Appendix — California v. Smith

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©: __gerige—or THE CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Petitioner,

V.

MARIAFELISSA SMITH, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

CALIFORNIA COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT,

DIVISION TWO

APPENDIX

DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Attorney General

GEORGE WILLIAMSON

Chief Assistant Attorney General

RONALD A. BASS

Senior Assistant Attorney General

RONALD S. MATTHIAS

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

DAVID D. SALMON

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

50 Fremont St., Room 300

San Francisco, CA 94105

Telephone: (415) 356-6217

Fax: (415) 356-6024

Counsel for Petitioner

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Opinion of California Court of Appeal

Filed July 3, 1997 1

Order of California Court of Appeal

Denying Rehearing and Modifying Opinion

Filed Aug 4, 1997 35

(he Ne ae ely ARS SONTRN 2 AACE A bor rate

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. A072044

MARIAFELISSA SMITH, (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 9509894)

Defendant and Appellant

Mariafelissa Smith appeals from a conviction of

second degree murder of her newborn child. She

contends the conviction must be reversed because it was

based upon statements to the police obtained in violation

of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.

436; the jury was not instructed to determine whether the

baby died from methamphetamine poisoning or from

drowning; the jury was not instructed on the lesser

included offense of misdemeanor manslaughter based on

methamphetamine use; and the jury was not instructed

that it had to agree unanimously on the act or omission

that caused the baby’s death.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant was charged by indictment filed on June 8,

1995, with the murder of her baby on or about April 18,

1995. Jury trial began on September 11, 1995, and

appellant was found guilty of second degree murder on

September 21. On October 20, appellant [2] was

sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life. She filed

a timely notice of appeal on October 24, 1995.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

At the time of trial, appellant and her husband,

Duane Smith, had been married for seven and a half years

were raising two children, age six years and four years,

and had given a third child up for adoption. Appellant

had also had two abortions and one miscarriage.

On October 21, 1994, appellant told her doctor, who

had diagnosed her with "adjustment disorder" or "mild

depression," that she had had a positive home pregnancy

test and wanted to terminate the pregnancy. When

informed that her medical insurance would not cover the

cost of an abortion unless she was in medical danger,

appellant said she would find a "way to terminate even if

it meant putting herself in danger." On October 26,

appellant was referred to Planned Parenthood.

Flordeliza Bartolo, appellant’s 16-year-old sister,

testified that in the fall of 1994 appellant had asked for a

ride to Oakland to get an abortion; she had agreed to

take appellant but had not in fact done so. Appellant had

said she did not want to have another baby with her

husband; she told her sister she was depressed and was

having marital problems.

Smith testified that appellant became pregnant in the

fall of 1994, but when she had her menstrual period in

November and December of that year, he and appellant

assumed the pregnancy test had been a false positive or

appellant had had a miscarriage.

On April 12, 1995, Dr. Anh Bui examined appellant

at the Antioch Kaiser-Permanente. Appellant was

experiencing pelvic pressure and had noticed enlargement

of her abdomen. She appeared to the doctor to be about

seven or eight months pregnant, although she could also

have had fibroids in her uterus. When Bui discovered a

fetal heartbeat, appellant expressed disbelief, saying she

could not be pregnant because she had been having

periods; she was very upset and cried. Ultrasound

examination revealed the [3] fetus to be approximately 33

and a half weeks, give or take two to three weeks. Bui

told appellant termination of a pregnancy after 24 weeks

was illegal and asked her to consider giving the baby up

for adoption. Although appellant said her period had

ended the day before the examination, Bui did not find

old blood as would be expected in this situation.

Appellant had answered in the negative to a questionnaire

query as to whether she had used drugs during pregnancy;

Bui testified that use of a large amount of

methamphetamine can cause bleeding and premature

labor as well as fetal death.

Two days later, Bui performed another ultrasound to

assess the well-being of the fetus. Based on the results of

this assessment, Bui testified the chance of a stillbirth the

following week would be less than one in a thousand; the

chances for survival of a fetus born at 33 and a half weeks

would be more than 95 percent. Appellant indicated she

was considering adoption. She was scheduled for another

appointment on April 18.

Appellant’s husband testified that although he had

noticed in February 1995, that appellant was starting to

put on weight, in April she was “not even close" to as big

as she had been in previous pregnancies, looking to Smith

at most four months pregnant and still wearing her regular

clothes. When appellant visited Kaiser in April, Smith

assumed she was about three months pregnant; she did

not tell him the doctor informed her she was 33 weeks

pregnant. Appellant’s sister testified she thought

appellant was getting fat because it “runs in our family."

She did not think appellant was pregnant because she had

given appellant sanitary pads to use during her periods.

During the afternoon on Easter Sunday, April 16,

Smith noticed appellant walking in an unusual manner,

"wobbling" and walking like a penguin. She went into the

bathroom but said she was all right. Smith heard her turn

on the water in the sink "once in a while;" when he

opened the door to the bathroom to hand her a cigarette

she had asked for, he saw water all over the floor and a

roll of toilet paper in the water. Smith fell asleep and

when he woke up, appellant was lying with him. She said

she was lightheaded and nauseated. The next day,

appellant wore wrapped up toilet paper in her vaginal

area [4] and looked a "little bit thinner, no stomach."

Smith assumed appellant had had a miscarriage.

Appellant did not show up for her appointment at

Kaiser on April 18. On April 19, nurse Donna Ball called

appellant repeatedly and eventually reached her in the

late afternoon. Appellant said she had a "problem" and

would like to see Dr. Bui, then said she had lost the baby.

Appellant said "Saturday night I was in the shower, and

there was this big gush of blood, and the baby came out.

And it was all blue and white." Appellant said she had

not yet seen a doctor and could not come that afternoon,

but agreed to come the next morning. Appellant sounded

pleasant and cooperative.

After speaking with Ball, Dr. Francis Wright, the

chief of obstetrics-gynecology at the Antioch Kaiser, called

appellant. Appellant told him she had lost the baby the

day before and had given him "a proper burial in the back

yard." She told Wright she had freaked. Wright told

appellant he would have to contact the police.

Pittsburg police officers Kohler, Calia and Beyhan

arrived at appellant’s apartment at about 4:50 p.m. on

April 19; Detective Barbanica arrived about 5:23.

Appellant, appearing nervous and shaken, said she had

been expecting them and told them the baby was in a

plastic garbage bag on the balcony. She said the baby had

been born the previous night. Her young children were

also in the apartment.

After the police found the baby, appellant was taken

to the Pittsburg Police Department. Later that evening

she was transported to the Walnut Creek Kaiser, where

she was examined by Dr. James Ferry. Appellant told

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Ferry her last menstrual period had been approximately

one and a half weeks before and she had given birth on

April 18. She said she had gotten into the shower to

relieve low back pain and had delivered the baby, blue

and not moving, followed after about two minutes by the

placenta. Appellant told the emergency room nurse she

spoke with on April 19 that she had delivered a stillborn

baby the day before and put him in a plastic bag on her

balcony. Appellant appeared to be very calm. The nurse

testified that appellant came to the hospital in the

company of a [5] uniformed police officer, who remained

outside the door of the room in which she was examined.

Analysis of appellant’s blood drawn at Kaiser on April 19

showed .38 micrograms per milliliter of

methamphetamine.

Detective Barbanica interviewed appellant at the

police station for about an hour and a half, beginning

around 12:30 a.m. on Thursday, April 20. Appellant had

at this point been in the "care" of the police department

for more than seven hours, having been taken by the

police from her home to the police station, then to the

Walnut Creek Kaiser, then back to the police station.

Barbanica testified that he conducted the interview in

"subdued" or "gentle" tones, like a "normal conversation."

Appellant told Barbanica she had begun to suspect she

was pregnant in February, but did not tell anyone, and

learned she was in fact pregnant about a week before the

interview. She said she had been told after the birth of

her last son that she was physically incapable of having

any more children and repeatedly said she did not want

any more children.

Appellant initially told the detective she had delivered

the baby, blue and white, in the shower on the Tuesday

before the interview, then placed the baby and placenta

into the garbage can. Appellant said she did not “see

herself" picking up the baby and putting him in the

garbage but realized after the fact that she had done so.

She told her husband she had had a miscarriage and

flushed the baby down the toilet. The next morning, she

moved the baby to the wastebasket in the children’s

bathroom so her husband would not find him, and then to

the balcony.

Barbanica told appellant he did not believe she was

being completely honest, said he knew she wanted to “get

this off [her] chest” and asked her to start over from the

beginning. Appellant told him the birth had occurred on

Easter Sunday and the baby had been born while she was

sitting on the toilet. She said as the baby went into the

toilet she could hear a "gurgling sound as though it was

gasping for its first breath of air." Appellant said the baby

landed head first into the toilet, with his mouth and nose

submerged under the water and feet sticking up. She

closed the lid on the toilet, leaving [6] the baby inside,

and took a shower. After taking her shower, appellant

lifted the toilet lid and poked the baby’s feet, but the baby

did not move. Barbanica suggested that appellant might

have actually put the baby into the toilet, but appellant

insisted she gave birth into the toilet.

Appellant had told Barbanica she had hoped the

baby was going to be born dead because she could not

handle any more children physically, emotionally, or

financially. She had considered adoption but "felt that the

baby would be better off with God than with another

family raising the child that she should be raising." She

said that if she had learned. of the pregnancy earlier, she

would have terminated it, and that she was having

menstrual cycles throughout the pregnancy. Appellant

said that at one point she felt she should be calling 911

and realized, "My God, what am I doing here?” When

asked if she ever thought, "“"I can’t let the baby die. I’ve

got to pick it up[,]""" she said, "Honestly, no." Late in the

interview, appellant was placed under arrest and started

to cry, saying I did not murder the baby. I couldn’t

have.”

Barbanica also interviewed appellant’s husband at the

police station that night. Smith told the detective he

thought appellant was three to four months pregnant.

Dr. Brian Peterson, a forensic pathologist, performed

an autopsy of the baby on the morning of April 20. The

placenta was still attached to the baby’s body, which

weighed a little under five pounds and was about 20

inches long. The baby was full term, with a gestational

age of between 34 and 40 weeks. Peterson found no

evidence of decomposition and estimated the baby had

died within 24 hours of 1 a.m. on April 20, the time at

which the body was refrigerated in the coroner’s Office.

Peterson was certain the baby had been born alive

and testified he had lived only a relatively brief time. He

found no evidence of infection, placental abruption (a

condition that can cause prenatal death), or maceration

(the changes undergone by a baby that dies in the womb).

He did find air in the stomach, which generally can

happen only from swallowing, and pink-tinged foam in the

upper airways, indicating air had been breathed, [7] and

evidence of air in the lungs. He did not determine a

cause of death; he did not find injuries that would

invariably be fatal and did not find evidence of natural

disease that would necessarily have produced death. He

found some "soft signs" of death by asphyxiation, namely

the pink-tinged foam in the airways, but did not find other

signs of asphyxia, such as hemorrhage in the base of the

skull.

Analysis of the baby’s blood revealed

methamphetamine at a level of 1.34 micrograms per

milliliter. Peterson testified that methamphetamine taken

by a pregnant woman will be transferred through the

placenta to the baby at the same level. Analysis of the

drug in the baby’s. blood indicated the mother had

ingested methamphetamine recently before the birth. The

level of methamphetamine found in the baby’s blood was

"significant" for a newborn; a level greater than 2 would

be considered lethal. Peterson felt methamphetamine was

a contributing factor in the death of the baby. He

testified that the amount of methamphetamine involved in

this case could have stopped the baby’s heart and could

have killed the baby but would not necessarily have done

so. Without the methamphetamine if the baby was left in

the toilet, it would have died. Peterson felt a baby born

with this amount of methamphetamine in his system "may

well have survived" if born in a hospital or given

immediate medical attention, and might have survived

even without immediate medical attention. The placenta

remaining attached to the baby could have hastened death

by causing shock more quickly.

Defense

Appellant, age 27 at the time of trial, testified that

she began using methamphetamine occasionally at age 15

and used it most weekends until she entered the military

when she was 18. She started to use the drug again when

she left the military in 1994. During the fall of 1994,

appellant was using about a quarter of a gram of

methamphetamine a day; she continued to use up to a

half gram a day until her arrest.

Appellant and Smith had been having marital

problems since April of 1991 which were getting worse by

the fall of 1994. When appellant learned she was

pregnant in [8] October 1994, she considered having an

abortion, but when she had periods in November and

December, she thought she had had a false pregnancy test

or a miscarriage. In February 1995, appellant again

thought she might be pregnant because she missed her

period but did not go to a doctor because she began to

bleed again in March and April. Appellant did not want

another child. She had been told after the birth of her

third child that it woul€¢ be hard for her to get pregnant,

although she had a miscarriage after being told this.

When she went to the doctor in April, she thought she

had a collapsed uterus. She was not as large as she had

been at eight months in her three full term pregnancies

and was not wearing maternity clothes. Her reaction to

being told she was pregnant was "disbelief;" she was not

happy and cried. Dr. Bui told her the baby was due at

the end of May. Appellant discussed with the nurse

calling the adoption agency she had used before. She did

not tell her husband about the pregnancy because she

expected him to be "outraged."

Appellant said she did not sleep between Friday,

April 14 and Sunday, April 16, and smoked

methamphetamine throughout that time. She never told

a medical professional that she was using drugs. She did

not know methamphetamine could cause bleeding or

premature labor or cause the baby to die.

Appellant did not think she was going to give birth on

April 16, was not trying to cause herself to have the baby,

and did not realize as she sat on the toilet that she was

having contractions. When the baby was born, she heard

a “gurgle" once or twice, looked and saw the baby was not

moving and was blue. She did not pick him up; she "just

couldn’t move at that point" and stood looking at him,

then closed the toilet lid because she "just couldn’t look at

him no more."

Appellant denied doing anything to actively kill the

baby, testifying she never ouce thought the baby was alive

and that it never occurred to her he could drown or she

could save him. She wanted to call 911 but did not do so

because her husband and children were around and she

was afraid people would hate her if they knew what had

happened. [9] She concealed the baby because she did

not want anyone to know what had happened. She

continued to use about a half gram of methamphetamine

a day until] Wednesday, when the police came, and slept

only a few hours during this time. She had last smoked

methamphetamine about a half hour before the police

10

came to the apartment. Appellant admitted she had lied

to others about her drug use and the circumstances and

date of the baby’s birth and death. She told the nurse and

doctor at Kaiser that the baby had been born on April 18

because she was scared and knew she had "disrespected"

his body. She acknowledged the various statements she

had made to Detective Barbanica and testified that when

she told him she could not believe what she did, she was

referring to putting the baby’s body on the balcony.

Dr. Albert Kastl, a psychologist with expertise on

Substance abuse, testified that people using

methamphetamine feel very capable but in fact have a

poor ability to function, often displaying illogical thinking,

difficulty planning behavior, paranoia, impulsiveness and

inability to adhere to conventional morality. They often

show inappropriate affect, displaying emotional reactions

inconsistent with the situation, and have a very poor

understanding of risks.

In response to a hypothetical question assuming the

general circumstances of appellant’s life, daily use of

approximately half a gram of methamphetamine and the

circumstances of appellant’s baby’s birth and death, Kastl

opined that the woman would not be able to make sound

and appropriate judgments or plan her behavior well,

would be likely to act impulsively and have an impaired

ability to appreciate the emotional significance of what

was happening, and would be unable to cope with the

additional stress of a premature, unwanted baby. He

testified the act of putting the dead baby into the

household garbage reflected an inability to plan or

incongruity between the emotions and socially appropriate

behavior and displayed many of the features associated

with acute amphetamine intoxication. With use of a

quarter gram of methamphetamine a week instead of a

half gram a day, the person would have a "serious inability

to. cope with [10] reality;" a single use of

methamphetamine could result in major changes in ability

11

to think and plan in a person not used to the drug. Kastl

did not think it was "psychologically probable" a woman in

appellant’s situation might have taken a large dose of

methamphetamine to allow her the ability to kill her

unwanted child and was not aware of any instance in

which this drug had been used to gain ability to commit an

antisocial act, but acknowledged that such use of the drug

would be possible.

Dr. Paul Hermann, a pathologist, testified that

newborn babies’ bodies decompose more slowly than

others and believed the baby could have died as early as

April 16, although it could also have died later. Hermann

agreed with Peterson’s conclusion that the baby was born

alive. He testified that the pink-tinged foam in the baby’s

windpipe could have been from drowning, although it

could also have been amniotic fluid taken into the lungs

before or during birth. Hermann found "considerable"

infection in the membranes around the baby, although not

in the umbilical cord. Such infection could cause rupture

of the membranes and onset of labor, or could occur if

labor did not begin for some time after rupture of the

membranes. There was no evidence of infection in the

baby.

Hermann testified that a level of .38 micrograms per

milliliter of methamphetamine in an adult women’s blood

was a high amount that would cause most people to show

outward signs of intoxication. The level of 1.34

micrograms per milliliter in the baby’s blood was an

extremely high amount. Hermann doubted the levels of

methamphetamine in the blood of mothers and newborns

would be the same over any period of time, suspected that

methamphetamine taken by a pregnant woman could

accumulate in the baby over time, as is the case with many

drugs, and testified the baby in the present case did not

necessarily receive the level of methamphetamine shown

from a single dose. A newborn could die from

methamphetamine poisoning and Hermann felt it was

12

possible methamphetamine alone could have killed the

baby in this case. At the level found in the baby,

Hermann would expect the child to be very tremulous and

possibly [11] have convulsions, cardiac arrhythmia and

breathing irregularities. Methamphetamine poisoning

could cause a baby to stop breathing.

Rebuttal

A police officer who participated in the search of

appellant’s apartment on April 19 testified that he found

a plastic baggie containing off-white residue that appeared

to be methamphetamine but did not find a pipe or other

instrument indicating methamphetamine use.

Detective Leonard Orman of the Antioch Police

Department, who iestified as an expert on recognizing the

effects of methamphetamine, did not consider a quarter to

a half gram a day of methamphetamine to be a “high

amount." After watching about 20 minutes of the tape of

appellant’s interview with Detective Barbanica, Orman

was of the opinion she was not under the influence of

methamphetamine because she was able to sit still for

long periods of time and concentrate on one subject as

she spoke with the officer did not "ramble on constantly"

and waited for questions to be asked. Orman testified

significant symptoms of methamphetamine use would last

approximately six to seven hours. He further testified that

a woman who took methamphetamine at 4:30 p.m. would

possibly still be exhibiting symptoms at 12:30 a.m. and

opined that appellant probably did not smoke a half gram

of methamphetamine at 4:30 p.m.

DISCUSSION

Appellant contends her conviction must be reversed

because the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution

to introduce evidence of her statements to Detective

13

Barbanica. She claims these statements were elicited in

violation of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966)

384 US. 436.

The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda

"that a person questioned bylaw enforcement officers after

being ‘taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his

freedom of action in any significant way’ must first “be

warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any

statement he does make may be used as evidence against

him, and [12] that he has a right to the presence of an

attorney, either retained or appointed.” (Stansbury v.

California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 322.) Statements obtained

in violation of this rule may not be used to establish guilt.

(Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444; People v.

Aguilera (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1161.)

The obligation to administer Miranda warnings

attaches “only where there has been such a restriction on

a person’s freedom as to render him “in custody.”

(Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 322, quoting

Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.) In the

present case, appellant contends she was in custody during

her entire interview with Detective Barbanica.

Respondent contends she was not in custody until she was

actually placed under arrest. "On appeal, we accept the

trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by

substantial evidence but independently determine whether

the interrogation was ‘custodial.” (People v. Aguilera,

supra, 51 Cal.App.4th at p. 1161.)

"In determining whether an individual was in custody,

a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding

the interrogation, but ‘the ultimate inquiry is simply

whether there [was] a “formal arrest or restraint on

freedom of movement of the degree associated with a

formal arrest.” (Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at

p. 322, quoting California v. Beheler (1983) 463 US. 1121,

1125.) "Courts have identified a variety of relevant

circumstances. Among them are whether contact with law

14

enforcement was initiated by the police or the person

interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person

voluntarily agreed to an interview; whether the express

purpose of the interview was to question the person as a

witness or a suspect; where the interview took place;

whether police informed the person that he or she was

under arrest or in custody; whether they informed the

person that he or she was free to terminate the interview

and leave at any time and/or whether the person’s conduct

indicated an awareness of such freedom; whether there

were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement

during the interview; how long the interrogation lasted;

how many police officers participated; [13] whether they

dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation;

whether they manifested a belief that the person was

culpable and they had evidence to prove it; whether the

police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory;

whether the police used interrogation techniques to

pressure the suspect; and whether the person was arrested

at the end of the interrogation. (See People v. Stansbury

[(1995)] 9 Cal.4th [824,. . .] 831-832; People v. Lopez

(1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 602, 608 . . .; People v. Spears

(1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1, 25 .. .; U.S. v. Griffin (8th Cir.

1990) 922 F.2d 1343, 1348.)" (People v. Aguilera, supra, 51

Cal.App.4th at p. 1162.) A police officer’s subjective view

that the defendant is a suspect is relevant only if it is

communicated or otherwise manifested to the defendant.

(Stansbury v. California, supra, 511 U.S. at p. 324.)

“Where no formal arrest has taken place, the pertinent

question is ‘how a reasonable man in the suspect’s

position would have understood his situation.” (People v.

Esqueda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1481, quoting

Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S. 440.442.)

At the suppression hearing in the present case,

Pittsburg police detective Michael Barbanica testified that

when he arrived at appellant’s apartment at 5:23 p.m.,

Officer Beyhan was with her in the dining area and two

15

other officers were also present at the scene. Barbanica

told appellant he was there to investigate the death of her

baby. He asked if she would be more comfortable waiting

in one of the bedrooms while he retrieved the baby from

the garbage bag and she went into a bedroom with

Beyhan. After finding the baby, Barbanica asked

appellant if she would come to the station to discuss what

had happened making it ‘very clear" this was on a

voluntary basis and appellant was not being arrested.

Appellant agreed and was taken to the police station by

Officer Beyhan at about 5:41 p.m. Barbanica told Beyhan

appellant was not under arrest and was being driven to

the police station on a voluntary basis. When Barbanica

arrived at about 6:30, appellant was watching television

with Officer Beyhan in the kitchen area.

[14] Barbanica walked with appellant to an interview

room and they talked about searching appellant’s

apartment; appellant refused consent, expressing concern

about whether this would be bad for her, and Barbanica

told her it was not a problem and explained he was going

to get a search warrant. Barbanica also told appellant he

was concerned that she should see a doctor, her doctor

had arranged for a visit at the Walnut Creek Kaiser, an

officer would give her a ride, but the medical appointment

was voluntary. Appellant said that would be fine and was

taken to an open area at the back of the station where

officers wrote their reports while Barbanica left to write

a search warrant. The search warrant, which included

taking a blood sample from appellant at Kaiser Walnut

Creek, was obtained at about 10 or 11 p.m. A police

officer took appellant to Kaiser, where her blood was

drawn with her consent, and returned her to the police

station.

Barbanica began to interview appellant shortly after

midnight in a small windowless room to which she had

been taken. The interview lasted about an hour and a

16

half. Appellant was placed under arrest more than an

hour into the interview.

Appellant testified that Barbanica told her he felt she

would be more comfortable going to the police station

while he dealt with the baby, informing her it was a "death

investigation" rather than a "criminal" one. Appellant said

she wanted to call her husband but the police told her

they did not want her to call and wanted her to go to the

station. She was told to enter a patrol car with a police

officer and did not feel she had any choice. At the police

station, the officer who waited with her sent a janitor

away, Saying he did not want anyone else in the room. A

“cadet" or "rookie" was assigned to watch her; when she

wanted to go to the bathroom, the cadet waited by the

door. When appellant asked to smoke a cigarette, the

cadet went to ask Barbanica and told appellant Barbanica

wanted her to "stay put." When Barbanica told her he was

concerned that she see a doctor, appellant told him she

had an appointment scheduled the next day at Kaiser in

Antioch but he said he would prefer she go that night and

she felt she had no choice but [15] to comply. At Kaiser,

the officer who had driven appellant waited outside the

room where she was being examined and appellant did

not think she was free to leave. Back at the police

station, when appellant was taken to the interview room,

she did not think she could get up and leave. Appellant

acknowledged that during the interview Barbanica told her

more than once she was not under arrest and was free to

leave, but nevertheless she did not think she was free to

leave. She was not allowed to go anywhere without a

police officer next to her, either at the station or at the

hospital. Appellant was never placed in handcuffs, no one

held a gun on her, she never tried to get out of a room

and found it locked, and she never told a police officer

she did not want to talk and wanted to go home.

The parties stipulated that civilians were not allowed

to wander around the police station without an escort;

17

smoking was not allowed in that building; and cadets were

not allowed to keep custody of prisoners.

The trial court also observed the videotape of

appellant’s interview, which took place in a tiny room,

unfurnished except for the two chairs occupied by

appellant and Barbanica, hers against the wall across from

the door and his between her and the door. Detective

Barbanica began the interview by reminding appellant that

she was not under arrest, did not have to talk to him, was

free to go, and was not being "criminally charged or

investigated." As appellant nodded and indicated she

understood by saying, "um-huh," Barbanica said, "Okay.

I’d like to get to the bottom of this. Okay. I’d like to find

out what happened. Okay. Tell me a little about yourself

first. What’s your name?" He told appellant to put her

purse down and relax; she apologized and said she was

thinking about her kids. Barbanica said, "They're okay.

They’re okay. Yeah. But you understand you're here on

your own free will." Appellant responded, "right," and

Barbanica began to ask questions about appellant’s

children, her husband and their employment. After a

number of such questions. He asked if appellant knew

why she was there, she said because when she "lost" or

"had the baby she should have called 911 and talked about

[16] how she felt "really bad" and "guilty" because she did

not give the baby "any type of respect," and how she had

not known she was pregnant until the week before. In

response to Barbanica’s questions, appellant said she did

not want more children and had been told she could not

have any, and went on to describe delivering the baby,

blue and white, in the shower and then placing his body in

the waste basket.

At this point, moving his chair a little closer to

appellant, Barbanica said, "I want you to know something.

Okay. This is a very, very serious matter. Okay. Now I

want you to think about something. All right. Think

about this really good. This is what I do for a living.

18

Okay. And obviously I do a decent job at it or they

wouldn’t be paying me as much as they do to do this job.

The other officers that work here -- there’s an officer up

at your house right now collecting evidence because we

did find evidence at your house. Appellant asked what

evidence, Barbanica said, "Well, let me get to that," and

the following colloquy ensued:

"BARBANICA: And he’s very good at his job, okay?

"APPELLANT: Um-hm.

"BARBANICA: And tomorrow morning I’m going to

the autopsy of the baby.

"APPELLANT: Um-hm.

"BARBANICA: And the pathologist is very good at

his job.

"APPELLANT: Um-hm.

"BARBANICA: Okay. A lot of times people say

things happen one way because they’re scared. Okay.

You may have made a mistake yesterday in the way you

handled the situation but let’s don’t make it worse now by

not being 100 percent honest. Because if you made a

mistake we can deal with that. Okay. And we will. We'll

deal with that. All right? But let’s, let’s be 100 percent

honest with each other here, okay, um, and I don’t think

you're being 100 percent honest with me right now.

Okay" And I think you know where you’re not being 100

percent honest. Okay.

"APPELLANT: Um-hm. [17]

"BARBANICA: I think that, uh, you want to really

tell me what happened. I know you do. I know you want

to get this off your chest. Because I can tell you seem like

a very good person and I know this is really sittin’ on you,

sittin’ on your chest and you want to get it off your chest.

Okay. I know you do. You don’t seem like a mean

person or a vindictive person at all. You seem like a

decent person. Okay. Think about that. I’m gonna know

exactly, exactly what happened to that baby tomorrow

when I go to the autopsy. Anc it wasn’t this. Okay? I’m

19

gonna know exactly. I think we need to sit back for a

second and let’s start talking about this over again and

let’s get to what really happened here. I understand you

didn’t want the baby and you probably didn’t know what

to do. Okay. Tell me what really happened yesterday."

After about a six-second pause, appellant said, "Well. Oh.

I’m gonna be in trouble. And the only thing that’s the

difference of the birth it wasn’t yesterday. ’ Appellant told

Barbanica the birth was on Easter. The interview then

continued:

"BARBANICA: And there’s more that you're not

telling me.

"APPELLANT: And I wasn’t in the shower, I was

sitting on the toilet and the baby came out, but swear to

God, it didn’t cry. It didn’t move. I probably, I heard a

little gurgle and that was it. And then when I looked

down in the toilet again the baby wasn’t moving.

"BARBANICA: And what'd you do?

"APPELLANT: I left it. I was looking at it for a

while until I had enough courage to take it out of the

toilet.

"BARBANICA: Okay.

"APPELLANT: And then I put it in the wastebasket.

"BARBANICA: Babies aren’t born that way.

"APPELLANT: That’s how it came out. I swear.

"BARBANICA: I know that and you know that.

Because you've had kids and I’ve had kids. And babies

aren’t born that way. It doesn’t happen that way. Okay?

But [18] hear me? [As appellant started to say

something] Stop. I’m going to know what the exact cause

of death is tomorrow when I go to that autopsy. That

pathologist is gonna look at that baby and do so many

scientific tests on that baby, he is gonna tell me to the

gnat’s ass what the cause of death on the baby was. He’s

gonna tell me. Okay.

"APPELLANT: Okay.

20

"BARBANICA: All right, and I’m gonna know. But

I want to know you first. I want you to tell me first.

Because you know when you had those three other babies,

[he snaps his finger] babies don’t come out like that.

"APPELLANT: Well, that third one came out in 15

minutes.

"BARBANICA: Okay.

"APPELLANT: And I was like I said I was having

pains, bad back pains, when I was cleaning up my house,

and then when I started feeling --

"BARBANICA: [interrupting] Please. Wait a minute.

Please stop for a minute. Let’s start this like we’re

starting this whole interview over. Okay. Let’s forget

about what you had already told me. Let’s forget about

that. Can we start over? I’m Detective Barbanica with

this police department, you’re here under your own free

will, we're talking about this you don’t have to talk to me.

Okay? Let’s start over. I want to give you another

Opportunity to tell me the actual, the actual story.

Because again we have physical evidence because our

physical evidence person is up there right now taking

evidence. The coroner was just up there and I’m going to

the autopsy tomorrow. Keep in mind this is what I do

every day. This is not the first time I’ve seen this, this is

what I do everyday. Okay? I want you to tell me the

story of what happened, I want to know the real story."

Appellant reiterated her description of delivering the

baby on the toilet and Barbanica questioned her about it,

eliciting from her the information that she heard a

"gurgle" and saw the baby in the toilet, head first, with his

feet up. He continued: [19]

“"BARBANICA: I’m gonna ask you a very important

question. Okay. And I want you to be honest. Because

I think partially you are being honest but I want to know

from you, when you left it in there, were you thinking to

yourself, I can’t afford another kid, just let this, let this

baby pass away easily? Let it die? [pause] Be honest.

21

"APPELLANT: Honestly, I didn’t -- I was hoping the

baby was gonna die stillborn.

"BARBANICA: But obviously it wasn’t. Am I

correct?

"APPELLANT: I guess not. If it gurgled it must have

died right after it gurgled.

"BARBANICA: Did you leave it in the toilet thinking

that, uh, just let this baby die? I just, I can’t afford

another baby right now. We don’t need another baby.

Let’s just let this baby die?

"APPELLANT: No. Not letting the baby die. I was

hoping it was dead.

"BARBANICA: Okay. But you knew it wasn’t. Am

I right? If it was gurgling?

"APPELLANT: Well. it gurgled just once or twice

and that was it. But --

"BARBANICA: [interrupting] Okay. But if it was

gurgling obviously it was alive, am I correct?

"APPELLANT: [sighing] Yeah, I guess.

"BARBANICA: I just want to know honestly from

you. I want to know where your mind was at that time.

Okay. And, I’m not judging you. If that was what you

were thinking. That’s what you were thinking. But I want

to know from you. Is that what you were thinking at the

time?

"APPELLANT: Part of me was and part of me

wasn’t. :

"BARBANICA: Is that why you left it in the toilet?

"APPELLANT: That and plus I just didn’t want to

see it.

"BARBANICA: Did you leave it in there to die?

APPELLANT: No. I just couldn’t have the courage

to get it out. I didn’t leave it in there to die. [20]

"BARBANICA: Did part of you want it to pass away?

"APPELLANT: Yes.

"BARBANICA: And is that why it stayed there?

22

"APPELLANT: I don’t know. Probably. I don’t

know. Barbanica then told appellant to relax, asked if she

wanted a soda, and left her alone for approximately 12

minutes. As he got up to leave, appellant expressed

concern and anxiety about the police telling her husband

what had happened; when Barbanica assured her they

would not tell him, she demonstrated great relief.

Appellant spent most of the time Barbanica was gone

crying quietly. When he returned, the conversation

resumed:

BARBANICA: I want you to understand. I want to

be real clear about this,though. You're not under arrest.

Okay. Alli right. You're free to go at any time. You

don’t have to talk to me. I’m only sitting here, I want to

get to the bottom of this thing. Okay. All right. That’s

the way I’m looking at it, okay? Can we still keep talking

about this? [six-second pause] Because I'd like to get to

the bottom of it. Wouldn’t you? And get this behind

you?

"APPELLANT: Yeah, but, well, what more did you

want me to --

"BARBANICA: [interrupting] I'd like to go over it a

couple more times. That okay? [five-second pause] Is

that okay?

"APPELLANT: Yeah. Fine."

Appellant’s responses did not follow immediately upon

Barbanica’s questions; rather, she hesitated as he

continued to encourage her, with a pause of perhaps 15

seconds from the time he asked if they could keep talking

until she asked what more he wanted, and another pause

before she said "fine" in a resigned tone. Barbanica told

her to relax, asked if she wanted more time or a tissue,

offered to open her soda, and asked appellant to tell him

about her children. Appellant began to speak about her

daughter, telling Barbanica her children were “her life" but

she did not want more and would have terminated the

[21] pregnancy if she had known about it earlier.

Appellant said she could not handle another child

“financially, emotionally or physically;" when she stopped,

Barbanica urged her to go on, tell me some more;"

appellant sighed, paused, and said, "I just can’t believe |

did what I did." Barbanica then questioned appellant

about when she learned of the pregnancy and what she

intended to do at that time, eliciting her comments that

she had hoped the baby would be stillborn, did not want

to go through the adoption process again and felt the baby

would be better off with God thar with another family.

At this, the interview continued:

"BARBANICA: Is that why you did this? To let it go

up with God?

"APPELLANT: [sighs and gestures]

"BARBANICA: Can I tell you something? And I’m

going to be very honest with you. Okay. And keep this

in mind. Okay. Again, this is what Ido. Okay. I know

that when the baby came out and think about this before

you answer me, please. Okay. Because I know in your

mind you’re gonna be saying this guy knows what he’s

talking about, okay. I know that you weren’t sitting on the

toilet when the baby came out, okay. I know that. Is it

possible, okay, and I want you to think about this, okay,

that you helped the baby into the toilet?

"APPELLANT: No/ I swear, that I did not do. I was

sitting on the toilet. You would have saw my sheet. my

bed sheet that I had on the floor, because I had to cover

it up. I was sitting like this on the toilet [gestures] and I

was holding my mouth [holds both hand over mouth] and

I pushed down. And the water squirted. It squirted to my

walls. And it squirted to that little cart thing. You

probably seen a little tinge of blood on my cart."

Barbanica asked appellant how she could have heard

the baby gurgle and she said she could hear the sound as

she sat on the toilet. He asked her to describe the sound;

she made a coughing noise; he asked, “Like it was

choking?" and appellant said, "Something like that. It was

24

like that drowning [inaudible] gurgle noise I guess." After

questions [22] about whether it sounded like the baby was

taking in water, Barbanica told appellant if the baby’s

head was submerged in water she would not have heard

any noise and that if she had jumped up as she claimed,

since the placenta was still inside her, the baby would

have been pulled out of the water. Appellant insisted on

her story and Barbanica elicited details, including a

description of the baby’s mouth and nose being under the

water in the toilet. During this part of the interview,

appellant was standing as she tried to demonstrate what

she had been doing. When Barbanica told her to go

ahead and sit, she said, "I did not put it in there. I did not

stick the baby in the toilet like you’re thinking that I did.

Barbanica continued with questions about details of

the delivery and appellant’s actions immediately afterward.

When appellant responded, "I don’t know," to his question

why she left the baby in the toilet, Barbanica said, "I don’t

buy the ‘I don’t know" answer. I really don’t . . . and I'll

tell you why. Because deep down inside, okay, there had

to be a reason. Okay. That’s your child, all right. Deep

down inside there had to be a reason that you closed the

lid on this toilet and walked away. Okay. Was it that you

wanted this baby to live?" Appellant said she did not

want the baby or whole situation to exist. After questions

about appellant’s husband’s knowledge regarding her

pregnancy, Barbanica asked if appellant ever thought she

wanted to pick the baby up and not let it die; crying, she

answered "no." Barbanica continued with more questions

about details of what appellant did after the baby was

delivered. He asked appellant if he was going to find

toilet water in the baby at the autopsy, if the baby really

ended up in the toilet, and if he would find appellant’s

fingerprints on the baby. He asked again if the baby was

alive when he was delivered and if the "gurgle" sounded

like the baby was choking on water. After appellant said

she assumed the baby was alive and guessed he may have

been "trying to gasp for that first air when the baby comes

out," Barbanica again told appellant to relax and left for

about six minutes. [23]

Just before Barbanica reentered the interview room,

appellant could hear voices outside the room saying

something including, "walk her out." As soon as Barbanica

came in, appellant asked, “I'm under arrest now?"

Barbanica said "no" and asked why; she told him what she

had heard. He then continued the interview:

"BARBANICA: No, you're not under arrest. You're

still free to go. We don’t have to talk. You're not under

arrest, Okay? We just want to find out some more things.

A few more things. The first thing I want to find out.

What was the garbage can you placed him in? Or do you

still want to keep talking? Is that okay?"

Appellant said that was "fine" and answered

Barbanica’s questions about the garbage can, and details

including the clothes she was wearing and items that were

in the bathroom. Seven minutes after he had returned to

the interview room, Barbanica told appellant he hoped

she would understand he had to place her under arrest.

Appellant broke down, saying she wanted to go home to

her children and denying she murdered the baby.

The trial court found appellant “could not reasonably

have believed that she was not free to go" because

Barbanica’s tone during the interview was "gentle,"

appellant was never handcuffed, appellant was asked to go

to the police station voluntarily and Barbanica made an

effort to explain to the officer who transported her that

she was not be treated as though in custody, Barbanica

sounded "genuine" when he told appellant she was free to

leave, and when she was finally placed under arrest

appellant became “quite upset," suggesting ‘she had

realized that a line had been crossed." The trial court

referred to this last.as a “minor" point, acknowledging that

appellant’s reaction may have reflected the realization that

she could not go home after having previously thought she

26

was not free to leave during the interview but would be

able to go home afterwards.

The critical question in determining whether

appellant was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda, as we

have stated, is whether a reasonable person in appellant’s

situation would have believed her freedom had been

restrained in a manner equivalent to [24] formal arrest.

In the present case, while appellant was told her

conversations with the Barbanica were voluntary and she

was free to leave, and was initially told the investigation

was not a criminal one, a host of factors contribute to an

overall situation that can only be characterized as

custodial.

Appellant was interviewed at the police station,

beginning at 12:30 a.m. While the fact the interview

occurred at the station would not in itself mean appellant

was in custody (Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 US. at p.

495, California v. Beheler, supra, 463 US. 1121,

1124-1125), this is not a case in which appellant

voluntarily participated in a brief interview at the station

and was then allowed to go her own way. (See, Oregon v.

Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S. at pp. 492, 493-494; California

v. Beheler, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 1122.) From the time four

police officers appeared at appellant’s home at around 5

p-m. on April 19 until the interview began at 12:30 a.m.,

a period of some seven and a half hours, appellant was

never Outside the company of a police officer. She was

accompanied by an officer or cadet at all times within the

police station. While respondent urges this treatment was

not specific to appellant but applied to any civilian inside

the station, there is no reason to believe appellant knew

of this procedure, nor of the fact the police department

does not allow cadets to keep custody of prisoners. From

her point of view. and that of a reasonable person in her

Situation, it would clearly have appeared she was being

kept under police supervision. Indeed, even when

appellant was taken to the doctor in Walnut Creek --

27

where her blood was drawn with her consent, but also

pursuant to the terms of a search warrant -- a police

officer waited outside the door of the room in which she

was examined.

In State of South Dakota v. Long (8th Cir. 1972) 465

F.2d 65, the defendant was stopped by the police and his

car searched, he and his companions were asked to follow

the officers to the sheriff's office. where the car was again

searched, a police officer accompanied the defendant to

have a team photograph taken, and the defendant was

then interviewed in his dormitory room, with the door

closed. The court stated, "from the time [25] they were

stopped in the canyon until the admissions were made

later in the room, Long was continuously accompanied by

or in the presence of the sheriff or one of his deputies or

both. This certainly was a significant deprivation of

Long’s freedom of action. He could have reasonably

believed that he was in custody, particularly when the

sheriff insisted on a deputy accompanying him to have his

picture taken." (Jd., at pp. 69-70.)

In People v. Esqueda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1450, the

defendant drove to a gas station at about 10 p.m. with his

young children and his dying live-in companion in his

truck. The defendant consented to a search of his

apartment and his truck was searched and impounded.

About 1:30 a.m., he was taken to a police station and

interviewed for about 20 minutes, then transported to a

different police station and interviewed for about an hour

in a small room in a secured area. He was guarded while

in the homicide building, had been separated from his

children and had not been allowed to go to the hospital or

given information about his girlfriend as requested. The

court found that the defendant’s having been asked for

the consent, not allowed to go to the hospital, taken to the

police station, asked to go to the interview room reached

only by security measures, accompanied by uniformed

officers to each police station and guarded while in the

28

homicide building “tends to show some indicia of arrest.

A reasonable person could have easily presumed under

such circumstances that he or she was not free to leave."

(Id., at p. 1482.)

In the present case, after seven and a half hours of

constant police company and surveillance, it can hardly be

supposed appellant felt she was genuinely free to leave at

any time she wished. We are aware of no case involving

a defendant kept under police supervision for more than

eight and a half hours before being placed under arrest

that has found the defendant was not in custody. Rather,

a detention of only a little more than an hour has been

characterized as a “long” one. (People v. Forster (1994) 29

Cal.App.4th 1746, 1753.) [26]

In addition, appellant testified she was not permitted

to call her husband before going to the police station and

ihe videotape of her interview demonstrates she expressed

concern over the well being of her young children, who

had been at home when she left for the police station.

"[S]eparation of the suspect from family or colleagues who

could offer moral support" and “isolation in nonpublic

questioning rooms" are factors tending to support a

finding of custody. (U.S. v. Griffin (JOth Cir. 1993) 7 F.3d

1512, 1519; see People v. Esqueda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th

at p. 1482 [defendant separated from his children and not

given requested information about condition of live-in

companion he was subsequently charged with murdering].)

In Griffin, the court found the defendant was in custody

where she was separated from the friend with whom she

was traveling and taken, voluntarily, to a small office in

the police restricted area of the airport, in which a police

officer sat at his desk, positioned so that the only means

of exit for the defendant was around him. Similarly, in the

present case, appellant was interviewed in a tiny

windowless room, barren save for the two chairs upon

which she and Barbanica sat, with Barbanica positioned

between appellant and the door. Appellant was clearly

29

subjected to a police dominated atmosphere (U.S. v.

Griffin, supra, 7 F.3d at pp. 1518, quoting Berkemer v.

McCarty, supra, 468 U.S. 420, 439; Miranda v. Arizona,

supra, 384 U.S. at p. 445); "[w]here police are in full

control of the questioning environment, custody is more

easily found. (U.S. v. Griffin, supra, 7 F.3d at pp.

1518-1519.) In Miranda, the Supreme Court noted that

the cases before it involved "incommunicado interrogation

of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting

in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of

constitutional rights." (384 U.S. at p. 445.) “Because the

court in Miranda expressed concern with the coerciveness

of situations in which the suspect was ‘cut off from the

outside world’ and ‘surrounded by antagonistic forces’ in

a ‘police dominated atmosphere’ and interrogated ‘without

relent,’ circumstances relating to those kinds of concerns

are also relevant to the custody issue. Thus custody is less

likely to be deemed present when the questioning

occurred in the presence of the suspect’s friends or [27]

other third parties, and more likely to be found when the

police have removed the suspect from such individuals."

(LaFave, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 6.6, p. 293.)

Notwithstanding Detective Barbanica’s "gentle" tone

and repeated statements that appellant was free to leave,

the nature of the interrogation also indicates appellant

was in custody. Barbanica relentlessly questioned

appellant in a manner calculated to intimidate her: telling

her how good he and the other officers on the case were

at their jobs, assuring her they would soon know exactly

what had happened, but telling her he wanted to hear it

from her first. In the context of this interview at 12:30

a.m., after appellant had been in the constant company of

the police for some seven and a half hours and had been

precluded from calling her husband or having a cigarette,

the "gentle" tone employed by Detective Barbanica can

only be viewed as a sophisticated tactic designed to create

the impression appellant was free to leave but at the same

30

time effectively induce her to remain subject to his efforts

to elicit incriminating statements. In Esqueda, supra, 17

Cal.App.4th at p. 1482, the court noted, as one of the

factors supporting a finding that the defendant was in

custody, that "the forms of questions asked Esqueda by

[the detective], although not specifically accusatory, were

purposefully stated in a comforting manner by(the

detective] because he knew he would lose Esqueda to

further questioning if he asked questions in an accusatory

fashion." Similarly, in State of South Dakota v. Long,

supra, 465 F.2d at p. 68, the court found a custodial

situation despite the sheriff having questioned the

defendant in a "fatherlike" manner and “gained [his]

friendship."

A reasonable person in appellant’s position could

have had little doubt why she was being questioned at the

police station at 12:30 a.m. This is not a case in which the

defendant was initially questioned as a witness to a crime

and subsequently became a suspect (People v. Stansbury,

supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 828); if the baby was murdered (as

opposed to having been stillborn) appellant, the only

person present at the birth, was the only suspect.

Suspicion understandably focussed upon appellant at the

commencement of the police investigation. Early in the

interview, Barbanica told appellant a search warrant [28]

had been executed at her apartment and the police had

found evidence -- thereby unquestionably communicating

to her that she was a suspect in a murder case. Barbanica

later prompted appellant to acknowledge the baby must

have been alive because of the "gurgling" sound she heard

and made it clear he believed the baby had been

murdered. Once it was clear the detective believed the

baby had been born alive, it was also clear he believed

appellant had murdered the infant. Indeed, Barbanica

said as much, asking appellant during the interview if she

left the baby in the toilet to die and if it was"possible she

had "helped the baby into the toilet." As in Griffin, supra,

31

7 F.3d at pp. 1518-1519, "[t]he questions were case

specific’ and "continued even after it was obvious

defendant was incriminated .... A reasonable person

under the same circumstances would believe she had no

choice but to continue to answer the incriminating

questions."

This conclusion is not altered by the fact that

Barbanica told appellant a number of times she was being

interviewed voluntarily and was free to leave. These

statements were invariably coupled either with pleas to

help him get to the bottom of the case or sympathetic

observations aimed at allaying her anxiety. Knowing

appellant was nervous and distraught (having just given

birth to a child who either died before birth or

immediately after), concerned about her young children,

and undoubtedly exhausted at 12:30 a.m. After seven and

a half hours at the police station or hospital, Barbanica

repeatedly coaxed appellant to "get it off her chest" and

help him learn what had happened, accused her of lying

to him, and constantly asked her to repeat details of the

incident. Indeed, at least after the initial statements with

which he began the interview, Barbanica’s admonitions

that appellant was free to leave were given at times that

make them appear calculated to persuade her to do just

the opposite. Barbanica began the interview by telling

appellant she was not under arrest, did not have to talk to

him and was not being criminally investigated, and that he

wanted to understand what had happened. She agreed,

then very quickly expressed concern about her children.

He told her the children were okay and repeated that she

was there of her own free will, then [29] asked a series of

neutral questions about appellant’s life and family before

delving into the incident under investigation. The primary

function of Barbanica’s statements seemed to be to calm

appellant so she would talk.

Later, after telling appellant he did not believe her

initial story about the baby being born in the shower,

32

hearing the revised description of the birth into the toilet,

expressing his disbelief of this story and reminding

appellant the pathologist was going to find out the cause

of death, Barbanica asked appellant to "start over" and

repeated the introductory portion of the interview in

abbreviated form, "I’m Detective Barbanica . . . you don’t

have to takk to me .... Let’s start over." This

admonition was not aimed at assuring appellant

understood she could terminate the interview, but was

Barbanica’s means of setting the stage to pretend the

interview already long underway was just commencing.

After the segment of the interview in which

Barbanica elicited from appellant the admission the baby

must have been alive when it was born and she wanted

him to be dead, he left appellant alone for approximately

12 minutes, most of which time she spent with her head in

her hands or crying. Barbanica returned, repeated that

appellant was free to leave and encouraged her to talk as

she hesitated for about 30 seconds before saying “fine."

Still later in the interview, after appellant had been left

alone for some six minutes and upon hearing another

officer outside the interview room say something about

walking her somewhere, asked Barbanica if she was now

under arrest, Barbanica assured her she was not, discussed

some of the details of the incident, and did not place her

under arrest and advise her of her Miranda rights until

approximately seven minutes later. Again, Barbanica’s

comments about appellant being free to leave come across

primarily as efforts to calm appellant and cause her to

continue the interview.

Barbanica’s statemerts at best gave a double

message, on the surface informing appellant she did not

have to continue the interview but at the same time, more

subtly, telling her she needed to stay. In the context of

the numerous factors in this case that [30] would induce

a reasonable person to believe he or she was effectively in

custody, to allow the "free to leave" admonitions to

33

determine a contrary conclusion would be to allow use of

such admonitions to completely undermine Miranda.

Telling a subject he or she is free to leave and does not

have to talk, of course, does not inform that subject of the

consequences of choosing to stay and talk to the police --

that any incriminating statements made may be used

against him or her. If merely telling a person he or she is

free to leave is sufficient to prove the person is not in

custody, police officers could routinely make such

statements in the hope of eliciting incriminating

admissions without informing the person of his or her

constitutional rights.

We conclude appellant was in custody, for purposes

of Miranda, during her interview by Detective Barbanica.

The trial court thus erred in denying her motion to

suppress the statements made during this interview.

There can be no doubt this error was prejudicial. It was

only in her statements to Barbanica that appellant told the

story of the baby being born into the toilet, damning

herself by her admissions that che heard a gurgle (proving

the baby was alive) yet left the baby with his head

submerged in the toilet. We cannot assume appellant

would have testified if these statements had been

excluded. Without these statements, it could have been

proved the baby was born alive -- both pathologists so

testified -- and appellant disposed of his body in her

garbage and told none for several days, but the

prosecution would have had no direct evidence of what in

fact happened to the baby and no evidence to contradict

appellant’s initial report to the nurse and doctor that she

had delivered the child in the shower and believed it was

dead because it was blue and unmoving. Even if a jury

could have believed appellant caused the baby’s death,

there would have been little or no evidence from which to

find the intent required to prove murder. Clearly,

admission of appellant’s statements to Barbanica was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v.

34

Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 285-302, 310; People v.

Esqueda, supre, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) [31]

In view of our conclusion that appellant’s conviction

must be reversed, it is not necessary for us to reach

appellant’s additional claims of error.

The judgment is reversed.

Kline, P.J.

We concur:

Haerle, J.

Lambden, J.

ot Bl a KOE 2 Py 6 TRS OR Rr is <1

35

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. A072044

MARIAFELISSA SMITH, (Contra Costa County

Super. Ct. No. 9509894)

Defendant and Appellant

BY THE COURT:

The petition for rehearing is denied.

The written opinion filed on July 3, 1997, is modified

in the following respects:

At page 30, the second full paragraph is deleted and

the following inserted in its place:

"We conclude appellant was in custody, for purposes

of Miranda, during her interview by Detective Barbanica.

The trial court thus erred in denying her motion to

suppress the statements made during this interview.

There can be no doubt this error was prejudicial. Aside

from appellant’s own trial testimony it was only in her

statements to Barbanica that appellant told the story of

the baby being born into the toilet, damning herself by her

admissions that she heard a gurgle (suggesting strongly the

baby was alive) yet left the baby with his head submerged

in the toilet. We cannot assume appellant would have so

testified if these custodial [2] statements had been

36

excluded.” Without these statements, it could have been

1. In its brief, respondent argued appellant was not in

custody when she made her statement to Detective

Barbanica but did not suggest that if she was found to

have been in custody, the error in admitting her statement

could be deemed harmless. Appellant specifically noted

this absence of harmless error in its reply brief and

respondent did not contest the point until after our initial

opinion. In a petition for rehearing, respondent asserts

for the first time the error in admitting appellant’s

statement is harmless because her trial testimony tells the

same story as the extrajudicial statement.

Respondent’s argument is based on the assumption

Oregon v. Elstad (1984) 470 U.S. 298, "implicitly overruled"

Harrison v. United States (1968) 392 U.S. 219. Harrison

held that if introduction of an inadmissible confession

impels a defendant to testify at trial, that testimony may

not be used on retrial. Elstad held that a failure to

comply with Miranda, “unaccompanied by any actual

coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine

the suspect’s ability to exercise his free will," does not

require suppression of a subsequent extrajudicial

statement given after Miranda warnings. (470 U'S. at p.

309, italics added.) Far from overruling Harrison, Elstad

reaffirmed that "[i]f the prosecution has actually violated

the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by introducing an

inadmissible confession at trial, compelling the defendant

to testify in rebuttal, the rule announced in Harrison v.

United States . . . precludes use of the testimony on

retrial." (/d., at pp. 316-317.)

Neither Elstad nor Harrison directly dealt with the

question whether a defendant’s testimony at trial may be

used to find a Miranda violation harmless error.

However, at least in the situation where the defendant’s

statements are not simply obtained without proper

37

proved the baby was born alive -- both pathologists so

testified -- and appellant [3] disposed of his body in her

garbage and told no one for several days, but the

prosecution would have had no direct evidence of what in

fact happened to the baby and no evidence to contradict

appellant’s initial report to the nurse and doctor that she

had delivered the child in the shower and believed it was

dead because it was blue and unmoving. Even if a jury

could have believed appellant caused the baby’s death,

there would have been little or no evidence from which to

warnings but are psychologically coerced or where the

defendant is compelled to testify in response to the

improperly admitted statements, both cases support the

conclusion that the trial testimony may not be so used.

This is consistent with the rule in California -- which has

continued to be applied in cases that post-date Elstad --

that in evaluating whether Miranda error is harmless, it

will not be assumed the defendant would have testified if

the inadmissible statements had been suppressed. (People

v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 280; People v. Esqueda,

supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.) In support of its

assertion that Harrison has been overruled by Elstad,

respondent cites Peri v. Director, Department of

Corrections (7th Cir. 1987) 817 F.2d 448, 450, fn. 2. In

that case, the although district court had reached the

conclusion 1espondent advances, the Court of Appeals

declined to decide the issue, as it rejected the defendant’s

contention that his confession was unknowing and

involuntary.

Given the lack of evidence of appellant’s intent apart

from the pretrial statements, there appears to be no

reason appellant would have testified as she did except for

the admission of her pretrial statements. In these

circumstances, Elstad gives no reason for departing from

the rule followed in Boyer and Esqueda.

Le

38

find the intent required to prove murder. Clearly,

admission of appellant’s statements to Barbanica was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Arizona v.

Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 285-302, 310; People v.

Esqueda, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th at p. 1487.)"

These modifications do not effect a change in the

judgment.

Dated: Aug 4 1997 KLINE, P.J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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