Appendix — Crawford v. United States

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

.

Unitep StaTes OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 4 No. 96-4785

Vern Overt Crawrorn,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Westem District of Virginia at Harrisonburg.

Jackson L. Kiser. Senior District Judge.

(CR-95-70108)

Argucd: June 3. 1997

Decided: August 29. 1997

Before HALL and MICHAEL. Circuit Judges. and

TILLEY. United States District Judge for the

Middle District of North Carolina. sitting by designation.

Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Barry Ray Taylor. SCIALDONE & ASSOCIATES. Vir-

ginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Michacl Emile Karam, Tax

Division, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Wash-

ington, D.C., for Appelice. ON BRIEF: Claude M. Scialdone, G.

Paul Martin. Third Year Law Student, SCIALDONE & ASSO-

CIATES, Virginia Beach. Virginia. for Appellant. Loretta C. Argrett,

la

2 Usitep States v. CRAWFORD

Assistant Attorney Gencral, Rober E. Lindsay. Alan Hechtkopf, Rob-

ert P. Crouch. Jr.. United States Attorney. Tax Division, UNITED

STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. Washington. D.C., for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. Sec

Local Rule 3@{(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Vern Oucll Crawford was convicted of two counts of willful failure

to file a federal tax rectum in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203 and one

count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. He

appeals those convictions on several bases. Finding no reversible

error. we affirm but will remand so that the district court may con-

sider the motion for a new trial which was filed after this appeal was

noticed.

During 1989-90, Appellant Vern Odell Crawford operated a variety

of businesses in Elkton. Virginia. These businesses included a grocery

Store and gasoline station. an automobile wrecker service, a used car

and truck business, and a cattle and horse farm. He also owned sev-

eral rental propertics in the area. Crawford paid all of his employees

in cash and transacted much of his business in cash. Up until May

1992, he did not deduct social security or taxcs from his employees’

pay.

Crawford filed timely tax retums from 1979 to 1983. Beginning in

1984, however. he cither failed to file or filed late retums. For the

years 1987, 1991. 1992, 1993 and 1994. Crawford filed no tax

returns. He filed late returns from 1984 through 1986. For 1988 and

the prosecution years, 1989 and 1990, Crawford did not have his

2a

Usrtep States v. CRAWFORD 3

retums prepared until May 18-19, 1992 and did not file them until

May 22, 1992 (postmarked on May 19. 1992).

On May 18, 1992. Jack Higginbotham. a special agent for the IRS,

contacted Crawford to tcll him that he necded to talk to Crawford

about his tax liability for the ycars 1988 through 1991. That evening

Crawford went to his accountant’s home and told his accountant that

he needed to file the returns for those ycars. The two. along with

Crawford's wife, prepared the returns throughout the night and mailed

them, along with payment checks. on May 19. 1992 before Crawford

met with Mr. Higginbotham.

The investigation continued and a grand jury procecding was held

in December 1992. The night before that hearing. Patricia Gail Little-

ton, an employee of the Crawfords and a paid informant for the state

police, went to Crawford's home. She testificd that he instructed her

how to answer questions to the grand jury and made a statement

which she interpreted as a threat should she not comply. Another wit-

ness, Tina Marie Shiffictt. the girlfriend of Crawford's son, testified

that Crawford told Littlcton to go and tell the truth. After Littleton

testified before the grand jury. Crawford came to see her and asked

her what questions the grand jury had asked. Littleton also testified

that Crawford said that he would gct a transcript of her testimony and

would know what she said.

Another former employce. Diane Meadows. testified at trial that

she was approached by Crawford and his family after she left his

employ. She was asked whether government agents had been to see

her. She responded that they had. that she had told them about her

wages ($4.00 an hour) and the method in which she was paid (cash)

while she worked for Crawford. She also told Crawford that the

agents showed her a paper she had signed while working for him stat-

ing that she would be responsible for her own taxcs. She testified

Crawford responded that "someone had crossed him by them having

that paper."

Il.

A.

Crawford first argucs that there is insufficient evidence to sustain

his convictions for failure to file federal tax retums and for obstruc-

3a

4 Usxrtep States v. CRAWFORD

tion of justice. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sup-

port a conviction. the relevant question is ‘whether, viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational

trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reason-

able doubt."" United States v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir.

1989) (citations omitted).

1. Failure to file

Crawford was prosecuted under 26 U.S.C. § 7203 which makes it

a crime to "willfully fail to pay| } such estimated tax or tax, [or] make

such retum . . . at the time or times required by law." To prove a vio-

lation of § 7203. the Goverment must show that the defendani was

(1) required to file a return: (2) failed to file the retum: and (3) that

the failurc to file was a willful failure. United States v. Ostendorff,

371 F.2d 729. 730 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 386 U.S. 982 (1967). The

Supreme Court has determined that wilfulncss under the statute

means "voluntary. intentional violation of a known legal duty." Cheek

v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991).

Crawford contends that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his

conviction because he filed his tax retums for 1989 and 1990 after an

IRS agent contacted him to set up an appointment to discuss his tax

liability for those years but before the agent informed him that the

investigation was criminal in nature. In support of his contention,

Crawford states that he is functionally illiterate and that he is totally

dependent on others for his bookkceping. reporting and filing activi-

ties. He states that he was not aware that he had failed to file and

thought that he had filed. Further. Crawford cites section (20) 122)

{2 from the IRS manual in suppor of his position. That provision

States:

Compliance is achieved when a taxpayer makes a diligent

effort to mect the requirement of the law. The law requires

that the taxpayer take affirmative action to meet his/her

requirements. Sometimes. the taxpayer takes sufficient

action tO mect the requirements but. because of some

unforeseen intervening event, is unable to do so. Affirmative

action recognizes that the obligation to mect the requirement

4a

Usnitep States v. CRAWFORD 5

is Ongoing and requircs that the taxpaycr continue to attempt

to meet the requirements, even though late.

Even if this provision could be read to support Crawford's position,

the manual does not confer any substantive rights on taxpayers but is

instead only an intemal statement of penalty policy and philosophy.

See, e.g.. Unites States v. Caceras, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United

States v. Groder, 8'6 F.2d 139. 142 (4th Cir. 1987). In addition,

delinquent filing of a return docs not relieve a tax paycr of criminal

liability. United States v. Ming. 466 F.2d 1000. 1005 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 915 (1972): United States v. McCormick, 67 F.2d

R67, 868 (2nd Cir. 1933). cert. denied, 291 U.S. 662 (1934). Craw-

ford filed his tax returns on time from 1979-83 and he filed late or

not at all from 1984-94. Evidence that a defendant has filed delin-

quent tax forms before or no tax forms at all can be cvidence of will-

fulness. See. e.g.. United States v. Greenlee, 517 F.2d 899, 903 (3rd

Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975): United States v. Farris, 517

F.2d 226. 229 (7th Cir.). cert denied. 423 U.S. 892 (1975): United

States v. Upton, 799 F.2d 432. 433 (8th Cir. 1986). There was suffi-

cient evidence to sustain a conviction based on a $ 7203 violation.

2. Obstruction of Justice

Crawford challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction for obstruction of justice under 1& U.S.C. § 1503. The

three clements of that crime arc (1) that a judicial procecding was

pending: (2) that the defendant had knowledge of the judicial pro-

ceeding: and (3) that the defendant acted corruptly. that is, with the

intent to influence. obstruct. or impede that proceeding in its due

administration of justice. United States v. Grubb, \1 F.3d 426 (4th

Cir. 1993). The Government's evidence consisted of testimony from

Patricia Gail Littleton that Crawford instructed her how to answer

questions before the grand jury. Further, Litticton testified that Craw-

ford made the statement that "if he found out who went up there and

told things on him. he would have them taken care of." which Little-

ton interpreted as a threat of bodily harm. Crawford claims that Little-

ton’s testimony was intemally inconsistent and that it was

contradicted by the testimony of Tina Marie Shiffictt. This is basi-

cally an attack on the credibility of Littleton and “assessing the credi-

bility of witnesses is within the province of the jury.” United States

Sa

6 Usitep States v. CRawForD

v. Johnson, 55 F.3d 976, 979 (4th Cir. 1995). Generally. unless there

is a serious deficiency in the evidence. "this court is bound by the

credibility determinations of the jury." United States v. Saunders, 886

F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989). A review of the testimony reveals that

any inconsistencies in Ms. cittleton’s testimony are not serious in

nature and are such that the jury could certainly choose to believe her

testimony over Tina Marie Shifflett’s testimony.

Crawford alleges that the failure to disclose information about Lit-

tleton’s status as a paid informant for the local police violated the

Brady rule and violated the Joint Discovery and Inspection Order

reached by the partics and entered by the trial court. Before trial,

Crawford's counscl allegedly asked the Assistant U.S. Attomey

whether Patricia Gail Littleton had any agreements with the govern-

ment or the local police. The Assistant U.S. Attomey allegedly

replied that there were nonc. In fact. Ms. Littlcton had been paid

almost $1400 over two years to be an informant for the Rockingham

County Sheriff's Department. The Virginia State Police provided the

funding for the payments and compiled a file documenting the meet-

“ings with Litticton. This arrangement was first revealed to Crawford's

counsel during Littlcton’s direct examination. The trial court allowed

a fifteen minute recess to give Crawford's counsel time to review the

documents and also allowed Crawford to recall Littleton as an adverse

defense witness. Crawford's attorncy did not indicate to the court that

he needed additional time to review the documents but moved for a

mistrial on the basis that the Government committed a Brady viola-

tion and therefore deprived Crawford of duc process. The trial court

denied the motion. "A district court's refusal to grant a mistrial will

be reverscd only for an abuse of discretion." United States v. Guay,

108 F.3d 545, 552 (4th Cir. 1997).

The Brady rule requires that the prosccution disclose exculpatory

evidence and information which could be uscd to impeach Govem-

ment witnesses if the information is material. Information is material

if, with the disclosure, there would have been a "“reasonable probabil-

ity’ of a different result." Kyles v. Whitley. 115 S. Ct. 1555, 1566

(1995). The Supreme Court has further stated ‘at

Usitep States v. CRAWFORD 7

[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more

likely than not have reccived a different verdict with the evi-

dence. but whether in its absence he received a fair trial.

‘understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confi-

dence. A “reasonable probability" of a different result is

accordingly shown when the Government's evidentiary sup-

ae “undermines confidence in the outcome of the

trial.”

Id. (citations omitted). When disclosure has come late in the game,

this Court has stated that "[n]o duc process violation occurs as long

as Brady material is discloscd to a defendant in time for its effective

use at trial." United States v. Smith Grading and Paving. Inc.. 760

F.2d 527. 532 (4th Cir.). cert. denied. 474 U.S. 1005 (1985). In this

case. Crawford's attomey was able to cross-cxaminc Litticton on her

status as a paid informant and was able to recall her as an adverse

defense witness later in the trial. Although. the information about her

status as a paid informant was brought out and Crawford was able to

use the information in closing argument. he argucs that he was (1)

deprived of the opportunity to further investigate Littlcton’s back-

ground for impeachment material: (2) denicd the opportunity to

explore an entrapment defense: (3) denicd the opportunity to explore,

illegal scarch and scivure arguments: and (4) was unable to usc the

information in opening statement. Crawford. however. must show that

at least one of these avenues. if he had been allowed to explore it.

would have resulted in a reasonable probability of a different out-

come. He has made no such showing.

Crawford also asserts for the first time on appeal that the failure to

reveal that Littleton had a scrious drinking problem in the past. had

been charged with crimes several times. had convictions in the Vir-

ginia court system. and had failed to report income from Crawford on

her federal tax forms. was a Brady violation. The information con-

ceming Littleton’s drinking habits and her tax filing situation were

brought out on cross-cxamination. At trial. Crawford did not object

to the Government's failure to disclose the information regarding

these topics. He has thercfore failed to preserve this argument.

Failure to disclose the prior criminal convictions and charges is

likewise not a Brady violation. According to the documents submitted

7a

~ Usitep States Vv. CRAWFORD

in the Joint Appendix, each of the charges involved automobile viola-

tions and, thereforc. did not relate to credibility in such a way as to

"undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial."

C.

Crawford claims that the trial judge’s failure to give the jury an

instruction on Littleton’s status as a paid informant was an abuse of

discretion. At trial. Crawford neither requested such an instruction nor

objected when none was given. Therefore. he can not be heard to

complain unless the failure to give such an instruction is plain error

under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The trial

court’s failure to give such an instruction. sua sponte. in this case is

not plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Bosch, 914 F.2d 1239,

1247-48 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that the failure to give a paid infor-

mation instruction. swa sponte, is not plain error); United States v.

Cook, 102 F.3d 249. 252 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that the decision of

whether to give such an instruction. even in the face of a request from

counsel, is discretionary with the trial judge).

D.

1. Prosecutorial delay

Crawford alleges that he has been prejudiced by the pre-indictment

delay in this case. Because the delay occurred before Crawford

became the “accused.” the Sixth Amendment docs not apply. United

States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (i971). However, "the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment would require dismissal of the indict-

ment if it were shown at triai that the pre-indictment delay in this case

caused substantial prejudice to [appellant's] rights to a fair trial and

that the delay was an intentional device to gain tactical advantage

over the accused." Jd. at 324.

The trial court held a hearing on prosecutorial delay out of the pres-

ence of the jury. At the hearing, the agent responsible for the investi-

gation during 1993-95 testified that the case spent much time during

those years being reviewed by various individuals within the IRS and

the Justice Department in order to determine the best theory of prose-

8a

Unitep States v. CRAWFORD +

cution. He stated that by 1993 he had about 90% to 95% of the infor-

mation actually used in this prosecution but, at that time, the

investigation was targeted toward making a tax evasion or false return

case. Much of the information needed to prosecute such a case was

not received until after 1993, with some bank records not subpoenaed

until six months to a year preceding the trial. The trial judge deter-

' mined that the defense had shown neither substantial premdice or

improper prosecutorial motive for the delay and we agree.

2. Jencks Act violation

The Jencks Act provides, in pertinent part,

{whenever any statement is delivered to a defendant pursu-

ant to this section, the court in its discretion . . . may recess

proceedings in the trial for such a time as it may determine

to be reasonably required for the examination of such state-

ment by said defendant and his preparation for its use in the

trial.

18 U.S.C. $ 3500(c). In this case, 92 pages of material concerning Lit-

tleton’s position as an informant for the locai police was given to

Crawford’s attorney when Littleton took the stand. Crawford moved

for a mistrial based on the govermment’s failure to provide this mate-

rial earlier and the trial court denied this motion (discussed, supra,

Part 11.B.). Instead, the court recessed the proceedings for fifteen min-

utes to give counsel an opportunity to review the documents. Craw-

ford made no objection that the time given was insufficient when the

proceedings resumed. In addition, the court allowed Crawford to

recall Littleton later in the trial as an adverse defense witness.

Crawford did not make a contemporaneous objection that the fif-

teen minute recess was insufficient to allow proper review of the

material. Because of the failure to object, we review this matter for

plain error under Rule 52(b). We find no plain error here. Although

the fifteen minute recess may not have been entirely sufficient, the

trial court allowed the witness to be recalled as an adverse defense

witness later in the trial. Any prejudice resulting from the short length

of the recess was certainly removed by Crawford’s opportunity to

recall the witness at a later time.

10 Unrtep States v. CRAWFORD

3. Trial judge's questions

Crawford claims that the trial judge abused his discretion in ques-

tioning a key defense witness, Tina Marie Shifflett. Shifflett is the

witness who contradicted Littleton’s testimony conceming what

Crawford told Littleton the night before she was to testify before the

grand jury. During Shifflett’s testimony, the trial judge asked her ten

questions.* Crawford contends that these questions reveal a bias

*The following are the questions and answers (not all occurred in onc

exchange):

COURT: Now, why did it take you from the end of "89 to

1992 to come up with the 1989 records?

SHIFFLETT: Well, we had several businesses and | just got

behind.

COURT: Well. that’s about three years.

SHIFFLETT: Yeah.

COURT: Were you behind three ycars on your record

keeping?

SHIFFLETT: I guess you could say that. yes.

COURT: What efforts were made to help you become cur-

rent?

SHIFFLETT: Well I called the accountant. Doug. to help mc

several times, but I never got no reply.

COURT: Did you go to Mr. Odell [sic] and say I can't

handle this, get somebody else to do it?

SHIFFLETT: No.

COURT: What training have you has in bookkeeping. Ms.

Shifflett?

SHIFFLETT: None.

COURT: Well, how to you hold yourseif out to be a book-

keeper if you've has no training?

SHIFFLETT: 1 don't call myself a bookkeeper.

COURT: Well, what do you call yourself?

SHIFFLETT: I'm just trying to help them out.

COURT: If they asked you to translate Chinese into

10a

UniteD States v. CRAWFORD i

against the witness and that the last question "If they [the Crawfords]

asked you to translate Chinese into English, would you try to do

that?" was the most prejudicial.

This Court has stated that "if the trial judge’s behavior whether in

commenting or in interrogating witnesses during trial reaches such a

level of prejudice “that it denied any or all the appellants a fair, as dis-

tinguished from a perfect, trial,’ a new trial is required." United States

v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 776 (4th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). In

view of Ms. Shifflett’s answers to the Court’s earlier questions, we do

not believe the final question was prejudicial.

BE.

After the trial, Crawford discovered that Littleton had allegedly

attempted to get at least four people to commit perjury regarding the

circumstances of an accident which resulted in a driving while intoxi-

cated charge against her. Based on this evidence, Crawford contends

that he should be granted a new trial.

First, the government states that this issue has been presented to,

and not yet resolved by, the trial court. Therefore, the government

asserts that this issue is not properly before this Court. We agree and

will, therefore, remand to the district court for consideration of this

issue.

The timing of the motion for a new trial presents a jurisdictional

question which we must resolve in determining whether other issues

are properly before us. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 pro-

vides, in pertinent part, "[a] motion for a new trial based on the

ground of newly discovered evidence may be made only before or

within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the

court may grant the motion only on remand of the case." Federal Rule

English. would you try to do that?

SHIFFLETT: If it would help them, yes.

(J.A. 360-61, 366).

lla

12 UNITED STATES V. CRAWFORD

of Appellate Procedure 4(b) provides that motions based on newly

discovered evidence which are filed before or within 10 days after

entry of judgment render notices of appeal ineffective. Federal Rule

of Criminal Procedure 45 provides that computation of time for a

period under 10 days is calculated by starting with the day following

the event and then counting forward, excluding weekends and holi-

days. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26 provides that. when

computing periods under 7 days, weekends and holidays are excluded

but that, when computing longer periods, those days are included. The

motion for a new trial in this case was entered 12 calendar days after

the entry of judgment. In this instance, we compute time for filing

according to the rule in Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. There-

fore, the motion was filed outside of the ten day window provided in

Rule 4(b) and this court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal.

e

Crawford alleges that the district court imposed a fine of $100,000

without properly considering the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 3572(a). Section 3572(a) states that the sentencing court. in deter-

mining whether to impose a fine, the amount of the finc. and the tim-

ing and the method of payment, shall consider (1) the defendant's

income, eaming capacity, and financial resources: (2) the burden

which will be imposed on the defendant and any dependents: (3) any

pecuniary loss inflicted on others by the offensc; (4) whether restitu-

tion is ordered and the amount of the restitution: (5) the need to

deprive the defendant of illegally obtained gains from the offense: (6)

the expected costs to the government of confinement and supervision:

(7) whether the defendant can pass the cost of the fine onto others:

and (8) if the defendant is an organization, the size of the organization

and the efforts taken by the organization to discipline any agent

responsible for the offense. This Court has stated that failure of the

district court to enter factual findings on these factors can so inhibit

appellate review as to warrant that the sentence be vacated and the

case remanded so that such findings can be made. United States v.

Harvey, 885 F.2d 181 (4th Cir. 1989). In this case, the district judge

found that Crawford had the ability to pay the fine (J.A. 591). In addi-

tion, the district court adopted the findings in the pre-sentence report

[PSR]. The PSR set out IRS estimated income for the defendant for

1984 through 1990. It also stated that Crawford and his family owned

12a

UniteD States v. CRAWFORD 13

property worth approximately one million dollars. Factual findings set

Out in a PSR and adopted by the district court may be sufficient for

sentencing purposes. United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277

(4th Cir. 1995). Furthermore, Crawford did not object to the imposi-

tion or calculation of the fine at sentencing. Therefore, he has waived

review absent plain error. Jd. This Court has affirmed fines under

§ 3572(a) when the district court adopted factual findings in a PSR

which were sufficient to support the § 3572(a) factors and the defense

failed to object. See, e.g., id.; United States vy. Taylor, 984 F.2d 618

(4th Cir. 1993),

Il.

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the district

court and remand the case so that the district court may consider the

motion for a new trial.

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

13a

ENTERED

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

United States of America Judgment in a Criminal Case

V. (Offenses committed on or after 11/1/87)

Vern Odell Crawford Case No.: 5:95CR70108-001

Claude M. Scialdone, E

Defendant's Attorney

THE DEFENDANT:

X was found guilty on count(s) 1,2,3

after a plea of not guilty

Title & Section Nature of Offense Date Count

18 U.S.C. 1503 2 Obstruction of Justice 9/22/95 l

26 U.S.C. 7203 Willful Failure to File 4/15/91 2,3

Federal Tax Return

Defendant’s Soc. Sec. No.: 227-60-5191

Defendant’s Date of Birth: 4/28/44

Defendant’s USM No. 06713-0804

Defendant’s Residence and Mailing Address:

Route 4, Box 266, Elkton, VA 22827

Date of Imposition of Judgment: 10/2/96

Jackson L. Kiser

Chief U.S. District Judge

10/10/96

l4a

IMPRISONMENT

The defendant is hereby committed to the custody of the

United States Bureau of Prisons to be imprisoned for a

total term of 51 month(s).

(51 months as to Count 1, 12 months as to Count 2 and 3,

to run concurrently)

4 The court makes the following recommendations to

the Bureau of Prisons:

1. Defendant receive physical examination

2. Defendant be place in facility to accommodate

any health problems found

4 The defendant is remanded to the custody of the

United States Marshafl.

SUPERVISED RELEASE

Upon release from imprisonment, the defendant shall be

on supervised release for a term of 3 year(s)

(3 years as to Count 1, 1 year as to Counts 2 and 3, to run

concurrently)

The defendant shall not commit another federal state or

local crime.

The defendant shall not illegally possess a controlle

substance.

X| The defendant shall not possess a firearm as

defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921

15a

SPECIAL CONDITIONS OF SUPERVISION

1. Defendant shall provide the probation officer with access

to any requested financial information.

2. Defendant shall participate in a program of testing and

treatment for substance abuse, as directed by the probation

officer, until such timw as the defendant is released from the

program by the probation officer.

3. Defendant shall reside in a residence free of firearms and

destructive devices.

4. Defendant shall submit to warrantless search and seizure

of person and property as directed by the probation officer,

to determine whether the defendant is in possession of illegal

controlled substances and or firearms.

CRIMINAL MONETARY PENALTIES

Assessment Fine Restitution

$100.00 $100,000 $

SCHEDULE OF PAYMENTS

X | in full immediately

The defendant shall pay the cost of prosecution.

X

$5,934.65

l6a

STATEMENT OF REASONS

The court adopts the factual findings and guideline

application in the presentence report except (see

attachment if necessary):

Court ruled that the two point enhancement for

obstruction does not apply.

Guideline Range Determined by the Court:

Total Offense Level: 20

Criminal History Category: III

Imprisonment Range: 41 to 51 months

Supervised Release Range: 3 years as to Count 1

1 year as to Counts 2 & 3

Fine Range: $7,500.00 to $292,388.00

The sentence is within the guideline range, that range

does not exceed 24 months, and the court finds no

reason to depart from the sentence called for by the

application of the guidelines.

17a

Affidavit

I, Frank A. Mika, hereby affirm as follows:

That prior to Odell Crawford’s trial, during an open discovery

meeting, I, Frank A. Mika, asked Thomas Eckert, the

Assistant United States Attorney, what, if any, agreements

Gail Littleton had with local or federal law enforcement

officers. The response was none.

On the basis of that statement I prepared a hand written

Motion to Dismiss due to the fact that Ms. Littleton had been

paid by law enforcement officers and notes of her meetings

were only given to us after she took the stand.

Frank A. Mika

State of Virginia, At Large:

City of Waynesboro, to-wit:

The foregoing signature was sworn and subscribed to

before me this 24th day of October 1996.

My Commission Expires: May 31, 1999.

my V. ] li

18a

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

FILED: October 1, 1997

No. 96-4785

CR-95-70108

U.S. v. Crawford

MANDATE

The judgment of this Court dated 8/29/97 takes effect

today.

PATRICIA S. CONNOR,

CLERK

19a

UNITED STATE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Filed: September 23, 1997

No. 96-4785

CR-95-70108

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff - Appellee,

Vv

VERN ODELL CRAWFORD

Defendant - Appellant

n Petition for Rehearing with ion for Rehearin

En Banc

The Appellant’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing en banc were submitted to this Court. As no

member of this Court or the panel requested a poll on the

suggestion for rehearing en banc, and

As the panel considered the petition for rehearing and is of the

opinion that it should be denied,

IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing en banc are denied.

For the Court,

Patricia §. Connor, Clerk

26 U.S.C. §7203

Any person required under this title to pay any estimated tax

Or tax, or required by this title or by regulations made under

authority thereof to make a return, keep any records, or

supply any information, who willfully fails to pay such

estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or

supply such information, at the time or times required by law

or by regulations, shall, in addition to other penalties provided

by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction

thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 ($100,000 in the

case of a corporation), or imprisoned not more than 1 year, or

both, together with the costs of prosecution. In the case of

any person with respect to whom there is a failure to pay any

estimated tax, this section shall not apply to such person with

respect to such failure if there is no addition to tax under

section 6654 or 6655 with respect to such failure. In the case

of a willful violation of any provision of section 6050I, the

first sentence of this section shall be applied by substituting

“felony” for “misdemeanor” and “S years” for “1 year”.

2la

18 U.S.C. §1503

INFLUENCING OR INJURING OFFICER OR JUROR

GENERALLY.

(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any

threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence,

intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror, or officer in or

of any court of the United States, or officer who may be

serving at any examination or other proceeding before any

United States magistrate judge or other committing

magistrate in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such

grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of

any verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of

his being or having been such juror, or injures any such

officer, magistrate judge, or committing magistrate in his

person or property on account of the performance of his

official duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any

threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or

impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the

due administration of justice shall be punished as provided in

subsection (b).

(b) The punishment of an offense under this section is...

(3) In any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10

years, a fine under this title, or both.

18 U.S.C. §3500

DEMANDS FOR PRODUCTION OF STATEMENTS AND

REPORTS OF WITNESSES

Section 3500 Provides in part:

(a) In any criminai Prosecution brought by the United States,

tement or report in the Possession of the United States

no sta

which was made by a Government witness Or prospective

case.

(b) After a witness called by the United States has testified on

defendant for his examination and use.

23a

Article IV. provides in pertinent part

Article IV. of the Constitution of the United States

Section 2.

(Privileges and Immunities, Fugitives)

The citizens of each state shall be entitled to al!

privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.

24a

Amendment XIV. of the Constitution of the United States

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property,

without due process of law: nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

25a