Opposition Brief — Microsoft Corp. v. Vizcaino
Supreme Court brief1998
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Supreme Court, U.S.
Pits k ee
JAN 5 1998
CLERK
5
4
No. 97-0854
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997
MICROSOFT CORPORATION, ef ai.,
Petitioners,
prin ene
DONNA VIZCAINO, et al.,
Respondents.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
RESPONDENTS’ OPPOSITION TO MOTIONS FOR LEAVE
TO SUBMIT AMICI BRIEFS BY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, et al,
and INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION, ef ai.
Stephen K. Strong
Counsel of Record
David F. Stobaugh
Bendich, Stobaugh & Strong, P.C.
506 Second Avenue, Suite 2010
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 622-3536
Counsel for Respondents
INTRODUCTION
Respondents oppose motions by employer groups to submit
two amici briefs. The motions, dated Wednesday, December 24,
1997, were not received by Respondents’ counsel until Friday,
January 2, 1998. The motions are by the Chamber of Commerce of
the U.S., et al. (hereafter “Chamber Br.”), and the Information
Technology Association, ef al. (hereafter “ITA Br.”).
ARGUMENT
The proposed amici briefs state they are in support of
Microsoft’s petition, which, in turn, seeks summary action.
Pronosed amici are employers’ groups related to Microsoft (e.g.,
Software Publishers Ass’n) and supporting Microsoft with amici
briefs below. The groups did not file and serve Respondents’
counsel with the proposed amici briefs until after Respondents’
Brief was already submitted, leaving no opportunity for
Respondents to deal with their arguments. In effect, this could
give Microsoft an additional 30 pages of reply briefs. Indeed,
Microsoft quotes and incorporates the proposed amici briefs in its
Reply.
SO Nee Le Se eae
If Microsoft were seeking full review, with briefing on the
merits after granting a writ of certiorari, Respondents would simply
deal with these points in their brief on the merits. Microsoft,
however, does not request full review and briefing. Pet., pp. 21,
22. The amici briefs should be rejected because they were not
submitted early enough to permit Respondents to address their
arguments in their brief in opposition.
The proposed briefs also shed no light whatsoever on the
issues of Washington law here. The Chamber brief cites not even a
single Washington case. The briefs instead propose, even though
this case is governed by Washington law, that this Court should
adopt, contrary to Erie, a rule of federal common law -- i.e., that
employers’ forms mislabeling employees as “contractors” always
control over the facts. This proposed rule is not only contrary to
the common law of Washington, it is also contrary to the general
common law of agency (see Restatement (2d) of Agency $220(2))
applied throughout the United States. See Nationwide Mutual Ins.
v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322-24 (1992)(adopting general common
law for purposes of defining “employee” under ERISA).
Interestingly, the Paul, Hastings law firm, submitting the
proposed amici brief for the Chamber, et al. (and which also
submitted two amici briefs in the Ninth Circuit for several
employer groups), has a very different public analysis of the Ninth
Circuit’s Vizcaino decision from that which it argues here. In the
Paul, Hastings public Website,' the firm states:
On July 24, 1997, the Ninth Circuit issued its long-awaited,
en banc decision in Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation,
holding that certain employee benefits might have to be
provided to individuals whom Microsoft had misclassified
as independent contractors. The majority’s logic was quite
simple:
* The benefit plans covered common law employees.
¢ The plaintiffs were common law employees.
* Hence, the plaintiffs were eligible or potentially
eligible for plan benefits.
* * *
Although the holding in Microsoft is fact-specific (and,
therefore, possibly of limited precedential value), the
message of the case is unmistakably clear, at least to
employers in the Ninth Circuit: Do not expect a benefit
exclusion premised on employment status misclassification
to be upheld. (Emphasis original.)
Accordingly, the Paul, Hastings firm recommended that employers
' www.phjw.com/ca2.htm (1/5/98).
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“take appropriate steps to minimize worker misclassification,
which is endemic.” Jd.
Similarly, the Seyfarth, Shaw law firm, submitting the
proposed ITA, et al., amici brief, summarized pertinent portions of
the Ninth Circuit’s Vizcaino decision on its public Website’:
The ESPP was intended to comply with Section 423 of the
Internal Revenue Code and, as a result, covered all
employees of Microsoft.
* * *
...[ T]he court found that Microsoft intended the ESPP to
comply with Section 423 of the Internal Revenue Code,
which requires that all common law employees be covered
by each offering under a plan. Because the plaintiffs met
the common law employee test, regardless of their
independent contractor designation, they were eligible to
purchase stock under the ESPP.
... In addition, the court found that by incorporating the
requirements of Code Section 423 into the ESPP, Microsoft
had extended an offer or constructive offer to the plaintiffs
that was a sufficient basis for a contractual right to purchase
stock under that arrangement.
CONCLUSION
If the Court were to review the merits of the Washington
common law issues as Microsoft requests, there are many
? www.seyfarth.com/insights/ MICROSOF.HTM (1/5/98)
arguments in amici’s briefs that should be disregarded because they
are based on false factual assertions concerning the nature of the
employees in the class.
The proposed briefs should be rejected.
DATED: January 5, 1998.
Respgttfully submitted,
STEPHEN K. STRONG
Counsel of Record
DAVID F. STOBAUGH
BENDICH, STOBAUGH & STRONG, P.C.
506 Second Avenue, #2010
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 622-3536
Attorneys for Respondents
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.