Appendix — Schudel v. General Electric Co.

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App. 19

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

DAVID SCHUDEL, et al, et ux,

No. CS-92-081-

FVS

ORDER RE POST-

)

Plaintiffs, ;

)

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY . TRIAL MOTIONS

)

)

)

)

VS.

and KAISER ALUMINUM AND (Filed

FE T N,

CHEMICAL CORPORATIO Nov. 25, 1994)

Defendants.

BEFORE THE COURT are certain post-trial motions.

They were decided without oral argument on November

22, 1994. See Local Rule (“LR”) 7(h)(3).

I. PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE

A. Background

Judgment was entered on July 13, 1994. On July 27,

1994, the defendants filed motions for both judgments as

a matter of law and a new trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b);

Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. That same day, copies of the motions

were mailed to opposing counsel via Federal Express.

The plaintiffs now move the Court to strike the

defendants’ Rule 50(b) and Rule 59 motions. They argue

that the motions were not served in a timely manner.

App. 20

B. Ruling

Motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a

new trial must be filed and served within ten days of the

date judgment is entered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b); Fed.R.Civ.P.

59(b). In calculating the ten-day deadline, neither inter-

mediate weekends nor legal holidays are counted.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b). Thus, the defendants had until the

twenty-seventh of July to file and serve their Rule 50(b)

and Rule 59 motions.

It is undisputed that the defendants mailed copies of

their motions to all opposing parties by Federal Express

on July 27, 1994. Since “[s]ervice by mail is complete

upon mailing,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b), the defendants’ motions

would appear to have been both filed and served prior to

the deadline.

The plaintiffs disagree. They contend that sending

documents by Federal Express does not constitute “mail-

ing” within the meaning of Rule 5(b).

Notwithstanding the plaintiffs’ disagreement, they

have failed to cite a single decision adopting their inter-

pretation of Rule 5(b). They are forced to rely upon

Transco Leasing Corp. v. United States, 992 F.2d 552, 554 n.2

(5th Cir. 1993), a case in which the Fifth Circuit cautioned,

in dicta, “that service by Federal Express may not be

service by mail.”?!

1 Professors Wright and Miller mention Transco, but do not

analyze the issue. 4A C. Wright, A. Miller, Federal Practice and

Procedure, § 1148 (2d ed. Supp. 1994).

in in

tee

—— a ee

App. 21

The defendants, by contrast, have cited two district

courts decisions that considered - and rejected - the

plaintiffs’ position. Both held that Rule 5(b) does not

require mailing through the United States Postal Service.

United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises Known As

63-29 Trimble Rd., 812 F.Supp. 332, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1992);

Edmond v. United States Postal Serv., 727 F.Supp. 7, 11

(D.D.C. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 949 F.2d 415 (1991).

Here, it was reasonable for the defendants to believe

that the method of service they utilized would be more

prompt than ordinary first class mail, and every bit as

reliable. Given the plaintiffs’ failure to cite authority sup-

porting their interpretation of Rule 5(b), and the fact that

two district courts have specifically rejected their posi-

tion, the plaintiffs’ motion to strike will be denied.

Il. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS A

MATTER OF LAW.

The defendants offer six reasons why the Court

should grant judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P.

50(b). They are as follows: (1) the plaintiffs’ experts based

their opinions upon unreliable data; (2) certain experts

were not qualified, and their opinions do not constitute

“scientific knowledge” within the meaning of Rule 702;

(3) even if the disputed opinions are admissible, they fail

to establish causation; (4) under Washington law, many of

Dr. Lantsberger’s opinions regarding causation are

legally insufficient; (5) the plaintiffs were loaned ser-

vants; and (6) Kaiser owed no duty of care to the plain-

tiffs.

App. 22

A. Reliability/Loaned Servant/Duty

Not all of the defendants’ arguments require in-depth

analysis. The first, fifth, and sixth may be disposed of

rather quickly.

1. Reliability of Data

The Court refused to admit the “Nebel” exhibits

because they were hearsay, and the plaintiffs had not

demonstrated the applicability of an exception to the

hearsay rule. Moreover, even if an exception had applied,

the exhibits were cumulative. (Tr. at 5790-91).

Later, the defendants attempted to impeach Craig

Thompson with statements he made to Ms. Nebel. See

Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (admission by party-opponent).

The plaintiffs objected. (Tr. at 5970.) In sustaining the

objection, the Court said, in part, “They [the Nebel

exhibits] were not admitted because of concerns about

reliability.” (Tr. at 5984.)

The defendants have interpreted the court’s state-

ment as a finding that the Nebel exhibits were unreliable.

When both sections of the transcript are read in context, it

is evident that no such finding was intended.

2. Loaned Servant

The jury was instructed properly on the question of

“loaned servant.” Since there is substantial evidence to

support the jury’s determination that the plaintiffs were

not loaned servants, there is no basis for granting the

defendants judgment on this issue.

iO lta cite

App. 23

~~

3. Duty of Care

With Respect to the question of “duty,” the defen-

dants have cited no new authority. The Court is satisfied

that a duty existed.

B. Admissibility of Certain Expert Opinions

The second argument focuses on the admissibility of

opinions given by Drs. Lantsberger, Goldstein, and Mor-

ton. The defendants submit that these three witnesses

were not qualified to render opinions regarding toxic

encephalopathy, and that their theories of organic brain

damage are not supported by the scientific literature.

Both prongs of the second argument were raised

prior to (and during) trial. After reviewing the materials

presented by the parties, the Court ruled against the

defendants on both issues.

Since then, the Ninth Circuit has decided two civil

cases, the outcome in each hinging on the admissibility of

expert testimony. Both opinions discuss the requirements

of Rule 702 in light of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-

cals, Inc., __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469

(1993). Both agree that expert testimony may not be

admitted unless the trial judge first determines that the

expert’s conclusions are based upon scientific knowledge.

Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir.

1994); Claar v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 502

(9th Cir. 1994).

Although Hopkins and Claar are clearly relevant here,

neither dictates a result different than that previously

App. 24

reached by the Court. As a result, the Court declines to

disturb its prior rulings regarding toxic encephalopathy.

C. Sufficiency of Certain Expert Opinions (Back-

ground)

The third and fourth arguments challenge the suffi-

ciency of certain expert opinions — primarily those of Dr.

Lantsberger. Because this part of the defendants’ Rule

50(b) motion attacks sufficiency, it is necessary to

describe the disputed opinions in some detail.

1. Dan Glass

Mr. Glass reported a number of symptoms to Dr.

Paula Lantsberger, including heart palpitations, head-

aches, memory loss, and respiratory problems. Dr. Lan-

tsberger was the only expert who attempted to link any of

Glass’ specific symptoms to work at Kaiser.

(a) Deposition Testimony

During a deposition in November, 1993, Dr. Lan-

tsberger testified that she “just [didn’t] know what

caused [the heart palpitations].” (Tr. at 2317.)

With respect to a headache Glass complained of dur-

ing May, 1990, Dr. Lantsberger testified that “it was prob-

ably a more migrainous type of headache and that it’s

probably not [related] to his exposure.” (Tr. at 2325.)

Dr. Lantsberger was asked the following question

regarding a headache Glass reported during September,

1991. “[I]s it true that the headache that he complained of

—————

Ses

App. 25

when you last saw him is unrelated to his industrial

exposure at Kaiser?” (Tr. at 3180.) “True,” she replied. Id.

Dr. Lantsberger was asked what factors she had con-

sidered in determining whether Glass’ brain had been

injured during the cleanup. They included “his function

and his performance since working at Kaiser,” “the

absence of any objective, neurologic findings,” and “the

literature on mixed organic solvents.” (Tr. at 3181.) Hav-

ing considered those factors, she was asked whether it

was true that she had concluded “that [Dan Glass] did

not sustain brain damage as a result of working at Kaiser

in 1988.” Id. “Correct,” she said. Id.

Finally, Dr. Lantsberger was asked to review a report

prepared by Dr. Patricia Sparks, a board-certified special-

ist in occupational medicine. (Dr. Sparks had examined

Mr. Glass at the request of Washington’s Department of

Labor and Industries.) In her report, Dr. Sparks had said

“that there is no respiratory, neurological or mental

impairment resulting from [Glass’] previous exposures on

a more probable than not basis.” (Tr. at 2350.) Dr. Lan-

tsberger was asked whether she agreed with that state-

ment. Once again, her response was, “Correct.” Id.

(b) Direct Examination

Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony at trial was dramatically

different. She now said that it was probable that Glass

had a pre-existing lung condition which had been aggra-

vated by “exposure to chemicals.” (Tr. at 1893.) She now

assumed that Glass’ headaches were related to the expo-

sure. (Tr. at 1895.) She now opined “that there may be a

relationship between his heart symptoms while working

App. 26

on the site and his exposure to the chemicals.” (Tr. at

1897.) Finally, in apparent reference to allegations of

memory loss and difficulty in concentrating, she now said

“that the symptoms that [Glass] was complaining of that

had been a change over his base line would be related to

his exposures.” (Tr. at 1899.)

(c) Cross-examination

Dr. Lantsberger testified that she first examined Dan

Glass during October, 1989, approximately ten months

after the cleanup project. He did not complain of respira-

tory problems. (Tr. at 2288.) His examination was essen-

tially normal. (Tr. at 2298.) He had normal pulmonary

functions. (Tr. at 2305-06.) At that point, Dr. Lantsberger

did not diagnose any respiratory injury or disease. (Tr. at

2312.)

Glass next went to Dr. Lantsberger during May, 1990.

Once again, he neither mentioned respiratory problems,

nor did Dr. Lantsberger diagnose any. (Tr. at 2326.) Glass

did complain of headaches. However, during cross exam-

ination, Dr. Lantsberger conceded that she could not say

there was a specific cause-and-effect relationship between

his industrial exposure and the headaches he described.

(Tr. at 2326.)

Dr. Lantsberger’s last examination of Mr. Glass

occurred during September, 1991. (Tr. at 2333.) At that

time, he made no mention of respiratory problems. Id. He

did, however, report headaches and memory loss. (Tr. at

2332.)

App. 27

With respect to the former, Dr. Lantsberger again

conceded that she was unable to find a cause-and-effect

relationship between Glass’ work at Kaiser and the head-

aches he mentioned. (Tr. at 2334.) With respect to the

latter, Dr. Lantsberger’s answers were somewhat coy.

Nevertheless, when pressed by defense counsel, she

finally acknowledged that she agreed with two other

experts who had reported that Glass had no neurological

or psychological impairment as a direct result of his work

at Kaiser. (Tr. at 2347-52.)

(d) First Redirect Examination

On redirect, Dr. Lantsberger said that she thought

Mr. Glass had experienced an “alteration in his level of

consciousness” while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3099.) She

did not, however, attempt to link that phenomenon with

a specific injury.

Later, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether it made

“scientific sense” to determine whether each condition

Mr. Glass’ complained of could be attributed to work at

Kaiser. (Tr. at 3138.) She denied that it did, insisting that

“you have to look at the patient as a whole.” Id.

Insofar as her prior testimony was concerned, Dr.

Lantsberger said, “I was trying to indicate that as a

specific, isolated, single, sole source cause, no, I couldn’t

ascribe things as each individual cause. I had to take

them as a whole and as an aggregate group of, aggregate

group of people, to provide the data I needed to develop

my opinions.” Id.

App. 28

(e) First Recross/Second Redirect

During First Recross, Dr. Lantsberger was impeached

with her prior deposition testimony. (Tr. at 3179-81.) In an

effort to rehabilitate her, counsel for the plaintiffs

attempted to show that the statements quoted by defense

counsel referred to an examination requested by the

Department of Labor and Industries. Plaintiffs’ counsel

implied that in the context of a Labor and Industries

examination, a finding of “impairment” must be based

upon certain limited objective factors. (Tr. at 3203-06.)

At best, the effort at rehabilitation was only partially

successful. As noted above, it is clear that the opinion

which Dr. Lantsberger gave during her deposition (i.e.,

that Mr. Glass had sustained no brain damage) was based

upon both subjective and objective factors. (Tr. at 3181.).

2. David Schudel

Mr. Schudel has been examined by Dr. Lantsberger

on a number of occasions. Although Schudel described a

number of symptoms, there were (at most) two medical

conditions which Lantsberger was willing to say were

more probably than not caused by his work at Kaiser.

One was a sensitization to odors; the other was an

“aggravation” of his “whole person.”

(a) Deposition Testimony

David Schudel had been tested by psychologists Paul

Domitor and Lloyd Cripe. Having reviewed that testing,

Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether it was her “medical

opinion that Mr. [David] Schudel does not have brain

App. 29

damage as a result of his industrial exposure at Kaiser?”

(Tr. at 2980.) She replied, “Correct.” Id.

During her deposition, Dr. Lantsberger described

Schudel’s reaction to odors as a “conditioned response.”

(Tr. at 2989.) She explained it this way:

I kind of liken it to the Pavlov’s dog theory.

When you put the dog, ring the bell, associate it

with food, the dog salivates. You take Dave. You

put him out with chemicals. You have some-

body’s investigation proceeding where he is see-

ing health effects that make him scared.

Subsequently[,] he continues to be scared

around chemicals.

(Tr. at 2990). Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether it was

the investigation conducted by the county health depart-

ment which rang the bell “and set in motion what has

become — what has been a sort of cascading conditioned

response from Mr. Schudel.” Id. “Correct,” she said. Id.

(b) Direct Examination

Dr. Lantsberger’s causation testimony was interest-

ing. When asked for the cause of “David Schudel’s emo-

tional reaction to smells,” (Tr. at 1777), she said, “I think

that on a reasonable medical certainty he did not have

this before his initial exposure in 1988 and subsequently

to that I think that it’s, on a more probable than not basis,

related to his initial chemical exposure in ’88.”) Id. In

other words, since Schudel did not react to odors before

being exposed to chemicals at Kaiser, it must be the

exposure which caused the reaction.

ae.

App. 30

Later, Dr. Lantsberger described certain pulmonary

function tests which had been administered to Mr.

Schudel after the trial was underway. (Tr. at 1840-41.)

According to Dr. Lantsberger, the results indicated that

Schudel’s reaction to odors was not strictly psychological.

(Tr. at 1841-42.)

Thereafter, Lantsberger was asked two additional

causation questions. The first was “whether David

Schudel’s physical problems with chemicals, as far as his

lungs, is in any way related to the 1988 clean-up?” (Tr. at

1843.) To this question she replied, “I do think that some

of the problems that he’s having with his lungs and

reactions are reactions to his, his lung condition are

related to his exposures in the ‘88 clean-up.” Id.

As a second causation question, Lantsberger was

asked “whether David Schudel would have these prob-

lems that you've identified if he was provided with ade-

quate working protective gear in 1988?” (Tr. at 1843-44.)

Ultimately, she said, “I think that if they had had respira-

tory protection equipment at that time frame, I don’t

think that he would be reacting as badly as he has now.”

Id. at 1844.

(c) Cross-examination

During the course of cross-examination, Dr. Lan-

tsberger conceded that David Schudel does not have

Reactive Airway Dysfunction Syndrome. (Tr. at 2978). She

further conceded that he did not sustain brain damage

while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 2979).

App. 31

Since the Kaiser project, Schudel has had numerous

tests, including methacholine challenge tests, pulmonary

function tests, neuropsychological tests, and chest x-rays.

(Tr. at 2992.) Dr. Lantsberger acknowledged that prior to

trial, none of the tests had revealed any pathology. (Tr. at

2992.) It was not until the Spring of 1994 (five and one-

half years after the cleanup project) that Dr. Lantsberger

was able to produce test results which “showed some

alteration in pulmonary function capabilities.” (Tr. at

2993-94.)

By the end of cross examination, Dr. Lantsberger had

begun to back away from her earlier diagnosis. When

asked whether the most recent pulmonary function test

results could be described as a conditioned response,

Lantsberger said, “I don’t ascribe as much of that to the

conditioned response now that we've got some of the

other confounding variables out of the way. We've gotten

the smoking out of the way, and I have data with him on

a work site with nurses monitoring him on the work

site.” (Tr. at 3012.)

(d) Redirect

On redirect, Dr. Lantsberger twice asserted that

David Schudel had experienced an alteration of con-

sciousness while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3073, 3098.) No

effort was made to link Schudel’s alteration of conscious-

ness with Lantsberger’s prior diagnosis.

Later, counsel for the plaintiffs asked Lantsberger

whether she had been cross-examined regarding “David

Schudel as . . . a whole, live person or was it to the

a

App. 32

isolated incidences [sic] of his existence?” (Tr. at 3140-41.)

The latter, Lantsberger said. Id.

Plaintiffs’ counsel asked whether it is “scientifically

sound to consider David Schudel in terms of isolated

incidences [sic]?” Id. “No,” Dr. Lantsberger said, “it is

not. You have to look at him in a whole.” Id.

Finally, counsel for the plaintiffs asked, “Would you

please tell the jury if you have any opinion as to David

Schudel as a whole person in relationship to his exposure

to the chemicals in 1988 on a more probable than not

basis?” Id. After an objection, Lantsberger said,

“[T]Jaking . . . into account the totality of his information

and all of the information that was presented, in an

aggregate way, I think that it was more probably than not

an aggravation.” Id.

(e) First Recross/Second Redirect

During First Recross, Lantsberger again admitted

that Schudel sustained no brain damage from working on

the cleanup. (Tr. at 3189.) During Second Redirect, Lan-

tsberger was asked to return to what plaintiffs’ counsel

described as “the Pavlov’s dog analogy.” (Tr. at 3218.)

Although Lantsberger had appeared to distance herself

from that comparison at the close of cross-examination,

she now reiterated the theory. (Tr. at 3219, 3221.)

3. Craig Thompson

Dr. Lantsberger described a variety of symptoms

while testifying on Mr. Thompson's behalf. Only a limited

a ee

App. 33

effort was made to link any of them to the cleanup project

on a more probable than not basis.

(a) Deposition Testimony

Dr. Lantsberger first saw Mr. Thompson in October,

1989. He complained of memory loss, among other

things. (Tr. at 2655.) With respect to memory loss, Dr.

Lantsberger was asked the following questions during a

deposition which took place in November, 1993. “[I]s it

your testimony that his complaints of memory loss in

1989 may possibly have been due to his industrial expo-

sure, but you can’t say with probability that they were?”

(Tr. at 2660.) “Correct,” she replied. Id.

(b) Direct Examination

At one point, Dr. Lantsberger said that Thompson

complained to her of feeling “very sleepy” and “high”

while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 1789-90). At another, she

said she had treated him for memory loss. (Tr. at 1800).

However, Lantsberger did not testify that Thompson's

mental sensations reflected neurologic injury; nor did she

say that his memory loss could be attributed (on a more

probable than not basis) to work at Kaiser.

With respect to respiratory impairment, Lantsberger

testified that Thompson “had indicated to me that he had

had an increase in the symptoms that he’s had since his

exposure while he was at work.” (Tr. at 1821.) The

increase in symptoms was apparently enough to per-

suade Lantsberger “that the exposure on the work site

aggravated his lung conditions.” (Tr. at 1822.)

i

App. 34

(c) Cross-examination

Dr. Lantsberger saw Mr. Thompson during October,

1989. The physical examination was normal, with the

exception of “crackles in the bases of his lungs.” (Tr. at

2676.) Besides doing a physical exam, Dr Lantsberger

ordered a number of tests. While a chest x-ray and pul-

monary function tests were normal, (Tr. at 2679, 2685), a

methacholine challenge test was positive. (Tr. at 2680.)

Mr. Thompson went to Dr. Lantsberger during June,

1990, complaining of a sore throat and cough. (Tr. at

2694.) She diagnosed an upper respiratory infection. (Tr.

at 2695.) When asked whether the infection was “proba-

bly related or caused by his industrial exposure,” (Tr. at

2696), she replied, “As a direct, single affect [sic], causal

relationship, no.” Id.

During December, 1990, Thompson was seen by one

of Dr. Lantsberger’s colleagues. (Tr. at 2703.) He had an

upper respiratory infection. Id. According to Lantsberger,

Thompson “may have had more sensitive respiratory

mucosa, resulting in him having an increased suscep-

tibility to infection.” (Tr. at 2704.) However, when ques-

tioned by defense counsel, she conceded that it was a

possible cause not a probable cause. Id

Thompson went to Lantsberger during January, 1991,

for another respiratory infection. (Tr. at 2706.) Lan-

tsberger was asked whether it was true that the infection

had a possible — but not a probable — relationship to his

work at Kaiser. Id. She said, “As a specific single etiology

causal factor, correct.” Id

App. 35

Thompson went from February, 1991, until Septem-

ber, 1992, without further respiratory problems. (Tr. at

2720.) During an examination in September, 1992, Lan-

tsberger detected crackles in his iungs. (Tr. at 2721.) How-

ever, she conceded that the crackles were consistent with

his “significant” smoking. Id.

(d) Redirect Examination

Dr. Lantsberger explained her “aggravation” theory

during redirect. She said, “[T]he fact that he is having

problems that exist now that didn’t exist before he had

his work at Kaiser leads me to think that there was some

aggravation of these preexisting conditions as a result of

his workplace.” (Tr. at 3083.)

As she had with respect to Dan Glass and David

Schudel, Dr. Lantsberger testified that Thompson had

experienced an alteration of consciousness while working

at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3098.) However, she made no effort to

link Thompson’s alteration of consciousness with her

prior diagnosis.

(e) First Recross

During recross, Dr. Lantsberger repeatedly asserted

that Thompson’s condition had been “aggravated” by

work at Kaiser. In each instance, she was confronted with

strikingly inconsistent deposition testimony. See, e.g., Tr.

at 3164 (“headaches he complained of in 1989 were differ-

ent in frequency and severity and were most likely not

related to the headaches that he was experiencing while

App. 36

he was on the job site”); Tr. at 3165 (possible that memory

loss was due to industrial exposure, but not probable).

4. Tim Schudel

Dr. Lantsberger was the only expert to testify on Tim

Schudel’s behalf. While on the stand, she listed the var-

ious symptoms he had reported to her. However, when it

came to the question of causation, her testimony was

quite tentative.

(a) Direct Examination

Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether she had “an opin-

ion based upon reasonable medical probability as to

whether there’s any relationship between Tim Schudel’s

lung problems and memory problems and his exposure to

the chemicals in 1988?” (Tr. at 1885.) She responded in the

following manner, “He indicated to me that he hadn’t had

any problems with memory or concentration or breathing

problems prior to his employment on the job site.” Id.

Shortly thereafter, Dr. Lantsberger was again asked

whether she had “an opinion as to whether there’s any

relationship between Mr. Tim Schudel’s long problems

and his memory problems and the exposure to the chemi-

cals in 1988?” (Tr. at 1888.)

She said, “Mr. Schudel had indicated to me in his

history and through the testing process that he had not

had any problems with his lungs nor any problems with

his memory prior to being exposed in 1988.” Id.

App. 37

Plaintiffs’ counsel followed up by asking, “So is there

a relationship there?” Id. To which Lantsberger replied, “I

believe so.” Id.

(b) Cross-examination

Dr. Lantsberger acknowledged that although Mr.

Schudel “needed to have a pulmonary work-up by a

pulmonologist,” Tr. at 2841, “[wle never did get him in to

see one.” Id.

Mr. Tim Schudel was examined by psychologist

Lloyd Cripe. Dr. Cripe asked that Mr. Schudel be

informed “that there is no clear indication that his brain

has been damaged as a result of his exposure.” (Tr. at

2847.) Cripe went on to say, “While it is possible that his

previous learning disabilities have been exacerbated or

strained in some manner, it is not possible in a medical/

legal manner to be reasonably certain that he has suffered

any kind of appreciable brain dysfunction related to the

industrial toxic exposure.” Id.

After being counseled regarding Dr. Cripe’s report,

Schudel made no further complaints regarding memory

loss. (Tr. at 2850.)

(c) Redirect

Dr. Lantsberger testified that Tim Schudel experi-

enced an “alteration of consciousness” while exposed to

chemicals at Kaiser. (Tr. at 3097.) As with the other

workers, no effort was made to link that opinion to a

specific diagnosis.

App. 38

With respect to her “aggravation” opinion, Dr. Lan-

tsberger said, “In relationship to him as a whole person in

the totality of the information that was supplied to me, as

a whole, I think that his condition was, on a more proba-

ble than not basis, an aggravation of his preexisting con-

ditions.” (Tr. at 3140.)

5. Kathrene Froese

Two experts testified regarding Ms. Froese’s specific

complaints. One was Dr. Jonathan Ostrow. The defen-

dants concede that he “opined with reasonable medical

probability that Ms. Froese [has] irritant-induced Reac-

tive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome.” (Defendants’

Memorandum in Support of Renewed Motion at 76.)

The other expert to testify regarding Ms. Froese’s

complaints was Dr. Lantsberger. She mentioned a number

of non-respiratory problems, including rash (Tr. at

1846-48), memory loss (Tr. at 1851, 1862-64), headaches

(Tr. at 2772-73), and “whole person” aggravation (Tr. at

3144.)

(a) Direct examination of Dr. Lantsberger

Ms. Froese told Dr Lantsberger that she had devel-

oped a rash while working at Kaiser. (Tr. at 1846.) Accord-

ing to Ms. Froese, the rash appeared on those portions of

her body that were most exposed to the cleaning agents

she was using. (Tr. at 1846-47). Although Dr. Lantsberger

implied that the cleaning agents caused the rash, she was

never asked whether she had an opinion on that matter.

App. 39

Dr. Lantsberger testified that Ms. Froese complained

of memory “difficulties.” (Tr. at 1862.) She acknowledged,

however, that “we never were able to do full neuro-

psychological testing on her.” Id.

Plaintiffs’ counsel did not ask Lantsberger whether

Froese’s reported memory difficulties were related to her

work at Kaiser. Plaintiffs’ counsel did ask, however,

whether it is “harder to show by objective test” that a

person who is not very bright has “been injured by

exposure to chemicals.” Id. Lantsberger said that it was,

clearly implying that the jury could find organic brain

damage notwithstanding the absence of neuropsychologi-

cal testing. (Tr. at 1862-64.)

(b) Cross-examination of Dr. Lantsberger

On cross, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether she

would agree that the headaches which Ms. Froese com-

plained of in 1989 were unrelated to work at Kaiser.

Lantsberger equivocated, saying, “Other than the fact

that Ms. Howell indicated that since the time that she

worked there she’s had persistent headaches. In relation-

ship to the fact that a significant number of the coworkers

complained of this, which means specific etiology causing

an infectious relationship, no, I can’t do that.” (Tr. at

2772-73.)

When defense counsel pressed for a more concise

answer, Lantsberger replied, “As a specific sole cause,

no.” (Tr. at 2773.)

App. 40

Later, Dr. Lantsberger was asked by defense counsel

whether Ms. Froese had experienced an alteration of con-

sciousness during the cleanup. (Tr. at 2828.) In response,

Lantsberger testified that Froese “had commented that

she had problems with headaches.” (Tr. at 2829.) That led

to the following exchange:

“Was a headache an alteration of consciousness,”

defense counsel wanted to know?

“It’s a neurologic symptom,” Lantsberger replied.

But “[I]s it an alteration of consciousness,” defense

counsel asked?

“Technically of consciousness, no,” Lantsberger said.

Id.

(c) Redirect examination of Dr. Lantsberger

On redirect, Lantsberger reversed her position on

alteration of consciousness. With respect to that phenom-

enon, she now said, “That’s often one of the symptoms of

the chemical that is affecting the brain is by giving head-

aches.” (Tr. at 3092.)

After soliciting that statement, counsel for the plain-

tiffs asked, “Did you take into account her alteration in

level of consciousness and her low intellect in forming

your opinions as to Kathrene Froese?” Id.

“Yes,” Lantsberger replied, “I did.” Id.

At that point, plaintiffs’ counsel broke off her line of

questioning. Although she suggested that she would

ee

App. 41

“come back to that,” she never asked Lantsberger

whether Froese’s alteration of consciousness caused a

specific injury.

The final issue addressed on redirect was that of

“aggravation.” Counsel for the plaintiffs asked, “Would

you please tell the jury if you have an opinion, based

upon reasonable medical probability, as to Kathrene

Howell Froese as a whole person in relationship to her

condition and her exposure to the chemicals at the 1988

clean-up at the Kaiser Trentwood plant?” (Tr. at 3144.)

After an objection, Lantsberger responded by saying,

“As I had indicated, I have to look at these people as a

total. And I have to look at all of the information as an

aggregate. And as a result of putting all of the informa-

tion together, I believe that the problems that she is

experiencing are an aggravation of her preexisting condi-

tion. Aggravated as a more probable than not cause from

her exposure.” Id.

6. Merlin Carlson

Two experts analyzed the symptoms that Merlin Car-

lson reported. One was Dr. Daniel Goldstein. Although

the defendants challenge the admissibility of his testi-

mony on a number of other grounds, they concede that

he testified — on a more probable than not basis - that Mr.

Carlson sustained brain damage due to solvent exposure.

(Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Renewed

Motion at 82.)

The other expert who analyzed Mr. Carlson’s symp-

toms was Dr. Lantsberger. Not only did she testify about

App. 42

respiratory problems (Tr. at 1922-23, 1925-26), but she also

testified about fatigue, headaches, “overall body pain,”

and “whole person” aggravation. (Tr. at 1926, 3143.)

(a) Direct examination of Dr. Lantsberger

On direct, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether she

had an opinion regarding the cause of Mr. Carlson's

“problems with breathing.” (Tr. at 1925.) She said that she

had reached the “same conclusion” with respect to his

“breathing problems” that she had reached with respect

to his “brain injuries,” namely, “[t]hat he has a similar

pattern as the other coworkers, and that the overall epi-

demilogical data leads me to believe that his exposure in

the work site is the joining factor of all of the physical

problems.” (Tr. at 1926.)

Next, Dr. Lantsberger was asked whether there was a

relationship between Carlson’s complaints of “fatigue,

headache, [and] overall body pain” and “exposure to

chemicals in 1988.” Id. She replied, in part, “The other

coworkers complaining of the same, similar respiratory,

cognitive, joint and body aches, leads me to assume based

on epidemiological look at the exposure, the symptoms

beginning about the same time frame and continuing

subsequently leads me to believe that they are associated

with the exposure.” (Tr. at 1926-27.)

(b) Cross-examination of Dr. Lantsberger

Dr. Lantsberger acknowledged that it was during

August, 1991, that she last made a note regarding Carl-

son’s complaints of breathing problems. (Tr. at 2935.) She

App. 43

~

further acknowledge that Carlson does not have Reactive

Airways Dysfunction Syndrome, (Tr. at 2935), and that

she has never diagnosed asthma. Id.

With respect to “bone pain and joint aches,” she said,

“1 don’t know what caused these guys to have the aches

and pains, but I do now that a significant number of the

workers did have them.” (Tr. at 2936.)

(c) Re-direct examination of Dr. Lantsberger

Dr. Lantsberger denied that it made sense to look at

Merlin Carlson in terms of “isolated incidences [sic].” (Tr.

at 3142-43.) Over objection, she testified, “In terms of his

entire exposure, his preexisting as, as a consequence of

his exposure, I think that his preexisting problems were

aggravated by his exposure at Kaiser on a more probable

that not basis.” (Tr. at 3143.)

7. Deborah Williams

A number of experts testified for Ms. Williams,

including Drs. Lantsberger, Morton and Keppel.

Although much of Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony may be

construed as foundation for opinions given by other

experts, she was asked to render opinions of her own. For

example, during redirect, she reiterated her theory of

aggravation, saying, “l think in terms of Debbie,

again, .. . taking it in totality, that on a more probable

than not basis, I think that her conditions as we have

outlined them have been aggravated by her exposure at,

by her work at the Kaiser plant.” (Tr. at 3145.)

App. 44

8. Ruth Hopkins/John Hopkins

The defendants concede that the Hopkins’ principal

claims involved respiratory injuries. The defendants

argue, however, that the Hopkins also maintained a claim

for brain damage. The record reflects the following con-

cerning the defendants’ contention:

During direct examination, Dr. Samuel Milham was

asked by counsel for the Hopkins to read the conclusion

of a study to the jury. Milham relied, in part, “[T]he severe

neurologic injuries suffered by the workers in the incident are

sobering reminders that easily preventable organic sol-

vent related occupational illness continues to occur in a

highly developed country in the late 20th century.” (Tr. at

1436.) (Emphasis added.)

In addition, the Hopkins’ attorney participated

actively in the cross-examination of Dr. Neil Rosenberg,

the defendant’s expert on the subject of solvent-induced

organic brain damage. (Tr. at 9473-89, 9529-40.) He ques-

tioned Rosenberg about neurologic injury in general, (see,

e.g., Tr. at 9481-82), and Mrs. Hopkins’ case in particular —

including magnetic resonance imaging (“MRI”.) (Tr. at

9538-39.) He also had Rosenberg confirm that his testi-

mony had nothing to do with the “pulmonary aspect of

this case.” (Tr. at 9540.)

During closing, the Hopkins’ attorney devoted most

of his time to pulmonary complaints. He did not restrict

himself to that subject, however. For example, he asked

the jury to think about Ruth Hopkins’ “memory prob-

lems.” (Tr. at 12022.) Later, he said, “These chemicals can

hurt you. They can hurt your organs. They can hurt your

brains.” (Tr. at 12028.)

App. 45

It was at this point that he asked the jury to discount

Dr. Rosenberg’s testimony about magnetic resonance

imaging and Toluene abusers. In essence, he argued that

his clients’ exposure to organic solvents was distinguish-

able from that of the Toluene abusers Dr. Rosenberg had

described, thereby implying that it was of no significance

that Mrs. Hopkins’s MRI was normal. (Tr. at 12028-29.)

D. Sufficiency of Certain Expert Opinions (Anal-

ysis)

A motion for judgment as a matter of law may be

granted when “a party has been fully heard with respect

to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis

for a reasonable jury to have found for that party with respect

to that issue... . ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)(1). See Montiel v. City

of Los Angeles, 2 F.3d 335, 342 (9th Cir.1993). The moving

party must demonstrate that insofar as the verdict is

concerned, the evidence permits but one reasonable con-

clusion. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1467 (9th Cir.1993).

1. Dan Glass

Dr. Lantsberger examined Mr. Glass on three occa-

sions. The first examination occurred during October,

1989: the second during May, 1990; and the third during

September, 1991. Mr. Glass did not report respiratory

problems on those occasions, nor did Dr. Lantsberger

diagnose pulmonary injury or disability. Given the record

as it now exists, a reasonable jury could not have found

for Mr. Glass on that issue.

;*

App. 46

With respect to Mr. Glass’ heart palpitations, Dr.

Lantsberger could only say that they may have been

related to his industrial exposure. Testimony of that sort

is legally insufficient. Under Washington law, an opinion

that a “physical disability ‘might have’ or ‘possibly did’

result from the hypothesized cause” is nothing more than

conjecture. O'Donoghue v. Riggs, 73 Wn.2d 814, 824, 440

P.2d 823 (1968). “To remove the issue from the realm of

speculation, the medical testimony must at least be suffi-

ciently definite to establish that the act complained of

‘probably’ or ‘more likely than not’ caused the subse-

quent disability.” Id.

Regarding headaches and memory loss, Dr. Lan-

tsberger was forced to concede that she had been unable

to find a cause-and-effect relationship between Glass’

participation in the Kaiser cleanup and his subsequent

complaints. Thus, her testimony concerning those condi-

tions falls short of the O'Donoghue standard.

Dr. Lantsberger attempted to bridge that causal gap

by suggesting that Glass’ “whole person” had been

“aggravated.” However, after Daubert and Claar, it is

difficult to see how Lantsberger’s fall-back theory can be

considered “scientific knowledge.” If none of Glass’s

specific symptoms can be linked to the cleanup on a

more-probable-than-not basis, how is it possible that his

whole person was aggravated?

It is the plaintiffs’ burden to demonstrate that Dr.

Lantsberger arrived at her conclusions “using scientific

methods and procedures,” and that her “conclusion [are]

not mere subjective beliefs or unsupported speculation.”

Claar, 29 F.3d at 502. Insofar as Lantsberger’s aggravation

App. 47

theory is concerned, the plaintiffs have failed to satisfy

that requirement.

In conclusion, a reasonable jury could not have found

for Glass on any of his claims. Dr. Lantsberger’s causa-

tion testimony was legally insufficient, and her aggrava-

tion theory is not scientific knowledge.

2. David Schudel

It is undisputed that Mr. Schudel did not sustain

neurologic injury as a result of his participation in the

Kaiser cleanup. A reasonable jury could not have found

for him on that issue. Similarly, although Dr. Lantsberger

suggested that Schudel’s exposure to chemicals caused

actual pulmonary injury, she could say only that his

“lung condition” was “related to his exposures.” Given

Lantsberger’s uncertainty, a finding for Schudel on a

claim of actual pulmonary injury would have been noth-

ing more than speculation. O'Donoghue, 73 Wn.2d at 824.

Two possibilities remain. One is that Mr. Schudel has

developed a conditioned response to chemicals as a result

of working at Kaiser. The other is that his whole person

was aggravated. The latter has already been discussed. It

is not sound science. With respect to the former (i.e.,

conditioned response), there are two serious questions.

First, is Dr. Lantsberger qualified to render an essentially

psychiatric opinion? Second, is there anything in the

record to indicate that her opinion reflects scientific

knowledge?

It is clear from Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony that

David Schudel’s response to odors is psychological in

App. 48

nature. Notwithstanding its psychological nature, plain-

tiffs’ counsel made no effort to show that Dr. Lantsberger

is qualified to diagnose or treat psychological disorders.

Indeed, she freely admitted that she is not an expert in

psychiatry. (Tr. at 2337.)

Even if Dr. Lantsberger was qualified to render a

psychiatric opinion of the sort she gave here, plaintiffs’

counsel failed to establish that Lantsberger’s conclusion

reflects sound science. Not one journal article was offered

in support of Dr. Lantsberger’s opinion, nor was an effort

made to satisfy any of the other Daubert criteria. As a

result, Dr. Lantsberger’s opinion fails to pass Rule 702

muster.

3. Craig Thompson

Dr. Lantsberger failed to link any of Mr. Thompson's

specific complaints to the Kaiser project on a more-proba-

ble-than-not basis. Her fall-back was “aggravation,” a

theory which does not meet the standards for admis-

sibility established by Rule 702. It follows that the jury’s

verdict in Mr. Thompson’s favor was based upon specula-

tion, nothing more.

4. Tim Schudel

Dr. Lantsberger acknowledge that Mr. Schudel

“needed to have a pulmonary work-up by a pulmonolo-

gist,” but that she “never did get him in to see one.”

Notwithstanding the absence of expert pulmonological

evidence, Lantsberger suggested that Schudel developed

App. 49

respiratory problems as a result of his exposure to “chem-

icals.” In that regard, however, she could say only that he

told her that he had not had problems before Kaiser and

that he did have problems after Kaiser.

That Mr. Schudel’s symptoms appeared after he

worked at Kaiser may establish a temporal link between

work and symptoms, but it does not establish a causal

link. See Rohrbough v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 916 F.2d 970,

974 (4th Cir.1990) (mere fact that a child suffered seizures

after receiving a vaccination insufficient to establish cau-

sation). Dr. Lantsberger’s testimony on that point is

therefore insufficient.

Tim Schudel obtained neuropsychological testing.

While the psychologist report that it was possible that

Schudel’s previous learning disabilities had been aggra-

vated, he could not say that aggravation was reasonably

certain. Indeed, as soon as Schudel was counseled regard-

ing the report's findings, he quit complaining of memory

loss. Given those undisputed facts, a reasonable jury

could not have found for Mr. Schudel on the question of

neurological injury.

That leaves Dr. Lantsberger’s aggravation theory. It is

neither scientifically nor causally sufficient to support the

jury's verdict.

5. Kathrene Froese

A reasonable jury could have found for Ms. Froese on

her respiratory claim. Were that her only claim, no fur-

ther discussion would be necessary. However, it was not.

Dr. Lantsberger was asked to testify regarding Ms.

App. 50

Froese’s complaints of rash, memory loss, and headaches.

With respect to these symptoms, Dr. Lantsberger was

either never asked about a causal relationship, or if she

was, her testimony fell short of the O'Donoghue standard.

6. Merlin Carlson

Mr. Carlson’s principal claim was for toxic encepha-

lopathy. He did not stop there, however. Dr. Lantsberger

reported breathing problems, fatigue, headaches, and

“overall body pain.”

With respect to respiratory complaints, Dr. Lants-

berger was forced to concede that Mr. Carlson does not

have Reactive Airways Dysfunction Syndrome or indus-

trially induced asthma. Similarly, with respect to “bone

pain and joint aches,” she could only say, “I don’t know

what caused these guys to have the aches and pains, but I

do know that a significant number of the workers did

have them.” Given the record, a reasonable jury could not

have found for Mr. Carlson on his non-neurological

claims.

7. Deborah Williams

Ms. Williams presented claims for organic brain dam-

age and respiratory injury. A number of experts testified

on her behalf. Although Dr. Lantsberger opined that Ms.

conditions” were aggravated by work at Kai-

ser, it is questionable whether her testimony would have

had appreciable impact on the jury’s verdict.

* #

Williams

App. 51

8. Ruth Hopkins/John Hopkins

Based upon the evidence presented by the Hopkins,

their cross-examination of Dr. Rosenberg, and the manner

in which they argued their case, a reasonable jury would

have assumed the Hopkins were making a claim for brain

damage. Granted, the jury may not have viewed it as the

Hopkins’ principal claim, but the jury would have under-

stood that it was a very real part of the Hopkins’ case.

Therein lies the problem. Having chosen to make a claim

for solvent-induced brain damage, the Hopkins were

obligated to prove it. They failed to do so. A reasonable

jury could not have found that the Hopkins suffered

neurologic injuries as a proximate cause of the defen-

dants’ negligence. The defendants are therefore entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on that particular claim.

E. Sufficiency of Certain Expert Opinions (Con-

clusion)

In view of the foregoing, the defendants are entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on a number of claims.

They include the following: all claims asserted by Dan

Glass, David Schduel, Craig Thompson and Tim Schudel;

all non-respiratory claims asserted by Kathrene Froese;

all non-neurological claims asserted by Merlin Carlson;

and all non-respiratory claims asserted by the Hopkins.

Although several claims must be dismissed, several

remain. The next question is whether a new trial is neces-

sary.

App. 52

Approximately six weeks prior to trial, the Court

asked the plaintiffs to list their claims against the defen-

dants. (Order Re Daubert Procedure (Ct. Rec. 326) at 7.)

The plaintiffs declined to do so. (Plaintiffs’ Lists of

Claims (Ct. Rec. 334).) Instead, they presented the jury

with a long list of symptoms, only some of which could

be connected to the plaintiffs’ work at Kaiser on a more

probable than not basis. Furthermore, when it came time

to instruct the jury, the plaintiffs rejected a suggestion

that the jurors be asked to decide specific claims.

The plaintiffs’ choice of tactics has placed the Court

in an awkward position. Because the jurors were not

asked to return verdicts with respect to each plaintiff's

individual claims, it is now impossible to separate the

wheat from the chaff. Thus, the Court is forced to con-

clude that the verdicts in favor of Kathrene Froese, Mer-

lin Carlson, Ruth Hopkins and John Hopkins are too

tainted to stand. For that reason, the plaintiffs’ remaining

claims must be re-tried.

Ill. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

The defendants give twelve reasons why the Court

should order a new trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. They include

the following: First, by urging thesjury to “send a mes-

sage” to the defendants, the plaintiffs injected irrelevant,

arbitrary, and punitive considerations into the jury’s

deliberations. Second, the Court failed to instruct the jury

on Washington’s medical causation standard. Third, the

Court’s instructions with respect to state and federal

safety regulations were in error. Fourth, the Court failed

to instruct the jury on the limited duties of the employer

App. 53

of an independent contractor. Fifth, the plaintiffs violated

a pretrial order by introducing evidence regarding Daniel

Skeman. Sixth, the Court applied Bryan v. John Bean, 566

F.2d 541 (5th Cir.1978), in an improper manner. Seventh,

the defendants should have been allowed to cross-exam-

ine the plaintiffs regarding inconsistent statements made

to Diane Nebel. Eight, the plaintiffs should not have been

allowed to offer evidence regarding symptoms experi-

enced by non-plaintiff workers. Ninth, the plaintiffs were

permitted to suggest that a defense expert had no basis

for opining that Mrs. Hopkins’s depression had a cause

other than that suggested by her experts. Tenth, the jury's

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. Eleventh,

the damages awarded were excessive both as a matter of

fact and a matter of law. Twelfth, the defendants’ right to

cross-examination was violated.

Given the Court’s various rulings with respect to the

defendants’ motion for judgment as a matter of law, the

defendants’ alternative request for a new trial is moot

with respect to all but Deborah Williams. Insofar as she is

concerned, the defendants’ motion is denied.

IV. PLAINTIFFS’ REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES

AND COSTS

On July 22, 1994, the plaintiffs filed a timely request

for attorneys’ fees, together with a request for costs

beyond those normally awarded to prevailing parties.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d). The defendants have objected to both.

Since then, the Court has granted the defendants’

Rule 50(b) motion in substantial part, dismissing a

number of the plaintiffs’ claims. Only the verdict in favor

App. 54

of Ms. Williams remains intact. However, because it does,

she may be entitled to fees and cos‘s.

The Court has two options concerning Ms. Williams’s

request. It can defer ruling until after the appellate pro-

cess has run its course, or it can decide the matter of fees

and costs at this juncture. Fed.R.Civ.P. 58 advisory com-

mittee’s note (1993 amendment).

The latter is the best course. This lawsuit has gener-

ated a number of complex legal questions, among them

whether Ms. Williams is entitled to fees and costs. Instead

of presenting them to the Court of Appeals piecemeal, it

is best to resolve as many as possible now so that they

may be reviewed together. Id. (“in many cases it may be

more efficient to decide fee questions before an appeal is

taken”).

One final issue must be addressed before turning to

the merits of Ms. Williams’s request — the matter of the

Court’s jurisdiction. As the advisory committee noted,

post-trial fee requests can create complicated jurisdic-

tional questions. To avoid them, Rule 58 permits a district

court to treat a request for fees as a Rule 59 motion and

extend the time for appeal from the underlying judgment.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 58. It is appropriate to do so here, and the

Court so orders.

A. Attorneys’ Fees

Ms. Williams submits that her request for fees may be

granted under either of two theories. One is based upon

state law, the other upon federal law. The two theories

will be examined separately.

App. 55

(a) State Law

When a request for attorneys’ fees is made in a

diversity action, and the request arises from the sub-

stance of a state-law claim, the request is governed by the

law of the forum state. Price v. Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1475

(9th Cir.1992). Washington follows the “American Rule.”

Dayton v. Farmers Insurance Group, 124 Wn.2d 277, 280,

876 P.2d 896 (1994). According to that rule, a court has no

power to award attorney fees as a cost of litigation absent

a contract, a statute, or some recognized principle in

equity. Id. Here, there is neither a contractual nor an

equitable basis for awarding fees. If Ms. Williams is to

recover attorneys’ fees, she must cite a statute which

authorizes them. She attempts to do just that.

According to Ms. Williams, the defendants violated

the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act

(“WISHA”)? by failing to provide adequate warnings

regarding the solvents used in the cleanup. She does not

assert that the defendants are liable for fees under

WISHA, however. Instead, she argues that the defendants

are liable for attorneys’ fees under one of three entirely

separate statutes — the Worker and Community Right to

Know Act.,? the Hazardous Waste Management Act,* or

the Model Toxics Control Act.°

Although ingenious, Ms. Williams’s state-law theory

is without merit. First, the jury did not find that the

2 RCW Chapt. 49.17.

3 RCW Chapt. 49.70

4 RCW Chapt. 70.105.

5 RCW Chapt. 70.105D.

App. 56

defendants violated either WISHA or any regulation pro-

mulgated thereunder. Thus, there would appear to be no

basis for Ms. Williams’s assertion that the defendants

violated that statute. Second, while it is true that the

Worker and Community Right to Know Act, the Hazard-

ous Waste Management Act, and the Model Toxics Con-

trol Act authorize fees in certain limited situations, there

is nothing in them to suggest that their (respective) fee

provisions can be invoked based upon a violation of an

entirely separate statute. See, e.g., RCW 49.70.150 (a civil

action may be brought to “compel compliance with the

provisions of this chapter or any rule promulgated under

this chapter”); RCW 70.105.097 (a “person injured as a

result of a violation of this chapter or the rules adopted

thereunder may bring an action... ”); RCW 70.105D.080

(“a person may bring a private right of action . . . for the

recovery of remedial action costs”). Finally, neither Ms.

Williams nor any of the other plaintiffs included the

matter of attorneys’ fees in the pretrial order. See Price

Dev. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 852 F.2d 1123, 1128 (9th

Cir.1988) (denying request for fees where pretrial order |

contained no indication that parties would be seeking

fees).

(b) Federal law

Ms. Williams also seeks fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.

That statute provides that an “attorney . . . who so

multiplies the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vex-

atiously may be required by the court to satisfy person-

ally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees

reasonably incurred because of such conduct.”

App. 57

Without question, the attorneys for the defendants

mounted a very aggressive defense on behalf of their

clients. There is no evidence, however, that they acted in

bad faith. For that reason, § 1927 is inapplicable here. See

MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Moore, 952 F.2d 1120, 1122 (9th

Ciri.1991) (§ 1927 requires a finding of bad faith).

B. Costs

In light of the Court’s prior rulings, it is clear that

Ms. Williams will need to revise her request for costs. She

should consider the following in doing so:

Ms. Williams asked for expert witness fees. Since

none of her witnesses were court-appointed, she is lim-

ited to the sums authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1821. See

Association of Flight Attendants v. Horizon Air, 976 F.2d 541,

551-52 (9th Cir.1992).

Ms. Williams seeks reimbursement for obtaining

copies of depositions. Although district courts have the

authority to tax such costs, Alflex Corporation v. Underwri-

ters Laboratories, 914 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 61, 116 L.Ed.2d 36 (1991),

the exercise of that discretion is often guided by local

rule. In this district, “[s]tenographic fees for depositions

may be allowed only when the deposition is used at trial

or hearing for substantive, as opposed to impeachment

purposes. Only the original deposition shall be taxed.”

Local Rule (“LR”) 54(f)(2).

In addition, Ms. Williams may be asking for other

costs associated with the taking of depositions. If so, she

must demonstrate that the costs were necessarily

App. 58

incurred. See. Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432,

1438-39 (9th Cir.1993).

Finally, Ms. Williams seeks compensation for

expenses assumed in obtaining daily transcripts of court

proceedings. Because of the length and complexity of the |

case, Ms. Williams is entitled to an award of costs for |

those portions of the daily transcript necessary for pre-

sentation of her claims. See Independent Iron Works, Inc. v.

United States Steel Corporation, 322 F.2d 656, 678 (9th Cir.)

(trial transcripts were reasonably necessary given the

complexity and length of proceedings), cert. denied, 375

U.S. 922, 84 S.Ct. 267, 11 L.Ed.2d 165 (1963).

V. MOTION TO AMEND VERDICT

Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation is one

legal entity; Kaiser Aluminum Corporation is another.

Since at least October, 1991, it is Kaiser Aluminum and

Chemical Corporation which has been one of the two

named defendants in this action.

The jury returned its verdict on July 13, 1994. Judg-

ment was entered that same day. The judgment refers to

Kaiser Aluminum Corporation, not Kaiser Aluminum and

Chemical Corporation.

Defendant Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corpora-

tion now moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 60, to amend

the judgment to reflect its true name. The plaintiffs do not

object.

TT

App. 59

Kaiser aluminum and Chemical Corporation is cor-

rect. The wrong corporate entity was listed in the judg-

ment. As a result, its motion will be granted and the

judgment modified accordingly.

VI. MOTION TO SET DISCOVERY HEARING

The Plaintiffs move the Court to set a hearing to

investigate their allegations that the defendants abused

the discovery process. No authorities have been cited in

support of this request.

Given the Court’s previous rulings, the plaintiffs’

motion is (at best) premature. Consequently, their motion

will be denied.

VII. MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT

The defendants move the Court to stay any proceed-

ings to enforcement the judgment pending resolution of

their post-trial motions. Fed.R.Civ.P. 62(b). With entry of

this order, the defendants’ request becomes moot. It will

therefore be denied.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The plaintiffs’ motion to strike defense motions

as untimely (Ct. Rec. 536) is denied.

2. The defendants’motion to strike plaintiffs’ mem-

orandum (Ct. Rec. 565) is denied.

3. The plaintiffs’ motion to strike reply (Ct. Rec.

552) is denied.

App. 60

4. The defendants’ motion for judgement as a mat-

ter of law (Ct. Rec. 488) is denied in part and granted in

part. The judgments entered herein are re-opened and

modified as follows:

(a) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-

ter of law on all claims asserted by Dan Glass, David

Schudel, Craig Thompson and Tim Schudel. Those claims

are dismissed with prejudice.

(b) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-

ter of law on all non-respiratory claims asserted by

Kathrene Froese. Those claims are dismissed with preju-

dice.

(c) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-

ter of law on all non-neurological claims asserted by

Merlin Carlson. Those claims are dismissed with preju-

dice.

(d) The defendants are granted judgment as a mat-

ter of law on all non-respiratory claims asserted by Ruth

Hopkins and John Hopkins. Those claims are dismissed

with prejudice.

5. The defendants are granted a new trial on all

remaining claims.

6. The defendants’ motion for new trial or alterna-

tive relief (Ct. Rec. 486) is denied.

7. The plaintiffs’ timely request for attorneys’ fees

and costs shall have the same effect under Fed.R.App.P.

4(a)(4) as a Rule 59 motion, and the period for filing a

notice of appeal shall be extended accordingly.

App. 61

8. The plaintiffs’ request for attorneys’ fees and

costs is denied in part and granted in part. Ms. Deborah

Williams is directed to submit a revised cost bill.

9. Defendant Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Cor-

poration’s motion to amend or correct judgments (Ct.

Rec. 513) is granted. The judgments entered herein shall

refer to “Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation,”

not “Kaiser Aluminum Corporation.”

10. The plaintiffs’ motion for order shortening time

(Ct. Rec. 555) is denied.

11. The plaintiffs’ motions for order setting hearing

on discovery abuses (Ct. Recs. 534 and 563) are denied.

12. The defendants’ motion for stay of proceedings

to enforce judgments (Ct. Rec. 490) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk is hereby directed to

file this order, enter judgment accordingly, and furnish

copies to counsel.

DATED this 22 day of November 1994.

/s/ Fred Van Sickle

FRED VAN SICKLE

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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