Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Medina v. United States
Supreme Court brief1999
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Supreme Cowl, US.
PILED
99 427StP7 09
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term 1999
ANTONIO MEDINA,
PETITIONER,
wi
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RESPONDENT,
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM T. CORNELIUS
2028 BUFFALO TERRACE
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77019
(713) 528-1005
Attorney for the Petitioner
QUESTION PRESENTED
1. WHETHER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT’S
GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS IS VIOLATED WHEN
THE GOVERNMENT BREACHES A PLEA AGREEMENT
BY REFUSING TO RECOMMEND TO THE TRIAL COURT
AT SENTENCING THE LOWER END OF THE
sUIDELINES AS SET OUT IN THE WRITTEN PLEA
AGREEMENT REQUIRING A NEW SENTENCING
HEARING AND REQUIRING THAT THE GOVERNMENT
STRICTLY COMPLY WITH THE PLEA AGREEMENT.
il
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PLAINTIFF- APPELLEE,
y, No. 98-20947
ANTONIO MEDINA
DEFENDANT- APPELLANT
The undersigned counsel of record certifies that the foliowing
listed persons have an interest in the outcome of this case. These
representations are made in order that the judges of this Court may
evaluate possible disqualification or recusal.
1. United States of America
2. Antonio Medina
WILLIAM T. CORNELIUS
Attorney of Record
2028 Buffalo Terrace
Houston, Texas 77019
Telephone: 713-528-1005
***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED...................00.00005. i
CERTIFICATE OF INTERESTED PERSONS........... ii
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........ccccccccccccsccccss iv
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ..................... l
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........................ 2
A. The Proceedings Below....................000005. 2
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EN sinks Ridin ee kee haek nsdescdcenecetscacs 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.............. 4
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iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE AUTHORITY
Case
Hentz v. Hargett, 71 F.3d 1169 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,
517 U.S. 1225, 116 S.Ct. 1858, 134 L.Ed.2d 957
EEE 5 bbcacddseus cotuciadssueesthaende thennsaneuauns
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30
gM EEE CEOFED cccccadocccessocecacccsessannoons
United States v. Alvarado-Saldivar, 62 F.3d 697 (Sth Cir.
United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208 (Sth Cir. 1993)
United States v. Ballis, 28 F.3d 1399 (Sth Cir. 1994) ....
United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160 (Sth Cir.
FOE ND inn ccnsaeneceunessnbghidaakedeendiaes
United States v. Cerverizzo, 74 F.3d 629
Pe, EE cc a cancadous duunieencasessaeaseea aes
United States v. Chagra, 957 F.2d 192
COR GI BID Ske dcnsccSsccencssinsscéétdsxevbansaes
United States v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568
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United States v. Esqueda-Moreno, 56 F.3d 578 (Sth Cir.
Pe sks diencndcdveddacecchonusucennacacduescealian
United States v. Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78 (Sth Cir. 1994)..
United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (Sth Cir. 1995) ......
United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24 (Sth Cir. 1995)......
United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096 (Sth Cir. 1991)..
United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d 568
COUT Ca NOUN sos Gained chanbebendandnacaeatiawe aes
Vv
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770,
123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 115
Sey Beige & EF og), |. rn 4,7
United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364 (Sth Cir. 1996)...... 4
United States, v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758
Coee Giee ROD widen ouddeebas Oda cdned bo candtcunee ee 5
United States v. Wilder, 15 F.3d 1292 (Sth Cir. 1994)... 4
Title 18,
Title 18,
Title 18,
Title 18,
Title 18,
Title 28,
Title 42,
Title 42,
Title 42,
vi
RULES AND STATUTES
Case
United States Code, Section 3742..............
United States Code, Section 2 .................
United States Code, Section 371 ...............
United States Code, Section 545...............
United States Code, Section 542...............
United States Code, Section 1291.............. .
United States Code, Section 7413..............
United States Code, Section 7413(c)(1) ........
United States Code, Section 7671c.............
he, Fo i rrr ry re
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 .............cccseeeeeee
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TERM, 1999
No.
ANTONIO MEDINA,
PETITIONER,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
RESPONDENT,
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Antonio Medina, respectfully petitions for a writ of certiorari to
review the judgment of the United States Court Of Appeals For The
Fifth Circuit in this case.
l
OPINION BELOW
By its unpublished opinion dated June 17, 1999, the United
States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth Circuit affirmed Mr.
Medina’s conviction and sentence for illegal importation of Freon.
No Motion For Rehearing was filed.
JURISDICTION
This was a direct appeal of a sentencing hearing held on October
5, 1998, by the Honorable David Hittner, Judge of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
This United States Court Of Appeals For the Fifth Circuit had
jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1291, Title 28, United States Code,
as an appeal from a judgment of conviction and sentence in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division, and under Section 3742, Title 18, United States
Code, as an appeal of a sentence imposed under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984. Timely notice of appeal was filed by
Defendant-Appellant Antonio Medina on October 15, 1998, and
entered on October 18, 1998, pursuant to Rule 4(b) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
On June 17, 1999, the Fifth Circuit Court Of Appeals, in an
unpublished opinion, affirmed the conviction and sentence. No
Motion For Rehearing was filed.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 United States
Code, Section 1254.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
INVOLVED
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
in pertinent part:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, ... nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ...
2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Proceedings Below
On February 23, 1998, an Indictment was returned against
Defendant-Appellant in the United States District Court For The
Southern District of Texas, At Houston. [Doc. 1].
The indictment originally alleged the following: in Count One,
Conspiracy to unlawfully import a Class I controlled substance, to
import merchandise contrary to law, to receive, buy, sell, or
facilitate the transportation of merchandise knowing it to have been
imported contrary to law, and to introduce imported merchandise
into the United States by fraudulent declaration, in violation of Title
18, United States Code, Section 371; in Count Two, Receiving and
transporting smuggled merchandise, in violation of Title 18, United
States Code, Section 545; in Count Three, Entry of goods by means
of false statements, in violation of Title 18, United States Code,
Section 542; and in Count Four, Violation of requirement and rule
relating to stratospheric ozone protection unlawfully importing a
Class I controlled substance, in violation of Title 42, United States
Code, Section 7413, The Clean Air Act. [Doc. 1].
On July 13, 1998, Defendant-Appellant was re-arraigned and
plead guilty to Count 4 of the Indictment. [Doc. 62 at 18]. A
Presentence Investigation Report was ordered. [Doc. 62 at 19].
Defendant-Appellant was sentenced on October 5, 1998, to 6
months to serve, followed by 2 years supervised release, a fine of
$5,000.00, and 100 hours of community service. [Doc. 54]. Counts
one, two, and three were dismissed. [Doc. 48].
Defendant-Appellant’s timely Notice Of Appeal was received by
the United States Clerk on October 15, 1998, filed on October 15,
1998, and entered on October 18, 1998. [Doc. 58].
B. The Facts
On July 13, 1998, Defendant-Appellant plead guilty to Count 4
of the indictment alleging a knowing violation of the requirement
relating to the Stratospheric Ozone Protection Act under the Clean
Air Act, Title 42, United States Code, Section 7413(c)(1); 7671c;
3
Title 18, United States Code, Section 2; and 40 CFR Section
82.4(b). [Doc. 62 at 18].
The penalty range is imprisonment not to exceed five years
and/or a fine of not to exceed $250,000. [Doc. 62 at 8].
Defendant-Appellant plead guilty with a written plea agreement.
[Doc. 32].
The Assistant United States Attorney stated during the re-
arraignment that the Government would recommend a sentence at
the lower end of the guideline. [Doc. 62 at 14]. In addition, the
written Plea Agreement states,
“The United States further agrees that if the defendant fully cooperates
in providing all information relating to criminal activity known to him,
as set out above, that the United States will recommend a sentence at
the lower end of the Guidelines.” [Doc. 32 at 2].
On October 5, 1998, at the sentencing hearing in this matter, the
Trial Court inquired as to what the Government’s position was at
sentencing and the Assistant United States Attorney stated, “Your
Honor, we are not making a specific recommendation. It is accurate
that Mr. Medina has talked with the authorities here and in New
York.” [Doc. 69 at 3]. The Trial Court, after taking into
consideration the presentence report, [Doc. 69 at 2], which
established a guideline range of 0 to 6 months, [Doc. 44 at 9],
sentenced Defendant-Appellant to six months confinement in
prison, two years supervised release, 100 hours of community
service, and a fine of $5,000. [Doc. 69 at 4].
C. The Appeal
On appeal to the United States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth
Circuit, Mr. Medina argued that the Government breached its plea
bargain agreement by refusing to recommend to the Trial Court at
sentencing the lower end of the Guidelines as set out in the written
plea agreement which required a new sentencing hearing and that
the Government be required to strictly comply with the plea
agreement. The United States Court Of Appeals For The Fifth
Circuit rejected this argument holding that Mr. Medina had not
demonstrated plain error.
4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Fifth Circuit decision presents an issue worthy of this
Court’s review: (1) whether the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of
due process is violated when the Government breaches a plea
agreement by refusing to recommend to the Trial Court at
sentencing the lower end of the Guidelines as set out in the written
plea agreement requiring a new sentencing hearing and requiring
that the Government strictly comply with the plea agreement.
Whether the Government violated the plea agreement is a
question of law hinging upon whether the Government’s conduct is
consistent with the parties’ reasonable understanding of the
agreement and is reviewed de novo. Because this complaint is
raised for the first time on appeal it is reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Price, 95 F.3d 364 (Sth Cir. 1996) (citing United
States v. Esqueda-Moreno, 56 F.3d 578, 580 (Sth Cir. 1995) and
United States v. Wilder, 15 F.3d 1292, 1301 (Sth Cir. 1994)). “The
government’s breach of a plea agreement can constitute plain
error.” /d. at 1301. However, under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b), plain error
‘is only established when the appellant demonstrates the following
factors: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious;
(3) the error affected the substantial rights of the appellant. United
States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-164 (Sth Cir. 1994)(en
banc)(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 730-737, 113
S.Ct. 1770, 1776-79, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)), cert. denied, —
U.S. —, 115 S.Ct. 1266, 131 L.Ed.2d 145 (1995). See also: United
States v. Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78, 80-81 (Sth Cir. 1994).
In this case, clearly the Government has violated the plea
agreement. The Government agreed in writing and stated on the
record that if Defendant-Appellant would plead guilty and fully
cooperate the Government would recommend the lower end of the
Guidelines. A recommendation of the lower end of the Guidelines
in this instance is tantamount to a recommendation of probation,
without confinement. However, when asked for their input, the
Government stated to the Court that they were not making a
specific recommendation, which constitutes clear error. It is
exacerbated by the fact that it sent a message to the Court that
Defendant-Appellant had not fully cooperated.
5
The Trial Court then sentenced Defendant-Appellant to six
months confinement, which, compared to no confinement, surely
affects a substantial right of Defendant- Appellant.
The Plea Agreement plainly states at paragraph 2:“... The United
States further agrees that if the defendant fully cooperates in
providing all information relating to criminal activity known to
him, as set out above, that the United States will recommend a
sentence at the lower end of the Guidelines.” And further at
paragraph 17: “Whether the defendant has breach any provision of
this plea agreement, if contested by the parties, shall be determined
by the Court in an appropriate proceeding during which the
defendant’s disclosures and documentary evidence shall be
admissible and during which the United States shall be required to
establish a breach of the plea agreement by a preponderance of the
evidence.” [Doc. 32].
If the Government’s position at sentencing was that Appellant
had not fulfilled some provision of the plea agreement, the
Government has still breached the agreement by not putting
Appellant on notice and affording Defendant-Appellant an
opportunity to respond.
Defendant-Appellant cites United States v. Moulder, 141 F.3d
568 (Sth Cir. 1998). “Plea bargain agreements are contractual in
nature, and are to be construed accordingly.” Hentz v. Hargett, 71
F.3d 1169, 1173 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1225, 116 S.Ct.
1858, 134 L.Ed.2d 957 (1996); United States v. Ballis, 28 F.3d
1399, 1409 (Sth Cir. 1994) The Court reviews de novo a breach-of-
plea-claim and determines whether the government’s conduct is
consistent with the defendant’s reasonable understanding of the
agreement. United States v. Valencia, 985 F.2d 758, 761 (Sth Cir.
1993).
“The application of contract law to plea agreements is premised
on the ‘notion that the negotiated guilty plea represents a bargained-
for quid pro quo.’ ” United States v. Asset, 990 F.2d 208, 215 (Sth
Cir. 1993)(quoting United States v. Escamilla, 975 F.2d 568, 570
(9th Cir. 1992)).
6
Even in situations were the government bargains with a
defendant to move for a downward departure if a defendant
provides substantial assistance the government can bargain away its
discretion under the terms of a plea agreement, and thereby obligate
itself to give a defendant an opportunity to provide substantial
assistance and then move for a downward departure if, in fact, the
defendant does provide the substantial assistance, depending upon
the wording of the plea agreement. If the plea agreement states the
government “will” recommend the government is so obligated.
United States v. Laday, 56 F.3d 24, 26 & n. 1 (Sth Cir. 1995); and
United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096, 1097-98 (Sth Cir. 1991)
(concluding that if district court determined on remand that
defendant relied on transmittal letter from assistant United States
Attorney stating “I will recommend” departure and offered
substantial assistance or stood ready to do so, government obligated
to move for downward departure).
Defendant-Appellant cites United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791 (Sth
Cir. 1995). If a plea agreement exists, and a plea of guilty has been
in some way induced by a promise, it is essential to the fairness of
the proceeding that the promise be fulfilled. Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971).
This circuit requires the government to strictly comply with the
agreements it makes with defendants. United States v. Chagra, 957
F.2d 192, 194 (Sth Cir. 1992).
Clearly the Government has breached the plea agreement. The
Trial Court’s findings, on the record, that he had no objections to
the presentence report, [Doc. 69 at 2], indicate the Trial Court’s
acquiescence to the guideline total offense level of 4, as reflected
on page 6 of the Presentence Report. [Doc. 44 at 6]. The applicable
guideline provisions for a level of 4 is 0 to 6 months, (Doc. 44 at 9],
not requiring the sentencing court to order a sentence of
confinement at all. Clearly establishing the lower end of the
Guidelines to be supervised release with no confinement.
In the instant case, the Government breached the plea agreement
due to the Government’s refusal to follow the plea agreement and
recommend the lower end of the Guidelines, Defendant-Appellant
was given a six month confinement, the most severe sentence the
ee ee a ee
7
Court could impose, which constitutes plain error and clearly
affects a substantial right of Defendant-Appellant.
Defendant-Appellant contends that Fifth Circuit’s reliance on
United States v. Cerverizzo, 74 F.3d 629 (Sth Cir. 1996) and United
States v. Alvarado-Saldivar, 62 F.3d 697 (5th Cir. 1995), is
misplaced and creates a substantial question to be resolved by the
Supreme Court.
In Cerverizzo, “The government's breach of a plea agreement can
constitute plain error.” Further, the Court “should correct a plain
forfeited error affecting substantial rights if the error “seriously
affect(s) the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial
proceedings’ ”. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct.
1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 115 S.Ct.
1266, 131 L.Ed.2d 145 (1995).
Still further, the facts of the Cerverizzo case are easily
distinguished from the case at bar in that in Cerverizzo the
sentencing court was bound by a statutorily mandated minimum
sentence. Therefore, failure of the government to recommend the
lower 25% of the guideline, and therefore not comply with the plea
agreement, did not affect a substantial right of Cerverizzo, thus the
error was not plain error. However, the case at bar does not have a
statutorily mandated minimum, the lower end of the guideline was
clearly probation and Defendant-Appellant received incarceration,
obviously affecting a substantial right of Defendant-Appellant.
Additionally, the Court Of Appeals has erroneously shifted the
burden of establishing whether Defendant-Appellant complied with
the plea agreement on Defendant-Appellant, when the agreement
itself clearly states at paragraph 17, of the plea agreement:
“Whether the defendant has breached any provision of this plea
agreement, if contested by the parties, shall be determined by the
Court in an appropriate proceeding during which the defendant’s
disclosures and documentary evidence shall be admissible and
during which the United States shall be required to establish a
breach of the plea agreement by a preponderance of the evidence.”
(Emphasis added). If the Government intended not to honor the
plea agreement, it was up to the Government to allege and prove at
the district court that Defendant-Appellant breached the plea
8
agreci: at, however, this was raised for the first time by the
Government during the appeal process.
Defendant-Appellant contends this issue is clearly established by
the record in this case, both in the plea agreement itself and the
transcript of the proceedings, and the responsibility to raise the
issue creates a substantial question to be determined by the
Supreme Court. United States v. Hernandez, 17 F.3d 78 (Sth Cir.
1994).
Once again, if a plea agreement exists, and a plea of guilty has
been in some way induced by a promise, it is essential to the
fairness of the proceeding that the promise be fulfilled. Santobello
v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427
(1971).
ae
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
ANTONIO MEDINA
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
Je a
BY: tthe... 4
WILLIAM T.CORNELIUS
2028 BUFFALO TERRACE
HOUSTON, TEXAS 77019
(713) 528-1005
A-1
APPENDIX
A-2
TABLE OF CONTENTS TO APPENDIX
Opinion, United States Court Of Appeals, For The Fifth
COBO 2 oc cccccascescsenssesegeavedbadsesasseunaenaee A-3
POGUES occ cccuscccvcdssosascadundageansabaaeuaanee A-4
Rearraignment Proceedings.................2.eceeeeeees A-14
FUOR AGTOOMNGEE oc cciccccuccessudadeseeetedhanuaeaeanne A-18
Presentence Investigation Report ................0s.040. A-31
SOMMGRGENG TEMMENG oc cccccccscsecossenscsensdennseaeane A-45
A-3
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-20948
Conference Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ANTONIO MEDINA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
USDC No. H-98-CR-61-2
Before EMILIO M. GARZA, BENAVIDES, and PARKER,
Circuit Judges, PER CURIAM:*
Antonia Medina appeals from his conviction by guilty plea of
illegal importation of Freon. Medina contends that the Government
breached his plea agreement by failing to recommend sentencing at
the low end of the guideline range.
Medina did not raise his contention in the district court; his
contention is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Cerverizzo,
74 F.3d 629, 631 (Sth Cir. 1996). Whether Medina provided the
cooperation necessary to obtain the Government’s recommendation
is a factual issue that could have been resolved by the district court
upon proper objection; Medina therefore cannot demonstrate plain
error. United States v. Alvarado-Saldivar, 62 F.3d 697, 700 (Sth
Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED.
* Pursuant to STH CiR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set
forth in STH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
A-4
Gnited States District Court
Southern District of Texas
Holding Session in Houston
JUDGMENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA er Gtmnes Commins Gh or Ai event 1, 1057)
Vv. Case Number: 4:98CR00061-002
ANTONIO G. MEDINA Chester Rene Gonzales
Detendani s Attorney
C) See Additional Aliases — Sheet
THE DEFENDANT:
&) pleaded guilty to count(s) 4.0n July 13, 1998
(C) pleaded nolo contendere to count(s) which
was accepted by the court.
C) was found guilty on count(s) after a plea of not guilty.
Date
Offense Count
Title & Section Nature of Offense Concluded Number(s)
42 U.S.C. Unlawful importation of Class | 06/09/1995 4
§ 7413(c)(1) controlled substance, aiding and
and 767 1c abetting, in violation of
Stratospheric Ozone Protection
[40 CFR §82.4(b))
C) See Additional Counts of Conviction - Sheet
The defendant is sentenced as provided in pages 2 through 6 of this
judgment. The sentence is imposed pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984.
(J The defendant has been found not guilty on count(s)
) Count(s) All comanne are dismissed on the
motion of the United States.
IT iS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall notify the United
States Attorney for this district within 30 days of any change of name,
residence, or mailing address until all fines, restitution, costs, and special
assessments imposed by this judgment are fully paid.
Detendant’s Social Security No.: 636-09-0433 October 5, 1998
Defendant's Date of Birth: TOWOVTSST — Date of Imposition of Judgment
Defendant's USM No.: 77676010 —~S*
Detendant’s Residence Address:
1895 West San Marcelo /s/ David Hittner
Brownsville TX 76521
s Address: DAVID HITTNER
1895 West San Marcelo UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 5594
T
Brownsville TX 7e5o1
tsi Oct 9, 1998
Date
4:98cr61 #55 Page 1/7
A-5
DEFENDANT: ANTONIO G. MEDINA Judgment —- Page 2 of 6
CASE NUMBER: 4:98CR00061-002 :
IMPRISONMENT
The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the
United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a total
term of 6 month(s).
The term consists of SIX (6) MONTHS as to Count 4.
L] See Additional Imprisonment Terms — Sheet
CJ The Court makes the following recommendations to the
Bureau of Prisons:
C] The defendant is remanded to the custody of the United
States Marshal.
[X] The defendant shall surrender to the United States
Marshal for this district:
OC) on
[X] as notified by the United States Marshal.
|] The defendant shall surrender for service of sentence at
the institution designated by the Bureau of Prisons:
LJ by 2 p.m. on
L) as notified by the United States Marshal.
L} as notified by the Probation or Pretrial Services Office.
RETURN
| have executed this judgment as follows:
Defendant delivered on to at with a
certified copy of this judgment.
UNITED STATES MARSHAL
By
Deputy U.S. Marshal
4:98cr61 #55 Page 2/7
A-6
DEFENDANT: ANTONIO G. MEDINA Judgment - Page 3 of 6
CASE NUMBER: 4:98CR00061-002
SUPERVISED RELEASE
Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be on
supervised release for a term of _2 year(s).
The term consists of TWO (2) YEARS as to Count 4.
C) See Additional Supervised Release Terms — Sheet
The defendant shall report to the probation office in the district to
which the defendant is released within 72 hours of release from the
custody of the Bureau of Prisons.
The defendant shall not commit another federal, state, or local
crime.
The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlled substance.
For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994:
The defendant shall refrain from any unlawful use of a controlled
substance. The defendant shall submit to one drug test within 15
days of release from imprisonment and at least two periodic drug
tests thereafter, as directed by the probation officer.
L) The above drug testing condition is suspended based on the
court’s determination that the defendant poses a low risk of
future substance abuse. (Check, if applicable)
[X] The defendant shall not possess a firearm as defined in 18
U.S.C. §921. (Check, if applicable) —
If this judgment imposes a fine or a restitution obligation, it shall
be a condition of supervised release that the defendant pay any
such fine or restitution that remains unpaid at the commencement of
the term of supervised release in accordance with the Schedule of
Payments set forth in the Criminal Monetary Penalties sheet of this
judgment.
The defendant shall comply with the standard conditions that
have been adopted by this court (set forth below). The defendant
shall also comply with the additional conditions on the attached
page.
[X] See Special Conditions of Supervision — Sheet 3.01
STANDARD CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
1) the defendant shall not leave the judicial district without the
permission of the Court or probation officer;
2) the defendant shall report to the probation officer and shall
submit a truthful and complete written report within the first
five days of each month;
were Se
A-7
3) the defendant shall answer truthfully all inquiries by the
probation officer and follow the instructions of the probation
Officer;
4) the defendant shall support his or her dependents and meet
other family responsibilities;
5) the defendant shall work regularly at a lawful occupation
unless excused by the probation officer for schooling,
training, or other acceptable reasons;
6) the defendant shall notify the probation officer ten days prior
to any change in residence or employment;
7) the defendant shall refrain from excessive use of alcohol:
8) the defendant shall not frequent places where controlled
substances are illegally sold, used, distributed, or
administered;
9) the defendant shall not associate with any persons engaged
in criminal activity, and shall not associate with any person
convicted of a felony unless granted permission to do so by
the probation officer;
10) the defendant shall permit a probation officer to visit him or
her at any time at home or elsewhere and shall permit
confiscation of any contraband observed in plain view of the
probation officer;
11) the defendant shall notify the probation officer within seventy-
two hours of being arrested or questioned by a law
enforcement officer;
12) the defendant shall not enter into any agreement to act as an
informer or a special agent of a law enforcement agency
without the permission of the Court;
13) as directed by the probation officer, the defendant shall notify
third parties of risks that may be occasioned by the
defendant's criminal record or personal history or
characteristics, and shall permit the probation officer to make
such notifications and to confirm the defendant’s compliance
with such notification requirement;
14) if restitution has been ordered, the defendant shall make
restitution as ordered by the Court and in accordance with the
applicable provisions of Title 18 U.S.C. §2248, 2259, 2264,
2327, 3663, 3663A, and/or 3664. The defendant shall also
pay the assessment imposed in accordance with the Title 18
U.S.C. §3013;
15) the defendant shall notify the U.S. Probation Office of any
material change in the defendant’s economic circumstances
that might affect the defendant's ability to pay restitution,
fines, or special assessments.
4:98cr61 #55 Page 3/7
A-8
DEFENDANT: ANTONIO G. MEDINA
CASE NUMBER: 4:98CR00061-002
SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION
lf deported, the defendant is not to re-enter the United
States illegally. If the defendant is deported during the period
of probation or the supervised release term, supervision by
the probation office becomes inactive. If the defendant
returns, the defendant shall report to the nearest U.S.
Probation Office immediately. Supervision by the probation
office reactivates automatically upon the defendant reporting.
The defendant is required to perform 100 hours of
community service as approved by the probation officer to be
completed during the first six months of the supervised
release term.
Judgment — 3.01
4:98cr61 #55 Page 4/7
A-9
DEFENDANT: ANTONIO G. MEDINA Judgment - Page 4 of 6
CASE NUMBER: 4:98CR00061-002
CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES
The defendant shall pay the following total criminal monetary
penalties in accordance with the schedule of payments set forth on
Sheet 5, Part B.
Assessment Fine Restitution
Totals: $50.00 $5,000.00
C) If applicable, restitution amount ordered
pursuant to plea agreement ............
C) See Additional Terms for Criminal Monetary Penalties - Sheet
FINE
C) The above fine includes costs of incarceration and/or supervision in
the amount of $0.00
The defendant shall pay interest on any fine of more than $2,500,
unless the fine is paid in full before the fifteenth day after the date of
judgment, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f). All of the payment options
on Sheet 5, Part B may be subject to penalties for default and
delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(g).
CJ The Court determined that the defendant does not have the ability to
pay interest and it is ordered that:
C) The interest requirement is waived.
C) The interest requirement is modified as follows:
RESTITUTION
() The determination of restitution is deferred until . An
Amended Judgment in a Criminal Case will be entered after such
determination.
CJ The defendant shall make restitution to the following payees in the
amounts listed below.
If the defendant makes a partial payment, each payee shall receive
an approximately proportional payment unless specified otherwise in
the priority order or percentage payment column below.
Priority Order or
“Total Amount of Percentage of
Name of Payee Amount ofLoss Restitution Ordered Payment
Totals: $0.00 $0.00
(1) See Additional Victims
** Findings for the total amount of losses are required under Chapter’s 109A, 110, 110A, and
113A of Title 18 for offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994, but before April 23,
1996.
4:98cr61 #55 Page 5/7
A-10
DEFENDANT: ANTONIO G. MEDINA Judgment - Page 5 of 6
CASE NUMBER: 4:98CRO00061-002
SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS
Payments shall be applied in the following order: (1) assessment:
(2) restitution; (3) fine principal; (4) cost of prosecution; (5) interest;
(6) penalties.
Payment of total fine and other criminal monetary penalties shall
be due as follows:
A ( in full immediately; or
B [xX] $5,050.00 immediately, balance due (in accordance with C, D,
or E); or
C LJ not later than ; or
D LJ in installments to commence _____ day(s)
In the event the entire amount of criminal monetary penalties
imposed is not paid prior to the commencement of supervision,
the U.S. probation officer shall pursue collection of the amount
due, and shall request the court to establish a payment
schedule if appropriate; or
E (J in (e.g. equal, weekly, monthly, quarterly)
installments of over a period of ____ years(s)
to commence _____ day(s) after the date of this judgment.
The defendant will receive credit for all payments previously made
toward any criminal monetary penalties imposed.
Special instructions regarding the payment of criminal monetary
penalties:
Make all payments payable to: U.S. District Clerk, Attn:
Finance, P.O. Box 61010, Houston, TX 77208.
L) Joint and Several
Case Number Joint and Several
(Including Defendant No.) Defendant Name Amount
LJ} The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.
(_] See additional Joint & Several Defendants
CJ The defendant shall pay the following court cost(s):
|} The defendant shall forfet the defendant's interest in the
following property to the United States:
_] See Additional Forfeited Property - Sheet
A-11
Unless the court has expressly ordered otherwise in the special
instructions above, if this judgment imposes a period of
imprisonment, payment of criminal monetary penalties shall be due
during the period of imprisonment. All criminal monetary penalty
payments, except those payments made through the Bureau of
Prison’s Inmate Financial Responsibility Program, are to be made
as directec by the Court, the probation officer, or the United States
Attorney.
4:98cr61 #55 Page 6/7
A-12
DEFENDANT: ANTONIO G. MEDINA Judgment — Page 6 of 6
CASE NUMBER: 4:98CR00061-002
STATEMENT OF REASONS
[x] The Court adopts the factual findings and guideline application in
the present report.
OR
LJ The Court adopts the factual findings and guideline application in
the presentence report except:
C] See Additional Findings and Guideline Application Exceptions - Sheet
Guideline Range Determined by the Court:
Total Offense Level: 4
Criminal History Category: 1_
Imprisonment Range: 0 to 6 months.
Supervised Release Range: 2 to 3 years.
Fine Range: $250.00 to $5,000.00
LJ Fine waived or below the guideline range because of inability to
pay.
Total Amouni of Restitution:
L] Restitution is not ordered because the complication and
prolongation of the sentencing process resulting from the
fashioning of a restitution order outweighs the need to provide
restitution to any victims, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3663(d).
L] For offenses committed on or after September 13, 1994 but
before April 23, 1996 that require the total amount of loss to be
Stated, pursuant to Chapters 109A, 110, 110A, 113A of
Title 18, restitution is not ordered because the economic
circumstances of the defendant do not allow for the payment of
any amount of a restitution order, and do not allow for the
payment of any or some portion of a restitution order in the
forseeable future under any reasonable schedule of payments.
(J Partial or no restitution is ordered for the following reason(s):
{X] The sentence is within the guideline range, that range does not
exceed 24 months, and the court finds no reason to depart
from the sentence called for by the application of the
guidelines.
OR
L] The sentence is within the guideline range, that range exceeds
24 months, and the sentence is imposed for the following
reason(s):
(_] See Additional Reasons for Point Within Range - Sheet
A-13
OR
CJ) The Sentence departs from the guideline range:
CJ upon motion of the government, as a result of defendant's
substantial assistance.
(J for the following specific reason(s):
(_) See Additional Reasons For Departure From The Guideline Range - Sheet
4:98cr61 #55 Page 7/7
A-14
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) CR NO. H-98-61
) Houston, Texas
vs. )
ERNESTO MEDINA, ANTONIO MEDINA, ) July 13, 1998
MEDINA FORWARDING CORPORATION) 9:30 a.m.
REARRAIGNMENT PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID HITTNER
APPEARANCES:
FOR THE UNITED STATES: Mr. Gordon Speights Young
Assistant U.S. Attorney
910 Travis, Suite 1500
Houston, Texas 77002
FOR THE DEFENDANT ERNESTO MEDINA
Mr. Luis Saenz
117 East Price Road
Brownsville, Texas 78521
FOR THE DEFENDANT ANTONIO MEDINA AND MEDINA
FORWARDING:
Mr. Chester R. Gonzales
117 East Price Road
Brownsville, Texas 78521
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: Joyce K. Schaefer
515 Rusk, Suite 8102
Houston, TX. 77002
OFFICIAL COURT INTERPRETER PRESENT
PROCEEDINGS RECORDED BY MECHANICAL
STENOGRAPHY,
PRODUCED BY COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION
JOYCE K. SCHAEFER - (713) 250-5595
>
-
A-15
MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor, they have been.
THE COURT: All right, As you are not citizens of the United
States, do you understand that a felony conviction may lead to your
deportation or exclusion from this country?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Has any plea agreement been entered into
between the parties?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: What is it, first? All I want to know now is what
does the plea agreement provide for the defendants’ rights to
appeal?
MR. YOUNG: Waiving their rights to appeal, Your Honor.
THE COURT: On all grounds?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right, Under what section are we proceeding?
11(e)(1) what?
MR. YOUNG: (B).
THE COURT: (B). All right. Under the Sentencing Reform Act,
the United States Sentencing Commission has issued guidelines for
judges to follow in determining the sentence in a criminal case.
Have you and your attorney talked about how these guidelines
might apply to your case?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you understand that the Court will not be able
to determine the guideline sentence in your case until after a
presentence report has been completed and you and your attorney
have had an opportunity to challenge the facts reported by the
Probation Officer?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
JOYCE K. SCHAEFER - (713) 250-5585
A-16
THE COURT: Do you also understand that, after it has been
determined what guideline applies in a case, I have the authority in
some circumstances to impose a sentence that is more severe or less
severe that the sentence called for by the guidelines?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you also understand that under some
circumstances, ordinarily you or the government may have the right
to appeal any sentence that a Court imposes, except in this case
each of you individually and corporately have waived the right to
appeal? Do you understand that?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Do you understand that parole has been
abolished in the federal system and, if you are sentenced to federal
prison, you will not be released on parole?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Please state for the record, then, the
terms of the full plea agreement.
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, the United States has agreed that, if
the defendants cooperate fully in further investigation, the United
States will dismiss counts 1, 2 and 3 and recommend an appropriate
sentence at the lower end of the guidelines. The defendants have
agreed, in addition to waiving their rights to apeal and to plead
guilty to count 4, to waive any right that they may have acquired
under the Hyde Amendment.
THE COURT: Okay. Are these the terms of the plea agreement
with the government as you understand them?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Has anyone made any other or different promise
to you of any kind such as possible leniency or an offer of
probation in order to get you to plead guilty in this case?
JOYCE K. SCHAEFER - (713) 250-5585
A-17
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: No, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. The Court is considering your plea
agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1(e)°1)(B).
Do you understand that I may accept or reject the plea agreement as
proposed to the Court?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Do you also understand that if I accept your plea
of guilty today but reject the plea agreement that the parties have
brought before the Court, you will, none the less, not be permitted
to withdraw your plea of guilty?
Also, do you understand that the government’s recommendation
or your request for a particular sentence is not binding on me and I
am free to assess any punishment within the limits prescribed by
law as I described them earlier?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Very well. Are you now ready to enter a
plea to count 4 of the charges pending against you?
MR. ERNESTO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
MR. ANTONIO MEDINA: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Let me ask each of the counsel: Do you
know any reason why your client should not plead guilty?
MR. SAENZ: No, Your Honor.
JOYCE K. SCHAEFER - (713) 250-5585
A-18
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA _)
)
vs. ) CRIMINAL NO. H-98-61-02
)
ANTONIO MEDINA )
PLEA AGREEMENT
COMES NOW the United States of America, by and
through its attorneys James DeAtley, United States Attorney
for the Southern District of Texas and GORDON SPEIGHTS
YOUNG, Assistant United States Attorney, and the defendant,
ANTONIO MEDINA, and the defendant's counsel, pursuant to
Rule 11(e)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
and state that they have entered into an agreement, the terms
and conditions of which are as follows:
1. The defendant, ANTONIO MEDINA, agrees to plead
guilty to Count Four of the indictment in this case. Count Four
charges the defendant with a violation of a requirement
relating to Stratospheric Ozone Protection under the Clean Air
Act, in violation of 42 USC §7413(c)(1), 7671c; 18 USC §2; 40
CFR §82.4(b).
The defendant further agrees to cooperate fully with the
United States and to provide all information relating to any
criminal activity know to the defendant, including but not
limited to the offenses charged in this case. The defendant
understands that such information may be provided to any
state, local or federal law enforcement agency. In that regard:
a. The defendant agrees to testify as a witness before any
grand jury as may be requested by the United States, and at
any other judicial proceedings when called upon to do so.
4:98cr61 #35 Page 1/13
A-19
b. The defendant agrees to be reasonably available for
interviews and conferences as the United States may request.
c. The defendant agrees to provide truthful, complete and
accurate information and testimony.
d. The defendant agrees to provide all documents,
records, writings or tangible objects or materials of any kind in
the defendant’s possession or under his custody or control
relating directly or indirectly to all areas of inquiry and
investigation.
2. As part of this agreement, the United States agrees to
dismiss Counts One, Two, and Three at time of sentencing.
The United States further agrees that if the defendant fully
cooperates in providing all information relating to criminal
activity known to him, as set out above, that the United States
will recommend a sentence at the lower end of the
Guidelines. The United States further stipulates that the
defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor in the criminal activity, and that the relevant
conduct of the defendant did not involve the failure to pay any
Customs tax, that it did not involve any required permit, and
that there was no release of the pollutant.
3. The penalty for each violation of Title 42, United States
Code, Sections 7413(c)(1) and 7671c, is a maximum term of
imprisonment of 5 years, and a fine of $250,000; and a
possible period of supervised release not to exceed three
years. The defendant also acknowledges and understands
that if he should violate the conditions of any period of
supervised release which may be imposed as part of his
sentence, then the Defendant may be
4:98cr61 #35 Page 2/13
A-20
imprisoned for the entire term of supervised release without
credit for time already served on the term of supervised
release prior to such violation. The defendant cannot be
placed on probation or have the imposition or execution of the
sentence suspended. Further, the defendant is not eligible for
parole.
4. Prior to or at the time of sentencing, the defendant will
pay to the United States Department of Justice a special
assessment in the amount of one hundred dollars ($100.00)
per count of conviction, as required in Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3013(a)(2)(A). The payment will be by certified
check payable to Department of Justice, c/o U.S. Attorney’s
Office. P.O. Box 61129, Houston, Texas 77208.
5. The defendant understands that the Court is permitted,
pursuant to Section 5E1.2(i) of the Sentencing Guidelines and
Policy Statements, to order the defendant to pay a fine that is
sufficient to reimburse the government for the costs of any
imprisonment, term of supervised release and probation, if
any are ordered.
6. The defendant agrees that any fine or restitution
imposed by the Court will be due and payable immediately.
7. The defendant agrees to file a sworn financial affidavit
that any fine or restitution imposed by the Court will be due
and payable immediately. The defendant also agrees not to
attempt to avoid paying any fine or restitution imposed by the
Court through any proceeding pursuant to the United States
Bankruptcy Code. The defendant hereby waives all rights, if
any, to obtain discharge or to delay payment of any fine or
restitution obligation or alter the
4:98cr61 #35 Page 3/13
A-21
time for payment by filing a petition pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Code. The defendant hereby stipulates that
enforcement of any fine or restitution obligation by the United
States or a victim is not barred or affected by the automatic
stay provisions of the United States Bankruptcy Code (Title
11, United States Code, Section 362), and that enforcement
of any fine or restitution obligation by the United States is a
valid exercise of its police or regulatory power within the
meaning of Title 11, United States Code, Section 362(b). The
defendant hereby stipulates and agrees not to institute or
participate in any proceeding to interfere with, alter, or bar
enforcement of any fine or restitution obligation pursuant to
the automatic stay or other provision of the Bankruptcy Code
in any case filed by the defendant or the defendant's
creditors. Upon request of the United States or the victim, the
defendant will execute an order or stipulation granting the
United States or the victim relief from the automatic stay or
other Bankruptcy Code provisions in order to enforce any fine
or restitution obligation. The defendant hereby stipulates that
any fine or restitution obligation imposed by the Court is not
dischargeable in any case commenced by the defendant or
the defendant's creditors pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.
The defendant's waivers and stipulations or agreements set
forth above are made in exchange for the United States’
concessions set forth in this plea agreement.
8. The defendant understands that the sentence to be
imposed is within the discretion of the sentencing judge. If the
Court should impose any sentence up to the maximum
established by statute, the defendant cannot, for that reason
alone, withdraw a
4:98cr61 #35 Page 4/13
A-22
guilty plea and will remain bound to fulfill all of the obligations
under this plea agreement.
9. The defendant is aware that the defendant’s sentence
will be imposed in accordance with the Sentencing Guidelines
and policy Statements. The defendant nonetheless
acknowledges and agrees that the Court has jurisdiction and
authority to impose any sentence within the statutory
maximum set for the offense(s) to which the defendant pleads
guilty. The defendant is aware that Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3742 affords a defendant the right to appeal
the sentence imposed. Knowing that, the defendant waives
the right to appeal the sentence (or the manner in which it was
determined) on the grounds set forth in Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3742 or on any ground whatever. This
agreement does not affect the rights or obligations of the
United States as set forth in Title 18, United States Code,
Section 3742(b).
10. In agreeing to this waiver, the defendant is aware that
a sentence has not yet been determined by the Court. The
defendant is also aware that any estimate or the probable
sentencing range under the sentencing guidelines that the
defendant may have received from the defendant's counsel,
the United States or the Probation Office, is a prediction, not a
promise, and is not binding on-the United States, the
Probation Office or the Court. The United States does not
make any promise or representation concerning what
sentence the defendant will receive. Realizing the uncertainty
in estimating what sentence the defendant will ultimately
receive, the defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal
the sentence in exchange for the concessions made by the
United States in this plea agreement.
4:98cr61 #35 Page 5/13
A-23
11. The United States reserves the right to carry cut its
responsibilities under guidelines sentencing. Specifically, the
United States reserves the right: (a) to bring its version of the
facts of this case including its file and any investigative files to
the attention of the Probation Office in connection with that
Office’s preparation of a presentence report; (b) to dispute
sentencing factors or facts material to sentencing; (c) to seek
resolution of such factors or facts in conference with
defendant's counsel and the Probation Office and (d) to file a
pleading relating to these issues, in accordance with Section
6A1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements.
12. The United States agrees that it will not further
criminally prosecute defendant in the Southern District of
Texas for offenses arising from conduct charged in the
indictment. This plea agreement binds only the United States
Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas and the
defendant; it does not bind any other United States Attorney.
The United States will bring this plea agreement and the full
extent of the defendant’s cooperation to the attention of other
prosecuting offices if requested.
13. The defendant agrees that the position of the United
States in its decision to charge him, or to pursue any charge
against him, is neither vexatious, frivolous, nor in bad faith. In
accord with this agreement, the defendant waives all rights he
has or may acquire under the “Hyde Amendment” to the
Department of Justice’s Appropriation Bill (H.R. 2267) for
fiscal year 1998,
4:98cr61 #35 Page 6/13
A-24
including any implementing regulation or rule (collectively
referred to as the “Hyde Amendment’), to recovery of
attorney’s fees, and other litigation expenses related to any
investigation or prosecution of the counts in the Indictment,
and to any transactions or conduct related to, arising from, or
associated with those counts. The defendant agrees that he
will not file any motion, request, or other cause of action, nor
will he request, authorize, or allow any other person to file or
make any such motion, request, or other cause of action on
his behalf.
14. The defendant represents to the Court that defendant
is satisfied that his attorney has rendered effective assistance.
Defendant understands that by entering into this Agreement,
he surrenders certain rights as provided in this Agreement.
Defendant understands that the rights of defendants include
the following:
a. If the defendant persisted in a plea of not guilty to the
charges, defendant would have the right to a speedy jury trial
with the assistance of counsel. The trial may be conducted by
a judge sitting without a jury if the defendant, the United
States and the court all agree.
b. At a trial, the United States would be required to
present its witnesses and other evidence against the
defendant. The defendant would be able to confront those
witnesses and his attorney would be able to cross-examine
them. In turn, the defendant could, but would not be required
to, present witnesses and other evidence of his own behalf. If
the witnesses for the defendant would not appear voluntarily,
he could require their attendance through the subpoena
power of the Court.
4:98cr61 #35 Page 7/13
A-25
e. At a trial, the defendant could rely on a privilege
against self-incrimination and decline to testify, and no
inference of guilt could be drawn from such refusal to testify.
However, if the defendant desired to do so, he could testify on
his owr? behalf.
15. The defendant understands that nothing in this plea
agreement, however, will restrict access by the Probation
Office or the Court to information and records in the
possession of the United States, including that obtained from
the defendant.
16. If the defendant should fail in any way to fulfill
completely all of the obligations under this plea agreement,
the United States will be released from its obligations under
the plea agreement. Thus, for example, if at any time the
defendant retains, conceals or disposes of assets in violation
of this plea agreement; or if the defendant knowingly
withholds evidence, or otherwise is not completely truthful
with the United States, an officer of the United States, any law
enforcement officer, or in testimony before the grand jury or at
trial; or if the defendant knowingly gives false information to
the United States relating to another's participation in criminal
activity, then:
a. The defendant may be prosecuted for perjury, false
declaration, false statement, and/or obstruction of justice or
any other offenses that may have been committed;
b. Any information and documents that have been
disclosed by the defendant, whether prior to or subsequent to
this plea agreement, and all leads derived therefrom will be
used against the defendant in any prosecution;
c. The United States will be permitted to recommend to
4:98cr61 #35 Page 8/13
A-26
the Court any sentence it considers appropriate, up to and
including the maximum possible sentence.
17. Whether the defendant has breached any provision of
this plea agreement, if contested by the parties, shall be
determined by the Court in an appropriate proceeding during
which the defendant’s disclosures and documentary evidence
shall be admissible and during which the United States shall
be required to establish a breach of the plea agreement by a
preponderance of the evidence. The provisions of this
paragraph do not apply, however, to the United States’
decision whether to file a motion based on “substantial
assistance” as the phrase is used iin Rule 35(b) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 5K1.1 of the
Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements. The defendant
agrees that the decision whether to file such a motion rests
within the sole discretion of the United States.
18. The defendant agrees as part of this plea agreement
to join in any motion brought by the United States under
Rule 6(e)(3)(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
disclose grand jury material to the Internal Revenue Service
for use is computing and collecting the defendant's taxes,
interest and penalties, and to the civil and forfeiture sections
of the United States Attorney’s Office for use in identifying
assets and collecting fines and restitution.
19. The defendant also understands that he must file tax
returns and pay taxes on any income derived directly or
indirectly from the offenses charged in the indictment/
information.
20. The defendant also agrees to make all books, records
and
4:98cr61 #35 Page 9/13
A-27
documents available to the Internal Revenue Service for use
in computing defendant's taxes, interest and penalties for the
years 1995.
21. This written agreement constitutes the complete plea
agreement between the United States, the defendant, and the
defendant's counsel. No promises or representations have
been made by the United States except as set forth in writing
in this plea agreement. The defendant acknowledges that no
threats have been made against the defendant and that the
defendant is pleading guilty freely and voluntarily because the
defendant is guilty. Any modification of this plea agreement
shall be valid only as set forth in writing in a supplemental or
revised plea agreement signed by all parties.
/s/ Antonio Medina
ANTONIO MEDINA
Defendant
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME On this 13th
day of July, 1998.
Michael N. Milby, Clerk
By: /s/
Deputy Clerk
4:98cr61 #35 Page 10/13
A-28
APPROVED:
/s/ Gordon M. Speights Young
GORDON M. SPEIGHTS YOUNG
Assistant United States Attorney
/s/ Chester Gonzalez
CHESTER GONZALEZ
Counsel for Defendant
/s/ Antonio Medina
ANTONIO MEDINA
Defendant
4:98cr61 #35 Page 11/13
_ A-29
| have consulted with my counsel and fully understand all
my rights with respect to the Indictment pending against me.
Further, | have consulted with my attorney and fully
understand my rights with respect to the provisions of the
Sentencing Guidelines and Policy Statements which may
apply in my case. | have read this plea agreement and
carefully reviewed every part of it with my attorney. |
understand this agreement and | voluntarily agree to it.
Date: 7/13/98 /s/ Antonio Medina
ANTONIO MEDINA
Defendant
4:98cr61 #35 Page 12/13
A-30
| have fully explained to the defendant, his rights with
respect to the pending indictment. Further, | have reviewed
the provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines and Policy
Statements and | have fully explained to the defendant the
provisions of those Guidelines which may apply in this case. |
have carefully reviewed every part of this plea agreement with
the defendant. To my knowledge, the defendant's decision to
enter into this agreement is an informed and voluntary one.
Date: 7/13/98 /s/ Chester Gonzalez
CHESTER GONZALEZ
Counsel for Defendant
4:98cr61 #35 Page 13/13
A-31
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )
) PRESENTENCE
vs. ) INVESTIGATION REPORT
) Docket No. 4:98CR00061-002
ANTONIO G. MEDINA )
Prepared For: The Honorable David Hittner
United States District Judge
Prepared By: Erma B. Navarro
United States Probation Officer
Houston, Texas
(713) 250-5292
Lisa Reed
Sr. United States Probation Officer
Lead Writer
Assistant U.S. Attorney Defense Counsel
Gordon Speights Young Chester Rene Gonzales
P.O. Box 61129 117 E. Price Road
Houston, Texas 77208 Brownsville, Texas 78521
(713) 567-9350 (956) 550-9550
Sentence Date: October 5, 1998, at 9:30 a.m.
Offense: Count 4: Clean Air Act, violation of requirement and rule
relating to stratospheric ozone protection by
unlawfully importing into the United States a Class I
controlled substance, aiding and abetting, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1) and 7671c:
18 U.S.C. § 2; and 40 CFR § 82.4(b).
Up to 5 years imprisonment, $250,000 fine, up to
3 years supervised release, and $50 special
assessment. (Class D Felony).
Release Status: Arrested on February 24, 1998, and was released on a
$100,000 property surety bond.
Detainers: None.
Codefendants: Emesto Medina 4:98CR00061-001
Medina Forwarding Corporation 4:98CR0006 1-003
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Date Report Prepared: September 4, 1998
Date Report Revised:
Related Cases: None.
Identifying Data:
Date of Birth: October 3, 1951
Age: 46
Race: White/Hispanic
Sex: Male
SSN No: 636-09-0433
FBI No: 234037HB1
USM No: 77876-079
Other ID No:
Education: College Graduate/CPA
Dependents: 2
Citizenship: Mexico
Legal Address: 1895 West San Marcelo
Brownsville, Texas 78521
Aliases: Antonio Gerardo Medina Flores
Antonio G. Flores
Tono
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PART A. THE OFFENSE
Charge(s) and Conviction(s)
1. On February 23, 1998, a four count indictment was filed in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
Houston Division, charging two individual defendants and a
corporation with conspiracy to violate the laws of the United
States, receiving and transporting smuggled merchandise,
entry of goods into the United States by means of false
Statements, and violation of the Clean Air Act requirements
and rules relating to stratospheric ozone protection by
unlawfully importing a Class I controlled substance. Emesto
Medina, Antonio Medina, and Medina Forwarding
Corporation are charged in each of the four counts.
2. Antonio Medina was arrested in Brownsville, Texas, on
February 24, 1998. He made his initial appearance before
United States Magistrate Judge Fidencio Garza, Jr., and bond
was set in the amount of $100,000 cash surety. The bond was
filed the following day.
3. On July 13, 1998, Antonio Medina appeared with counsel
before United States District Judge David Hittner and entered
a plea of guilty to Count 4. This plea was entered pursuant to a
Rule 11(e)(1)(B) Plea Agreement, wherein the Government
agrees to dismiss the remaining counts at the time of
sentencing. The defendant agrees to cooperate fully with the
Government. The Government agrees to recommend a
sentence at the lower end of the Guidelines and stipulates that
the defendant was not an organizer, leader, manager, or
supervisor in the criminal activity. The Government also
stipulates that the relevant conduct of the defendant did not
involve the failure to pay any Customs tax, that it did not
involve any required permit, and that there was no release of
the pollutant. The defendant knowingly waives the right to
appeal the sentence or the manner in which it is determined. A
presentence report was ordered and sentencing is scheduled for
October 5, 1998, at 9:30 a.m.
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The Offense Conduct
. Information for this section of the report was obtained through
review of the investigative files of the United States
Attorney’s Office, United States Customs Service (USCS),
United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and
through interviews with USCS special agent Edward Tarver.
. This offense involves receiving, transporting and mishandling
smuggled merchandise. To better illustrate the facts of the
case, the following background information is provided. An
international treaty (the Montreal Protocol) outlawed the
production of dichlorodifluoromethane, also referred to as R-
12, CFC-12, and Freon (brand name); and production was to
be phased out over a period of years. Certain countries were
given a longer time to cease production. Mexico and Russia
are among those countries and are still producing R-12,
although production for internal consumption has ceased in the
United States and Western Europe. In the United States, the
Clean Air Act was amended to prohibit the importation of R-
12 into the United States without an allowance from the EPA
during the phase-out period. All production and importation
was to cease by January 6, 1996. After the phase-out period, a
small quantity has been allowed to be imported under essential
use permits for use in inhalants. In-bond shipments (held in the
United States under a bonding company) of R-i2 for
immediate export to other countries were not prohibited during
the phase-out period.
. On April 28, 1995, 1,200 - 30 Ib. pressure cylinders containing
R-12 were shipped from St. Petersburg, Russia, to a Mexican
automobile parts distributor. On the shipping documents
accompanying the cargo from Russia, Madison Metals located
in Bayshore, New York was listed as the party to be notified
concerning the cargo. The owner of Madison Metals is Joseph
Yariv, a Russian national. The cylinders were to travel through
Houston in-bond on an immediate transport status for
immediate export to Mexico. While the cargo was in transit,
Madison Metals notified the shipper that the consignee was to
4
10.
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be changed from the original Mexican parts distributor to a
company in Mexico City named Comertex, and that the new
party to be notified concerning the shipment was Medina
Forwarding, Corp., Brownsville, Texas.
The containers of R-12 were sent by truck on May 24, from
Houston to Sam Martinez Company’s shipping yard in
Brownsville, and from there were picked up by Medina
Forwarding, Corp. on June 1, 1995. Customs from 7512 shows
entry of the 1,200 cylinders at Brownsville on May 31, 1995,
and listed the immediate export number of the Sam Martinez
Company, meaning that the goods were covered by the Sam
Martinez Company’s bond.
A few days after the arrival of the R-12 at Brownsville, Sam
Martinez, owner of the Sam Martinez Company, met with
Ernesto Medina and Antonio Medina and informed them that
he did not want to continue handling the bond on this
shipment. On June 3, 1995, David Ruiz replaced the bond in
the name of his company, removing Martinez’s bond from the
Customs form.
On June 6, 1995, Alex Roitman, an employee of Madison
Metals, checked into a hotel in Brownsville. During his visit,
he met with the Emesto and Antonio Medina. Two days after
his departure, the 1,200 cylinders were shipped in two Yellow
Freight trucks from Medina Forwarding to Skillman Auto
Body, Long Island City, New York. At Skillman, the cylinders
were loaded onto a rental truck. The rental papers for the truck
listed the driver as Alex Roitman. At that same time, Ernesto
Medina deposited $8,000 into his bank account in the form of
one $2,400 money order from a bank in New York and eight
$700 postal money orders from a Long Island City post office.
The Clean Air Act and Customs law prohibit the importation
of R-12 into the United States without an essential use permit
from the EPA. Also, Mexican law does not allow the
importation of R-12 into Mexico.
Approximately two weeks before the R-12 cylinders were
transported to Long Island City, New York, a freight forwarder
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11.
12.
43.
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had prepared a bill of lading from AAA Guarantee to Medina
Forwarding for 1,170 empty Freon cylinders. During this same
time frame, Worthington Cylinders received a wire transfer
from Madison Metals for the purchase of empty pressure York,
confidential informants (CIs) notified USCS agents that
Medina Forwarding had a large number of cylinders that
represented to have Freon, and that they were in fact empty.
The empty cylinders were to be exported into Mexico to clear
the Customs paperwork, as had been represented on the
original shipping documents.
USCS agents established surveillance on Medina Forwarding.
On July 25, 1995, agents witnessed_a tractor-trailer being
loaded with the cylinders. On July 26, 1995, it left the
warehouse and was driven to one of the Brownsville Port of
Entry bridges. USCS inspectors stopped the truck as it
attempted to leave the United States. The cargo manifest
declared a shipment of 1,200 pieces of dichloromethane (a
solvent) in bond from Russia to Mexico. (It is noted that the
false manifest did not comport to the original bill of lading
which listed the cargo as dichlorodifluoromethane). Inspectors
found 1,170 empty canisters marked as Freon. There was
paperwork on the truck showing that the cylinders were
purchased from AAA Cylinders in mid-June. The driver told
inspectors that at least two Medina employees checked the
cylinders to ensure that they were empty.
On July 26, 1995, the day the cylinders were transported from
the warehouse, Ermesto Medina and Jaime Alcove flew to
Houston and then to Chicago, where they met with Joseph
Yariv at Chicago O’Hare Airport on July 27, 1995.
On July 27, 1995, USCS agents executed a search warrant at
Medina Forwarding Corp., at which time agents seized
documents concerning the shipment of the full containers on
Yellow Freight Systems trucks. During the search, agents also
found a facsimile regarding the meeting between Medina and
Yariv in Chicago.
14.
15.
16.
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Victim Impact
There are no identifiable victims of the offense.
Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice
The probation officer has no information to suggest that the
defendant impeded or obstructed justice.
Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility
The defendant provided a written statement which reads, in
part, “Sometime during the month of May 1995, my brother
Emesto Medina and I were contacted at Medina Forwarding
by Joseph Yariv and Alex Roitman. They asked us if we could
export into Mexico cylinders of dicholorodifluormethane
(commercially known as freon). We could not accomplish this
because freon is a banned product in Mexico. Yariv and
Roitman then devised a plan to divert the shipment of 1200
cylinders of freon from its bond status in the warehouse of
Medina Forwarding Corp. We then met with David Ruiz of
R.C. David Co., a licensed freight forwarder, to prepare
paperwork and to use its bond to ship empty freon cylinders to
Mexico and replace the full cylinders that had been imported
in bond into the United States but returned to Long Island,
New York. We then loaded approximately 1170 empty
cylinders warehouse of Medina Forwarding Corp. We then met
with David Ruiz of R.C. David Co., a licensed freight
forwarder, to prepare paperwork and to use its bond to ship
empty freon cylinders to Mexico and replace the full cylinders
that had been imported in bond into the United States but
returned to Long Island, New York. We then loaded
approximately 1170 empty cylinders from the Medina
Forwarding Corporation warehouse onto a trailer. However,
the empty cylinders never crossed into Mexico because they
were apprehended by United States Customs. What I did was
wrong, against the law and I am truly remorseful for my
conduct.”
17.
18.
19.
20.
a.
ro
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
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Offense Level Computations
The 1997 edition of the Guidelines Manual has been used in
this case.
Count 4—Violation of Clean Air Act
6
Base Offense Level: The United States Sentencing
Commission Guideline for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1)
is found in U.S.S.G. § 2Q1.3 and calls for a base offense level
of 6.
Specific Offense Characteristic: None.
Victim-Related Adjustments: None.
Adjustments for Role in the Offense: None.
Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice: None.
Adjusted Offense Level (Subtotal):
Adjustment for Acceptance of Responsibility: Pursuant
to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a), the offense is reduced two levels,
as the defendant admitted to the conduct comprising the
offense of conviction.
Total Offense Level: 4
Chapter Four Enhancements: None. _0
Total Offense Level: 4
PART B. DEFENDANT’S CRIMINAL HISTORY
Juvenile Adjudication(s)
. None.
Adult Criminal Conviction(s)
None.
Criminal History Computation
The criminal convictions above result in a subtotal criminal
history score of zero. The total of the criminal history points is
zero. According to the sentencing table at U.S.S.G. §
Chapter 5, Part A, zero criminal history points establish a
criminal history category of I.
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PART C. OFFENDER CHARACTERISTICS
3}.
32.
33.
34.
a.
Personal and Family Data
Antonio G. Medina was born on October 3, 1951, in Mexico
City, Mexico. He is one of three children born to Antonio
Medina Sr., age 73 and to Carmen Flores Medina, age 65.
Both his parents live in Brownsville, Texas. The defendant’s
siblings are Ernesto Medina, age 45, who is a co-defendant in
this case; and Maria De La Luz Medina, age 35, who is a
housewife in San Antonio, Texas. The defendant reported a
close and loving relationship with his parents and siblings. The
defendant came to the United States in 1995, under a work
visa. Since his stay in the United States, he has lived in
Brownsville, Texas, where he continues to reside.
In 1976, the defendant married Carmen Zapien; however, the
marriage ended in divorce in 1981. From this union, they have
a son identified as Antonio Medina Zapien, who resides in
Mexico. On November 22, 1988, the defendant married
Juliana Medrino and the marriage remains intact. From this
union, they have two children, Marta Juliana Medina, age 8;
and Jovana Medina, age 6. Both children reside with the
defendant and his wife in Brownsville, Texas.
Physical Condition
The defendant is 5 feet 10 inches tall, weighs approximately
160 pounds, has black hair and green eyes. He has no
distinguishing marks, scars or tattoos. The defendant reported
to be in good health and is not undergoing any type of
treatment.
Mental and Emotional Health
The defendant reported to be in good mental health and denied
having any history of psychological or emotionally problems.
Substance Abuse
Medina stated that he has never used illegal drugs and does not
consume alcohol or tobacco items.
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36.
37.
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Education and Vocational Skills
The defendant completed his primary and secondary levels of
education in Mexico City. From 1972 until 1976, he attended
the College Politecnico De Mexico and earned a Bachelor of
Arts degree in Accounting. Medina is also a certified
accountant.
Employment Record
From 1986 until present, the defendant has been employed as
the office manager for Medina Forwarding Corporation at
3549 14th Street, Brownsville, Texas. The corporation is
owned and operated by the defendant’s brother Ernesto, who is
named as a codefendant in this case. The defendant’s
additional duties involved the supervision of personnel and the
classification of goods shipped into Mexico.
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Asset
38. The defendant submitted the following joint financial
information:
Cash
Checking Account(s) 2,000.00
Subtotal: $ 2,000.00
Unencumbered Assets
Household Furnishings $30,000.00
Subtotal: $30,000.00
Equity in Other Assets
Real Estate 54,000.00
Subtotal: $54,000.00
Total Assets: $86,000.00
Unsecured Debts
Credit Cards 51,000.00
Total Unsecured Debt: $51,000.00
NET WORTH: $35,000.00
Income
Defendant’s Net Salary 1,600.00
Commissions 3,000.00
Mexican Truck 400.00
Total Income: $ 5,000.00
Necessary Monthly Living Expenses
Property Mortgage(s)/Rent 1,000.00
Food 500.00
Utilities 300.00
Telephone 100.00
Credit Cards 96.00
Car Insurance 150.00
Health Insurance 250.00
School Tuition 500.00
Total Expenses: $ 2,896.00
Net Monthly Cash Flow: $ 2,104.00
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The defendant indicated that in 1991, he purchased his home
located 1895 West San Marcelo for $120,000. His current
balance is approximately $66,000. He also has two vehicles, a
1996 Dodge Caravan with a loan balance of $19,509 and a
1994 Grand Marquis with a loan balance of $6,000. The
defendant indicated monthly payments of $709 which brings
his total expenses to $3,605 and his net monthly cash flow to
$1,395.
PART D. SENTENCING OPTIONS
40.
41.
42.
43.
Custody
Statutory Provisions: The maximum term of imprisonment is
5 years, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 7413(c)(1).
Guideline Provisions: Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § Chapter 5,
Part A, based on a total offense level of 4 and a criminal
history category of I, the guideline range for imprisonment is 0
to 6 months.
Impact of the Plea Agreement
The Plea Agreement filed by the Government has no impact
upon the prescribed guideline imprisonment range.
Supervised Release
Statutory Provisions: If a term of imprisonment is imposed,
the court may impose a term of supervised release of not more
than three years, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(b)(2).
Guideline Provisions: The guideline range for a term of
supervised release is at least two years but not more than three
years, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.2(a)(2). If a sentence of
imprisonment of one year or less is imposed, a term of
supervised release is not required but is optional, pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(b). Supervised release is required if the
Court imposes a term of imprisonment of more than one year,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1(a).
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45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
Probation
Statutory Provisions: The defendant is eligible for not less
than one nor more than five years probation by statute,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3561(c)(1). Because the offense is a
felony, one of the following must be imposed as a condition of
probation unless extraordinary circumstances exist: « fine,
restitution, or community service, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3563(a)(2).
Guideline Provisions: The defendant is eligible for probation
because the applicable guideline range is in Zone A of the
Sentencing Table, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5B1.1(a)(1). If the
court imposes probation, the term must be no more thar: three
years because the offense level for the instant offense is 4,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5B1.2(a)(2).
Fines
Statutory Provisions: The maximum fine is $250,000,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3571. A special assessment of $50 is
mandatory, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(1), a defendant shall pay
interest on any fine of more than $2,500, unless the fine is paid
in full before the 15th day after the date of judgment. If the
Court determines that the defendant does not have the ability
to pay interest, 18 U.S.C. § 3612(f)(3) authorizes the Court to
waive the requirement for interest, limit the total interest
payable to a specific dollar amount; or limit the length of the
period during which interest accrues. If interest is not waived
by the Court at the time of sentencing, the Attorney General
may subsequently waive all or part of any interest that has
accrued if, as determined by the Attorney General, reasonable
efforts to collect the interest are not likely to be effective,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3612(h).
Guideline Provisions: The fine range for the instant offense is
from $250 to $5,000, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.2(c)(3).
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Restitution
50. Statutory Provisions: Restitution is not an issue.
51. Guideline Provisions: Restitution is not an issue.
PART E. FACTORS THAT MAY WARRANT DEPARTURE
52. The probation officer has no information concerning the
offense or the offender which would warrant a departure from
the prescribed sentencing guidelines.
Respectfully submitted,
Louis G. Brewster
Chief U.S. Probation Officer
by /s/ Erma B. Navarro
Erma B. Navarro
United States Probation Officer
EBN:hs:jmj
Approved:
/s/ Becky Burks
Becky Burks, Supervising DATE: September 4, 1998
United States Probation Officer
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ) Criminal No. H-98-61-02
)
VERSUS ) Houston, Texas
) October 5, 1998
ANTONIO MEDINA ) 9:30 a.m.
SENTENCING
BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID HITTNER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
For the United States: Mr. Gordon Speights Young
Assistant United States Attorney
P.O. Box 61228
Houston, Texas 77208
For the Defendant: Mr. Chester Rene Gonzales
Attorney at Law
117 E. Price Road
Brownsville, Texas 78520
Court Reporter: Fred Warner
Official Court Reporter
515 Rusk Avenue
Houston, Texas 77002
Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography, produced
by computer-aided transcription.
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THE COURT: Court calls the case 98-61-02, United States
versus Antonio Medina.
MR. GONZALES: Ready, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Who represents the government?
MR. YOUNG. Gordon Speights Young, Your Honor.
THE COURT: For the defense?
MR. GONZALES: Chester Gonzales, Your Honor.
THE COURT: I have read the presentence report. I don’t see any
objections, but aside from what you have in writing, any additions
or corrections or objections by the government?
MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any additions or corrections or objections by the
defense?
MR. GONZALES: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Counsel, do you desire to make a statement on
behalf of your client?
MR. GONZALES: Judge, my client is remorseful for his
conduct; has never had any prior problems before, Judge. We would
ask the Court to consider the recommendation lower end of the
guidelines, Judge. He has cooperated with the authorities, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: very well.
Does your client desire to make a statement on his own behalf?
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THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, before anything, I would like
you to know this has been a terrible nightmare for us because this
affected my parents, my wife, my marrage, my reputation and my
brother’s reputation and the company’s reputation. We lost several
customers. We are working people. We are trying by all means to
recover our customers, working hard.
I want you to know we are very regretful. It was a very serious
mistake. I guarantee you that it will not happen again.
THE COURT: Government’s position.
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, no specific recommendations.
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, do you know any reason why
your client should not be sentenced at this time?
MR. GONZALES: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It is the order of the Court the defendant shall be
sentenced to six months custody with the Bureau of the Prisons.
Upon release from custody, he will be placed on supervised
release, which will be pursuant to the standard conditions that have
been adopted by this Court.
While on supervised release, the defendant shall not commit
another federal, state or local crime, shall comply with the
mandatory standard conditions that
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have been adopted by this Court, and the defendant will be required
to perform 100 hours of community service as approved by the
probation officer, to be completed six months before the
termination of probation. It is suggested that this community
service — or rather, within six months of the commencement cf the
supervised release term. It’s suggested this community service be
performed in an environmental-related agency.
The Court finds the defendant has the ability to pay fine. A
$5,000 fine is being instituted and ordered and due immediately.
It is further ordered that the defendant shall pay to the United
States a special assessment of $50, due immediately.
Also, the defendant is not a citizen of the United States;
therefore, a felony conviction may lead to your deportation from
the United States.
If you are deported, you are not to re-enter the United States
illegally; and if you do so enter the United States illegally, you are
to immediately report to the nearest probation office, at which time
supervision will immediately reinstate.
Anything further from the government?
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, with regard to all three, I have a
motion.
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THE COURT: What is the motion?
MR. YOUNG: A motion pursuant to the plea agreement to
dismiss Counts 1, 2 and 3.
THE COURT: All right. Hand them up.
Anything further from the government?
MR. YOUNG: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Anything further from the defense?
MR. GONZALES: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you. We will stand adjourned in this
matter.
(Conclusion of Sentencing)
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CERTIFICATION
I, FRED WARNER, Official Court Reporter for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division,
do hereby certify that the foregoing pages | through 5 are a true and
correct transcript of the proceedings had in the above-styled and
mumbered cause before the Honorable DAVID HITTNER, United
States District Judge, on the Sth day of October, 1998.
WITNESS MY OFFICIAL HAND at my office in Houston,
Harris County, Texas on this the 24th day of December, A.D.,
1998.
/s/ Fred Warner
Fred Warner, CSR
Official Court Reporter
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.