Appendix — Bragg v. State Bar of California
Supreme Court brief1998
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
Cy ? ?
>) PY . Suprame Court, U.S.
FILED
No. 97 1168 JAN 1 2 1998
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1997
In the Matter of
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG
APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THF
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
LAWRENCE C. BRAGG
15454 East Gale Avenue
Hacienda Heights, CA
91745-1500
1-626-961-0511
Petitioner Attorney Pro Se
a
Table of Contents for Appendix
Order, California Supreme Court, December 10, 1997
Opinion on Review, Review Department, State Bar Court
of the State Bar of California
Motion for Recusal of Members of California Supreme
Court
Notice to Show Cause
Transmittal of State Bar Court recommendation
State Statutes
SONS RE ME
ree
SUPREME COURT FILED
Dec 10 1997
Robert Wandruff Clerk
Deputy
$062861
SBC #85-0-12550
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
IN RE LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG ON
DISCIPLINE
Petition for writ of review is denied.
It is ordered that Lawrence Crawford Bragg be suspended
from the practice of law for two years, that execution of
suspension be stayed, and that he be placed on probation for
two years subject to the conditions of probation, including one
year actual suspension, recommended by the Review
Department of the State Bar Court in its opinion filed April 28,
1997. It is also ordered that he take and pass the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination within one year after
the effective date of this order. (See Segretti v. State Bar
{1976} 15 Cal.3d 878, 891, fn.8). It is further ordered that he
comply with Rule 955, California Rules of Court, and that he
A
perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule
within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the date this order is
effective.* Costs are awarded to the State Bar pursuant to
Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 payable in
accordance with Business and Professions Code section
6140.7, as amended effective January 1, 1997.
*See Business and Professions Code section 6126. subd, (c).
George
Chief Justice
I, Robert V. Wandruff, Clerk of the Supreme Court of the
State of California, do hereby certify that the preceding is a
true copy of an order of this Court, as shown by the
records of my office.
Witness my hand and the seal of the Court this
day of Dec. 11 1997
By_K. Robinson _
Deputy Clerk
ad
A rpc TEIN me
PUBLIC MATTER-CERTIFIED FOR
PUBLICATION
FILED
APR 28 1997
STATE BAR COURT
CLERK'S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES
REVIEW DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE BAR
COURT
In the Matter of 85-0-12550
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG, OPINION ON
REVIEW
A Member of the State Bar
Respondent Lawrence Crawford Bragg seeks review
of a hearing judge's decision on a four-count charge against
respondent in which the hearing judge found respondent
culpable on each of the four counts. The hearing judge
recommended a two-year stayed suspension and two-year
probation, conditioned on one-year actual suspension along
Brel
with certain other conditions,’
In a general count (count two), respondent was
charged with entering into a partnership with a non-lawyer
that involved the practice of law in violation of current rule 1-
310, Rules of Professional Conduct,” sharing legal fees with
non-lawyer in violation of current rule 1-320, and engaging in
an act or acts that involved moral turpitude in violation of
Business and Professions Code section 6106.2 The hearing
judge found respondent culpable of each of the charges under
this count, including a finding that respondent’s conduct
involved moral turpitude.
On the first count, involving client Renee Harmon
1 At page | of the decision, the hearing judge's decision recites "two (2)
’ Probation including four 14) years actual suspension." We treat this as a
Clerical error.
2 Current rule shall refer to the Rules of Professional Conduct in effect since
May 27, 1989; and former rule shall refer to the Rules of Professional Conduct in
effect not earlier than January l, 1975, and not later than May 26, 1989.
3 Unless otherwise indicated, section shall refer to the Business
and Professions Code.
B-Z
(Harmon), respondent was charged with violation of section
6068., subdivision (m) (requiring an attorney “(t) to respond
promptly to reasonable status inquiries of clients"), rule 3-
110(A) (requiring that a lawyer "not intentionally, recklessly,
or repeatedly fail to perform legal services with competence"),
and rule 3-700(A)(z> (prohibiting attorney from withdrawing
from employment until reasonable steps are taken to see that
harm will not result to the client). Respondent was found not
culpable of violation of section 6068, subdivision (m) and
culpable on the other two charges.
In count three, respondent was charged with and
found culpable of violating section 6068, subdivision (1)
(requiring an attorney to keep all agreements made in lieu of
disciplinary prosecution). The agreement in lieu of discipline
required respondent to take and pass the California
Professional Responsibility Examination (CPRE) and to take a
course in law office management, all within one year.
Respondent failed to do either.
In count four respondent, as a part of his agreement in
B-3
lieu of discipline, which was the subject of count three,
admitted a violation of former rules 6-101(A)(2) and 6-
101(2), and sections 6068, subdivision (a) and 6103, as a part
of his stipulation leading to his agreement in lieu of discipline,
The facts admitted in the stipulation are included in our
review of the evidence.
We agree with the hearing judge that the misconduct
was serious, however, we do not find that respondent entered
into a partnership with Bruce Hickman, although we find
respondent did have an agreement with him that amounted to
sharing legal fees with a non-lawyer in violation of current
rule 1-320. We f ind in aggravation that respondent violated
current rule 1-300 in aiding a non-lawyer to engage in the
practice of law. We further find that the misconduct involved
moral turpitude in violation of section 6106.
As to count one, the Harmon matter, following
analysis, we agree with the hearing judge that there was not
clear and convincing evidence of violation of section 6068,
subdivision (m). We determine that there is not clear and
B-4
convincing evidence of culpability of violation of current rule
3-700 (A) (2) . We agree with the hearing judge that
respondent is culpable of violating current rule 3-110(A).
The culpability under section 6068, current (1) (failing
to comply with the terms of an agreement in lieu of discipline)
(count three) is clear. The issue is not mentioned in the briefs
of respondent, and without further comment, we affirm the
hearing judge's findings.
The respondent, in reaching the agreement in lieu of
discipline, has admitted the violations charged in count four,
and again we affirm the findings of the hearing judge without
further comment.
After giving weight to our determination that
respondent was culpable of moral turpitude under section
6106, we affirm the discipline recommended by the hearing
judge that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
for two years, that this suspension be stayed, and that
respondent be placed on probation for two years, on the
condition that he be actually suspended for the first one year
B.S
of that probation, along with the other conditions
recommended by the hearing judge.
L
—REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
A. Charge of Entering a Partnership With Non-lawver
and Fee Splitting
Initially, we look to the evidence pertaining to the charges
that respondent entered into and maintained a partnership with
a non-lawyer, Bruce Hickman, that involved the practice of
law, and that he shared legal fees with Hickman (count two.)
That charge further alleges that the misconduct involved moral
turpitude in violation of section 6106.
The record is clear that respondent, admitted to practice
in 1963, has, for many years, maintained a high-volume
plaintiff's personal injury practice, operated primarily out of an
office in Hacienda Heights. Respondent estimated that he had
an inventory extensively in the yellow pages of various
telephone directories covering areas of San Bernardino,
Riverside, and San Gabriel Valley, as well as other areas of
B-G
Prior to March 31, 1992, and in that year, respondent
received a call from Hickman, whom he had neither met nor
heard of at the time of the call. Hickman suggested that they
meet and discuss ways in which respondent could improve the
effectiveness of his advertising and his case management of
“pre-litigation" matters. Pre-litigation matters were defined as
those in which respondent had been retained, but no complaint
had been filed. Hickman represented himself as having
experience as an adjuster for various insurance carriers, and as
an independent adjuster with experience in administering and
negotiating settlements on personal injury matters.
Following an initial meeting, Hickman reviewed a portion
of respondent's client files and prepared a report containing
suggestions for improvement in management of the files, and
outlining a program for more effective yellow page advertising,
covering a wider area at no additional cost. Included in the
report was a suggestion that respondent modify and expand his
advertising and open new offices with the expectation of an
B+?
staffed offices in Ontario, from which he performed
investigations and other services for at least one other attorney,
Although no written agreement was reached between
respondent and Hickman, we adopt the hearing judge's findings
that an oral agreement was reached between the parties, and we
adopt the findings of the hearing judge regarding the terms of
that agreement. * It was agreed that the pre-litigation files
would be moved to Hickman's Ontario office, and be under the
management of Hickman. Hickman would be an independent
contractor, and would employ his own personnel, some of
disdain for the authority of the hearing court. The hearing judge used Hickman’ s
testmony only when corroborated by other reliable evidence. We agree, and follow
whom would leave respondent's employ and join Hickman's
staff. The litigation files would remain at the Hacienda Heights
office and remain under the management of respondent.
Compensation to Hickman was to be determined on a formula.
Respondent was to pay all of his office expenses from gross
attorney's fees earned on pre-litigation cases, which included
the cost of advertising, rent, employee's compensation, and
other office expenses. The balance was defined as net profit, to
be divided between respondent and Hickman. Hickman was to
get 25 percent of the net profit of those pre-litigation cases in
respondent's office prior to the association with Hickman, and
50 percent of the net profit on those cases where the retainer
was signed after Hickman joined the office.
Hickman's duties were agreed to include receiving and
responding to new personal injury inquiries in response to
telephone calls, meeting with clients either in the office or at the
client's’ home or other place of convenience, obtaining-client
signatures on retainer agreements, and submitting those
agreements to respondent's office for acceptance or rejection.
B-4
He was to obtain statements, police re ports, and medical
reports; conduct field investigations; prepare demand letters on
and negotiate settlements with insurance companies to the
extent practicable; and administer the-pre-litigation files.
This agreement was made in early April 1992, and the
parties operated under it, as will be described, until January 12,
1993.
Hickman recommended and respondent agreed to a new
plan of yellow page advertising plus other incidental
advertising, all of which became effective incrementally during
the term of the relationship between Hickman and respondent.
New client calls were received by Hickman or a member of his
staff. They would screen the calls for those claims that
appeared viable, and set appointments with such potential
clients. Hickman or a member of his staff would interview the
client regarding the nature of the accident and the extent of
injury. If the interviewer determined that the claim was viable,
a form retainer agreement was presented to the client, and the
member of Hickman's staff would open a file and undertake
B-}6
such investigation as may be indicated. While the agreement
between Hickman and respondent called for the retainer
agreement to be submitted to respondent for his approval and
signature, the evidence demonstrated that, in fact, Hickman or
his employees had a signature stamp in respondent's name and
that they frequently stamped the retainer agreements with
respondent's signature, without approval of respondent.
Respondent's name was placed on Hickman's offices in
Ontario, and over the term of the agreement Hickman leased
additional offices in various communities in Southern
California. These leases were generally in Hickman's name,
although they were held out as the offices of respondent, by
signage and telephone answers. Respondent reimbursed
Hickman for the rent on these offices as a charge before
determining net profit. By virtue of the telephone system
suggested by Hickman the area from which the call was made
could be identified, and an appointment would be set by an
employee of Hickman in an office in or near that area.
Respondent visited these offices infrequently, and some
B-!tl
not at all. He visited Hickman's Ontario office approximately
10 times, the Huntington Beach office less than that, and other
offices when required for a deposition or other litigated matter.
or their insurance carriers. The negotiators would then do a
disbursement sheet, including all medical liens and other
charges to be paid, and present it to the client for approval.
The disbursement sheet and the draft would then be forwarded
to respondent's Hacienda Heights office for approval, and the
check prepared there. Respondent did not charge clients for
incidentals such as telephone, duplication, facsimile
transmission, postage, or like items. In addition, in no event
were the attorney's fees deducted from any client's recovery to
exceed the amount the client received, even if that meant no
attorney's fees at all.
eee
Respondent discussed cases with Hickman on almost a
daily basis. However, there is clear and convincing evidence
that in many cases. the evaluation, negotiating, and settlement
were conducted by Hickman or his negotiators, with no
supervision by an attorney, with the exception that after
acceptance by the client the draft was submitted to respondent
or an employee attorney for approval of the disbursement sheet,
showing the allocation of the settlement funds, and for the
actual disbursement of those funds.
Other than the Harmon matter, discussed post, the
record reveals no complaints by clients during the term of the
arrangement with Hickman, nor any complaints by medical care
providers or other lien claimants. There are no allegations of
capping nor improper handling of trust funds.
The agreement between respondent and Hickman did
not provide that Hickman was to have an ownership interest in
the pre-litigation matters, nor was Hickman to share in losses,
should they occur. There was no holding out to the public or
others that a partnership had been created between Hickman
B.!13
and respondent, nor was there any change in the name as the
result of the association with Hickman. There was no sharing
of prof its or income from cases other than the pre-litigation
cases.
During the period of the relationship between
respondent and Hickman, April 1992 to January 12, 1993,
respondent paid to Hickman approximately $350,000, which
included reimbursement for equipment and telephone
advertising expenses Hickman had advanced, certain other
expenses and salaries for negotiators and office personnel, and
compensation to Hickman according to the agreed formula. In
January 1993 a dispute arose between Hickman and respondent
over a $61,000 check. Respondent delivered to Hickman to
reimburse him for yellow page advertising. Early the morning
following the dispute Hickman and one of his employees
removed from the offices a substantial portion of the pre-
litigation files, resulting in the arrest of Hickman.
B. The Harmon Matter
On July 24, 1990, Renee Harmon was involved in a
B-!4
single car accident while driving a Chrysler automobile rented
from General Rent-A-Car. Following the rental, which was to
be for an extended period, Harmon complained to General-
Rent-A-Car that the steering was periodically malfunctioning.
Following an inspection the vehicle was returned to Harmon
with a statement that no malfunction could be found.
Thereafter, with Harmon driving, the automobile crossed
opposing traffic, jumped the curb, and came to rest. She
sought treatment for neck and back pain the next day.
Harmon filed an accident report with General Rent-A-Car,
and although called, the police did not prepare an accident
report.
In late July or early August 1990, Harmon retained
respondent to handle the personal injury arising from the
accident. She advised respondent that she had purchased all
of the insurance available at the time of the rental of the
Chrysler. On September 21, 1990, on Harmon's behalf,
respondent filed a personal injury action against General Rent-
A-Car, its parent company, and 20 Does. Respondent
Be-t§
referred Harmon to physicians and advised her that they
would file a lien to be paid at the time of her recovery. There
was no discussion of responsibility for the medical charges in
the event of no-recovery.
Respondent's investigation of the Claim included a
discussion with representatives of General Rent-A-Car, who
advised that they had checked over the Chrysler and found
nothing wrong with it, but did not include an independent
examination of the vehicle, nor did it include any discovery on
that issue, or otherwise. Respondent testified that in
September of 1990 he determined that Harmon's case had no
merit and that he so advised her, but that he filed the action to
protect her claim. Harmon did not recall such a statement.
In July 1991, and within one year of the date of the
accident, respondent filed a first amended complaint naming
Chrysler Corporation for the first time. Chrysler was not
named as a Doe, but rather was named as the result of the
filing of new complaint entitled "First Amended Complaint.”
In March 1992 respondent made written demand on
B-16
General RentA-Car for over $59,000. In May 1992, an
identical demand was made on Chrysler. Both denied liability.
No further action in the Harmon file is shown until August
1993, when Harmon wrote respondent complaining about the
level of service, On September 20, 1993, the first amended
complaint was served on Chrysler by certified mail, return
receipt requested. On that same day Harmon signed a
substitution of attorney substituting Michael Hemming as
attorney for Harmon. That substitution was filed September
29 1993.
In November 1993 Chrysler moved to quash service
or to seek discretionary dismissal under Code of Civil
Procedure sections 583.210 and 583.420. No opposition to
that motion was filed on behalf of Harmon, nor was any
appearance made at the hearing, and the court ultimately
dismissed the complaint as to Chrysler.
Harmon's testimony-regarding communications with
respondent was vague, while respondent testified that he
personally talked with Harmon on 15 occasions, and with her
B-'1
brothers on five other occasions. Also, she talked with
Hickman's negotiators an undetermined number of times.
C. Agreement in Lieu of Discipline
In April 1990 respondent entered into an agreement in
lieu of discipline requiring him to take and pass the CPRE and
to complete a course in law office management, all within one
year. In testimony, respondent has admitted his failure to
comply with either of these provisions of the agreement.
D: Thsaniariumas te eam a
Discipli
In the agreement in lieu of discipline respondent
stipulated to the facts and conclusions of law set forth below.
1. Facts
On March 4, 1980, respondent was hired by Wesley F.
Jefferson and Mary J. Jefferson (the Jeffersons) to represent
them in a foreclosure action concerning their real property and
to file a lawsuit on their behalf arising therefrom against several
defendants, including Goldenstate Company and Josephine
DeFalco.
2. Respondent filed an action on behalf of the
Jeffersons in Los Angeles Superior Court entitled Wesley and
Mary Jefferson v. Robert P. Davis, et al., case no. EAC 33683.
He conducted discovery, including a mandatory settlement
conference held on October 4, 1983.
3. Respondent located and served the two defendants
who appeared to be most at fault, Goldenstate and DeFalco.
On April 7, 1985, the statute of Eeitetions tolled as to the
remaining -defendants for failure to prosecute within the five-
year limitation, due to respondent's inadvertence. Respondent
successfully obtained a default judgment as to Goldenstate and
DeFalco, who had, in the meantime, disappeared without
responding to the complaint.
4. Respondent also represented the Jeffersons as
defendants in an unlawful detainer action known as Lewis v.
Jefferson, et al., Pomona Municipal Court case no. 37608.
5. On April 7, 1980, respondent appeared in the
Pomona Municipal Court on behalf of his clients, who were not
present. He negotiated a stipulation which would allow his
B-19
clients to remain in possession of their residence until resolution
of the superior court matter described above, on certain
conditions. The latter included paying back rent of $475 per
month. As the only alternative was immediate eviction,
respondent believed his clients would be willing and able to
enter such a stipulation.
6. On April 10, 1980, respondent executed a stipulation
for judgment on behalf of the Jeffersons without their
authorization,but believing they would agree to the terms if
fully advised. He thereafter left a message at their home
advising them of his action and asking them to contact him if
they did not agree to the terms. The Jeffersons were out of
town and did not receive or respond to the message.
7. The stipulated judgment was received and filed by
the plaintiff's attorney. The Jeffersons were unable to meet the
terms of the stipulation and were evicted from their property.
Respondent attempted to set aside the judgement, but was
unsuccessful.
8. Respondent Is conduct in the unlawful detainer
. B-206
action did not cause the Jeffersons to be evicted, but, in fact,
resulted in some extension of time in what would otherwise
have been a summary eviction proceeding.
9. The delay in respondent's handling of the superior
court action, and his failure to maintain contact with his clients
and to keep them fully advised of their position in the unlawful
detainer action, were partially the result of insufficient office
controls to assure attention to those client matters.
2. Conclusions of law
Respondent admitted that he wilfully violated former
rules 6-101(A) (2) and 6-101(2) and sections 6068, subdivision
(a) and 6103.
Ti. DISCUSSION
A. The Exist of a Partnership With Hick
We first consider whether or not either the terms of the
oral agreement between respondent and Hickman or their
conduct in carrying out that agreement created a partnership
consisting of the practice of law as proscribed by current rule 1-
"310. Absent authority -to—“the contrary we interpret the use
B-2)
of the word “Partnership” in that rule to mean partnership in the
commonly understood definition as it exists in the civil law.
Under the Uniform Partnership Act, specifically section
15006 of the Corporations Code, "A partnership is an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a
business for a profit." Section 15007, subdivision (3) of that
same code states that sharing of gross returns does not, of
itself, establish a partnership, while subdivision (4) provides in
effect that receipt of a share of profits in business is prima
facie evidence of partnership, except, inter alia, where the share
of profits was received as wages of an employee. (See also
Brockman v. Lane, (1951) 103 Cal App.2d 802, 805; 9 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. (1989) Parmership, § 23, pp.
422, 423.)
The record is barren of evidence that Hickman had any
ownership interest in any of the assets of respondent's law firm,
including additions to equipment that were purchased as a
result of the relationship. Respondent either paid for or
reimbursed Hickman for additional computers, phone
s
B-22m
directly or as a partner. Further, the files were respondent's and
the client's. In spite of Hickman's removal of the files at the
termination of the relationship, it is clear that they were the files
of respondent.
Hickman, although sharing in the profits from a portion
of respondent's practice, had no obligation to pay any portion
of the firm's liabilities, contingent or actual.
Hickman, in his testimony, repeatedly referred to
himself as the partner of respondent, whether the question
related to the relation of the parties nor not. However, there is
no evidence that he ever referred to himself as a partner during
the term of the relationship. Nor is there any evidence that the
parties ever held themselves out as partners, either to clients or
others Respondent testified that the sole purpose of the shared
ne profits was to create a compensation plan that would fairly
compensate Hickman, and create an incentive for productive
work from Hickman and his staff. Hickman had no access to
B-293
the general or trust accounts of respondent, nor did respondent
share in the proceeds of any activity of Hickman, other than in
relation to the pre-litigation cases.
The State Bar calls our attention to Crawford v. State
Bar (1960) 54 Cal.2d 659. There, we note, the court found
that the respondent and his father, a disbarred lawyer, adopted
a firm name of Crawford & Crawford, held themselves out as
partners, maintained a single general account into which were
deposited the proceeds of the law practice and the disbarred
father's “tax consulting" business, all of which was conducted
out of a single office. There was no separate accounting of
income and expenses, and the court found that not only did
they hold themselves out as partners, they considered
themselves as partners.
In the matter before us none of the elements found by
the court in Crawford is present. Hickman's testimony appears
to be the first representation to or by anyone that a partnership
existed. As we have indicated, Hickman's testimony in this
regard is neither confirmed nor believable.
B-a4
In the judgment of this court there is not clear and
convincing evidence that respondent entered into a partnership
with Hickman, and we reverse the finding of culpability in the
charge of violating current rule 1-310.
B. The Sharing of Fees
We next look to the charge of violation of current rule
1320({A) (prohibiting a lawyer from directly or indirectly
sharing fees with a non-lawyer) . Respondent freely
acknowledges the terms of the compensation plan for Hickman,
but argues that such a plan does not violate current rule 1-
320(A), or any other rule of professional conduct. We
disagree.
The pre-litigation cases, as defined by the parties, were
delivered to Hickman for his supervision and administration.
The control of these cases by respondent or his attorney staff,
under the terms of the agreement or as carried out in practice as
found by the hearing judge, was, at best, minimal. We agree.
We need not decide whether the compensation plan for
Hickman would have been proper had respondent or his
B-as
attorney staff remained in control of the pre-litigation clients
and maintained the files under their direct supervision, for, in
fact, Hickman and his staff, with little or no control, were
settling 30 to 50 cases a month, evaluating whether to accept
clients in respondent's name, frequently without review by an
attorney, setting values on clients’ daim,-4 negctiating with
insurance companies and settling those claims, frequently
without any attorney input; and, =m occasion, even filing
lawsuits to prevent the running of the statute of limitations
without attorney control. The frelitigation files were
transferred to a separate facility at whch there was no resident
lawyer, only periodic visits by a: attommey member of
respondent's staff. Hickman’s employes were receiving calls
from over 40 different telephone lines ind evaluating the claims
with almost no attommey supervision. For this Hickman
received a percentage of the net fees on the pre-litigation cases
he handled.
In In the Matter of Jones (Revew Dept. 1993) 2 Cal.
State Bar Ct. Roptr. 411, this court vas confronted with an
B-26
almost identical agreement for the compensation of a non-
attorney. There the agreement provided that half of all attorney
fees collected would go to office upkeep and overhead, one-
quarter would go to respondent lawyer, and one-quarter would
go to the non-lawyer. (Id. at p. 416.) We held that respondent
was culpable of dividing fees with a non-lawyer. There, the
decision was based on former rule 3-102 (A). There is no
material difference between that former rule and current rule 1-
320(A) for our purposes.
Respondent argues that there are marked differences
between the instant matter and Jones in that in Jones there was
a clear and deliberate effort to create a partnership, and that in
this matter respondent maintained control of all of the pre-
litigation cases, and that all disbursements were properly made
from respondent's trust account.-under respondent's
supervision.
As we have pointed out, we do not agree that, in fact,
respondent maintained control over his pre-litigation cases, but
rather aff irm the hearing judge’s finding that the control had
B-27
been substantially abdicated to Hickman. In our previous
section we have determined that there was no partnership.
While that may bear on the degree of discipline, it has little
bearing on the issue of culpability regarding sharing fees with a
non-lawyer. Respondent did maintain control over the
disbursement of clients' funds received in settlement, which is a
significant factor, but that alone does not demonstrate suf f
icient control to avoid a showing of sharing fees with a non-
lawyer in violation of the current rules.
As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the fundamental
concern addressed by the prohibition against fee-splitting with a
nonlawyer is the risk posed by the possibility of control by non-
lawyers more interested in personal profit than the client's
welfare. (In re Amoff (1978) 22 Cal.3d 740, 748, fn. 4;
Gassman vy. State Bar (1976) 18 Cal. 3d. 125, 132.
The issue of fee-splitting was also presented in In the
Matter of Nelson (Review Dept. 1990) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 178, along with issues of forming a partnership with a
non-lawyer and capping. While we have not found a
B-28
partnership, and there is no evidence of capping, Nelson
remains matractive: In a situation in which Nelson exercised at
least some control over the activities of the non-lawyer, this
court found that he violated the prohibition against sharing fees
with a non-lawyer.
We conclude that respondent is culpable of sharing fees
with a non-attorney in violation of current rule 1-320(A).
C. The Issue of Moral Turpitude
The State Bar has charged respondent with commission
of acts of moral turpitude under section 6106 regarding his
relationship with Hickman. To properly evaluate this charge
we must look to the acts shown by the record and consider not
only culpability, but also any acts shown by the record that
would constitute aggravation. Although not charged, the
record is reviewed to determine if respondent is culpable of
aiding a person or entity in the practice of law in violation of
current rule 1-300 (A) . That rule provides, “A [lawyer] shall
not aid any person or entity in the unauthorized practice of
law »”»
As we have set forth, ante, the control of the pre-
litigation cases by respondent or his attorney staff was minimal.
The prelitigation cases were delivered to Hickman for his
supervision and administration at a location away from
respondent's principal office. Hickman and his staff were
accepting clients in the name of respondent and negotiating and
settling cases with little or no attorney control. These
settlements were at a rate of 30 to SO cases a month; and
bonuses were paid by Hickman to his employees for settlement
of these cases, demonstrating a concern for profit by Hickman
and his employees rather than a concern for the individual
client. (Cf. In re Amoff. sut)ra, 22 Cal.3d. 740, 748, fn. 4.)
Respondent's name stamp was used by Hickman and his
employees in sending out demand letters, correspondence with
clients, and, on occasion, even complaints filed on behalf of
clients. There was little or no contact between respondent and
his attorney staff and the pre-litigation clients, as a general rule.
The evaluation of the claim was done almost exclusively by
Hickman, or his "negotiators," although there were regular
B°go
— a a ae
conferences between Hickman and respondent. The madority
of meetings with prelitigation clients was done on premises
without an attorney in regular attendance, although there was
generally telephonic advice available when requested by a
negotiator.
We conclude that in totality the agreement as carried
out between respondent and Hickman created a situation where
Hickman was, in fact, practicing law. In this respect, the
conduct of Hickman was analogous to the wain of the
disbarred father, Howard, in Crawford v. State Bar, supra, 54
Cal.2d 659. There Howard gave advice on.a mining claim, but
a fee was charged by the firm. The court noted "Although
Howard's services might lawfully have been performed by title
companies, insurance companies, brokers, and other laymen, it
does not follow that when they are rendered by an attorney, or
in his office, they do not involve the practice of law. People
call on lawyers for services that might otherwise be obtained
from laymen because they expect and are entitled to legal
counsel. Attorneys must conform to professional standards in
_B-3/
whatever capacity they are acting in a particular matter.
(Citations.}” (1d. at pp. 667-668)
In the matter before us the clients engaged the services
of respondent. They expected and were entitled to have the
services of an attorney in evaluating and settling their personal
injury claims. Instead, they got the services of an adjuster and
his negotiators, housed in offices bearing respondent's name,
with phones answered in respondent's name and
correspondence and negotiations conducted in respondent's
name, with little or no input from respondent. We conclude
that respondent aided Hickman in the practice of law in
violation of current rule 1-300 (A) Since not charged, that
violation will be considered in aggravation and considered in
making a determination of whether respondent is culpable of
moral turpitude under section 6106.
When the totality of respondent’s conduct is considered
in his relationship with Hickman and Hickman's employees, we
are confronted with respondent moving a substantial portion of
his practice away from his principal office, and with few
“
-_—_—_——
B-32
aR il
remaining controls delivering it to the administration and
supervision of a non-lawyer, Hickman.
There are no ethical concerns raised in connection with
respondent's advertising, nor with the screening of potential
client calls. The volume of respondent, s practice does not
present ethical questions, provided that each of the steps that
involve the practice of law either are performed by a lawyer or
are sO immediately under a lawyer's supervision as to not run
afoul of the underlying purpose of current rule 1-300 (A) or
sections 6125 and 6126.
Here, a lawyer with almost 30 years of practice, primarily
in the personal injury field, entered into an agreement that we
have found to constitute fee-splitting, as well as conduct that
aided a non-lawyer in the practice of law. The scheme as
carried into effect clearly created the illusion that the various
new offices of respondent were, in fact, law offices staffed by
lawyers to whom clients could come to resolve their persona!
injury problems. In fact, they were obtaining a lay negotiating
service that, in many obvious respects, was practicing law.
B-33
This operation continued in effect for some nine months,
accelerating in volume on a monthly basis. In spite of this
increase in volume there is no evidence of increased supervision
by attorneys, and, in fact, as the volume increased, the
supervision by attorneys on individual cases decreased, even as
the number of Hickman's employees increased.
In In the Matter of Jones, supra, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 411, the misconduct was found to involve moral turpitude
where the respondent set up a venture with a non-lawyer. In
that matter the respondent had only practiced law for two
years, and the court noted that he ignored the "basic precepts of
attomey professional responsibility.....” (Id. at p. 419.) In this
matter, we less egregious conduct by an experienced attorney
who, we must assume, had a full command of the "basic
precepts of attorney professional responsibility.”
Even though respondent's misconduct was less
egregious than Jones's misconduct, it was committed by an
attorney, who, with the slightest bit of research, would have
been made fully acquainted with the proscription on sharing
B-24
fees, or aiding a non-lawyer in the practice of-law. This plan
continued for nine months.
Although respondent testified that the retainer
agreements signed by the client were to be delivered to him
for approval or rejection, the evidence is clear that in many, if
not nearly all cases, Hickman or his negotiators were the ones
who accepted the clients without further approval.
Respondent knew that Hickman and the negotiators were
settling cases about which he knew little or nothing.
During oral argument respondent called our attention to
the Insurance Adjuster's Act, Insurance Code section 14000 et
seq., arguing that the activities of Hickman and his employees
would have been authorized under that act. we note that no
evidence was introduced showing or suggesting that either
Hickman or any of his employees were licensed under that
act. Insurance Code section 14002 prohibits an insurance
adjuster from engaging in the practice of law unless the
adjuster is an active member of the State Bar of California,
while Insurance Code section 15002 imposes a similar
B-.33S
restriction on public insurance adjusters. We further note that
a public insurance adjuster includes one who, for
compensation, assists an insured in negotiating for or effecting
a Claim on behalf of an insured. (Ins. Code, § 15007.)
Respondent seeks to identify his duties in pre-litigation
cases as no more that those of an insurance adjuster. The
analogy is not apt. Respondent is a lawyer, and clients
contact his office because of and in reliance on that fact.
When retained, respondent must competently evaluate the
client's claim and represent the client appropriately. While
insurance on the part of a prospective defendant may affect
the value of the claim, it is not strictly a claim against that
defendant's insurance carrier, but against that defendant,
regardless of insurance. Also, in making such an assertion,
respondent completely ignores the language of Crawford y.
State Bar, supra, 54 Cal.2d. 659, 667-668, quoted ante. The
argument places in doubt respondent's understanding of his
fundamental duties as a lawyer in representing clients.
Respondent knew that he was abdicating his
B-9&
responsibilities as an attorney and acted purposefully in
allowing Hickman to engage in activities which constituted
the practice of law. Accordingly, respondent's acts involved
moral turpitude in violation of section 6106.
D. TheHarmon Matters
1. Charge of violation of 6068, subdivision (m)
The hearing judge found a lack of clear and convincing
evidence that respondent was culpable of violating section
6068, subdivision (m) (imposing a duty on attorneys to respond
promptly to reasonable status inquires of clients) Our
independent review of the record leads us to a like finding and
we affirm the hearing judge's decision as that count.
2. Charge of violation of current mile 3-110(A)
Current rule 3-110(A) provides that an attorney shall
not intentionally, or with reckless disregard or repeatedly fail to
perform legal services competently.
As the record reveals and the hearing judge found,
respondent failed to make claim against the medical coverage
that Harmon represented that she had purchased, to properly
B-31
investigate the condition of the Chrysler automobile following
the incident, and to conduct discovery regarding Harmon's
claim. on the other hand, respondent filed a timely action,
caused it to be served on the car rental agency, and filed a
timely amended complaint naming Chrysler Corporation, but
made ineffective effort tc have it served. In addition,
respondent's office had made settlement demands on both the
car rental agency and Chrysler Corporation.
While respondent did undertake some action on behalf
of Harmon, he failed to make claim on her purported insurance,
he took no action to prosecute Harmon's case other than file
the complaint and the first amended complaint, he caused no
independent investigation to be made, he performed no
discovery, and he failed to cause service to made in such a
manner to prevent a motion for discretionary dismissal.
Respondent argues that as early as September 1990 he
concluded that Harmon’ s case was not meritorious in spite of
that he remained counsel of record and performed some
services until September 1993. Following our de novo review
B-88
we conclude that respondent is culpable of violating current
rule 3-110(A).
3. Charge of violation of current rule 3-700(A)
Current rule 3-700(A)(2) prohibits a member from
withdrawing from employment without taking reasonable steps
to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the client. Here respondent
withdrew following service on Chrysler Corporation, and well
before any motion for discretionary dismissal or to quash
service was brought by Chrysler. Chrysler was served on
September 20, 1993. On that same day Harmon signed a
substitution of attorney replacing respondent with Hemming as
attorney for Harmon. That substitution was filed nine days
later. The Chrysler motion to dismiss or quash service was not
made until November and was served on Hemming. The fact
that respondent's successor counsel made no effort to resist the
discretionary dismissal motion cannot be attributed to
respondent. While respondent's failure to act more promptly
may have inspired the motion for dismissal, we have dealt with
such conduct in the prior section of this opinion. We determine
B-39
that there is not clear and convincing evidence that his
withdrawal, under circumstances giving successor counsel
ample time to resist the motion for discretionary dismissal,
resulted in a violation of current rule 3-700(A) (2), and we
reverse the hearing judge's determination on that issue.
IV. DISCIPLINE
While we have reversed the findings of culpability in
part of the Harmon matter and as to entering into a
partnership agreement with Hickman, a non-lawyer,
respondent remains culpable of sharing fees with a non-lawyer
in several hundred cases, extending over a period of some
nine months. In aggravation respondent has been found to
have aided a non-lawyer to engage in the practice of law,
again, covering several hundred cases and for a period of nine
months.
In addition, these findings of culpability and
aggravation are measured in a situation in which respondent
has failed to comply with a prior agreement in lieu of
discipline. We therefore add to the balance that violation by
B-¥2
respondent of section 6068, subdivision (1) (requiring a
lawyer to keep all agreements made in lieu of discipline).
Still further, we look to respondents admission of
violation of former rule 6-101(A)(2) (requiring an attorney
not to intentionally, recklessly or repeatedly fail to perform
competently), former rule 6-101 (2) (requiring reasonable
diligence to accomplish the purpose for an attorney was
employed) and section 6068, subdivision (a) (requiring an
attorney to support the federal and state laws and
constitutions) and section 6103 (prohibiting disobedience to
an order of court that attorney ought, in good faith, to obey).
Each of the admissions to these charges followed respondent's
stipulation of fact arising out of the 1985 disciplinary charge.
We weigh these admissions of culpability along with the
admitted facts in determining discipline.
We consider in recommending discipline, among other
things, the fact that the conduct in sharing fees with a non-
lawyer appears to go directly to the heart of the reason for
current rule 1-320(A) as expressed by the Supreme Court in
B-4
In ce Ani:ff supra, 22 Cal.3d 740, 748, fn. 4. The conduct of
Hickman and his negotiators clearly posed the risk of non-
lawyers, elevating the personal profit motive above the
interests of the clients. This risk was greatly exacerbated by
respondent's deliberately creating a situation where Hickman
and his negotiators were, in fact, practicing law. We also
consider the volume of cases handled by Hickman and his
employees, the dollar amount involved, and the length of time
it continued.
In further aggravation, we note that respondent, so far
as the record shows, has made no effort to take the
professional responsibility examination, required by his
agreement in lieu of discipline.
We consider in mitigation, as found by the hearing
judge, that respondent presented evidence of good moral
character and reputation in the community from a broad cross
section of the community, including lawyers. Each of the
witnesses had known respondent for many years, each knew
of the nature of the charges against him, and each testified to
B-42
rr
his good moral character.
We also consider the evidence of community service
by respondent. This shows that for many years he has
participated in community activities and lent assistance and
support to them. We further note, in mitigation, respondent's
evidence of the revision in the management of his off ices.
This includes far greater participation by respondent in
each case, whether in litigation or otherwise, and
commendable evidence of management systems to control a
high-volume law office.
The State Bar has recommended that respondent be
suspended for a period of three years, stayed, and that he be
placed on probation for three years on the condition, among
others, that he be actually suspended for a period of one year.
This is the actual suspension recommended by the hearing
judge. The respondent, on the other hand, argues in
connection with discipline only that one year of actual
suspension is far too harsh.
In looking to the cases dealing with discipline for the
B -43
type of culpability found here, we find no case identical, but
several that are helpful. In In the Matter of Scapa and Brown
(Review Dept. 1993) 2 Cal. State Bar Ct. Roptr. 635,
respondents set up a branch office in which non-lawyer
independent contractors were responsible for signing up
clients and were paid in cash based on the value of the client's
case. In that case, there was also illegal solicitation by the
non-lawyers, and respondents were found culpable of
charging unconscionable fees. There, respondents were
actually suspended for 18 months.
In In the Matter of Jones, supra, 2 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 411, this court found that respondent had entered into a
partnership with a non-lawyer, divided fees with a non-lawyer,
and aided a non-lawyer in the practice of law. There was
harm to clients, and upon discovering that non-lawyers were
using cappers to obtain clients in respondent’s name,
respondent took no decisive action. The actual suspension
imposed was two years.
In In re Amoff, supra, 22 Cal.3d 740, there was a fee-
B-44
splitting agreement between Amnoff and a non-lawyer. This
was exacerbated by the layman paying kickbacks to doctors and
others, although it was not clear that Amoff knew of the
kickbacks. Further, in that matter the layman maintained the
books and records of the office, and disbursements were made
without the control of Arnoff. There-was strong evidence that
fraudulent medical reports were used, and there was a question
as to whether Arnoff knew of that fraud. In that matter Arnoff
was actually suspended for a period of two years.
In In the Matter of Nelson, supra, 1 Cal. State Bar Ct.
Rptr. 178, it was stipulated that respondent entered a
partnership for the practice of law with a non-lawyer, divided
fees with the nonlawyer, and used the non-lawyer as a capper.
There was no evidence of harm to clients. In addition, cases
were transferred to another lawyer who settled cases without
client authority and misappropriated a portion of their
settlement proceeds. There, the respondent showed mitigation
in the form of decisive withdrawal from the misconduct and
thorough cooperation with the State Bar. In addition, five
B-4S
years had elapsed between the misconduct and the hearing. In
Nelson respondent received six months actual suspension.
In the matter before us we have no known harm to clients
as the result of the relations between respondent and Hickman,
although as pointed out in Nelson, “the potential for such harm
was great... . 11 (Id. at p. 189.)” Looking to 2.3 and 2.6 of
the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional
Misconduct (Standards) , we note that where moral turpitude is
found we look to client harm and the magnitude of the act as it
relates to the practice of law in determining the extent of
discipline.
We find this case less egregious than the cited cases in
that no capping was involved. While no partnership agreement
has been found in the instant case, the circumstances of
permitting Hickman and his employees to practice law with pre-
litigation cases in an enormous volume create substantially the
same risk to the public and the administration of justice. We
find far less cooperation with the State Bar in this matter than
in either Nelson or Jones. Further, in this matter we have
B-Y6
Sm, i iii |
elements that were not present in any of the cited cases.
Respondent had practiced law for approximately 29 years when
he engaged in the misconduct described.
Respondent has practiced for many years without
discipline and is entitled to great weight in mitigation for that
factor. However, we are left with an experienced attorney who
engaged in serious misconduct, in great volume over an
extended period of time.
We also consider serious, respondent's failure to comply
with the terms of his agreement in lieu of discipline. We weigh
respondent's admitted misconduct in the matters leading to the
agreement in lieu of discipline.
Weighing all of the factors, we conclude that the actual
suspension of one year requested by the State Bar and
recommended by the hearing judge is appropriate, and we
affirm that recommendation.
V.
RECOMMENDATION
It is recommended that respondent be suspended from
B-47
the practice of law in the State of California for a period of two
years, that execution of this suspension be stayed, and that
respondent be placed on probation for two years, on condition
that during the first year of probation respondent be actually
suspended from the practice of law in the State of California.
In addition, we recommend that each of the remaining
conditions of probation and other requirements recommended
by the hearing judge be imposed, except that the
recommendation for costs be amended to provide that costs be
awarded to the State Bar pursuant to section 6086-10 and that
those costs be payable in accordance with section 6140.7 (as
amended effective January 1, 1997). As a further exception, it
is recommended that respondent be required to take the
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination in lieu of
the California Professional Responsibility Examination.
OBRIEN, P.J.
We concur:
NORIAN, J.
STOVITZ, J.
B-4¥8
Case No. 85-0-12550
In the Matter of LAWRENCE C. BRAGG
Hearing Judge: Hon. Ellen R. Peck
Counsel for Parties
For State Bar Of California: § Teresa Schmid
Elena Bardellini
Enforcement Department
Office of the Chief Trial Counsel
The State Bar of California
1149 S. Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015
For Respondent: Lawrence C. Bragg, in pro. per.
15454 East Gale Avenue
Hacienda Heights, CA 91745
B-49
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
[Rule 62 Rules Proc. for State Bar Ct. Proceedings; Code Civ.
Proc., 5 1013a(4)]
I am a Deputy Case Coordinator of the State Bar Court.
I am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within
proceeding. Pursuant to standard court practice, in the City
and County of Los Angeles, on the date shown below, |
deposited a true copy of the following documents
OPINION ON REVIEW, FILED APRIL 28, 1997.
in a sealed envelope as follows:
[XI by first-class mail, with postage thereon fully prepaid,
through the United States Postal Service at Los Angeles,
California, addressed as follows:
LAWRENCE C BRAGG ESQ 15454 E
GALE AVENUE
HACTIENDA HEIGHTS CA 91745
by certified mail, with a return receipt requested,
through the United States Postal Service at Los
B-5°
Ee
Angeles, California, addressed as follows:
N/A
(XI by interoffice mail, through a facility regularly
maintained by the State Bar of California addressed as
follows:
TERESA J SCHMID ESQ ELENA G
BARDELLINI ESQ
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed at Los Angeles, California, on April 28, 1997.
Shemainee C. Carranza
Deputy Case Coordinator
State Bar Court
LAW OFFICES OF LAWRENCE C. BRAGG
A Professional Law Corporation
15454 E. Gale Avenue
Hacienda Heights, Ca. 91745
818-961-0511
Petitioner Attorney Pro Se
SUPREME COURT
FILED
SEPT 16 1997
Robert Wandruff Clerk
DEPUTY
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Docket No. $062861
In the Matter of State Bar Court Case No.
85-0-12550
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG Motion for Recusal
of Members of
California Supreme
Court
No. 33302
A Member of the State Bar
Now comes the Petitioner, Lawrence Crawford Bragg, an
attorney for thirty four years, and respectfully moves for this
Court, and its members, to recuse itself from hearing and
Cc =|
PP PE PS EO rye Serre, oe
oats
determining whether there is a due process and equal
protection violation involved in the selection, hiring, housing,
training, and employment of the appointees of this Court to
the State Bar of California, which is the prosecuting party in
proceedings, which acts deny to each accused attorney a fair
and impartial adjudicator.
Petitioner requests this Court forbear hearing or
determining the submitted Petition and issue a ruling first on
this motion for recusal, so as to provide the Petitioner with a
minimum thereafter of two weeks to request, if this Court
declines to recuse itself or assign a Court of Appeals panel, a
federal court hear and determine whether this Court's role for
a party to decisions concerning the admission and discipline of
attorneys offends the principles of due process of law
concerning a fair and impartial adjudicator.
This motion is based on this Motion, the attached Points
and Authorities, the files, and the records, and judicial notice
of the State Bar Court statutes and Rules of Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Dated:September 15, 1997
LAWRENCE C. BRAGG
Petitioner Attorney Pro Se
|
fe i "
LAW OFFICES OF LAWRENCE C. BRAGG
A Professional Law Corporation
15454 E. Gale Avenue
Hacienda Heights, Ca. 91745
818-961-0511
Petitioner Attorney Pro Se
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Docket No. S062861
In the Matter of State Bar Court Case No.
85-0-12550
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG Points and
Authorities in
Support of
Motion for Recusal
of Members of
California Supreme
Court
No. 33302
A Member of the State Bar
The issue presented is whether the California Supreme
Court, or its members, should or may entertain deliberations
or decision-making concerning a party appearing before it
when this Court, and all of its members, have appointed
fifteen employees to that party and assumed a fiduciary role of
overseeing its appointees to that party.
References to “section(s)" refers to sections of the California
Business and Professions Code. References to the "State
Bar" refers to the State Bar of California.
I. The Risk of Bias is Intolerably High when a
Court is a Partisan for a Party
When the risk of unfairness is intolerably high, a judge
must be recused from a case. Withrow v. Larkin 421 U'S. at
58, 95 S. Ct. at 1470. While a judge is obligated to be
unswayed by partisan interests, when he occupies a role as a
partisan for a party and/ or on the issues presented by a party,
he is disqualified to sit on a case as the risk of bias is
intolerably high. California and American Bar Association
Judicial Codes of Conduct, Canon 3(A)(1), Canons 3C(1 a),
c-$
nn
(1Xc), 3C(3(c). This Court appointed nine employees to the
State Bar of California in 1989. It appointed a tenth
employee in 1994. It appointed five more employees in 1996.
Due to a recent resignation of one of its appointees , it is
scheduled to imminently appoint a sixteenth employee. Its
appointees were and are selected, hired, housed, trained,
provided their expenses, staffs, salaries, and facilities and
employed by the State Bar of California. The State Bar of
California is the prosecuting party in cases concerning
professional conduct of attorneys. However, this Court’s
appointees sit in an advisory administrative adjudicative
capacity concerning those same matters while they are also
employees of the prosecuting party.” This Court reviews the
recommendations of discipline of its appointees. Though by
law this Court is required to exercise independent and plenary
review, in seven years since creation of its appointees, it has
5
The decision under review asserts that this Court's
appointees to the State Bar of California sit in place and in stead of this
Court in fulfilling its judicial duties on te itebeten ond deciell
of attorneys. It asserts it has elevated itself from an administrative arm to
this Court, to being this Court itself. Refer Exhibit A:5.
C rb
denied review to all accused attorneys. It has assumed review
solely to increase discipline in two cases this year. All
petitions of accused attorneys have been summarily denied
without grounds stated. This Court also removes for cause
and oversees its appointees to the State Bar of California.
Sections 6086.65, 6079.1, 6079.5, California Rules of Court,
Rules 950-962. Its appointees are paid from the private
funds of the State Bar of California. The annual base salaries
of this Court’s appointees total approximately one million
dollars. Sums are obtained by the State Bar of California
from finding guilt of accused attorneys through the imposition
of administrative costs to reimburse the salaries and expenses
it must pay this Court’s appointees, monetary sanctions of up
to $50,000 per attorney for the Client Security Fund of the
State Bar of California, and through forced participation in
section memberships, schools, classes, examinations the State
Bar of California runs for private profit. Sections 6079.1,
6086.65, 6086.10, 6086.13.
The former appointee of this Court, Lise A. Perlman,
cr)
PRIA RE Bs BOE SL AGE SODA TENOR
the denominated presiding judge of the State Bar’s "Court”
has stated in The California Lawyer, the official monthly
publication of the State Bar of California, in its April, 1996
issue, in her article, “Declare Independence,” at page 28
that,”"Many disciplined attorneys also view the [State Bar’s]
court with suspicion because of its connection to the State
Bar [of California] The bar [State Bar of California] has
defended at considerable expense, numerous federal suits
challenging the court’s constitutionality, and more suits
appear likely. The State Bar [of California] defended these
challenges by arguing that there was no inappropriate
commingling of the executive and adjudicative functions.
Then, in 1995, the board [of the State Bar of California]
rewrote its long-standing rules to abolish the presiding judge’s
general supervisory role over all assigned staff, relegating the
judges to consultation and “meaningful input” in the
administration of the court.” This Court’s appointees are
clearly not independent adjudicators. They are employees of
the prosecuting party who must follow its orders in
C-8
adjudicating the guilt or innocence of an accused attorney.
A judge who is an active participant in the affairs of a party
remains subject to the unconscious leanings of human nature
to favor that party in which he actively participates. When a
judge personally knows and appoints people to a party, this
tempts the judge to favor that party he has already favored
with his extrajudicial support. Similar to Judge Ito sitting on
an issue conceming statements made by a witness which are
critical of his wife, this Court sitting on cases concerning the
unconstitutionality of its appointees to a party is just as
tempted to feel offended, or as Judge Ito said, “wounded,” by
the allegations of illegality of what this court and its
appointees have done and the extrajudicial role this Court has
assumed for and in support of a particular party appearing
before it and the disqualification of its appointees to fulfill the
role this Court gave them when its appointees are selected,
hired, and employed by a party. That is why “active
participation in the affairs of a party” is defined as a judge
possessing a"financial interest" in a party or proceedings as
c -f
defined by the California and American Bar Association
Judicial Codes of Conduct requiring a judge’s recusal for
cause. American and California Bar Association Judicial
Codes of Conduct, Canons 3 C(1)(c) and 3C(3)(c). Canon 3
C(3)(c) of the California and American Bar Association
Judicial Codes of Conduct requires a judge to disqualify
himself when "he has a financial interest in the subject matter
in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other
interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of
the proceeding."
Active participation in the affairs of a party is a financial
interest in a party. California and American Bar Association
Judicial Codes of Conduct, Canon 3(A)(1), Canons 3C(1)(a),
(1)(c), 3C(3)(c). This makes sense. A judge who actively
participates in a party's affairs, in making a judgement for it,
will be saving it monies or awarding it monies. In this Court's
case, it awards the State Bar party monies by awarding costs
to the State Bar, which are, in fact, the salaries and benefits of
its appointees to the State Bar party and those of their co-
Co
employees, plus ordering probation terms which obligates the
other party to pay for other programs administered by the
party to which this Court has appointed employees, some of
which this Court's appointees directly participate in or
oversee, such as the Client Security Fund of the State Bar of
California. Sections 6079.1, 6086.65, 6140.5,
6086. 10(a)(b)(c).
As the Judicial Codes of Conduct emphasize, "financial
interest" in a party is not limited to a judge putting money in
his own pocket. It includes giving, granting, awarding
judgments to a party with whom the judge actively
participates, since it is assumed that every judgment carries
with it a financial saving, cost, or aspect to the party in whose
favor a judgment is awarded. That is not an incorrect
assumption, since this Court's orders denying all petitions of
all accuseds always order monies paid to the State Bar party
which include recoupment of the salaries and benefits of this
Court's nine appointees to their State Bar employer. 3,091
attorneys have been summarily disbarred and suspended by
C-1]
ABS RN SSA BP Set 20 eA SARE YR DB IB 4
sa
this Court since January 1, 1989 with all orders ordering them
to pay this Court's appointees’ salaries and benefits as claimed
"Costs." Exhibit A.
A. Active Participation in the Affairs of the
Prosecuting Party disqualifies the California
Supreme Court and its members
Pursuant to Ward v. Village of Monroeville 409 U.S.
57, 93 S. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 2d. 267 (1972), "the court dealt
with the issue of whether trial before a mayor who also had
executive responsibilities for the village budget and finances
was consistent with the guarantees of the due process clause
when the revenue produced from the mayor's court provided a
substantial portion of village funds. The court once noted that
in Tumey [v. Ohio 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S. Ct. at 444] the fact
that the mayor.... shared directly in the fees and costs did not
define the limits of the principle." 409 U.S.. at 60, 93 S. Ct. at
83. Rather the court reiterated, ‘the test is whether the
mayor's situation is one which ‘would offer a possible
temptation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden
of proof required to convict the defendant, or which might
C-12
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clean, and true between
the State and the accused....Id, quoting Tumey v. Ohio,
supra, 273 U.S. at 532, 47 S. Ct. at 444. The court held that
such "possible temptation might exist, even in the absence of a
direct, personal pecuniary interest on the part of the
adjudicator, when his ‘executive responsibilities for village
finances may make him partisan to maintain the high level of
contribution from the mayor's court.' 409 U.S. at 60, 93 S. Ct.
at 83, as presented in Matter of Ross, 668 P. 2d. 10989
(1983), at p. 836.
This Court appointing employees to a party is an
executive role it has assumed for a party. This Court
overseeing its appointees to a party is another executive role
this Court has assumed for a party. With two executive roles
this Court has assumed for the State Bar party in full
operation since 1989, its occupancy of a judiciai role for that
party since 1989 appears to be more disqualifying that the
executive role the judge occupied in Tumey, supra, and
Ward, supra. It is wearing three hats at “se same time- two
c-18
executive roles for a party and a judicial role in direct conflict
thereto.
The United States Supreme Court in_Liljeberg v.
Health Services Acquisition Corp. 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.
Ct. 2194, 100 L. Ed. 2d. 855(1988) held that a judge who
was on the Board of a College, even though the College was
not a party to the action, when the College was a financial
beneficiary of the judgement, was disqualified under the
objective reasonable person test of recusal which applies to
the disqualification of both state and federal judges. See
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. La Voie 475 U.S. 813, 89
L.Ed. 823, 106 S. Ct. 1580 (1986). Thus, even if a financial
beneficiary of a judgment is not a party, a judge is disqualified
when he has an extrajudicial relationship with a financial
beneficiary of its orders. The Judicial Codes have held that an
active participant in the affairs of a party is similar to a Board
member or director in requiring a judge's disqualification for
direct involvement with a party. California and American Bar
Association Judicial Codes of Conduct, Canon 3(A)(1),
Cc +14
Canons 3C(1\(a), (1c), 3C(3)X(c). Liljeberg, supra, makes
clear that the involvement may be with a financial beneficiary
of an order and is not limited to direct involvement with the
parties.
Aetna, supra, makes clear that the state standard of
recusal used by this Court and cited in Lebbos v. State Bar
of California_53 Cal.3d. 37, 278 Cal. Rptr. 845, 806 P.2d.
317 (1991), footnote 1, as a rationale for its sitting on over
4,000 cases involving the State Bar, while it has appointed
employees to it since 1989, has been overruled by a
requirement that the California Supreme Court comply with
an objective standard of recusal and not continue to use a
subjective standard which permits each justice to determine
his or her own bias. In Aetna, supra, the United States
Supreme Court made ciear that a direct, personal, substantial
pecuniary interest in a State Supreme Court Justice is not
required for a State Supreme Court Justice to be required to
recuse himself. As stated in Aetna, supra, at 822, "No judge
‘can be a judge in his own case [or be] permitted to try cases
CHI
where he has an interest in the outcome." In re: Murchison
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).....what degree or kind of interest is
sufficient to disqualify a judge from sitting ‘cannot be defined
with precision.' Jbid. None-the-less, a reasonable formulation
of the issue is whether the ‘situation is cne ‘which would offer
a possible temptation to the average ... judge to ... lead him
not to hold the balance nice, clear and true.' Ward v. Village
of Monroeville, supra, at 60." "...Justice must satisfy the
appearance of Justice." Aetna, supra, p. 825, quoting In re:
Murchison 349 US. at 136.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the
process is to"examine what factors might constitute an
interest in the outcome of this case that would bear on
recusal." Aetna, supra, p. 822. On information and belief,
members of this Court in 1988 met with officials and
employees of the prosecuting party, the State Bar of
California, without disclosure to any accuseds. On
information and belief, members of this Court from 1988
through to the present have met with and had conversations
C-Ie
with officials and employees of the prosecuting party, the
State Bar of California, to which no accused has been privy
and to which this Court has made no disclosure to any
accused. Those meetings and conversations concerned a
commitment by the members of this Court to aid and assist
the State Bar prosecuting party in controlling and taking over
attorney discipline from this Court so as to permit this Court
to control its workload. No accused was ever apprized of
any of these conversations, commitments, or ex parte
collaborations by and between the members of this Court and
a party. In 1988 and 1989, the members of this Court had ex
parte communications with the State Bar party which it never
disclosed to any accused. Those communications concerned
requests from the prosecuting party for this Court to appoint
employees to it to be "judges" to its State Bar Court to
replace this Court issuing disbarment or suspension orders on
the state's attorneys. This Court, as recent publicity
indicates, continues to have ex parte communications and
conversations and meetings with the prosecuting party
c-11
without any disclosure or notice to any accused. On
information and belief, for over seven years this Court has had
ex parte communications with the prosecuting party
concerning the merits of the constitutional issues presented
by accuseds concerning the recusal of this Court and of the
State Bar and its "judges" appointed by this court and
concerning the unconstitutionality of the State Bar Court
attorney licensing system. This Court superseded the state
statute permitting access to accuseds to the State Court of
Appeals concerning cases concerning the State Bar party in
1990. It did so by passing rules of court, which were
recommended ex parte by the prosecuting party to this Court
and which were prohibited public comment, which prohibit
access to any other court. California Rules of Court, Rules
950-962, section 6082. The passage of such a rule, when this
Court appointed employees to the State Bar prosecuting party
in 1989, permits this Court to review its appointees’
recommendations against each accused and award the
employer of its appointees’ monies from the takings of each
c-I8
accused's license to practice law. On information and belief,
recently this Court met with and/ or communicated ex parte
with officials of the State Bar party about what to do with all
of the federal law suits questioning the disqualification of this
Court and its appointees to the State Bar party as partisans
for the State Bar party and as co-defendants in those law suits
how to prevent removal of this Court and its appointees from
siting on attorney licensing cases. This mutual collaboration
with a party resulted in this Court appoiriting a Committee to
recommend appointees to this Court, which does not alter any
constitutional issue. California Rules of Court, Rule 962.
These facts present an appearance of impropriety in the mind
of the average citizen concerning this Court’s participation in
cases involving the State Bar of California. These objective
facts raise a sufficient doubt in the mind of the average person
on the street as to whether this Court could be impartial
concerning an accused's case to compel this Court's recusal
for cause for cases concerning the State Bar of California.
Section 6082, California Rules of Court, Rules 950-962.
c-19
EP SU AR sa i i ca
That this court changed, at the ex parte request of the
State Bar and without allowing public comment, from de
novo review of recommendations of the State Bar to no
review permitted to an accused in this Court's discretion,
which discretion it has exercised against over 3,091 accused
attorneys since it appointed employees to the State Bar in
1989, is an additional indicia to the average person on the
street that this Court is a biased adjudicator for the State Bar
prosecuting party. Ca. Rules of Court, Rules 952, 954.
Appointing employees to a prosecuting party to be its
Judges from a list exclusively provided by a prosecuting party
is an additional indicia of bias for the prosecuting party which
is unmistakable and which act was declared unconstitutional
in a similar fact situation in Wall v. American Optometric
Association 379 F. Supp. 175, affirmed 95 S. Ct. 166 (N_D.
Ga. 1974), in which the United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
MI
c-2e
I. The Risk of Bias is Intolerably High when a
Court is a Partisan on the Issues
While a State Supreme Court Justice had on-going litigation
with an insurance company, which was not a party to the
judgment, the judgment involved application of a new issue
concerning bad faith insurance practices, which "had the clear
and immediate effect of enhancing both the legal status and
the settlement value of his own case." This compelled the
United States Supreme Court to void the judgment and order
of the State Supreme Court. Aetna, supra, p. 824. When a
judge sat as a one-man Grand jury and then sat on whether he
would enforce his own orders by way of contempt, he was
disqualified as a partisan on his own issues. He wore two hats
at the same time-one partisan and one adjudicative. In re:
Murchison, supra. This Court created a State Bar Court
with a privately financed party. It did so by appointing its
judges. It occupies an executive role for a party. It appoints,
reappoints, removes, and oversees its appointee Judges to a
party's claimed Court. Now the issue is whether the
c-al
appointees of this Court are disqualified to sit as judges
because they are selected, hired, and employed by a party.
This Court did it. This Court did it in an extrajudicial role it
assumed for a party. It is this Court that created personally
the alleged unconstitutionality the petitioner challenges.
Since this Court, similar to the Board in Gibson v.
Berryhill 411 U.S. 564, 579, 93 S. Ct. 1689, 36 L. Ed. 2d.
488 (1973), one of the Commissioner on a Board in Yamaha
Motor Corp. , U.S.A. v. Riney 21 F.3d 793 (Eighth Cir.
1994), and the entire Commission in United Church Etc. v.
Medical Center Com'n 689 F. 2d. 693 (Seventh Cir.1982),
is a partisan about the issue of its appointees to a party sitting
as judges, it is disqualified to hear or entertain the Petitioner's
challenge that its appointees to a party are constitutionally
precluded as partisans for a party from being judges.
Conclusion
Since this court has had an opportunity to recuse itself
in this situation for over seven years, and has summarily
denied all petitions of all accuseds and, on information and
C. a2
belief, has refused to rule on about five hundred recusal
motions ° raising these identical issues presented by accuseds,
and this Court's duty appears to be to forbear participating in
decision-making concerning whether its appointees to a party
are disqualified to sit in the positions this Court appointed
them to, Petitioner requests that this Court issue a ruling on
its recusal first. This will permit the Petitioner access to the
federal court to hear and determine whether this Court may,
consistent with the fifth and fourteenth amendment due
process and equal protection clauses of the United States
Constitution, hear and determine whether its appointees are
constitutionally precluded from occupying the positions to
which this Court appointed them to, or whether by reason of
conflict of interest and appearance of impropriety, this Court
6 On information and belief, this Petitioner is informed that the
following attorneys have requested recusal of this Court on the identical
issues: Lebbos. supra, Attorneys Barry Ammon, Harold Rauch, John Rakus,
B. Gunn, G.G. Baumen, Evangelin Marie Miller, Jessie Ho, Richard Travis,
Stuart Hirsh, Harold Perry, Howard Johnson, Lawrence Bragg, Edmundo
Espinoza, Howard Johnson, and Peter Acuna.
c-23
NE ee TT NE TT TE nee
is foreclosed from such consideration and must forbear from
deciding the legality of its appointees to the prosecuting party.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
Dated: September 15, 1997
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG
Petitioner Attorney Pro Se
Verification
I have read the foregoing Points and Authorities in support
of Motion for Recusal of members of the California Supreme
Court and state it is made on my own personal knowledge,
information, and belief, and this verification is executed this
15" day of September, 1997 at Hacienda Heights, California.
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG
Petitioner Attorney Pro Se
OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL OFFICE OF TRIALS
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
ROBERTA M. YANGTERESA J. SCHMID
ELENA BARDELLINI
1149 South Hill Street
Los Angeles, CA 90015-2299
Telephone: (213) 765-1000
SEP 0 7 1994
THE STATE BAR COURT
OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES
In the Matter of Case Nos. 85-0-12550
93-0 -17012
93-0-18322
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG,
NOTICE TO
SHOW CAUSE
No. 33302
A Member of the State Bar
TO: LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG, Respondent
herein:
IF YOU FAIL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE
WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED BY STATE BAR RULES,
D-!
INCLUDING EXTENSIONS, YOU MAYBE ENROLLED
AS AN INVOLUNTARY INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE
STATE BAR AND WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO
PRACTICE LAW UNTIL AN ANSWER IS FILED.
You were admitted to the practice of law in the State of
California on January 10, 1963. Pursuant to mile 501,
Transitional Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of California,
reasonable cause has been found to conduct a formal
disciplinary hearing, commencing at a time and place to be fixed
by the State Bar Court (NOTICE OF TIME AND PLACE OF
HEARING WILL BE MAILED TO YOU BY THE STATE
BAR COURT CLERK'S OFFICE), by reason of the
following:
COUNT ONE
Case No... 93-0-17012
1. In or about July, 1990, you were employed by Renee
Harmon (hereinafter "Harmon") to represent her interest in a
personal injury matter. A written fee agreement was entered
into in this matter.
2. On or about September 21, 1990, you caused a lawsuit to
be filed on Ms. Harmon's behalf entitled Renee Harmon v.
AGSY, Inc. et al, Case No. KC 002027 in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court. On or about July 22, 1991, you caused
a First Amended Complaint, entitled Renee Harmon y. Chrysler
Corp. et. al. to be filed.
3. Between July, 1990 and August 1993, Harmon called your
office on at least three occasions. You never returned her
phone calls. During that time period, the only communication
she received from you was a letter dated March 31, 1992
advising her that her file was being transferred from your
Hacienda Heights office to your new Ontario office. You
advised her that your employee, Bruce Hickman would assist
her with any questions. On August 21, 1993, Harmon wrote
you a letter and requested that you inform her of the status of
her case. She received no response from you.
4. In or about September of 1993, you were substituted out of
the lawsuit by Harmon. The Law Offices of Michael J.
Hemming was substituted in your place.
Dd-3
5. In or about December of 1993, The Los Angeles Superior
court dismissed Defendant Chrysler from Harmon vy.AGSY,
INC., et-al because of a failure to serve Defendant Chrysler
within two years of the commencement of the action.
6. You failed to perform the services for which you had been
hired. You failed to communicate with your client, or respond
to her reasonable status inquiries. You withdrew from
employment without taking reasonable steps to avoid
reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of your client.
You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation
of your oath and duties as an attorney under Rules of
Professional Conduct 3-110(A) and 3-700(A)(2) and Business
and Professions Code section 6068(m).
COUNT TWO
Case No. 93-0-18322
l. In or about April, 1992, you hired Bruce Hickman
(hereinafter “Hickman") to assist you with your office
management problems. Bruce Hickman was not an attorney
licensed to' practice law in the state of California.
p-4
a i i
2. You operated out of an office in Hacienda Heights, and
Hickman operated out of an office that he rented from an
attorney named Arthur Ackerman (hereinafter "Ackerman") in
Ontario. Hickman also did consulting work with Ackerman.
You agreed to share office expenses with Ackerman since you
had clients in Ontario as well as Hacienda Heights. You did
work out of both offices.
3. You entered into an arrangement with Hickman whereby
Hickman was paid a percentage of the income from all of the
cases settled by Hickman, after deducting the office expenses of
each of the offices.
4. From April 1992 to in or about January, 1993, you entered
into and maintained a partnership with a non-attorney, and you
shared legal fees with a non-attorney.
You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation
of your oath and duties as an attorney under disciplinary case
law and/or California Business and Professions Code section
6106, and Rules of Professional Conduct 1-310 and 1-320.
Mf
COUNT THREE
Case No. 85-0-12550 >
1. On or about April 26, 1990, you executed a Stipulation as
to Facts and Agreement in Lieu of Discipline Pursuant to
Business and Professions Code Section 6068(1) (he-einafter the
"Stipulation") with the Office of Trial Counsel of the State Bar
of California. A true and correct copy of the Stipulation is
attached hereto as "Exhibit Il” and incorporated herein by this
reference.
2. In the Stipulation, you stipulated to violations of Sections
6068(a) and 6103 of the California Business and Professions
Code and to violations of former Rules 6-101(A)(2) and 6-
101(2) of the former Rules of Professional Conduct with regard
to your representation of your clients, Wesley and Mary
Jefferson, in a foreclosure action and resulting lawsuit and in an
unlawful detainer action.
3. In the Stipulation, you agreed to be subject to and to
perform certain conditions as follows:
(a) To take and complete an office management
D-&
course within one (1) year of the effective date of the
stipulation.
(b) To take and pass the Professional Responsibility
Examination within one (1) year of the effective date of the
Stipulation.
4. You have failed to comply with these conditions of the
Stipulation.
You committed the above-described acts in wilful violation
of your oaths and duties as an attorney under disciplinary case
law and/or California Business and Professions Code section
6068(1).
COUNT FOUR
l. Every allegation in Count Three is realleged and
incorporated herein hy reference as if fully set forth herein.
2. In the Stipulation, you stipulated to certain facts
constituting violations of the California Business and
Professions Code and Rules of Professional Conduct. In
entering into the Stipulation, you agreed that the stipulated
facts contained therein would be binding upon you and may be
D-7
admitted as evidence without foundation should you be found
to be in violation of the Stipulation.. The Statement of Acts or
Omissions of Respondent Which Are Admitted and
Acknowledged by the Respondent Constituting a Basis for an
Agreement in Lieu of Disciplinary Action, which is a part of the
attached Stipulation, is hereby realleged and incorporated by
reference as though fully set forth herein.
You committed the above-described acts in wilful
violation of your oath and duties as an attorney under
disciplinary case law and/or California Business and Professions
Code sections 6068(a) and 6103 and former Rules of
Professional Conduct 6-101(A)(2) and 6-101(2).
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS after service of this
Notice to Show Cause, you shall file a written answer as
provided in rule 552, Transitional Rules of Procedure of the
State Bar of California.
NOTICE - DEFAULT PROCEDURE!
YOUR DEFAULT MAY BE ENTERED FOR FAILURE TO
FILE A WRITTEN ANSWER TO THIS NOTICE WITHIN
D-8
TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER SERVICE AS PRESCRIBED
BY RULE 552, RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE
BAR. SHOULD YOU TIMELY FILE AN ANSWER, YOUR
DEFAULT MAY ALSO BE ENTERED FOR FAILURE TO
APPEAR AT THE FORMAL HEARING. THE ENTRY OF
YOUR DEFAULT MAY RESULT IN THE CHARGES SET
FORTH IN THIS NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE BEING
ADMITTED AND DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED OR
IMPOSED BASED) ON THOSE ADMITTED CHARGES. IF
YOUR DEFAULT IS ENTERED, YOU WILL LOST THE
OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE FURTHER IN THESE
PROCEEDINGS UNLESS AND UNTIL YOUR DEFAULT
IS SET ASIDE ON MOTION TIMELY MADE UNDER THE
PRESCRIBED GROUNDS. SEE RULE 552.1-ET SEQ.,
TRANSITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
STATE BAR.
NOTICE - INACTIVE ENROLLMENT
YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT-IF THE
STATE BAR COURT FINDS, PURSUANT TO BUSINESS
D-9
AND PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6007(c)> THAT
YOUR CONDUCT POSES A SUBSTANTIAL THREAT OF
HARM TO THE INTERESTS OF YOUR CLIENTS OR TO
THE PUBLIC, THAT YOU MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY
ENROLLED AS AN INACTIVE MEMBER OF THE STATE
BAR. YOUR INACTIVE ENROLLMENT WOULD BE IN
ADDITION TO ANY DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDED BY
THE COURT. SEE RULES 550 AND 560, TRANSITIONAL
RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR.
NOTICE - COST ASSESSMENT!
IN THE EVENT THESE PROCEDURES RESULT IN
PUBLIC DISCIPLINE, YOU MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE
PAYMENT OF COSTS INCURRED BY THE STATE BAR
IN THE INVESTIGATION, HEARING AND REVIEW OF
THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO BUSINESS AND
PROFESSIONS CODE SECTION 6086.10. SEE RULE 460
ET SEQ., TRANSITIONAL RULES OF PROCEDURE OF
THE STATE BAR.
OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL/
Det &
OFFICE OF TRIALS
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
DATED: 1994. BY: ELENAG. BARDELLINI
Deputy Trial Counsel/Examiner
D-lf
STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
Office of the clerk
State Bar Court
1149 South Hill, 5th Floor
Los Angeles, California 90015
(213) 765-1400
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
IN THE MATTER OF
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG
Transmittal of State
Bar Court
Recommendation
A Member of the State Bar S
State Bar Court No.
85-0-12550
[ ]Conviction proceeding
(rule 951(a), Cal. Rules of Ct.)
[ Rule 955 proceeding
(rule 955, Cal. Rules of Ct.)
E F-)
RI iii i regu
[XI original proceeding
(Bus. and Prof. Code § 6081)
other proceeding
[ ] other proceeding
To the CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT:
1.
RECOMMENDATION. The State Bar Court hereby
transmits its recommendation in the above-entitled
matter, as reflected in the enclosed proposed order
subject to review by the Supreme Court.
RECORD ENCLOSED. Enclosed please find the official
State Bar Court file in the above-entitled matter
including:
[XI State Bar Exhibits .]-19
[XI Respondent Exhibits A-H
[XI VOLUMES 1-11 Transcript(s) of State Bar
Court Hearings
IMPOSITION OF COSTS. Pursuant to Section
6086.10, Business and Professions Code, statutorily
E-2
costs of this disciplinary proceeding should be awarded to
the State Bar of California. Enclosed are the Certificate
of Costs and Statements of Costs pursuant to rule 280-
284, Rules of Procedure for State Bar Court
Proceedings.
4. MEMBER'S ADDRESS:
State Bar records list the following current address for the
above member:
15454 East Gale Avenue Hacienca Heights, CA 91745
5. INFORMATION GIVEN MEMBER. We have this
day mailed to the member information about:
rule 951, California Rules of Court
re: Authority of the State Bar Court
rule 952, California Rules of Court
re: review of State Bar Court decision
rule 953, California Rules of Court
re: effective date of Supreme Court Order
tule 954, California Rules of Court
re: grounds for review of State Bar Court
E°3
Oe SSS...
decisions in Supreme Court
rule 955, California Rules of Court re: duties
of disbarred, resigned or suspended members
Business & Professions Code Section 6083
re: petition to review State Bar Court
decision
Business & Professions Code Section
6086.10 and
6140.7 Re: costs of disciplinary proceeding
6. [XI OTHER INFORMATION TO ASSIST THE
SUPREME COURT:
This attorney has not had prior discipline imposed.
We would like to bring to the Court's attention that
Mr. Bragg currently has no matters pending with
the Supreme Court.
Judy Duffield
Clerk of the State Bar Court
Dated: July 16, 1997 By Erick E. Estrada
Deputy Court Clerk
E-4
State Bar Court Case No. 85-0-12550
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
IN RE LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG ON
DISCIPLINE
It is ordered that Lawrence Crawford Bragg be suspended
from the practice of law for two years, that execution of
suspension be stayed, and that he be placed on probation for
two years subject to the conditions of probation, including one
year actual suspension, recommended by the Review
Department of the State Bar Court in its opinion filed April 28,
1997. It is also ordered that he take and pass the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination within one year after
the effective date of this order. (See Segretti v. State Bar
{1976} 15 Cal.3d 878, 891, fn.8). It is further ordered that he
comply with Rule 955, California Rules of Court, and that he
perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of that rule
E-S
ry es
within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the date this order is
effective.* Costs are awarded to the State Bar pursuant to
Business and Professions Code section 6086.10 payable in
accordance with Business and Professions Code section
6140.7, as amended effective January 1, 1997.
*See Business and Professions Code section 6126. subd, (c).
Chief Justice
FILED July 16, 1997
STATE BAR COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
LOS ANGELES
STATE BAR COURT
OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA
1149 SOUTH HILL STREET 5TH FLOOR
LOS ANGELES, CA 90015-2299
(212) 765-1400
In the Matter of
LAWRENCE CRAWFORD BRAGG
Member of the State Bar
CERTIFICATE OF COSTS CASE NO. 85-0-12550
Imposition of the following costs are recommended pursuant to
Business and Professions Code Section 6086. 10(b)(1)-(3):
1. Transcript Costs and Court Reporter’s Fees........... a.
2. Taxable Cost Recoverable (see attached Statement(s)
of Costs)
6 SORE a ESS athe 0
b. Service of Process Costs..........................000. heats 0
SUC a RSA | epcont 0
Ce aS. me Ei... 0
f. Court-Ordered Expert Costs...........0...0.0........ mW. ids... 0
g OGber Tenable Coma 2523 5........................ — : 0
3. Reasonable Costs ( see attached Statement(s) of Costs)
a. Office of Investigation Costs................. 3a. $ 1,320.00
b. Office of Trial Counsel Costs................ 3b. $ 1,143.00
c. Office of State Bar Court Costs............ 3c $ 1,851.00
TUTAR CGR ik. ods eS asc TOTAL $4,314.00
I, Judy Duffield, Clerk of the State Bar Court, do hereby
certify that, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the above
costs, based on this certificate and the accompanying cost
Statements are correct as provided by rule 461, Rules of
Procedure of the State Bar of California.
Judy Duffield
Clerk of the State Bar Court
Date: August 28, 1996 By: (signed)
ERIK ESTRADA
DEPUTY COURT CLERK
E.8
In the Matter of LAWRENCE CRAWFORD
BRAGG
Case Number(s) 85-0-12550
Pursuant to Business and Professions Code section 6086.10, it
is requested that Lawrence Crawford Bragg, a member of the
State Bar of California, be ordered to pay the following costs.
Reasonable Costs of the Office of the State Bar Court
1. Level One Assessment He
[Stipulated disposition reached prior to filing
of a Notice to Show Cause]
2. Level Two Assessment Posy tare ar
[Stipulated disposition reached prior to time
of trial]
3. Level Three Assessment kasice ae
[Stipulated disposition reached at time of trial or trial not
exceeding one day is conducted]
4. Level Four Assessment $_1.851.00
E-4
[Trial exceeding one day is conducted]
5. Resignation of Member with Charges $_
Pending
Judy Duffield
Clerk of the State Bar Court
Date: July 16, 1997 By: (signed)
ERICK E. ESTRADA
Deputy Court Clerk
E -(&
CERTIFICATE OF COSTS
Submitted by
the Office of The Chief Trial Counsel
The State Bar of California
In the Matter of Lawrence Crawford Bragg, 33302
Case Number(s) 85-0-12550, 93-0-17012, 93-0-18322
Pursuant to Business and Professions Code, it is requested that
Lawrence Crawford Bragg, a member of the State Bar of
California be ordered to pay the following costs.
TAXABLE COSTS
1. Deposition Costs $0.00
BT ais ei i seiner $0.00
3. Court-ordered Expert Costs....................::000065 $0.00.
4. Gebveenel Piettiias. icc cdi ane..., $0.00
5. Court-ordered reporting and Transcripts.......... $0,00
©, WR ga AE. on nivvcccesssdbessaisessecs $0.00
7. Other Reasonable Costs....................:c:::cceeeeee: $0.00
RE eR asi Gaia i2i sik cidcencsencess $0.00
‘Oem Teemite Cs. 6.8. SE eS SBE ec $0.00
REASONABLE COSTS OF INVESTIGATION, HEARING,
REVIEW
1. Pursuant to State Bar Approved Models
a. Office of Investigation ................. $1,320.00
b. Office of Trial Counsel....................... $1,143.00
2. Extraordinary Costs
a. Office of Investigation ................. $ 000
5 sss RENEE $ 0.00
Total Costs of Investigation, Hearing, and Review....$2,463.00
EPRI PIE Diisnrcensnscisaiicecissncidiocnacssseds $2,463.00
Dated: November 14,1995 BY: (SIGNED)
Linda E. Perry
Administrative Secretary
E-1%
THE STATE BAR ACT
California Business and Professions Code
Sec. 6001. STATE BAR; PERPETUAL SUCCESSION;
SEAL; REVENUE; POWERS; LAWS APPLICABLE
The State Bar of California is a public corporation. It is
hereinafter designated as the State Bar.. . .No law of this state
restricting, or prescribing a mode of procedure for the exercise
of powers of state public bodies or state agencies, or classes
thereof, including, but not by way of limitation, the provisions
contained in Division 3 (commencing with section 11000),
Division 4 (commencing with section 16100), and Part
1(commencing with section 18000) and Part 2 (commencing
with section 18500) of Division 5, of Title 2 of the Government
Code, shall be applicable to the State Bar, unless the legislature
expressly so declares. (Origin: State Bar Act, sec. 2. added by
Stats. 1939, ch 34. Amended by Stats. 1957, ch. 1526; Stats.
978, ch. 380; Stats. 1988, ch. 1149.)
Sec. 6079.1 STATE BAR COURT HEARING JUDGES
(a) The Supreme Court shall appoint a presiding judge of the
F-}
Ne TT
State Bar Court and no fewer than seven hearing judges, and
any additional hearing judges as may be authorized by the
Legislature, to efficiently decide any and all regulatory matters
pending before the Hearing Department of the State Bar Court.
(c) The board shall screen and rate all applicants for
appointment or reappointment as a State Bar Court judge, and
submit its nominations to the Supreme Court, unless otherwise
directed by the Supreme Court. . .
(d) For judges appointed pursuant to this section or Section
6086.65, the board shall fix and pay reasonable compensation
and expenses and provide adequate supporting staff and
facilities.
Sec. 6079.5 CHIEF TRIAL COUNSEL; APPOINTMENT;
TERM; QUALIFICATIONS
(a) The board shall appoint a lawyer admitted to practice in
California to serve as chief trial counsel. . .
Sec. 6086.5 STATE BAR COURT; ESTABLISHMENT;
POWERS; RULES
The board of governors shall establish a State Bar Court,
to act in its place and stead in the determination of disciplinary
and reinstatement proceedings and proceedings pursuant to
subdivisions (b) and (c) of section 6007 to the extent provided
by rules adopted by the board of governors pursuant to this
chapter. . .
Sec. 6086.10 PAYMENT OF COSTS OF DISCIPLINARY
PROCEEDINGS
(a) Any order imposing a public reproval on a member of the
State Bar shall include a direction that the member shall pay
costs. In any order imposing discipline, or accepting a
resignation with a disciplinary matter pending, the Supreme
Court shall include a direction that the member shall pay costs.
(b) The costs required to be imposed pursuant to this section
include all of the following:
(1) The actual expense incurred by the State bar for the
original and copies of any reporter's transcript of the State Bar
proceedings, and any fee paid for the services of the reporter.
(2) All expenses paid by the State Ber which would
F-3
qualify as taxable costs recoverable in civil proceedings.
(3) The charges determined by the State Bar to be
"reasonable costs" of investigation, hearing, and review. These
amounts shall serve to defray the costs, other than fees for the
services of attorneys or experts, of the State bar in the
preparation or hearing of disciplinary proceedings, and costs
incurred in the administrative processing of the disciplinary
proceedings and in the administration of the client security
fund.
(d) In the event an attorney is exonerated of all charges
following a formal hearing, he or she is entitled to
reimbursement from the State bar in the amount determined by
the State bar to be the reasonable expenses, other than fees for
attorneys or experts , of preparation for the hearing. (Added by
Stats. 1986, ch. 662.)
Section 6106 ACT OF MORAL TURPITUDE
The commission of any act involving moral turpitude,
dishonesty or corruption... constitutes a cause for disbarment or
Fy
suspension.
Section 6140.7 DISCIPLINARY COSTS ADDED to
MEMBERSHIP FEE
Costs assessed against a publicly reproved or suspended
member shall be added to and become a part of the membership
fee of the member, for the next calendar year. Costs unpaid by
a member who resigns with disciplinary charges pending or by a
member who is suspended of disbarred shall be paid as a
condition of reinstatement of membership.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.