Appendix — Parker v. Wakelin
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| 97 1181 JAN 15 1998
-_ OFFICE OF PHE CLERK
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
RICHARD M. PARKER et al.,
Petitioners,
v.
Davip S. WAKELIN et ai.,
Respondents.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
ROBERT H. CHANIN
(Counsel of Record)
JOHN M. WEST
JONATHAN D. HACKER
BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C.
1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 1300
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 833-9340
DONALD F.. FONTAINE
FONTAINE & BEAL, P.A.
482 Congress Street
Portland, Maine 04112
(207) 879-1879
Attorneys for Petitioners
WILson - Eras Printing Co., Inc. - 769-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
@ EER w
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit in Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1
Re Ge MUI cininpseneciinidgnsviiehonestnicoinmaiadbamenistcimaniiaes
Opinion of the United States District Court for
the District of Maine in Parker v. Wakelin, 937
Bo CI IE eats IIA OID siceciieeeces ecient drcicdeneniocts
Order of the En Banc Court of the United States
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Parker
v. Wakelin, Nos. 96-2225, 96-2226, 96-2227 & 96-
ee ee Cire Sis i UU DF ccetethaiticitignscienkbinmmenpesovsiers
Statutory Provisions Involved ..............02.2.......0........
Page
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FIRST CIRCUIT
Nos. 96-2225 through 96-2228
RICHARD M. PARKER, et al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
Cross-A ppellants,
Vv.
Davip S. WAKELIN, et al.,
Defendants, Appellants,
Cross-A ppellees.
Heard April 8, 1997
Decided Aug. 11, 1997
Before TORRUEL“A, Chief Judge, BOUDIN and
LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.
The question presented by this appeal is whether cer-
tain legislative amendments to the Maine State Retirement
System (“MSRS”) violate the Contract Clause of the
United States Constitution as applied to plaintiffs, a class
comprised of current Maine public school teachers all of
whom are members of the MSRS. Following a bench
trial, the district court held that certain amendments vio-
lated the Contract Clause as applied to those public em-
ployees who had satisfied the service requirements under
2a
the MSRS and whose pension rights had thereby “vested.”
Finding no unmistakable intent on the part of the Maine
legislature to create private contractual rights against the
reduction of pension benefits prior to the point at which
pension benefits may actually be received, we hold that the
Maine amendments do not violate the Contract Clause
with regard to any of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we re-
verse the district court’s holding that the amendments vio-
late the Contract Clause as applied to “vested” members
of the MSRS.
BACKGROUND
None of the relevant facts recited below are in dispute.
I. The Maine State Retirement System (MSRS)
The MSRS operates as a public pension trust pursuant
to Maine’s public employee retirement benefit statute.
See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001-18663 (1989 & Supp.1996).
The MSRS was created in 1942 to encourage “qualified
persons to seek public employment and to continue in pub-
lic employment in their productive years.” 5 M.R.S.A.
§ 17050 (1989). For all Maine state employees, includ-
ing the public school teachers comprising the plaintiff
class in the instant case, membership in the MSRS is man-
datory. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001(14), 17651 (1989). All
MSRS members make mandatory contributions into a pen-
sion fund. The State of Maine also contributes annually
to maintain the fund’s actuarial soundness with regard to
future benefit obligations. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17701-A,
17701-B, 171531(1-A)(B) (Supp. 1996). The MSRS can
be classified as a “defined benefit system,” in that the re-
tirement benefits provided for teachers are defined upon
employment and financed in part by their fixed contribu-
tions into the system.
The teachers, as members of the system, qualify to re-
ceive retirement benefits upon (1) reaching the statutory
retirement age, and (2) satisfying either of the following
3a
service requirements: (a) at least ten years of creditable
service; or (b) at least one year of creditable service
prior to reaching the statutory retirement age while
in public service. 5 M.R.S.A. $ 17851 (1989 & Supp.
1996). Alternatively, a member may be entitled to re-
ceive retirement benefits when he or she retires after per-
forming at least 25 years of creditable service. Jd. In the
district court’s decision, the term “vesting” was used to
describe the satisfaction of the service requirements. See
Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F.Supp. 46, 49 n. 1 (D.Me.1996).
However, as the district court in fact noted, the term
“vesting” does not figure in the statutory scheme itself,
which simply indicates the age and service requirements
that must be met. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 17851 (1989 &
Supp.1996).' Members who terminate their public service
prior to satisfying the pension eligibility requirements are
entitled to a return of their contributions, with interest.
5 M.R.S.A. § 17705(2).
An eligible retiree earns a pension in the amount of
two percent of his or her “average final compensation”
multiplied by the number of years of total creditable pub-
lic service (up to 25 years). 5 M.R.S.A. § 17852
(1989).* The legislative amendments at issue on this ap-
peal affect, among other things, the process by which one
computes an employee’s “average final compensation” in
such a manner as to reduce the expected pension benefits
of many members.
The State of Maine concedes that the sole purpose for
enacting the changes in the terms and conditions of retire-
ment benefits (“the 1993 Amendments”) was to save
money by lowering budget allocations by the state to the
! Other non-pension benefits under the retirement system, such as
life insurance and disability retirement benefits, may be received
without having satisfied any minimum service requirement.
2 A slightly different method applies to those retirees whose eli gi-
bility is based on having completed 25 or more years of creditable
service.
4a
trust funds of the MSRS; their enactment coincided with
other responses to a state fiscal crisis. The 1993 Amend-
ments may be sorted into two groups: three changes apply
to the pensions of all current teacher-members of the
MSRS, while three others apply only to those who had not
satisfied the service requirements under the MSRS as of
the effective date of the amendments. None of the amend-
ments affected retirees earning pensions as of the effective
date. The amendments that affected all of the plaintiffs
were: (1) an increase in the rate of required member
contributions from 6.5 percent of their salary to 7.65 per-
cent; (2) a cap on the salary increase that may be in-
cluded in the course of calculating the level of teachers’
retirement benefits; and (3) a six-month delay in the first
cost-of-living adjustment of retirement benefits. See P.L.
1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 28, 13, 31.° The district court
held that these three modifications were unconstitutional as
applied to those plaintiffs who had satisfied the service
requirements. The other 1993 amendments, which only
applied to those who had not served 10 years as of the
effective date of the amendments, were: (1) an increase
in the regular retirement age from 60 to 62; (2) an in-
crease in the early retirement penalty from 2.25 percent to
6 percent of the teachers’ retirement benefit for each year
preceding age 62; and (3) the elimination of an inclusion
of per diem payment of up to thirty days of unused sick
or vacation pay in the course of calculating teachers’ re-
tirement benefits. See P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 33, 35,
37, 12. It is not disputed that the 1993 Amendments
operate to the disadvantage of MSRS members without
providing substantive offsetting benefits.
When the MSRS was first adopted in 1942, the legisla-
ture made no express statement as to its ability to amend
8 These provisions are codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A.
§§ 17001-B, 17701(18)(C), 17806(3).
‘These provisions are codified as amended at 5 M.RS.A.
§§ 17851(1-A) & (2-A), 17852(3-A), 17001(13) (B).
Se
———EE
Sa’
or alter the pension benefit structure. In 1975, the Maine
legislature enacted the following provision:
No amendment to this chapter shall cause any reduc-
tion in the amount of benefits which would be due
to the member based on creditable service, compen-
sation, employee contributions and the provisions of
this chapter on the date immediately preceding the
effective date of such amendment.
P.L.1975, ch. 622, § 6, codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 17801
(1989), under the title “Amendment not to cause reduc-
tion in benefit.” °
II. The Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs, the Maine Education Association and a class
representing public school teachers throughout the State
of Maine, challenged the constitutionality of the 1993
Amendments under the Contract Clause, the Due Process
Clause, and the Takings Clause, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to block implementation. The district
court held that: (1) the 1993 Amendments violated the
Contract Clause only as applied te MSRS members whose
benefits had “vested” under the system; and (2) the 1993
Amendments did not violate any other provision of the
constitution. By using the term “vested” the district court
referred to those MSRS members who had satisfied the
service requirements under the system—a service require-
ment is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition to
being entitled to actually receive a pension. See Parker v.
Wakelin, 937 F.Supp. at 49 n. 1.
° The current version has a few minor changes in language:
No amendment to this Part may cause any reduction in the
amount of benefits that would be due to a member based on
creditable service, earnable compensation, employee contribu-
tions, pick-up contributions and the provisions of this Part on
the date immediately preceding the effective date of the amend-
ment.
6a
On appeal, the state defendants ask that we hold that
the 1993 Amendments do not violate the Contract Clause
as applied to any of the plaintiffs. In their cross-appeal,
the plaintiffs argue that the 1993 Amendments violate the
Contract Clause as applied to all teacher members of the
MSRS prior to the effective date of the amendments, and
that the 1993 Amendments also violate substantive due
process.
DISCUSSION
The essential facts being undisputed, this appeal turns
on questions of law over which we exercise de novo re-
view. See Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 75 F.3d 727, 730 (lst
Cir.1996). This appeal raises a legal issue of considerable
importance, one we specifically left unresolved in McGrath
v. Rhode Island Retirement Board, 88 F.3d 12, 19 (lst
Cir.1996). When stated broadly, the issue is whether a
legislative amendment to a state employee retirement pen-
sion plan that is detrimental to employees triggers further
scrutiny under the Contract Clause as applied to state em-
ployees whose pension rights under the plan have “vested”
prior to such amendment. In McGrath, we did not need
to resolve this issue, because the plaintiff's pension rights
had not vested prior to the legislative amendment at issue,
and because the legislature specifically reserved the power
to amend or terminate the plan as to nonvested members.
88 F.3d at 19-20. We now conclude that a blanket answer
to the issue of Contract Clause protection for vested em-
ployees is not possible, because, as we explain below, a
detailed examination of the particular provisions of a state
pension program will be required prior to determining the
nature and scope of the unmistakable contractual rights,
if any, that are created by a given state legislature.
I. General Contract Clause Principles
Although the wording of the Contract Clause appears
uncompromising—‘“No state shall . . . pass any .. . Law
7a
impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .”*—the Su-
preme Court does not interpret it as an absolute bar on
the impairment of either governmental or private con-
tractual obligations. See United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1517, 52 L.Ed.2d
92 (1977) (“‘[T]he prohibition is not an absolute one
and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathe-
matical formula.’” (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n y.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 54 S.Ct. 231, 236, 78 L.Ed.
413 (1934))). Rather, the Supreme Court has elaborated
an analysis under which a court must first ascertain
whether a change in state law has resulted in “ ‘the sub-
stantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’ ” Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 US. 181, 186, 112
S.Ct. 1105, 1109, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) (quoting
Allied Structural Steel Co. y. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,
244, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2722, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978)).
Next, the reviewing court must determine whether the im-
pairment is nevertheless justified as “reasonable and nec-
essary to serve an important public purpose.” United
States Trust Co., 431 US. at 25, 97 S.Ct. at 1519.
Where the contract allegedly impaired is one created, or
entered into, by the state itself, less deference to a legisla-
tive determination of reasonableness and necessity is re-
quired, because “the State’s self-interest is at stake.” 7d.
at 26, 97 S.Ct. at 1519: see also McGrath, 88 F.3d at 16
(when the state itself is a party, it “must do more than
mouth the vocabulary of the public weal in order to reach
safe harbor.”).
The first step described above can be further broken
down into “three components: whether there is a con-
tractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that
contractual relationship, and whether the impairment is
substantial.” Romein, 503 U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109.
In the instant case, we need not reach the issue of impair-
*U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
8a
ment or substantiality, because the plaintiffs fail to demon-
strate the existence of a contractual relationship protected
by the Contract Clause. At the same time that less defer-
ence is given to state legislatures when it is the state that
wishes to relieve itself of contractual obligations, a clear
showing must be made that a state law has created a con-
tractual obligation on the part of the state in the first
place. See Hoffman v. Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 614 (Ist
Cir.1990) (“The Contract Clause is applicable to con-
tracts into which the state enters, but normally state statu-
tory enactments do not of their own force create a con-
tract with those whom the statute benefits.” ).
Il. The Unmistakability Doctrine
In order to deem a state legislative enactment a con-
tract for the purposes of the Contract Clause, there must
be a clear indication that the legislature intends to bind
itself in a contractual manner. See National R.R. Passen-
ger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470
U.S. 451, 465-66, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 84 L.Ed.2d 432
(1985) (“[A]bsent some clear indication that the legisla-
ture intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption
is that ‘a law is not intended to create private contractual
or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued
until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.’” (quoting
Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98,
100, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937)); United States Trust Co., 431
U.S. at 17-18 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 1515-16 n. 14 (a statute
may be treated as a binding contract “when the language
and the circumstances evince a legislative intent to create
private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against
the state.”).
This threshold requirement for the recognition of public
contracts has been referred to as the “unmistakability doc-
trine.” See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 19 (citing United States
v. Winstar, US. , 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d
964 (1996)). In United States v. Winstar, the Supreme
IRN ts ak
9a
Court traced the history of the unmistakability doctrine
from Justice Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810), and explained
its purpose. Because legislatures should not bind future
legislatures from employing their sovereign powers in the
absence of the clearest of intent to create vested rights
protected under the Contract Clause, courts developed
canons of construction disfavoring implied governmental
contractual obligations. Thus, “ ‘neither the right of taxa-
tion, nor any other power of sovereignty, will be held... .
to have been surrendered, unless such surrender has been
expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.’” Wéinstar,
U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2455 (quoting Jefferson
Branch Bank vy. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446
(1861)). The requirement that “the government’s obli-
gation unmistakably appear thus served the dual purposes
of limiting contractual incursions on a State’s sovereign
powers and of avoiding difficult constitutional questions
about the extent of State authority to limit the subsequent
exercise of legislative power.” Winstar, USS. at .
116 S.Ct. at 2455.
In its most recent Contract Clause case holding a state
to its obligations under a public contract, the Supreme
Court found ample evidence that a promise on the part
of the state had been made in a contractual setting, in re-
turn for a specific bargained-for benefit, and found that
the statutory scheme clearly employed the language of con-
tract. See United States Trust Co., 431 USS. at 18, 97
S.Ct. at 1515 (involving a legislative covenant between
New York and New Jersey and future bondholders where
the very “purpose of the covenant was to invoke the con-
Stitutional protection of the Contract Clause as security
against repeal”). In the instant case, we must determine
whether the MSRS also evinces a clear intent on the part
of the Maine legislature to create contractual rights
against the modification of pension benefits.
10a
III. Pension Plans as Contractual Obligations
The law governing the rights of members of public em-
ployee retirement plans varies greatly from state to state,
and has not been the subject of federal regulation or
harmonization. There is no modern Supreme Court case
that provides guidance as to the rights public employees
have to their pensions. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 10
S.Ct. 149, 33 L.Ed. 426 (1889), stands for the proposi-
tion that public employee pension programs do not create
vested rights against legislative modifications, and thus
are gratuities that a state may freely revoke. See Pennie,
132 U.S. at 470-71, 10 S.Ct. at 151 (holding California’s
adjustment of a pension benefit plan for police officers did
not constitute deprivation of property without due proc-
ess). Althrough this “gratuity” approach has been re-
jected by most state courts, Pennie has never been ex-
plicitly overruled. See generally 60A Am.Jur.2d, Pensions
and Retirement Funds, §§ 1620-29 (discussing the shift
away from the gratuity approach toward the contract ap-
proach). Pennie has, however, been ignored as a prece-
dent, perhaps because its dicta regarding public pension
benefits arose in the context of a Due Process claim.
Although only two other circuits have addressed this
question, state courts have generally viewed a public pen-
sion plan as creating implied-in-fact unilateral contracts.
See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 17 (collecting cases). The
Ninth Circuit in State of Nevada Employees Ass'n v.
Keating, 903 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.1990), agreed with the
Nevada Supreme Court that the “ ‘better reasoned view’
recognizes that non-vested employees have contractual
rights in pension plans ‘subject to reasonable modification
in order to keep the system flexible to meet changing con-
ditions, and to maintain the actuarial soundness of the
system.’” 903 F.2d at 1227 (quoting Public Employees’
Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 96 Nev. 718, 615
P.2d 972 (1980)). Thus the Ninth Circuit in Keating
concluded that a Nevada law penalizing the withdrawal
of pension contributions and therevy altering the previ-
i ae a aan anaes
lla
ous law that contained no such penalty, violated the Con-
tract Clause because it did not represent a reasonable
modification of the pension plan. The court in K eating
noted, however, that the state did not dispute that
Nevada's statutes providing pensions for public employees
created contractual obligations. See Keating, 903 F.2d at
1225-26. The Fourth Circuit also ignored the gratuity
approach in the course of holding that legislative amend-
ments to a North Carolina public employee disability ben-
efit plan did not violate the Contract Clause because,
under relevant state law interpretations of the statute,
rights to benefits under the plan did not vest until retire.
ment. See Kestler v. Board of Trustees of North Carolina
Legal Governmental Employees’ Retirement Sys., 48 F.3d
800, 804 (4th Cir.1995) (no Contract Clause violation
where plaintiff was not vested at the time of the effective
date of the amendment).
These cases reflect the modern trend among state su-
preme courts, which is to protect pension rights on the
theory that a state’s promise of pension benefits repre-
sents an offer that can be accepted through the employ-
ee’s performance—thus, a unilateral, implied-in-fact con-
tract is created that is binding on the state. See generally
Andrew Mackenzie, “Spiller v. State: Determining the
Nature of Public Employees’ Rights to Their Pensions,”
46 Me. L.Rev. 355, 357-59 (1994); Note, John J.
Dwyer, “‘Til Death Do Us Part: Pennsylavnia’s ‘Con-
tract’ With Public Employees For Pension Benefits,” 59
Temp. L.Q. 553 ( 1986). There is much disagreement on
the details, however, under this unilateral contract ap-
proach. One widely held view is that at some point, pub-
lic employees’ contractual rights to pension benefits vest;
after vesting, the state is contractually bound to honor its
obligation to provide a pension without any further modifi-
cations or decreases in overall benefit levels. See, e.g.,
Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894,
896 (Del. 1983) (rights vest upon completion of mini-
mum service requirement); Baker y. Oklahoma Fire-
12a
fighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 353 (Okla.
1986) (same); Leonard v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.2d
479, 503 P.2d 741, 746 (1972) (en banc) (same);
Sylvestre v. State, 298 Minn. 142, 214 N.W.2d 658, 666-
67 (1973) (rights vest at start of employment); Yeazell
v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965) (en banc)
(same as Sylvestre ). Several states have provisions in
their constitutions declaring that vesting occurs at the
moment of public employment and barring any legislative
modifications that retroactively reduce the accrued bene-
fits of public employees. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. XII,
§ 7; Haw Const. art. XVI, § 2; Ill. Const. art. XIII, § 5;
Mich. Const. art. IX, § 24; N.Y. Const. art. V, § 7. Sev-
eral states follow a modified contract approach, which
permits some unilateral legislative modifications of pen-
sion plans as long as the legislature offsets any new dis-
advantage with comparable new advantages, as seen from
the point of view of the public employee. See, e.g., Singer
v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356, 607 P.2d 467, 475
(1980); Betts v. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees’
Ret. Sys., 21 Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal.Rptr. 158, 161, 582
P.2d 614, 617 (1978) (en banc); Opinion of the Jus-
tices, 364 Mass. 847, 303 N.E.2d 320, 328 (1973). At
least two state supreme courts, including Maine’s, have
declined to use the language of “vesting” in the course of
upholding modifications to pension benefits at any time
during the employment relationship. See Spiller v. State,
627 A.2d 513, 516 (Me.1993); Pineman v. Oechslin,
195 Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803 (1985). The Connecti-
cut Supreme Court in fact rejected the contract model
altogether and indicated that public employees have a
property interest in pension benefits that may not be arbi-
trarily confiscated by the state, under the Due Process
Clause. Pineman, 488 A.2d at 809-810.
Although we have recognized the diversity of contract
theories adepted by state courts—in particular the diver-
gence of approaches with regard to when exactly binding
rights to a certain level of retirement benefits “vest”—we
13a
have never chosen to adopt a particular approach to pub-
lic pension rights. See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 16-18.
In McGrath, we noted that, as a general matter, pen-
sions are viewed as “a species of unilateral contracts,”
although there is considerable disagreement as to when
rights in public pension plans vest, if at all. Jd. at 17.
But in the course of analyzing a Contract Clause chal-
lenge to certain amendments to the Rhode Island public
employee retirement system, we eschewed participating in
abstract contract theory in favor of performing a close
analysis of the statutory provision at issue. Such an ap-
proach is wise, because the unmistakability doctrine man-
dates that we determine whether the challenged legislative
enactment evinces the clear intent of the state to be bound
to particular contractual obligations. It may well be that
the variety of approaches adopted by state supreme courts
reflect, in part, differences in the structure of the various
state pension programs, and of the intention of the differ-
ent state legislatures that created them. There is a dan-
ger, however, in adopting a theory of pension rights and
subsequently forcing a given program to fit under it. Any
given theoretical approach will make assumptions regard-
ing the intent of legislatures to be bound, as well as the
time at which vesting should occur, which may be con-
tradicted by particular statutory provisions such as, for
example, an express reservation of the right to revoke -
pension benefits." When reviewing a particular enactment.
therefore, we must suspend judgment and “proceed cau-
tiously both in identifying a contract within the language
of a regulatory statute and in defining the contours of
any contractual obligations.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. at 466, 105 S.Ct. at 1452. The
district court’s decision protects Maine public employees
from benefit reduction once employees’ rights are “vested.”
Unfortunately, the line it drew between teachers who had
™In McGrath, we specifically reserved judgment on the question
of whether such express reservations are valid after the poirt at
which pension rights are “vested.” 88 F.3d at 19.
l4a
and had not completed a minimum service requirement,
cannot be justified on the basis of the Maine statute, which
nowhere speaks of “vesting” as understood by the district
court.
IV. Contractual Rights Under the MSRS
Turning to the MSRS, we ask whether the Maine Legis-
lature has unmistakably evinced the intention to create
binding contractual rights. See Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 614
(determining whether “language and circumstances” of
Rhode Island benefits statute reveal “a legislative intent
to create private contractual rights”). Specifically, in light
of the plaintiffs’ claims, we must ask whether Maine has
bound itself not to modify or alter, at any time before the
employee’s retirement, the level of pension benefits an
employee would expect to receive. The statutory language
is the primary focus of the inquiry. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. at 466, 105 S.Ct. at 1542.
Under the terms of the MSRS, public employees who
have met certain service and age requirements are entitled
to receive pensions. At the heart of this case is 5
M.R.S.A. § 17801, which reflects the state’s intent to
reserve the power to amend the amount of pension bene-
fits, as well as, arguably, the state’s intent to create private
contractual rights. That is, the State’s self-imposed limita-
tions on its legislative power through section 17801 may
reasonably serve as an indication of its intent to guarantee
pension benefits once they are “due,” as well as an ob-
vious reservation of amendment powers with regard to the
amount of benefits that are not “due.” The parties dis-
agree as to the unmistakable intentions section 17801
represents.
Section 17801 states that “no amendment . . . may
cause any reduction in the amount of benefits which would
be due a member . . . on the date immediately preceding
the effective date of the amendment.” Much turns on the
meanirig of “due.” The plaintiff public school teachers
argue that benefits are “due” from the moment of em-
15a
ployment, and that this section merely confirms the appli-
cability of a strict implied-in-fact, unilateral contract ap-
proach. The State contends that section 17801 is a
reservation of the power to alter benefits until the retire-
ment benefits are literally due to be received. The third
alternative, not the basic position of either party, is that
benefits are “due” if a teacher has completed the statute’s
initial service requirements, although pension benefits are
not yet currently payable.
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s Spiller decision,
which deserves our “ ‘respectful consideration and great
weight,’ Romein, 503 U.S. at 187, 112 S.Ct. at 1110
(quoting Indiana ex rel. Anderson y. Brand, 303 USS.
95, 100, 58 S.Ct. 443, 446, 82 L.Ed. 685 (1938)),
clearly rejects the alternative pressed by the teachers. The
court was “unpersuaded by the reasoning of those juris-
dictions that have discerned in the Statutory language the
creation at the time of employment of binding contractual
rights.” Spiller, 627 A.2d at 516. It held that, as to the
Spiller plaintiffs, none of whom had Satisfied the statute’s
Service requirements at the time of the Statutory amend-
ment challenged in Spiller, “[nJone of the benefits at issue
here were due .. . on the effective date of [the] legisla-
tion.” Id.
The question remains, however, whether section 17801
Should be read to protect a teacher—and possibly to cre-
ate contract rights—whenever a teacher satisfies the serv-
ice requirements even though the teacher is still in active
service and no pension is currently payable. Section
17801 does not clearly compel such a reading, since “due”
could easily be read to mean currently payable. And such
a reading would also arguably conflict with some of the
language in Spiller (although not its holding) and with
the dissent’s reading of the majority. See Spiller, 627
A.2d at 516 (“By implication, the [statutory] language
reserves to future legislatures the power to modify pro-
spective service retirement benefits for employees to whom
benefits are not then due”); id. at 519 ( “Although the
l6a
Court does not reach the issue today, its interpretation of
section 17801 also undermines the pension benefits of
those employees who have met the eligibility conditions
for pension benefits but [have not yet retired].”) (Wathen,
C.J., dissenting).
Even if we treat the statute as unclear and conclude
that Spiller leaves the issue open, we think that the prin-
ciple of unmistakability would defeat the teachers’ claim
that the contract rights are created when service require-
ments are satisfied. We need not decide whether the stat-
ute ever gives rise to a contractual relationship; it is
enough to say that it does not clearly do so before a
teacher retires, and thus gains an immediate right to the
payment of pension benefits. Because there is no attempt
here to take away retirees’ benefits, there can be no
plausible contract clause claim in this case.
The district court reasoned that “due” should be con-
strued as referring to the point at which a member quali-
fies for retirement benefits. But even if this is a possible
reading. we do not think this language could be said to
reflect the unmistakable intent of the Maine Legislature,
particularly when the legislature could very well have indi-
cated as much. In fact, the MSRS makes no reference to
“vesting.” As the district court points out, and as the
plaintiffs have vigorously argued, there is some evidence
indicating that certain legislators wanted to protect vested
rights; and that the Maine Legislature, in enacting section
17801, responded to a report that recommended the pro-
tection of employees’ accrued retirement benefits from
retroactive reduction. But the language of section 17801
remains at best ambiguous, and we cannot find that legis-
lature as a whole unmistakably intended to create contract
rights at the time that service requirements were satisfied
—especially where, as here, it would have been easy to
make any such intention crystal clear.
We do not decide today whether, in order to satisfy
the unmistakability doctrine, a public pension statute must
17a
explicitly employ the language of contract. Nor need we
decide whether Contract Clause principles would apply if
Maine sought to reduce pension benefits already “due” to
present retirees, a step that would in any case appear to
require revision of the present section 17801. To resolve
this appeal, we need only conclude that there is no un-
mistakable intent by the Maine Legislature to create an
enforceable private contract right against the modification
of the plaintiffs’ retirement benefits until they are actually
receivable.
As we indicated in McGrath, public employment con-
tracts operate in a “special employment environment” re-
quiring recognition of “the states’ flexibility vis-a-vis the
retirement benefits that it offers public employees.” 88
F.3d at 19. Whether the amendments here are wise or
justified as a matter of political philosophy is not our
concern. As Contract Clause challenges arise, we must
look to the language of the pension statutes to determine,
as a threshold matter, whether the unmistakability doc-
trine is satisfied. Here, as it relates to Maine’s purported
obligation not to alter the benefits of its public teacher
employees, it is not. Thus, no violation of the Contract
Clause may be found.
With regard to the teacher-plaintiffs’ due process claim
on cross-appeal, we affirm the decision of the district
court, finding no due process violation, for the reasons
given in its opinion, extending that reasoning to all plain-
tiffs. See 937 F.Supp. at 58.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of
the district court, to the extent that it found the Maine
legislative amendments violative of the Contract Clause,
is reversed in part, and to the extent that it found no
constitutional violations, is affirmed in part.
18a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
D. MAINE
Civil No. 94-157-P-C
RICHARD M. PARKER, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
Davip S. WAKELIN, et al.,
Defendants.
Aug. 1, 1996
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
GENE CARTER, Chief Judge.
Plaintiffs, the Maine Education Association (“MEA”)
and a class representing public school teachers throughout
the State of Maine (“MSRS members”), bring this action
challenging the constitutionality of certain amendments
to the Maine State Retirement System (“MSRS” or
“Maine Plan”) passed by the Maine Legislature in 1993.
P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 12, 13, 28, 31-37 (codified
as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001, 17701-B, 17806,
17851, 17852) (collectively “1993 amendments”). Plain-
tiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to block the
implementation of the amendments. Second Amended
Complaint (Docket No. 23).
This Court has already entertained Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss (Docket No. 11), which was granted in part
——————————————————eE
19a
and denied in part (Docket No. 28). Parker v. Wakelin,
882 F.Supp. 1131 (D.Me.1995). After a three-day bench
trial and extensive post-trial briefing, the case now comes
before the Court for final decision. For the reasons that
follow, the Court will find that: (1) the 1993 Amend-
ments, as applied to MSRS members whose benefits had
“vested” prior to the effective date of the amendments,
violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion; (2) the 1993 Amendments, a5 appuied to MSRS
members whose benefits had not “vested” prior to the
effective date of the amendments, violate no provision of
the United States Consiitution.
I. FACTS
In 1942, the Maine Legislature created the Maine State
Retirement System for two purposes: (1) attracting and
keeping qualified employees in state service throughout
their productive years and (2) providing benefits upon
their retirement, disability, or death. 5 M.R.S.A. § 17050
(1989). Membership in the system is mandatory for all
public school teachers, including all Plaintiffs in this case.
5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001(14), 17651 (1989). All MSRS
members are required to make contributions from their
Salaries to the fund from which benefits are paid. 5
M.R.S.A. § 17701, 17701-A, 17701-B (1989 & Supp.
1995). The State of Maine must also contribute annually
to the fund an amount sufficient to discharge its future
pension obligations. 5 M.R.S.A. § 17153(1-A)(B)
(Supp. 1995). MSRS members, however, do not qualify
to receive the service retirement benefits representing the
combination of those two contributions until “vesting,”
i.e., until they meet eligibility requirements either by pro-
viding ten years of creditable service if they are not in
service at the statutory retirement age or by providing one
year of creditable service if they are in service at the
statutory retirement age." 5 M.R.S.A. § 17851 (1989 &
1 Although the term “vesting” is nowhere defined in the plan, it
has been used frequently, consistently, and without objection
20a
Supp.1995). If MSRS members end their service prior to
vesting, they are entitled only to the return of their con-
tributions with interest. 5 M.R.S.A. § 17705(2).
In 1993, in order to lower the State’s budget allocation
for its contribution to the fund, legislators enacted certain
amendments to the Maine Plan. Defendants’ Responses
to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Admissions ( Plaintiffs’
Ex. 501) 47 (“Defendants’ Second Admissions”). The
1993 Amendments operated to the disadvantage of Plain-
tiffs without providing offsetting advantages to Plaintiffs
or to the trust fund generally. Stipulation No. 1 of the
Parties (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 526) 45 (“First Stipulation”);
see Defendants’ Second Admissions 4 4.
Three of those modifications adversely affected all
teachers’ pensions: (1) raising the rate of teachers’ re-
quired contribution from 6.5% of their salary to 7.65% ;?
(2) capping at 5% in each year, and at a total of 10%
over the highest 3 years, the salary increase that may be
included in calculating teachers’ retirement benefits;* (3)
delaying by six months the first cost-of-living adjustment
to teachers’ retirement benefit.* First Stipulation 4 3.
Three other modifications adversely affected only the
pensions of those teachers whose right to retirement bene-
fits had not yet vested: ° (1) increasing teachers’ regular
throughout this litigation to refer to the satisfaction of this re-
quirement for receiving benefits. E.g., Parker 882 F.Supp. at 1134
n, 2, 1136, 1139-40; Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 5 n. 4; Defendants’
Post-Trial Brief at 4; Trial Transcript passim; see Plaintiffs’ Exs.
215A at 11, 215B at 11, 215C at 12.
2 P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 28, enacting 5 M.R.S.A. § 17001-B.
* P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 18, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17001
(18)(C).
* P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 31, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17806(3).
5In light cf this structure of the 1993 Amendments, the Court
will use the terra “nonvested member Plaintiffs” to refer to thcse
to whoni all 1938 Amendments apply, and “vested member Plain-
2la
retirement age from sixty to sixty-two;* (2) increasing
the early retirement penalty from 2.25% to 6% of teach-
ers’ retirement benefit for each year preceding age 62;"
(3) eliminating the inclusion of per diem payment of up
to thirty days of unused sick leave or vacation pay in
calculating teachers’ retirement benefit.* First Stipula-
tion 4 4.
At trial, Plaintiffs presented extensive documentary and
testimonial evidence relevant to the factual questions
raised by its constitutional claims.*
tiffs” to refer to those to whom only the three amendments de-
scribed in the preceding paragraph above apply.
*P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 33, 36, amending 56 M.R.S.A.
§ 17851(1-A) & (2-A).
7 P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 37, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17852(3-A).
* P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 12, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17001
(13) (B).
® Plaintiffs also presented “evidence” relevant to certain legal
questions raised by its constitutional claims. Defendants have
objected to these submissions to the extent that they are offered for
the purpose of demonstrating legislative intent. The parties agree
that the requirement that a court consider the language and cir-
cumstances of the relevant statute to determine whether a contract
is formed requires this Court to consider, along with the text of
the Maine Plan, its legislative history. Parker v. Wakelin, 882
F.Supp. 1131, 1137 n. 8 (D.Me.1995). Those two sources have
provided the Court with an indication of legislative intent on that
issue that is sufficiently clear that the Court has not needed to resort
to the various other more questionable “circumstances” that Plain-
tiffs’ contend might also reflect legislative intent. See infra Section
II.A.1 (finding legislative intent to create implied-in-fact contract
based on text and legislative history). These submissions include:
@ The testimony of individual former members of the MSRS
Board of Trustees and administrators of the MSRS, whose
opinions Plaintiffs’ would impute to the legislature. Testimony
of Robert Bourgault, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at
256-74; Testimony of Patricia M. Dunn, March 19, 1996, Trial
Transcript at 172-93; Testimony of Paula Gaudet, March 20,
1996, Trial Transcript at 229-56; Testimony of Philip R.
22a
On the Contract Clause issue of whether the 1993
Amendments would substantially impair the retirement
benefits alleged to be contractual, Plaintiffs presented evi-
dence demonstrating that they reasonably relied on, and
were induced to serve the State of Maine by, the continued
existence of certain retirement benefits." See infra Sec-
Gingrow, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at 274-81; Testi-
mony of Claude R. Perrier, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at
327-45; Deposition of Jon A. Lund, March 11, 1996. Plaintiffs’
Ex. 299C; Deposition of Claude R. Perrier, May 8, 1995, Plain-
tiffs’ Ex. 299B; Deposition of David S. Wakelin, January 17,
1995, Plaintiffs’ Ex. 299A.
@ The testimony of individual former legislators and members
of legislative commissions, whose opinions Plaintiffs’ would
impute to the legislature. Testimony of Robert Bourgault,
March 20, 1996. Trial Transcript at 256-74; Testimony of
Harrison L. Richardson, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at
214-229.
@ MSRS manuals and newsletters, the content of which Plain-
tiffs would impute to the legislature. Piaintiffs’ Exs. 201, 202,
203, 204, 205, 206, 211, 215A, 215B, 215C, 215D, 215E, 222,
223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 258, 259, 270.
@ Actuary reports and intra-executive documents which share
the common characteristic of never having been addressed to
the legislature or individual legislators, but the content of
which Plaintiffs nevertheless would impute to the legislature.
Plaintiffs’ Exs. 170, 214, 218, 401, 402, 409.
@ Memoranda from MSRS personnel addressed to individual
legislators, the content of which Plaintiffs would impute to the
legislature. Plaintiffs’ Exs. 113, 172, 220, 227, 290, 298.
That “evidence,” admitted at trial de bene esse, is superfluous in
this case for the purpose of determining legislative intent to create
an implied-in-fact contract. Therefore, the Court will not decide
whether that evidence may properly be considered for that purpose
in another case.
% Because the Court will find that a contract has formed for
Contract Clause purposes under an implied-in-fact contract theory,
it need not, and therefore will not, consider Plaintiffs’ quasi-
contract theory. See infra note 12. Accordingly, the Court admits
only for the purpose of determining whether vested member Plain-
tiffs’ contractual rights are substantially impaired (and not for
23a
tion II, A.2. Plaintiff Richard M. Parker testified that
MSRS benefits induced him to accept his job as a public
school teacher in Maine, and that he relied specifically on
the continued existence of the benefits adversely altered by
the cap on salary increases calculable for determining
annuity payments and by the increased contribution rate.
Testimony of Richard M. Parker, March 19, 1996, Trial
Transcript at 63, 81-83, 86. Plaintiff Paul L. Hutchins
testified to the same inducement and reliance, adding his
specific reliance on the cost-of-living increase at 6 months.
Testimony of Paul L. Hutchins, March 19, 1996, Trial
Transcript at 118-120. Similarly, Plaintiffs Daniel J.
Lowell testified that MSRS pension benefits induced him
to work for the State and that he specifically relied on
benefits reduced by the cap. Testimony of Daniel J.
Lowell, March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 138, 143-44.
All MSRS members who testified said that no one ever
told them that their benefits could not be reduced uni-
laterally by the legislature. E.g., Trial Transcript at 89,
129, 149. No MSRS members who testified, however, said
that anyone ever told them that their benefits could be
reduced unilaterally by the legislature. E.g., Trial Tran-
script at 89, 117.
On the Contract Clause issue of whether the 1993
Amendments were necessary to the state’s public pur-
pose of saving money in a time of fiscal crisis, Plaintiffs
presented evidence demonstrating that they were not. See
infra Section II.A.3. In particular, the testimony of Mr.
the purpose of determining quasi-contract formation) the evidence
of reasonable reliance upon which the factual findings below are
based. This evidence includes both individual vested member Plain-
tiffs’ testimony to this effect and the MSRS manuals and newsletters
which informed their reliance. Testimony of Richard M. Parker,
March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 62-95: Testimony of Paul L.
Hutchins, March i9, 1996, Trial Transcript at 110-30: Testimony
of Daniel J. Lowell, March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 131-50;
Plaintiffs’ Exs. 215A, 2i5B, 215C, 215D, 215E, 223, 226, 258, 259.
24a
Bent Schlosser indicated specific alternative means avail-
able to the legislature for cutting the budget without
impinging on teachers’ pension benefits. Testimony of
Bent Schlosser, March 21, 1996, Trial Transcript at
410-13. Moreover, although the testimony of Defendants’
witness, Mr. H. Sawin Millett, provided plausible estimates
of the considerable savings to the State issuing from the
pension. cuts, it provided no indication that those cuts
were the only means of generating those savings. See
Testimony of H. Sawin Millett, March 21, 1996, Trial
Transcript at 349-98.
On the Takings Clause issue of the economic impact
of the 1993 Amendments on nonvested member Plaintiffs,
see infra Section II.C., several such Plaintiffs testified.
E.g., Testimony of Paula Reed, March 19, 1996, Trial
Transcript at 34-49; Testimony of Lana R. Savage, March
19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 49-61; Testimony of Nancy
B. Sullivan, March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 95-110.
The Court finds the expert testimony of actuary Michael
E. Gallagher, however, most relevant to this point. Testi-
mony of Michael E. Gallagher, March 20, 1996, Trial
Transcript at 299-326. Mr. Gallagher was asked to de-
scribe the economic impact of the 1993 Amendments on
a hypothetical MSRS member with nine years and ten
months of creditable service just before the amendments,
who currently has 12 years of creditable service at age 51
and still intends to retire at age 60. Jd. at 314-15. Mr.
Gallagher testified that, under those circumstances, the
total value of that member’s benefit would be 24%, or
$75,000, less than if the 1993 Amendments were not in
effect. Jd. Cross-examination revealed, however, that an
additional two years of work and contribution, from ages
sixty to sixty-two, would cut the devaluation by more than
half, down to $30,000, reducing her monthly annuity pay-
ment by only $100. Jd. at 322-326.
25a
ll. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the 1993
Amendments on three separate grounds: (1) they violate
the Contract Clause of article I, § 10 (Count 1); (2) they
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment (Count II); (3) they violate the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment (Count II). Plaintiffs will prevail
only in their claim that the 1993 Amendments violate the
Contract Clause as applied to vested MSRS members.
A. Contract Clause (Count 1)
The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution
provides that “[nJo State shall . . . pass any . . . Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. 1,
§ 10. Since Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,
137-39, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810), courts have regularly ap-
plied the Clause to contracts between states and private
parties. Analysis under the Contract Clause proceeds in
four steps. The Court must inquire: (1) whether there is
a contractual relationship; (2) whether a change in law
impairs that contract; (3) whether that impairment is sub-
stantial; (4) whether that substantial impairment is rea-
sonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-
pose. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181,
186, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992);
United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25,
97 S.Ct. 1505, 1519, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977); McGrath
v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16-17 (ist
Cir.1996). When the state is a party to the contract at
issue, the court must undertake the fourth inquiry at a
heightened level of scrutiny “‘because the State’s self-
interest is at stake.” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. vy.
Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 US. 400, 412-13 n. 14,
103 S.Ct. 697, 705 n. 14, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983) (quot-
ing United States Trust Co., 431 US. at 26, 97 S.Ct.
at 1519-20); see Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island y. Re-
tirement Bd. of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement Sys-
26a
tem, 890 F.Supp. 1143, 1151 (D.R.1.1995) (character-
izing test as one of intermediate scrutiny).
The Court will conclude :(1) that the MSRS members
who had met the service requirement qualifying them for
pension benefits, i.c., those who were “vested,” as of July
1, 1993 then had a contractual relationship with the State,
but that MSRS members who were not vested as of July 1,
1993 did not then have a contractual relationship with the
State; (2) that the 1993 Amendments reducing the bene-
fits of vested members substantially impaired their contract
with the State; “’ (3) that the 1993 Amendments reducing
the benefits of vested members were not necessary to serve
the purpose of resolving Maine’s fiscal crisis. Accordingly,
the Court will declare that the 1993 Amendments violate
the Contract Clause as applied to vested members and so
will enjoin the application of those Amendments to those
members.
l. Is there a Contract?
Whether a statute gives rise to a contractual relationship
is a question of federal constitutional law. Romein, 503
U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109-10. To the extent that
the determination of this federal question involves the
interpretation of state law, however, it is appropriate to
“accord respectful consideration and great weight to the
views of the State’s highest court.” Indiana ex rel. Ander-
son v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100, 58 S.Ct. 443, 446, 82
L.Ed. 685 (1938).
Analysis of this question must begin with the well-
established proposition “that absent some clear indication
that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the
" The Court has combined the second and third elements of the
analysis because there is no dispute as to the second, namely,
whether the 1993 Amendments constitute an impairment at all.
See Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Admis-
sions (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 501) { 4.
27a
presumption is that ‘a law is not intended to create pri-
vate contractual or vested rights but merely declares a
policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain
otherwise.”” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66, 105
S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 84 L.Ed.2d 432 (1985) (quoting
Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 100,
82 L.Ed. 57 (1937)). Plaintiffs may overcome this pre-
sumption by demonstrating that “the language and circum-
stances [of the statute] evince a legislative intent to create
private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against
the state.” United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17 n. 14,
97 S.Ct. at 1515 n. 15; Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909
F.2d 608, 614 (1st Cir.1990). The statutory language
itself, however, constitutes the primary object of this in-
quiry. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 466, 105
S.Ct. at 1451-52.
This Court will apply the common law of contracts to
determine whether a contract has formed between Plain-
tiffs and the State for Contract Clause purposes.” See,
e.g., Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island, 890 F.Supp. at
1156-59 (applying “traditional contract law principles”).
According to those principles, three familiar elements are
typically required for the formation of a contract: offer,
acceptance, and consideration. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts §§ 17(1), 22(1) (hereinafter “Restatement’);
Estes v. Smith, 521 A.2d 682, 684 (Me.1987). An offer
is defined as “the manifestation of willingness to enter
12 Because this Court will decide that, under the common law
of contracts, the statutory language and circumstances of the Maine
plan (constituting an offer), combined with the conduct of member
Plaintiffs (constituting acceptance and consideration, but not here
considered for legislative intent), gives rise to an implied-in-fact
contract for Contract Clause purposes, this Court need not consider
the theories of quasi-contract and trust that Plaintiffs also advance
to establish the existence of a contract for Contract Clause purposes.
Accordingly, this Court will not consider Plaintiffs’ exhibits to the
extent that they are offered in support of those theories.
28a
into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in
understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited
and will conclude it.” Restatement § 24. Offers may be
express or implied. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Con-
tracts § 1.19, at 55 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 1993). An
offeree may accept the offer by “a manifestation of assent
to the terms thereof . . . in a manner invited or required
by the offer.” Restatement § 50; Ouellette v. Bolduc, 440
A.2d 1042, 1045 (Me.1982). To render an offeror’s
promise enforceable, an offeree must provide considera-
tion, which is some “performance or return promise .. .
sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise.”
Restatement § 71(2); Whitten v. Greeley-Shaw, 520 A.2d
1307, 1310 (Me.1987). When the offeror seeks a per-
formance rather than a return promise, the offeror pro-
poses a unilateral contract. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts
§ 1.23, at 89; Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596,
600 (Me.1978).
In light of these principles, it should come as no sur-
prise that most contemporary public pension plans have
been held to give rise to implied-in-fact unilateral contracts
within the reach of the Contract Clause. McGrath, 88
F.3d at 16-18; 60A Am.Jur.2d, Pensions and Retirement
Funds, § 1620, at 950 (1988). A legislature’s manifesta-
tion, through the language and circumstances of the pen-
sion statute, of its intent to enter a bargain with its em-
ployees, whereby the state provides them pension benefits
in exchange for a long period of their loyal service and
monetary contribution, establishes the existence of an
offer. E.g., Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island, 890 F.Supp.
at 1157. State employees’ performance of that service and
contribution for the period required for eligibility consti-
tutes both acceptance (because it manifests their assent
to the terms of the state’s offer) and consideration (be-
cause it represents the performance sought by the state in
exchange for its promise of benefits). Jd. at 1158-59.
Thus, an implied-in-fact unilateral contract implicating the
29a -
Contract Clause is formed. See Brand, 303 U.S. at 100,
58 S.Ct. at 446 (“a legislative enactment may contain
provisions which, when accepted as the basis of action by
individuals, become contracts between them and the State
or its subdivisions within the protection of article I,
§ 10.”)
Although public pension plans generally share this con-
tractual character, they vary widely as to when in the
employment relationship the benefits they provide become
contractual. McGrath, 88 F.3d at 17-18; Spiller v. State,
627 A.2d 513, 516 & n. 10 (Me.1993). Careful review
of the relevant cases reveals that two main factors account
for the variation among courts on this point. The first is
variation in the language and circumstances of each state’s
pension statute."* The second, and perhaps more often
determinative, is variation in the theory of pension con-
tracts that each court applies. Pineman v. Oechslin, 195
Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803, 807-10 (1985) (surveying and
choosing among various pension contract theories); Singer
v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356, 607 P.2d 467, 473-75
(1980) (same). Two cases illustrate in an especially
clear and relevant way how each of these two factors can
affect the resolution of this issue.
In the recent case of McGrath v. Rhode Island Retire-
ment Board, 88 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1996), the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit discussed the effect of statu-
tory language that expressly reserves to a state legislature
the power to amend or terminate its public pension plan.
Id. at 17-19. The court noted that, under the common
law of contracts generally, when an offeror expressly re-
serves the power to revoke an offer to enter a unilateral
contract until performance is complete, the offer is illusory
-
18To the extent that the questions of whether a contract is
formed are necessarily intertwined, it would seem particularly
appropriate that courts consider primarily the language, as well as
the circumstances, of the statute. See United States Trust Co.,
431 U.S. at 17 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 1515.
30a
and may not yet give rise to a contract. Id. at 17-18
(citing Restatement § 45, cmt. b). The court added that,
under the common law of pension contracts particularly,
however, such a revocation power is effective only until
“an employee’s rights under the plan vest,” the time at
which “an employee fulfills the service requirements en-
titling him or her to retirement benefits under a pension
plan.” Jd. at 18-19. The court nevertheless expressed
doubt regarding whether this limitation on an employer’s
reserved power to revoke pension benefits applies with the
same force to state pension plans, since this limitation
might constitute an unprecedented infringement of state
sovereignty. Id. at 19; see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger
Corp., 470 U.S. at 467 & n. 22, 105 S.Ct. at 1452 & n. 22
(discussing unlimited effect of express reservation by Con-
gress of revocation power).
In Petras v. State Board of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d
894 (Del.1983), the Supreme Court of Delaware, in
deciding the issue of when its state pension plan created
enforceable contractual rights to benefits exemplified a
widely held theory of pension contracts. The plan at issue
was typical of many contemporary plans in that it con-
tained provisions that: extended benefits to members;
predicated eligibility for those benefits upon the comple-
tion of a minimum period of service; and required con-
tributions of members."* Jd. at 895. The court affirmed
the holdings of earlier Delaware court cases that this statu-
tory scheme gave rise to enforceable contractual rights,
but only “upon fulfillment of the eligibility requirements.”
Id. at 869. Correspondingly, “no contract exists between
an employee and the State, concerning the state pension
plan, unless and until the pension vests.” Jd. The court
concluded, therefore, that “pension rights may be changed
at any time before they become vested.” /d.
14 There is no indication that the plan contained any statutory
provision expressly reserving the power to revoke benefits.
3la
The pension theory embodied in the Petras decision has
been applied in other jurisdictions as well. Petras, 464
A.2d at 896 (collecting cases); Baker v. Oklahoma Fire-
fighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 352 (Okla.
1986); see Singer, 607 P.2d at 474-75. Upon adopting
the Petras view of pension contracts, the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma concisely articulated the compelling theo-
retical and practical reasons for doing so:
Viewing the contract between the state and its em-
ployees as coming into existence at the point of eligi-
bility allows the necessary flexibility in fiscal planning
which must be given to the Legislature. This view
also avoids the necessity of engaging in the tortuous
applications of contract law which other jurisdictions
have applied in finding that rights, which they have
characterized as being in existence, [nevertheless] re-
main subject to unilateral modifications. This view
also realistically acknowledges the contingent nature
of the relationship as it ripens into a contractual
obligation on the part of the state.
Baker, 718 P.2d at 352. This theory of pension con-
tracts, whereby benefits vest and become enforceable only
upon satisfaction of service requirements for eligibility,
has been described elsewhere as a “deferred compensa-
tion” theory. McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Board,
15 Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has
criticized the “limited vesting” theory of pension contracts, e.g.,
Public Employees’ Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 96 Nev.
718, 615 P.2d 972, 974-75 (1980), whereby pension benefits become
contractual on acceptance of employment but nevertheless remain
subject, pursuant to an implied term of that contract, to “reasonable
modification” by the employer.
It makes little sense to strain established rules of statutory
interpretation to find a contract where the requisite express
legislative intent is lacking, only to strain other equally well
settled legal principles to allow for necessary unilateral modifi-
cation by the state.
Pineman v. Oechslin, 195 Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803, 809 (1985).
32a
906 F.Supp. 749, 760 n. 1 (D.R.1.1995) (citing Nat'l
Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island, 890 F.Supp. at 1156), aff'd,
88 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1996).
It is within this legal context that this Court will deter-
mine whether and when the Maine State Retirement Sys-
tem creates a contract with any of the present Plaintiffs
for Contract Clause purposes.
This Court holds that, at some point in the employ-
ment relationship between the State of Maine and MSRS
members, the Maine Plan creates a contract that binds the
State to provide MSRS members with certain retirement
benefits. The Maine Plan contains all the elements which
have been found almost uniformly to give rise to an
implied-in-fact unilateral pension contract. The pension
statute contains provisions which manifest the State of
Maine’s willingness to enter into a bargain with Maine
State employees, whereby retirement benefits would be
exchanged for ten years of loyal service and monetary
contribution, in a way that justified those employees in
believing their acceptance is invited. See 5 M.R.S.A.
§§ 17050, 17151, 17851. MSRS members both manifest
their assent to (and, therefore, acceptance of) this offer
and provide the consideration *’ sought by the State by
performing ten years of service and contribution to the
system. In this way, the Maine State Retirement System
creates a contractual relationship between the State of
Maine and MSRS members.
The question remains of when in the employment rela-
tionship those enforceable contract rights arise. Consist-
16 The so-called “Towne Report,” which was adopted by the Legis-
lative Recess Committee to which it was submitted and, in turn,
by the entire Maine Legislature itself, indicated that “[p]ension
payments are generally deemed as made in consideration of past
services, injury or loss sustained, merit, poverty, etc.” Report to
Legislative Recess Committee on Maine State Retirement System
and Social Security Coverage, April 8, 1954, at 17 (Plaintiffs’ Ex.
207) (emphasis added) (hereinafter “Towne Report”).
33a
ent with the method of other courts, this Court will make
this determination by considering the language and cir-
cumstances of any relevant statutory provisions and by
applying the most appropriate theory of pension contracts.
The language and circumstances of 5 M.R.S.A. § 17801
bear particular relevance to the question of when the
Maine Plan creates contractual rights to retirement bene-
fits. That section provides:
No amendment to this Part may cause any reduc-
tion in the amount of benefits which would be due
to a member based on creditable service, earnable
compensation, employee contributions, pick-up con-
tributions, and the provisions of this part on the date
immediately preceding the effective date of the
amendment.
5 M.R.S.A. § 17801. This Court discerns in this provision
two statements of legislative intent pertinent to the present
issue. First, the legislature intends to be bound, as a
term of the implied pension contract whose existence is
established supra, not to reduce a member’s benefits after
they become “due to a member.” Second, the legislature
intends not to be bound not to reduce a member’s benefits
before they become “due to a member.” Accord Spiller,
627 A.2d at 516 (reading § 17801 to reserve right to
modify benefits not then due). This implied reservation
of the power to revoke, as to members whose benefits are
not yet “due,” the offer giving rise to the contract renders
that offer illusory as to those members. See McGrath, 88
F.3d at 17-18. These two facets of § 17801 indicate
legislative intent to create enforcement contract rights to
benefits only when they become “due to a member.”
It is necessary to determine, then, when in the employ-
ment relationship benefits become “due to a member.”
The term “due” is nowhere defined in the Maine Plan. It
is clear, however, that the phrase “due to a member” can-
not mean “due to a retiree to whom benefits are currently
34a
payable” because retirees are, by definition, not members.
5 M.R.S.A. § 17654(2). Nor is it legitimate to charac-
terize as “due to a member” benefits for which the mem-
ber is not even eligible. Accord Spiller, 627 A.2d at 516
(finding no benefits “due to” plaintiff members, none of
whom had met eligibility requirements). Correspondingly,
once a member has met eligibility requirements for bene-
fits, it becomes possible, even plausible, to describe those
benefits as “due to a member.” Moreover, the legislative
history of § 17801 indicates that the provision was initially
recommended and ultimately passed “to insure the con-
tinuation of presently vested rights.” Final Report of the
Committee on Veterans and Retirement on its Study of
the Maine State Retirement System at 4 (January 1975)
( Plaintiffs’ Ex. 105B) (emphasis added). Therefore, this
Court concludes that the language and circumstances of 5
M.R.S.A. § 17801 indicate that retirement benefits be-
come enforceable in contract under the Maine Plan when
those benefits are “due to a member,” here understood as
“vested in a member,” where vesting occurs upon comple-
tion of the service requirement for eligibility.
The theory of pension contracts which this Court finds
most appropriate to the Maine Plan yields the same result.
That theory, embodied in the Petras decision discussed
supra, provides that pension benefits become enforceable
in contract only upon vesting, defined as satisfaction of
eligibility requirements. The Court considers this theory
applicable to the Maine Plan for three reasons. First, the
Maine Plan contains provisions substantially similar to
those in Petras, in that both plans extend benefits to mem-
bers, predicate eligibility for those benefits on the comple-
tion of a service requirement, and require monetary con-
tribution. Second, the theoretical and practical strengths
of the Petras theory, as explicated in Baker, apply with no
less force to this case. Third, the Petras theory has been
fairly characterized as a “deferred compensation” theory
of pension contracts, and the legislative history of the
Maine Plan contains frequent references to an under-
a
35a
standing of the system as one of “deferred compensation.”
See, e.g., Towne Report at 17-19. Therefore, the theory
of pension contracts best suited to the circumstances of
this case also indicates that pension benefits under the
Maine Plan become contractual only upon vesting.
The language and circumstances of the relevant provi-
sion of the Maine Plan, as well as the appropriate theory
of pension contracts, then, both point to the same conclu-
sions with respect to the present Plaintiffs.
First, the Court holds that MSRS members not vested
on the effective date of the 1993 Amendments do not
have enforceable contract rights to the benefits reduced
by the those amendments. Under the applicable theory
of pension contracts, members of a pension plan have no
contractual rights to benefits until vesting. Even if it were
somehow more appropriate to apply a different theory of
pension contracts under which the implied offer or bene-
fits is viewed as extended to nonvested member Pizintiffs,
the reservation in § 17801 of the power to reduce benefits
not then “due to a member” renders the offer of those
benefits illusory as to those Plaintiffs. McGrath, 88 F.3d
at 17-18. Finally, although § 17801 indicates the legisla-
ture’s intent, as a term of its implied-in-fact contract with
members, not to reduce benefits then “due to a member,”
the benefits reduced by the 1993 Amendments were not
“due to” member Plaintiffs not presently vested on the
effective date of those amendments.
Second, the Court holds that MSRS members vested on
the effective date of the 1993 Amendments have enforce-
able contract rights to the benefits reduced by those
amendments. Once again, under the applicable theory of
pension contracts, members of a pension plan acquire con-
tractual rights to benefits upon vesting. Moreover, the
legislature’s reservation in § 17801 of the power to reduce
benefits not then “due to a member” renders the offer of
those benefits illusory only as to nonvested members, not
36a
as to vested members.” Perhaps most important of all,
§ 17801 indicates the legislature’s intent, as a term of its
implied-in-fact contract, not to reduce benefits then “due
to a member,” and the benefits reduced by the 1993
Amendments were “due to” member Plaintiffs presently
vested on the effective date of those amendments.
Therefore, because Plaintiffs not presently vested before
the effective date of the 1993 Amendments have no en-
forceable contract rights to the benefits reduced by those
amendments, their claim under the Contract Clause must
fail. Correspondingly, because Plaintiffs presently vested
before the effective date of the 1993 Amendments do have
enforceable contract rights to the benefits reduced by
those amendments, their claim under the Contract Clause
may proceed to the next stage of analysis.
2. Is the Contract Substantially Impaired?
To establish a violation of the Contract Clause, those
Plaintiffs with contractual rights in the benefits modified
by the 1993 Amendments must yet demonstrate that those
modifications “substantially impair” those rights. Romein,
503 U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109-10. Although guid-
ance from the Supreme Court on this issue is sparse, two
rules relevant to this case have emerged at the appellate
level. First, a contract with a state is substantially im-
paired if the legislature adversely modifies a term that
induced the plaintiff to enter the contract and on whose
continued existence the plaintiff reasonably relies. Balti-
more Teachers’ Union v. Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir.1993); see Energy
Reserves Group, 459 US. at 411, 103 S.Ct. at 704 (citing
El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515, 85 S.Ct. 577,
587, 13 L.Ed.2d 446 (1965)). Second, a pension con-
tract with a state is not substantially impaired if the
17 The effect of the legislature’s revocation power may also not
extend to vested members as a member of the common law of pen-
sion contracts. See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 17-19.
37a
legislative modification “bear[s] some material relationship
to the purpose of the pension system and its successful
operation; and any disadvantage to employees [is] accom-
panied by comparable new advantages.” State of Nevada
Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th
Cir.1990).”*
The Court finds that the three 1993 Amendments ap-
plicable to vested member Plaintiffs substantially impair
their contract with the State of Maine. Once again, those
amendments would: (1) increase the employee contribu-
tion rate from 6.5% to 7.65%; (2) cap the salary in-
creases that may be included in the calculation of the
18 This Court is aware that the test outlined above is commonly
labeled the “reasonable modification” test. E.g., Public Employees’
Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 96 Nev. 718, 615 P.2d 972,
974-75 (1980). For three reasons, however, this Court declines to
apply that label to this test in the context of this case. First, using
the phrase “reasonable modification” to describe a test that gives
content to “substantial impairment” risks its confusion with, and
misapplication as, the next step in the analysis (whether the sub-
stantial impairment is “reasonable and necessary to serve an impor-
tant public purpose”). See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief (Docket
No. 58) at 11; Halpin v. Nebraska State Patrolmen’s Retirement
System, 211 Neb. 892, 320 N.W.2d 910, 915 (1982). Second, using
the phrase “reasonable modification” to describe this test risks its
confusion with the contract term both that state courts commonly
imply in state pension contracts as a matter of state law, and from
which the test originally derives. By contrast, this Court reads
Keating to say that, as a matter of federal law, a contract modifica-
tion is not a “substantial impairment” for Contract Clause purposes
if it meets the requirements of this test, regardless of whether the
pension contract in question contains such an implied term as a
matter of state law. Keating, 903 F.2d at 1227. Third, the test
better helps define the ordinary meaning of the phrase “substantial
impairment.” A modification can hardly be described as an impair-
ment, least of all a substantial one, if it creates benefits to offset its
burdens. This is especially so when the purpose of such a modifica-
tion is to enhance the successful operation of a pension system.
These two factors, then, describe particularly well what a “substan-
tial impairment” is not, less well what a “reasonable modifica-
tion” is.
a
38a
annuity benefit; and (3) postpone for six months the first
cost-of-living increase in the annuity benefit after retire-
ment. First Stipulation §3. None of these impairments
either bear any material relationship to the successful op-
eration of 2 pension plan or create benefits to offset the
burdens they impose. Testimony at trial also reveals both
that the benefits impaired by these amendments induced
vested member Plaintiffs to enter their contract with the
State of Maine, and that those Plaintiffs reasonably relied
on the continued existence of those benefits. See Testi-
mony of Richard M. Parker, Paul L. Hutchins, and Daniel
J. Lowell, cited supra Section I. Moreover, Courts have
commonly found an increase in the rate of contribution
in particular to represent a substantial impairment. Marvel
v. Dannemann, 490 F.Supp. 170, 171 (D.Del. 1980);
Pennsylvania Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila-
delphia, 506 Pa. 196, 484 A.2d 751, 753 (1984); Singer,
607 P.2d at 476-77. Therefore, the 1993 Amendments
substantially impair the contractual rights of vested mem-
ber Plaintiffs to the retirement benefits at issue.
3. Is the Substantial Impairment Reasonable and
Necessary to Serve an Important Public Purpose?
Even though the State’s impairment of vested Plaintiffs’
rights to retirement benefits is substantial, it may yet be
permissible under the Contract Clause “if it is reasonable
and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”
United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25, 97 S.Ct. at 1519.
The Court need not decide whether the present substantial
impairment is “reasonable,” nor whether the public pur-
pose it serves is “important,” because the Court finds that
it is not “necessary” to that purpose. It is undisputed that
the State’s purpose in reducing pension benefits was to
help alleviate the State’s fiscal crisis. Persuasive expert
testimony presented at trial, which described various
means of cutting expenditures to serve this purpose with-
out impairing Plaintiffs’ contract rights, defeats Defend-
ants’ claim that the impairment was necessary to serve
39a
that purpose. See Testimony of Bent Schlosser, cited
supra Section I. Therefore, the State’s substantial impair-
ment of vested Plaintiffs’ contractual benefits constitutes a
violation of the Contract Clause.
B. Due Process Clause (Count I1)
Plaintiffs claim that the 1993 Amendments violate
the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.
To withstand such a challenge, the 1993 Amendments
need only be rationally related to a legitimate state pur-
pose. Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F.Supp. 1131, 1138 (D.Me.
1995); see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
487-88, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955);
Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir.1988).
The Court finds the 1993 Amendments rationally related
to the legitimate state purpose of reducing expenditures
in a time of fiscal crisis. See Spiller, 627 A.2d at 521
(Wathen, C.J., and Glassman, J., dissenting). Therefore,
the 1993 Amendments, as applied to nonvested member
Plaintiffs, do not violate the Due Process Clause.
C. Takings Clause (Count II)
Plaintiffs also claim that the 1993 Amendments violate
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. Const.
amend V. To determine whether legislation effects an
unconstitutional taking of property,” the Court considers
® Because the Court has determined that application of the 1993
Amendments to vested member Plaintiffs violates the Contract
Clause, it is unnecessary to decide whether that same application
also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It remains neces-
sary, however, to determine whether the application of the 1993
Amendments to nonvested member Plaintiffs violates either of those
other two constitutional provisions. Therefore, Sections II.B. and
T1.C. will pertain only to nonvested member Plaintiffs.
2° The Court assumes, without deciding, that nonvested Plaintiffs’
interest in their pension benefits constitutes “property” for Takings
Clause purposes.
40a
three factors of “ ‘particular significance’: (1) ‘the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant’; (2) ‘the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations’; and (3) ‘the character
of the governmental action.’” Connolly v. Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225, 106 S.Ct. 1018,
1025, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (quoting Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98
S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)).
The Court finds that the 1993 Amendments, as applied
to nonvested Plaintiffs, do not effect a taking of their
alleged property because none of these three factors so
indicate. First, although the economic impact on non-
vested Plaintiffs, as illustrated by the mnear-worst-case
scenario addressed by an expert actuary at trial, is “sig-
nificant,” Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts
Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir.1993), it is
neither “severe,” Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602
(2d Cir.1988), nor of a sort that “extinguish[es] a funda-
mental attribute of ownership,” Agins v. Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 262, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 65 L.Ed.2d 106
(1980). See Testimony of Michael E. Gallagher, cited
supra Section I. Second, the 1993 Amendments do not
interfere to any extent with investment-backed expecta-
tions of nonvested members because, without contractual
rights, nonvested members have no investment-backed ex-
pectations subject to interference. Pineman, 842 F.2d at
603. Third, the 1993 Amendments constitute neither a
permanent physical invasion of their benefits nor an elimi-
nation of the economic value of their benefits. Washing-
ton Legal Foundation, 993 F.2d at 975 (citing Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-16,
112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)). In-
stead, they amount only to an ordinary “adjustment of
the benefits and burdens of economic life.” Pineman, 842
F.2d at 602 (characterizing change in pension plan that
increases retirement age) (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn
Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892-93, 49
4la
L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). Therefore, this Court finds no
unconstitutional taking in the application of the 1993
Amendments to nonvested member Plaintiffs.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that those 1993
Amendments to the Maine State Retirement System, P.L.
1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 13, 28, 31, that purport to apply
to the retirement benefits of MSRS members who were
“vested” prior to the effective date of those amendments
be, and they are hereby DECLARED, to violate the Con-
tract Clause as applied to those members. It is further
ORDERED that application of those amendments to
“vested” MSRS members be, and it is hereby, ENJOINED.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit to the Court, within
ten (10) days from the date of the docketing of this
order, a proposed order of judgment for consideration by
the Court which will fully implement the decision set forth
above.
42a
APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
=
No. 96-2225, 96-2226, 96-2227 and 96-2228
RICHARD M. PARKER, ef al.,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
Cross-A ppellants,
Vv.
Davip S. WAKELIN, ef al.,
Defendants, Appellants,
Cross-A ppellees.
ORDER OF THE EN BANC COURT
BEFORE TORRUELLA, Chief Judge,
SELYA, BOUDIN, STAHL and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.
Entered: October 17, 1997
The panel of judges that rendered the decision in this
case having voted to deny the petition for rehearing and
the suggestion for rehearing en banc having been care-
fully considered by the judges of the Court in regular,
active service and a majority of said judges not having
voted to order that the appeal be heard or reheard by the
Court En Banc,
43a
It is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the
suggestion for rehearing en banc, be denied.
By The Court
PHOEBE MORSE
Clerk
By: /s/ Janice M. O’Neil
Chief Deputy Clerk
44a
APPENDIX D
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
Title 5 of the Maine Revised Statutes provides, in perti-
nent part:
§ 17001.
Definitions
As used in this Part, unless the context otherwise indi-
cates, the following terms have the following meanings.
13. Earnable compensation. “Earnable compensation”
means salaries and wages paid for services rendered in an
employment position, subject to the following inclusions,
exclusions and limitations.
A.
“Earnable compensation” includes:
(1) Workers’ compensation benefits;
(2) Maintenance, if any;
(3) Any money paid by an employer to a 3rd
party under a tax sheltered annuity contract or
a deferred compensation plan for the future
benefit of an employee provided that the money
is not derived from amounts excluded from
earnable compensation by paragraph B; and
(4) Pick-up contributions.
“Earnable compensation” does not include:
(1) For any member who has 10 years of
creditable service by July 1, 1993 or who has
reached 60 years of age and has been in service
for a minimum of one year immediately before
that date, payment for more than 30 days of
unused accumulated or accrued sick leave, pay-
ment for more than 30 days of unused vacation
leave or payment for more than 30 days of a
combination of both;
45a
(2) For any member who is not covered by
subparagraph (1), payment for any unused ac-
cumulated or accrued sick leave or payment for
any unused vacation leave;
(3) Any other payment that is not compensa-
tion for actual services rendered or that is not
paid at the time the actual services are ren-
dered; or
(4) Teacher recognition grants paid pursuant
to Title 20-A, section 13503-A.
A payment for unused sick leave or unused vacation
leave may not be included as part of earnable com-
pensation unless it is paid upon the member’s last
termination before the member applies for retirement
benefits.
C. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this sub-
section, for the purposes of determining average final
compensation, “earnable compensation” does not in-
clude any increase that exceeds the prior year’s earn-
able compensation by more than 5% or that results
in a total increase of more than 10% during the
3-year period used in the calculation of average final
compensation, unless the cost of the additional ac-
tuarial liability arising from the excess increase is
paid by the employer as provided in section 17154.
Any payment made under paragraph B, subparagraph
(1) must be included in determining the amount of
increase in the year in which the payment is made.
This paragraph does not apply to excess increases
resulting from compensation paid prior to July 1,
1993, from compensation paid in accordance with an
individual employment contract executed prior to
July 1, 1993 or a collective bargaining agreement
executed or ratified in its final form by final vote of
one party to the agreement prior to July 1, 1993 for
the initial term of that contract or agreement or from
other action by the governing body of a school ad-
46a
ministrative unit in effect on July 1, 1993. This
paragraph does not apply to increases in compensa-
tion of state employees during fiscal year 1993-94
and fiscal year 1994-95. In all circumstances in
which this paragraph does not apply to earnable
compensation of state employees and teachers, the
provisions of this paragraph that were in effect prior
to June 30, 1993 apply. This paragraph does not
apply to earnable compensation of employees of
participating local districts.
D. For a teacher who is eligible for participation
in the retirement system who is on a leave of absence
while serving as President of the Maine Teachers
Association, “earnable compensation” means the
amount that the teacher would have earned if the
teacher had remained in a teaching position.
E. “Earnable compensation” of a part-time, sea-
sonal or temporary employee is the sum of amounts
computed under paragraphs A, B, C and D adjusted
to reflect the wages or salary that the member would
have been paid if the member had been employed, at
the member’s rate of pay, for the number of days or
hours that a permanent full-time employee of the
same employer would have been employed.
F. For a teacher who, as provided by subsection
42, serves as president of a recognized or certified
bargaining agent representing teachers for which re-
leased time from teaching duties for performance of
the functions of president has been negotiated in a
collective bargaining agreement between the collec-
tive bargaining agent and the teacher’s school admin-
istrative unit, “earnable compensation” includes com-
pensation paid for the release time, except that the
amount of that compensation included in “earnable
compensation” may not be more than the compensa-
tion that the teacher would have been paid had the
teacher remained that same amount of time in the
teacher’s teaching position.
47a
14. Employee. “Employee” means:
A. For purposes of this chapter, a state employee,
including any person serving during any probation-
ary period required under the Civil Service Law and
rules of the Civil Service Appeals Board, a teacher
or a participating local district employee;
B. For purposes of chapter 423, a state employee,
including any person serving during any probation-
ary period required under the Civil Service Law and
rules of the Civil Service Appeals Board, or a
teacher; or
C. For purposes of chapter 425, a participating
local district employee.
§ 17050. Legislative intent
It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage qualified
persons to seek public employment and to continue in
public employment during their productive years. It is
further the intent of the Legislature to assist these persons
in making provision for their retirement years by establish-
ing benefits reasonably related to their highest earnings
and years of service and by providing suitable disability
and death benefits.
* * * x
§ 17151. Legislative findings and intent
1. Findings. The Legislature finds that the State owes
a great debt to its retired employees for their years of
faithful and productive service.
A. Part of that debt is repaid by the benefits pro-
vided to retirees through the Maine State Retirement
System.
B. Retirees, who depend heavily on these benefits,
and current employees, who will one day retire and
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receive benefits, are concerned about the financial
viability of the retirement system.
2. Intent. It is the intent of the Legislature that there
must be appropriated and transferred annually to the re-
tirement system the funds necessary to meet the system’s
long-term and short-term financial obligations based on the
actuarial assumptions established by the board upon the
advice of the actuary, except that for fiscal year 1991-92
the annual appropriation must be $73,500,000 less than
the amount that would otherwise be applied toward the
unfunded liability of the system. It is the intent of the
Legislature that the amount of the reduction, together
with the balance of the unfunded liability in the retire-
ment system on July 1, 1993, must be placed on a 27-year
amortization schedule. Funds that have been appropri-
ated must be considered assets of the retirement system.
A. The goal of the actuarial assumptions is to
achieve a fully funded retirement system.
B. The retirement system’s unfunded liability for per-
sons formerly subject to the Maine Revised Statutes
of 1944, chapter 37, sections 212 to 220 must be
repaid to the system from annual appropriations over
the funding period of the retirement system.
C. This section may not be construed to require the
State to appropriate and transfer funds to meet the
obligations of participating local districts to the re-
tirement system.
* * * *
§ 17153. Board of trustees
1-A. Actuarially sound basis. The board shall calcu-
late the funds necessary to maintain the retirement system
on an actuarially sound basis, including the unfunded
liability arising from payment of benefits for which con-
tributions were not received and shall transmit those cal-
culations to the State Budget Officer as required by
chapter 149.
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A. For benefits applicable to state employees, teach-
ers or participating local district employees that are
established through collective bargaining, the board
shall apply the funding methods and assumptions
adopted by the board pursuant to this subsection. —
B. The Legislature shall appropriate and transfer an-
nually those funds the board determines to be nec-
essary under this subsection to maintain the retire-
ment system on an actuarially sound basis, except
that for fiscal year 1991-92 the annual appropriation
must be $73,500,000 less than the amount that
would otherwise be applied toward the repayment of
the unfunded liability of the system.
C. This subsection may not be construed to require
the State to appropriate and transfer funds to meet
the obligations of participating local districts to the
retirement system.
2. Trustee of funds. The members of the board shall
be the trustees of the several funds created by this Part.
3. Investment of funds. The board may cause the
funds created by this Part to be invested and reinvested
in accordance with the standards defined in Title 18-A.
section 7-302, subject to periodic approval of the invest-
ment program by the board.
4. Prohibitions. In addition to the limitations of sec-
tion 18 and except as otherwise provided, no trustee and
no employee of the board of trustees may:
A. Have any direct interest in the gains or profits
of any investment made by the board:
B. Directly or indirectly, for himself or as an agent,
in any manner, use the gains or profits of any invest-
ment made by the board except to make whatever
current and necessary payments are authorized by the
board; or
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C. Become an endorser, surety or obligor for money
loaned to or borrowed from the board.
* * * *
§ 17651. Mandatory membership
All employees shall become members of the retirement
system as a condition of their employment.
* * * *
§ 17654. Cessation of membership
A member ceases to be a member of the retirement
system if the member:
1. Withdrawal. Withdraws accumulated contributions:
2. Beneficiary. Becomes a beneficiary as a result of the
member’s own retirement; or
3. Death. Dies.
* * * *
§ 17701. Member contributions
Each member shall contribute to the retirement system
or have pick-up contributions made at a rate of 6.5%
of earnable compensation, except as otherwise provided in
this Part.
1. Employer pick-up. The contributions required to
be made on behalf of a member under this section shall,
after the effective date of this section, be picked up by the
employer in lieu of contributions by the employee with a
reduction of the member’s salary consistent with section
17001, subsection 28-A.
2. No employee option. The employee may not choose
to receive pick-up contribution amounts directly instead
of having them paid by the employer to the system.
2-A. Optional members. If a person, whose member-
ship in the Maine State Retirement System is optional under
section 17652, elects a 5% salary increase in lieu of state
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payment of the retirement contribution, pursuant to Public
Law 1981, chapter 453, and chooses to participate in the
Maine State Retirement System, the State shall pick up the
retirement contribution with a reduction of the member’s
salary consistent with section 17001, subsection 28-A.
3. Treatment of pick-up contributions. Pick-up contri-
butions shall be treated as follows.
A. Pick-up contributions shall be treated as the em-
ployer’s contribution in determining tax treatment
under the United States Internal Revenue Code for
federal tax purposes, pursuant to the United States
Code, Title 26, Section 414(h) (2).
B. For all other purposes, pick-up contributions shall
be treated in the same manner and to the same extent
as member contributions were treated before the
effective date of this section.
4. Payment or repayment of contributions, back time,
refunds or purchase of service credits. The board shall
designate, by rule, a period of not less than 30 days dur-
ing which annual direct payments or repayments as pro-
vided in this chapter may be made.
§ 17701-A. Member contributions; members hired after
July 1, 1992
Notwithstanding section 17701, a member hired after
July 1, 1992 shall contribute to the retirement system or
have pick-up contributions made at a rate of 7.5% of
earnable compensation, except as otherwise provided in
this Part.
§ 17701-B. Member contributions on and after July 1,
1993
Notwithstanding sections 17701 and 17701-A, on and
after July 1, 1993 all members shall contribute to the
retirement system or have pick-up contributions made at a
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rate of 7.65% of earnable compensation except as other-
wise provided in this Part.
* * * *
§ 17705. Refund of accumulated contributions
If the service of any member has terminated, except
by death or by retirement under this Part, the member
shall be paid the amount of his accumulated contributions,
under the following conditions.
1. Ten or more years of service. If the member has
10 or more years of creditable service at the time service
is terminated, the member must have properly applied for
a refund of accumulated contributions. Refunds of ac-
cumulated contributions are governed as follows.
A. Payment must be made after termination of serv-
ice and not less than 22 days nor more than 60 days
after receipt of the application and receipt of the last
payroll upon which the name of the member appears,
whichever occurs later.
B. An application for refund is void if the member
filing the application returns to service as a state
employee or teacher before issuance of the payment.
C. Only contributions made by a particular member
or picked up by the employer may be refunded to
that member under this section.
2. Less than 10 years of service. If the member has
less than 10 years of creditable service at the time service
is terminated, refunds of accumulated contributions are
governed as follows.
A. Payment must be made after termination of serv-
ice and not less than 22 days nor more than 60 days
after receipt of the application and receipt of the last
payroll upon which the name of the member appears,
whichever occurs later.
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B. No interest may be added to the member's ac-
count for any period beyond the Sth anniversary of
the date of the member’s termination of service, ex-
cept that interest on accumulated contributions re-
lated to a member’s compensation for service ren-
dered as a part-time, seasonal or temporary employee
after December 31, 1991 must be added as required
by 26 CFR Part 31.
C. An application for refund is void if the member
filing the application returns to service as a state em-
ployee or teacher before issuance of the payment.
D. Except when inclusion of a portion of employer
contributions is required by paragraph F, only ac-
cumulated contributions made by a particular mem-
ber or picked up by the employer may be refunded
to that member under this section.
E. The members must have properly applied for a
refund of accumulated contributions, except that the
retirement system may make an automatic refund of
contributions if the member has not properly applied
for a refund and the amount of accumulated contri-
butions is less than $650. In the case of a part-time,
seasonal or temporary employee the $650 limitation
does not apply.
F. The amount of the refund of accumulated con-
tributions related to a member’s compensation for
service rendered as a part-time, seasonal or tem-
porary employee after December 31, 1991 must be
at least equal to 7.5% of the member’s compensa-
tion for that service plus interest as provided by
section 17156, The right to a refund under this para-
graph is nonforfeitable until the member has accrued
10 years of creditable service but does not constitute
a right to a retirement benefit.
* * * *
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§ 17801. Amendment not to cause reduction in benefit
No amendment to this Part may cause any reduction
in the amount of benefits which would be due to a mem-
ber based on creditable service, earnable compensation,
employee contributions, pick-up contributions and the pro-
visions of this Part on the date immediately preceding the
effective date of the amendment.
* * * *
§ 17806. Cost-of-living adjustment to retirement benefits
Cost-of-living adjustments to the retirement benefits be-
ing paid to retired state employees, teachers or benefi-
ciaries of either shall be governed as follows.
1. Determination of adjustment. The cost-of-living ad-
justment shall be determined as follows.
A. Whenever there is a percentage change in the
Consumer Price Index from July Ist to June 30th,
the board shall automatically make an equal percent-
age increase or decrease in retirement benefits, be-
ginning in September, up to a maximum annual
increase or decrease of 4%.
B. Whenever the annual percentage increase in the
Consumer Price Index from July Ist to June 30th
exceeds 4%, the board shall make whatever adjust-
ments in the retirement benefits are necessary to re-
flect an annual increase of 4% and shall submit a
supplemental budget request to the Governor for the
additional funds that would be required to make ad-
justments in the retirement benefits to reflect the
actual increase in the Consumer Price Index. The
request shall include a report stating the cost of the
4% increase, the actual percentage increase in the
Consumer Price Index and the percentage adjust-
ments granted during the previous 5 years. The
board shall make an additional adjustment in the
retirement benefits in the month following the appro-
priation only in that amount.
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C. Notwithstanding any other provision of this sec-
tion, the amount of annual retirement benefit other-
wise payable under this Part may not be less than
the retired member received on the effective date of
his retirement or on July 1, 1977, whichever amount
is greater.
2. Cost. The board shall determine the costs of the
adjustments under this section and shall include those
costs in its budget requests.
3. Eligibility. Cost-of-living adjustments under this
section must be applied to the retirement benefits of all
retirees who have been retired for at least 12 months be-
fore the date that the adjustment becomes payable, except
that a member who has less than 10 years of creditable
service on July 1, 1993 may not receive a cost-of-living
adjustment until at least 12 months after reaching normal
retirement age. Beneficiaries of deceased retirees and
members are eligible for the cost-of-living adjustment at
the same time the deceased retiree or member would have
become eligible. A member who is eligible to retire as of
June 30, 1993 and who actually retires effective no later
than July 1, 1994 is eligible for the cost-of-living adjust-
ment if that member has been retired for at least 6 months
before the date that the adjustment becomes payable.
* * * *
§ 17851. Qualification for benefits
1. Member in service; 10 years of creditable service
on July 1, 1993. A member who is in service when
reaching 60 years of age, or is in service after reaching
60 years of age, qualifies for a service retirement benefit
if the member:
A. Retires upon or after reaching 60 years of age;
and
B. Has been in service for a minimum of one year
immediately before retirement or has at least 10
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years of creditable service, which may include credit-
able service as a member of the Maine Legislative
Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-
section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine
State Retirement System.
This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,
have 10 years of creditable service or who have reached
60 years of age and have been in service for a minimum
of one year immediately before that date. For the pur-
pose of calculating creditable service under this subsection
only, creditable service includes time during which a mem-
ber participated in the voluntary cost savings plan or the
voluntary employee incentive program, authorized by Pub-
lic Law 1989, chapter 702, section F-6 and Public Law
1991, chapter 591, Part BB and chapter 780, Part VV,
or 10 years of combined creditable service under this Part
and Title 3, chapter 29, or creditable service available to
a member that the member was eligible to purchase on
June 30, 1993 and that the member does purchase in ac-
cordance with rules adopted by the board.
1-A. Member in service; less than 10 years creditable
service on July 1, 1993. A member who is in service
when reaching 62 years of age, or is in service after reach-
ing 62 years of age, qualifies for a service retirement bene-
fit if the member:
A. Retires upon or after reaching 62 years of age;
and
B. Has been in service for a minimum of one year
immediately before retirement or has at least 10
years of creditable service, which may include credit-
able service as a member of the Maine Legislative
Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-
section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine
State Retirement System.
This subsection applies to members who are not covered
under subsection 1.
2. Member not in service; 10 years of creditable serv-
ice on July 1, 1993. A member who is not in service
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when reaching 60 years of age qualifies for a service re-
tirement benefit if the niember:
A. Retires upon or after reaching 60 years of age;
and
B. Has at least 10 years of creditable service or 5
full terms as a Legislator, which may include credit-
able service as a member of the Maine Legislative
Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-
section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine
State Retirement System.
This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,
have 10 years of creditable service. For the purpose of
calculating creditable service under this subsection only,
creditable service includes time during which a member
participated in the voluntary cost savings plan or the volun-
tary employee incentive program, authorized by Public Law
1989, chapter 702, section F-6 and Public Law 1991,
chapter 591, Part BB and chapter 780, Part VV, or 10
years of combined creditable service under this Part and
Title 3, chapter 29, or creditable service available to a
member that the member was eligible to purchase on June
30, 1993 and that the member does purchase in accord-
ance with rules adopted by the board.
2-A. Member not in service; less than 10 years credit-
able service on July 1, 1993. A member who is not in
service when reaching 62 years of age qualifies for a serv-
ice retirement benefit if the member:
A. Retires upon or after reaching 62 years of age;
and
B. Has at least 10 years of creditable service or 5
full terms as a Legislator, which may include credit-
able service as a member of the Maine Legislative
Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-
section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine
State Retirement System.
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This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,
do not have 10 years of creditable service.
3. Member with creditable service of 25 years or more.
A member who has completed 25 or more years of credit-
able service qualifies for a service retirement benefit if he
retires at any time after completing 25 years of service,
which may include, for the purpose of meeting eligibility
requirements, creditable service as a member of the Maine
Legislative Retirement System under Title 3, section 701,
subsection 8, before becoming a member of the Maine
State Retirement System.
§ 17852. Computation of benefit
1. Member in service. The amount of the service re-
tirement benefit for members qualified under section
17851, subsection 1, shall be computed as follows:
A. 1/50 of the member’s average final compensa-
tion multiplied by the number of years of his mem-
bership service and up to 25 years of his prior serv-
ice. Membership service under this paragraph does
not include creditable service under the Legislative
Retirement System; or
B. The total amount of the service retirement bene-
fit of any member qualifying under section 17851,
subsection 1, who became a member before July 1,
1947, and for whom the date of establishment of the
retirement system is July 1, 1942, must be at least
equal to 1/2 of his average final compensation, if the
member has at least 20 years of total creditable serv-
ice, including at least 13 years of prior service if he
retires upon or after reaching age 70.
2. Member not in service. The amount of the service
retirement benefit for members qualified under section
17851, subsection 2, shall be computed in accordance
with subsection 1.
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t
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3. Member with creditable service of 25 years or more;
10 years of creditable service on July 1, 1993. The
amount of the service retirement benefit for members
qualified under section 17851, subsection 3, is computed
in accordance with subsection 1, except that:
A. The amount arrived at under subsection | is re-
duced by applying to that amount the percentage that
a life annuity due at age 60 bears to the life annuity
due at the age of retirement; and
B. For the purpose of making the computation under
paragraph A, the board-approved tables of annuities
in effect at the date of the member’s retirement are
used.
This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,
have 10 years of creditable service. For the purpose of
calculating creditable service under this subsection only,
creditable service includes time during which a member
participated in the voluntary cost savings plan or the vol-
untary employee incentive program, authorized by Public
Law 1989, chapter 702, section F-6 and Public Law 1991,
chapter 591, Part BB and chapter 780, Part VV, or 10
years of combined creditable service under this Part and
Title 3, chapter 29, or creditable service available to a
member that the member was eligible to purchase on
June 30, 1993 and that the member does purchase in ac-
cordance with rules adopted by the board.
3-A. Member with creditable service of 25 years or
more; less than 10 years of creditable service on July 1,
1993. The amount of the service retirement benefit for
members qualified under section 17851, subsection 3, is
computed in accordance with subsection 1, except that the
benefit is reduced by 6% for each year that the member’s
age precedes age 62.
This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,
do not have 10 years of creditable service.
* * * *
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