Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Helms v. United States

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Supreme Court, US.

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No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

AIRMAN FIRST CLASS SAMUEL T. HELMS II,

PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT

Petition For a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Thomas R. Uiselt

Captain, United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

Counsel of Record

Douglas H. Kohrt

Colonel, United States Air Force

Chief, Appellate Defense Division

Counsel for Petitioner

Air Force Legal Services Agency

Appellate Defense Division

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343

Bolling AFB, DC 20332-8000

202-767-1562

October 1997 | 4 of

oS

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether Petitioner’s Due Process rights were violated

when he was convicted of larceny of basic allowances for

quarters (BAQ) and overseas housing allowance (OHA)

payments even though he took no affirmative step to take,

obtain or withhold the allowances from the United States.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED ...........-cc-cceecee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.....................

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REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ......

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APPENDIX A

(Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals

Sor Te Armed TOPCO). cos i kes kee cs beens

APPENDIX B

(Opinion of the United States Air Force

Court of Criminal Anpeeia).... . ... .. «<5 0s 050s

APPENDIX C

United States v. Antonelli, ACM 28856

(AF Ct.Crim.App, 19 January 1996) ..........

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) ............05.- 3

Military Cases:

United States v. Antonelli, ACM 28856

(A.F.C.M.R. 19 April 1991), 35 M.J. 122

(C.M.A. 1992), 37 M.J. 932 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993),

43 M.J. 183 (1995), ACM 28856

(AF Ct.Crim.App, 19 January 1996) ............. 3-9

United States v. Gray , 44 M.J. 585

(NMC Ct.Crim.App, 1996), pet denied,

iin es yh beets Ce deuseses 8,9

United States v. Sundeen, 45 MJ 508

SP ARAMA, 2990) oe eee ce wt ens recce 6,7,9

Federal Statutes:

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Pte 525, es BO UA FZ) one cence ees 1,6

ee

The petitioner, Airman First Class Samuel T. Helms II,

respectfully prays that a writ of certiorari issue to review the

order and judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces entered in his case on 28 August 1997,

OPINIONS BELOW

The order and judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces, reported at United States v.

Helms, 47 M.J. 1 (1997), is located at Appendix A. The

unpublished opinion of the United States Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals, United States v. Helms, ACM 31250 (A.F.

Ct. Crim. App., 6 June 1996) is located at Appendix B.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces was entered on 28 August 1997. The

jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1259(3) (West Supp. 1996) and 10 U.S.C. § 867(a)(3) (West

Supp. 1996).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States provides, in relevant part:

“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or

property, without due process law .. .”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On 29-30 March 1994, appellant was tried by a general

court-martial consisting of military judge sitting alone.

Contrary to his pleas, petitioner was convicted of larceny of

about $11,000 of basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) and

overseas housing allowance (OHA) in violation of Article 121

of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. He was acquitted of

dishonorably failing to pay an overpayment of about $11,000

of the same BAQ and OHA.

Appellant was sentenced to a bad conduct discharge, ten

months confinement, reduction to airman basic and a

reprimand. On i July 1994, the convening authority approved

the findings and sentence as adjudged. On 6 June 1996, the

Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Appendix A.

On 28 August 1997, the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces affirmed the decision of the Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals. Appendix B.

AIC Helms and his wife arrived at Rhein-Main AB,

Germany in the summer of 1992 when he was authorized to

live in off base, ‘economy’ housing and thus receive Basic

Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and Overseas Housing

Allowance (OHA). He applied for and began receiving BAQ

and OHA in July 1992. Pros Exh 1, para 2. OHA is a military

entitlement as are BAQ and VHA. See Pros Exh 1-S. In

October 1992, A1C Helms applied for government housing

and moved into it at the end of December 1992. This

terminated his eligibility for BAQ and OHA. Pros Exh 1,

6-12. However, AlC Helms’ servicing Accounting and

Finance Office failed to terminate BAQ/VHA payments and

he received them until the time of his out-processing in

October 1993. Pros Exh 1, para 8, Pros Exh 14—15.

A1C Helms followed the standard procedures in

applying for on base housing and filled out all related

paperwork honestly and correctly. It was the duty of the

Wiesbaden Housing Office to prepare and send

documentation of AlC Helms’ change of status to the Lindsey

Air Station Accounting and Finance Office in turn was

required to send it to the Rhein-Main Accounting and Finance

Office which was responsible for terminating the BAQ/OHA

payments to A1C Helms. One of these offices at one of these

facilities failed to carry out their part and the payments were

never stopped. Pros Exh i, para 7, Pros Exh 13. AlC Helms

continued to receive the payments through no fault of his

own. Even if, at some date during the charged period, A1C

Helms or his wife may have suspected that he was being

overpaid, as the government attempted to show at trial and the

Air Force Court assumed in its opinion (Helms, slip. op. at 3),

a’ most, this should have supported a charge of dereliction of

duty—not larceny. See United States v. Antonelli, 37 MJ 932,

938, n. 14 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993).

In any case, the Air Force did not discover this error until

A1C Helms reported to Accounting and Finance at Rhein-

Main as part of out-processing and the clerk, Sgt Enlow,

asked about AIC Helms’ housing status. AlC Helms

answered honestly and told him he was in government

housing. Sgt Enlow saw that AlC Helms had been receiving

BAQ/VHA for the whole period. He terminated payments and

informed A1C Helms that the overpayment would have to be

recouped. By the time of trial, Accounting and Finance had

recouped about $5,200 of the approximately $ 11,000 owed.

Pros Exh 1, para 8.

REASON FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The test for legal sufficiency of the evidence is “whether,

after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

Prior to this case, the issue regarding larceny under Article

121 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice most recently

received the attention of the Court of Appeals for the Armed

Forces in United States v. Antonelli, 43 MJ 183 (1995). Senior

Airman Antonelli’s ex-wife, at the time of their divorce in

1975, obtained a child support order for their daughter. Based

upon this, Antonelli qualified for and received Basic Allowance

for Quarters (BAQ) and Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) at

the ‘with dependent’ rate. However, his daughter had received

no money from him since 1977, nor had she ever resided with

him subsequent to the divorce. On 4 November 1987, Antonelli

signed a form recertifying that he was providing support for his

daughter which allowed him to continue to receive BAQ and

VHA at the with dependent rate. An investigation was initiated

in 1989 and Antonelli was charged with false official statement

and larceny of the with dependent rate BAQ and VHA and

convicted of both offenses in 1990. The larceny alleged

included some of the period prior to the false recertification in

1987. The prosecution relied upon the theory of false

withholding for the period leading up to the false recertification

on 4 November 1987. Antonelli, 37 MJ at 933-934.

The Air Force Court overturned the conviction for the

period prior to the false recertification finding that these facts

did not establish wrongful withholding. United States v

Antonelli, ACM 28856, (A.F.C.M.R. 19 April 1991). The

government appealed and the then Court of Military Appeals

remanded the case for the Air Force Court to determine whether

a wrongful withholding might be established from a bailment

or wrongful conversion. United States v. Antonelli, 35 MJ 122

(C.M.A. 1992). The Air Force Court reexamined this area and

again concluded that larceny was not established with these

facts and sent it back to the Court of Military Appeals.

Antonelli, 37 MJ 932 (A.F.C.M.R. 1993). The Court of Military

Appeals, in its subsequent review of the case, found that the Air

Force Court failed to correctly follow its guidance in its earlier

opinion and remanded it yet again. Antonelli, 43 MJ 183. The

Air Force Court finally affirmed Antonelli’s larceny conviction

for the entire period charged, in its last opinion on the case

(unpublished) on 19 January 1996. Appendix C.

In reaching its conclusion in Antonelli, the Court of

Military Appeals required the Air Force Court to make its

legal sufficiency review in the crucial light of Antonelli's false

recertification.

[E]ven if one hypothetically accepts the proposition

that a servicemember who accepts found money and

who does nothing to correct the continued cash flow

is not criminally liable (a proposition that we do not

reach in this appeal, but cf. United States v.

Antonelli, 35 MJ at 130-131 (Crawford, J.

concurring in the result)), any affirmative action

either to ensure the inappropriate continuation of

the elevated allowances or to mislead officials in a

way SO as to co-opt a recoupment has more than

civil-indebtedness ramifications.

Antonelli, 43 MJ at 185 (emphasis in original). The Court of

Military Appeals, in Antonelli, supra, apparently left open the

question of whether an individual who receives BAQ type

payments as a result of some error, not as a result of an

affirmative act on his part, can be found guilty of larceny.

In the appellant’s case, at no time did he falsify any

document or otherwise lie about his status or take any other

affirmative act to ensure that the erroneous payments would

continue. To the contrary, he carried out all actions as directed

and when asked about his housing status, he responded

honestly. It was the failure of one of the offices involved in

this unusually complicated bureaucratic chain (at a time when

at least one of the facilities was in the process of closing

down) that caused the payments to continue, not A1C Helms.

On 6 June 1996, the Air Force Court when next

addressing this issue in the appellant’s case, decided that A1C

Helms was aware of the overpayment and found his failure to

come forward to stop the payments “an affirmative action

designed to ensure the continuation of the allowances which

he was not entitled to receive.” Helms, slip op at 3. They thus

found the facts legally and factually sufficient.

However, both the Navy-Marine Corps and Army Courts

of Criminal Appeals have addressed this issue since Antonelli,

supra, and both have come to different conclusions than that

of the Air Force Court.

The Army Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this

issue in United States v. Sundeen, 45 MJ 508 (Army Ct. Crim

App 1996). Sundeen pled guilty to being absent without

authority and wrongful appropriation of “excess pay.”

Sundeen had pay problems that repeated visits to various

finance offices did not resolve. He set up direct pay deposits

to a local bank (it had been going to another out of state bank)

in an effort to correct these pay errors and was soon receiving

basic pay in both accounts, i.e. basic pay overpayments.

During his plea providency inquiry, Sundeen admitted that he

“suspected” that he was being overpaid but did not know by

how much. However, there was no evidence that Sundeen

“made any affirmative misrepresentations, made untrue

certifications, or took deceptive actions designed to create or

perpetuate the payroll overpayments. In all his dealings with

finance officials, appellant appeared open and forthright about

his situation.” Sundeen, 45 MJ at 510.

The Army Court summarized the relevant case law

governing larceny as follows:

As drafted, Article 121, UCMJ, combined several

property offenses, one of which was embezzlement

(wrongful withholding-type larcenies). “When

testing whether an offense of wrongful withholding

has been . . . providently pleaded to, we search for

two factors . . . (1) a fiduciary relationship; and, (2)

an initial lawful possession.” A fiduciary

relationship exists, and includes the legal duty to

return or deliver to the owner entrusted property,

when such a return or delivery is due or demanded.

(citations omitted.)

As a general rule, no inherent legal duty to account

for erroneously transferred property exits. Even if

the recipient is aware of the error, absent a specific,

identifiable fiduciary relationship, such

circumstances involve no criminality and cannot

support a guilty plea to wrongful appropriation as a

matter of law. (citations omitted.)

An exception to this general rule involves accepting

increased allowances on behalf of one’s dependents.

However, Antonelli specifically distinguishes

allowances from salary, and that precedent does not

extend to erroneous overpayments of basic pay.

(citations omitted.)

Sundeen, 45 MJ at 510-11.

The Army Court, after the above extensive analysis of

the Congressional intent, case law history and resultant

requirements of wrongful withholding, found that there has to

be an underlying fiduciary relationship. The Army Court went

on to interpret the holdings in Antonelli to mean that when the

government pays a member increased allowances for the

benefit of dependents—this creates just such a fiduciary

relationship. Thus, the Army Court found that a member can

be found guilty of wrongful withholding and thus larceny of

funds paid for the support of dependents even if there is no

affirmative act on the part of a member. However, where the

money paid is for the benefit of the member, i.e. here base pay

or as the Navy Court found with housing allowances, there

can be no guilt of larceny without an affirmative act, e.g. a

false recertification.

Prior to the Air Force Court’s decision in the appellant’s

case, but after the Court of Military Appeals’ decision in

Antonelli, supra, the Navy-Marine Corps Court of Criminal

eee ee Se

Appeals reviewed the same fact pattern and came to the

opposite conclusion than that of the Air Force Court in United

States v. Gray, 44 MJ 585 (NMC Ct. Crim App 1996).

- Seaman Recruit Gray, as did AlC Helms, moved his

household and became ineligible to receive further BAQ/VHA

payments. As in A1C Helms’ case, in Gray “the government’s

evidence in the appellant’s case indicates that the housing

office had primary responsibility for reporting the changed

circumstances to the appellant’s command” and that although

Seaman Gray knew about the overpayments and remained

silent while receiving the extra pay he took no affirmative

action “to ensure the inappropriate continuation of the

overpayment or to mislead of officials in a way as to co-opt a

recoupment.” Gray, 44 MJ at 587 (citing Antonelli, supra).

The Navy Court found that “the appellant’s passive conduct,

although it may have ramifications relating to dereliction of a

duty by omission, does not rise to the same level of criminality

as would more affirmative action,” i.e. these facts were not

sufficient to establish guilt of larceny. Gray, 44 MJ at 588.

Obviously, this area of law has proven difficult for the

courts to interpret and thus appellate guidance to trial level

practitioners has not been clear.! In fact, the service courts

have examined the precedent of the Court of Appeals for the

Armed Forces and have arrived at at opposite results.

The Navy and the Army Courts of Criminal Appeals’

decisions are consistent with each other as well as the

precedent of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The

'Judge Crawford suggests that a solution to the time consuming and

apparently confusing historical analysis this issue has generated would

simply be to find that Congress intended military courts to apply the “clear

language” of the statute, i.e. applying the plain meaning of the words

rather than look to the historical context of the decision to generate the

statutory language. See, J. Crawford’s concurrence in the result in

Antonelli, 35 MJ at 130.

‘“Army/Navy Rule’ is that there can be no larceny of

Overpayments of pay or entitlements even where the accused

is aware of overpayment (unless delivered for the benefit of a

dependent and not forwarded to that dependent by the

accused, i.e. Antonelli’s situation) absent some wrongful,

affirmative act. Gray, supra; Sundeen, supra.

To the contrary are the unpublished Helms opinion from

one panel of the Air Force Court and the Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces’ decision which affirmed the Air Force

Court’s decision. The Air Force Court in this case found that

where an accused knows or suspects there were overpayments

of housing allowances (where no issue regarding support of

dependents is involved), his or her failure to act is “an

affirmative action designed to ensure the continuation of the

allowances which he was not entitled to receive.” Helms, slip

op at 3. Therefore, he can be found guilty of larceny. The

Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces held that “once a

service member realizes that he or she is receiving pay or

allowances and forms the intent to steal that property, the

servicemember has committed larceny.” Helms, slip op at 8.

The Court found that appellant realized he was mistakenly

receiving housing allowances and formed an intent to steal it.

CONCLUSION

The more better reasoned approach to this issue is that

adopted by the Army and Navy Courts: absent a fiduciary

duty such as that created where a member is given payments

provided specifically for the support of dependents (Antonelli,

supra), there is no larceny of overpayments of pay and

allowances absent some affirmative misdeed, e.g. false

recertification, on the part of an accused. This rule does not

prohibit the government from prosecuting, for dereliction of

duty, someone who finds themselves in Gray’s or Helms’

position—in possession of an erroneously produced

10

overpayment windfall, provided the prosecution can prove

knowledge of the overpayment. Nor does it prohibit the

government from prosecuting someone in Gray’s or Helms’

position for dishonorable failure to pay a just debt once the

overpayment is identified and the member is notified of the

debt owed to the United States and given a reasonable

opportunity to repay (as was done in the appellant’s case and

he was acquitted). This rule merely prevents the government

from prosecuting a member under a theory of larceny where

the accused has taken no wrongful affirmative action, but in

spite of this, has come into the possession of a windfall

through no fault of his or her own—but rather to the fault of

the United States.

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

THOMAS R. UISELT

Captain, United States Air Force

Appellate Defense Counsel

Counsel of Record

DOUGLAS H. KOHRT

Colonel, United States Air Force

Chief, Appellate Defense Division

Counsel for Petitioner

Air Force Legal Services Agency

Appellate Defense Division

112 Luke Avenue, Suite 343

Bolling AFB DC 20332-8000

(202) 767-1562

la

Appendix A

United States, Appellee

v.

Samuel T. HELMS, II, Airman First Class

U. S. Air Force, Appellant

No. 96-1167

Crim. App. No. 31250

United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

Argued April 9, 1997

Decided August 28, 1997

Counsel

For Appellant: Major Ormond R. Fodrea (argued); Lieutenant

Colonel Kim L. Sheffield (on brief); Colonel Jay L. Cohen.

For Appellee: Captain Mitchel Neurock (argued); Colonel

Theodore J. Fink (on brief); Major LeEllen Coacher.

Military Judge: Bruce T. Brown

Opinion of the Court

CRAWFORD, Judge:

A military judge sitting as a general court-martial at

Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany, found appellant guilty of

larceny of military property, in violation of Article 121,

Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC § 921. The

convening authority approved the sentence of a bad-conduct

discharge, confinement for 10 months, reduction to the lowest

enlisted grade, and a reprimand. The Court of Criminal

2a

Appeals affirmed the findings and the sentence in an

unpublished opinion.

We granted review of the following issue:

WHETHER THE FACTS ARE LEGALLY

SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF

LARCENY OF BAQ AND OHA PAYMENTS.

We hold that the facts are legally sufficient to support

appellant’s larceny conviction under the standard established

in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781,

2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

FACTS

On assignment in Germany, appellant lived off base and

received a basic allowance for quarters (BAQ) and an

overseas housing allowance (OHA). He subsequently

requested a move into government quarters. Standard

procedure was for the housing representative to process the

paperwork to stop the housing allowances. For some reason,

appellant’s housing allowances did not end when he entered

government housing. Despite his move to on-base housing,

appellant continued to receive both BAQ and OHA for 11

months. He was overpaid more than $11,000.

At trial, Sergeant (Sgt) Sykes, the NCOIC of Customer

Service in the Accounting and Finance Office, testified that

she saw appellant’s wife at a track meet during the summer of

1993 and that appellant’s wife said “her husband felt that they

were being overpaid” for housing. According to Sgt Sykes,

appellant was present during part of this conversation, and she

advised him to stop by her office to find out if he was being

overpaid. She testified as follows:

A. I told Airman Helms that I needed him to come

in so I could verify if he was, in fact, being

overpaid; how much he was being overpaid; and

3a

at that point, | could figure out a repayment

schedule so that it wouldn’t put him into much

of a financial bind.

Q. What, if anything, did he say to you when you

tell [sic] him this?

A. He said, “Okay.”

Did he indicate to you when he would follow up

with repaying these overpayments?

©

A. No. He didn’t indicate when. My statement was

that when we got back, that he should come in

and see me and then we could figure out a way

to repay.

Q. Did either Airman Helms or his wife ever come

in to see you?

A. No.

Appellant’s wife testified that she took over the family

financial matters when they moved into government quarters.

She stated that appellant never saw his leave and carnings

Statements and that she took care of paying ail of the bills.

Mrs. Helms acknowledged that she had a conversation with

Sgt Sykes about a possible overpayment but contended that

appellant was standing about 75 feet away from them during

the conversation. Mrs. Helms testified that she may not have

remembered to tell appellant to go to the finance office as Sgt

Sykes had directed.

Appellant’s continued receipt of housing allowances was

discovered when he began providing information for a

recertification form while preparing to separate from the Air

Force. Appellant informed the separation and retirement

technician, Sgt Enlow, that he was living in government

housing. Sgt Enlow discovered that appellant had been

receiving housing allowances and told appellant that he had

4a

been overpaid and would have to repay the money or put in a

request for a waiver. Appellant did not seem surprised by the

news and made no comment. Sgt Enlow then asked appellant

how he would like to handle the situation, and appellant said

that he had to think about it. Sgt Enlow testified that he told

appellant to let the finance office know as soon as possible,

preferably, that very day.

DISCUSSION

This Court has applied the benchmark test for legal

sufficiency established in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,

319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (197%). “The test

for... [legal sufficiency of the evidence] is whether,

considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, a reasonable factfinder could have found all the

essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States

v. Turner, 25 MJ 324 (CMA 1987), citing Jackson, supra at

319 99 S.Ct. at 2789. Writing in United States v. Harper, 22

MJ 157, 161 (CMA 1986), then-Judge Cox stated, “In this

context, sufficient evidence generally means some legal and

competent evidence from which a court-martial may find or

infer beyond a reasonable doubt those facts required by law

for conviction.” See also United States v. Pritchett, 31 MJ

213, 216 (CMA 1990).

Until now, this Court has reserved the question of

whether “a servicemember who accepts found money and

who does nothing to correct the continued cash flow is not

criminally liable. . . .” United States v. Antonelli, 43 MJ 183,

185 (1995), citing United States v. Antonelli, 35 MJ 122, 130-

31 (CMA 1992) (Crawford, J., concurring in the result).

However, we have made clear that “any affirmative action

either to ensure the inappropriate continuation of the elevated

allowances or to mislead officials in a way so as to co-opt a

Sa

recoupment has more than civil-indebtedness ramifications.”

Antonelli, 43 MJ at 185.

The mistaken delivery of property to an individual who

realizes the mistake and simultaneously forms the intent to

Steal the property at the moment of receipt constitutes larceny

at common law. W. LaFave & A. Scott, 2 Substantive

Criminal Law § 8.2(g) at 342-43 (1986). Furthermore, where

the individual does not realize the mistake at the time of

receipt but realizes it later and then forms the requisite intent,

there is a larceny as well. Para. 46c(1)(f)(i), Part IV, Manual

for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.)(“Although a

person gets property by a taking or obtaining which ... was

without a concurrent intent to steal, a larceny is nevertheless

committed if an intent to steal is formed after the taking or

obtaining and the property is wrongfully withheld with that

intent.”); United States v. Aldridge, 2 USCMA 330, 8 CMR

130, 1953 WL 1645 (1953); United States v. Cox, 37 MJ 543

(NMCMR 1993); see also State v. Langford, 467 So.2d 41

(La. App. 4th Cir. 1985). This latter larceny relies on the

“fictional notion of continuing trespass” to find the concurrent

existence of the taking element and the requisite intent.

LaFave & Scott, supra, § 8.5(f) at 366.

We now hold that once a servicemember realizes that he

or she is erroneously receiving pay or allowances and forms

the intent to steal that property, the servicemember has

committed larceny. Thus, the analysis in this case must focus

on whether the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that

appellant (1) realized he was mistakenly receiving housing

allowances and (2) formed an intent to steal it. Giving proper

deference to the military judge and the Court of Criminal

Appeals, as well as viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the Government, we hold that the evidence is

legally sufficient to support appellant’s conviction for larceny.

6a

Sgt Sykes testified that appellant was present when she

and Mrs. Helms discussed appellant’s possible overpayment.

In fact, she testified that she spoke directly to appellant and

informed him to visit her at the finance office so that they

could straighten the matter out. When Sgt Enlow told

appellant that he had been overpaid, appellant did not appear

surprised. The Court of Criminal Appeals, which has

factfinding authority under Article 66(c), UCMJ, 10 USC

866(c), was “convinced that appellant knew he was receiving

these allowances and was not entitled to them.” Unpub. op. at

3. The lower court also noted that the more than $11,000 in

housing allowances which appellant received amounted to

about 40% of his pay. /d. Viewing this evidence in the light

most favorable to the prosecution, a reasonable factfinder

could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant

realized he was receiving unauthorized housing allowances.

The evidence is also legally sufficient to establish that

appellant formed an intent to steal the housing allowances.

The Court of Criminal Appeals found Sgt Sykes’ testimony

that she advised appellant to stop by the finance office

credible. That court also found that appellant’s failure to

follow Sgt Sykes’ advice was an “affirmative action designed

to ensure the continuation of the allowances which he was not

entitled to receive.” Jd. We agree. A reasonable factfinder

could find that appellant’s inaction, in light of Sgt Sykes’

recommendation, constituted evidence of an “intent

permanently to deprive or defraud another person of the use

and benefit of property or to appropriate it to his own use...,”

which is required for a larceny conviction under Article

121(a)(1).

The decision of the United States Air Force Court of

Criminal Appeals is affirmed.

Chief Judge COX and Judges SULLIVAN, GIERKE,

and EFFRON concur.

7a

Appendix B

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

Vv.

Airman First Class SAMUEL T. HELMS II, FR254~-5998

United States Air Force

ACM 31250

6 June 1996

Sentence adjudged 30 March 1994 by GCM convened at

Rhein-Main Air Base, Germany. Military Judge: Bruce T.

Brown (sitting alone).

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for

10 months, reprimand, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Colonel Jay L Cohen and

Maior Ormond R. Fodrea.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel! Jeffery T.

Infelise, Colonel Thomas E. Schlegel, and Captain R. Scott

Howard.

Before

DIXON, SCHREIER, and STARR

Appellate Military Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

SCHREIER Senior Judge:

Contrary to his pleas, a military judge convicted

appellant of stealing Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ) and

8a

Overseas Housing Allowance (OHA) totalling about $11,000.

Article 121, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 921. The military judge

acquitted appellant of the dishonorable failure to repay the

stolen allowances. Article 134, UCMJ. The convening

authority approved the adjudged sentence of a bad-conduct

discharge, confinement for 10 months, reduction to E-1, and a

reprimand. Appellant alleges the evidence is factually and

legally insufficient to convict him of larceny. Finding no

error, we affirm.

FACTS

Following assignment to Germany, appellant initially

lived “on the economy” in non-government housing. While

living on the economy, he received both BAQ and OHA.

Military members who are not living in adequate government

quarters receive these allowances. Appellant’s allowances did

not cover all his housing and transportation costs, so, after

several months, he requested a move into government

quarters which was granted in December 1992.

Appellant acknowledged that he was no longer entitled

to BAQ once he moved into government quarters. A housing

office representative testified that their standard procedure

was to process the paperwork to finance to stop the housing

allowances. However, for some unknown reason, this did not

happen and appellant continued to receive the housing

allowances for another 10 months. The error was discovered

in October 1993 during outprocessing when appellant was

separating from the Air Force. The amount of the

overpayment was about $11,000.

Staff Sergeant Sykes, NCOIC of Customer Service in the

Accounting and Finance office, testified that Mrs. Helms,

appellant’s wife, approached her informally during summer

1993 at a track meet. She said that Mrs. Helms indicated that

She and appellant were concerned about a possible

overpayment. Sergeant Sykes stated that appellant was

9a

present during part of this conversation. She advised him to

stop by Finance to find out if he was being overpaid and, if

necessary, to work out a repayment schedule. This

conversation took place about three months before the

overpayment was discovered. There is no indication that

appellant ever followed up on Sergeant Sykes’ advice to stop

by Finance to find out if there was an overpayment.

Mrs. Helms testified that after they moved into

government quarters she assumed responsibility for their

financial matters picking up all mail and paying all bills. She

said that appellant never saw either his Leave and Earnings

statements or any bank statements because she destroyed

them after opening. She claimed that she never used a check

register, but knew how much money they had and told

appellant what was left after the bills were paid. Therefore,

she stated that appellant had no knowledge of their income or

any overpayment.

Mrs. Helms admitted that at some point she thought they

might be overpaid because she realized they were receiving

more money than their neighbors. She also verified the

conversation with Staff Sergeant Sykes. However, she

claimed that appellant was not present and that Sergeant

Sykes told her appellant would have to come to the Finance

office. However, at trial she could not remember if she ever

discussed these matters with her husband.

SUFFICIENCY THE EVIDENCE

Trial defense counsel moved to dismiss the larceny charge

for failure to state an offense, arguing that there is no duty to

report an overpayment before the normal recertification

process. The military judge denied the motion, finding that the

specification stated an offense. Appellant renews his argument

on appeal relying on this Court’s decision in United States v.

Antonelli, 37 M.J. 932 (A.F.C.M..R. 1993).

10a

However, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces

overturned this Court’s 1993 decision. United States v.

Antonelli, 43 M.J. 183 (1995); see also United States v.

Bulger, 41 M.J. 194, 196 (C.M.A. 1994). The Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces restated its position that

allowances paid to a service member for support, but which

are not used for support, remain the lawful property of the

United States.

The Antonelli decision was based on a case where the

accused affirmatively falsified documents showing that he

provided support for his dependents. Therefore, the Court left

open the issue of whether an individual who passively, rather

than actively, receives unauthorized allowances is also

criminally liable for the offense of larceny. See United States

v. Antonelli, 35 M.J. 122, 131 (C.M.A. 1992) (Crawford J.,

concurring in the result).

BAQ and OHA are paid to a member when adequate

government quarters are not available. A member who lives in

government quarters fails to meet the basic qualification for

those allowances. Therefore, the member is not entitled to

those allowances and they remain the property of the United

States. See United States v. Antonelli, 43 M.J. at 184 (citations

omitted); United States v. Stadler, __ M.J. — (A.F. Ct. Crim.

App. 8 May 1996).

Furthermore, we are convinced that appellant knew he

was receiving these allowances and was not entitled to them.

We find Mrs. Helms’ statement that appellant had no

knowledge of the overpayment unbelievable. Appellant

received over $11,000 in ten months. This amounted to

approximately 40% of his pay. This is not a case where the

overpayment was insignificant or lasted only a short time.

Additionally, we find Sergeant Sykes’ testimony that she

advised appellant to stop by Finance to determine if there was

an overpayment credible. Appellant’s failure to follow-up on

lla

this advice was an affirmative action designed to ensure the

continuation of allowances which he was not entitled to

receive. We find that the evidence is factually and legally

sufficient to find appellant guilty of larceny. Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); United States v. Turner, 25

M.J. 324 (C.M.A. 1987).

The findings of guilty and the sentence are correct in law

and fact and, on the basis of the entire record, are

AFFIRMED.

Chief Judge DIXON and Judge STARR concur.

OFFICIAL

ALVIN J. STRIBLING

Technical Sergeant, USAF

Chief Court Administrator

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Appendix C

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE COURT OF

CRIMINAL APPEALS

UNITED STATES

v.

Senior Airman ANTHONY M. ANTONELLI, FR532-—54—9447

United States Air Force

ACM 28856 (f rev)

19 January 1996

Sentence adjudged 19 May 1990 by GCM convened at Lowry

Air Force Base, Colorado. Military Judge: Robert E. Sears

and Robert N. Spencer.

Approved sentence: Bad-conduct discharge, confinement for 6

months, a fine of $10,000, and reduction to E-1.

Appellate Counsel for Appellant: Colonel Jay L. Cohen and

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Heimann.

Appellate Counsel for the United States: Colonel Jeffery T.

Infelise, Lieutenant Colonel Michael J. Breslin, and Major

John H. Kongable.

Before

PEARSON, BECKER, and MORGAN

Appellate Military Judges

_—__—_——_-

UPON FURTHER REVIEW

PER CURIAM:

On May 19, 1990, court members convicted appellant of

signing false official documents and stealing more than $100

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in military pay allowances from the United States. The court

sentenced him to a bad-conduct discharge, 6 months

confinement, a fine of $10,000, and reduction to E-1, which

the convening authority approved.

On appeal, appellant argued that a portion of the larceny

conviction was not supported by the evidence and he was

prejudiced by evidence of uncharged misconduct improperly

admitted during sentencing. On April 19, 1991, we granted

relief on both issues by modifying the larceny conviction to

shorten the length of the offense and reassessing the sentence

for it and the uncharged misconduct error. Reassessing, we

disapproved the final in total. United States v. Antonelli, ACM

28856 (A.F.C.M.R. Apr. 19, 1991) (unpub.).

The government appealed that portion of our decision

overturning the larceny conviction. On September 14, 1992,

the Court of Military Appeals, now the Court of Appeals for

the Armed Forces, set aside our decision on the larceny

conviction and remanded the case to us for review in light of

their opinion concerning the scope of the military’s larceny

statute. United States v. Antonelli, 35 M.J. 122 (C.M.A. 1992).

Once more, we considered the law and evidence and

once again modified the larceny conviction to shorten the

period of the offense and reassessed the sentence as we did

before. United States v. Antonelli, 37 M.J. 932 (A.F.C.M.R.

1993). Once more, the government appealed. Once more, the

Court of Appeals set aside our decision on the larceny

conviction and remanded. United States v. Antonelli, 43 M.J.

183 (1995).

Today, we affirm the original findings of guilty adjudged

on May 19, 1990, as we find the evidence legally and

factually sufficient in accordance with the Court of Appeals’

decision. See United States v. Turner, 25 M.J. 324 (C.M.A.

1987). We reassess the sentence only for the sentencing error,

a point which the government did not appeal. Reassessing we

14a

disapprove the fine in its entirety. See United States v.

Peoples, 29 M.J. 426 (C.M.A. 1990). The findings of guilty

and sentence, as reassessed, are correct in law and fact, and on

the basis of the entire record, are

AFFIRMED.

OFFICIAL

ALVIN J. STRIBLING

Technical Sergeant, USAF

Chief Court Administrator

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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