Opposition Brief — Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Prudential Assurance Co.

Supreme Court brief2000

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

No. 99-720

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORPORATION

Petitioner,

v.

PRUDENTIAL ASSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, et al.,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

Unitrep STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENT

CGU INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA,

AS SUCCESSOR TO GENERAL ACCIDENT

ASSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA

PauL D. HERBERT

Counsel of Record

Ropers, MAJESKI, KOHN & BENTLEY

Attorneys for Respondent

CGU Insurance Company of Canada,

as successor to General Accident

Assurance Company of Canada

1001 Marshall Street

Redwood City, CA 94063

(650) 364-8200

156376 @) Counsel! Press LLC

FORMERLY LUTZ APPELLATE SERVICES

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should an unsuccessful appellant be permitted to bring

an Erie' violation claim before this Court on petition for

certiorari merely because that losing party disagrees with

the manner in which a federal court of appeals applied the

acknowledged authority of a state’s highest court to the

particular facts of the appellant’s case, — particularly where

the facts of the case support the outcome reached by the

federal court?

1. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

Prudential Assurance Company Limited (Canadian

Branch) was taken over by The Prudential Assurance

Company of England Property Casualty, later renamed

General Accident Indemnity Company which later became

General Accident Assurance Company of Canada, which

later merged with Commercial Union Assurance Company

of Canada to become CGU Insurance Company of Canada;

Continental Insurance Company; Certain Underwriters at

Lloyd’s Of London; The Home Insurance Company;

Commercial Union Assurance Company of Canada Limited,

which has since been merged with General Accident

Assurance Company of Canada to become CGU Insurance.

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Respondent, The Prudential Assurance Company

Limited (Canadian Branch), taken over by The Prudential

Assurance Company of England Property Casualty, later

renamed General Accident Indemnity Company, which later

became General Accident Assurance Company of Canada,

which later merged with Commercial Union Assurance

Company of Canada to become CGU Insurance Company

of Canada, is a corporation organized and existing under the

laws of Canada. No publicly held company owns 10% or

more of the stock of CGU Insurance Company of Canada.

r

a

os

lil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented 2... ww... cece cece i

I ign SE ors ll

ee ll

NN een ili

Table of Cited Authorities .................... Vi

Statement of Jurisdiction ..................... |

The Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

ENTE res on Oa ie AT ee l

pemeememt OF the Case .... wk ecw ccce ]

Reasons for Denying the Writ ................. 5

I. Contrary To Alcan’s Petition, The Ninth

Circuit Properly Applied California Law And

Did Not Violate The Erie Doctrine. ....... 5

A. The Ninth Circuit Expressly Followed

The State’s Law Permitting Allocation

To An Insured, As Set Forth In Aerojet

cae ed Bis hE RA Sk kc 0k wx 5

1. Aerojet Allows For Allocation To

An Insured For Those Triggering

Injuries That Occurred Outside Its

Period Of Insurance. ............ 6

iv

Po eee

Contents

Page |

2. The Ninth Circuit Affirmed The 7

Trial Court’s Allocation To Alcan

Based Upon Triggering Injuries |

That Occurred Beyond Alcan’s :

Period Of Insurance. ............ S ,

B. Alcan’s Dispute With The Ninth Circuit ,

Does Not Implicate The Erie Doctrine

Since It Involves, At Most,

Disagreement Over The Intended

Meaning Of Aerojet, Not Whether

Aerojet Is Controlling Precedent For

i Te rey Serr ree 10 ,

II. The Manuscript Policies Created By Alcan

In This Case Compel A Result Different

From Aerojet, Which Was Based Upon A

Review Of “Standard Comprehensive Or

Commercial General Liability Policies”

Drafted By The Insurance Carriers :

Pe 2 5S 5a o Seka Wace sideeeet es 11

A. The Plain Language Of The General

Accident Policies, Written By Alcan,

Does Not Require General Accident To

Pay For Either Indemnity Or Defense

Alleged To Have Been Suffered Beyond

its Last Policy Period. ............. 12

Contents

Page

B. Any Perceived Ambiguity In The

Language Must Be Interpreted Against

Alcan, As Drafter Of The Manuscript

er rey eee mer 14

III. This Decision Has No Importance

Whatsoever Beyond Alcan’s Monetary Self-

| PPT EET eS IS EL ee eee 14

CI 6o. kc cack bc eee ee 15

vi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Corp.,

948 P.2d 909, 17 Cal. 4" 38 (1997) .......... passim

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) ....

ses es cue eee 84 0a ee ee i, 5, 6, 10, 11

Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552 (1941) ....... 10

Mendoza Vv. Gime, 27 F.2G1SSt 1.4 6vsc ckasavnes 10

Newman v. Stringfellow Riverside County,

NO. 1GGPRG- OEE a ose cas sasensawangeeraee 2,4, 9

United States v. Stringfellow, CV 83-2501, JMI

WTTTTTeT Tere ee ie ee

Statutes:

yi BOR A ome ee | rrr oe rr rein ry |

Cok, Ce Oe vein a die ibe eke eee 14

Cal. Civil Code § 3287(a) ......... 20... cece ees

United States Constitution:

U.S. Om GR: Fe 66a abe ee eee es ]

Rule:

supeoune Cost Rete 80... 6.00 senccéuceutacues 14

I

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

entered its judgment on March 31, 1999 and Alcan’s Petition

for Rehearing En Banc was denied on June 24, 1999. On

September 13, 1999, the Honorable Justice O’Conner

extended Alcan’s time to file a petition for writ of certiorari

up to and including October 22, 1999. Alcan filed its petition

for writ of certiorari on October 22, 1999, and the matter

was placed on the docket on October 27, 1999. Alcan asserts

jurisdiction in this Court based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

AND STATUTES INVOLVED

U.S. Const. Art. X

Cal. Civil Code § 3287(a)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

- Petitioner, Alcan Aluminum Corporation (“Alcan”)

brought the present action to recover defense costs and

indemnity expenses arising in connection with two

underlying proceedings involving injury allegedly caused by

hazardous materials deposited by Alcan at the Stringfellow

Acid Pits in Riverside County, California. From 1965 to

1972, the Stringellow Hazardous Waste Disposal Site (“the

Site”) in Riverside County, was an area used for treatment

and disposal of hazardous substances. (JR-83; CR-227 at

2:2.”) During this period, Alcan disposed of waste at the Site.

(JR-84; CR-227 at 3:5.)

2. All cites to “JR” and “CR” are to the appellate record that

was before the Ninth Circuit.

2

On January 17, 1995, Alcan filed its First Amended

Complaint against certain of its insurers, including General

Accident, alleging breach of contract, breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of

fiduciary duty. (JR-99; CR-227, at 18:39.) Thereafter General

Accident was permitted to amend its answer to assert

counterclaims against Alcan and cross-claims against

Commercial Union’ for declaratory relief, and equitable

contribution and apportionment. (CR- 90 and CR-95.)

In July and August 1996, the parties filed motions for

summary judgment/adjudication. (CR-158-159, 167-168,

172, 180, 184, and 190.) On September 23, 1996, the District

Court issued a series of separate Orders in this case. In its

Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant

General Accident Indemnity’s Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (“Order No. 1”), the District Court ordered that

Alcan should bear a portion of indemnity and defense costs

allocable to its self-insured period incurred by Alcan in

United States v. Stringfellow, a CERCLA action

(“Stringellow”), and in Newman vy. Stringfellow, a toxic tort

action (“Newman”) (See generally, JR-147-165; CR-232.)

(JR-160; CR-232, at 14.)*

3. Notably, Alcan had refrained from suing Commercial Union

and, instead, entered into a pre-litigation settlement with Commercial

Union for $750,000 (Can.). It was undisputed below that $500,000

(Can.) of that amount was then reimbursed to Commercial Union

by Alcan Limited pursuant to its obligations as the reinsurer for the

years from 1975-1979 when Commercial Union merely acted as a

“fronting insurer” for the entire Alcan family of companies.

(See pp.7-8, infra.) Thus, in practical effect, Alcan has been self-

insured at a primary level for the first $1 million of exposure since

August 1975.

4. In a separate Order, the District Court also granted

Commercial Union’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the cross-

(Cont'd)

~ Boe ON a NS aire at Hate La Tas) La bane tet

3

Notably, the district court’s summary judgment ruling

to permit allocation to Alcan did not impose any specific

allocation scheme or formula for the Stringfellow and

Newman actions. Indeed, the district court denied that portion

of General Accidents Motion for Summary Judgment, finding

potential triable issues of fact with regard to how the

allocation should be done. (See Order Granting in Part and

Denying in Part General Accident’s Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, filed 9/23/96, at JR-162: 8-16.) The

district court deferred that issue for trial.

To enable the Court to enter a final judgment in this

case, Alcan and the Insurer Defendants subsequently entered

into a series of stipulations (“Additional Stipulations”) which

resolved various factual disputes, including the appropriate

allocation formula and the amounts of indemnity and defense

costs. (CR-243, 244-245; JR-82, 105, and 119.) The

additional Stipulations were considered and accepted by the

District Court and were specifically incorporated into its

Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

(CR-276; JR-68.)

With regard to the allocation formula, the parties

stipulated amongst themselves that allocation to self-insured

periods “shall be calculated based on the proportionate

amount of time Alcan was self-insured.” (See Second

Statement of Stipulated Facts, at 910, JR-112:27-113:5.) The

only caveat to this agreement was the insurers’ having

(Cont'd

claims brought by General Accident based upon the pollution

exclusion contained in Commercial Union’s policy and the

settlement agreement entered into between Commercial Union and

Alcan. Commercial Union therefore was not a party to the subsequent

trial proceedings. (CR-235.)

4

reserved the right to argue at trial that they should be

completely excluded from having to pay any defense costs

or indemnity expenses associated with Newman plaintiffs

who had never lived in the vicinity of the Stringfellow site

until after their respective policy periods had expired.

(/d. at J 12, JR-113:20-114:18.)

Because of the parties’ stipulation, the district court

never was called upon to decide on the appropriateness of

any particular formula for allocation, except as respects the

Newman plaintiff “move-on dates.” Likewise, the parties’

stipulation eliminated the need for any party to put on

evidence regarding how any allocations should be made.

Instead, the Stipulations presented three issues of law

for resolution by the district court which also formed the

principal issues in the appeal and cross-appeals to the Ninth

Circuit. These issues were tried by the court on May 5, 1997.

Following extended oral argument, the District Court issued

oral rulings from the bench which were memorialized in the

reporter’s transcript of the proceedings (See Supplemental

Excerpt of Record (hereinafter “SER”) SER-159-237;

CR-280), in the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions

of Law (CR-276; JR-66), and in the Amended Judgment

(CR-278; JR-46). Cross-appeals followed.

Even before cross-appeals were fully briefed, the

California Supreme Court rendered its decision in Aerojet-

General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity Company,

17 Cal.4" 38 (1997). Accordingly, the parties had a full

opportunity to brief and argue the case to the Ninth Circuit

court. Contrary to Alcan’s expectation, Aerojet held that

allocation to an insured can be permissible.

5

Acting with the benefit of Aerojet, the United States

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled on the cross-

appeals on March 31, 1999. Alcan was unhappy with the

outcome and therefore sought Petition for Rehearing

En Banc, which was denied on June 24, 1999. On September

13, 1999, the Honorable Justice O’ Conner extended Alcan’s

time to file a petition for writ of certiorari up to and including

October 22, 1999. Alcan filed its petition for writ of certiorari

on October 22, 1999, and the matter was placed on the docket

on October 27, 1999.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. CONTRARY TO ALCAN’S PETITION, THE NINTH

CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED CALIFORNIA LAW

AND DID NOT VIOLATE THE ERIE’ DOCTRINE.

A. The Ninth Circuit Expressly Followed The State’s

Law Permitting Allocation To An Insured, As Set

Forth In Aerojef®

Alcan’s entire Petition for Writ of Certiorari is based

upon the false premise that the Ninth Circuit was ignoring

the California Supreme Court’s precedent, set forth in

Aerojet-General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity

Company, 17 Cal.4" 38 (1997), when the Ninth Circuit ruled

against Alcan’s appeal. On the contrary, the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion makes clear that it was applying Aerojet to the

particular facts in this case when it ruled against Alcan. Alcan

is simply unwilling to recognize that the facts in this case

5. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tomkins, supra, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).

6. Aerojet-General Corporation v. Transport Indemnity

Company, supra, 17 Cal.4" 38 (1997).

6

(as well as the stipulations that Alcan agreed to in this case)

are different from those present in Aerojet. The result reached

by the Ninth Circuit was fully appropriate and consistent

with the precedent created by Aerojet. Thus, this case does

not implicate the Erie Doctrine at all since, at most, it is a

dispute between Alcan and the Ninth Circuit over the

intended meanings of Aerojet, rather than whether the Aerojet

decision represents controlling precedent for California.

1. Aerojet Allows For Allocation To An Insured For

Those Triggering Injuries That Occurred Outside

Its Period Of Insurance.

In Aerojet, the California Supreme Court plainly has held

that defense costs can be allocated to the insured for a claim

or a part of a claim that is not even potentially covered by an

insurer’s policy of insurance. (Aerojet-General Corp. v.

Transport Indemnity Corp. 948 P.2d 909; 928; 17 Cal.4"

38, 69.) There the court noted that for a “mixed” claim, in

which at least one of the parts is potentially covered and at

least one of the parts is not, the insurer does not have a

contractual duty to defend the claim in its entirety, and

therefore may be entitled to seek an appropriate reallocation

to the insured for some of those costs. (Aerojet-General Corp.

v. Transport Indemnity Corp. 948 P.2d 909, 921.)

It follows that, pursuant to quasi-contract,

defense costs that can be allocated solely to a

claim, or a part of a claim, that is not even

potentially covered can be allocated to the insured.

(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Corp. 948

P.2d 909; 928.)

7

The court then decided that on the issue of allocation of

defense costs to the insured, the insurer must carry the burden

of proof and it must do so by the preponderance of the

evidence. (Ibid.)

[I]f [the insurer] carries the burden of proof

by a preponderance of the evidence, each insurer

may allocate defense costs to Aerojet for any part

of the single broad “mixed” claim presented in

the governmental and private actions that was not

even potentially covered because it did not even

possibly embrace any triggering harm of the

specified sort within its policy period or

periods. ...

(Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Corp. 948

P.2d 909, 929.)

In the instant case, the evidence supported partial

allocation of the Stringfellow defense and indemnity expense

to Alcan. Furthermore, as set forth infra, Alcan is ignoring

its own stipulated agreement that any allocation for the

Stringfellow federal clean up action should be “calculated

based on the proportionate amount of time Alcan was self-

insured... .”’

7. See Second Statement of Stipulated Facts, ¥ 10:2-5 at

JR-113.

8

2. The Ninth Circuit Affirmed The Trial Court's

Allocation To Alcan Based Upon Triggering

Injuries That Occurred Beyond Alcan’s Period Of

Insurance.

The Ninth Circuit opinion acknowledged that, under

Aerojet, an insurer may allocate to the insured any defense

costs for triggering injuries that occurred beyond an insurer’s

policy period. The insurer whose policy is triggered “may

still allocate costs to the insured that are attributable to

triggering injuries occurring before or after the effective dates

of the insured’s policies.” (See opinion at A-5: citing Aerojet-

General, supra, 17 Cal 4" 38, 71.)

The Ninth Circuit then concluded that the district court

had not erred when it concluded that a share of the defense

and indemnity costs arising from the Stringfellow and

Newman actions must be allocated to Alcan. The Ninth

Circuit found that allocation to Alcan was appropriate for

those triggering injuries that occurred after the insurers’

policies had expired for which they could not be held liable.

(See opinion at A-6.)

The district court did not err when it concluded

that Alcan would be responsible for those costs

arising out of the Stringfellow and Newman

actions attributable to injuries occurring during

Alcan’s period of self-insurance.

([bid.)

Here, the record before the Ninth Circuit amply

supported this conclusion. First, the parties had stipulated

prior to the district court’s ruling on allocation that the

9

injuries alleged in the Stringfellow and Newman actions had

been continuous through Alcan’s period of “self-insurance.”

(See Pre-Trial Conference Order, filed 9/18/95, at 45E,

Supplemental Excerpts of Record (SER) pp. 000020:28-

21:2.) Second, the district court’s summary judgment ruling

to permit allocation to Alcan did not impose any specific

allocation scheme or formula for the Stringfellow and

Newman actions. Indeed, the district court denied that portion

of General Accidents Motion for Summary Judgment, finding

that potential triable issues of fact existed with regard to

how the allocation should be done. (See Order Granting in

Part and Denying in Part General Accident’s Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment, filed 9/23/96, at JR-162: 8-16.)

The district court deferred that issue for trial. Third, before

the issue could be adjudicated at trial, the parties stipulated

amongst themselves that allocation to self-insured periods

“shall be calculated based on the proportionate amount

of time Alcan was self-insured.” (See Second Statement of

Stipulated Facts, at 410, JR-112:27-113:5.) The only caveat

to this agreement was the insurers’ having reserved the right

to argue at trial that they should be completely excluded from

having to pay any defense costs or indemnity expenses

associated with Newman plaintiffs who had never lived in

the vicinity of the Stringfellow site until after their respective

policy periods had expired. (/d. at § 12, JR-113:20-114:18.)

Because of the parties’ stipulation, the district court

never was called upon to decide on the appropriateness of

any particular formula for allocation for the Stringfellow

costs. Likewise, the parties’ stipulation eliminated the need

for any party to put on evidence regarding how the allocation

should be made.

Faced with this record, the Ninth Circuit had no basis to

overturn this aspect the district court’s judgment. The issue,

10

as framed by the parties for determination by the Ninth

Circuit, was whether allocation to an insured of such costs

could ever be permissible. Here, the Ninth Circuit court

simply followed Aerojet’s holding that there could be

allocation. As for the formula to be used for allocation, that

issue had already been agreed to by the parties and was

therefore not subject to appellate review.

The rules of appellate review do not permit a party like

Alcan to first stipulate to the appropriateness of a formula at

trial and later claim error because the court accepted the

stipulation. (See Mendoza v. Black, 27 F.3d 1357, 1360.)

Likewise, the rules of appellate review do not permit a party

to claim error on matters that the lower court was never called

upon to decide. (Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556

(1941).) Once the California Supreme Court had decided the

legal issue in Aerojet of whether allocation to an insured for

defense costs was ever permissible, Alcan’s stipulation that

injuries had occurred during its period of “self-insurance”

and its stipulation to permit allocation based upon the time

on the risk, eliminated its right to raise these claims of error

on appeal.

B. Alcan’s Dispute With The Ninth Circuit Does Not

Implicate The Erie Doctrine Since It Involves, At

Most, Disagreement Over The Intended Meaning Of

Aerojet, Not Whether Aerojet Is Controlling

Precedent For California.

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case was expressly

based on its application of the California Supreme Court’s

decision in Aerojet to the facts in the present case.

Nevertheless, because Alcan is dissatisfied with the outcome,

Alcan is attempting to manufacture an issue of constitutional

11

dimension, where none truly exists, in a “last ditch” attempt

to get the outcome overturned. In reality, there is no Erie

Doctrine aspect to this case. This is nothing more than a

case where Alcan disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s

interpretation of the Aerojet decision and is literally now

trying to make a federal case out of that disagreement. In

like manner Alcan challenges the Ninth Circuit’s

interpretation of California Civil Code section 3287,

governing the circumstances in which a party may recover

prejudgment interest. The Erie doctrine has never been

intended for such circumstances where the federal court is,

in fact, applying the law of the state where the diversity action

originates, rather than federal law. For this reason also,

Alcan’s petition should be rejected.

Il. THE MANUSCRIPT POLICIES CREATED BY

ALCAN IN THIS CASE COMPEL A RESULT

DIFFERENT FROM AEROJET, WHICH WAS BASED

UPON A REVIEW OF “STANDARD COMPRE-

HENSIVE OR COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY

POLICIES” DRAFTED BY THE INSURANCE

CARRIERS THEMSELVES.

The Aerojet decision is further distinguishable on its

facts because the instant case involves manuscript policies,

drafted by Alcan, rather than the standard comprehensive

general liability policy forms which were the subject of the

Supreme Court’s discussion in Aerojet. Here, the language

of the General Accident policies drafted by Alcan do not

require General Accident to pay for defense or indemnity

suffered beyond its policy periods.

12

A. The Plain Language Of The General Accident

Policies, Written By Alcan, Does Not Require General

Accident To Pay For Either Indemnity Or Defense

Alleged To Have Been Suffered Beyond Its Last

Policy Period.

The Supreme Court in Aerojet makes clear that its

decision is based upon interpretation of the “standard

comprehensive or commercial general liability insurance

policies” created by the insurance industry itself. The Aerojet

decision makes such references no less than seven different

times throughout its decision. (See Aerojet at pp. 45, 46, 55,

56, 57, 69 and 74, fn. 24.) Indeed, the Court framed the issues

to be resolved in the decision as follows:

Whether, under standard comprehensive or

commercial general liability insurance policies,

site investigation expenses may constitute defense

costs that the insurer must incur in fulfilling its

duty to defend, and whether, under such policies,

defense costs may be allocated to the insured.

(/d. at pp. 55-56.) Furthermore, at fn. 24 of the Aerojet

decision, the Court noted that its result might be different if

it had not been reviewing the “standard comprehensive or

commercial general liability policy . . .” (/d. at p. 74, fn. 24)

The California Supreme Court’s holdings on the

allocation issue were premised upon application of a

“contractual/quasi contractual analysis” of the standard

comprehensive or commercial liability policy. (/d. at p. 73.)

Applying that same “contractual/quasi contractual analysis”

to the policies manuscripted by Alcan compels finding in

favor of General Accident. Here, the language of the policies

13

written by Alcan does not require General Accident to pay

for indemnity or defense alleged to have been suffered

beyond its last policy period. Instead, the contract only

requires General Accident to pay all sums which the insured

shall become legally obligated to pay by reason of the

insured’s legal liability for damages on account of bodily

injury or damage to or destruction of property “suffered or

alleged to have been suffered within the policy period or

any renewal thereof...” (SER-97; SER-139.)

On its face, this language limits General Accident’s

potential for coverage to damages “suffered or alleged to

have been suffered within the policy period or any renewal

thereof.” If the manuscript language is interpreted according

to its plain and ordinary meaning, General Accident is not

be required to pay indemnity for any damages suffered or

alleged to have been suffered beyond its last policy period.

Likewise, with regard to the duty to defend, the policy

manuscripted by Alcan only requires General Accident to

“defend in the name of and on behalf of the Insured any

civil action which at any time may be brought against the

Insured for injuries or damages or alleged injury or damages

covered under this policy.” (SER-97; SER-139.) (Emphasis

added.) Thus, here too, interpreting the manuscript contract

according to its plain and ordinary meaning, General

Accident should not be required to pay for defense costs for

damages suffered beyond its policy period since the contract

does not require indemnification for any damages beyond

General Accident’s last policy period.

l-

B. Any Perceived Ambiguity In The Language Must Be

Interpreted Against Alcan, As Drafter Of The

Manuscript Policies.

Furthermore, to the extent the Court believed any of the

language used in the manuscript policies is ambiguous, the

language must be interpieted against Alcan in its capacity

as drafter of the manuscript policies. (California Civ. Code

§ 154.)

Accordingly, allocation by the District Court to Alcan’s

self-insured periods was appropriate under the particular

language of the General Accident policies written by Alcan

Since the Aerojet decision involved standard adhesion policy

forms written by the insurance industry, this is yet another

reason why a different result is appropriate in our case.

Ill. THIS DECISION HAS NO IMPORTANCE

WHATSOEVER BEYOND ALCAN’S MONETARY

SELF-INTEREST.

Can there be any doubt that this case fails to meet every

threshold of significance for cases accepted by this Court?

The Ninth Circuit’s decision breaks no new ground and

involves no true questions of constitutional dimension.

(Supreme Court Rule 10.) Furthermore, the decision has no

impact whatsoever as precedent on anyone other than the

parties to this case because the Ninth Circuit recognized that

this case was appropriate for routine disposition, and did

not certify the opinion for publication. This petition is being

brought to serve Alcan’s monetary self-interest, nothing

more. Taking this case would be an utter waste of this Court’s

precious time and resources, and for that reason alone, the

petition should be denied.

15

CONCLUSION

For all the above reasons, respondent respectfully

requests that Alcan’s Petition for Certiorari be denied in all

respects.

Respectfully submitted,

PauL D. HERBERT

Counsel of Record

Ropers, MAJESKI, KOHN & BENTLEY

Attorneys for Respondent

CGU Insurance Company of Canada,

as successor to General Accident

Assurance Company of Canada

1001 Marshall Street

Redwood City, CA 94063

(650) 364-8200

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.