Appendix — Schudel v. General Electric Co.
Supreme Court brief1998
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App. 19
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
DAVID SCHUDEL, et al, et ux,
No. CS-92-081-
FVS
ORDER RE POST-
)
Plaintiffs, ;
)
GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY . TRIAL MOTIONS
)
)
)
)
VS.
and KAISER ALUMINUM AND (Filed
FE T N,
CHEMICAL CORPORATIO Nov. 25, 1994)
Defendants.
BEFORE THE COURT are certain post-trial motions.
They were decided without oral argument on November
22, 1994. See Local Rule (“LR”) 7(h)(3).
I. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE
A. Background
Judgment was entered on July 13, 1994. On July 27,
1994, the defendants filed motions for both judgments as
a matter of law and a new trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b);
Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. That same day, copies of the motions
were mailed to opposing counsel via Federal Express.
The plaintiffs now move the Court to strike the
defendants’ Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions. They argue
that the motions were not served in a timely manner.
App. 20
B. Ruling
Motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a
new trial must be filed and served within ten days of the
date judgment is entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); Fed.R.Civ.P.
59(b). In calculating the ten-day deadline, neither inter-
mediate weekends nor legal holidays are counted.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). Thus, the defendants had until the
twenty-seventh of July to file and serve their Rule 50(b)
and Rule 59 motions.
It is undisputed that the defendants mailed copies of
their motions to all opposing parties by Federal Express
on July 27, 1994. Since “[s]ervice by mail is complete
upon mailing,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), the defendants’ motions
would appear to have been both filed and served prior to
the deadline.
The plaintiffs disagree. They contend that sending
documents by Federal Express does not constitute “mail-
ing” within the meaning of Rule 5(b).
Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ disagreement, they
have failed to cite a single decision adopting their inter-
pretation of Rule 5(b). They are forced to rely upon
Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 992 F.2d 552, 554 n.2
(5th Cir. 1993), a case in which the Fifth Circuit cautioned,
in dicta, “that service by Federal Express may not be
service by mail.”?!
1 Professors Wright and Miller mention Transco, but do not
analyze the issue. 4A C. Wright, A. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure, § 1148 (2d ed. Supp. 1994).
in in
tee
—— a ee
App. 21
The defendants, by contrast, have cited two district
courts decisions that considered - and rejected - the
plaintiffs’ position. Both held that Rule 5(b) does not
require mailing through the United States Postal Service.
United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises Known As
63-29 Trimble Rd., 812 F.Supp. 332, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1992);
Edmond v. United States Postal Serv., 727 F.Supp. 7, 11
(D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 949 F.2d 415 (1991).
Here, it was reasonable for the defendants to believe
that the method of service they utilized would be more
prompt than ordinary first class mail, and every bit as
reliable. Given the plaintiffs’ failure to cite authority sup-
porting their interpretation of Rule 5(b), and the fact that
two district courts have specifically rejected their posi-
tion, the plaintiffs’ motion to strike will be denied.
Il. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
The defendants offer six reasons why the Court
should grant judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.
50(b). They are as follows: (1) the plaintiffs’ experts based
their opinions upon unreliable data; (2) certain experts
were not qualified, and their opinions do not constitute
“scientific knowledge” within the meaning of Rule 702;
(3) even if the disputed opinions are admissible, they fail
to establish causation; (4) under Washington law, many of
Dr. Lantsberger’s opinions regarding causation are
legally insufficient; (5) the plaintiffs were loaned ser-
vants; and (6) Kaiser owed no duty of care to the plain-
tiffs.
App. 22
A. Reliability/Loaned Servant/Duty
Not all of the defendants’ arguments require in-depth
analysis. The first, fifth, and sixth may be disposed of
rather quickly.
1. Reliability of Data
The Court refused to admit the “Nebel” exhibits
because they were hearsay, and the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated the applicability of an exception to the
hearsay rule. Moreover, even if an exception had applied,
the exhibits were cumulative. (Tr. at 5790-91).
Later, the defendants attempted to impeach Craig
Thompson with statements he made to Ms. Nebel. See
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (admission by party-opponent).
The plaintiffs objected. (Tr. at 5970.) In sustaining the
objection, the Court said, in part, “They [the Nebel
exhibits] were not admitted because of concerns about
reliability.” (Tr. at 5984.)
The defendants have interpreted the court’s state-
ment as a finding that the Nebel exhibits were unreliable.
When both sections of the transcript are read in context, it
is evident that no such finding was intended.
2. Loaned Servant
The jury was instructed properly on the question of
“loaned servant.” Since there is substantial evidence to
support the jury’s determination that the plaintiffs were
not loaned servants, there is no basis for granting the
defendants judgment on this issue.
iO lta cite
App. 23
~~
3. Duty of Care
With Respect to the question of “duty,” the defen-
dants have cited no new authority. The Court is satisfied
that a duty existed.
B. Admissibility of Certain Expert Opinions
The second argument focuses on the admissibility of
opinions given by Drs. Lantsberger, Goldstein, and Mor-
ton. The defendants submit that these three witnesses
were not qualified to render opinions regarding toxic
encephalopathy, and that their theories of organic brain
damage are not supported by the scientific literature.
Both prongs of the second argument were raised
prior to (and during) trial. After reviewing the materials
presented by the parties, the Court ruled against the
defendants on both issues.
Since then, the Ninth Circuit has decided two civil
cases, the outcome in each hinging on the admissibility of
expert testimony. Both opinions discuss the requirements
of Rule 702 in light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc., __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469
(1993). Both agree that expert testimony may not be
admitted unless the trial judge first determines that the
expert’s conclusions are based upon scientific knowledge.
Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir.
1994); Claar v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502
(9th Cir. 1994).
Although Hopkins and Claar are clearly relevant here,
neither dictates a result different than that previously
App. 24
reached by the Court. As a result, the Court declines to
disturb its prior rulings regarding toxic encephalopathy.
C. Sufficiency of Certain Expert Opinions (Back-
ground)
The third and fourth arguments challenge the suffi-
ciency of certain expert opinions — primarily those of Dr.
Lantsberger. Because this part of the defendants’ Rule
50(b) motion attacks sufficiency, it is necessary to
describe the disputed opinions in some detail.
1. Dan Glass
Mr. Glass reported a number of symptoms to Dr.
Paula Lantsberger, including heart palpitations, head-
aches, memory loss, and respiratory problems. Dr. Lan-
tsberger was the only expert who attempted to link any of
Glass’ specific symptoms to work at Kaiser.
(a) Deposition Testimony
During a deposition in November, 1993, Dr. Lan-
tsberger testified that she “just [didn’t] know what
caused [the heart palpitations].” (Tr. at 2317.)
With respect to a headache Glass complained of dur-
ing May, 1990, Dr. Lantsberger testified that “it was prob-
ably a more migrainous type of headache and that it’s
probably not [related] to his exposure.” (Tr. at 2325.)
Dr. Lantsberger was asked the following question
regarding a headache Glass reported during September,
1991. “[I]s it true that the headache that he complained of
—————
Ses
App. 25
when you last saw him is unrelated to his industrial
exposure at Kaiser?” (Tr. at 3180.) “True,” she replied. Id.
Dr. Lantsberger was asked what factors she had con-
sidered in determining whether Glass’ brain had been
injured during the cleanup. They included “his function
and his performance since working at Kaiser,” “the
absence of any objective, neurologic findings,” and “the
literature on mixed organic solvents.” (Tr. at 3181.) Hav-
ing considered those factors, she was asked whether it
was true that she had concluded “that [Dan Glass] did
not sustain brain damage as a result of working at Kaiser
in 1988.” Id. “Correct,” she said. Id.
Finally, Dr. Lantsberger was asked to review a report
prepared by Dr. Patricia Sparks, a board-certified special-
ist in occupational medicine. (Dr. Sparks had examined
Mr. Glass at the request of Washington’s Department of
Labor and Industries.) In her report, Dr. Sparks had said
“that there is no respiratory, neurological or mental
impairment resulting from [Glass’] previous exposures on
a more probable than not basis.” (Tr. at 2350.) Dr. Lan-
tsberger was asked whether she agreed with that state-
ment. Once again, her response was, “Correct.” Id.
(b) Direct Examination
Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony at trial was dramatically
different. She now said that it was probable that Glass
had a pre-existing lung condition which had been aggra-
vated by “exposure to chemicals.” (Tr. at 1893.) She now
assumed that Glass’ headaches were related to the expo-
sure. (Tr. at 1895.) She now opined “that there may be a
relationship between his heart symptoms while working
App. 26
on the site and his exposure to the chemicals.” (Tr. at
1897.) Finally, in apparent reference to allegations of
memory loss and difficulty in concentrating, she now said
“that the symptoms that [Glass] was complaining of that
had been a change over his base line would be related to
his exposures.” (Tr. at 1899.)
(c) Cross-examination
Dr. Lantsberger testified that she first examined Dan
Glass during October, 1989, approximately ten months
after the cleanup project. He did not complain of respira-
tory problems. (Tr. at 2288.) His examination was essen-
tially normal. (Tr. at 2298.) He had normal pulmonary
functions. (Tr. at 2305-06.) At that point, Dr. Lantsberger
did not diagnose any respiratory injury or disease. (Tr. at
2312.)
Glass next went to Dr. Lantsberger during May, 1990.
Once again, he neither mentioned respiratory problems,
nor did Dr. Lantsberger diagnose any. (Tr. at 2326.) Glass
did complain of headaches. However, during cross exam-
ination, Dr. Lantsberger conceded that she could not say
there was a specific cause-and-effect relationship between
his industrial exposure and the headaches he described.
(Tr. at 2326.)
Dr. Lantsberger’s last examination of Mr. Glass
occurred during September, 1991. (Tr. at 2333.) At that
time, he made no mention of respiratory problems. Id. He
did, however, report headaches and memory loss. (Tr. at
2332.)
App. 27
With respect to the former, Dr. Lantsberger again
conceded that she was unable to find a cause-and-effect
relationship between Glass’ work at Kaiser and the head-
aches he mentioned. (Tr. at 2334.) With respect to the
latter, Dr. Lantsberger’s answers were somewhat coy.
Nevertheless, when pressed by defense counsel, she
finally acknowledged that she agreed with two other
experts who had reported that Glass had no neurological
or psychological impairment as a direct result of his work
at Kaiser. (Tr. at 2347-52.)
(d) First Redirect Examination
On redirect, Dr. Lantsberger said that she thought
Mr. Glass had experienced an “alteration in his level of
consciousness” while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3099.) She
did not, however, attempt to link that phenomenon with
a specific injury.
Later, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether it made
“scientific sense” to determine whether each condition
Mr. Glass’ complained of could be attributed to work at
Kaiser. (Tr. at 3138.) She denied that it did, insisting that
“you have to look at the patient as a whole.” Id.
Insofar as her prior testimony was concerned, Dr.
Lantsberger said, “I was trying to indicate that as a
specific, isolated, single, sole source cause, no, I couldn’t
ascribe things as each individual cause. I had to take
them as a whole and as an aggregate group of, aggregate
group of people, to provide the data I needed to develop
my opinions.” Id.
App. 28
(e) First Recross/Second Redirect
During First Recross, Dr. Lantsberger was impeached
with her prior deposition testimony. (Tr. at 3179-81.) In an
effort to rehabilitate her, counsel for the plaintiffs
attempted to show that the statements quoted by defense
counsel referred to an examination requested by the
Department of Labor and Industries. Plaintiffs’ counsel
implied that in the context of a Labor and Industries
examination, a finding of “impairment” must be based
upon certain limited objective factors. (Tr. at 3203-06.)
At best, the effort at rehabilitation was only partially
successful. As noted above, it is clear that the opinion
which Dr. Lantsberger gave during her deposition (i.e.,
that Mr. Glass had sustained no brain damage) was based
upon both subjective and objective factors. (Tr. at 3181.).
2. David Schudel
Mr. Schudel has been examined by Dr. Lantsberger
on a number of occasions. Although Schudel described a
number of symptoms, there were (at most) two medical
conditions which Lantsberger was willing to say were
more probably than not caused by his work at Kaiser.
One was a sensitization to odors; the other was an
“aggravation” of his “whole person.”
(a) Deposition Testimony
David Schudel had been tested by psychologists Paul
Domitor and Lloyd Cripe. Having reviewed that testing,
Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether it was her “medical
opinion that Mr. [David] Schudel does not have brain
App. 29
damage as a result of his industrial exposure at Kaiser?”
(Tr. at 2980.) She replied, “Correct.” Id.
During her deposition, Dr. Lantsberger described
Schudel’s reaction to odors as a “conditioned response.”
(Tr. at 2989.) She explained it this way:
I kind of liken it to the Pavlov’s dog theory.
When you put the dog, ring the bell, associate it
with food, the dog salivates. You take Dave. You
put him out with chemicals. You have some-
body’s investigation proceeding where he is see-
ing health effects that make him scared.
Subsequently[,] he continues to be scared
around chemicals.
(Tr. at 2990). Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether it was
the investigation conducted by the county health depart-
ment which rang the bell “and set in motion what has
become — what has been a sort of cascading conditioned
response from Mr. Schudel.” Id. “Correct,” she said. Id.
(b) Direct Examination
Dr. Lantsberger’s causation testimony was interest-
ing. When asked for the cause of “David Schudel’s emo-
tional reaction to smells,” (Tr. at 1777), she said, “I think
that on a reasonable medical certainty he did not have
this before his initial exposure in 1988 and subsequently
to that I think that it’s, on a more probable than not basis,
related to his initial chemical exposure in ’88.”) Id. In
other words, since Schudel did not react to odors before
being exposed to chemicals at Kaiser, it must be the
exposure which caused the reaction.
ae.
App. 30
Later, Dr. Lantsberger described certain pulmonary
function tests which had been administered to Mr.
Schudel after the trial was underway. (Tr. at 1840-41.)
According to Dr. Lantsberger, the results indicated that
Schudel’s reaction to odors was not strictly psychological.
(Tr. at 1841-42.)
Thereafter, Lantsberger was asked two additional
causation questions. The first was “whether David
Schudel’s physical problems with chemicals, as far as his
lungs, is in any way related to the 1988 clean-up?” (Tr. at
1843.) To this question she replied, “I do think that some
of the problems that he’s having with his lungs and
reactions are reactions to his, his lung condition are
related to his exposures in the ‘88 clean-up.” Id.
As a second causation question, Lantsberger was
asked “whether David Schudel would have these prob-
lems that you've identified if he was provided with ade-
quate working protective gear in 1988?” (Tr. at 1843-44.)
Ultimately, she said, “I think that if they had had respira-
tory protection equipment at that time frame, I don’t
think that he would be reacting as badly as he has now.”
Id. at 1844.
(c) Cross-examination
During the course of cross-examination, Dr. Lan-
tsberger conceded that David Schudel does not have
Reactive Airway Dysfunction Syndrome. (Tr. at 2978). She
further conceded that he did not sustain brain damage
while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 2979).
App. 31
Since the Kaiser project, Schudel has had numerous
tests, including methacholine challenge tests, pulmonary
function tests, neuropsychological tests, and chest x-rays.
(Tr. at 2992.) Dr. Lantsberger acknowledged that prior to
trial, none of the tests had revealed any pathology. (Tr. at
2992.) It was not until the Spring of 1994 (five and one-
half years after the cleanup project) that Dr. Lantsberger
was able to produce test results which “showed some
alteration in pulmonary function capabilities.” (Tr. at
2993-94.)
By the end of cross examination, Dr. Lantsberger had
begun to back away from her earlier diagnosis. When
asked whether the most recent pulmonary function test
results could be described as a conditioned response,
Lantsberger said, “I don’t ascribe as much of that to the
conditioned response now that we've got some of the
other confounding variables out of the way. We've gotten
the smoking out of the way, and I have data with him on
a work site with nurses monitoring him on the work
site.” (Tr. at 3012.)
(d) Redirect
On redirect, Dr. Lantsberger twice asserted that
David Schudel had experienced an alteration of con-
sciousness while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3073, 3098.) No
effort was made to link Schudel’s alteration of conscious-
ness with Lantsberger’s prior diagnosis.
Later, counsel for the plaintiffs asked Lantsberger
whether she had been cross-examined regarding “David
Schudel as . . . a whole, live person or was it to the
a
App. 32
isolated incidences [sic] of his existence?” (Tr. at 3140-41.)
The latter, Lantsberger said. Id.
Plaintiffs’ counsel asked whether it is “scientifically
sound to consider David Schudel in terms of isolated
incidences [sic]?” Id. “No,” Dr. Lantsberger said, “it is
not. You have to look at him in a whole.” Id.
Finally, counsel for the plaintiffs asked, “Would you
please tell the jury if you have any opinion as to David
Schudel as a whole person in relationship to his exposure
to the chemicals in 1988 on a more probable than not
basis?” Id. After an objection, Lantsberger said,
“[T]Jaking . . . into account the totality of his information
and all of the information that was presented, in an
aggregate way, I think that it was more probably than not
an aggravation.” Id.
(e) First Recross/Second Redirect
During First Recross, Lantsberger again admitted
that Schudel sustained no brain damage from working on
the cleanup. (Tr. at 3189.) During Second Redirect, Lan-
tsberger was asked to return to what plaintiffs’ counsel
described as “the Pavlov’s dog analogy.” (Tr. at 3218.)
Although Lantsberger had appeared to distance herself
from that comparison at the close of cross-examination,
she now reiterated the theory. (Tr. at 3219, 3221.)
3. Craig Thompson
Dr. Lantsberger described a variety of symptoms
while testifying on Mr. Thompson's behalf. Only a limited
a ee
App. 33
effort was made to link any of them to the cleanup project
on a more probable than not basis.
(a) Deposition Testimony
Dr. Lantsberger first saw Mr. Thompson in October,
1989. He complained of memory loss, among other
things. (Tr. at 2655.) With respect to memory loss, Dr.
Lantsberger was asked the following questions during a
deposition which took place in November, 1993. “[I]s it
your testimony that his complaints of memory loss in
1989 may possibly have been due to his industrial expo-
sure, but you can’t say with probability that they were?”
(Tr. at 2660.) “Correct,” she replied. Id.
(b) Direct Examination
At one point, Dr. Lantsberger said that Thompson
complained to her of feeling “very sleepy” and “high”
while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 1789-90). At another, she
said she had treated him for memory loss. (Tr. at 1800).
However, Lantsberger did not testify that Thompson's
mental sensations reflected neurologic injury; nor did she
say that his memory loss could be attributed (on a more
probable than not basis) to work at Kaiser.
With respect to respiratory impairment, Lantsberger
testified that Thompson “had indicated to me that he had
had an increase in the symptoms that he’s had since his
exposure while he was at work.” (Tr. at 1821.) The
increase in symptoms was apparently enough to per-
suade Lantsberger “that the exposure on the work site
aggravated his lung conditions.” (Tr. at 1822.)
i
App. 34
(c) Cross-examination
Dr. Lantsberger saw Mr. Thompson during October,
1989. The physical examination was normal, with the
exception of “crackles in the bases of his lungs.” (Tr. at
2676.) Besides doing a physical exam, Dr Lantsberger
ordered a number of tests. While a chest x-ray and pul-
monary function tests were normal, (Tr. at 2679, 2685), a
methacholine challenge test was positive. (Tr. at 2680.)
Mr. Thompson went to Dr. Lantsberger during June,
1990, complaining of a sore throat and cough. (Tr. at
2694.) She diagnosed an upper respiratory infection. (Tr.
at 2695.) When asked whether the infection was “proba-
bly related or caused by his industrial exposure,” (Tr. at
2696), she replied, “As a direct, single affect [sic], causal
relationship, no.” Id.
During December, 1990, Thompson was seen by one
of Dr. Lantsberger’s colleagues. (Tr. at 2703.) He had an
upper respiratory infection. Id. According to Lantsberger,
Thompson “may have had more sensitive respiratory
mucosa, resulting in him having an increased suscep-
tibility to infection.” (Tr. at 2704.) However, when ques-
tioned by defense counsel, she conceded that it was a
possible cause not a probable cause. Id
Thompson went to Lantsberger during January, 1991,
for another respiratory infection. (Tr. at 2706.) Lan-
tsberger was asked whether it was true that the infection
had a possible — but not a probable — relationship to his
work at Kaiser. Id. She said, “As a specific single etiology
causal factor, correct.” Id
App. 35
Thompson went from February, 1991, until Septem-
ber, 1992, without further respiratory problems. (Tr. at
2720.) During an examination in September, 1992, Lan-
tsberger detected crackles in his iungs. (Tr. at 2721.) How-
ever, she conceded that the crackles were consistent with
his “significant” smoking. Id.
(d) Redirect Examination
Dr. Lantsberger explained her “aggravation” theory
during redirect. She said, “[T]he fact that he is having
problems that exist now that didn’t exist before he had
his work at Kaiser leads me to think that there was some
aggravation of these preexisting conditions as a result of
his workplace.” (Tr. at 3083.)
As she had with respect to Dan Glass and David
Schudel, Dr. Lantsberger testified that Thompson had
experienced an alteration of consciousness while working
at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3098.) However, she made no effort to
link Thompson’s alteration of consciousness with her
prior diagnosis.
(e) First Recross
During recross, Dr. Lantsberger repeatedly asserted
that Thompson’s condition had been “aggravated” by
work at Kaiser. In each instance, she was confronted with
strikingly inconsistent deposition testimony. See, e.g., Tr.
at 3164 (“headaches he complained of in 1989 were differ-
ent in frequency and severity and were most likely not
related to the headaches that he was experiencing while
App. 36
he was on the job site”); Tr. at 3165 (possible that memory
loss was due to industrial exposure, but not probable).
4. Tim Schudel
Dr. Lantsberger was the only expert to testify on Tim
Schudel’s behalf. While on the stand, she listed the var-
ious symptoms he had reported to her. However, when it
came to the question of causation, her testimony was
quite tentative.
(a) Direct Examination
Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether she had “an opin-
ion based upon reasonable medical probability as to
whether there’s any relationship between Tim Schudel’s
lung problems and memory problems and his exposure to
the chemicals in 1988?” (Tr. at 1885.) She responded in the
following manner, “He indicated to me that he hadn’t had
any problems with memory or concentration or breathing
problems prior to his employment on the job site.” Id.
Shortly thereafter, Dr. Lantsberger was again asked
whether she had “an opinion as to whether there’s any
relationship between Mr. Tim Schudel’s long problems
and his memory problems and the exposure to the chemi-
cals in 1988?” (Tr. at 1888.)
She said, “Mr. Schudel had indicated to me in his
history and through the testing process that he had not
had any problems with his lungs nor any problems with
his memory prior to being exposed in 1988.” Id.
App. 37
Plaintiffs’ counsel followed up by asking, “So is there
a relationship there?” Id. To which Lantsberger replied, “I
believe so.” Id.
(b) Cross-examination
Dr. Lantsberger acknowledged that although Mr.
Schudel “needed to have a pulmonary work-up by a
pulmonologist,” Tr. at 2841, “[wle never did get him in to
see one.” Id.
Mr. Tim Schudel was examined by psychologist
Lloyd Cripe. Dr. Cripe asked that Mr. Schudel be
informed “that there is no clear indication that his brain
has been damaged as a result of his exposure.” (Tr. at
2847.) Cripe went on to say, “While it is possible that his
previous learning disabilities have been exacerbated or
strained in some manner, it is not possible in a medical/
legal manner to be reasonably certain that he has suffered
any kind of appreciable brain dysfunction related to the
industrial toxic exposure.” Id.
After being counseled regarding Dr. Cripe’s report,
Schudel made no further complaints regarding memory
loss. (Tr. at 2850.)
(c) Redirect
Dr. Lantsberger testified that Tim Schudel experi-
enced an “alteration of consciousness” while exposed to
chemicals at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3097.) As with the other
workers, no effort was made to link that opinion to a
specific diagnosis.
App. 38
With respect to her “aggravation” opinion, Dr. Lan-
tsberger said, “In relationship to him as a whole person in
the totality of the information that was supplied to me, as
a whole, I think that his condition was, on a more proba-
ble than not basis, an aggravation of his preexisting con-
ditions.” (Tr. at 3140.)
5. Kathrene Froese
Two experts testified regarding Ms. Froese’s specific
complaints. One was Dr. Jonathan Ostrow. The defen-
dants concede that he “opined with reasonable medical
probability that Ms. Froese [has] irritant-induced Reac-
tive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome.” (Defendants’
Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion at 76.)
The other expert to testify regarding Ms. Froese’s
complaints was Dr. Lantsberger. She mentioned a number
of non-respiratory problems, including rash (Tr. at
1846-48), memory loss (Tr. at 1851, 1862-64), headaches
(Tr. at 2772-73), and “whole person” aggravation (Tr. at
3144.)
(a) Direct examination of Dr. Lantsberger
Ms. Froese told Dr Lantsberger that she had devel-
oped a rash while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 1846.) Accord-
ing to Ms. Froese, the rash appeared on those portions of
her body that were most exposed to the cleaning agents
she was using. (Tr. at 1846-47). Although Dr. Lantsberger
implied that the cleaning agents caused the rash, she was
never asked whether she had an opinion on that matter.
App. 39
Dr. Lantsberger testified that Ms. Froese complained
of memory “difficulties.” (Tr. at 1862.) She acknowledged,
however, that “we never were able to do full neuro-
psychological testing on her.” Id.
Plaintiffs’ counsel did not ask Lantsberger whether
Froese’s reported memory difficulties were related to her
work at Kaiser. Plaintiffs’ counsel did ask, however,
whether it is “harder to show by objective test” that a
person who is not very bright has “been injured by
exposure to chemicals.” Id. Lantsberger said that it was,
clearly implying that the jury could find organic brain
damage notwithstanding the absence of neuropsychologi-
cal testing. (Tr. at 1862-64.)
(b) Cross-examination of Dr. Lantsberger
On cross, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether she
would agree that the headaches which Ms. Froese com-
plained of in 1989 were unrelated to work at Kaiser.
Lantsberger equivocated, saying, “Other than the fact
that Ms. Howell indicated that since the time that she
worked there she’s had persistent headaches. In relation-
ship to the fact that a significant number of the coworkers
complained of this, which means specific etiology causing
an infectious relationship, no, I can’t do that.” (Tr. at
2772-73.)
When defense counsel pressed for a more concise
answer, Lantsberger replied, “As a specific sole cause,
no.” (Tr. at 2773.)
App. 40
Later, Dr. Lantsberger was asked by defense counsel
whether Ms. Froese had experienced an alteration of con-
sciousness during the cleanup. (Tr. at 2828.) In response,
Lantsberger testified that Froese “had commented that
she had problems with headaches.” (Tr. at 2829.) That led
to the following exchange:
“Was a headache an alteration of consciousness,”
defense counsel wanted to know?
“It’s a neurologic symptom,” Lantsberger replied.
But “[I]s it an alteration of consciousness,” defense
counsel asked?
“Technically of consciousness, no,” Lantsberger said.
Id.
(c) Redirect examination of Dr. Lantsberger
On redirect, Lantsberger reversed her position on
alteration of consciousness. With respect to that phenom-
enon, she now said, “That’s often one of the symptoms of
the chemical that is affecting the brain is by giving head-
aches.” (Tr. at 3092.)
After soliciting that statement, counsel for the plain-
tiffs asked, “Did you take into account her alteration in
level of consciousness and her low intellect in forming
your opinions as to Kathrene Froese?” Id.
“Yes,” Lantsberger replied, “I did.” Id.
At that point, plaintiffs’ counsel broke off her line of
questioning. Although she suggested that she would
ee
App. 41
“come back to that,” she never asked Lantsberger
whether Froese’s alteration of consciousness caused a
specific injury.
The final issue addressed on redirect was that of
“aggravation.” Counsel for the plaintiffs asked, “Would
you please tell the jury if you have an opinion, based
upon reasonable medical probability, as to Kathrene
Howell Froese as a whole person in relationship to her
condition and her exposure to the chemicals at the 1988
clean-up at the Kaiser Trentwood plant?” (Tr. at 3144.)
After an objection, Lantsberger responded by saying,
“As I had indicated, I have to look at these people as a
total. And I have to look at all of the information as an
aggregate. And as a result of putting all of the informa-
tion together, I believe that the problems that she is
experiencing are an aggravation of her preexisting condi-
tion. Aggravated as a more probable than not cause from
her exposure.” Id.
6. Merlin Carlson
Two experts analyzed the symptoms that Merlin Car-
lson reported. One was Dr. Daniel Goldstein. Although
the defendants challenge the admissibility of his testi-
mony on a number of other grounds, they concede that
he testified — on a more probable than not basis - that Mr.
Carlson sustained brain damage due to solvent exposure.
(Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Renewed
Motion at 82.)
The other expert who analyzed Mr. Carlson’s symp-
toms was Dr. Lantsberger. Not only did she testify about
App. 42
respiratory problems (Tr. at 1922-23, 1925-26), but she also
testified about fatigue, headaches, “overall body pain,”
and “whole person” aggravation. (Tr. at 1926, 3143.)
(a) Direct examination of Dr. Lantsberger
On direct, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether she
had an opinion regarding the cause of Mr. Carlson's
“problems with breathing.” (Tr. at 1925.) She said that she
had reached the “same conclusion” with respect to his
“breathing problems” that she had reached with respect
to his “brain injuries,” namely, “[t]hat he has a similar
pattern as the other coworkers, and that the overall epi-
demilogical data leads me to believe that his exposure in
the work site is the joining factor of all of the physical
problems.” (Tr. at 1926.)
Next, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether there was a
relationship between Carlson’s complaints of “fatigue,
headache, [and] overall body pain” and “exposure to
chemicals in 1988.” Id. She replied, in part, “The other
coworkers complaining of the same, similar respiratory,
cognitive, joint and body aches, leads me to assume based
on epidemiological look at the exposure, the symptoms
beginning about the same time frame and continuing
subsequently leads me to believe that they are associated
with the exposure.” (Tr. at 1926-27.)
(b) Cross-examination of Dr. Lantsberger
Dr. Lantsberger acknowledged that it was during
August, 1991, that she last made a note regarding Carl-
son’s complaints of breathing problems. (Tr. at 2935.) She
App. 43
~
further acknowledge that Carlson does not have Reactive
Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, (Tr. at 2935), and that
she has never diagnosed asthma. Id.
With respect to “bone pain and joint aches,” she said,
“1 don’t know what caused these guys to have the aches
and pains, but I do now that a significant number of the
workers did have them.” (Tr. at 2936.)
(c) Re-direct examination of Dr. Lantsberger
Dr. Lantsberger denied that it made sense to look at
Merlin Carlson in terms of “isolated incidences [sic].” (Tr.
at 3142-43.) Over objection, she testified, “In terms of his
entire exposure, his preexisting as, as a consequence of
his exposure, I think that his preexisting problems were
aggravated by his exposure at Kaiser on a more probable
that not basis.” (Tr. at 3143.)
7. Deborah Williams
A number of experts testified for Ms. Williams,
including Drs. Lantsberger, Morton and Keppel.
Although much of Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony may be
construed as foundation for opinions given by other
experts, she was asked to render opinions of her own. For
example, during redirect, she reiterated her theory of
aggravation, saying, “l think in terms of Debbie,
again, .. . taking it in totality, that on a more probable
than not basis, I think that her conditions as we have
outlined them have been aggravated by her exposure at,
by her work at the Kaiser plant.” (Tr. at 3145.)
App. 44
8. Ruth Hopkins/John Hopkins
The defendants concede that the Hopkins’ principal
claims involved respiratory injuries. The defendants
argue, however, that the Hopkins also maintained a claim
for brain damage. The record reflects the following con-
cerning the defendants’ contention:
During direct examination, Dr. Samuel Milham was
asked by counsel for the Hopkins to read the conclusion
of a study to the jury. Milham relied, in part, “[T]he severe
neurologic injuries suffered by the workers in the incident are
sobering reminders that easily preventable organic sol-
vent related occupational illness continues to occur in a
highly developed country in the late 20th century.” (Tr. at
1436.) (Emphasis added.)
In addition, the Hopkins’ attorney participated
actively in the cross-examination of Dr. Neil Rosenberg,
the defendant’s expert on the subject of solvent-induced
organic brain damage. (Tr. at 9473-89, 9529-40.) He ques-
tioned Rosenberg about neurologic injury in general, (see,
e.g., Tr. at 9481-82), and Mrs. Hopkins’ case in particular —
including magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”.) (Tr. at
9538-39.) He also had Rosenberg confirm that his testi-
mony had nothing to do with the “pulmonary aspect of
this case.” (Tr. at 9540.)
During closing, the Hopkins’ attorney devoted most
of his time to pulmonary complaints. He did not restrict
himself to that subject, however. For example, he asked
the jury to think about Ruth Hopkins’ “memory prob-
lems.” (Tr. at 12022.) Later, he said, “These chemicals can
hurt you. They can hurt your organs. They can hurt your
brains.” (Tr. at 12028.)
App. 45
It was at this point that he asked the jury to discount
Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony about magnetic resonance
imaging and Toluene abusers. In essence, he argued that
his clients’ exposure to organic solvents was distinguish-
able from that of the Toluene abusers Dr. Rosenberg had
described, thereby implying that it was of no significance
that Mrs. Hopkins’s MRI was normal. (Tr. at 12028-29.)
D. Sufficiency of Certain Expert Opinions (Anal-
ysis)
A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be
granted when “a party has been fully heard with respect
to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis
for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect
to that issue... . ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). See Montiel v. City
of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335, 342 (9th Cir.1993). The moving
party must demonstrate that insofar as the verdict is
concerned, the evidence permits but one reasonable con-
clusion. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir.1993).
1. Dan Glass
Dr. Lantsberger examined Mr. Glass on three occa-
sions. The first examination occurred during October,
1989: the second during May, 1990; and the third during
September, 1991. Mr. Glass did not report respiratory
problems on those occasions, nor did Dr. Lantsberger
diagnose pulmonary injury or disability. Given the record
as it now exists, a reasonable jury could not have found
for Mr. Glass on that issue.
;*
App. 46
With respect to Mr. Glass’ heart palpitations, Dr.
Lantsberger could only say that they may have been
related to his industrial exposure. Testimony of that sort
is legally insufficient. Under Washington law, an opinion
that a “physical disability ‘might have’ or ‘possibly did’
result from the hypothesized cause” is nothing more than
conjecture. O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn.2d 814, 824, 440
P.2d 823 (1968). “To remove the issue from the realm of
speculation, the medical testimony must at least be suffi-
ciently definite to establish that the act complained of
‘probably’ or ‘more likely than not’ caused the subse-
quent disability.” Id.
Regarding headaches and memory loss, Dr. Lan-
tsberger was forced to concede that she had been unable
to find a cause-and-effect relationship between Glass’
participation in the Kaiser cleanup and his subsequent
complaints. Thus, her testimony concerning those condi-
tions falls short of the O'Donoghue standard.
Dr. Lantsberger attempted to bridge that causal gap
by suggesting that Glass’ “whole person” had been
“aggravated.” However, after Daubert and Claar, it is
difficult to see how Lantsberger’s fall-back theory can be
considered “scientific knowledge.” If none of Glass’s
specific symptoms can be linked to the cleanup on a
more-probable-than-not basis, how is it possible that his
whole person was aggravated?
It is the plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that Dr.
Lantsberger arrived at her conclusions “using scientific
methods and procedures,” and that her “conclusion [are]
not mere subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation.”
Claar, 29 F.3d at 502. Insofar as Lantsberger’s aggravation
App. 47
theory is concerned, the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy
that requirement.
In conclusion, a reasonable jury could not have found
for Glass on any of his claims. Dr. Lantsberger’s causa-
tion testimony was legally insufficient, and her aggrava-
tion theory is not scientific knowledge.
2. David Schudel
It is undisputed that Mr. Schudel did not sustain
neurologic injury as a result of his participation in the
Kaiser cleanup. A reasonable jury could not have found
for him on that issue. Similarly, although Dr. Lantsberger
suggested that Schudel’s exposure to chemicals caused
actual pulmonary injury, she could say only that his
“lung condition” was “related to his exposures.” Given
Lantsberger’s uncertainty, a finding for Schudel on a
claim of actual pulmonary injury would have been noth-
ing more than speculation. O'Donoghue, 73 Wn.2d at 824.
Two possibilities remain. One is that Mr. Schudel has
developed a conditioned response to chemicals as a result
of working at Kaiser. The other is that his whole person
was aggravated. The latter has already been discussed. It
is not sound science. With respect to the former (i.e.,
conditioned response), there are two serious questions.
First, is Dr. Lantsberger qualified to render an essentially
psychiatric opinion? Second, is there anything in the
record to indicate that her opinion reflects scientific
knowledge?
It is clear from Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony that
David Schudel’s response to odors is psychological in
App. 48
nature. Notwithstanding its psychological nature, plain-
tiffs’ counsel made no effort to show that Dr. Lantsberger
is qualified to diagnose or treat psychological disorders.
Indeed, she freely admitted that she is not an expert in
psychiatry. (Tr. at 2337.)
Even if Dr. Lantsberger was qualified to render a
psychiatric opinion of the sort she gave here, plaintiffs’
counsel failed to establish that Lantsberger’s conclusion
reflects sound science. Not one journal article was offered
in support of Dr. Lantsberger’s opinion, nor was an effort
made to satisfy any of the other Daubert criteria. As a
result, Dr. Lantsberger’s opinion fails to pass Rule 702
muster.
3. Craig Thompson
Dr. Lantsberger failed to link any of Mr. Thompson's
specific complaints to the Kaiser project on a more-proba-
ble-than-not basis. Her fall-back was “aggravation,” a
theory which does not meet the standards for admis-
sibility established by Rule 702. It follows that the jury’s
verdict in Mr. Thompson’s favor was based upon specula-
tion, nothing more.
4. Tim Schudel
Dr. Lantsberger acknowledge that Mr. Schudel
“needed to have a pulmonary work-up by a pulmonolo-
gist,” but that she “never did get him in to see one.”
Notwithstanding the absence of expert pulmonological
evidence, Lantsberger suggested that Schudel developed
App. 49
respiratory problems as a result of his exposure to “chem-
icals.” In that regard, however, she could say only that he
told her that he had not had problems before Kaiser and
that he did have problems after Kaiser.
That Mr. Schudel’s symptoms appeared after he
worked at Kaiser may establish a temporal link between
work and symptoms, but it does not establish a causal
link. See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 916 F.2d 970,
974 (4th Cir.1990) (mere fact that a child suffered seizures
after receiving a vaccination insufficient to establish cau-
sation). Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony on that point is
therefore insufficient.
Tim Schudel obtained neuropsychological testing.
While the psychologist report that it was possible that
Schudel’s previous learning disabilities had been aggra-
vated, he could not say that aggravation was reasonably
certain. Indeed, as soon as Schudel was counseled regard-
ing the report's findings, he quit complaining of memory
loss. Given those undisputed facts, a reasonable jury
could not have found for Mr. Schudel on the question of
neurological injury.
That leaves Dr. Lantsberger’s aggravation theory. It is
neither scientifically nor causally sufficient to support the
jury's verdict.
5. Kathrene Froese
A reasonable jury could have found for Ms. Froese on
her respiratory claim. Were that her only claim, no fur-
ther discussion would be necessary. However, it was not.
Dr. Lantsberger was asked to testify regarding Ms.
App. 50
Froese’s complaints of rash, memory loss, and headaches.
With respect to these symptoms, Dr. Lantsberger was
either never asked about a causal relationship, or if she
was, her testimony fell short of the O'Donoghue standard.
6. Merlin Carlson
Mr. Carlson’s principal claim was for toxic encepha-
lopathy. He did not stop there, however. Dr. Lantsberger
reported breathing problems, fatigue, headaches, and
“overall body pain.”
With respect to respiratory complaints, Dr. Lants-
berger was forced to concede that Mr. Carlson does not
have Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome or indus-
trially induced asthma. Similarly, with respect to “bone
pain and joint aches,” she could only say, “I don’t know
what caused these guys to have the aches and pains, but I
do know that a significant number of the workers did
have them.” Given the record, a reasonable jury could not
have found for Mr. Carlson on his non-neurological
claims.
7. Deborah Williams
Ms. Williams presented claims for organic brain dam-
age and respiratory injury. A number of experts testified
on her behalf. Although Dr. Lantsberger opined that Ms.
conditions” were aggravated by work at Kai-
ser, it is questionable whether her testimony would have
had appreciable impact on the jury’s verdict.
* #
Williams
App. 51
8. Ruth Hopkins/John Hopkins
Based upon the evidence presented by the Hopkins,
their cross-examination of Dr. Rosenberg, and the manner
in which they argued their case, a reasonable jury would
have assumed the Hopkins were making a claim for brain
damage. Granted, the jury may not have viewed it as the
Hopkins’ principal claim, but the jury would have under-
stood that it was a very real part of the Hopkins’ case.
Therein lies the problem. Having chosen to make a claim
for solvent-induced brain damage, the Hopkins were
obligated to prove it. They failed to do so. A reasonable
jury could not have found that the Hopkins suffered
neurologic injuries as a proximate cause of the defen-
dants’ negligence. The defendants are therefore entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on that particular claim.
E. Sufficiency of Certain Expert Opinions (Con-
clusion)
In view of the foregoing, the defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law on a number of claims.
They include the following: all claims asserted by Dan
Glass, David Schduel, Craig Thompson and Tim Schudel;
all non-respiratory claims asserted by Kathrene Froese;
all non-neurological claims asserted by Merlin Carlson;
and all non-respiratory claims asserted by the Hopkins.
Although several claims must be dismissed, several
remain. The next question is whether a new trial is neces-
sary.
App. 52
Approximately six weeks prior to trial, the Court
asked the plaintiffs to list their claims against the defen-
dants. (Order Re Daubert Procedure (Ct. Rec. 326) at 7.)
The plaintiffs declined to do so. (Plaintiffs’ Lists of
Claims (Ct. Rec. 334).) Instead, they presented the jury
with a long list of symptoms, only some of which could
be connected to the plaintiffs’ work at Kaiser on a more
probable than not basis. Furthermore, when it came time
to instruct the jury, the plaintiffs rejected a suggestion
that the jurors be asked to decide specific claims.
The plaintiffs’ choice of tactics has placed the Court
in an awkward position. Because the jurors were not
asked to return verdicts with respect to each plaintiff's
individual claims, it is now impossible to separate the
wheat from the chaff. Thus, the Court is forced to con-
clude that the verdicts in favor of Kathrene Froese, Mer-
lin Carlson, Ruth Hopkins and John Hopkins are too
tainted to stand. For that reason, the plaintiffs’ remaining
claims must be re-tried.
Ill. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
The defendants give twelve reasons why the Court
should order a new trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. They include
the following: First, by urging thesjury to “send a mes-
sage” to the defendants, the plaintiffs injected irrelevant,
arbitrary, and punitive considerations into the jury’s
deliberations. Second, the Court failed to instruct the jury
on Washington’s medical causation standard. Third, the
Court’s instructions with respect to state and federal
safety regulations were in error. Fourth, the Court failed
to instruct the jury on the limited duties of the employer
App. 53
of an independent contractor. Fifth, the plaintiffs violated
a pretrial order by introducing evidence regarding Daniel
Skeman. Sixth, the Court applied Bryan v. John Bean, 566
F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1978), in an improper manner. Seventh,
the defendants should have been allowed to cross-exam-
ine the plaintiffs regarding inconsistent statements made
to Diane Nebel. Eight, the plaintiffs should not have been
allowed to offer evidence regarding symptoms experi-
enced by non-plaintiff workers. Ninth, the plaintiffs were
permitted to suggest that a defense expert had no basis
for opining that Mrs. Hopkins’s depression had a cause
other than that suggested by her experts. Tenth, the jury's
verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Eleventh,
the damages awarded were excessive both as a matter of
fact and a matter of law. Twelfth, the defendants’ right to
cross-examination was violated.
Given the Court’s various rulings with respect to the
defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, the
defendants’ alternative request for a new trial is moot
with respect to all but Deborah Williams. Insofar as she is
concerned, the defendants’ motion is denied.
IV. PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
AND COSTS
On July 22, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a timely request
for attorneys’ fees, together with a request for costs
beyond those normally awarded to prevailing parties.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). The defendants have objected to both.
Since then, the Court has granted the defendants’
Rule 50(b) motion in substantial part, dismissing a
number of the plaintiffs’ claims. Only the verdict in favor
App. 54
of Ms. Williams remains intact. However, because it does,
she may be entitled to fees and cos‘s.
The Court has two options concerning Ms. Williams’s
request. It can defer ruling until after the appellate pro-
cess has run its course, or it can decide the matter of fees
and costs at this juncture. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory com-
mittee’s note (1993 amendment).
The latter is the best course. This lawsuit has gener-
ated a number of complex legal questions, among them
whether Ms. Williams is entitled to fees and costs. Instead
of presenting them to the Court of Appeals piecemeal, it
is best to resolve as many as possible now so that they
may be reviewed together. Id. (“in many cases it may be
more efficient to decide fee questions before an appeal is
taken”).
One final issue must be addressed before turning to
the merits of Ms. Williams’s request — the matter of the
Court’s jurisdiction. As the advisory committee noted,
post-trial fee requests can create complicated jurisdic-
tional questions. To avoid them, Rule 58 permits a district
court to treat a request for fees as a Rule 59 motion and
extend the time for appeal from the underlying judgment.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. It is appropriate to do so here, and the
Court so orders.
A. Attorneys’ Fees
Ms. Williams submits that her request for fees may be
granted under either of two theories. One is based upon
state law, the other upon federal law. The two theories
will be examined separately.
App. 55
(a) State Law
When a request for attorneys’ fees is made in a
diversity action, and the request arises from the sub-
stance of a state-law claim, the request is governed by the
law of the forum state. Price v. Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1475
(9th Cir.1992). Washington follows the “American Rule.”
Dayton v. Farmers Insurance Group, 124 Wn.2d 277, 280,
876 P.2d 896 (1994). According to that rule, a court has no
power to award attorney fees as a cost of litigation absent
a contract, a statute, or some recognized principle in
equity. Id. Here, there is neither a contractual nor an
equitable basis for awarding fees. If Ms. Williams is to
recover attorneys’ fees, she must cite a statute which
authorizes them. She attempts to do just that.
According to Ms. Williams, the defendants violated
the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act
(“WISHA”)? by failing to provide adequate warnings
regarding the solvents used in the cleanup. She does not
assert that the defendants are liable for fees under
WISHA, however. Instead, she argues that the defendants
are liable for attorneys’ fees under one of three entirely
separate statutes — the Worker and Community Right to
Know Act.,? the Hazardous Waste Management Act,* or
the Model Toxics Control Act.°
Although ingenious, Ms. Williams’s state-law theory
is without merit. First, the jury did not find that the
2 RCW Chapt. 49.17.
3 RCW Chapt. 49.70
4 RCW Chapt. 70.105.
5 RCW Chapt. 70.105D.
App. 56
defendants violated either WISHA or any regulation pro-
mulgated thereunder. Thus, there would appear to be no
basis for Ms. Williams’s assertion that the defendants
violated that statute. Second, while it is true that the
Worker and Community Right to Know Act, the Hazard-
ous Waste Management Act, and the Model Toxics Con-
trol Act authorize fees in certain limited situations, there
is nothing in them to suggest that their (respective) fee
provisions can be invoked based upon a violation of an
entirely separate statute. See, e.g., RCW 49.70.150 (a civil
action may be brought to “compel compliance with the
provisions of this chapter or any rule promulgated under
this chapter”); RCW 70.105.097 (a “person injured as a
result of a violation of this chapter or the rules adopted
thereunder may bring an action... ”); RCW 70.105D.080
(“a person may bring a private right of action . . . for the
recovery of remedial action costs”). Finally, neither Ms.
Williams nor any of the other plaintiffs included the
matter of attorneys’ fees in the pretrial order. See Price
Dev. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 852 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th
Cir.1988) (denying request for fees where pretrial order |
contained no indication that parties would be seeking
fees).
(b) Federal law
Ms. Williams also seeks fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
That statute provides that an “attorney . . . who so
multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vex-
atiously may be required by the court to satisfy person-
ally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”
App. 57
Without question, the attorneys for the defendants
mounted a very aggressive defense on behalf of their
clients. There is no evidence, however, that they acted in
bad faith. For that reason, § 1927 is inapplicable here. See
MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th
Ciri.1991) (§ 1927 requires a finding of bad faith).
B. Costs
In light of the Court’s prior rulings, it is clear that
Ms. Williams will need to revise her request for costs. She
should consider the following in doing so:
Ms. Williams asked for expert witness fees. Since
none of her witnesses were court-appointed, she is lim-
ited to the sums authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. See
Association of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541,
551-52 (9th Cir.1992).
Ms. Williams seeks reimbursement for obtaining
copies of depositions. Although district courts have the
authority to tax such costs, Alflex Corporation v. Underwri-
ters Laboratories, 914 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 61, 116 L.Ed.2d 36 (1991),
the exercise of that discretion is often guided by local
rule. In this district, “[s]tenographic fees for depositions
may be allowed only when the deposition is used at trial
or hearing for substantive, as opposed to impeachment
purposes. Only the original deposition shall be taxed.”
Local Rule (“LR”) 54(f)(2).
In addition, Ms. Williams may be asking for other
costs associated with the taking of depositions. If so, she
must demonstrate that the costs were necessarily
App. 58
incurred. See. Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432,
1438-39 (9th Cir.1993).
Finally, Ms. Williams seeks compensation for
expenses assumed in obtaining daily transcripts of court
proceedings. Because of the length and complexity of the |
case, Ms. Williams is entitled to an award of costs for |
those portions of the daily transcript necessary for pre-
sentation of her claims. See Independent Iron Works, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corporation, 322 F.2d 656, 678 (9th Cir.)
(trial transcripts were reasonably necessary given the
complexity and length of proceedings), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 922, 84 S.Ct. 267, 11 L.Ed.2d 165 (1963).
V. MOTION TO AMEND VERDICT
Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation is one
legal entity; Kaiser Aluminum Corporation is another.
Since at least October, 1991, it is Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation which has been one of the two
named defendants in this action.
The jury returned its verdict on July 13, 1994. Judg-
ment was entered that same day. The judgment refers to
Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, not Kaiser Aluminum and
Chemical Corporation.
Defendant Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corpora-
tion now moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 60, to amend
the judgment to reflect its true name. The plaintiffs do not
object.
TT
App. 59
Kaiser aluminum and Chemical Corporation is cor-
rect. The wrong corporate entity was listed in the judg-
ment. As a result, its motion will be granted and the
judgment modified accordingly.
VI. MOTION TO SET DISCOVERY HEARING
The Plaintiffs move the Court to set a hearing to
investigate their allegations that the defendants abused
the discovery process. No authorities have been cited in
support of this request.
Given the Court’s previous rulings, the plaintiffs’
motion is (at best) premature. Consequently, their motion
will be denied.
VII. MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
The defendants move the Court to stay any proceed-
ings to enforcement the judgment pending resolution of
their post-trial motions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(b). With entry of
this order, the defendants’ request becomes moot. It will
therefore be denied.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The plaintiffs’ motion to strike defense motions
as untimely (Ct. Rec. 536) is denied.
2. The defendants’motion to strike plaintiffs’ mem-
orandum (Ct. Rec. 565) is denied.
3. The plaintiffs’ motion to strike reply (Ct. Rec.
552) is denied.
App. 60
4. The defendants’ motion for judgement as a mat-
ter of law (Ct. Rec. 488) is denied in part and granted in
part. The judgments entered herein are re-opened and
modified as follows:
(a) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-
ter of law on all claims asserted by Dan Glass, David
Schudel, Craig Thompson and Tim Schudel. Those claims
are dismissed with prejudice.
(b) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-
ter of law on all non-respiratory claims asserted by
Kathrene Froese. Those claims are dismissed with preju-
dice.
(c) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-
ter of law on all non-neurological claims asserted by
Merlin Carlson. Those claims are dismissed with preju-
dice.
(d) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-
ter of law on all non-respiratory claims asserted by Ruth
Hopkins and John Hopkins. Those claims are dismissed
with prejudice.
5. The defendants are granted a new trial on all
remaining claims.
6. The defendants’ motion for new trial or alterna-
tive relief (Ct. Rec. 486) is denied.
7. The plaintiffs’ timely request for attorneys’ fees
and costs shall have the same effect under Fed.R.App.P.
4(a)(4) as a Rule 59 motion, and the period for filing a
notice of appeal shall be extended accordingly.
App. 61
8. The plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and
costs is denied in part and granted in part. Ms. Deborah
Williams is directed to submit a revised cost bill.
9. Defendant Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Cor-
poration’s motion to amend or correct judgments (Ct.
Rec. 513) is granted. The judgments entered herein shall
refer to “Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation,”
not “Kaiser Aluminum Corporation.”
10. The plaintiffs’ motion for order shortening time
(Ct. Rec. 555) is denied.
11. The plaintiffs’ motions for order setting hearing
on discovery abuses (Ct. Recs. 534 and 563) are denied.
12. The defendants’ motion for stay of proceedings
to enforce judgments (Ct. Rec. 490) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk is hereby directed to
file this order, enter judgment accordingly, and furnish
copies to counsel.
DATED this 22 day of November 1994.
/s/ Fred Van Sickle
FRED VAN SICKLE
United States District Judge
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