (or “but-for cause”)

and a sufficient condition. If event A is a necessary condition

of event B, this means that, without A, B will not occur. If

A is a sufficient condition of B, this means that, if A occurs,

B will occur. If A is that the murder weapon was loaded and

B is the murder, then A is a necessary condition. If A is

shooting a person through the heart and B is the death of the

shooting victim, then A is a sufficient condition of B but not

a necessary condition, because a wound to another part of the

victim's body might have been fatal as_well.

9a

Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

This distinction may sometimes be important in the

pollution context. It is easy to imagine a case in which, had

X not polluted a site, no clean-up costs would have been

incurred; X’s pollution would be a necessary condition of

those costs and it would be natural to think that he should pay

at least a part of them. But suppose that even if X had not

polluted the site, it would have to be cleaned up — and at the

same cost - because of the amount of pollution by Y. (That

would be a case, perhaps rare, in which the clean-up costs

were sensitive neither to the amount of pollution nor to any

synergistic interaction between the different pollutants.) Then

X’s pollution would not be a necessary condition of the clean

up, or of any of the costs incurred in the clean up. But that

should not necessarily let X off the hook. For suppose that if

X had not polluted the site at all, there still would have been

enough pollution from Y to require a clean up, but that if Y

had not polluted the site X’s pollution would have been

sufficient to require the clean up. In that case, the conduct of

X and the conduct of Y would each be a sufficient but not a

necessary condition of the clean up, and it would be entirely

arbitrary to let either (or, even worse, both) off the hook on

this basis. So far as appears, this is such a case; Browning-

Ferris’s pollution was serious enough (if indeed it dumped a

large quantity of Chrysler’s particularly toxic wastes) to

require that the site be cleaned up, but the other pollution at

the site was also enough. If Browning-Ferris’s conduct was

thus a sufficient though not a necessary condition of the clean

up, it is not inequitable to make it contribute substantially to

the cost.

We do not suggest that this is one of the presumably

rare cases in which the total costs of clean up are unaffected

by the number of polluters or the specific amounts or types of

10a

-Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

pollution contributed by each. Browning-Ferris’s pollution

was not, so far as appears, so serious all by itself as to have

required the incurring of ail the cleanup costs that were

incurred. Even so, no principle of law, logic, or common

sense required the court to allocate those total costs among the

polluters on the basis of the volume of wastes alone. Not only

do wastes differ in their toxicity, harm to the environment,

and costs of cleaning up, and so relative volume is not a

reliable guide to the marg:.ial costs imposed by each polluter;

but polluters differ in the blameworthiness of the decisions or

omissions that led to the pollution, and blameworthiness is

relevant to an equitable allocation of joint costs. (Presumably

it would not entitle the judge to make one polluter pay for

separable costs wholly imposed by other polluters.) The

district judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that all

these factors warranted making Browning-Ferris bear more

than its proportional volumetric share of the pollution.

It remains to consider two issues of derivative liability.

If Ter Maat is deemed on remand to be personally liable as an

operator of the landfill, and especially if the judge allocates

100 percent of the joint liability of M.I.G. and AAA to AAA,

the solvent one of the pair (there is no suggestion that the

‘change of ownership gets AAA off the liability hook), then

Browning-Ferris and the other plaintiffs will be able to collect

the amount of contribution to which they are entitled from the

defendants. But these are big “ifs” (how big is for the district

judge to decide, in the first instance, on remand). The judge

may find that Ter Maat was not an operator and that AAA

should not bear the entirety of its joint liability with M.I.G.

In that event, it will become important whether Ter Maat and

AAA are derivatively liable for the conduct of M.I.G., and as

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

the issue is fully briefed we shall resolve it now and hope to

head off a further appeal.

The argument is that the corporate veil should be

pierced, and Ter Maat, as shareholder of M.I.G. and AAA,

and AAA as an affiliate of M.I.G. (both dominated by Ter

Maat, and AAA in addition a 30 percent shareholder of

M.I.G.), should be held liable for M.I.G.’s debt to the

plaintiffs. Although there is a split of authority on whether

federal or state law governs the piercing of the corporate veil

in CERCLA cases (the Supreme Court expressly left the

question open in United States v. Bestfoods, supra, 524 U.S.

at 63 n. 9), that is not a problem here because the parties have

assumed that state law (Illinois state law, specifically) governs

and so any contention that federal law should instead govern

has been waived. Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489, 495 (7th

Cir. 1982).

The general rule, of course, in Illinois as elsewhere,

is that a shareholder qua shareholder, and a parent,

subsidiary, or other affiliate, qua affiliate, is not liable for a

corporation’s debts. E.g., /n re Rehabilitation of Centaur Ins.

Co., 632 N.E.2d 1015, 1017 (Ill. 1994); Jtofca, Inc. v. Hell-

hake, supra, 8 F.3d at 1204 (applying [llinois law). That is

the principle of limited liability and it serves the important

social purpose of encouraging investment by individuals who

are risk averse and therefore will not invest (or will insist on

a much higher return) in an enterprise if by doing so they

expose their entire wealth to the hazards of litigation. But in

some circumstances’ the corporate veil is pierced and the

corporation’s debtor allowed to collect his debt from the

shareholder or affiliate.

12a

Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

In the case of a voluntary creditor, for example

someone who had lent money to the corporation, the strongest

case for piercing the veil is presented when the corporation

had led potential creditors to believe that it was more solvent

than it really was. Holland vy. Joy Candy Mfg. Corp., 145

N.E.2d 101 (Ill. App. 1957); In re Xonics Photochemical,

Inc., 841 F.2d 198, 201 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Kaiser, 791

F.2d 73, 75 (7th Cir. 1986). For example, the nonbank

subsidiary of a bank holding company might hold itself out as

being the bank, leading creditors to believe that they were

dealing with a more substantial corporation than was in fact

the case; that would be a good case for piercing the veil.

FMC Finance Corp. v. Murphree, 632 F.2d 413, 423 (Sth

Cir. 1980); cf. Fentress y. Triple Mining, Inc., 635 N.E.2d

102, 108 (Ill. App. 1994): Hystro Products, Inc. v. MNP

Corp., 18 F.3d 1384, 1390-9] (7th Cir. 1994) (Illinois law).

Although Illinois formulates the test for piercing the veil in

more traditional terms - with much talk of “unity of interest

and ownership,” “commingling of assets,” disappearance of

the separate “personalities” of the corporation and its owner

or affiliate, and the desirability of avoiding “injustice,” e.g. ,

id. at 1388-91- it is hard to see how a voluntary creditor can

complain if he knows that his debtor lacks sufficient assets to

be certain to be able to pay the debt when it comes due.

Analysis is more difficult in the case of an involuntary

creditor, such as the plaintiffs here, who wish to be

compensated for having in effect “lent” the money to clean up

the site of the former landfill but lent under compulsion,

having been forced to clean it up by the Superfund law rather

than pursuant to a contract with the “debtors,” such as M.I.G.

See generally Secon Service System, Inc. v. St. Joseph Bank

& Trust Co., 855 F.2d 406, 413-14 (7th Cir. 1988). In such

13a

Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

a case there is no issue of protecting reliance induced by

misrepresentations by the debtor. The plaintiffs in dumping

toxic wastes to the landfill obviously were not relying on

M.1.G.’s appearing to have greater assets than it actually had.

In these circumstances we can think of only two arguments for

piercing the corporate veil. The first is that the owners may

. have so far neglected the legal requirements (requirements not

intended solely for the protection of creditors) for operating

in the corporate form that they should be taken to have

forfeited its protections, forfeiture thus operating to enforce

the legal requirements that the state has seen fit to impose on

investors who want the benefits of limited liability.

Moreover, if the formalities have been flouted, it becomes

hard to see how the investors could reasonably have relied on

the protections of limited liability; they would have known

they were skating on thin ice. In such a case the investment-

encouraging function of limited liability is attenuated.

Second, it could be argued that enterprises engaged in

potentially hazardous activities should be prevented from

externalizing the costs of those activities, by being required to

maintain or at least endeavor to maintain a sufficient capital

cushion to be answerable in a tort suit should its activities

cause harm for which liability would attach, on pain of its

shareholders’ and affiliates’ losing their limited liability

should the corporation fail to do this. This argument has not

carried the day in any jurisdiction that we are aware of,

presumably because of the risks that it would impose on

shareholders and because the potential victims of the

corporation’s hazardous activities can be protected without

making inroads into limited liability by requiring enterprises

engaged in such activities to post a bond large enough to

assure that any judgment against the corporation will be

l4a

—

——

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Court of Appeals Opinion - 11/1/99

collectible. Courts do, it is true, frequently mention

“undercapitalization” as a separate ground from neglect of

corporate formalities for piercing the corporate veil. Hystro

Products, Inc. v. MNP Corp., supra, 18 F.3d at 1389-91;

Sea-Land Services, Inc. y. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 289, $22

(7th Cir. 1991): People v. V& M Industries, Inc., 700

N.E.2d 746, 751 (Ill. App. 1998); Jacobson y. Buffalo Rock

Shooters Supply Inc., 664 N -E.2d 328, 332 (Ill. App. 1996):

Fentress v. Triple Mining, Inc., supra, 635 N.E.2d at 107:

McCracken v. Olson Cos., 500 N -E.2d 487, 492 (II. App.

1986). They do not do so on the basis of unusual risks to

potential tort victims or other involuntary creditors, however,

though conceivably such concerns are in the background of

their thinking.

There is no evidence that either M.I.G. or AAA failed

to comply with the legal requirements for Operating in the

corporate form, except with regard to keeping minutes of their

corporate meetings - not a failure Significant enough to

warrant forfeiture of limited liability, given that penalties

should be proportioned to the gravity of the misconduct being

penalized. The plaintiffs further argue, however, that M.I.G.

was undercapitalized. The Clearest case -- here merging,

though, with neglect of corporate formalities - for forfeiture

of limited liability on this ground is where the corporation has

failed to maintain the minimum Capitalization required by law.

But such cases are few (the only Illinois case we can find is

Gallagher v. Reconco Builders, Inc., 415 N.E.2d 560, 564

(Ill. App. 1980)), and do not bear on the “pierceability” of

the corporate veil of M.1.G., which is not accused of ever

having maintained a lower Capitalization than the law

required. The fact that its motivation in operating with little

capital was to reduce taxes does not argue for piercing the

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corporate veil, since taking advantage of lawful opportunities

for avoiding taxes is not wrongful activity.

There is of course a difference between assets

available to pay a judgment and taxable income; the former

might be ample while the latter was slight. But our point is

only that the fact that M.I.G. might have been “under-

capitalized” for tax reasons is not a reason for piercing the

corporate veil. The cases in which undercapitalization has

figured in the decision to pierce the corporate veil are ones in

which the corporation had so little money that it could not and

did not actually operate its nominal business on its own. An

example is the corporation in the Fentress case, which had no

Capital at all that the court could find, and no bank account.

Even there the court did not pierce the veil on the basis of

undercapitalization alone, but cited also a persistent neglect of

corporate formalities. Undercapitalization is rarely if ever the

sole factor in a decision to pierce the corporate veil, William

_ P. Hackney & Tracey G. Benson, “Shareholder Liability for

Inadequate Capital,” 43 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 837, 885-87 (1982),

and we think is best regarded simply as a factor helpful in

identifying a corporation as a pure shell, which M.I.G. was

not.

So on remand, to summarize, there will be no issues

of veil piercing to consider but the court will have to decide

Ter Maat’s personal liability and whether AAA should pay

more than 50 percent of the two corporations’ liability to the

plaintiffs.

AFFIRMED IN PART,

REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

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A true Copy:

Teste:

/s/

Clerk of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

17a

APPENDIX B.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[Dated November 1, 1999]

Nos. 98-3204 and 99-1360

BROWNING-FERRIS

INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,

INCORPORATED, APACHE

PRODUCTS COMPANY,

TAMMS INDUSTRIES, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

V.

RICHARD TER MAAT, MIG

INVESTMENTS,

INCORPORATED, AAA

DISPOSAL SYSTEMS,

INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Ne ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee”

JUDGMENT - WITH ORAL ARGUMENT

BEFORE: Honorable RICHARD A. POSNER, Chief Judge

Honorable WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

18a

Honorable KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division

No. 92 C 20259, Philip G. Reinhard, Judge

The judgment of the District Court is AFFIRMED in

part, REVERSED in part, and this cause is REMANDED, in

accordance with the decision of this court entered on this date.

No costs shall be awarded.

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

WESTERN DIVISION

[Filed July 29, 1998]

No. 92 C 20259

BROWNING-FERRIS

INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,

INC., et al.

Plaintiffs,

¥.

Richard TER MAAT, et al.,

Defendants,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

REINHARD, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs filed this action for contribution and

declaratory relief pursuant to the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(CERCLA), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 and 9613 and

under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and

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2202, seeking monetary damages against defendants for the

past and future costs incurred to respond to environmental

contamination at the MIG/DeWane Landfill Superfund Site

located in Boone County, Illinois. The Court conducted a

two-week bench trial in January 1998 and set a briefing

schedule for the parties to submit post-trial briefs setting forth

the issues and citing the trial evidence relevant thereto.' This

order will decide the legal issues, make the necessary factual

findings, allocate liability among the parties and assess

damages against defendants where appropriate.

BACKGROUND

The site (also termed a facility as defined in CERCLA)

at issue is an approximately forty-seven acre landfill located

near Belvidere in Boone County, Illinois. The property

during the entire relevant time period was owned by Raymond

DeWane, Jean A. Farina and L.A.E., Inc. who leased it for

operation of a landfill. It was operated as a landfill from

February 1969 to June 1988. During that time, a variety of

residential, commercial and industrial waste was placed in the

landfill.

The landfill initially consisted of an excavated area

which was lined with five feet of clay as required by the state

landfill permit. About 45,000 cubic yards of waste were

placed in the excavation between February 1969 and March

1971. The operator of the landfill during that time left it in

' The court compliments the attorneys from both sides for

the exemplary manner in which they tried this case and their

extensive efforts in Preparing the post-trial briefs.

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poor condition and there was suspected contamination of the

groundwater by leachate.’

In early 1971, the owners leased the landfill to

Browning-Ferris Industries of Illinois, Inc. (BFI).2 BFI

| sought and obtained a new landfill permit from the Illinois

Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA) in May 1972 to

operate the site. The landfill began receiving waste in April

1973, although on a limited basis. In September 1973, when

a nearby landfill closed, the landfill began receiving waste on

an unlimited basis. BFI operated the landfill until October

1975.

BFI’s permit required a five-foot, compacted clay liner

and a gravity-powered leachate collection system which fed

into a surface impoundment. Additionally, daily, intermediate

and final earthen cover was required.* There is no evidence

to show that BFI did not comply with these requirements.

During its operating period, BFI admittedly placed about

375,000 cubic yards of waste into the landfill. At the end of

? Leachate may be described as the end result of water

leaching through a substance and collecting soluble compounds in.

the process.

> The original lease was to Rockford Disposal Service,

Inc., the predecessor to BFI. The court will simply refer to the

entities as BFI.

* Cover is a prescribed level of soil to be placed over the

waste to prevent its movement by the wind and to retard the amount

of rainwater reaching the waste.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

BFI’s operation, it closed and placed a final cover over the

area it had landfilled.

Beginning in October 1975, the owners leased the

landfill to defendants.° Defendants operated the landfill from

October 1975 to June 1988. During that time, they deposited

approximately 3.5 million cubic yards of waste. MIG was the

Operator per the lease and AAA was a transporter to the

landfill. Richard Ter Maat served as an officer of both

corporations.

After filing a site closure plan with the IEPA, which

was rejected because the owners refused to sign it, defendants

left the landfill without properly closing it, including no final

cover. MIG lacked the funds to effectuate a proper closure.

AAA was sold, and Richard Ter Maat moved to Florida.

Defendants took no Part in operating or Closing the landfill

after June 30, 1988.

In August 1990, the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (USEPA) placed the landfill on the

national Priorities List (NPL) for clean-up under CERCLA.

In October 1990 and again in March 1991, the USEPA and

IEPA issued administrative orders on consent (AOC) to clean-

up the landfill. Pursuant to these AOCs, plaintiffs were to:

(1) conduct immediate waste Stabilization measures, such as

pump leachate from the surface impoundment, repair the

impoundment berm and construct an interim cap on the

landfill, (2) conduct a remedial investigation and feasibility

> When the court refers to defendants, it means MIG,

Inc,, AAA Disposal, Inc. and Richard Ter Maat.

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study (RI/FS) pursuant to the NPL®; and (3) to pay past

response costs and oversight costs incurred by USEPA and

IEPA.

Plaintiffs filed this action in an effort to recover

contribution for these costs, applicable interest and a

declaration of liability as to future costs.’ The future costs

will depend on the Record of Decision (ROD) to be issued by

USEPA which will set forth the needed measures to complete

the clean- up and management of the landfill.*

Following the bench trial, the parties submitted post-

trial briefs in which they set forth thirty-five issues to be

decided by the court. The court will decide each of the issues

in this order. The facts and evidence relevant to a particular

issue will be discussed when the court decides that issue.

The purpose of an RI/FS is to collect data, evaluate |

releases of hazardous substances and to conduct engineering

evaluations sufficient to allow federal and state agencies to select

remedies.

; Defendants have never been involved with, or

contributed to, the clean-up of the landfill despite their notification

of potential liability by the USEPA and IEPA.

5 As of the time of trial, plaintiffs suggested the ROD

would be issued in February or March 1998. As of the date of this

order, plaintiffs have not advised the court of the ROD’s issuance.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Operator Liability

Plaintiffs assert liability against AAA and Richard Ter

Maat as operators through theories of direct liability and

derivative liability under state corporate veil-piercing law.°

The court will first address the issue of direct liability.

3. AAA

The United States Supreme Court has recently spoken

on the issue of when a party can be held directly liable as an

operator under CERCLA. See United States v. Bestfoods,

524 U.S. 51, 118 S.Ct. 1876, 141 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998).'° At

issue in Bestfoods was to what extent, if any, a parent can be

held liable as either an owner or an Operator of a hazardous

waste site owned or operated by its subsidiary. The court

answered that the parent can be found derivatively liable as an

Owner or operator only if the corporate veil may be pierced in

light of the applicable state law. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at ----,

118 S.Ct. at 1880-81. On the other hand, the parent can also

be found directly liable as an Operator, independent of any

State veil-piercing law, if a plaintiff can show the parent

actively participated in, and exercised control over, the

” All Parties stipulate that MIG was an operator at the site.

This case was decided after the Parties submitted their

post-trial briefs. Plaintiff filed a motion to supplement its authority,

citing Bestfoods, which defendants opposed. The court being aware

of the Bestfoods decision independent of plaintiffs’ motion, denied

the motion as moot. Also, because of the Bestfoods decision,

several of the joint issues need not be directly addressed.

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operations of the site.'' /d. at 1881. Any person or

corporation who operates a site is directly liable for the costs

of clean-up regardless of whether that person is the site’s

owner, the owner’s parent corporation or business partner, or

someone who sneaks in at night to discharge toxic waste at the

site. Id. at 1885.

The difficulty comes in defining actions sufficient to

constitute direct operation. Bestfoods, at 1885. Because the

statute fails to adequately define the term “operator,” the

Supreme Court looked to its ordinary or natural meaning. In

the organizational sense, which was the intent of CERCLA,

operate means to conduct the affairs, manage, or operate a

business. Jd. (citing American Heritage Dictionary 1268 (3d

ed. 1992)). Therefore, under CERCLA, an operator is

simply someone who directs the workings of, manages, or

conducts the affairs of a site. /d. To sharpen this definition

for purposes of CERCLA’s concern with environmental

contamination, an operator must manage, direct, or conduct

operations specifically related to pollution, that is, operations

having to do with the leakage or disposal of hazardous waste,

or decisions about compliance with environmental regulations.

Id.

If the issue of direct liability as an operator is to be

kept distinct from derivative liability, there must be no fusion

'! The court recognizes that the two corporate defendants

here, MIG and AAA, did not have a parent-subsidiary relationship.

Nonetheless, because of their common ownership and directorship,

they are sufficiently analogous to a parent-subsidiary (sister

corporations seems an appropriate description) to make applicable

the tenets of Bestfoods.

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NAR RIN I nde as saint

District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

of direct and indirect liability concepts. Bestfoods, at 1885.

The question for direct liability is not whether the one

corporation operates the other, but rather, whether it operates

the site. Jd. at 1886. Such Operation is evidenced by

Participation in the activities of the site and not the subsidiary.

Id. Control of the operating corporation, if extensive enough,

gives rise to indirect liability under state law piercing

doctrine, not direct liability under the statute, /d.

Having said that, the Court cautioned that it is entirely

appropriate for directors of a parent Corporation to serve as

directors of its subsidiary and that fact alone may not serve to

expose the parent to liability for the acts of the subsidiary.

Bestfoods, at 1886. This recognizes the well-established

principle that directors and officers holding positions with a

Parent and its subsidiary can and do change hats to represent

the two corporations separately despite their common

ownership. /d. Therefore, it is not enough to establish direct

liability as an operator that dual officers and directors made

policy decisions and Supervised activities at the site. Jd.

Rather, it must be shown that, despite the general presumption

to the contrary, the officers and directors were acting in their

Capacities as officers and directors of the parent and not as

officers and directors of the subsidiary.'* /d.

The court went on to discuss various possible

scenarios where a parent corporation could be found directly

- Again, while the corporations in this case are not

parent-subsidiary, they do share officers and directors. As such,

the court finds the language of Bestfoods equally applicable here.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

liable as an operator. The first is where the parent operates

the site in the stead of its subsidiary or alongside the

subsidiary in some sort of joint venture. Bestfoods, at 1887.

The second possibility is where a dual officer or director

might depart so far from the norms of parental influence

exercised through dual office-holding as to serve the parent,

even when ostensibly acting on behalf of the subsidiary in

operating the site. /d. The third scenario is that an agent of

the parent, with no hat to wear but that of the parent, might

manage or direct activities at the site. /d. Norms of

corporate behavior, undisturbed by any CERCLA provision,

are crucial reference points. /d. The critical question is

whether, in degree and detail, actions directed to the site by

an agent of the parent alone are eccentric under accepted

norms of parental oversight of a subsidiary’s site. /d.

In the present case, the evidence shows that Richard

Ter Maat, as an officer and director of AAA and MIG, was

involved in the operational decision-making at the site. The

dispositive question is whether his conduct and that of AAA

was done outside the norms of corporate conduct so as to be

considered done on behalf of AAA rather than MIG.”

The pertinent evidence establishés that MIG paid AAA

a management fee to reimburse AAA, in part, for its

performing certain administrative functions for MIG related

3 , . : ——

'° In considering the evidence on this issue, the court

disregards the evidence related to AAA's control of MIG. Such

evidence is clearly not pertinent to an analysis of direct liability as

an operator under CERCLA. See Bestfoods, at 1886 (“The

question is not whether the parent operates the subsidiary, but

rather whether it operates the site. . . .”).

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

to the site. Numerous outside Parties who were involved with

the site, including the IEPA and waste haulers, considered

AAA to be the operator. Some venders sent Correspondence

and invoices to AAA for services related to site operations.

Additionally, Richard Ter Maat sent several letters to the

IEPA pertaining to operational matters at the site which he

Signed as president of AAA. He also sent a letter to the

[llinois Division of Land/Noise Pollution Control pertaining

{0 an Operating permit for the site which was also signed by

him as president of AAA. While defendants attempted to

explain these letters away as aberrations, the letters speak for

themselves. Furthermore, there are several letters from

AAA's environmental consultant, M. Rapps Associates Inc.,

addressed to Richard Ter Maat and AAA which discuss

pollution and clean-up issues at the site.

On the other hand, as defendants point out, there is

also Correspondence between Rapps and MIG and the IEPA

and MIG which also pertains to Operations at the site. All this

shows, however, at best is that AAA and MIG both were

involved as operators at the site. Nothing in CERCLA, or the

case law interpreting it, prohibits a finding of more than one

operator liable for a site.

The court finds that there is sufficient evidence,

irrespective of the evidence related to AAA’s control of MIG,

to conclude that AAA was, at the very least, a joint operator

of the site. As such, AAA bears direct liability under

CERCLA for the clean-up costs. The court will determine

AAA's share in a separate section of this order. Having

found AAA directly liable as an operator under CERCLA, the

court need not address the issue of whether AAA is liable

indirectly under a veil-piercing theory.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

a Richard Ter Maat

While the Bestfoods decision offers significant

guidance on the meaning of an operator for purposes of direct

liability under CERCLA, the Court was careful to point out

that CERCLA does not impinge on established corporate

principles under state law. See Bestfoods, at 1880. Prior to

Bestfoods , however, the Seventh Circuit held that a corporate

officer could be held directly liable as an operator under

CERCLA irrespective of state veil-piercing law. Sidney S.

Arst Co. v. Pipefitters Welfare Educ. Fund, 25 F.3d 417, 420-

21 (7th Cir. 1994). This court respectfully believes that the

Bestfoods case directly applies to, and therefore trumps, the

Sidney S. Arst decision. Consequently, the only way plaintiffs

can attribute individual liability as an operator to Richard Ter

Maat, as an officer of both MIG and AAA, is derivatively

under state veil-piercing law.

Efforts to pierce the corporate veil are governed by the

law of the state of incorporation, Stromberg Metal Works,

Inc. v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 933 (7" Cir.

1996), which in this case is Illinois. In Ilkinois, a

corporation’s veil of limited liability may be pierced only if

there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate

personalities of the corporation and the individual no longer

exist and if the circumstances are such that adherence to the

fiction of separate corporate existence would sanction a fraud

Or promote injustice. Hystro Prod., Inc. v. MNP Corp., 18

F.3d 1384, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994). In determining whether

to disregard a corporate entity, the court will consider a

number of factors, including: (1) inadequate capitalization;

(2) failure to issue stock; (3) failure to observe corporate

formalities; (4) nonpayment of dividends; (5) insolvency of

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

the debtor corporation at the time; (6) nonfunctioning of other

officers or directors: (7) absence of corporate records; and (8)

whether the corporation is a mere facade for the operation of

dominant stockholders. Ted Harrison Oil Co., Inc. v. Dokka,

247 Ill. App.3d 791, 187 Ill. Dec. 441, 617 N.E.2d 898, 901

(4th Dist. 1993). The court may also consider whether the

dominant individuals commingled corporate funds with

personal funds or preferred themselves as creditors. /d.

When such factors are coupled with some element of injustice

or fundamental unfairness, the corporation will be considered

aS an aggregate of persons both in equity and law and its

officers, directors and shareholders wil] be held liable for the

corporation’s obligations. /d. That being said, a court should

reluctantly pierce the corporate veil. /d. The party seeking

to have the corporate entity disregarded must come forward

with a substantial showing that the corporation is really a

dummy or a sham for a dominating personality. /d.

The present case is unique as the officers, directors

and shareholders, of which Richard Ter Maat is more than

one, chose to set up two corporations, one to operate the site

(MIG) and another to haul garbage to the site (AAA). At first

glance, one might be suspicious that two corporations were

formed where one could do the job. But that is the nature of

corporate law, and there are many legitimate benefits, not the

least of which is related to taxes, that might motivate such an

organizational move. Moreover, nothing in CERCLA

purports to reject the bedrock common-law principle

respecting corporate structure. Bestfoods at 1883. The

particular structure and functions of the corporation alone do

not justify attributing liability to Richard Ter Maat

individually.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Plaintiffs contend that Richard Ter Maat is liable as

the alter ego of MIG and AAA.“ The court will assess this

contention in light of the various factors recognized under

Illinois law, keeping in mind plaintiffs’ burden of a substantial

showing.

First, there is no evidence of undercapitalization.

While MIG did not have tremendous resources, it was able to

function financially on its own for many years. Second, stock

was issued by both corporations. Third, corporate formalities

were in fact observed. The evidence shows that while

Richard Ter Maat was president of each corporation,

decisions were made collectively. Simply because Richard

Ter Maat demonstrated a leadership role does not reflect

dominance. Additionally, regular meetings were held and

books were kept for both corporations. Both corporations

also filed corporate tax returns. Similarly, each corporation

employed a controller, Phil Stevens, to maintain corporate

accounting functions. Fourth, the evidence shows that the

other officers and directors performed specific, identifiable

functions for each corporation. While Richard Ter Maat may

have been the leader, it was not a one-man show. Fifth,

although plaintiffs point to some questionable corporate

minutes, the overall evidence demonstrates that corporate

records were maintained for both MIG and AAA. Sixth,

there is no evidence sufficient to show that either corporation

was a mere facade for the operation of Richard Ter Maat.

'* Of course, plaintiffs need only pierce the corporate veil

of either MIG or AAA to achieve their goal of attributing liability

to Richard Ter Maat.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

These foregoing factors do not justify piercing the corporate

veil.

The remaining factors, while arguably supporting

piercing the corporate veil of MIG, are insufficient to do so

in light of the factors pointing the other way and plaintiffs’

burden of a substantial Showing. There was no evidence of

any payment of dividends, although that is not entirely

unusual in small corporations. As for the insolvency of MIG,

it only became insolvent once the CERCLA obligations were

imposed on it. Prior to that time, it maintained its own °

financial vitality. The fact that AAA prospered comparatively

does not show MIG’s insolvency. Lastly, there is some

Suggestion that AAA and Richard Ter Maat preferred

themselves as creditors. Given the unusually low tipping

rates charged AAA by MIG (irrespective of AAA’s volume),

the lease arrangement for heavy equipment and the

management fees paid by MIG to AAA, it is evident that

AAA prospered at MIG’s expense. Such an arrangement is

not entirely unusual as between two corporations. Ultimately,

of course, Richard Ter Maat received the benefit of AAA’s

prosperity through the sale of AAA. Whether that was part

of some grand fraudulent scheme or only last minute

manipulations by a shrewd business person, the evidence

simply does not answer. Hinting at or suggesting such

matters is not enough in light of state corporate law. The

court finds that plaintiffs have failed to prove a basis to pierce

the corporate veil as to either AAA or MIG.

Admissibility of Parnello Affidavit

On June 24, 1988, BFI submitted, via its legal

counsel, the affidavit of one of its employees, Joseph E.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Parnello, to the United States Environmental Protection

Agency (USEPA). The letter accompanying the Parnello

affidavit states, in pertinent part, that the affidavit is submitted

in response to the USEPA’s contention that BFI “has a

continuing obligation to supply information relevant to

Belvidere Municipal Landfill No. 1.” The letter further states

that the Parnello affidavit “attests to the types and volumes of

waste hauled from the Chrysler plant . . . to the Belvidere

Municipal Landfill No. 1 from 1967 to 1973.” It further

asserts that Parnello “started hauling Chrysler’s waste in 1967

and continues to haul this waste to this day.” The letter also

includes a list of the types and approximate amounts of waste

hauled from Chrysler for the seven-year period.

Parnello’s affidavit itself states, in relevant part, that

Parnello was hauling Chrysler waste to a BFI landfill in Davis

Junction, Illinois and that he had hauled Chrysler waste to the

Belvidere Municipal Landfill No. 1 from 1967 to 1973.

Parnello also states that “[a]ll of the waste [he] hauled from

Chrysler was taken to the Belvidere Municipal Landfill No.

1 until the landfill closed in 1973.” The Parnello affidavit

further states that during the seven-year period he hauled:

approximately 15,000 gallons of infilco sludge every two

months, approximately three to five 20 cubic yard loads per

week of paint sludge, approximately three to five loads of fly

ash per week depending on the season, approximately two to

five 30 yard loads of metal debris and scrap per week and

approximately two 15 yard loads per day of industrial

wastewater sludge. According to Parnello, Chrysler also

disposed of about sixty drums of waste per week, with some

of the drums containing solvents, tar or metal scraps.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Defendants seek to admit the Parnello affidavit as

circumstantial evidence of what type and volume of Chrysler

waste was hauled by Parnello during the period of 1973 to

1975. Plaintiffs contend the affidavit is inadmissible hearsay.

Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) governs the

admissibility of the Parnello affidavit. Rule 801(d)(2)

provides that an admission by a party opponent is not hearsay,

and therefore admissible, if it “is offered against a party and

is (A) the party’s own Statement, in either an individual or a

representative capacity or (B) a statement of which the party

has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a

Statement by a person authorized by the party to make a

statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by the

party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope

of the agency or employment, made during the existence of

the relationship. . . .” Parnello’s affidavit, while arguably

admissible under subsection (A), qualifies as'an admission by

BFI under subsection (B), (C) and (D). The cover letter by

BFI’s attorney reflects that BFI had adopted a belief in its

truth as it was submitted to the USEPA and also that BFI

authorized Parnello to make the Statement. Additionally, as

to subsection (D), Parnello was an employee of BFI at the

time he made the affidavit and it concerned a matter within

Parnello’s employment. Accordingly, the court admits the

Parnello affidavit as an admission by BFI.

Chrysler Waste

The parties have presented the twin issues of whether

an adverse inference can be drawn based on Chrysler’s

alleged failure to produce all documents relevant to disposal

of its wastes for the period 1973 to 1975 and whether such an

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inference can be attributed to BFI for its similar failure. A

related issue is whether section 103(d) of CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. § 9603(d), required BFI to retain all records of its

operation at the site. The court finds it unnecessary to decide

these issues as there is sufficient evidence to infer that

Chrysler waste did in fact go to the site during the period

1973 to 1975.

The undisputed evidence shows that Parnello, a BFI

employee, exclusively hauled the Chrysler waste from at least

1967 to 1973. Additionally, the undisputed evidence

demonstrates he exclusively hauled Chrysler waste after 1975.

Other evidence strongly suggests that he also hauled the

Chrysler waste from 1973 to 1975.

The big mystery, of course, is where did he haul it

during the 1973-75 period. In that regard, the evidence shows

that from 1967 to 1973 Parnello hauled all of the Chrysler

waste to BFI’s site at Belvidere Municipal Landfill No. 1 and

that from 1975 forward he hauled it to BFI’s new site at Davis

Junction.'? David Boque, a management level employee of

Chrysler, testified by deposition that he was aware of Parnello

hauling Chrysler waste to Belvidere Municipal Landfill No.

1 before 1973 and to Davis Junction from sometime in 1975

thereafter. Curiously, Boque had no knowledge of where

Pamello hauled Chrysler waste from 1973 to 1975.

Furthermore, BFI applied for a permit in early 1973 from

'S The evidence shows that for a short time in 1975 he

hauled Chrysler waste to the Pagel Pit in Rockford, Illinois. That

was between the time BFI relinquished control over the site and

when it opened its new operation at Davis Junction.

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Illinois Environmental Protection Agency to deposit liquid

wastes from Chrysler in the site.

Additionally, an employee of BFI at the site, Kenneth

Bodey, testified at trial that while he worked there Parnello

hauled Chrysler waste to the Site. According to Bodey, once

or twice a week Parnello would bring in a twenty-yard

container containing two different Sludges. One sludge Bodey

described as purple in color with a stiff consistency which he

referred to as number five Sludge and described as paint

Sludge. The second Sludge, referred to as number seven

Sludge, was gray in color with a soft, but not liquid,

consistency. Bodey described this as Sewage sludge. Neither

Sludge smelled like solvents. Bodey also testified he saw

Parnello bring infilco waste into the site ina twenty-yard box.

According to Bodey, he also saw fly ash and cinders hauled

into the site by Parnello, at a rate in the winter of two to three

loads per day. To Bodey’s knowledge, BFI’s trucks went

Only to-the site and no other landfill while BF] operated the

site. While Bodey saw Parnello haul drums into Belvidere

Municipal Landfill No. 1, he never saw him haul drums to the

Site.

Cleatos Atkinson, the former general manager of BFI,

testified, and the documentary evidence Shows, that in mid-

1975 BFI sought and received Significant hauling and disposal

rate charges for liquid waste in the agreement covering 1973

to 1976. This was at about the same time BFI began hauling

Chrysler waste to Pagel Pit and then Davis Junction.

When the court views this evidence in its entirety, the

inescapable conclusion is that BFI hauled Chrysler waste,

including sludges and infilco waste, to the site during the

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period of 1973 to 1975. The more difficult questions are how

much was deposited and to what extent did these wastes

contain solvents.

In that regard, the court finds persuasive the expert

opinion of defendants’ witness, Paul R. Ammann. According

to Ammann, BFI contributed approximately 3,430,000 pounds

of solvents to the site between April 1973 and June 1975."°

This amount is based on the number of vehicles manufactured

by Chrysler during this time period and the approximate

amount of solvent-bearing waste generated therefrom.

According to Ammann, the 3.4 million pounds of solvents

deposited by BFI at the site represents about 91 percent of the

total solvent content at the site.'’ The question of the impact

of solvents at the site will be addressed when the court decides

the allocation issue.

Appropriateness of Damages Under the NCP

Defendants contend that plaintiffs have failed to carry

their burden of proving that the response costs they seek to -

recover were both necessary and consistent with the National

'© This conclusion is based on the assumption that BFI

dumped all the Chrysler waste during the relevant period at the site.

In its prior discussion, the court has already found such assumption

to be supported by the evidence. The court, therefore, finds that

about 3,430,000 pounds of solvents are attributable to BFI’s

hauling of Chrysler waste to the site.

'7 Ammann attributed the remaining nine percent to MIG

based on the amount and nature of municipal and industrial trash

hauled by MIG during its operating period as per records.

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Contingency Plan. Peppers counsel for defendants'® further

identifies 13 examples which he contends are not recoverable

special damages.

Section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA imposes liability on

potentially responsible Parties (PRPs) for “any other

necessary costs of response incurred by any other person

consistent with the National Contingency Plan.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607(a)(4)(B). Proof that a private Party’s response costs

were Consistent with the NCP is an element of a private cost

recovery action under CERCLA. Bancamerica Commercial

Corp. v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 900 F.Supp. 1427, 145]

(D.Kan. 1995). The 19909 NCP, which applies to this action,

specifies that any response action “carried out in compliance

with the terms of an order issued by EPA pursuant to section

106 of CERCLA, or a consent decree entered into pursuant to

section 122 of CERCLA will be considered ‘consistent with

the NCP.’” 40 C.E.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(ii). Private party

response actions not made pursuant to an EPA order or decree

require substantial compliance with a list of requirements in

order for the response action to be considered consistent with

the NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(5)-(6). Response actions

taken pursuant to an EPA order or decree will be found

consistent with the NCP if the actions were in compliance

with the order or decree. Trinity Indus., 900 F.Supp. at

1452; United States y. Colorado & Eastern R.R. Co., Inc.,

No. 89-C-1786, 1993 WL 350171 (D.Colo. 1993), afl’d, 50

F.3d 1530 (10" Cir. 1995); Central Maine Power Co. v. FJ.

5 See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peppers, 64 Ill.2d 187,

355 N.E.2d 24 (1976) (Insured entitled to independent counsel]

where potential conflict of interest exists under insurance policy.)

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O’Connor Co., 838 F.Supp. 641, 647 (D.Me. 1993). In fact,

there is an irrebuttable presumption that actions taken

pursuant to the terms of an EPA consent decree are consistent

with the plan. Central Maine Power, 838 F.Supp. at 647.

In this case, the undisputed evidence shows that the

response costs sought by plaintiffs were for actions taken

pursuant to two administrative orders on consent executed

after April 9, 1990. Therefore, the court finds the costs are

consistent with the NCP.

Defendants contend that the oversight costs sought by

plaintiffs related to the emergency removal and RI/FS

activities are not recoverable, relying on United States v.

Rohm and Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265 (3d Cir. 1993). The

Seventh Circuit has not addressed the issue. Two other

circuit courts of appeals have, in addressing the issue, rejected

the conclusion and reasoning of the Rohm case. See United

States v. Lowe, 118 F.3d 399 (Sth Cir. 1997); see also

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. American Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564

(10" Cir. 1996) (limiting Rohm to the narrower circumstance

of removal actions).

After carefully reading all three cases and the

applicable statutory provisions under CERCLA, the court

respectfully disagrees with the Third Circuit and follows the

decisions of the Fifth and Tenth Circuits. It appears that

allowing oversight costs to be recovered best serves the broad

remedial purpose of CERCLA and promotes the effective

clean-up of environmental hazards. Accordingly, the court

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finds that plaintiffs are entitled to recover all of the Oversight

costs of the USEPA and IEPA.'?

Defendants, alternatively, contend that certain costs

are not recoverable and present an enumerated laundry list of

contentions and commentary as support for their position.

The court finds that the evidence supports plaintiffs’ claims

for costs as to all these matters. Only two warrant further

discussion.

First, defendants contend plaintiffs’ additional

expenses of $392,055.89 in PRP search costs were duplicative

and done ip anticipation of litigation. Patrick McGrath, vice-

president of Peterson Consulting, testified that $378,450 was

expended to identify PRPs through the identification of

generators and transporters and the specific volumes of waste

they hauled or sent to the site. According to McGrath, this

function was necessary to facilitate the de minimis settlement

process. Furthermore, McGrath’s expert report shows a

delineation of the various tasks conducted by Peterson

Consulting as part of the PRP search process. The court

agrees thai PRP search costs are not limited to the name of the

PRP alone. Information related to who brought what and how

much is particularly relevant to the de minimis settlement

process. McGrath’s testimony and report sufficiently support

the claim for the costs related to the PRP search process.

Therefore, the court finds plaintiffs are entitled to the full

amount sought.

? Even if the court were to follow the Rohm decision, the

Oversight costs related to the RI/FS activities would still be

recoverable.

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Second, defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims for

attorney fees are not recoverable because such claims are

vague and plaintiffs have not shown they are “closely tied” to

the actual clean-up. Plaintiffs respond that they are not

seeking recovery for items related to litigation support in

Golden & Associates’ bills, that the bills from the law firms

of McDermott, Will & Emery and Kirkland & Ellis are for

administrative services provided to the MLTF and not legal

services and that the computerized legal research charge from

Lathrop & Norquist was for locating PRP addresses.

While plaintiffs’ claims include some work performed

by attorneys, they have shown it is “closely tied” to the actual

clean-up activities. Defendants’ objections do not specify

particular costs that are attributable to litigation matters versus

clean-up matters. Defendant agreed to do so where they

believed there were discrepancies, and the court will not comb

the record in search of such problems. Plaintiffs have

sufficiently shown that their costs of $8,036,608.87 are

necessary and consistent with the NCP.

Allocation of response costs associated with the emergency

removal actions and the interim remedial measures (IRM)

Plaintiffs’ expert, Edwin Raymond, testified in his trial

affidavit that the costs associated with the emergency removal

actions and the IRMs were $2,305, 183.44 as of December 31,

1997. Plaintiffs contend that defendants” should be

20 The court has already decided that Richard Ter Maat

has no individual liability as an operator under either CERCLA or

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responsible for this entire amount because of their failure to

Properly close the site when they abandoned it in 1988.

Plaintiffs further maintain that there will be future operation

and maintenance costs associated with the IRMs and that the

court should enter a declaratory judgment attributing all of the

future costs to defendants.

Defendants respond that they should not be held liable

for the full amount of the emergency removal and IRM costs

because the presence of solvents, which were introduced by

BFI, caused the emergency and interim remedial response.

Defendants further contend that a portion of the costs should

be attributed to the owners of the site because they had a legal

obligation to participate in the proper closure of the site which

was not eradicated by the agreement between the owners and

defendants.

As will be seen in more detail later in this order,

allocation of response costs is far from an exact science. This

is equally true in the context of Who should pay what for the

emergency removal and IRM costs. Here, there are three

potential parties: plaintiffs, defendants and the owners. The

court will discuss each.

As for BFI, there is simply no evidence, expert or

otherwise, to show that anything they did attributed to the

need to take emergency removal and IRM action. There has

been no showing that the toxicity contributed by BFI via the

Chrysler waste stream caused these actions to be taken.

While such toxicity will have an impact on the court’s

State veil-piercing law.

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allocation for the other clean-up costs, it has no effect in this

context. There is also no showing that anything else BFI did

years before contributed in any way to the emergency nature

of the initial response and the interim measures taken. There

is also no evidence that BFI’s closure of the site in 1975

contributed to these costs. Nor did the law impose any

obligation on them to effect closure in 1988. Therefore, the

court attributes zero percentage of the emergency removal and

IRM costs to plaintiffs.

As for defendants, they clearly had an obligation under

applicable regulations to properly close the site. It is also

undeniable that they failed in this undertaking. Further, the

experts, both plaintiffs’ and defendants’, agree that failure to

properly close the site contributed to the need for emergency

removal and IRM activities. Defendants left the site without

proper slope and without a proper cap which resulted in

excessive ponding of water and runoff of water, both of which

contributed significantly to the extensive leachate problem.

There is no doubt that had the site been properly closed the

need for emergency and interim actions would have been

minimized. Defendants must share significantly in the costs

for the emergency removal and IRMs.

That leaves the owners. Plaintiffs contend the owners

should escape responsibility because they had an agreement

with defendants that gave defendants the obligation to close

the site. Nevertheless, the law places the responsibility for

closure on both the owners and defendants. This obligation

could not be bargained away. The evidence shows that, not

only did the owners fail to take any action to close the site,

they interfered with defendants proposal to do so by refusing

to sign off on the closure plan submitted to the IEPA. While

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the court does not €Xpress an opinion on defendants’ proposed

closure plan, the key at this point is that the Owners’ refusal

to become involved reflects a hands-off approach contrary to

their legal obligations. As will be discussed more thoroughly

later in this order in the allocation issue, the owners could not

sit back and reap great financial rewards from their land while

the very use of the land for which they benefitted

contaminated the environment. Equity, which is the

underpinning of the allocation process, will not allow it.

Having determined that defendants and the owners

Share the responsibility for the costs associated with the

emergency removal and IRM activities, the court must decide

what share each will bear. Of course, there can be no

exactitude in this process.

That being said, and having carefully considered the

evidence, including the expert reports and testimony, the

court finds that defendants are eighty-five percent responsible

and the owners are fifteen percent responsible. This division

of responsibility is based on the fact that the operators were

in the besi position to effectuate a closure but refused to do

so. While the owners foiled defendants’ attempt to seek

approval from the IEPA for defendants Proposed closure, that

did not prevent defendants from closing the site anyway. It

was a poor exercise of judgment by defendants to throw up

their hands and walk away simply because of the lack of

Cooperation by the owners.2! A Proper closure would have

*! While the parties could not bargain away their legal

obligations, the fact that defendants had the sole responsibility for

closure under the agreement further reflects their poor judgment in

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made a significant impact on the cleanup and response costs.

On the other hand, the owners are not squeaky Clean in all of

this. Their persistent inclination to stick their heads in the

sand is an irresponsible approach that cannot be overlooked.

Had they and defendants worked together to close the site,

which the law contemplated them doing, much environmental

harm could have been avoided. As for future costs related to

the IRMs, the court enters a declaratory judgment against

defendants and the owners based on these percentages.

Whether MIG and AAA ~* should be considered a single party

tor purposes of allocating response costs

Plaintiffs contend that section 2(a)(2) of the Uniform

Comparative Fault Act should apply and that MIG and AAA

should be treated as a single party for allocation purposes.

The court disagrees. In a contribution action such as this one

under section 113 of CERCLA, defendants are severally liable

and plaintiffs have the burden of allocating the harm to each

defendant. See Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis Chalmers

Corp., 974 F.Supp. 684, 688 (N.D.Ind. 1997). While it is

true that MIG and AAA share the role of operator, they

cannot share the liability. Any allocation of liability will take

into consideration their dual role as operators of the site

abandoning the site without effective closure.

*2 Plaintiffs contend all three parties, MIG, AAA and

Richard Ter Maat should be treated as one. This court has held in

a separate part of this order, however, that Richard Ter Maat

cannot be held individually liable as operator either directly or

derivatively.

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during their period of operation. In all likelihood each will

bear an equal share of their joint allocation which will be

decided in the allocation portion of this order. Such a result

would not be inconsistent with several liability under section

113.

Whether defendants can be declared liable for future response

costs pursuant to section ] 13(g)(2) of CERCLA

Defendants object to the entry of a declaratory

judgment against them for future response costs in the form

of final remedial action. Defendants contend such costs are

too speculative to base a declaratory judgment on.

Defendants also argue that because the baseline risk

assessment’s focus shifted from solvents to metals after the

Close of discovery that they will be denied due process if they

are not allowed to explore the bases for the metals-division

remedy for future clean-up.

Section 113(g)(2) of CERCLA provides that “[i]n any

such action described in this subsection, the court shall enter

a declaratory judgment on liability for response costs or

damages that will be binding on any subsequent action or

actions to recover further response costs or damages.” This

language reflects Congress’s intent to insure that a responsible

party’s liability, once established, will not have to be

relitigated. American Nat’l Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago v.

Harcros Chem., Inc., No. 95 C 3750, 1997 WL 281295, at

*12 (N.D.IIl. May 20, 1997). The entry of a declaratory

judgment as to liability is, therefore, mandatory under

CERCLA. Jd. (citing United States v. USX Corp., 68 F.3d

811, 819 (3d Cir. 1995)). Moreover, the fact that future costs

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are speculative is no bar to a present declaration of liability.

Id. Additionally, defendants do not cite, and the court cannot

find, any authority recognizing a due process claim in this

context. Defendants have had the same opportunity as

plaintiffs to consider and respond to the USEPA’s approach

to this case. Allocation responsibility can be assessed at this

point and applied to future response costs.

Whether plaintiffs are entitled to interest from defendants on

plaintiffs’ costs related to the site

Plaintiffs seek interest at the rate of 5.6% for a period

from January 31, 1995, the date they served a demand letter

upon defendants, to the date of judgment. Defendants only

objection is to reiterate their contention that plaintiffs are not

entitled to recover certain underlying clean-up costs as argued

in other sections of their post-trial brief. Defendants do not

raise any argument directly in opposition to the imposition of

interest for the period or the rate sought.

Because section 107(a) allows for interest, and

defendants have not directly objected to its imposition, the

court will award interest for the time period and rate sought.

Such an award will only apply, however, to the percentage of

costs awarded to plaintiffs and against defendants as set forth

in other sections of this order.

Whether solvents caused the listing of the site on the National

Priorities List (NPL) or caused any element of the remedy

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As plaintiffs correctly point out in their reply brief, the

issue of what caused the site to be placed on the NPL is of no

consequence as to what remedies are ultimately necessary to

clean up the site. On the other hand, while plaintiffs’ experts

point to the remedies as being driven by the presence of

metals, there is also evidence that volatile organic compounds

(VOCs) are also present in significant levels. Furthermore,

VOCs, while present in solvents, are also found in ordinary

municipal and industrial waste.

It cannot be said that the remedies in this case are

entirely independent of solvents. The court has already found

that Chrysler waste, which included solvents, was placed in

the site during the BF] period. It may prove impossible to

Separate the solvent from the non-solvent VOCs. That,

however, supports the court’s conclusion that the remedies are

likewise indivisible. Accordingly, the court finds that

solvents are, in part, Causing some elements of the remedy.

The court will apportion this causation in its allocation

discussion.

Whether defendants Closed the site on June 30, 1988

Plaintiffs contend that under the State environmental

regulations applicable at the time, see Ill.Admin. Code tit. 35,

§§ 807.101 ef seq. (807 regulations), defendants failed to

properly close the site but instead abandoned it. Defendants

make a half-hearted response, essentially blaming the owners

and the IEPA for preventing them from properly closing the

Site.

District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

The court will take little time addressing this issue.

While several aspects of this case are murky, it is crystal clear

that defendants walked away from the site without properly

closing it. No legitimate argument can be made that

defendants did not abandon the site within the meaning of the

807 regulations. Therefore, the court finds that the site was

not closed by defendants on June 30, 1988 or anytime

thereafter.”

Whether defendants should bear any of the orphan share

An orphan share in the context of CERCLA

contemplates an inability to account for all hazardous waste

streams or to assign a measure of monetary responsibility to

an otherwise responsible party. United States v. Kramer, 953

F.Supp. 592, 595 (D.N.J.1997). The parties here do not take

issue with this definition. Rather, they disagree as to whether

defendants should bear any of the orphan share in this case.

In a contribution action such as this one, the court

enjoys broad discretion to consider and apply such equitable

factors as it deems appropriate to achieve a just and fair

allocation among liable parties. Kramer, 953 F.Supp. at 597.

Section 113(f) permits the court to allocate response costs to

all liable parties. /d. at 598. Thus, nothing in CERCLA or

its legislative history prohibits the court from allocating

orphan shares to all liable parties. /d.; see also Charter

3 Such facts as the owners’ recalcitrance and defendants’

legitimate attempts to close, if any, will be considered in allocating

costs.

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Township of Oshtemo y. American Cyanamid Co., 898

F.Supp. 506, 508 (W.D. Mich. 1995) (in a section 113(f)

contribution claim, the Orphan shares must be equitably

apportioned among all solvent PRPs). Furthermore, the

Orphan shares should be apportioned to the PRPs (both

plaintiffs and defendants) according to their relative equitable

Share. Kramer, 953 F .Supp. at 598: Charter Township, 898

F.Supp. at 509.

The court agrees with the analysis in Kramer and

Charter T, ownship and rejects the contentions of defendants.

To allocate Orphan shares to all liable Parties is not

inconsistent with several liability under section 113.

Additionally, such an approach is entirely consistent with

equitable considerations applicable to an allocation scheme

under section 113. To Properly effectuate the purposes of

CERCLA, all liable and solvent parties must share the cost in

Proportion to their relative fault.

In this case, plaintiffs’ expert, William Hengeminhle,

testified that approximately 34,615 cubic yards of waste are

attributable to orphan Operators and about 510,580 cubic

yards to orphan transporters. According to Hengemihle, the

total orphan share is 1,58 percent to be distributed on a pro

rata basis to all parties. Defendants have not countered this

allocation. Accordingly, the court accepts Hengemihle’s

apportionment of the Orphan share to the respective parties,

including defendants.

Whether BFI violated its landfill permit by failing to remove

the waste deposited in the Kennedy-Mollendorf area prior to

May 5, 1972

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

It is undisputed that BFI’s landfill operating permit,

issued by the IEPA, contained a special condition, among

others, requiring BFI to remove the waste from the Kennedy-

Mollendorf area and to seal the area according to design

specifications. It is further undisputed that BFI never met that

condition. What is in dispute is whether the IEPA modified

BFI’s permit by allowing BFI to leave the waste but requiring

it to take Certain actions, including covering the waste with

clay.

It is not clear whether BFI actually complied with the

substitute conditions, even if they were approved by IEPA.

Contrary to BFI’s assertion in its post-trial brief, Raymond

De Wane did not testify that BFI complied with the special

conditions. Rather, De Wane testified that cover was placed

on the Kennedy-Mollendorf area during its use prior to BFI

becoming the operator. There is some indication that BFI

covered the Kennedy-Mullendort area and that they placed no

additional waste there, as reflected by the site characterization

memorandum. There is no evidence however, to show that

the other conditions were met.

Nonetheless, the court cannot conclude that the IEPA

ever formally approved the substitute conditions. Clearly,

several letters from the IEPA to BFI during the early to mid-

part of 1973 reflect the IEPA’s insistence that the original

condition be met and that BFI remove the waste from the

Kennedy-Mollendorf area. The memorandum from the

July 23, 1973, meeting between BFI, Wallace Koster and the

IEPA is nothing more than that, a memorandum. It is far

from an official authorization from the IEPA. In fact, one

would expect a supplemental permit to have issued had the

IEPA formally approved the change. The fact that the IEPA

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records after July 23, 1973, do not indicate a continued belief

by the IEPA that BFI was Violating its permit is not

Particularly persuasive.

Therefore, the court finds that the original condition

of the permit regarding the Kennedy-Mollendorf area was not

modified or substituted for by the IEPA, Having reached that

conclusion, the court finds that BF] did not comply as it never

removed the waste. The significance of this finding, if any,

will be addressed in the allocation section of this order.

Whether Richard Ter Maat’s deposition testimony can be

considered substantively as admissions of a Party where he

also testified at trial

Richard Ter Maat’s deposition testimony contains

admissions by a party and is, therefore, admissible as

Substantive evidence. Fed.R. Evid. 801(d)(2). It may be used

as substantive evidence at trial even if Ter Maat testifies

(which he did here). Fed.R.Civ. P. 32(a); Aircraft Gear

Corp. v. Kaman Aerospace Corp., No. 93 C 1220, 1996

WL 65990, at *] (N.D.IIl. Feb. 12, 1996); W.R. Grace &

Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90 C 5383, 199] WL 211647, at

*2 (N.D.III. Oct. 15, 1991).

Having said that, the court also finds the submitted

evidence from Ter Maat’s deposition to be Vague and of little

evidentiary value. Much of what Ter Maat testified to

regarding his activities related to the site could apply equally

to his role as an officer of MIG. Absent an Opportunity for

further explanation, such Statements have little evidentiary

weight.

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The environmental conditions at the site prior to October 1975

and whether BFI and the owners had a duty to disclose those

conditions to defendants

Defendants contend that the groundwater at the site

was “contaminated” prior to their becoming operators in

Octobe* 1975, that BFI and the owners had a duty to disclose

the condition and that they wilfully failed to disclose the

condition in an effort to spread liability under CERCLA.

Defendants assert that this failure to disclose should effect the

allocation of responsibility for response costs.

Wallace Koster testified that as of March 1972 he

believed there was a “strong likelihood” that the groundwater

at the site was being polluted by previous refuse disposed of

at the site. In fact, Koster stated such possibility in a letter to

the Illinois Division of Land Pollution Control (predecessor

ot the IEPA) as part of the application process to operate the

site in March 1972.

According to Koster, he believed as of March 1972

that due to the geological conditions of the Kennedy-

Mollendorf area that it would “in all likelihood lead to

groundwater pollution.” Furthermore, a testing company

hired to test the groundwater sent results to Koster stating that

two of the water samples “had a distinct garbage odor” which

indicated that leachate was contaminating the groundwater.

BFI also admits that the groundwater samples from 1971-72

showed increases in metals, clorides, hardness and dissolved

solids. According to BFI, no tests were done to ascertain if

any solvents or VOCs were in the water.

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Ter Maat testified that he requested the information

submitted by Koster from the IEPA but the IEPA refused to

provide it because BFI considered the information a trade

secret. According to Ter Maat, the IEPA refused to provide

the information on “many, many occasions.” There js no

evidence to show that BFI ever made Ter Maat aware of the

“strong likelihood” of groundwater contamination or of the

lest report stating that the groundwater samples smelled like

garbage or contained increased levels of metals, chlorides,

hardness and dissolved solids.

It is not necessary for the court to now conclude

Whether BFI had a hard and fast duty to disclose such

information back in 1972. On the other hand, the court

considers such evidence relevant to the issue of BFI’s conduct

as it bears on the equitable considerations of allocation.

Whether the settlement by BFI and CNA Insurance

Companies is admissible to show bias of plaintiffs’ allocation

expert and the ability to pay of the owners

During trial, defendants sought to have Floyd Wisher,

an attorney who had represented the CNA Insuran’e

Companies (CNA), testify regarding a settlement agreemc uc

entered into between BFI and CNA pertaining to numerous

insurance policies and insureds. Defendants contended at that

time that such evidence was relevant to the issue of the

Owners’ ability to pay and to the issue of the bias of the

proposed allocation by BFI to be attributed to the owners.

Wisner then testified as an offer of proof. After hearing

Wisner’s testimony via the offer of proof, the court ruled that

it did not consider the evidence admissible but would

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

reconsider after the parties briefed the issue post-trial. The

parties submitted their post-trial briefs on this issue under

seal, as the transcript of Wisner’s testimony on this issue was

under seal.

In their post-trial brief, defendants contend that

Wisner’s testimony shows that BFI and the other plaintiffs

“postur[ed] with their experts to assign a re nimal amount of

liability through their allocation expert to we owners.” In

essence, defendants contend that Wisner’s testimony is

relevant to attack plaintiffs’ allocation scheme and the

motivation for it. Plainuffs contend such evidence ts

irrelevant and not admissible under Rule 408 of the Federal

Rules of Evidence

Rule 408 generally prohibits evidence of settlement

negotiations except “when the evidence is offered for another

purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness. . .

In this case, Wisner’s testimony is offered to show the bias or

prejudice of plaintiffs’ allocation expert.

The court stands by its original ruling that such

evidence ts inadmissible. There must be significant reason to

admit’ evidence of otherwise confidential settlement

agreements under Rule 408. Defendants have simply not

established the nexus between BFI's settlement dealings with

CNA and BFls’ allocation expert's opinion as to what

allocation is attributable to the owners. Clearly, because BFI

settled with the owners and therefore acquired the owners’

allocation responsibility, itis motivated to keep that allocation

us low as possible. There is no showing that the settlement

with CNA injected any bias into the allocation expert opinion

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

that would not otherwise be there as a result of the allocation

expert being a witness testifying on behalf of BFI.

Limit of plaintiffs’ contribution rights

This is really a non-issue in this case. It appears from

the post-trial briefs that the issue is based on semantics and

that the parties agree in substance that plaintiffs are entitled to

seek contribution for $8 036,608.87 before any settlement set-

ofts and allocation are applied or any pre-judgment interest is

assessed.

Whether BFI complied with the lease requiring it to provide

insurance for, and indemnify, the owners

The relevance of this issue eludes the court. Even if

defendants could establish that BFI did not comply with the

insurance and indemnity provisions of the lease between BFI

and the owners, that is of no concern to defendants. More

importantly, it is of no concern to the court.

Whether MIG complied with its lease Provisions relating to

rental payments, insurance agreements, indemnities and

closure of the site

The court agrees with defendants that the issue of

whether MIG complied with the lease requirements as to rent,

indemnity and insurance has no relevance to this case. The

issue of MIG's alleged violation of its lease is no more

relevant than the issue of BFI’s compliance with its lease.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

As for the lease provisions pertaining to conditions at,

and closure of, the site, while arguably relevant, they are of

negligible weight. There is ample evidence, independent of

the lease, upon which the court can assess MIG’s activity as

it related to operation and closure of the site. It is the impact

of that activity on the site, not its effect on the lease, that is

critical to this court's allocation assessment.

Whether MIG violated its operating permit by irrigating the

landfill with leachate

It is undisputed that MIG did in fact recirculate

leachate from the leachate pond back into the landfill and that

such a practice was in violation of its operating permit. It is

also undisputed, however, that inspectors for the IEPA were

aware of this practice and never cited it as a permit violation.

According to Robert Wengrow, who was in charge of the

regional IEPA office having jurisdiction over the site, it was

customary during that time period to handle leachate that way

because there was nothing else that could be done with it.

It is clear that MIG violated its permit by pumping the

leachate trom the collection pond back into the landfill. It is

equally clear, however, that the IEPA was aware of the

practice and allowed it to continue. While the IEPA’s

ratification of MIG’s conduct does not eradicate MIG’s

responsibility, it does mitigate it significantly. The court will

District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

consider the entire Circumstance of the Situation when

determining MIG’s allocation responsibility .*4

The legal effect of the settlement proceeds received by

plaintiffs

Plaintiffs have entered into settlement agreements with

sixty-four parties regarding response costs who, in turn,

assigned their contribution claims to plaintiffs. Further, the

USEPA reached a de minimis settlement with several PRPs as

tO response costs, with sixty-eight settlers assigning their

contribution claims. Defendants contend that the actual

amount of the settlements with the de minimis settlors and the

third-party defendants should be Credited against the RI/FS

costs before any further allocation is determined. As for the

settlement between plaintiffs and the owners, defendants

contend that the owners actual allocated liability (as

determined by the court) be setoff rather than the amount of

the settlement itself.

“This circumstance epitomizes the overall problem with

assessing liability ina CERCLA case such as this. The “science”

of landfilling has changed, and continues to change, dramatically

in twenty plus years. Back in the mid-1970's and into the 1980's

the state and federal agencies were in their fledgling stages of

development. Additionally, the laws governing landfill operation

Were just coming into bloom. Now, of course, the court must

assess in hindsight the actions of the operators through a present

day lense. Imposing today’s standards on yesterday's conduct is an

inartful task at best.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

There are two recognized approaches for crediting the

contribution of settling parties. One, the pro tanto rule

considers the settlement amount. See Atlantic Richfield Co.

v. American Airlines, Inc., 836 F. Supp. 763, 766 (N.D.Okla.

1993). The other is the proportionate credit rule which

applies the actual amount of allocated liability of the settling

party. See Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvent Reclaiming, Inc.,

771 ~F.Supp. 219, 223 (N.D.Il. 1990). Under the

circumstances of this case, the court will) apply the

proportionate credit rule as that is the rule followed by courts

in this circuit and by the majority of courts addressing the

issue. See, e.g., United States v. SCA Serv. of Indiana, Inc.,

827 F.Supp. 526, 533-36 (N.D.Ind. 1993); Allied Corp., 771

F.Supp. at 223; Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan

Materials Co., No. 85 C 1142, 1987 WL 27368, at *2-3

(N.D.11.1987). As such, the court will consider the

allocation amount for the settling parties when it takes up the

allocation issues.

Whether the owners had responsibility for leachate

management at the site

The evidence does not support defendants’ contention

that the owners had responsibility for leachate management at

the site. They rely on the 1972 permit application which

provides that treated leachate would be used periodically to

irrigate the owner's fields and that the owners would maintain

the completed landfill. This certainly implies thait the owners

had responsibility for leachate maintenance once the site was

completed (or closed). It does not imply, however, that they

had responsibility for the leachate during the active operation

of the site. Of course, the evidence shows that the site never

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

was completed (or closed). Hence, any responsibility owed

by the owners never came to fruition.

Moreover, even if it is assumed that the actual permit

incorporated the permit application parameters, the permit

changed the leachate requirement as to irrigating the fields.

Thus, any contemplated responsibility for leachate

management by the owners was eradicated when the IEPA

disapproved the method called for in the permit application.

Therefore, the court finds the owners had no responsibility for

leachate management at the site.

The proper method of allocating response costs

The landfill at issue in this case was in existence and

actively operated from the late 1960s to the late 1980s. For

twenty years, a variety of waste was brought to, and deposited

in, the landfill. Over 3.5 million cubic yards of waste were

landfilled during that time.

All during this time, as the volume and variety of

Waste increased, what was there began to decompose. The

decomposition process resulted in the waste returning to its

base constituencies. This further led to a complex and ill-

defined mass of substances.

All of this waste also contained a certain amount of

Water which mixed with the base elements from the

decomposition process to create what the experts call leachate

but which may fairly be described as toxic soup. This “soup”

eventually intermixed from various locations throughout the

landfill and worked its Way into the surrounding soil and

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

finally into the groundwater. And like grandma's special

soup, the final product was the result of a unique blend of

ingredients, some known and some unknown.

Now the parties ask, and the law requires, that this

court analyze the “soup” and determine who put in which

ingredients and how much. Like someone trying to figure out

what makes Coke taste the way it does, this is no easy task.

Unraveling a twenty-year process involving millions of cubic

yards of waste and complex ecological, biological and

geological forces is likely to yield less than precise results.

The parties have each taken a stab by offering their

experts’ opinions as to who should be responsible for what.

But the expert opinions merely reflect the imprecision of the

task at hand. And, of course, each parties “experts”

ultimately arrive at conclusions which most favor their clients.

For example, plaintiffs conclude that volume should be the

only basis for allocating responsibility. Defendants, on the

other hand, preach toxicity and cost causation as the way to

ZO.

Further complicating matters, is the evolving nature of

the law itself and its application to this particular landfill. In

the early and midyears of the landfill, the law was in its

embryonic stages. Techniques for operating a landfill, which

today seem archaic, Were acceptable back then. Methods that

were approved ten to twenty years ago are being rejected

today. It is difficult to attribute fault on such a sliding scale.

Much of what was done acceptably back then is now improper

when viewed through the lens of today’s regulatory schemes.

District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Additionally, as to the many issues raised in this case,

most of which ultimately bear on the allocation issue, there is

little guidance in the way of case law, particularly at the

appellate level. This is most likely due to the fact that many

of these cases settle. The high rate of settlement is probably

attributable to the inherently unpredictable results a trial will

bring. Further, most of the cases performing allocations

rightfully caution that each case is unique and should provide

little, if any, guidance in future allocation matters. Given the

dearth of cases on many of the issues, combined with the less

than precise language of CERCLA itself, the court is plowing

new ground on many issues. The bottom line is the court is

left with an underdeveloped legal framework in which to

resolve the many issues raised by the parties.

Of course, because an allocation in a CERCLA

contribution action is an equitable matter, the court may take

into consideration all relevant conduct of the parties that

might demonstrate fault on their part. This results in an

inordinate amount of mudslinging in an effort to make each

party look like the bad guy. Unfortunately, this has a

tendency to detract from other issues in the case which require

the parties’ and the court’s attention. Not only that, but

neither party comes out smelling like a rose. There is ample

evidence that all parties failed to play entirely by the rules

(some of which were surely changed in the middle of the

game) and also contributed Significantly, whether by volume

OF toxicity, to the contamination at the landfill.

After having analyzed many cases, considered

numerous articles, reviewed volumes of evidence and studied

the post-trial briefs, the court concludes that the allocation in

this case will be a “best guess” proposition within the exercise

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

of its discretion. The court will, of course, make every effort

to carefully consider all relevant factors in assessing

responsibility. Ultimately, however, that assessment will be

limited by the nature of what must be considered. And, as

has been said many times before, the allocation arrived at here

should not be applied to other factual scenarios in other cases.

Both parties in this case have presented their suggested

methods of allocating response costs. In support of their

respective positions, they have submitted testimony and

reports trom allocation experts. In turn, the experts have

rendered allocation opinions that are based on percentages

attributable to the various classes (owners, Operators,

generators and transporters) and then percentages within each

of the classes. Additionally, the experts take into

consideration various equitable factors, each giving different

factors varying amounts of weight in arriving at their final

conclusions.

While the court appreciates the efforts of the parties

and their experts, ultimately the equitable allocation of

response costs belongs to the court. As discussed previously,

this is a task immune to precision. Although dollars are at

issue, and, hence, numerical divisions are inevitably called

for, any numerical assessment will be illusory at best.

That being said, there are several propositions that the

court will definitively apply in allocating costs in this case.

First, the court does not find volume alone to be an adequate

measure of allocation. Such an approach ignores many other

relevant factors, the most important of which is the conduct

of the parties. Second, although defendants’ cost allocation

approach is much more expansive in its application, the court

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

cannot agree with defendants’ emphasis on toxicity While

the knowing placement of toxic substances in the landfill

reflects relevant conduct of the parties, any effort at

quantifying toxicity as it relates to the ultimate problems at the

landfill is nearly impossible under the disputed testimony of

the experts in this area. Finally, while both parties’ experts’

approaches have some redeeming qualities and take into

consideration some relevant conduct, they are, in their efforts

to identify waste streams and establish a nexus between those

streams and the ultimate clean-up costs, somewhat wanting.

After considering the experts’ testimony and reports, the court

is convinced that there are Significant limits as to the

qualitative and quantitative conclusions that can be reached in

this case.

The court finds that the truest measure to assess

equitably the liability in this case is to consider the conduct of

the parties as it relates to their respective categories of owner,

operator, generator and transporter. In other words, liability

Should be based on a percentage of fault rather than a

percentage of volume or a percentage based on a particular

Waste stream. Such factors that bear on fault include: (1)

how much waste was contributed; (2) the type and nature of

the waste; (3) compliance with regulatory schemes; (4)

Operation of the landfill, including closure and post-closure

activities; and (5) cooperation and involvement in Cleaning up

the site. The court will consider each of these factors and

others as it applies to the relevant conduct of the parties. This

will provide an evidentiary basis for the allocation. Once that

task is accomplished, the court will then assess a percentage

of liability to each of the parties based on their relevant

conduct as it relates to the condition of the landfill and the

related response costs.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

It is first necessary to make an inter-class allocation

between the four statutory groups: owners, operators,

transporters and generators. The court will assess a

percentage of liability to each of these groups.” Once that is

accomplished the court will determine the percentage of

liability on an intra-class basis.

The first group the court will consider are the

transporters. The court considers the transporters to have the

most tenuous connection to the site.°° They merely hauled

waste to the site. They, with the exception of BFI and AAA,

had no involvement in how the site was operated or whether

the site operators complied with applicable regulations. On

the other hand, they were necessary players in the creation of

a massive garbage pile. The court finds, based on their

relative contribution to the site in terms of bringing the waste

there, that the transporters should be assessed a ten percent

share of the present and future clean-up costs.

Turning to the generators, they were responsible for

the waste in the first place. The waste, without which there

could be no landfill, was the by-product of the generators’

various operations, whether private or governmental. While

” Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ allocation experts,

Hengemihle and Wise, agree that fifty percent of the liability based

on volume should be allocated to the generator/transporter class.

Taking this into consideration, the court, along with all the other

evidence of fault, makes its independent allocation as to these two

classes.

*6 The exception, of course, is BFI and AAA who were

also operators of the site.

66a ‘y \

Poew !

District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

they had no involvement with the operations of the landfill,

they cannot avoid significant liability based on the sheer

volume of the waste they created and contracted to have taken

to the site. The court finds the volume of waste of the

generators is the best method under the facts to determine

fault of the generators. Accordingly, the court allocates forty

percent of the present and future clean-up costs to the

generator class.

That leaves the owners and operators. While the court

will allocate a separate percentage of the entire liability to

each of these groups, the court emphasizes that the owners

group is, next to the operators, the most intimately related to

the site in this case. The site was located on the farm where

they resided and conducted other business operations. They

were present at or near the site from time to time and were in

a position to observe operations. Further, they received

copies of various correspondence between the operators and

state regulatory agencies concerning operations at the site and

compliance with regulations. They also held regular meetings

with the Ter Maats as to the status of the site and negotiated

payment terms based on the volume of the waste going into

the site. Over the entire period of the landfall Operation they

received payments of over one million dollars. Based on

these circumstances, the court allocates a share of five percent

of the present and future cleanup costs to the owners.

What remains is a forty-five percent share of the

present and future costs to be allocated to the operators. The

court finds this to be an appropriate share based on the

extensive involvement of the operators in creating and

managing the landfill. It was the operators who held the

lion’s share of responsibility for what went into the site, how

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

it went in, where it went in and what happened to it after it

went it. The operators also had primary responsibility for

ensuring compliance with state and federal regulatory

schemes. A forty-five percent allocation is an entirely

appropriate assessment of liability to the operators.

There remains, of course, the issue of intra-class

allocation as between BFI and MIG/AAA as operators and

transporters. The court will first address the operator

allocation issue. This allocation, which will be based on a

whole percentage of the forty-five percent operator class -

share,’’ will reflect consideration of the five aforementioned

factors relevant to the fault of each. Once the relevant factors

are discussed as to each, the court will arrive at a percentage

for each.

As to the volume of waste, it is evident that the largest

amount of waste was placed in the site during the MIG/AAA

period of operations. Roughly 83 percent of the total volume

of waste in the landfill was placed there during the MIG/AAA

operation. Approximately 17 percent went in under the BFI

era.®

>” This is exclusive of the orphan share attributable to the

operator class.

28 The court recognizes that about one percent was placed

there during the brief period that Kennedy/Mollendorf operated the

site pre-1971. This amount is of no import to the present

allocation.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

Of course, these figures do not account for the

approximately 3.4 million pounds of solvent-bearing waste

brought to the site by BFI during its operating period. There

is no evidence to quantify how the 3.4 million pounds of

solvent waste computes into volume. Nonetheless, while the

court will not strain to adjust the estimated percentages of

volume, the court considers the additional Chrysler waste to

have a volumetric impact significant to its assessment of this

factor. In other words, BFI’s liability will be based in part on

the additional volume of waste it contributed to the site via the

Chrysler solvent waste.

The next factor is the type and nature of the waste.

For the most part, this factor is a wash as the waste going into

the site during the BFI and MIG/AAA periods was a

homogeneous stream of residential, commercial and industrial

garbage. This factor would have little effect on the allocation

equation except for the Chrysler solvent waste attributable to

BFI. This waste was highly toxic and contributes to the

groundwater contamination at the site. That is not to Say,

however, that the VOCs and SVOCs at the site all came from

Chrysler waste. Some surely came from the other waste

placed there. But it is undeniable the toxicity of the Chrysler

waste had a significant impact at the site.

The Chrysler waste was also in liquid and semi-liquid

form which would have accelerated its trip to the

groundwater. The liquidity of the Chrysler waste would also

have added to the mobility of other contaminates at the site.

It did little good to place cover over the site to keep liquid out

when liquid was being placed into the site. The court finds

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

this factor to weigh heavily in its assessment of liability to

BFI.” ;

The third relevant factor is the parties’ compliance

with applicable regulatory schemes. The court will first point

out that it gives virtually no weight to the evidence of the

IEPA’s reports of non-compliance of MIG/AAA based on

blowing litter at the site. This case is clearly not about

blowing litter.

There is also evidence that MIG/AAA pumped

leachate from the retention pond back over the landfill and

that this was in violation of applicable regulations. While this

fact will have more significance when the court discusses how

the landfill was operated, it causes less weight under this

factor as the evidence shows the IEPA was aware of the

practice and allowed it to go on.

The fact that BFI placed Chrysler solvent waste into

the site without obtaining the proper permits weighs heavily

against BFI. It is one thing to allow litter to blow around, it

is entirely another to dispose of over 3 million pounds of

solvent waste knowing that the regulatory agencies were

unwilling to allow such disposal.

Finally, as for the issue of BFI’s failure to remove the

waste deposited in the Kennedy/Mollendorf area prior to

1971, such non-compliance with their operating permit is

9 The expert testimony does not clearly establish the

impact of the nature and toxicity of Chrysler waste at the site.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

minimized somewhat by the IEPA’s knowledge of their non-

compliance and its apparent willingness to allow it. _ While

such noncompliance is relevant, it is not particularly weighty.

That brings the court to the issue of how BFI and

MIG/AAA operated the site, including closure and post-

closure conduct. As for BFI, its most significant downfall

was the placement of 3.4 million pounds of liquid and semi-

liquid solvent waste at the site. Without a doubt, this

contributed substantially to contamination at the site. Exactly

how much, no one will ever know. But as discussed earlier,

exactness is neither obtainable nor necessary in this case.

BFI also failed to excavate the Kennedy/Mollendorf

waste which was located in what was once a gravel pit.

While there was evidence on both sides of the issue, the court

finds that the Kennedy/Mollendorf area was, to some degree,

exposed to the groundwater, at least during the spring when

water levels were higher. This finding is reinforced by the

IEPA’s requirement contained in BFI’s operating permit that

the waste in the Kennedy/Mollendorf area be excavated and

moved to another part of the site. This failure to excavate the

waste allowed leachate from the waste a much more efficient

access to the groundwater. While it is not established from

the evidence where this groundwater moved within or

adjacent to the site, it is clear that it contributed to the overall

contamination of the site.

As for MIG/AAA, their big downfall was the state in

which they left the site upon their abandonment in June 1988.

The court has already assessed a good measure of liability to

MIG/AAA for the emergency removal and IRM costs based

on this factor. However, the court also finds that failure to

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

properly close the site contributed to contamination at the site

that will need to be addressed independent of the emergency

removal and IRM costs. Although such contamination is

arguably minimal as compared to the site as a whole, its

relevance cannot be ignored. j

The last factor the court will consider is the level of

cooperation and involvement in clean-up of the site. This

factor clearly inures to the benefit of BFI and the significant

detriment of MIG/AAA. BFI has been a lead performer in

the site clean-up while MIG/AAA abandoned the site and

refused to cooperate with, or contribute to, the clean-up

effort. The sooner and more thoroughly a site can be cleaned

up, the less severe its impact will be on the environment.

MIG/AAA’s recalcitrance is entirely antithetical to the spirit

and purpose of CERCLA and other regulatory statutes. The

failure of MIG/ AAA to provide relevant site information also

hindered the clean-up process. The court finds MIG/AAA’s

lack of cooperation and involvement in the clean-up to weigh

heavily in favor of allocating them a greater share of costs.

Having considered these various factors carefully, the

court must now arrive at a percentage of fault attributable to

BFI and MIG/AAA as operators. As emphasized earlier in

this order, such task escapes any degree of precision. It is, at

best, a matter of “Kentucky windage,” grounded on the

relevant conduct of the parties. Keeping in mind its

discussion of the foregoing factors, the court allocates forty

percent of the remaining 44.63 percent of the overall costs to

BFI and sixty percent of the remaining 44.63 percent to

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

MIG/AAA.” When the orphan shares are distributed using

Hengemihle’s methodology, this equates to 18.21 percent of

the overall costs to BFI and 27.14 percent of the overall costs

to MIG/AAA.”

Turning to BFI and AAA as transporters, the court

allocates sixty percent of the 7.77 percent share to AAA and

forty percent to BFI.”’ The court bases this allocation on the

volume attributable to BFI and AAA as transporters,

including the additional Chrysler waste this court has found

BFI liable for. Additionally, the court considers not only the

added volume of the Chrysler waste but also its toxicity. In

doing so, the court recognizes, as it did in allocating the

operator share between BFI and MIG/AAA, that it is

impossible to quantify with precision the precise impact of the

Chrysler waste on either the volume at, or the condition of,

the landfill. When the orphan shares are distributed using

Hengemihle’s methodology, this equates to 4.74 percent of

_*© The non-orphan share attributable to the operators is

44.63 percent.

3! Because the court can find no discernable difference in

the conduct of MIG and AAA as operators, the court allocates

13.57 percent ( 1/2 of 27.14) to MIG and 13.57 percent to AAA.

*2 Of the ten percent attributable to the transporter class

as a whole, 1.02 percent represents the transporters who settled

with plaintiffs and 1.21 percent represents the orphan transporter

share. Therefore, the allocation is based on the remaining 7.77

percent.

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District Court Memorandum Opinion & Order - 7/29/98

the overall costs to AAA and 4.2T percent of the overall costs .

to plaintiffs.

The total past IRM costs through December 31, 1997

with prejudgment interest are $2,754,549.62. Eighty-five

percent of this total is $2,341,367.18 to be split evenly

between MIG and AAA. The total past non-IRM costs

through December 31, 1997 with prejudgment interest are

$6,615,026.56. MIG is also responsible for 13.57 percent of

this amount, or $897,659.10. AAA is also responsible for

18.31 percent (4.74 percent as a transporter and 13.57 percent

as an operator) of this amount, or $1,211,211.36.

Consequently, MIG’s total share of past response costs

incurred by plaintiffs through December 31, 1997 (with

interest) is $2,068,342.70, while AAA’s total share is

$2,381,894.95. MIG is responsible for 42.50 percent of all

IRM costs and 13.57 percent of all other site costs incurred

after December 31, 1997 which are consistent with the NCP.

AAA is responsible for 42.50 percent of all IRM costs and

18.31 percent of all other site costs incurred after December

31, 1997 which are consistent with the NCP.

Judgment is therefore entered for plaintiffs and against

MIG Investments, Inc. for $2,068,342.70 in site costs

incurred through December 31, 1997, and for 42.50 percent

of all IRM costs and 13.57 percent of all other site costs

incurred after December 31, 1997 which are consistent with

the NCP. Judgment is further entered for plaintiffs and

against AAA Disposal Systems, Inc. for $2,381,894.95 in site

costs incurred through December 31, 1997, and for 42.50

percent of all IRM costs and 18.31 percent of all other. site

costs incurred after December 31, 1997 which are consistent

with the NCP.

74a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

[Dated November 30, 1999]

Nos. 98-3204 and 99-1360

BROWNING-FERRIS

INDUSTRIES OF ILLINOIS,

INCORPORATED, APACHE

PRODUCTS COMPANY,

TAMMS INDUSTRIES, et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

Vv.

RICHARD TER MAAT, MIG

INVESTMENTS,

INCORPORATED, AAA

DISPOSAL SYSTEMS,

INCORPORATED, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

BEFORE: Honorable RICHARD A. POSNER, Chief Judge

Honorable WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

Honorable KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge

75a

Appeals from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Western Division

No. 92 C 20259, Philip G. Reinhard, Judge

ORDER

On November 15, 1999, plaintiffs-appellants filed a

petition for rehearing. All the judges on the panel have voted

to deny the petition. The petition is therefore DENIED.

76a

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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