Appendix — Parker v. Wakelin

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| 97 1181 JAN 15 1998

-_ OFFICE OF PHE CLERK

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

RICHARD M. PARKER et al.,

Petitioners,

v.

Davip S. WAKELIN et ai.,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT H. CHANIN

(Counsel of Record)

JOHN M. WEST

JONATHAN D. HACKER

BREDHOFF & KAISER, P.L.L.C.

1000 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Suite 1300

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 833-9340

DONALD F.. FONTAINE

FONTAINE & BEAL, P.A.

482 Congress Street

Portland, Maine 04112

(207) 879-1879

Attorneys for Petitioners

WILson - Eras Printing Co., Inc. - 769-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

@ EER w

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the First Circuit in Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 1

Re Ge MUI cininpseneciinidgnsviiehonestnicoinmaiadbamenistcimaniiaes

Opinion of the United States District Court for

the District of Maine in Parker v. Wakelin, 937

Bo CI IE eats IIA OID siceciieeeces ecient drcicdeneniocts

Order of the En Banc Court of the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Parker

v. Wakelin, Nos. 96-2225, 96-2226, 96-2227 & 96-

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Statutory Provisions Involved ..............02.2.......0........

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIRST CIRCUIT

Nos. 96-2225 through 96-2228

RICHARD M. PARKER, et al.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

Cross-A ppellants,

Vv.

Davip S. WAKELIN, et al.,

Defendants, Appellants,

Cross-A ppellees.

Heard April 8, 1997

Decided Aug. 11, 1997

Before TORRUEL“A, Chief Judge, BOUDIN and

LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

TORRUELLA, Chief Judge.

The question presented by this appeal is whether cer-

tain legislative amendments to the Maine State Retirement

System (“MSRS”) violate the Contract Clause of the

United States Constitution as applied to plaintiffs, a class

comprised of current Maine public school teachers all of

whom are members of the MSRS. Following a bench

trial, the district court held that certain amendments vio-

lated the Contract Clause as applied to those public em-

ployees who had satisfied the service requirements under

2a

the MSRS and whose pension rights had thereby “vested.”

Finding no unmistakable intent on the part of the Maine

legislature to create private contractual rights against the

reduction of pension benefits prior to the point at which

pension benefits may actually be received, we hold that the

Maine amendments do not violate the Contract Clause

with regard to any of the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we re-

verse the district court’s holding that the amendments vio-

late the Contract Clause as applied to “vested” members

of the MSRS.

BACKGROUND

None of the relevant facts recited below are in dispute.

I. The Maine State Retirement System (MSRS)

The MSRS operates as a public pension trust pursuant

to Maine’s public employee retirement benefit statute.

See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001-18663 (1989 & Supp.1996).

The MSRS was created in 1942 to encourage “qualified

persons to seek public employment and to continue in pub-

lic employment in their productive years.” 5 M.R.S.A.

§ 17050 (1989). For all Maine state employees, includ-

ing the public school teachers comprising the plaintiff

class in the instant case, membership in the MSRS is man-

datory. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001(14), 17651 (1989). All

MSRS members make mandatory contributions into a pen-

sion fund. The State of Maine also contributes annually

to maintain the fund’s actuarial soundness with regard to

future benefit obligations. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17701-A,

17701-B, 171531(1-A)(B) (Supp. 1996). The MSRS can

be classified as a “defined benefit system,” in that the re-

tirement benefits provided for teachers are defined upon

employment and financed in part by their fixed contribu-

tions into the system.

The teachers, as members of the system, qualify to re-

ceive retirement benefits upon (1) reaching the statutory

retirement age, and (2) satisfying either of the following

3a

service requirements: (a) at least ten years of creditable

service; or (b) at least one year of creditable service

prior to reaching the statutory retirement age while

in public service. 5 M.R.S.A. $ 17851 (1989 & Supp.

1996). Alternatively, a member may be entitled to re-

ceive retirement benefits when he or she retires after per-

forming at least 25 years of creditable service. Jd. In the

district court’s decision, the term “vesting” was used to

describe the satisfaction of the service requirements. See

Parker v. Wakelin, 937 F.Supp. 46, 49 n. 1 (D.Me.1996).

However, as the district court in fact noted, the term

“vesting” does not figure in the statutory scheme itself,

which simply indicates the age and service requirements

that must be met. See 5 M.R.S.A. § 17851 (1989 &

Supp.1996).' Members who terminate their public service

prior to satisfying the pension eligibility requirements are

entitled to a return of their contributions, with interest.

5 M.R.S.A. § 17705(2).

An eligible retiree earns a pension in the amount of

two percent of his or her “average final compensation”

multiplied by the number of years of total creditable pub-

lic service (up to 25 years). 5 M.R.S.A. § 17852

(1989).* The legislative amendments at issue on this ap-

peal affect, among other things, the process by which one

computes an employee’s “average final compensation” in

such a manner as to reduce the expected pension benefits

of many members.

The State of Maine concedes that the sole purpose for

enacting the changes in the terms and conditions of retire-

ment benefits (“the 1993 Amendments”) was to save

money by lowering budget allocations by the state to the

! Other non-pension benefits under the retirement system, such as

life insurance and disability retirement benefits, may be received

without having satisfied any minimum service requirement.

2 A slightly different method applies to those retirees whose eli gi-

bility is based on having completed 25 or more years of creditable

service.

4a

trust funds of the MSRS; their enactment coincided with

other responses to a state fiscal crisis. The 1993 Amend-

ments may be sorted into two groups: three changes apply

to the pensions of all current teacher-members of the

MSRS, while three others apply only to those who had not

satisfied the service requirements under the MSRS as of

the effective date of the amendments. None of the amend-

ments affected retirees earning pensions as of the effective

date. The amendments that affected all of the plaintiffs

were: (1) an increase in the rate of required member

contributions from 6.5 percent of their salary to 7.65 per-

cent; (2) a cap on the salary increase that may be in-

cluded in the course of calculating the level of teachers’

retirement benefits; and (3) a six-month delay in the first

cost-of-living adjustment of retirement benefits. See P.L.

1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 28, 13, 31.° The district court

held that these three modifications were unconstitutional as

applied to those plaintiffs who had satisfied the service

requirements. The other 1993 amendments, which only

applied to those who had not served 10 years as of the

effective date of the amendments, were: (1) an increase

in the regular retirement age from 60 to 62; (2) an in-

crease in the early retirement penalty from 2.25 percent to

6 percent of the teachers’ retirement benefit for each year

preceding age 62; and (3) the elimination of an inclusion

of per diem payment of up to thirty days of unused sick

or vacation pay in the course of calculating teachers’ re-

tirement benefits. See P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 33, 35,

37, 12. It is not disputed that the 1993 Amendments

operate to the disadvantage of MSRS members without

providing substantive offsetting benefits.

When the MSRS was first adopted in 1942, the legisla-

ture made no express statement as to its ability to amend

8 These provisions are codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A.

§§ 17001-B, 17701(18)(C), 17806(3).

‘These provisions are codified as amended at 5 M.RS.A.

§§ 17851(1-A) & (2-A), 17852(3-A), 17001(13) (B).

Se

———EE

Sa’

or alter the pension benefit structure. In 1975, the Maine

legislature enacted the following provision:

No amendment to this chapter shall cause any reduc-

tion in the amount of benefits which would be due

to the member based on creditable service, compen-

sation, employee contributions and the provisions of

this chapter on the date immediately preceding the

effective date of such amendment.

P.L.1975, ch. 622, § 6, codified at 5 M.R.S.A. § 17801

(1989), under the title “Amendment not to cause reduc-

tion in benefit.” °

II. The Proceedings Below

Plaintiffs, the Maine Education Association and a class

representing public school teachers throughout the State

of Maine, challenged the constitutionality of the 1993

Amendments under the Contract Clause, the Due Process

Clause, and the Takings Clause, seeking declaratory and

injunctive relief to block implementation. The district

court held that: (1) the 1993 Amendments violated the

Contract Clause only as applied te MSRS members whose

benefits had “vested” under the system; and (2) the 1993

Amendments did not violate any other provision of the

constitution. By using the term “vested” the district court

referred to those MSRS members who had satisfied the

service requirements under the system—a service require-

ment is a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition to

being entitled to actually receive a pension. See Parker v.

Wakelin, 937 F.Supp. at 49 n. 1.

° The current version has a few minor changes in language:

No amendment to this Part may cause any reduction in the

amount of benefits that would be due to a member based on

creditable service, earnable compensation, employee contribu-

tions, pick-up contributions and the provisions of this Part on

the date immediately preceding the effective date of the amend-

ment.

6a

On appeal, the state defendants ask that we hold that

the 1993 Amendments do not violate the Contract Clause

as applied to any of the plaintiffs. In their cross-appeal,

the plaintiffs argue that the 1993 Amendments violate the

Contract Clause as applied to all teacher members of the

MSRS prior to the effective date of the amendments, and

that the 1993 Amendments also violate substantive due

process.

DISCUSSION

The essential facts being undisputed, this appeal turns

on questions of law over which we exercise de novo re-

view. See Villafane-Neriz v. FDIC, 75 F.3d 727, 730 (lst

Cir.1996). This appeal raises a legal issue of considerable

importance, one we specifically left unresolved in McGrath

v. Rhode Island Retirement Board, 88 F.3d 12, 19 (lst

Cir.1996). When stated broadly, the issue is whether a

legislative amendment to a state employee retirement pen-

sion plan that is detrimental to employees triggers further

scrutiny under the Contract Clause as applied to state em-

ployees whose pension rights under the plan have “vested”

prior to such amendment. In McGrath, we did not need

to resolve this issue, because the plaintiff's pension rights

had not vested prior to the legislative amendment at issue,

and because the legislature specifically reserved the power

to amend or terminate the plan as to nonvested members.

88 F.3d at 19-20. We now conclude that a blanket answer

to the issue of Contract Clause protection for vested em-

ployees is not possible, because, as we explain below, a

detailed examination of the particular provisions of a state

pension program will be required prior to determining the

nature and scope of the unmistakable contractual rights,

if any, that are created by a given state legislature.

I. General Contract Clause Principles

Although the wording of the Contract Clause appears

uncompromising—‘“No state shall . . . pass any .. . Law

7a

impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . .”*—the Su-

preme Court does not interpret it as an absolute bar on

the impairment of either governmental or private con-

tractual obligations. See United States Trust Co. v. New

Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 21, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 1517, 52 L.Ed.2d

92 (1977) (“‘[T]he prohibition is not an absolute one

and is not to be read with literal exactness like a mathe-

matical formula.’” (quoting Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n y.

Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 428, 54 S.Ct. 231, 236, 78 L.Ed.

413 (1934))). Rather, the Supreme Court has elaborated

an analysis under which a court must first ascertain

whether a change in state law has resulted in “ ‘the sub-

stantial impairment of a contractual relationship.’ ” Gen-

eral Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 US. 181, 186, 112

S.Ct. 1105, 1109, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) (quoting

Allied Structural Steel Co. y. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234,

244, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 2722, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978)).

Next, the reviewing court must determine whether the im-

pairment is nevertheless justified as “reasonable and nec-

essary to serve an important public purpose.” United

States Trust Co., 431 US. at 25, 97 S.Ct. at 1519.

Where the contract allegedly impaired is one created, or

entered into, by the state itself, less deference to a legisla-

tive determination of reasonableness and necessity is re-

quired, because “the State’s self-interest is at stake.” 7d.

at 26, 97 S.Ct. at 1519: see also McGrath, 88 F.3d at 16

(when the state itself is a party, it “must do more than

mouth the vocabulary of the public weal in order to reach

safe harbor.”).

The first step described above can be further broken

down into “three components: whether there is a con-

tractual relationship, whether a change in law impairs that

contractual relationship, and whether the impairment is

substantial.” Romein, 503 U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109.

In the instant case, we need not reach the issue of impair-

*U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

8a

ment or substantiality, because the plaintiffs fail to demon-

strate the existence of a contractual relationship protected

by the Contract Clause. At the same time that less defer-

ence is given to state legislatures when it is the state that

wishes to relieve itself of contractual obligations, a clear

showing must be made that a state law has created a con-

tractual obligation on the part of the state in the first

place. See Hoffman v. Warwick, 909 F.2d 608, 614 (Ist

Cir.1990) (“The Contract Clause is applicable to con-

tracts into which the state enters, but normally state statu-

tory enactments do not of their own force create a con-

tract with those whom the statute benefits.” ).

Il. The Unmistakability Doctrine

In order to deem a state legislative enactment a con-

tract for the purposes of the Contract Clause, there must

be a clear indication that the legislature intends to bind

itself in a contractual manner. See National R.R. Passen-

ger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470

U.S. 451, 465-66, 105 S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 84 L.Ed.2d 432

(1985) (“[A]bsent some clear indication that the legisla-

ture intends to bind itself contractually, the presumption

is that ‘a law is not intended to create private contractual

or vested rights but merely declares a policy to be pursued

until the legislature shall ordain otherwise.’” (quoting

Dodge v. Board of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98,

100, 82 L.Ed. 57 (1937)); United States Trust Co., 431

U.S. at 17-18 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 1515-16 n. 14 (a statute

may be treated as a binding contract “when the language

and the circumstances evince a legislative intent to create

private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against

the state.”).

This threshold requirement for the recognition of public

contracts has been referred to as the “unmistakability doc-

trine.” See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 19 (citing United States

v. Winstar, US. , 116 S.Ct. 2432, 135 L.Ed.2d

964 (1996)). In United States v. Winstar, the Supreme

IRN ts ak

9a

Court traced the history of the unmistakability doctrine

from Justice Marshall’s opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10

U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810), and explained

its purpose. Because legislatures should not bind future

legislatures from employing their sovereign powers in the

absence of the clearest of intent to create vested rights

protected under the Contract Clause, courts developed

canons of construction disfavoring implied governmental

contractual obligations. Thus, “ ‘neither the right of taxa-

tion, nor any other power of sovereignty, will be held... .

to have been surrendered, unless such surrender has been

expressed in terms too plain to be mistaken.’” Wéinstar,

U.S. at , 116 S.Ct. at 2455 (quoting Jefferson

Branch Bank vy. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 436, 446

(1861)). The requirement that “the government’s obli-

gation unmistakably appear thus served the dual purposes

of limiting contractual incursions on a State’s sovereign

powers and of avoiding difficult constitutional questions

about the extent of State authority to limit the subsequent

exercise of legislative power.” Winstar, USS. at .

116 S.Ct. at 2455.

In its most recent Contract Clause case holding a state

to its obligations under a public contract, the Supreme

Court found ample evidence that a promise on the part

of the state had been made in a contractual setting, in re-

turn for a specific bargained-for benefit, and found that

the statutory scheme clearly employed the language of con-

tract. See United States Trust Co., 431 USS. at 18, 97

S.Ct. at 1515 (involving a legislative covenant between

New York and New Jersey and future bondholders where

the very “purpose of the covenant was to invoke the con-

Stitutional protection of the Contract Clause as security

against repeal”). In the instant case, we must determine

whether the MSRS also evinces a clear intent on the part

of the Maine legislature to create contractual rights

against the modification of pension benefits.

10a

III. Pension Plans as Contractual Obligations

The law governing the rights of members of public em-

ployee retirement plans varies greatly from state to state,

and has not been the subject of federal regulation or

harmonization. There is no modern Supreme Court case

that provides guidance as to the rights public employees

have to their pensions. Pennie v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464, 10

S.Ct. 149, 33 L.Ed. 426 (1889), stands for the proposi-

tion that public employee pension programs do not create

vested rights against legislative modifications, and thus

are gratuities that a state may freely revoke. See Pennie,

132 U.S. at 470-71, 10 S.Ct. at 151 (holding California’s

adjustment of a pension benefit plan for police officers did

not constitute deprivation of property without due proc-

ess). Althrough this “gratuity” approach has been re-

jected by most state courts, Pennie has never been ex-

plicitly overruled. See generally 60A Am.Jur.2d, Pensions

and Retirement Funds, §§ 1620-29 (discussing the shift

away from the gratuity approach toward the contract ap-

proach). Pennie has, however, been ignored as a prece-

dent, perhaps because its dicta regarding public pension

benefits arose in the context of a Due Process claim.

Although only two other circuits have addressed this

question, state courts have generally viewed a public pen-

sion plan as creating implied-in-fact unilateral contracts.

See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 17 (collecting cases). The

Ninth Circuit in State of Nevada Employees Ass'n v.

Keating, 903 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir.1990), agreed with the

Nevada Supreme Court that the “ ‘better reasoned view’

recognizes that non-vested employees have contractual

rights in pension plans ‘subject to reasonable modification

in order to keep the system flexible to meet changing con-

ditions, and to maintain the actuarial soundness of the

system.’” 903 F.2d at 1227 (quoting Public Employees’

Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 96 Nev. 718, 615

P.2d 972 (1980)). Thus the Ninth Circuit in Keating

concluded that a Nevada law penalizing the withdrawal

of pension contributions and therevy altering the previ-

i ae a aan anaes

lla

ous law that contained no such penalty, violated the Con-

tract Clause because it did not represent a reasonable

modification of the pension plan. The court in K eating

noted, however, that the state did not dispute that

Nevada's statutes providing pensions for public employees

created contractual obligations. See Keating, 903 F.2d at

1225-26. The Fourth Circuit also ignored the gratuity

approach in the course of holding that legislative amend-

ments to a North Carolina public employee disability ben-

efit plan did not violate the Contract Clause because,

under relevant state law interpretations of the statute,

rights to benefits under the plan did not vest until retire.

ment. See Kestler v. Board of Trustees of North Carolina

Legal Governmental Employees’ Retirement Sys., 48 F.3d

800, 804 (4th Cir.1995) (no Contract Clause violation

where plaintiff was not vested at the time of the effective

date of the amendment).

These cases reflect the modern trend among state su-

preme courts, which is to protect pension rights on the

theory that a state’s promise of pension benefits repre-

sents an offer that can be accepted through the employ-

ee’s performance—thus, a unilateral, implied-in-fact con-

tract is created that is binding on the state. See generally

Andrew Mackenzie, “Spiller v. State: Determining the

Nature of Public Employees’ Rights to Their Pensions,”

46 Me. L.Rev. 355, 357-59 (1994); Note, John J.

Dwyer, “‘Til Death Do Us Part: Pennsylavnia’s ‘Con-

tract’ With Public Employees For Pension Benefits,” 59

Temp. L.Q. 553 ( 1986). There is much disagreement on

the details, however, under this unilateral contract ap-

proach. One widely held view is that at some point, pub-

lic employees’ contractual rights to pension benefits vest;

after vesting, the state is contractually bound to honor its

obligation to provide a pension without any further modifi-

cations or decreases in overall benefit levels. See, e.g.,

Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d 894,

896 (Del. 1983) (rights vest upon completion of mini-

mum service requirement); Baker y. Oklahoma Fire-

12a

fighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 353 (Okla.

1986) (same); Leonard v. City of Seattle, 81 Wash.2d

479, 503 P.2d 741, 746 (1972) (en banc) (same);

Sylvestre v. State, 298 Minn. 142, 214 N.W.2d 658, 666-

67 (1973) (rights vest at start of employment); Yeazell

v. Copins, 98 Ariz. 109, 402 P.2d 541 (1965) (en banc)

(same as Sylvestre ). Several states have provisions in

their constitutions declaring that vesting occurs at the

moment of public employment and barring any legislative

modifications that retroactively reduce the accrued bene-

fits of public employees. See, e.g., Alaska Const. art. XII,

§ 7; Haw Const. art. XVI, § 2; Ill. Const. art. XIII, § 5;

Mich. Const. art. IX, § 24; N.Y. Const. art. V, § 7. Sev-

eral states follow a modified contract approach, which

permits some unilateral legislative modifications of pen-

sion plans as long as the legislature offsets any new dis-

advantage with comparable new advantages, as seen from

the point of view of the public employee. See, e.g., Singer

v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356, 607 P.2d 467, 475

(1980); Betts v. Board of Admin. of the Pub. Employees’

Ret. Sys., 21 Cal.3d 859, 148 Cal.Rptr. 158, 161, 582

P.2d 614, 617 (1978) (en banc); Opinion of the Jus-

tices, 364 Mass. 847, 303 N.E.2d 320, 328 (1973). At

least two state supreme courts, including Maine’s, have

declined to use the language of “vesting” in the course of

upholding modifications to pension benefits at any time

during the employment relationship. See Spiller v. State,

627 A.2d 513, 516 (Me.1993); Pineman v. Oechslin,

195 Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803 (1985). The Connecti-

cut Supreme Court in fact rejected the contract model

altogether and indicated that public employees have a

property interest in pension benefits that may not be arbi-

trarily confiscated by the state, under the Due Process

Clause. Pineman, 488 A.2d at 809-810.

Although we have recognized the diversity of contract

theories adepted by state courts—in particular the diver-

gence of approaches with regard to when exactly binding

rights to a certain level of retirement benefits “vest”—we

13a

have never chosen to adopt a particular approach to pub-

lic pension rights. See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 16-18.

In McGrath, we noted that, as a general matter, pen-

sions are viewed as “a species of unilateral contracts,”

although there is considerable disagreement as to when

rights in public pension plans vest, if at all. Jd. at 17.

But in the course of analyzing a Contract Clause chal-

lenge to certain amendments to the Rhode Island public

employee retirement system, we eschewed participating in

abstract contract theory in favor of performing a close

analysis of the statutory provision at issue. Such an ap-

proach is wise, because the unmistakability doctrine man-

dates that we determine whether the challenged legislative

enactment evinces the clear intent of the state to be bound

to particular contractual obligations. It may well be that

the variety of approaches adopted by state supreme courts

reflect, in part, differences in the structure of the various

state pension programs, and of the intention of the differ-

ent state legislatures that created them. There is a dan-

ger, however, in adopting a theory of pension rights and

subsequently forcing a given program to fit under it. Any

given theoretical approach will make assumptions regard-

ing the intent of legislatures to be bound, as well as the

time at which vesting should occur, which may be con-

tradicted by particular statutory provisions such as, for

example, an express reservation of the right to revoke -

pension benefits." When reviewing a particular enactment.

therefore, we must suspend judgment and “proceed cau-

tiously both in identifying a contract within the language

of a regulatory statute and in defining the contours of

any contractual obligations.” Atchison, Topeka & Santa

Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. at 466, 105 S.Ct. at 1452. The

district court’s decision protects Maine public employees

from benefit reduction once employees’ rights are “vested.”

Unfortunately, the line it drew between teachers who had

™In McGrath, we specifically reserved judgment on the question

of whether such express reservations are valid after the poirt at

which pension rights are “vested.” 88 F.3d at 19.

l4a

and had not completed a minimum service requirement,

cannot be justified on the basis of the Maine statute, which

nowhere speaks of “vesting” as understood by the district

court.

IV. Contractual Rights Under the MSRS

Turning to the MSRS, we ask whether the Maine Legis-

lature has unmistakably evinced the intention to create

binding contractual rights. See Hoffman, 909 F.2d at 614

(determining whether “language and circumstances” of

Rhode Island benefits statute reveal “a legislative intent

to create private contractual rights”). Specifically, in light

of the plaintiffs’ claims, we must ask whether Maine has

bound itself not to modify or alter, at any time before the

employee’s retirement, the level of pension benefits an

employee would expect to receive. The statutory language

is the primary focus of the inquiry. Atchison, Topeka &

Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. at 466, 105 S.Ct. at 1542.

Under the terms of the MSRS, public employees who

have met certain service and age requirements are entitled

to receive pensions. At the heart of this case is 5

M.R.S.A. § 17801, which reflects the state’s intent to

reserve the power to amend the amount of pension bene-

fits, as well as, arguably, the state’s intent to create private

contractual rights. That is, the State’s self-imposed limita-

tions on its legislative power through section 17801 may

reasonably serve as an indication of its intent to guarantee

pension benefits once they are “due,” as well as an ob-

vious reservation of amendment powers with regard to the

amount of benefits that are not “due.” The parties dis-

agree as to the unmistakable intentions section 17801

represents.

Section 17801 states that “no amendment . . . may

cause any reduction in the amount of benefits which would

be due a member . . . on the date immediately preceding

the effective date of the amendment.” Much turns on the

meanirig of “due.” The plaintiff public school teachers

argue that benefits are “due” from the moment of em-

15a

ployment, and that this section merely confirms the appli-

cability of a strict implied-in-fact, unilateral contract ap-

proach. The State contends that section 17801 is a

reservation of the power to alter benefits until the retire-

ment benefits are literally due to be received. The third

alternative, not the basic position of either party, is that

benefits are “due” if a teacher has completed the statute’s

initial service requirements, although pension benefits are

not yet currently payable.

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s Spiller decision,

which deserves our “ ‘respectful consideration and great

weight,’ Romein, 503 U.S. at 187, 112 S.Ct. at 1110

(quoting Indiana ex rel. Anderson y. Brand, 303 USS.

95, 100, 58 S.Ct. 443, 446, 82 L.Ed. 685 (1938)),

clearly rejects the alternative pressed by the teachers. The

court was “unpersuaded by the reasoning of those juris-

dictions that have discerned in the Statutory language the

creation at the time of employment of binding contractual

rights.” Spiller, 627 A.2d at 516. It held that, as to the

Spiller plaintiffs, none of whom had Satisfied the statute’s

Service requirements at the time of the Statutory amend-

ment challenged in Spiller, “[nJone of the benefits at issue

here were due .. . on the effective date of [the] legisla-

tion.” Id.

The question remains, however, whether section 17801

Should be read to protect a teacher—and possibly to cre-

ate contract rights—whenever a teacher satisfies the serv-

ice requirements even though the teacher is still in active

service and no pension is currently payable. Section

17801 does not clearly compel such a reading, since “due”

could easily be read to mean currently payable. And such

a reading would also arguably conflict with some of the

language in Spiller (although not its holding) and with

the dissent’s reading of the majority. See Spiller, 627

A.2d at 516 (“By implication, the [statutory] language

reserves to future legislatures the power to modify pro-

spective service retirement benefits for employees to whom

benefits are not then due”); id. at 519 ( “Although the

l6a

Court does not reach the issue today, its interpretation of

section 17801 also undermines the pension benefits of

those employees who have met the eligibility conditions

for pension benefits but [have not yet retired].”) (Wathen,

C.J., dissenting).

Even if we treat the statute as unclear and conclude

that Spiller leaves the issue open, we think that the prin-

ciple of unmistakability would defeat the teachers’ claim

that the contract rights are created when service require-

ments are satisfied. We need not decide whether the stat-

ute ever gives rise to a contractual relationship; it is

enough to say that it does not clearly do so before a

teacher retires, and thus gains an immediate right to the

payment of pension benefits. Because there is no attempt

here to take away retirees’ benefits, there can be no

plausible contract clause claim in this case.

The district court reasoned that “due” should be con-

strued as referring to the point at which a member quali-

fies for retirement benefits. But even if this is a possible

reading. we do not think this language could be said to

reflect the unmistakable intent of the Maine Legislature,

particularly when the legislature could very well have indi-

cated as much. In fact, the MSRS makes no reference to

“vesting.” As the district court points out, and as the

plaintiffs have vigorously argued, there is some evidence

indicating that certain legislators wanted to protect vested

rights; and that the Maine Legislature, in enacting section

17801, responded to a report that recommended the pro-

tection of employees’ accrued retirement benefits from

retroactive reduction. But the language of section 17801

remains at best ambiguous, and we cannot find that legis-

lature as a whole unmistakably intended to create contract

rights at the time that service requirements were satisfied

—especially where, as here, it would have been easy to

make any such intention crystal clear.

We do not decide today whether, in order to satisfy

the unmistakability doctrine, a public pension statute must

17a

explicitly employ the language of contract. Nor need we

decide whether Contract Clause principles would apply if

Maine sought to reduce pension benefits already “due” to

present retirees, a step that would in any case appear to

require revision of the present section 17801. To resolve

this appeal, we need only conclude that there is no un-

mistakable intent by the Maine Legislature to create an

enforceable private contract right against the modification

of the plaintiffs’ retirement benefits until they are actually

receivable.

As we indicated in McGrath, public employment con-

tracts operate in a “special employment environment” re-

quiring recognition of “the states’ flexibility vis-a-vis the

retirement benefits that it offers public employees.” 88

F.3d at 19. Whether the amendments here are wise or

justified as a matter of political philosophy is not our

concern. As Contract Clause challenges arise, we must

look to the language of the pension statutes to determine,

as a threshold matter, whether the unmistakability doc-

trine is satisfied. Here, as it relates to Maine’s purported

obligation not to alter the benefits of its public teacher

employees, it is not. Thus, no violation of the Contract

Clause may be found.

With regard to the teacher-plaintiffs’ due process claim

on cross-appeal, we affirm the decision of the district

court, finding no due process violation, for the reasons

given in its opinion, extending that reasoning to all plain-

tiffs. See 937 F.Supp. at 58.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this opinion, the decision of

the district court, to the extent that it found the Maine

legislative amendments violative of the Contract Clause,

is reversed in part, and to the extent that it found no

constitutional violations, is affirmed in part.

18a

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

D. MAINE

Civil No. 94-157-P-C

RICHARD M. PARKER, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Davip S. WAKELIN, et al.,

Defendants.

Aug. 1, 1996

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

GENE CARTER, Chief Judge.

Plaintiffs, the Maine Education Association (“MEA”)

and a class representing public school teachers throughout

the State of Maine (“MSRS members”), bring this action

challenging the constitutionality of certain amendments

to the Maine State Retirement System (“MSRS” or

“Maine Plan”) passed by the Maine Legislature in 1993.

P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 12, 13, 28, 31-37 (codified

as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001, 17701-B, 17806,

17851, 17852) (collectively “1993 amendments”). Plain-

tiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to block the

implementation of the amendments. Second Amended

Complaint (Docket No. 23).

This Court has already entertained Defendants’ Motion

to Dismiss (Docket No. 11), which was granted in part

——————————————————eE

19a

and denied in part (Docket No. 28). Parker v. Wakelin,

882 F.Supp. 1131 (D.Me.1995). After a three-day bench

trial and extensive post-trial briefing, the case now comes

before the Court for final decision. For the reasons that

follow, the Court will find that: (1) the 1993 Amend-

ments, as applied to MSRS members whose benefits had

“vested” prior to the effective date of the amendments,

violate the Contract Clause of the United States Constitu-

tion; (2) the 1993 Amendments, a5 appuied to MSRS

members whose benefits had not “vested” prior to the

effective date of the amendments, violate no provision of

the United States Consiitution.

I. FACTS

In 1942, the Maine Legislature created the Maine State

Retirement System for two purposes: (1) attracting and

keeping qualified employees in state service throughout

their productive years and (2) providing benefits upon

their retirement, disability, or death. 5 M.R.S.A. § 17050

(1989). Membership in the system is mandatory for all

public school teachers, including all Plaintiffs in this case.

5 M.R.S.A. §§ 17001(14), 17651 (1989). All MSRS

members are required to make contributions from their

Salaries to the fund from which benefits are paid. 5

M.R.S.A. § 17701, 17701-A, 17701-B (1989 & Supp.

1995). The State of Maine must also contribute annually

to the fund an amount sufficient to discharge its future

pension obligations. 5 M.R.S.A. § 17153(1-A)(B)

(Supp. 1995). MSRS members, however, do not qualify

to receive the service retirement benefits representing the

combination of those two contributions until “vesting,”

i.e., until they meet eligibility requirements either by pro-

viding ten years of creditable service if they are not in

service at the statutory retirement age or by providing one

year of creditable service if they are in service at the

statutory retirement age." 5 M.R.S.A. § 17851 (1989 &

1 Although the term “vesting” is nowhere defined in the plan, it

has been used frequently, consistently, and without objection

20a

Supp.1995). If MSRS members end their service prior to

vesting, they are entitled only to the return of their con-

tributions with interest. 5 M.R.S.A. § 17705(2).

In 1993, in order to lower the State’s budget allocation

for its contribution to the fund, legislators enacted certain

amendments to the Maine Plan. Defendants’ Responses

to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Admissions ( Plaintiffs’

Ex. 501) 47 (“Defendants’ Second Admissions”). The

1993 Amendments operated to the disadvantage of Plain-

tiffs without providing offsetting advantages to Plaintiffs

or to the trust fund generally. Stipulation No. 1 of the

Parties (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 526) 45 (“First Stipulation”);

see Defendants’ Second Admissions 4 4.

Three of those modifications adversely affected all

teachers’ pensions: (1) raising the rate of teachers’ re-

quired contribution from 6.5% of their salary to 7.65% ;?

(2) capping at 5% in each year, and at a total of 10%

over the highest 3 years, the salary increase that may be

included in calculating teachers’ retirement benefits;* (3)

delaying by six months the first cost-of-living adjustment

to teachers’ retirement benefit.* First Stipulation 4 3.

Three other modifications adversely affected only the

pensions of those teachers whose right to retirement bene-

fits had not yet vested: ° (1) increasing teachers’ regular

throughout this litigation to refer to the satisfaction of this re-

quirement for receiving benefits. E.g., Parker 882 F.Supp. at 1134

n, 2, 1136, 1139-40; Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief at 5 n. 4; Defendants’

Post-Trial Brief at 4; Trial Transcript passim; see Plaintiffs’ Exs.

215A at 11, 215B at 11, 215C at 12.

2 P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 28, enacting 5 M.R.S.A. § 17001-B.

* P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 18, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17001

(18)(C).

* P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 31, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17806(3).

5In light cf this structure of the 1993 Amendments, the Court

will use the terra “nonvested member Plaintiffs” to refer to thcse

to whoni all 1938 Amendments apply, and “vested member Plain-

2la

retirement age from sixty to sixty-two;* (2) increasing

the early retirement penalty from 2.25% to 6% of teach-

ers’ retirement benefit for each year preceding age 62;"

(3) eliminating the inclusion of per diem payment of up

to thirty days of unused sick leave or vacation pay in

calculating teachers’ retirement benefit.* First Stipula-

tion 4 4.

At trial, Plaintiffs presented extensive documentary and

testimonial evidence relevant to the factual questions

raised by its constitutional claims.*

tiffs” to refer to those to whom only the three amendments de-

scribed in the preceding paragraph above apply.

*P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 33, 36, amending 56 M.R.S.A.

§ 17851(1-A) & (2-A).

7 P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 37, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17852(3-A).

* P.L.1993, ch. 410, pt. L, § 12, amending 5 M.R.S.A. § 17001

(13) (B).

® Plaintiffs also presented “evidence” relevant to certain legal

questions raised by its constitutional claims. Defendants have

objected to these submissions to the extent that they are offered for

the purpose of demonstrating legislative intent. The parties agree

that the requirement that a court consider the language and cir-

cumstances of the relevant statute to determine whether a contract

is formed requires this Court to consider, along with the text of

the Maine Plan, its legislative history. Parker v. Wakelin, 882

F.Supp. 1131, 1137 n. 8 (D.Me.1995). Those two sources have

provided the Court with an indication of legislative intent on that

issue that is sufficiently clear that the Court has not needed to resort

to the various other more questionable “circumstances” that Plain-

tiffs’ contend might also reflect legislative intent. See infra Section

II.A.1 (finding legislative intent to create implied-in-fact contract

based on text and legislative history). These submissions include:

@ The testimony of individual former members of the MSRS

Board of Trustees and administrators of the MSRS, whose

opinions Plaintiffs’ would impute to the legislature. Testimony

of Robert Bourgault, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at

256-74; Testimony of Patricia M. Dunn, March 19, 1996, Trial

Transcript at 172-93; Testimony of Paula Gaudet, March 20,

1996, Trial Transcript at 229-56; Testimony of Philip R.

22a

On the Contract Clause issue of whether the 1993

Amendments would substantially impair the retirement

benefits alleged to be contractual, Plaintiffs presented evi-

dence demonstrating that they reasonably relied on, and

were induced to serve the State of Maine by, the continued

existence of certain retirement benefits." See infra Sec-

Gingrow, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at 274-81; Testi-

mony of Claude R. Perrier, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at

327-45; Deposition of Jon A. Lund, March 11, 1996. Plaintiffs’

Ex. 299C; Deposition of Claude R. Perrier, May 8, 1995, Plain-

tiffs’ Ex. 299B; Deposition of David S. Wakelin, January 17,

1995, Plaintiffs’ Ex. 299A.

@ The testimony of individual former legislators and members

of legislative commissions, whose opinions Plaintiffs’ would

impute to the legislature. Testimony of Robert Bourgault,

March 20, 1996. Trial Transcript at 256-74; Testimony of

Harrison L. Richardson, March 20, 1996, Trial Transcript at

214-229.

@ MSRS manuals and newsletters, the content of which Plain-

tiffs would impute to the legislature. Piaintiffs’ Exs. 201, 202,

203, 204, 205, 206, 211, 215A, 215B, 215C, 215D, 215E, 222,

223, 224, 225, 226, 228, 230, 258, 259, 270.

@ Actuary reports and intra-executive documents which share

the common characteristic of never having been addressed to

the legislature or individual legislators, but the content of

which Plaintiffs nevertheless would impute to the legislature.

Plaintiffs’ Exs. 170, 214, 218, 401, 402, 409.

@ Memoranda from MSRS personnel addressed to individual

legislators, the content of which Plaintiffs would impute to the

legislature. Plaintiffs’ Exs. 113, 172, 220, 227, 290, 298.

That “evidence,” admitted at trial de bene esse, is superfluous in

this case for the purpose of determining legislative intent to create

an implied-in-fact contract. Therefore, the Court will not decide

whether that evidence may properly be considered for that purpose

in another case.

% Because the Court will find that a contract has formed for

Contract Clause purposes under an implied-in-fact contract theory,

it need not, and therefore will not, consider Plaintiffs’ quasi-

contract theory. See infra note 12. Accordingly, the Court admits

only for the purpose of determining whether vested member Plain-

tiffs’ contractual rights are substantially impaired (and not for

23a

tion II, A.2. Plaintiff Richard M. Parker testified that

MSRS benefits induced him to accept his job as a public

school teacher in Maine, and that he relied specifically on

the continued existence of the benefits adversely altered by

the cap on salary increases calculable for determining

annuity payments and by the increased contribution rate.

Testimony of Richard M. Parker, March 19, 1996, Trial

Transcript at 63, 81-83, 86. Plaintiff Paul L. Hutchins

testified to the same inducement and reliance, adding his

specific reliance on the cost-of-living increase at 6 months.

Testimony of Paul L. Hutchins, March 19, 1996, Trial

Transcript at 118-120. Similarly, Plaintiffs Daniel J.

Lowell testified that MSRS pension benefits induced him

to work for the State and that he specifically relied on

benefits reduced by the cap. Testimony of Daniel J.

Lowell, March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 138, 143-44.

All MSRS members who testified said that no one ever

told them that their benefits could not be reduced uni-

laterally by the legislature. E.g., Trial Transcript at 89,

129, 149. No MSRS members who testified, however, said

that anyone ever told them that their benefits could be

reduced unilaterally by the legislature. E.g., Trial Tran-

script at 89, 117.

On the Contract Clause issue of whether the 1993

Amendments were necessary to the state’s public pur-

pose of saving money in a time of fiscal crisis, Plaintiffs

presented evidence demonstrating that they were not. See

infra Section II.A.3. In particular, the testimony of Mr.

the purpose of determining quasi-contract formation) the evidence

of reasonable reliance upon which the factual findings below are

based. This evidence includes both individual vested member Plain-

tiffs’ testimony to this effect and the MSRS manuals and newsletters

which informed their reliance. Testimony of Richard M. Parker,

March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 62-95: Testimony of Paul L.

Hutchins, March i9, 1996, Trial Transcript at 110-30: Testimony

of Daniel J. Lowell, March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 131-50;

Plaintiffs’ Exs. 215A, 2i5B, 215C, 215D, 215E, 223, 226, 258, 259.

24a

Bent Schlosser indicated specific alternative means avail-

able to the legislature for cutting the budget without

impinging on teachers’ pension benefits. Testimony of

Bent Schlosser, March 21, 1996, Trial Transcript at

410-13. Moreover, although the testimony of Defendants’

witness, Mr. H. Sawin Millett, provided plausible estimates

of the considerable savings to the State issuing from the

pension. cuts, it provided no indication that those cuts

were the only means of generating those savings. See

Testimony of H. Sawin Millett, March 21, 1996, Trial

Transcript at 349-98.

On the Takings Clause issue of the economic impact

of the 1993 Amendments on nonvested member Plaintiffs,

see infra Section II.C., several such Plaintiffs testified.

E.g., Testimony of Paula Reed, March 19, 1996, Trial

Transcript at 34-49; Testimony of Lana R. Savage, March

19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 49-61; Testimony of Nancy

B. Sullivan, March 19, 1996, Trial Transcript at 95-110.

The Court finds the expert testimony of actuary Michael

E. Gallagher, however, most relevant to this point. Testi-

mony of Michael E. Gallagher, March 20, 1996, Trial

Transcript at 299-326. Mr. Gallagher was asked to de-

scribe the economic impact of the 1993 Amendments on

a hypothetical MSRS member with nine years and ten

months of creditable service just before the amendments,

who currently has 12 years of creditable service at age 51

and still intends to retire at age 60. Jd. at 314-15. Mr.

Gallagher testified that, under those circumstances, the

total value of that member’s benefit would be 24%, or

$75,000, less than if the 1993 Amendments were not in

effect. Jd. Cross-examination revealed, however, that an

additional two years of work and contribution, from ages

sixty to sixty-two, would cut the devaluation by more than

half, down to $30,000, reducing her monthly annuity pay-

ment by only $100. Jd. at 322-326.

25a

ll. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of the 1993

Amendments on three separate grounds: (1) they violate

the Contract Clause of article I, § 10 (Count 1); (2) they

violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment (Count II); (3) they violate the Takings Clause of

the Fifth Amendment (Count II). Plaintiffs will prevail

only in their claim that the 1993 Amendments violate the

Contract Clause as applied to vested MSRS members.

A. Contract Clause (Count 1)

The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution

provides that “[nJo State shall . . . pass any . . . Law

impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. 1,

§ 10. Since Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,

137-39, 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810), courts have regularly ap-

plied the Clause to contracts between states and private

parties. Analysis under the Contract Clause proceeds in

four steps. The Court must inquire: (1) whether there is

a contractual relationship; (2) whether a change in law

impairs that contract; (3) whether that impairment is sub-

stantial; (4) whether that substantial impairment is rea-

sonable and necessary to serve an important public pur-

pose. General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181,

186, 112 S.Ct. 1105, 1109-10, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992);

United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 25,

97 S.Ct. 1505, 1519, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977); McGrath

v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 16-17 (ist

Cir.1996). When the state is a party to the contract at

issue, the court must undertake the fourth inquiry at a

heightened level of scrutiny “‘because the State’s self-

interest is at stake.” Energy Reserves Group, Inc. vy.

Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 US. 400, 412-13 n. 14,

103 S.Ct. 697, 705 n. 14, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983) (quot-

ing United States Trust Co., 431 US. at 26, 97 S.Ct.

at 1519-20); see Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island y. Re-

tirement Bd. of Rhode Island Employees’ Retirement Sys-

26a

tem, 890 F.Supp. 1143, 1151 (D.R.1.1995) (character-

izing test as one of intermediate scrutiny).

The Court will conclude :(1) that the MSRS members

who had met the service requirement qualifying them for

pension benefits, i.c., those who were “vested,” as of July

1, 1993 then had a contractual relationship with the State,

but that MSRS members who were not vested as of July 1,

1993 did not then have a contractual relationship with the

State; (2) that the 1993 Amendments reducing the bene-

fits of vested members substantially impaired their contract

with the State; “’ (3) that the 1993 Amendments reducing

the benefits of vested members were not necessary to serve

the purpose of resolving Maine’s fiscal crisis. Accordingly,

the Court will declare that the 1993 Amendments violate

the Contract Clause as applied to vested members and so

will enjoin the application of those Amendments to those

members.

l. Is there a Contract?

Whether a statute gives rise to a contractual relationship

is a question of federal constitutional law. Romein, 503

U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109-10. To the extent that

the determination of this federal question involves the

interpretation of state law, however, it is appropriate to

“accord respectful consideration and great weight to the

views of the State’s highest court.” Indiana ex rel. Ander-

son v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100, 58 S.Ct. 443, 446, 82

L.Ed. 685 (1938).

Analysis of this question must begin with the well-

established proposition “that absent some clear indication

that the legislature intends to bind itself contractually, the

" The Court has combined the second and third elements of the

analysis because there is no dispute as to the second, namely,

whether the 1993 Amendments constitute an impairment at all.

See Defendants’ Responses to Plaintiffs’ Second Request for Admis-

sions (Plaintiffs’ Ex. 501) { 4.

27a

presumption is that ‘a law is not intended to create pri-

vate contractual or vested rights but merely declares a

policy to be pursued until the legislature shall ordain

otherwise.”” Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison,

Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470 U.S. 451, 465-66, 105

S.Ct. 1441, 1451, 84 L.Ed.2d 432 (1985) (quoting

Dodge v. Bd. of Educ., 302 U.S. 74, 79, 58 S.Ct. 98, 100,

82 L.Ed. 57 (1937)). Plaintiffs may overcome this pre-

sumption by demonstrating that “the language and circum-

stances [of the statute] evince a legislative intent to create

private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against

the state.” United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 17 n. 14,

97 S.Ct. at 1515 n. 15; Hoffman v. City of Warwick, 909

F.2d 608, 614 (1st Cir.1990). The statutory language

itself, however, constitutes the primary object of this in-

quiry. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 470 U.S. at 466, 105

S.Ct. at 1451-52.

This Court will apply the common law of contracts to

determine whether a contract has formed between Plain-

tiffs and the State for Contract Clause purposes.” See,

e.g., Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island, 890 F.Supp. at

1156-59 (applying “traditional contract law principles”).

According to those principles, three familiar elements are

typically required for the formation of a contract: offer,

acceptance, and consideration. See Restatement (Second)

of Contracts §§ 17(1), 22(1) (hereinafter “Restatement’);

Estes v. Smith, 521 A.2d 682, 684 (Me.1987). An offer

is defined as “the manifestation of willingness to enter

12 Because this Court will decide that, under the common law

of contracts, the statutory language and circumstances of the Maine

plan (constituting an offer), combined with the conduct of member

Plaintiffs (constituting acceptance and consideration, but not here

considered for legislative intent), gives rise to an implied-in-fact

contract for Contract Clause purposes, this Court need not consider

the theories of quasi-contract and trust that Plaintiffs also advance

to establish the existence of a contract for Contract Clause purposes.

Accordingly, this Court will not consider Plaintiffs’ exhibits to the

extent that they are offered in support of those theories.

28a

into a bargain, so made as to justify another person in

understanding that his assent to that bargain is invited

and will conclude it.” Restatement § 24. Offers may be

express or implied. Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Con-

tracts § 1.19, at 55 (Joseph M. Perillo rev. ed. 1993). An

offeree may accept the offer by “a manifestation of assent

to the terms thereof . . . in a manner invited or required

by the offer.” Restatement § 50; Ouellette v. Bolduc, 440

A.2d 1042, 1045 (Me.1982). To render an offeror’s

promise enforceable, an offeree must provide considera-

tion, which is some “performance or return promise .. .

sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise.”

Restatement § 71(2); Whitten v. Greeley-Shaw, 520 A.2d

1307, 1310 (Me.1987). When the offeror seeks a per-

formance rather than a return promise, the offeror pro-

poses a unilateral contract. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts

§ 1.23, at 89; Chenard v. Marcel Motors, 387 A.2d 596,

600 (Me.1978).

In light of these principles, it should come as no sur-

prise that most contemporary public pension plans have

been held to give rise to implied-in-fact unilateral contracts

within the reach of the Contract Clause. McGrath, 88

F.3d at 16-18; 60A Am.Jur.2d, Pensions and Retirement

Funds, § 1620, at 950 (1988). A legislature’s manifesta-

tion, through the language and circumstances of the pen-

sion statute, of its intent to enter a bargain with its em-

ployees, whereby the state provides them pension benefits

in exchange for a long period of their loyal service and

monetary contribution, establishes the existence of an

offer. E.g., Nat'l Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island, 890 F.Supp.

at 1157. State employees’ performance of that service and

contribution for the period required for eligibility consti-

tutes both acceptance (because it manifests their assent

to the terms of the state’s offer) and consideration (be-

cause it represents the performance sought by the state in

exchange for its promise of benefits). Jd. at 1158-59.

Thus, an implied-in-fact unilateral contract implicating the

29a -

Contract Clause is formed. See Brand, 303 U.S. at 100,

58 S.Ct. at 446 (“a legislative enactment may contain

provisions which, when accepted as the basis of action by

individuals, become contracts between them and the State

or its subdivisions within the protection of article I,

§ 10.”)

Although public pension plans generally share this con-

tractual character, they vary widely as to when in the

employment relationship the benefits they provide become

contractual. McGrath, 88 F.3d at 17-18; Spiller v. State,

627 A.2d 513, 516 & n. 10 (Me.1993). Careful review

of the relevant cases reveals that two main factors account

for the variation among courts on this point. The first is

variation in the language and circumstances of each state’s

pension statute."* The second, and perhaps more often

determinative, is variation in the theory of pension con-

tracts that each court applies. Pineman v. Oechslin, 195

Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803, 807-10 (1985) (surveying and

choosing among various pension contract theories); Singer

v. City of Topeka, 227 Kan. 356, 607 P.2d 467, 473-75

(1980) (same). Two cases illustrate in an especially

clear and relevant way how each of these two factors can

affect the resolution of this issue.

In the recent case of McGrath v. Rhode Island Retire-

ment Board, 88 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1996), the Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit discussed the effect of statu-

tory language that expressly reserves to a state legislature

the power to amend or terminate its public pension plan.

Id. at 17-19. The court noted that, under the common

law of contracts generally, when an offeror expressly re-

serves the power to revoke an offer to enter a unilateral

contract until performance is complete, the offer is illusory

-

18To the extent that the questions of whether a contract is

formed are necessarily intertwined, it would seem particularly

appropriate that courts consider primarily the language, as well as

the circumstances, of the statute. See United States Trust Co.,

431 U.S. at 17 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 1515.

30a

and may not yet give rise to a contract. Id. at 17-18

(citing Restatement § 45, cmt. b). The court added that,

under the common law of pension contracts particularly,

however, such a revocation power is effective only until

“an employee’s rights under the plan vest,” the time at

which “an employee fulfills the service requirements en-

titling him or her to retirement benefits under a pension

plan.” Jd. at 18-19. The court nevertheless expressed

doubt regarding whether this limitation on an employer’s

reserved power to revoke pension benefits applies with the

same force to state pension plans, since this limitation

might constitute an unprecedented infringement of state

sovereignty. Id. at 19; see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger

Corp., 470 U.S. at 467 & n. 22, 105 S.Ct. at 1452 & n. 22

(discussing unlimited effect of express reservation by Con-

gress of revocation power).

In Petras v. State Board of Pension Trustees, 464 A.2d

894 (Del.1983), the Supreme Court of Delaware, in

deciding the issue of when its state pension plan created

enforceable contractual rights to benefits exemplified a

widely held theory of pension contracts. The plan at issue

was typical of many contemporary plans in that it con-

tained provisions that: extended benefits to members;

predicated eligibility for those benefits upon the comple-

tion of a minimum period of service; and required con-

tributions of members."* Jd. at 895. The court affirmed

the holdings of earlier Delaware court cases that this statu-

tory scheme gave rise to enforceable contractual rights,

but only “upon fulfillment of the eligibility requirements.”

Id. at 869. Correspondingly, “no contract exists between

an employee and the State, concerning the state pension

plan, unless and until the pension vests.” Jd. The court

concluded, therefore, that “pension rights may be changed

at any time before they become vested.” /d.

14 There is no indication that the plan contained any statutory

provision expressly reserving the power to revoke benefits.

3la

The pension theory embodied in the Petras decision has

been applied in other jurisdictions as well. Petras, 464

A.2d at 896 (collecting cases); Baker v. Oklahoma Fire-

fighters Pension & Ret. Sys., 718 P.2d 348, 352 (Okla.

1986); see Singer, 607 P.2d at 474-75. Upon adopting

the Petras view of pension contracts, the Supreme Court

of Oklahoma concisely articulated the compelling theo-

retical and practical reasons for doing so:

Viewing the contract between the state and its em-

ployees as coming into existence at the point of eligi-

bility allows the necessary flexibility in fiscal planning

which must be given to the Legislature. This view

also avoids the necessity of engaging in the tortuous

applications of contract law which other jurisdictions

have applied in finding that rights, which they have

characterized as being in existence, [nevertheless] re-

main subject to unilateral modifications. This view

also realistically acknowledges the contingent nature

of the relationship as it ripens into a contractual

obligation on the part of the state.

Baker, 718 P.2d at 352. This theory of pension con-

tracts, whereby benefits vest and become enforceable only

upon satisfaction of service requirements for eligibility,

has been described elsewhere as a “deferred compensa-

tion” theory. McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Board,

15 Along the same lines, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has

criticized the “limited vesting” theory of pension contracts, e.g.,

Public Employees’ Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 96 Nev.

718, 615 P.2d 972, 974-75 (1980), whereby pension benefits become

contractual on acceptance of employment but nevertheless remain

subject, pursuant to an implied term of that contract, to “reasonable

modification” by the employer.

It makes little sense to strain established rules of statutory

interpretation to find a contract where the requisite express

legislative intent is lacking, only to strain other equally well

settled legal principles to allow for necessary unilateral modifi-

cation by the state.

Pineman v. Oechslin, 195 Conn. 405, 488 A.2d 803, 809 (1985).

32a

906 F.Supp. 749, 760 n. 1 (D.R.1.1995) (citing Nat'l

Educ. Ass’n-Rhode Island, 890 F.Supp. at 1156), aff'd,

88 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1996).

It is within this legal context that this Court will deter-

mine whether and when the Maine State Retirement Sys-

tem creates a contract with any of the present Plaintiffs

for Contract Clause purposes.

This Court holds that, at some point in the employ-

ment relationship between the State of Maine and MSRS

members, the Maine Plan creates a contract that binds the

State to provide MSRS members with certain retirement

benefits. The Maine Plan contains all the elements which

have been found almost uniformly to give rise to an

implied-in-fact unilateral pension contract. The pension

statute contains provisions which manifest the State of

Maine’s willingness to enter into a bargain with Maine

State employees, whereby retirement benefits would be

exchanged for ten years of loyal service and monetary

contribution, in a way that justified those employees in

believing their acceptance is invited. See 5 M.R.S.A.

§§ 17050, 17151, 17851. MSRS members both manifest

their assent to (and, therefore, acceptance of) this offer

and provide the consideration *’ sought by the State by

performing ten years of service and contribution to the

system. In this way, the Maine State Retirement System

creates a contractual relationship between the State of

Maine and MSRS members.

The question remains of when in the employment rela-

tionship those enforceable contract rights arise. Consist-

16 The so-called “Towne Report,” which was adopted by the Legis-

lative Recess Committee to which it was submitted and, in turn,

by the entire Maine Legislature itself, indicated that “[p]ension

payments are generally deemed as made in consideration of past

services, injury or loss sustained, merit, poverty, etc.” Report to

Legislative Recess Committee on Maine State Retirement System

and Social Security Coverage, April 8, 1954, at 17 (Plaintiffs’ Ex.

207) (emphasis added) (hereinafter “Towne Report”).

33a

ent with the method of other courts, this Court will make

this determination by considering the language and cir-

cumstances of any relevant statutory provisions and by

applying the most appropriate theory of pension contracts.

The language and circumstances of 5 M.R.S.A. § 17801

bear particular relevance to the question of when the

Maine Plan creates contractual rights to retirement bene-

fits. That section provides:

No amendment to this Part may cause any reduc-

tion in the amount of benefits which would be due

to a member based on creditable service, earnable

compensation, employee contributions, pick-up con-

tributions, and the provisions of this part on the date

immediately preceding the effective date of the

amendment.

5 M.R.S.A. § 17801. This Court discerns in this provision

two statements of legislative intent pertinent to the present

issue. First, the legislature intends to be bound, as a

term of the implied pension contract whose existence is

established supra, not to reduce a member’s benefits after

they become “due to a member.” Second, the legislature

intends not to be bound not to reduce a member’s benefits

before they become “due to a member.” Accord Spiller,

627 A.2d at 516 (reading § 17801 to reserve right to

modify benefits not then due). This implied reservation

of the power to revoke, as to members whose benefits are

not yet “due,” the offer giving rise to the contract renders

that offer illusory as to those members. See McGrath, 88

F.3d at 17-18. These two facets of § 17801 indicate

legislative intent to create enforcement contract rights to

benefits only when they become “due to a member.”

It is necessary to determine, then, when in the employ-

ment relationship benefits become “due to a member.”

The term “due” is nowhere defined in the Maine Plan. It

is clear, however, that the phrase “due to a member” can-

not mean “due to a retiree to whom benefits are currently

34a

payable” because retirees are, by definition, not members.

5 M.R.S.A. § 17654(2). Nor is it legitimate to charac-

terize as “due to a member” benefits for which the mem-

ber is not even eligible. Accord Spiller, 627 A.2d at 516

(finding no benefits “due to” plaintiff members, none of

whom had met eligibility requirements). Correspondingly,

once a member has met eligibility requirements for bene-

fits, it becomes possible, even plausible, to describe those

benefits as “due to a member.” Moreover, the legislative

history of § 17801 indicates that the provision was initially

recommended and ultimately passed “to insure the con-

tinuation of presently vested rights.” Final Report of the

Committee on Veterans and Retirement on its Study of

the Maine State Retirement System at 4 (January 1975)

( Plaintiffs’ Ex. 105B) (emphasis added). Therefore, this

Court concludes that the language and circumstances of 5

M.R.S.A. § 17801 indicate that retirement benefits be-

come enforceable in contract under the Maine Plan when

those benefits are “due to a member,” here understood as

“vested in a member,” where vesting occurs upon comple-

tion of the service requirement for eligibility.

The theory of pension contracts which this Court finds

most appropriate to the Maine Plan yields the same result.

That theory, embodied in the Petras decision discussed

supra, provides that pension benefits become enforceable

in contract only upon vesting, defined as satisfaction of

eligibility requirements. The Court considers this theory

applicable to the Maine Plan for three reasons. First, the

Maine Plan contains provisions substantially similar to

those in Petras, in that both plans extend benefits to mem-

bers, predicate eligibility for those benefits on the comple-

tion of a service requirement, and require monetary con-

tribution. Second, the theoretical and practical strengths

of the Petras theory, as explicated in Baker, apply with no

less force to this case. Third, the Petras theory has been

fairly characterized as a “deferred compensation” theory

of pension contracts, and the legislative history of the

Maine Plan contains frequent references to an under-

a

35a

standing of the system as one of “deferred compensation.”

See, e.g., Towne Report at 17-19. Therefore, the theory

of pension contracts best suited to the circumstances of

this case also indicates that pension benefits under the

Maine Plan become contractual only upon vesting.

The language and circumstances of the relevant provi-

sion of the Maine Plan, as well as the appropriate theory

of pension contracts, then, both point to the same conclu-

sions with respect to the present Plaintiffs.

First, the Court holds that MSRS members not vested

on the effective date of the 1993 Amendments do not

have enforceable contract rights to the benefits reduced

by the those amendments. Under the applicable theory

of pension contracts, members of a pension plan have no

contractual rights to benefits until vesting. Even if it were

somehow more appropriate to apply a different theory of

pension contracts under which the implied offer or bene-

fits is viewed as extended to nonvested member Pizintiffs,

the reservation in § 17801 of the power to reduce benefits

not then “due to a member” renders the offer of those

benefits illusory as to those Plaintiffs. McGrath, 88 F.3d

at 17-18. Finally, although § 17801 indicates the legisla-

ture’s intent, as a term of its implied-in-fact contract with

members, not to reduce benefits then “due to a member,”

the benefits reduced by the 1993 Amendments were not

“due to” member Plaintiffs not presently vested on the

effective date of those amendments.

Second, the Court holds that MSRS members vested on

the effective date of the 1993 Amendments have enforce-

able contract rights to the benefits reduced by those

amendments. Once again, under the applicable theory of

pension contracts, members of a pension plan acquire con-

tractual rights to benefits upon vesting. Moreover, the

legislature’s reservation in § 17801 of the power to reduce

benefits not then “due to a member” renders the offer of

those benefits illusory only as to nonvested members, not

36a

as to vested members.” Perhaps most important of all,

§ 17801 indicates the legislature’s intent, as a term of its

implied-in-fact contract, not to reduce benefits then “due

to a member,” and the benefits reduced by the 1993

Amendments were “due to” member Plaintiffs presently

vested on the effective date of those amendments.

Therefore, because Plaintiffs not presently vested before

the effective date of the 1993 Amendments have no en-

forceable contract rights to the benefits reduced by those

amendments, their claim under the Contract Clause must

fail. Correspondingly, because Plaintiffs presently vested

before the effective date of the 1993 Amendments do have

enforceable contract rights to the benefits reduced by

those amendments, their claim under the Contract Clause

may proceed to the next stage of analysis.

2. Is the Contract Substantially Impaired?

To establish a violation of the Contract Clause, those

Plaintiffs with contractual rights in the benefits modified

by the 1993 Amendments must yet demonstrate that those

modifications “substantially impair” those rights. Romein,

503 U.S. at 186, 112 S.Ct. at 1109-10. Although guid-

ance from the Supreme Court on this issue is sparse, two

rules relevant to this case have emerged at the appellate

level. First, a contract with a state is substantially im-

paired if the legislature adversely modifies a term that

induced the plaintiff to enter the contract and on whose

continued existence the plaintiff reasonably relies. Balti-

more Teachers’ Union v. Mayor and City Council of

Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1018 (4th Cir.1993); see Energy

Reserves Group, 459 US. at 411, 103 S.Ct. at 704 (citing

El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 515, 85 S.Ct. 577,

587, 13 L.Ed.2d 446 (1965)). Second, a pension con-

tract with a state is not substantially impaired if the

17 The effect of the legislature’s revocation power may also not

extend to vested members as a member of the common law of pen-

sion contracts. See McGrath, 88 F.3d at 17-19.

37a

legislative modification “bear[s] some material relationship

to the purpose of the pension system and its successful

operation; and any disadvantage to employees [is] accom-

panied by comparable new advantages.” State of Nevada

Employees Ass'n v. Keating, 903 F.2d 1223, 1227 (9th

Cir.1990).”*

The Court finds that the three 1993 Amendments ap-

plicable to vested member Plaintiffs substantially impair

their contract with the State of Maine. Once again, those

amendments would: (1) increase the employee contribu-

tion rate from 6.5% to 7.65%; (2) cap the salary in-

creases that may be included in the calculation of the

18 This Court is aware that the test outlined above is commonly

labeled the “reasonable modification” test. E.g., Public Employees’

Retirement Board v. Washoe County, 96 Nev. 718, 615 P.2d 972,

974-75 (1980). For three reasons, however, this Court declines to

apply that label to this test in the context of this case. First, using

the phrase “reasonable modification” to describe a test that gives

content to “substantial impairment” risks its confusion with, and

misapplication as, the next step in the analysis (whether the sub-

stantial impairment is “reasonable and necessary to serve an impor-

tant public purpose”). See, e.g., Plaintiffs’ Reply Brief (Docket

No. 58) at 11; Halpin v. Nebraska State Patrolmen’s Retirement

System, 211 Neb. 892, 320 N.W.2d 910, 915 (1982). Second, using

the phrase “reasonable modification” to describe this test risks its

confusion with the contract term both that state courts commonly

imply in state pension contracts as a matter of state law, and from

which the test originally derives. By contrast, this Court reads

Keating to say that, as a matter of federal law, a contract modifica-

tion is not a “substantial impairment” for Contract Clause purposes

if it meets the requirements of this test, regardless of whether the

pension contract in question contains such an implied term as a

matter of state law. Keating, 903 F.2d at 1227. Third, the test

better helps define the ordinary meaning of the phrase “substantial

impairment.” A modification can hardly be described as an impair-

ment, least of all a substantial one, if it creates benefits to offset its

burdens. This is especially so when the purpose of such a modifica-

tion is to enhance the successful operation of a pension system.

These two factors, then, describe particularly well what a “substan-

tial impairment” is not, less well what a “reasonable modifica-

tion” is.

a

38a

annuity benefit; and (3) postpone for six months the first

cost-of-living increase in the annuity benefit after retire-

ment. First Stipulation §3. None of these impairments

either bear any material relationship to the successful op-

eration of 2 pension plan or create benefits to offset the

burdens they impose. Testimony at trial also reveals both

that the benefits impaired by these amendments induced

vested member Plaintiffs to enter their contract with the

State of Maine, and that those Plaintiffs reasonably relied

on the continued existence of those benefits. See Testi-

mony of Richard M. Parker, Paul L. Hutchins, and Daniel

J. Lowell, cited supra Section I. Moreover, Courts have

commonly found an increase in the rate of contribution

in particular to represent a substantial impairment. Marvel

v. Dannemann, 490 F.Supp. 170, 171 (D.Del. 1980);

Pennsylvania Fed’n of Teachers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila-

delphia, 506 Pa. 196, 484 A.2d 751, 753 (1984); Singer,

607 P.2d at 476-77. Therefore, the 1993 Amendments

substantially impair the contractual rights of vested mem-

ber Plaintiffs to the retirement benefits at issue.

3. Is the Substantial Impairment Reasonable and

Necessary to Serve an Important Public Purpose?

Even though the State’s impairment of vested Plaintiffs’

rights to retirement benefits is substantial, it may yet be

permissible under the Contract Clause “if it is reasonable

and necessary to serve an important public purpose.”

United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 25, 97 S.Ct. at 1519.

The Court need not decide whether the present substantial

impairment is “reasonable,” nor whether the public pur-

pose it serves is “important,” because the Court finds that

it is not “necessary” to that purpose. It is undisputed that

the State’s purpose in reducing pension benefits was to

help alleviate the State’s fiscal crisis. Persuasive expert

testimony presented at trial, which described various

means of cutting expenditures to serve this purpose with-

out impairing Plaintiffs’ contract rights, defeats Defend-

ants’ claim that the impairment was necessary to serve

39a

that purpose. See Testimony of Bent Schlosser, cited

supra Section I. Therefore, the State’s substantial impair-

ment of vested Plaintiffs’ contractual benefits constitutes a

violation of the Contract Clause.

B. Due Process Clause (Count I1)

Plaintiffs claim that the 1993 Amendments violate

the substantive aspect of the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.

To withstand such a challenge, the 1993 Amendments

need only be rationally related to a legitimate state pur-

pose. Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F.Supp. 1131, 1138 (D.Me.

1995); see Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,

487-88, 75 S.Ct. 461, 464-65, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955);

Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 601 (2d Cir.1988).

The Court finds the 1993 Amendments rationally related

to the legitimate state purpose of reducing expenditures

in a time of fiscal crisis. See Spiller, 627 A.2d at 521

(Wathen, C.J., and Glassman, J., dissenting). Therefore,

the 1993 Amendments, as applied to nonvested member

Plaintiffs, do not violate the Due Process Clause.

C. Takings Clause (Count II)

Plaintiffs also claim that the 1993 Amendments violate

the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. Const.

amend V. To determine whether legislation effects an

unconstitutional taking of property,” the Court considers

® Because the Court has determined that application of the 1993

Amendments to vested member Plaintiffs violates the Contract

Clause, it is unnecessary to decide whether that same application

also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. It remains neces-

sary, however, to determine whether the application of the 1993

Amendments to nonvested member Plaintiffs violates either of those

other two constitutional provisions. Therefore, Sections II.B. and

T1.C. will pertain only to nonvested member Plaintiffs.

2° The Court assumes, without deciding, that nonvested Plaintiffs’

interest in their pension benefits constitutes “property” for Takings

Clause purposes.

40a

three factors of “ ‘particular significance’: (1) ‘the eco-

nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant’; (2) ‘the

extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct

investment-backed expectations’; and (3) ‘the character

of the governmental action.’” Connolly v. Pension Bene-

fit Guaranty Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 225, 106 S.Ct. 1018,

1025, 89 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (quoting Penn Cent.

Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98

S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978)).

The Court finds that the 1993 Amendments, as applied

to nonvested Plaintiffs, do not effect a taking of their

alleged property because none of these three factors so

indicate. First, although the economic impact on non-

vested Plaintiffs, as illustrated by the mnear-worst-case

scenario addressed by an expert actuary at trial, is “sig-

nificant,” Washington Legal Foundation v. Massachusetts

Bar Foundation, 993 F.2d 962, 976 (1st Cir.1993), it is

neither “severe,” Pineman v. Fallon, 842 F.2d 598, 602

(2d Cir.1988), nor of a sort that “extinguish[es] a funda-

mental attribute of ownership,” Agins v. Tiburon, 447

U.S. 255, 262, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 2142, 65 L.Ed.2d 106

(1980). See Testimony of Michael E. Gallagher, cited

supra Section I. Second, the 1993 Amendments do not

interfere to any extent with investment-backed expecta-

tions of nonvested members because, without contractual

rights, nonvested members have no investment-backed ex-

pectations subject to interference. Pineman, 842 F.2d at

603. Third, the 1993 Amendments constitute neither a

permanent physical invasion of their benefits nor an elimi-

nation of the economic value of their benefits. Washing-

ton Legal Foundation, 993 F.2d at 975 (citing Lucas v.

South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-16,

112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992)). In-

stead, they amount only to an ordinary “adjustment of

the benefits and burdens of economic life.” Pineman, 842

F.2d at 602 (characterizing change in pension plan that

increases retirement age) (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn

Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892-93, 49

4la

L.Ed.2d 752 (1976)). Therefore, this Court finds no

unconstitutional taking in the application of the 1993

Amendments to nonvested member Plaintiffs.

Ill. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that those 1993

Amendments to the Maine State Retirement System, P.L.

1993, ch. 410, pt. L, §§ 13, 28, 31, that purport to apply

to the retirement benefits of MSRS members who were

“vested” prior to the effective date of those amendments

be, and they are hereby DECLARED, to violate the Con-

tract Clause as applied to those members. It is further

ORDERED that application of those amendments to

“vested” MSRS members be, and it is hereby, ENJOINED.

Counsel for the Plaintiffs shall submit to the Court, within

ten (10) days from the date of the docketing of this

order, a proposed order of judgment for consideration by

the Court which will fully implement the decision set forth

above.

42a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

=

No. 96-2225, 96-2226, 96-2227 and 96-2228

RICHARD M. PARKER, ef al.,

Plaintiffs, Appellees,

Cross-A ppellants,

Vv.

Davip S. WAKELIN, ef al.,

Defendants, Appellants,

Cross-A ppellees.

ORDER OF THE EN BANC COURT

BEFORE TORRUELLA, Chief Judge,

SELYA, BOUDIN, STAHL and LYNCH, Circuit Judges.

Entered: October 17, 1997

The panel of judges that rendered the decision in this

case having voted to deny the petition for rehearing and

the suggestion for rehearing en banc having been care-

fully considered by the judges of the Court in regular,

active service and a majority of said judges not having

voted to order that the appeal be heard or reheard by the

Court En Banc,

43a

It is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the

suggestion for rehearing en banc, be denied.

By The Court

PHOEBE MORSE

Clerk

By: /s/ Janice M. O’Neil

Chief Deputy Clerk

44a

APPENDIX D

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Title 5 of the Maine Revised Statutes provides, in perti-

nent part:

§ 17001.

Definitions

As used in this Part, unless the context otherwise indi-

cates, the following terms have the following meanings.

13. Earnable compensation. “Earnable compensation”

means salaries and wages paid for services rendered in an

employment position, subject to the following inclusions,

exclusions and limitations.

A.

“Earnable compensation” includes:

(1) Workers’ compensation benefits;

(2) Maintenance, if any;

(3) Any money paid by an employer to a 3rd

party under a tax sheltered annuity contract or

a deferred compensation plan for the future

benefit of an employee provided that the money

is not derived from amounts excluded from

earnable compensation by paragraph B; and

(4) Pick-up contributions.

“Earnable compensation” does not include:

(1) For any member who has 10 years of

creditable service by July 1, 1993 or who has

reached 60 years of age and has been in service

for a minimum of one year immediately before

that date, payment for more than 30 days of

unused accumulated or accrued sick leave, pay-

ment for more than 30 days of unused vacation

leave or payment for more than 30 days of a

combination of both;

45a

(2) For any member who is not covered by

subparagraph (1), payment for any unused ac-

cumulated or accrued sick leave or payment for

any unused vacation leave;

(3) Any other payment that is not compensa-

tion for actual services rendered or that is not

paid at the time the actual services are ren-

dered; or

(4) Teacher recognition grants paid pursuant

to Title 20-A, section 13503-A.

A payment for unused sick leave or unused vacation

leave may not be included as part of earnable com-

pensation unless it is paid upon the member’s last

termination before the member applies for retirement

benefits.

C. Notwithstanding the other provisions of this sub-

section, for the purposes of determining average final

compensation, “earnable compensation” does not in-

clude any increase that exceeds the prior year’s earn-

able compensation by more than 5% or that results

in a total increase of more than 10% during the

3-year period used in the calculation of average final

compensation, unless the cost of the additional ac-

tuarial liability arising from the excess increase is

paid by the employer as provided in section 17154.

Any payment made under paragraph B, subparagraph

(1) must be included in determining the amount of

increase in the year in which the payment is made.

This paragraph does not apply to excess increases

resulting from compensation paid prior to July 1,

1993, from compensation paid in accordance with an

individual employment contract executed prior to

July 1, 1993 or a collective bargaining agreement

executed or ratified in its final form by final vote of

one party to the agreement prior to July 1, 1993 for

the initial term of that contract or agreement or from

other action by the governing body of a school ad-

46a

ministrative unit in effect on July 1, 1993. This

paragraph does not apply to increases in compensa-

tion of state employees during fiscal year 1993-94

and fiscal year 1994-95. In all circumstances in

which this paragraph does not apply to earnable

compensation of state employees and teachers, the

provisions of this paragraph that were in effect prior

to June 30, 1993 apply. This paragraph does not

apply to earnable compensation of employees of

participating local districts.

D. For a teacher who is eligible for participation

in the retirement system who is on a leave of absence

while serving as President of the Maine Teachers

Association, “earnable compensation” means the

amount that the teacher would have earned if the

teacher had remained in a teaching position.

E. “Earnable compensation” of a part-time, sea-

sonal or temporary employee is the sum of amounts

computed under paragraphs A, B, C and D adjusted

to reflect the wages or salary that the member would

have been paid if the member had been employed, at

the member’s rate of pay, for the number of days or

hours that a permanent full-time employee of the

same employer would have been employed.

F. For a teacher who, as provided by subsection

42, serves as president of a recognized or certified

bargaining agent representing teachers for which re-

leased time from teaching duties for performance of

the functions of president has been negotiated in a

collective bargaining agreement between the collec-

tive bargaining agent and the teacher’s school admin-

istrative unit, “earnable compensation” includes com-

pensation paid for the release time, except that the

amount of that compensation included in “earnable

compensation” may not be more than the compensa-

tion that the teacher would have been paid had the

teacher remained that same amount of time in the

teacher’s teaching position.

47a

14. Employee. “Employee” means:

A. For purposes of this chapter, a state employee,

including any person serving during any probation-

ary period required under the Civil Service Law and

rules of the Civil Service Appeals Board, a teacher

or a participating local district employee;

B. For purposes of chapter 423, a state employee,

including any person serving during any probation-

ary period required under the Civil Service Law and

rules of the Civil Service Appeals Board, or a

teacher; or

C. For purposes of chapter 425, a participating

local district employee.

§ 17050. Legislative intent

It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage qualified

persons to seek public employment and to continue in

public employment during their productive years. It is

further the intent of the Legislature to assist these persons

in making provision for their retirement years by establish-

ing benefits reasonably related to their highest earnings

and years of service and by providing suitable disability

and death benefits.

* * * x

§ 17151. Legislative findings and intent

1. Findings. The Legislature finds that the State owes

a great debt to its retired employees for their years of

faithful and productive service.

A. Part of that debt is repaid by the benefits pro-

vided to retirees through the Maine State Retirement

System.

B. Retirees, who depend heavily on these benefits,

and current employees, who will one day retire and

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receive benefits, are concerned about the financial

viability of the retirement system.

2. Intent. It is the intent of the Legislature that there

must be appropriated and transferred annually to the re-

tirement system the funds necessary to meet the system’s

long-term and short-term financial obligations based on the

actuarial assumptions established by the board upon the

advice of the actuary, except that for fiscal year 1991-92

the annual appropriation must be $73,500,000 less than

the amount that would otherwise be applied toward the

unfunded liability of the system. It is the intent of the

Legislature that the amount of the reduction, together

with the balance of the unfunded liability in the retire-

ment system on July 1, 1993, must be placed on a 27-year

amortization schedule. Funds that have been appropri-

ated must be considered assets of the retirement system.

A. The goal of the actuarial assumptions is to

achieve a fully funded retirement system.

B. The retirement system’s unfunded liability for per-

sons formerly subject to the Maine Revised Statutes

of 1944, chapter 37, sections 212 to 220 must be

repaid to the system from annual appropriations over

the funding period of the retirement system.

C. This section may not be construed to require the

State to appropriate and transfer funds to meet the

obligations of participating local districts to the re-

tirement system.

* * * *

§ 17153. Board of trustees

1-A. Actuarially sound basis. The board shall calcu-

late the funds necessary to maintain the retirement system

on an actuarially sound basis, including the unfunded

liability arising from payment of benefits for which con-

tributions were not received and shall transmit those cal-

culations to the State Budget Officer as required by

chapter 149.

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A. For benefits applicable to state employees, teach-

ers or participating local district employees that are

established through collective bargaining, the board

shall apply the funding methods and assumptions

adopted by the board pursuant to this subsection. —

B. The Legislature shall appropriate and transfer an-

nually those funds the board determines to be nec-

essary under this subsection to maintain the retire-

ment system on an actuarially sound basis, except

that for fiscal year 1991-92 the annual appropriation

must be $73,500,000 less than the amount that

would otherwise be applied toward the repayment of

the unfunded liability of the system.

C. This subsection may not be construed to require

the State to appropriate and transfer funds to meet

the obligations of participating local districts to the

retirement system.

2. Trustee of funds. The members of the board shall

be the trustees of the several funds created by this Part.

3. Investment of funds. The board may cause the

funds created by this Part to be invested and reinvested

in accordance with the standards defined in Title 18-A.

section 7-302, subject to periodic approval of the invest-

ment program by the board.

4. Prohibitions. In addition to the limitations of sec-

tion 18 and except as otherwise provided, no trustee and

no employee of the board of trustees may:

A. Have any direct interest in the gains or profits

of any investment made by the board:

B. Directly or indirectly, for himself or as an agent,

in any manner, use the gains or profits of any invest-

ment made by the board except to make whatever

current and necessary payments are authorized by the

board; or

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C. Become an endorser, surety or obligor for money

loaned to or borrowed from the board.

* * * *

§ 17651. Mandatory membership

All employees shall become members of the retirement

system as a condition of their employment.

* * * *

§ 17654. Cessation of membership

A member ceases to be a member of the retirement

system if the member:

1. Withdrawal. Withdraws accumulated contributions:

2. Beneficiary. Becomes a beneficiary as a result of the

member’s own retirement; or

3. Death. Dies.

* * * *

§ 17701. Member contributions

Each member shall contribute to the retirement system

or have pick-up contributions made at a rate of 6.5%

of earnable compensation, except as otherwise provided in

this Part.

1. Employer pick-up. The contributions required to

be made on behalf of a member under this section shall,

after the effective date of this section, be picked up by the

employer in lieu of contributions by the employee with a

reduction of the member’s salary consistent with section

17001, subsection 28-A.

2. No employee option. The employee may not choose

to receive pick-up contribution amounts directly instead

of having them paid by the employer to the system.

2-A. Optional members. If a person, whose member-

ship in the Maine State Retirement System is optional under

section 17652, elects a 5% salary increase in lieu of state

" ™ ahits P

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payment of the retirement contribution, pursuant to Public

Law 1981, chapter 453, and chooses to participate in the

Maine State Retirement System, the State shall pick up the

retirement contribution with a reduction of the member’s

salary consistent with section 17001, subsection 28-A.

3. Treatment of pick-up contributions. Pick-up contri-

butions shall be treated as follows.

A. Pick-up contributions shall be treated as the em-

ployer’s contribution in determining tax treatment

under the United States Internal Revenue Code for

federal tax purposes, pursuant to the United States

Code, Title 26, Section 414(h) (2).

B. For all other purposes, pick-up contributions shall

be treated in the same manner and to the same extent

as member contributions were treated before the

effective date of this section.

4. Payment or repayment of contributions, back time,

refunds or purchase of service credits. The board shall

designate, by rule, a period of not less than 30 days dur-

ing which annual direct payments or repayments as pro-

vided in this chapter may be made.

§ 17701-A. Member contributions; members hired after

July 1, 1992

Notwithstanding section 17701, a member hired after

July 1, 1992 shall contribute to the retirement system or

have pick-up contributions made at a rate of 7.5% of

earnable compensation, except as otherwise provided in

this Part.

§ 17701-B. Member contributions on and after July 1,

1993

Notwithstanding sections 17701 and 17701-A, on and

after July 1, 1993 all members shall contribute to the

retirement system or have pick-up contributions made at a

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rate of 7.65% of earnable compensation except as other-

wise provided in this Part.

* * * *

§ 17705. Refund of accumulated contributions

If the service of any member has terminated, except

by death or by retirement under this Part, the member

shall be paid the amount of his accumulated contributions,

under the following conditions.

1. Ten or more years of service. If the member has

10 or more years of creditable service at the time service

is terminated, the member must have properly applied for

a refund of accumulated contributions. Refunds of ac-

cumulated contributions are governed as follows.

A. Payment must be made after termination of serv-

ice and not less than 22 days nor more than 60 days

after receipt of the application and receipt of the last

payroll upon which the name of the member appears,

whichever occurs later.

B. An application for refund is void if the member

filing the application returns to service as a state

employee or teacher before issuance of the payment.

C. Only contributions made by a particular member

or picked up by the employer may be refunded to

that member under this section.

2. Less than 10 years of service. If the member has

less than 10 years of creditable service at the time service

is terminated, refunds of accumulated contributions are

governed as follows.

A. Payment must be made after termination of serv-

ice and not less than 22 days nor more than 60 days

after receipt of the application and receipt of the last

payroll upon which the name of the member appears,

whichever occurs later.

|

334

B. No interest may be added to the member's ac-

count for any period beyond the Sth anniversary of

the date of the member’s termination of service, ex-

cept that interest on accumulated contributions re-

lated to a member’s compensation for service ren-

dered as a part-time, seasonal or temporary employee

after December 31, 1991 must be added as required

by 26 CFR Part 31.

C. An application for refund is void if the member

filing the application returns to service as a state em-

ployee or teacher before issuance of the payment.

D. Except when inclusion of a portion of employer

contributions is required by paragraph F, only ac-

cumulated contributions made by a particular mem-

ber or picked up by the employer may be refunded

to that member under this section.

E. The members must have properly applied for a

refund of accumulated contributions, except that the

retirement system may make an automatic refund of

contributions if the member has not properly applied

for a refund and the amount of accumulated contri-

butions is less than $650. In the case of a part-time,

seasonal or temporary employee the $650 limitation

does not apply.

F. The amount of the refund of accumulated con-

tributions related to a member’s compensation for

service rendered as a part-time, seasonal or tem-

porary employee after December 31, 1991 must be

at least equal to 7.5% of the member’s compensa-

tion for that service plus interest as provided by

section 17156, The right to a refund under this para-

graph is nonforfeitable until the member has accrued

10 years of creditable service but does not constitute

a right to a retirement benefit.

* * * *

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§ 17801. Amendment not to cause reduction in benefit

No amendment to this Part may cause any reduction

in the amount of benefits which would be due to a mem-

ber based on creditable service, earnable compensation,

employee contributions, pick-up contributions and the pro-

visions of this Part on the date immediately preceding the

effective date of the amendment.

* * * *

§ 17806. Cost-of-living adjustment to retirement benefits

Cost-of-living adjustments to the retirement benefits be-

ing paid to retired state employees, teachers or benefi-

ciaries of either shall be governed as follows.

1. Determination of adjustment. The cost-of-living ad-

justment shall be determined as follows.

A. Whenever there is a percentage change in the

Consumer Price Index from July Ist to June 30th,

the board shall automatically make an equal percent-

age increase or decrease in retirement benefits, be-

ginning in September, up to a maximum annual

increase or decrease of 4%.

B. Whenever the annual percentage increase in the

Consumer Price Index from July Ist to June 30th

exceeds 4%, the board shall make whatever adjust-

ments in the retirement benefits are necessary to re-

flect an annual increase of 4% and shall submit a

supplemental budget request to the Governor for the

additional funds that would be required to make ad-

justments in the retirement benefits to reflect the

actual increase in the Consumer Price Index. The

request shall include a report stating the cost of the

4% increase, the actual percentage increase in the

Consumer Price Index and the percentage adjust-

ments granted during the previous 5 years. The

board shall make an additional adjustment in the

retirement benefits in the month following the appro-

priation only in that amount.

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C. Notwithstanding any other provision of this sec-

tion, the amount of annual retirement benefit other-

wise payable under this Part may not be less than

the retired member received on the effective date of

his retirement or on July 1, 1977, whichever amount

is greater.

2. Cost. The board shall determine the costs of the

adjustments under this section and shall include those

costs in its budget requests.

3. Eligibility. Cost-of-living adjustments under this

section must be applied to the retirement benefits of all

retirees who have been retired for at least 12 months be-

fore the date that the adjustment becomes payable, except

that a member who has less than 10 years of creditable

service on July 1, 1993 may not receive a cost-of-living

adjustment until at least 12 months after reaching normal

retirement age. Beneficiaries of deceased retirees and

members are eligible for the cost-of-living adjustment at

the same time the deceased retiree or member would have

become eligible. A member who is eligible to retire as of

June 30, 1993 and who actually retires effective no later

than July 1, 1994 is eligible for the cost-of-living adjust-

ment if that member has been retired for at least 6 months

before the date that the adjustment becomes payable.

* * * *

§ 17851. Qualification for benefits

1. Member in service; 10 years of creditable service

on July 1, 1993. A member who is in service when

reaching 60 years of age, or is in service after reaching

60 years of age, qualifies for a service retirement benefit

if the member:

A. Retires upon or after reaching 60 years of age;

and

B. Has been in service for a minimum of one year

immediately before retirement or has at least 10

56a

years of creditable service, which may include credit-

able service as a member of the Maine Legislative

Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-

section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine

State Retirement System.

This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,

have 10 years of creditable service or who have reached

60 years of age and have been in service for a minimum

of one year immediately before that date. For the pur-

pose of calculating creditable service under this subsection

only, creditable service includes time during which a mem-

ber participated in the voluntary cost savings plan or the

voluntary employee incentive program, authorized by Pub-

lic Law 1989, chapter 702, section F-6 and Public Law

1991, chapter 591, Part BB and chapter 780, Part VV,

or 10 years of combined creditable service under this Part

and Title 3, chapter 29, or creditable service available to

a member that the member was eligible to purchase on

June 30, 1993 and that the member does purchase in ac-

cordance with rules adopted by the board.

1-A. Member in service; less than 10 years creditable

service on July 1, 1993. A member who is in service

when reaching 62 years of age, or is in service after reach-

ing 62 years of age, qualifies for a service retirement bene-

fit if the member:

A. Retires upon or after reaching 62 years of age;

and

B. Has been in service for a minimum of one year

immediately before retirement or has at least 10

years of creditable service, which may include credit-

able service as a member of the Maine Legislative

Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-

section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine

State Retirement System.

This subsection applies to members who are not covered

under subsection 1.

2. Member not in service; 10 years of creditable serv-

ice on July 1, 1993. A member who is not in service

57a.

when reaching 60 years of age qualifies for a service re-

tirement benefit if the niember:

A. Retires upon or after reaching 60 years of age;

and

B. Has at least 10 years of creditable service or 5

full terms as a Legislator, which may include credit-

able service as a member of the Maine Legislative

Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-

section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine

State Retirement System.

This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,

have 10 years of creditable service. For the purpose of

calculating creditable service under this subsection only,

creditable service includes time during which a member

participated in the voluntary cost savings plan or the volun-

tary employee incentive program, authorized by Public Law

1989, chapter 702, section F-6 and Public Law 1991,

chapter 591, Part BB and chapter 780, Part VV, or 10

years of combined creditable service under this Part and

Title 3, chapter 29, or creditable service available to a

member that the member was eligible to purchase on June

30, 1993 and that the member does purchase in accord-

ance with rules adopted by the board.

2-A. Member not in service; less than 10 years credit-

able service on July 1, 1993. A member who is not in

service when reaching 62 years of age qualifies for a serv-

ice retirement benefit if the member:

A. Retires upon or after reaching 62 years of age;

and

B. Has at least 10 years of creditable service or 5

full terms as a Legislator, which may include credit-

able service as a member of the Maine Legislative

Retirement System under Title 3, section 701, sub-

section 8, before becoming a member of the Maine

State Retirement System.

‘8a

This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,

do not have 10 years of creditable service.

3. Member with creditable service of 25 years or more.

A member who has completed 25 or more years of credit-

able service qualifies for a service retirement benefit if he

retires at any time after completing 25 years of service,

which may include, for the purpose of meeting eligibility

requirements, creditable service as a member of the Maine

Legislative Retirement System under Title 3, section 701,

subsection 8, before becoming a member of the Maine

State Retirement System.

§ 17852. Computation of benefit

1. Member in service. The amount of the service re-

tirement benefit for members qualified under section

17851, subsection 1, shall be computed as follows:

A. 1/50 of the member’s average final compensa-

tion multiplied by the number of years of his mem-

bership service and up to 25 years of his prior serv-

ice. Membership service under this paragraph does

not include creditable service under the Legislative

Retirement System; or

B. The total amount of the service retirement bene-

fit of any member qualifying under section 17851,

subsection 1, who became a member before July 1,

1947, and for whom the date of establishment of the

retirement system is July 1, 1942, must be at least

equal to 1/2 of his average final compensation, if the

member has at least 20 years of total creditable serv-

ice, including at least 13 years of prior service if he

retires upon or after reaching age 70.

2. Member not in service. The amount of the service

retirement benefit for members qualified under section

17851, subsection 2, shall be computed in accordance

with subsection 1.

i

t

;

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3. Member with creditable service of 25 years or more;

10 years of creditable service on July 1, 1993. The

amount of the service retirement benefit for members

qualified under section 17851, subsection 3, is computed

in accordance with subsection 1, except that:

A. The amount arrived at under subsection | is re-

duced by applying to that amount the percentage that

a life annuity due at age 60 bears to the life annuity

due at the age of retirement; and

B. For the purpose of making the computation under

paragraph A, the board-approved tables of annuities

in effect at the date of the member’s retirement are

used.

This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,

have 10 years of creditable service. For the purpose of

calculating creditable service under this subsection only,

creditable service includes time during which a member

participated in the voluntary cost savings plan or the vol-

untary employee incentive program, authorized by Public

Law 1989, chapter 702, section F-6 and Public Law 1991,

chapter 591, Part BB and chapter 780, Part VV, or 10

years of combined creditable service under this Part and

Title 3, chapter 29, or creditable service available to a

member that the member was eligible to purchase on

June 30, 1993 and that the member does purchase in ac-

cordance with rules adopted by the board.

3-A. Member with creditable service of 25 years or

more; less than 10 years of creditable service on July 1,

1993. The amount of the service retirement benefit for

members qualified under section 17851, subsection 3, is

computed in accordance with subsection 1, except that the

benefit is reduced by 6% for each year that the member’s

age precedes age 62.

This subsection applies to members who, on July 1, 1993,

do not have 10 years of creditable service.

* * * *

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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