Opposition Brief — Brierly v. Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc.

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No. 99- 683 OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JEFFREY D. BRIERLY, Administrator

of the Estate of Paul Brierly, Deceased,

Petitioner,

v.

ALUSUISSE FLEXIBLE PACKAGING,

INC., DAVID ELLISON,

Respondents.

Own Petition For Writ OF CERTIORARI

To Tue UNiteED STATES CourT OF APPEALS

For THe Sixtus Circuit

RESPONDENT ELLISON BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ARNOLD TAYLOR *

O'Hara, RUBERG, TAYLOR,

SLOAN & SERGENT

209-C THomMas More PARK

P.O. Box 17411

CovinGTON, KY 41017-0411

(606) 331-2000

Attorneys for Respondent Ellison

* Counsel of Record

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC..

CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

i

RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED

:

II.

Whether this Court should waste judicial resources by

reviewing the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals, where the law of the Commonwealth of

Kentucky and the facts of this case compelled

summary judgment in favor of the Respondent

Ellison?

Whether the Respondent Ellison should be prevented

from having access to the Federal Courts where he

was not served with process for 18 months and had

nothing to do with any procedural missteps by the

other Respondent.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

RESTATEMENT OF QUESTIONS PRESENTED. .... . i

TABLE OF AUTIOUREEES® 2 cc cscvscisdateasn iv

OPENACS MAIN fcc ccnw acne uahowee ran l

STATUTORY PROVESGUID oc cccccncccceuess l

STATEOGEING GE Cae CAR 2s os eich cece 2

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION. ....... 7

I. Whether this Court should waste judicial

resources by reviewing the decision of the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, where the law

of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the

facts of this case compelled summary judgment

in favor of the Respondent Ellison? ......... 7

II. Whether the respondent Ellison should be

prevented from having access to the federal

courts where he was not served with process

for 18 months and had nothing to do with any

procedural missteps by the other respondent .. . 19

oe 8). wrerrere rr ry ye ee 28

iil

APPENDIX

APPENDIX A

The Order of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at

Frankfort, entered October 11, 1994 ........ la

APPENDIX B

The Order of the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at

Frankfort, entered March 21,1995 ......... 3a

APPENDIX C

ie ec ame ba hwe en Sa

APPENDIX D

OE a Ta

APPENDIX E

Portion of Petition for Writ of Certiorari in

Ritchey v. Upjohn Company, etal ......... 8a

hY

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Bradley v. Austin,

S41 F260 1206 GU Cm. ISGS) 2. cee 9

Brown v. Demco, Inc.,

Wee Ore eG, OE es wk oe wh we ees 16

Cantrell v. Great Republic Ins. Co.,

873 F.2d 1249 (9 Cir. 1989) .............005. 16

Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis,

519 U.S. Gi, 117 SpA. 467 (198O). ww ce 4,5,14

Com. Ex Rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson,

See ee ee, SO ee ee eeu bas 8

Commonwealth of Ky. Ex Rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus,

362 F.Supp. 360, Aff'd 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974),

Aff'd 426 U.S. 167, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 48 L. Ed.2d 555

DN ay Oe hoe an we oe ee eee Y 8,14

Fryman vy. Electric Steam Radiator Corporation,

eet oe es SS oe EE ea a eee es 12

Ford v. United States,

273 U.S. 593, 47 $2. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927)... ..... 8

George v. Com.,

eee es Oe Se Se hc is oink dee a 8

Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,

Ad Fi i ee ee kh ew wea nee 17

Louisville Water Co. v. Wells,

ee re I Oe tek ka i eee oe a 8

Vv

Manning v. Kentucky Bd. of Dentistry,

657 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1983). ................... 9

McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co.,

419 S.W.2d 542 (Ky.1967)...................... 12

McKinney v. Board of Trustees of Mayland Com. Coll.,

955 F.2d 924 (4" Cir. 1992)... ............00-... 17

Reddick v. Commonwealth,

33 S.W. 416 My. 1895)... cc cece ee, 12

Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug Co.,

139 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998),

cert. denied 119S.Ct407 .................... 25

Russell v. Able,

931 S.W.2d 460 es WO S50 Se ee ee 11

Scialo v. Scala Packing Co., Inc.,

821 F.Supp. 1276 (N.D. Ill. 1993)................. 16

Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court,

312 Ky. 614, 229 S.W.2d 319 (1950) ............ 8

Stone v. Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n.,

wus 5. W.2d 67S My. 1995)... .... 2... oc. ce. 8

Wade v. Commonwealth,

303 S.W.2d 905 (Ky. 1957). .................. 8

Weimer v. City of Johnstown,

NY, 931 F.Supp.985 (N.D. NY 1996).............. 18

Woods v. Simpson,

46 F.3d 21 (6th Cir. 1995)...................... 8

VI

STATUTES

Page

i ge 8 Pere er ere er re oe passim

ESD, og 60-5 4 8s ee ee passim

i fo Rk Of PPPPeePUrerererer: ore 9

l

OPINIONS BELOW

The Order of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort, entered October

11, 1994, is not reported and is set forth in the Appendix to

this Brief at page la.

The Order of the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Kentucky at Frankfort, entered March 21,

1995, is not reported and is set forth in the Appendix to this

Brief at page 3a.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

KRS 342.690 EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY

(1) If an employer secures payment of compensation

! as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer

| under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other

liability of such employer to the employee, his legal

representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of

kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from

! such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such

injury or death. For purposes of this section, the term

“employer” shall include a “contractor” covered by

subsection (2) of KRS 342.610, whether or not the

subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of

compensation. The liability of an employer to another person

who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account of

injury or death of an employee of such employer arising out

of and in the course of employment and caused by a breach of

any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other

shall be limited to the amount of compensation and other

I ileal daaiaiasaiadiaainl

pie Maia i Rast tsi hes

2

benefits for which such employer is liable under this chapter

on account of such injury or death, unless such other and the

employer by written contract have agreed to share liability in

a different manner. The exemption from liability given an

employer by this section shall also extend to such employer’s

carrier and to all employees, officers or directors of such

employer or carrier, provided the exemption from liability

given an employee, officer or director or an employer or

carrier shall not apply in any case where the injury or death

is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical

aggression of such employee, officer or director.

KRS 446.080LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION;

STATUTES NOT RETROACTIVE;

COMMON USAGE; TECHNICAL TERMS

* * *

(4) All words and phrases shall be construed according to

the common and approved usage of language, but

technical words and phrases, and such others as may

have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in

the law, shall be construed according to such meaning.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Under Kentucky Workers’ Compensation laws an

employer is generally exempt from civil claims by an

employee for injury in the workplace; co-employees, such as

the Respondent, David Ellison (“Ellison”), also enjoy an

exemption from liability. Only two exceptions are carved out

of those exemptions. The first exception is found in KRS

342.610 (4), which will be found at page 97a of the Appendix

3

to the Petition. That statute provides that a civil cause of

action will lie against the employer if injury or death results

to an employee through the deliberate intention of his

employer to produce such injury or death. No cause of action

was stated against Ellison under KRS 342.610 (4) because that

Statute does not grant a cause of action against a fellow

employee such as Ellison. The second exception is found in

KRS 342.690 (1), which will be found at page la of the

Appendix to this Brief. That statute provides that the

employer's exemption also extends to co-employees, so long

as the injury or death suffered by an employee is not caused

by the wilful and unprovoked physical aggression of the co-

employee. The Complaint never stated a cause of action

under KRS 342.690 (1) because there was no allegation that

Brierly’s injury or death was caused by the “wilful and

unprovoked physical aggression” of Ellison.

Ellison was the Safety Director at the facility of the

Respondent, Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc. (“Alusuisse”)

He was advised that welding was to be done on a machine

known as a parts washer, which used solvents to clean ink off

parts. He went to the parts washer room and observed that:

(1) the electricity to the machine was locked

out and tagged out; (2) the washing machine

and solvent supply reservoir were drained of

solvent; (3) the pit below the washer was

ventilated with a compressed air hose over the

course of the entire weekend to purge any

accumulated fumes from underneath the

machine; (4) the washing machine door was

left open Friday evening so-that the interior of

the machine could be aired out over the

weekend; (5) and a special floor-level

ventilation system was left running during the

4

weekend to help purge the room of fumes.

He smelled no solvent odors in the room. He

suggested wrapping portions of the machine with fire

retardant blankets and putting water in the bottom of a pit in

which the washer sat, in order to prevent residual materials on

the floor of the pit from catching fire. There was an apparent

misunderstanding between Ellison and other gentlemen about

whether an LEL (“Lower Explosive Limit”) monitor had been

used.

When Ellison was told by another employee of

concerns about the possibility of fire during the welding, he

and that employee returned to the parts washer room and

discussed the precautions that had been taken. Ellison left the

room for a period of time and was returning to it when the

welding began and the explosion occurred. A spark from the

welding torch ignited solvent vapors within the parts washer,

blowing a steel door off the washer. The door struck the

Petitioner’s decedent. When the decedent was killed, he was

standing in what was considered to be the safest position in

the room.

At the time of the accident, Ellison was a Kentucky

resident. On or before May 9, 1994 Ellison left Alusuisse’s

employ and became a citizen of Wisconsin, so there was

complete diversity at the time this action was originally filed

on May 12, 1994. A Summons was issued for Ellison on

May 12, 1994 and on May 13, 1994 the Shelby County

Sheriff made a return indicating that Ellison was no longer a

Kentucky resident. On August 11, 1994 one of the attorneys

for Alusuisse advised Petitioner’s counsel of Ellison’s new

address and employment. However, Ellison was not-served

with Summons or pleadings until November 13, 1995. That

was in part due to an Order issued by the District Court on

pe te, mee “

nar icticar iteiiie Ghatesa tite ne AS A wt dn ca Be lt) tA TBR OA ce tncend

5

October 11, 1994 in Alusuisse’s earlier removal effort and

continued by Order dated March 21, 1995. (Appendix to this

Brief, pages la and 3a, respectively.) However, Brierly

never objected to the Order and made no further efforts to

serve Ellison until November of 1995. No substantive steps

occurred in Shelby Circuit Court, but considerable substantive

discovery occurred in the federal action.

The District Court determined that Ellison properly

removed the case and that Alusuisse could consent to that

removal. Ultimately the District Court granted Ellison’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and the Sixth Circuit

affirmed. |

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD WASTE

JUDICIAL RESOURCES BY REVIEWING THE

DECISION OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF

APPEALS, WHERE THE LAW OF THE

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY AND THE

FACTS OF THIS CASE COMPELLED SUMMARY

JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT

ELLISON?

Even if the issues framed by Petitioner were worthy of

consideration, this is not the case in which to review them.

The Court stated in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61,

117 Sup.Ct. 467 (1996), at 477:

To wipe out the adjudication post-judgment

and return to state court a case now satisfying

all federal jurisdictional requirements would

6

impose an exorbitant cost on our dual court

system, a cost incompatible with the fair and

unprotracted administration of justice.

In this case, all federal jurisdictional requirements

were met. No discovery was conducted in the State court

case, while extensive discovery was conducted in the Federal

action before the Summary Judgment was granted. The

holdings of the courts below were well-founded and returning

this case to Shelby Circuit Court would “impose an exorbitant

cost on our dual court system, a cost incompatible with the

fair and unprotracted administration of justice.”

The Petitioner would have the Court believe that the

lower courts imposed upon him a burden of proof in a civil

action greater than that required to support a criminal

conviction, but the arguments about “inferred” intent have no

relevance to Ellison. In fact, no cause of action was stated

against Ellison, because there was no allegation of the single

basis on which such a cause of action may be founded.

There are two instances in which an injured employee may

avoid the exclusive remedies of the Kentucky Workers’

Compensation system and file a civil action for damages,

neither of which provided the Petitioner any relief against

Ellison.

A. The Petitioner has no cause of action under

the first exception to the Workers’ Compensation laws.

The first exception is found in KRS 342.610 (4),

which provides:

If injury or death results to an employee

through the deliberate intention of his

employer to produce such injury or death, the

7

| employee or his dependent as herein defined

| shall receive the amount provided in this

chapter in a lump sum to be used, if desired, to

prosecute the employer. The dependents may

. bring suit against the employer for any amount

they desire. If injury or death results to an

employee through the deliberate intention of

his employer to produce such injury or death,

the employee or his dependents may take

under this chapter, or in lieu thereof, have a

cause of action at law against the employer as

if this chapter had not passed, for such damage

SO sustained by the employee, his dependents

or personal representatives as is recoverable at

law. Ifa suit is brought under this subsection,

all right to compensation under this chapter

shall thereby be waived as to all persons. If a

. Claim is made for the payment of compensation

or any other benefit provided by this chapter,

| all rights to sue the employer for damages on

; account of such injury or death shall be waived

: as to all persons. (Emphasis added.)

Even if the decedent’s injuries and death were

considered to have resulted from the deliberate intention of

Alusuisse (which Ellison denies), KRS 342.610 (4) grants the

Petitioner a cause of action only against Alusuisse, not a

fellow employee such as Ellison.

A A Ci ee ls

Under any rule of statutory construction, KRS 342.610

(4) must be construed as excluding Ellison from any potential

liability to the Plaintiff. Under the rule of ejusdem generis,

where general words follow or precede a designation of

particular subjects or classes of persons, the meaning of the

general words ordinarily will be presumed to be restricted by

8

the particular designation, and to include only things or

persons of the same kind, class or nature as those specifically

enumerated. Woods v. Simpson, 46 F.3d 21 (6th Cir. 1995);

Steinfeld v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court, 312 Ky. 614, 229

S.W.2d 319 (1950). Here the use of the word “employer”

does not admit the inclusion of the word “employee” into

KRS 342.610 (4).

Likewise, under the maxim, Expressio unius est

exclusio alterius, the express mention of one thing in a statute

implies the exclusion of another different thing. Steinfeld,

supra. The maxim applies where that which is expressed is

in such great contrast to that which is omitted that the contrast

enforces the affirmative inference that which is omitted must

be intended to have opposite and contrary treatment. Ford v.

United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793

(1927); Wade v. Commonwealth, 303 S.W.2d 905 (Ky.

1957); George v. Com., 885 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1994);

Louisville Water Co. v. Wells, 664 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1984).

The Kentucky legislature could have easily included the word

“employee” in KRS 342.610 (4) but did not, whereas

“employer” is mentioned multiple times.

Where there is no exception to the positive terms of a

statute the presumption is that the legislature intended none.

Com. Ex Rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610 (Ky.

1992); Stone v. Kentucky Ins. Guar. Ass’n., 908 S.W.2d 675

(Ky. 1995). Where a particular provision appears in a statute,

the failure to include that same requirement in another section

of the statute will not be deemed to have been inadvertent.

Commonwealth of Ky. Ex Rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, 362

F.Supp. 360, Aff’d 497 F.2d 1172 (6th Cir. 1974), Aff'd 426

U.S. 167, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 48 L. Ed.2d 555 (1976).

9

In determining the meaning of legislation, the Court

must first look to the plain language of the statute itself: if no

ambiguity in the statutory ianguage is found, that language is

regarded as conclusive unless there is a clearly expressed

legislative intent to the contrary. Bradley v. Austin, 841 F.2d

1288 (6th Cir. 1988). That same philosophy and approach

applies to any Kentucky statute. In Manning v. Kentucky Bad.

of Dentistry, 657 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1983), the court stated, at

587:

we

The Court’s function in the interpretation of

. Statutes is to construe the language so as to

give effect to the intent of the legislature.

i [citations omitted] Where words in a statute

are clear and unambiguous and express the

legislative intent, there is no room for

construction and the statute must be accepted

as it is written. [citations omitted] It is

presumed that the legislature is acquainted

with the law on the subjects on which it

legislates and is informed of previous

legislation and construction that it has

previously received. Where it has made no

exception to the positive terms of the statute,

the presumption is that it intended to make

none, and it is not the province of a court to

introduce an exception by construction.

[citations omitted]

KRS 446.080 (4) provides:

All words and phrases shall be construed

according to the common and approved usage

of language, but technical words and phrases,

and such others as may have acquired a

peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law,

10

shall be construed according to such meaning.

The word “employer” has a common and distinct

meaning both in law and ordinary usage; an employer is an

entity quite distinct from an employee. It must be presumed

that the legislature meant to allow a civil cause of action,

under the specified circumstances, only against employers.

There are no ambiguities in the statute; KRS 342.610 (4)

allows a cause of action at law only against an employer.

B. The Petitioner stated no cause of action under

the second exception to the Workers’ Compensation laws and

Ellison's right to Judgment was compelling.

KRS 342.690 (1) provides, in part:

The exemption from liability given an

employer by this section shall also extend to

such employer's . . . employees .. . ,

provided the exemption from liability given an

employee shall not apply in any case where the

injury or death is proximately caused by the

wilful and unprovoked physical aggression of

such employee . . . . (emphasis added).

The Complaint stated no cause of action under KRS

342.690 (1) because there was no allegation that the

decedent's injury or death was “proximately caused by the

wilful and unprovoked physical aggression” of Ellison. The

Complaint alleged that Ellison “knew immediately prior to the

explosion that [his] intended course of action created a known

unsafe and hazardous work environment which could or

would result in serious bodily injury or death to... Paul

Brierly, yet deliberately placed [Brierly] in a position of

imminent peril.” The Complaint alleged that Ellison “failed

and refused to take even the minimum safety precautions

| 1

required by local, state and/or federal law, and took

affirmative and intentional actions in violation of such laws,

all of which caused and brought about the death of [Brierly].”

It was alleged that the death “resulted from the

deliberate, wilful and unprovoked intention of . . . Ellison .

: . . o produce serious injury or death as contemplated by KRS

342.610 (4), and/or KRS 342.690 (1) such that the

prosecution of this action is without the restrictions of KRS

Chapter 342" and that Ellison’s “intentional conduct was

undertaken with a deliberate and flagrant indifference to the

rights of [Brierly] and with a subjective awareness that such

intentional conduct would result in bodily harm or death to

[Brierly].”

If those allegations were an attempt to meet the

“physical aggression” requirements of KRS 342.690 (1) it

was a failed Procrustean effort. There was no physical

aggression by Ellison and there is no allegation of such

physical aggression.

The Kentucky legislature meant to remove the

exclusivity protection from an employee who intentionally and

physically attacks another empioyee without provocation. For

example, in Russell v. Able, 931 S.W.2d 460 (Ky. 1996),

Able approached Russell from behind and intentionally placed

her knee to the back of Russell’s knee, Causing Russell to fall

to the floor. Russell was allowed to sue Able, despite the fact

i that she had recovered compensation benefits. The case

makes it apparent that “physical aggression” means exactly

what it says; there is no exception for anything less.

Even if the allegations of the Complaint are stretched

to encompass “physical aggression”, Ellison was entitled to

summary judgment because he never committed any act of

O°EESS AT TT

12

physical aggression. It is apparent that even if “deliberate

intention” were a criterion applicable to Ellison, he committed

no such act. Fryman v. Electric Steam Radiator Corporation,

277 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. 1955); McCray v. Davis H. Elliott Co.,

419 S.W.2d 542 (Ky. 1967). The record is clear that no

Alusuisse employee ever contemplated the possibility of an

explosion.

. No inference of intent operates against Ellison.

The argument Petitioner makes at pages 25 et seq. of

the Petition should be read carefully. There the Petitioner

argues that the deliberate intention required by KRS 342.610

(4) may be inferred from circumstances. Whether this is true

or not, KRS 342.610 (4) does not apply to employees such as

Ellison, but only to employers. The Petitioner carefully fails

to mention that distinction in his argument and it is a critical

omission.

Moreover, Ellison’s acts or inactions would not

furnish the basis for such an inference in any event. In

Reddick _v. Commonwealth, 33 S.W. 416 (Ky. 1895), the

Court held that a person who caused a hotel to burn, in which

fire a person died, could be convicted of murder even though

he might deny intent to have caused a death. The Court held,

at 417, that this felony of arson:

. . Clearly belonged to the cases “malum in

se” and not merely “malum prohibitum.”

In determining whether a fact finder may infer intent

in a civil case, Kentucky focuses on the nature of the actions

causing the injury. Is the crime malum in se? Is itaheinous

act? Is it an act that is certain to cause a harm? Did the

effort to perpetrate the act go beyond the casual? Kentucky

13

does not hold that deliberate intent to injure may be inferred

in cases of ordinary claims of negligence. Do the facts of this

case come anywhere near meeting the criteria for allowing an

inference of intent? Not at all. As the District Court pointed

out:

Surely these gentlemen would have been out of

the plant long before the welding started had

they planned or even anticipated the possibility

of an explosion.

Ellison was manifestly entitled to judgment, and to

remand this case to State court would not only be an

unwarranted burden on him, it would be a waste of judicial

resources.

II.

WHETHER THE RESPONDENT ELLISON

SHOULD BE PREVENTED FROM HAVING

ACCESS TO THE FEDERAL COURTS WHERE HE

WAS NOT SERVED WITH PROCESS FOR 18

MONTHS AND HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH

ANY PROCEDURAL MISSTEPS BY THE OTHER

RESPONDENT.

A. The one year bar does not apply.

28 U.S.C. § 1446 (b) provides, in pertinent part:

The notice of removal of a civil action or

proceeding shall be filed within thirty days after

receipt by the defendant, through service or

otherwise, of a copy of the initial pleading

setting forth the claim for relief upon which

such action or proceeding is based. . . .

14

If the case stated by the initial pleading is not

removable, a notice of removal may be filed

within thirty days after receipt by the defendant,

through service or otherwise, of a copy of an

amended pleading, motion, order or other paper

from which it may first be ascertained that the

case is one which is or has become removable,

except that a case may not be removed on the

basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332

of this title more than one year after

commencement of the action.

This case was removable as originally filed and Ellison

complied with the first paragraph of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The

second paragraph deals with cases not removable upon initial

filing. It is important to note that the only reference to the one

year bar is found within the second paragraph, so the modifying

clause applies only to the second paragraph. If Congress

intended the one year bar to apply to the entirety of 28 U.S.C.

§$1446(b), a third sub-paragraph could have easily been

inserted, stating that the one year bar applied to all cases.

Where a particular provision appears in a statute, the failure to

include that same requirement in another section of the statute

will not be deemed to have been inadvertent. Commonwealth

of Kentucky, Ex Rel. Hancock v. Ruckelshaus, supra.

Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, supra, does not impose the

one year bar on this case. The Petitioner claims that the

Supreme Court’s statement, that no case may be removed

beyond one year, is a ruling by the Supreme Court that the

one year bar applies to actions originally removable. That is

not correct. Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis was a case which was

not originally removable and became removable only after the

deletion of other defendants. Thus, the Supreme Court only

had before it the question of the one year bar as it applied to

ee Oe

15

cases which later became removable; whether the one year

bar applied to cases removable as Originally filed was not a

question necessary for resolution.

After the Shelby County Sheriff’s return on May 12,

1994 the Petitioner never even attempted to serve Ellison until

November of 1995, even though a Wisconsin address was

known to the Petitioner’s attorney in August of 1994. The

Petitioner did not object to the Stay Order of October 11,

1994 or the Order of March 21, 1995 continuing the Stay

Order. Moreover, the District Court’s Memorandum Opinion

and Order of March 30, 1995 (Appendix to Petition at page

83a) points out that the stay was on the merits and did not

preclude the Court from rendering its opinion regarding

jurisdictional issues; the issue of Ellison’s citizenship was a

jurisdictional issue, resolution of which was delayed by the

Petitioner’s failure to effect service until November of 1995.

Petitioner acknowledges that the Fifth and Ninth

Circuits have also ruled that the one year limitation applies

only to cases not initially removable. Even more significant

is this Court’s denial of certiorari in Ritchey v. Upjohn Drug

Co., 139 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied 119 S.Ct

407 (1998). There the Petitioner framed one of his issues as

follows:

I. Does the one year limitation on diversity

removal under the 1988 amendments to 28

U.S.C. § 1446 (b) absolutely preclude removal

in all diversity cases after the limitation period

expires, and if not, does the one year

limitation period on removal only begin to run

from the date when the action stated by the

initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief

filed in state court was served on the diverse

State court defendant, who then filed notice of

16

removal more than two years beyond the filing

of the original action in state court? (Appendix

to this Brief, page 9a)

Thus, the Court has already rejected a Petition to visit

this issue, and Ellison respectfully submits that the Court

should reject the instant petition.

B. To construe Alusuisse’s vigorous attempts at

removal as a waiver would unfairly deprive Ellison of his

rights under 28 USC § 1446 (b).

The Petitioner’s cited cases are distinguishable. For

example, in Scialo v. Scala Packing Co., Inc., 821 F.Supp.

1276 (N.D. Ill. 1993), the original attempts at removal were

woefully inadequate, and a reading of the case makes it

apparent that the original defendants attempted to justify their

lack of proper removal with spurious reasoning, as detailed by

the court at 1277, footnote 3.

In Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478 (5" Cir. 1986)

the original Defendants did not remove the case, but defended

it in State court for about four years. Thereafter, new

Defendants were named and they proceeded to remove the

case; the original Defendants gave their consent to that

removal. The Fifth Circuit merely decided that the original

Defendants had waived their right to consent, precluding their

later consent.

Petitioner misreads Cantrell v. Great Republic Ins.

Co., 873 F.2d 1249 (9" Cir. 1989). There the Plaintiffs sued

Great Republic Insurance Company (GRIC) but the Complaint

was answered by Great Republic Life Insurance Company

(GRLIC), which even counterclaimed against Cantrell. There

was no removal. The Plaintiff then filed an Amended

17

Complaint, specifically naming GRLIC as a Defendant. The

Ninth Circuit held that the original failure to remove was a

waiver because GRLIC was acting as a party long before the

technical amendment of the Complaint.

In this case, it can hardly be said that Alusuisse

waived its right to remove; it may have made procedural

missteps, but its actions were all in the course of a vigorous

attempt to remove the case.

e. The Sixth Circuit properly decided that a later

served Defendant has 30 days from service in which to remove

a case to federal district court.

Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America,

841 F.2d 1254 (5" Cir. 1988) did in fact apply a rule of

unanimity. However, even that case must be viewed in the

context of its facts. There Getty sued three defendants,

serving them on September 3", September 5" and September

24", 1986 respectively. The first served Defendant removed

timely, with the second served Defendant consenting. The

third served Defendant consented, but beyond thirty days

from service on the first served Defendant. The court held

that all served Defendants must join in the Petition no later

than thirty days from service on the first Defendant. Of

course, Getty Oil deals with a situation in which all of the

named Defendants were served within a relatively close time

period. Getty Oil was criticized in McKinney v. Board of

Trustees of Mayland Com. Coll., 955 F.2d 924 (4" Cir.

1992).

The McKinney court pointed out that §1446 (b) does

not address the issue of multiple defendants and does not Say

that the time will run from service on the “first served”

defendant. The court rejected Getty Oil by saying it was not

18

logical and promoted inequity, not unanimity. To the

argument that a Plaintiff should know at the earliest possible

date what court he will be in, the court answered that the

Plaintiff should get ail of the Defendants served at about the

same time. Moreover, the court rejected the notion that

choosing the forum was “bad” or a “defeat” of the Plaintiff's

choice of forum. The court did not believe that Congress

meant a Plaintiff's right to choose a forum was of any greater

value than a Defendant’s right to remove.

Weimer v. City of Johnstown, NY, 931 F.Supp.985

(N.D. NY 1996) points out many reasons why the last served

rule was not applied in that particular case. Even in Weimer,

however, the Court specifically stated, at 993, that “...the

Court does not wish to close the door to this line of argument

in future cases displaying the characteristics...warranting

application of the minority, last-served rule.”

The Sixth Circuit was correct. Ellison and Alusuisse

have separate counsel. Petitioner’s counsel was aware of

Ellison’s Wisconsin address in August of 1994 but made no

effort to serve him for eighteen months. Removals to federal

district court are subject to Rule 11 of the federal rules of

civil procedure and a later served defendant should be given

time to properly analyze the Complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1446

(b) does not adequately deal with the issue of multiple

defendants and it never makes reference to a “first served”

defendant. The Sixth Circuit properly decided that to refuse

Ellison a right of removal granted him by Congress would be

inequitable. The Petitioner’s parade of horribles should not

persuade this court. The Sixth Circuit has not created a

situation where parties wishing to be in state court will be

subjected to frequent journeys to federal court and back and

the Sixth Circuit certainly did not shift to a Plaintiff the

burden of proving nondiversity.

HO er A ela sit

19

CONCLUSION

Thereare no compelling reasons why certiorari should

be granted in this case. The law and the facts in favor of

Ellison are so compelling that it would be a waste of judicial

resources for this Court to grant certiorari.

For those reasons, Ellison respectfully submits that the

Court should deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari now

pending before this Court.

Respectfully submitted this thea November, 1999.

209-C Thomas More Park

P. O. Box 17411

Covington, KY 41017-0411

(606) 331-2000

Attorneys for Respondent David Ellison

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

FRANKFORT

[Filed October 11, 1994]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-55

JEFFREY D. BRIERLY, Administrator

of the Estate of Paul Brierly, deceased

PLAINTIFF,

v. ORDER

ALUSUISSE FLEXIBLE PACKAGING, INC.,

and

DAVID ELLISON,

DEFENDANTS.

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of the

defendant, Alusuisse Flexible Packaging, Inc. [Alusuisse] to

Stay further proceedings in this action until the resolution of

separate actions stemming from the explosion in question

including: pending action before Kentucky Workers’

Compensation Board; the pendency of criminal charges

2a

against Alusuisse; and the pendency of three separate actions

against Alusuisse other than the instant action. [Record No.

4). The plaintiff has failed to respond.

Having considered the record and being otherwise

advised,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

(1) That the motion of the defendant to stay

further proceedings [Record No. 4] be, and the

same hereby is, GRANTED.

(2) That all further proceedings in this matter

SHALL BE STAYED pending further Orders

from this Court.

(3) That the parties shall file a joint status report

within the earlier of 120 days from the date of

entry of this Order or when the case

proceeding before the Kentucky Workers’

Compensation Board has been resolved.

This the 4" day of October, 1994.

/s/ Joseph M. Hood

JOSEPH M. HOOD, JUDGE

Date of Entry and Service:

3a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY

FRANKFORT

[Filed March 21, 1995]

CIVIL ACTION NO. 94-55

JEFFREY D. BRIERLY, Administrator of

the Estate of Paul Brierly, deceased,

PLAINTIFF,

V. ORDER

ALUSUISSE FLEXIBLE PACKAGING,

INC.,

DEFENDANT.

The Court having considered the parties’ status reports

[Record Nos. 11 & 12], and being duly advised, accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the STAY in the above-

captioned matter entered by this Court on October 11, 1995,

shall continue in full force and effect pending further orders.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the parties file a

joint status report within the earlier of 180 days from the date

of entry of this Order or when the case proceeding before the

4a

Kentucky Workers’ Compensation Board has been resolved.

This the 21" day of March, 1995.

/s/__ Joseph M. Hood

JOSEPH M. HOOD, JUDGE

Date of Entry and Service:

Sa

APPENDIX C

KRS 342.690 (1)

KRS 342.690 EXCLUSIVENESS OF LIABILITY

(1) If an employer secures payment of compensation

as required by this chapter, the liability of such employer

under this chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other

liability of such employer to the employee, his legal

representative, husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of

kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from

such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such

injury or death. For purposes of this section, the term

“employer” shall include a “contractor” covered by

subsection (2) of KRS 342.610, whether or not the

subcontractor has in fact, secured the payment of

compensation. The liability of an employer to another person

who may be liable for or who has paid damages on account of

injury or death of an employee of such employer arising out

of and in the course of employment and caused by a breach of

any duty or obligation owed by such employer to such other

shall be limited to the amount of compensation and other

benefits for which such employer is liable under this chapter

on account of such injury or death, unless such other and the

employer by written contract have agreed to share liability in

a different manner. The exemption from liability given an

employer by this section shall also extend to such employer’s

carrier and to all employees, officers or directors of such

employer or carrier, provided the exemption from liability

given an employee, officer or director or an employer or

6a

carrier shall not apply in any case where the injury or death

is proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical

aggression of such employee, officer or director.

Ta

APPENDIX D

KRS 446.080 (4)

KRS 446.080LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION;

STATUTESNOT RETROACTIVE;

COMMON USAGE; TECHNICAL TERMS

* *

(4) All words and phrases shall be construed

according to the common and approved usage of language, but

technical words and phrases, and such others as may have

acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall

be construed according to such meaning.

8a

APPENDIX E

No.

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

JOE B. RITCHEY,

Petitioner,

V.

UPJOHN COMPANY and WILLIAM DEMENT,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

MICHAEL D. MOSHER

ROBERT S. CATZ

Counsel of Record

50 North Main Street

Paris, Texas 75460-4250

(903) 785-4721

Counsel for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

9a

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Does the one year limitation on diversity removal

under the 1988 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)

absolutely preclude removal in all diversity cases after

the limitation period expires, and if not, does the one

year limitation period on removal only begin to run

from the date when the action stated by the initial

pleading setting forth the claim for relief filed in state

court was served on the diverse state court defendant,

who then filed notice of removal more than two years

beyond the filing of the original action in state court?

2. Does removal of a case by a diverse defendant under

28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) on grounds of fraudulent joinder

based on the bald and frivolous claim that plaintiff

could not possibly prevail in state court under state

law against non-diverse defendants, unconstitutionally

vet the judicial power in the United States courts

beyond Article III, Section 2 of the United States

Constitution when any alleged pleading deficiencies

could have been readily cured by amendment to the

original state court complaint which had not even once

yet been amended in state court?

3. Is a diversity case removable under 28 U.S.C.

§1446(b) on grounds of alleged fraudulent joinder of

nondiverse parties where the district court found, in

the absence of any discovery and in the face of

comprehensive and detailed countervailing declaration,

that the pro se plaintiff could not possible prevail

against a statute of limitations and res judicata defense

for state law common law fraudulent concealment,

deceit and conspiracy by a _ pharmaceutical

manufacturer and its so-called independent FDA

Rite veut

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3

j

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:

:

10a

advisors who allegedly, for payments from Upjohn of

more than $2,000,000 per year, concealed research

from and misled the Food and Drug Administration to

prevent the timely discovery of the cause of injury and

cause of action by the petitioner - even though the

offered new and independent State resident actions

tolled the statutes of limitations under California law

and the state law conspiracy was only discovered by

the plaintiff less than 6 months before the filing of this

action in state court.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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