Opposition Brief — Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of America
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Supreme Court. U S.
=e. £&
FEB 9 1998
No. 97-834 tie
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
ABE POLLIN, et al.,
Petitioners,
Vv.
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ef ai.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
WILLIAM H. JEFFRESS, JR.
Counsel of Record
Of Counsel: NIKI KUCKES
ROBERT L. NELSON DAVID S. COHEN
LAWRENCE B. HAGEL JODY MANIER KRIS
PARALYZED VETERANS MILLER, CASSIDY, LARROCA
OF AMERICA & Lewin, L.L.P.
801 18th Street, N.W. 2555 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 872-1300 (202) 293-6400
Attorneys for Respondents
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS ¢ WASHINGTON, D.C. @ 1-800-347-8208
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
eT Ge BI ra tieeccscctrcnssceseracissvenenesennsensen l
A. The Statute and the Regulation 2.0.2.0... 3
B. The Justice Department’s Consistent
EES aE REE oT 4
C. The Design of the MCI Conter....................-cccccccesess 6
SESE AEE 18 EY POT ROOT 6
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.................0............ 9
I. THE LAW IS CLEAR ON THE DEGREE OF
DEFERENCE DUE AN AGENCY’S
INTERPRETATION OF ITS OWN REGULATION ...... 9
A. For Halfa Century, This Court Has Applied
a Clear, Consistent Standard to Agency
Interpretations of Regulations ........................ccccc00 9
B. There Is No Open Issue as to the Deference
Afforded Regulatory Interpretations That Are
Issued in “Informal Formats”..............................---+. 1]
C. The Cases Cited by Petitioners Reveal
No Conflict on Any Issue Presented
a cscesscsesesaces 12
D. This Case Does Not Involve Chevron, and
the Alleged Conflict Cited by Petitioners
Could Not Be Decided Here ..........................cccceeee0 15
E. Petitioners Seek The Reversal of a
Half-Century of Unquestioned Decisions
PS OE 16
Il. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS ON
HOW TO DISTINGUISH “INTERPRETATIVE”
FROM “SUBSTANTIVE” RULES..................--..2eeeee 17
A. Petitioners Miscite and Misread Authority ................ 19
B. The Circuit Courts Agree That the “Impact”
of an Interpretation Is Not Determinative.................. 20
C. This Court Recently Has Offered Clear
Guidance On This Precise Issue...........................0.... 22
Ill. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR
CONSIDERING THE QUESTIONS
REE LIS A EE RRS Re 24
IIIT stiicscsancnintiniacesénindeemcaacieiiadanamdainni amas 26
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases: Page
American Hospital Association v. Bowen,
834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..........0...0.... 23
American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Service, 707 F.2d 548
ce cc csnee 21
Anaheim Memorial Hospital v. Shalala,
130 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1997)...00000 oo. 1]
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437
(7th Cir. 1994), aff'd on other grounds
sub nom., Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R.,
Ee ee 13
Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905
EE ARSE ts the le 2, passim
Avol v. HHS, 883 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1989).......... 14
Board of Trustees of Knox County Hospital
v. Shalala, 1998 WL 35149 (7th Cir. 1998)..... 11
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,
325 U.S. 410 (1945) ooo ecco ecccccccceeceeseeeees 2,7, 10,11
Brown Express, Inc. v. United States,
607 F.2d 695 (Sth Cir. 1979)...00.0 0. 18
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,
RES TS A 14
Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429
Pe ies cecsatcineecotephoceve coves. 18
Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment
Center, 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997).......... 25
Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Commission v. Pena,
113 F.3d 1468 (7th Cir. 1997)... eee. 13
Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331
aS a 18
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)............ 13, 15, 16
iV
Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala,
118 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1997).....0....0. ee. 14, 21
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
Re es Mati rhiics tis tercncisiensinne. 22-23
Comet Enterprise Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp.,
128 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1997)...................ccceee 1]
Datheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 521
a aia a dilaabralirctiinicbonnds 14
Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971)......... 10
Elaine ’s Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Department of
Labor, 106 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 1997) ............... 11
Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center v. Knoll,
61 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
ERT ee 13, 21
First National Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185
| REE i ean re 21
FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747
I i ae 18, 21
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,
GEG ULE. SES CIID ovvvcccccvicceceeesss..-.... 12, 14, 16, 24
General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,
742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (in banc),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985) ...........0---. 20
Headrick v. Rockwell International Corp.,
24 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1994) ........ecccccscseesseees 13, 19
Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)...... 19, 20
Independent Living Resources v. Oregon
Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Ore. 1997) 25
INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969) ..............00000- 10
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Local 441 Retail,
Wholesale & Department Store Union,
AFL-CIO, 39 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 1994)........ 11
Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1997) .. 13
Kelley v. EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
17 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 1994).....................0....000 13
Knuizen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing
Center, 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987) .......... 19
La Casa del Convaleciente v. Sullivan,
od ee By Te L&D.’ 1 Ieee 21, 22
Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983).. 21, 22
Love v. Tippy, 1998 WL 3141 (8th Cir. 1997) ..... 1]
Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986)... 10
Metropolitan School District v. Davila,
969 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1992)... eee. 18, 20, 21
Motor Vehicle Manufacturer Association v.
New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation, 17 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1994)....... 13
Mullins Coal Co. v. Department of Labor,
rt eee 10
New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 1997) 11
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v.
Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.,
423 U.S. 12 (1975) (per curiam) ...........0....... 10
Oklahoma v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 595
a iscesaws 11
P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC,
Eb pe Gf ls Ae, , Ocean 11
Ramey v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ll
Reich v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313
ERY ET ek a 14-15
Reich v. John Alden Life Insurance Co.,
be mR . : : a 13
Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995)...0.......0cccccceee. 14
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,
I oi icintcnsannennnsnséniiscsvenseanece 10
Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA,
971 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1992)... ee. 18, 19
Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,
Eee a 10, passim
Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center,
50 P.36 522.(6@ Cir. 1995)......2..:..0:............... 14
Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 172
I eee 11
Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.,
71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
PO Be Fe Ce vhs cisnsci seca iil ssecses 13
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)..... 13, 14
Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12
ho Ae. Ae a NO a ee 13
Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco
Production Co., 119 F.3d 816
ELIE PRED, nn ee eT 13
Stinson v. United States,
Fe es asi secdiintibasccpiceddesineies 10, 12, 23
Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,
es EE a Ona eee 7, 10, 15
Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,
SOS a a cess 0 10
Transamerica Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller
Freight Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28 (1975)....... 12
Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244
Ee REIRSON 9 Silo aie oe Oe 13
Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)................00. 10
United States v. Century Offshore Management
Corp., 111 F.3d 443(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
66 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998)........... 18
United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc.,
976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997)................. 25
United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977)... 10
United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611
PRE IESE 2 ke 18, 22
United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279
Cy Biche RE AAR icissen ei 19
United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47(2d Cir. 1995) 18
United States Railroad Retirement Board
v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) .....0.......00 19
United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714
te 8 ER aber eee an 20
Vii
Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore v.
Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
Lie es 2 Ce 14
White v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd, 835 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1987)... 21
WRT Energy Corp. v. FERC, 107 F.3d 314
Ce scales 11
Statutes:
Administrative Procedure Act,
Ds I ices csvaraccnravesececescececoceses 2
Americans With Disabilities Act,
RR a Ol vo) k 3
Se ooo as dans decsnsnasacjeceens 2
Fre Oe EE IAD ccs ssccssessarecsersccoveccessecess 1]
ES RETR 3
A REA nn ee oe 7
Ae re cig. curvcdicncyensacevncesoonse. 3
A ee ME oo cicecncsseaccnsensséccecosseresess 3
Oy Ne occ ciccsssncvncsassoccevcscorcecesnecs 3, 16
A se IE osvccscckccceccoscssccecccscoccsssseosess 3, 26
BE Ue I DD viccsisecsesccssesncssceccsconeccessees 3
i as cuicnsensoievasdermecniveernee 3
Oe Re I kaisssscsenedesessersscncssecosescscoass 3
Oe Ce We Dc occssncessssceonssssncssseccoeesiore 4
GE iis OF NI oessissnsvcnssnrcsescensenssonnsieces 3, 4, 16
Regulations:
28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. A, § 4.33.3.00000..c ccc. 4
yy CS 3
56 Fed. Reg. 35408 (1991).................................. 5
56 Fed. Reg. 35544 (1991) ...................0... cee. 4
viii
Notices:
FE BE, NE I a cccci sec acnsssectvencsanvvisens 5
SD FOG. FU, SIG TO CI9FF) .....5...000c0scccenseseescessesese 5
FP FOG. FOE, GEOG CIID 5s sesecceccccesscsscsessesepesenes 25
Miscellaneous:
3 ACCESS CURRENTS (Nov./Dec. 1997) ............... 26
Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,
Guidances, Manuals and the Like—Should
FREE siiviesevve Agencies Use Them To Bind
The Public?, 41 DUKEL.J. 1311 (1992).......... 18
Manning, Constitutional Structure and
Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules,
96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996)... 17
United States Department of Justice,
Title III Technical Assistance Manual
No. 97-834
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
ABE POLLIN, et ai,
Petitioners,
v.
PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
To implement the equal-access mandate of Title III of the
Americans With Disabilities Act, the Department of Justice
in 1991 promulgated a regulation requiring “assembly areas”
to provide wheelchair users “lines of sight comparable” to
those of other spectators. The Department has consistently
interpreted its regulation to mean that facilities where
spectators can be expected to stand during the show (e.g.,
professional sports arenas) must provide wheelchair users
lines of sight over standing spectators.
2
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for
District of Columbia Circuit (per Judge Silberman, joined by
Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Sentelle), held that the
Department’s “quite natural[]” interpretation of its regulation
was entitled to judicial deference. A. 8a.’ It thus affirmed an
injunction requiring a _ substantial percentage of the
wheelchair seating locations at the new MCI Center in
Washington, D.C., to provide lines of sight unobstructed by
standing spectators.
Petitioners now seek this Court’s review of two questions,
neither of which is in doubt. First, they ask the Court to
decide how much deference is due an agency’s interpretation
of its own regulations. The Court answered this precise
question, most recently, just last Term in Auer v. Robbins,
117 S. Ct. 905 (1997). Auer unanimously reaffirmed the
long-standing rule that an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation.” Jd. at 911. The D.C.
Circuit in this case relied on Auer and a half-century of
precedent dating back to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). A. 10a-lla. Petitioners offer
no good reason for the Court to revisit this established rule.
Second, Petitioners ask the Court to mle on what
distinguishes an “interpretative” rule from a “substantive”
rule for purposes of the notice-and-comment requirements of
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b). Petitioners say there is a circuit split on this issue,
but base their assertion in large part on a passage from a
dissent that they portray as a holding. See p. 19, infra. In
truth, the D.C. Circuit in this case applied the settled doctrine
that a substantive rule “carries ‘the force and effect of law,””
while an interpretative rule “spells out a duty fairly
encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation
' “A.” refers to Petitioners’ appendix, and “C.A.A.” refers to the
Court of Appeals appendix.
3
purports to construe.” A. 18a. These same principles
appear—in slightly different language, but without any
practical distinction—in many decisions of this Court and the
various courts of appeals. There is no circuit split for this
Court to resolve.
A. The Statute and the Regulation.
Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
broadly prohibits disability-based discrimination, requiring
that persons with disabilities be provided “full and equal
enjoyment” of public accommodations. 42 US.C.
§ 12182(a); A. 83a. It requires buildings opened after
January 26, 1993, to be “readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities.” Jd. § 12183(a)(1); A. 87a.
Congress designated the United States Department of Justice
as the sole federal agency with authority to enforce these
requirements, and gave it responsibility to investigate and
bring enforcement actions against violators. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12188(b)(1).
Congress also expressly directed the Justice Department to
promulgate regulations “to carry out the provisions” of Title
Ill. Jd. § 12186(b); A. 88a. Congress gave the US.
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board
(the “Access Board”) a subsidiary, “advisory” role in the
rulemaking process. 29 U.S.C. § 792(b). Congress directed
the Access Board to “issue minimum guidelines” consistent
with the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12204(a) & (b); A. 89a-90a, “to
assist the Department of Justice” in developing its Title III
regulations. 36 C.F.R. § 1191.1. Although the Justice
Department’s regulations must “be consistent with” the floor
set by the Board’s guidelines, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c); A. 88a,
the Department is free to impose more stringent accessibility
obligations than contemplated by the Board. A. 16a.
Congress also tasked the Justice Department to provide
guidance to “individuals or entities with rights or duties
under” Title III. It instructed the Department, “as part of its
4
implementation responsibilities,” to “ensure the availability
of appropriate technical assistance manuals.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 12206(c)(3); A. 9Qla. Congress also directed the
Department to “render technical assistance” on a less formal
basis to those affected by Title III. /d. § 12206(c)(1); A. 90a.
On July 26, 1991, after notice and comment, the Justice
Department issued regulations implementing Title III. While
relying on the Access Board’s “minimum guidelines,” the
Department issued these rules as its own regulations. 56 Fed.
Reg. 35544 (1991), codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 36 & App. A;
A. 90a. The regulation addressing seating for wheelchair
users in assembly areas states:
Wheelchair areas... shall be provided so as to
provide people with physical disabilities . . . lines of
sight comparable to those for members of the
general public.
Id. App. A, § 4.33.3; A. 104a.
B. The Justice Department’s Consistent Interpretation.
The Department fulfilled the congressional directive to
furnish technical assistance by issuing an interpretation of the
comparable sightlines regulation in two basic forms:
First, beginning shortly after the new-construction
provisions of the ADA became effective in early 1993, the
Department alerted architects and developers through
correspondence that it interpreted “comparable” lines of sight
to mean “line[s] of sight over standing spectators.” C.A.A.
1224. The Department first expressed this interpretation in
letters concerning the Atlanta Olympic Stadium, and
reiterated it in dozens of letters issued in conjunction with
other Departmental investigations, and in response to
inquiries by Members of Congress and the public. C.A.A.
406-65. Notably, the Department sent one of these letters, in
November 1994, to the MCI Center’s architects and its ADA
attorney. C.A.A. 424.
5
Second, the Department interpreted its regulation in its
congressionally mandated Title IJ] Technical Assistance
Manual. In the September 1994 update to the Manual—
issued months before the first plans for the MCI Center were
drawn—the Department explained:
[This regulation] requires that wheelchair locations
provide people with disabilities lines of sight
comparable to those for members of the general
public. Thus, in assembly areas where spectators
can be expected to stand during the event or show
being viewed, the wheelchair locations must
provide lines of sight over spectators who stand.
This can be accomplished in many ways, including
placing wheelchair locations at the front of a seating
section, or by providing sufficient ad onal
elevation for wheelchair locations placed at the rear
of seating sections to allow those spectators to see
over the spectators who stand in front of them.
Title III Technical Assistance Manual, § TI-7.5180; A. 115a
(emphasis added).
In contrast to the Justice Department, the Access Board,
which has no enforcement or interpretative role under the
ADA, never offered an official interpretation of the phrase
“comparable line of sight” in its minimum guidelines, and
repeatedly declined to ascribe a specific meaning to it. 56
Fed. Reg. 35408, 35440 (1991); A. 97a; 57 Fed. Reg. 60612,
60618 (1992); 59 Fed. Reg. 31676, 31679 (1994).’
2 Petitioners imply that the Access Board excluded the possibility that
its guideline could be read to require lines of sight over standing
spectators. Pet. at 20. In fact, the Access Board has never resolved the
issue. Its staff and consultants, however, have opined repeatedly that the
Board’s “comparable line of sight” guideline—like the Justice
Department’s analogous regulation—requires unobstructed sightlines.
E.g., C.A.A. 470 (“A comparable line of sight allows a person using a
wheelchair to see the playing surface between the heads and over the
shoulders of persons standing in the row immediately in front . . .”), see
also id. at 423, 1422.
ooo
6
C. The Design of the MCI Center.
In late December 1994, the MCI Center’s architects
presented the Center’s owner, Petitioner Abe Pollin, with an
array of preliminary options for the arena’s seating bowl.
C.A.A. 968-77. Only one of these options offered well-
distributed wheelchair locations with lines of sight over
standing spectators.
Mr. Pollin initially selected this option, C.A.A. 968, but
quickly became concerned that in this bowl design, the
facility’s luxury suites would not attract a high enough price.
C.A.A. 978. To maximize revenues, Mr. Pollin abandoned
his initial selection and opted instead for a design that
provided obstructed sightlines for wheelchair users at most
locations. C.A.A. 991.
The architects and Mr. Pollin’s ADA attorney—all of
whom were aware of the Justice Department’s long-standing
interpretation of its comparable sightlines regulation and,
specifically, its September 1994 update to the Technical
Assistance Manual—warned Mr. Pollin that the Department
interpreted its regulation to mean that wheelchair users must
be provided lines of sight over standing spectators. As the
Court of Appeals rightly observed, “there is no question but
that [Petitioners] were on notice of Justice’s interpretation”
when they selected the design for the spectator seating bow!
that the District Court found to be unlawful. A. 17a.
Mr. Pollin nonetheless chose to defy the Department.
Notes of the design team meetings reveal Mr. Pollin saying
he “doesn’t want to lose seats for wheelchair seating.”
C.A.A. 501. Other notes of his statements are even more
explicit: “Abe says he’s not going ‘to do’ the handicapped
seating. Abe doesn’t think he’s going to have to comply.”
C.A.A. 497, 500.
D. The Litigation.
Four wheelchair users and the Paralyzed Veterans of
America, a congressionally chartered organization
7
representing honorably discharged veterans of the armed
forces with spinal cord injuries or disease, see 36 U.S.C.
§ 1151 et seq., filed this suit under the ADA. After a week-
long bench trial, the District Court (Hogan, J.) found that the
MCI Center’s original design “ghettoized” wheelchair users,
A. 58a, and was unlawful and discriminatory. A. 75a. The
Court entered a permanent injunction requiring design
changes, including modifications to the arena to provide
well-dispersed wheelchair locations, a substantial percentage
of which offer lines of sight over standing spectators. A. 76a.
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court in all
respects. Judge Silberman, writing for the Court, held:
First, contrary to Petitioners’ claim that the term “lines of
sight comparable” had “for years . . . been understood” as not
requiring “views over spectators who stand,” Pet. at 3, at the
time the Justice Department issued its regulation “[t]he words
simply had not taken on a well-understood meaning.” A. 9a.
Thus, the regulation “quite naturally is interpreted to refer to
the ability of a wheelchair user to see a performance without
any obstruction,” as stated in the Justice Department’s
Technical Assistance Manual. A. 9a.
Second, the Department’s interpretation of its comparable
sightlines regulation is entitled to deference under principles
éstablished by a long line of Supreme Court precedents:
Agency interpretations of their own regulations
have been afforded deference by federal reviewing
courts for a very long time and are sustained unless
“plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with the
regulation. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.
Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Bowles v.
Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945).
A. 10a.
Third, the regulation at issue is properly considered the
Justice Department’s “own regulation,” to which these
traditional deference rules apply. A. 13a. While the Access
8
Board played a role in drafting the regulation, “the doctrine
of deference is based primarily on the agency’s statutory role
as the sponsor of the regulation,” A. 12a, and on the agency’s
“delegated authority to administer the [regulation].” A. 13a.
Both lie with the Justice Department here.
Fourth, with respect to the deference analysis, it is also
“significant” that Congress “specifically requir[ed] the
publication of a technical manual that would further refine or
interpret in detail the regulation’s substantive obligations.”
A. 13a-14a. This reveals that Congress “contemplated a
continuing administration of the regulation that approaches,
if not equates with, the adjudicatory authority of other
statutory schemes.” Jd.
Fifth, the Department’s interpretation of the regulation in
the Technical Assistance Manual did not, as Petitioners
claimed, “constitute[] a fundamental modification of its
previous interpretation,” A. 14a, since the Department had
“never authoritatively adopted a position contrary to its
manual interpretation.” A. 18a. The agency’s interpretation
thus was not an improper attempt to amend that regulation.
Id?
Sixth, the Department’s explanation of the regulation’s
meaning in the Technical Assistance Manual “spells out a
duty fairly encompassed within the regulation” itself. A. 18a.
Accordingly, it is “interpretative,” not “substantive,” and did
not require notice-and-comment rulemaking. Indeed, “the
government could have relied on the regulation itself, even
without the manual interpretation, to seek lines of sight over
standing spectators.” A. 19a. Because the “interpretation is
> Although the Court of Appeals called the contention that the agency
had “switch[ed]” its interpretation Petitioners’ “most powerful
argument,” A. 14a, this contention is neither encompassed in the
questions presented nor addressed in the body of the Petition. Thus, the
legal standard applicable when an agency switches its interpretative
position is not presented for review in this case.
9
”
not sufficiently distinct or additive to the regulation,” it is a
valid interpretative rule. /d.
Petitioners’ request for rehearing and rehearing in banc by
the D.C. Circuit did not garner a single vote. A. 23a, 24a.
They now seek review solely of the appellate court’s second
and sixth holdings.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. THE LAW IS CLEAR ON THE DEGREE OF
DEFERENCE DUE AN AGENCY’S INTERPRETA-
TION OF ITS OWN REGULATION.
Petitioners ask the Court to provide “guidance” on “the
extent of agency power to make law by interpreting
regulations in issuances in informal formats.” Pet. at 9. But
there is absolutely no need for the Court to provide
“guidance” on the deference due an agency’s regulatory
interpretation, because it has done so already in an unbroken
string of decisions over the last fifty years—precedents the
D.C. Circuit correctly applied.
Judging from the only alleged circuit split Petitioners
identify, their real request is that the Court use this case to
decide the degree of deference due an agency’s interpretation
of its governing statute. This case, however, involves only a
dispute about an agency’s interpretation of its own
regulation, not a dispute about an agency’s interpretation of
statutory provisions. This Court has made clear that these
two distinct questions are governed by separate lines of
authority. The Court should not grant certiorari to resolve an
alleged circuit split on a question that has no bearing on this
case.
A. For Half a Century, This Court Has Applied a
Clear, Consistent Standard to Agency Interpreta-
tions of Regulations.
For over fifty years, the federal courts have consistently
applied a single test to describe the deference due to an
10
administrative agency when it interprets a regulation it
enforces. The test was first stated by this Court in 1945 in
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417
(1945), and the Court has reiterated it time and again, as
recently as last Term in Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905, 912
(1997). Under this established rule, an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless
‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.””
Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting Seminole Rock)“ As the
D.C. Circuit accurately stated, “[a]gency interpretations of
their own regulations have been afforded deference by
federal reviewing courts for a very long time.” A. 10a.
Given this Court’s frequent repetition of this principle, it
is scarcely surprising that the circuits unanimously follow it,
and have for decades. Each year, the federal courts confront
scores of cases involving agency interpretations of
regulations. Each circuit applies the same test in such
cases—the deferential standard first announced in Seminole
Rock. Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, the federal circuits
are not “divided and confused” on this issue. Pet. at 8.°
* See also, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’! Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-
95 (1995); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994);
Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993); Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989); Mullins Coal Co. v.
Department of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S.
926, 939 (1986); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977);
Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Izaak Walton League of America,
Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975) (per curiam); Ehlert v. United States, 402
U.S. 99, 105 (1971); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v.
Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Udall v. Tallmar:,
380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Even the “dissenting Justices” cited by
Petitioners as questioning this standard, Pet. at 22, were in agreement that
the Seminole Rock cases provide the governing deference rule. See
Guernsey Memorial Hospital, supra, 514 U.S. at 103 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
° Every one of the federal circuits has recently applied the test
established in Seminole Rock and its progeny as the standard for
11
B. There Is No Open Issue as to the Deference
Afforded Regulatory Interpretations That Are
Issued in “Informal Formats.”
Notwithstanding a half-century of consistent case law
granting deference to agencies’ regulatory interpretations,
Petitioners conjure up a supposedly open question as to
whether regulatory interpretations issued in “informal
formats” should receive less deference. Pet. at 9. This
alleged conflict is nonexistent.
By definition, agency interpretations of regulations—
“interpretative rules” in the parlance of the APA, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(3)(A); A. 82a—are not required to go through
notice and comment. Jd. In fact, virtually all of them are
“issued without complying with the APA’s formal
rulemaking requirements.” Pet. at 10. This has never been
relevant to this Court’s deference analysis. In the landmark
case of Seminole Rock, this Court deferred to precisely such
an “informal” statement—an agency’s interpretation of its
regulation expressed in an administrative “bulletin” and a
“quarterly report” to Congress. 325 U.S. at 417. This Court
has deferred to similar “informal” agency statements in many
cases since Seminole Rock® Just last Term, in Aver v.
deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations: See, e.g., P.
Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 115 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 1997); New
York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1997), Shell Oil Co. v.
Babbitt, 125 F.3d 172, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1997); Comet Enter. Ltd. v. Air-A-
Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1997); WRT Energy Corp. v.
FERC, 107 F.3d 314, 318 (Sth Cir. 1997); Elaine ’s Cleaning Serv., Inc. v.
Department of Labor, 106 F.3d 726, 729 (6th Cir. 1997). Board of
Trustees of Knox County Hosp. v. Shalala, 1998 WL 35149 at *5 (7th
Cir. 1998); Love v. Tippy, 1998 WL 3141 at *1 n6 (8th Cir. 1997);
Anaheim Memorial Hosp. v. Shalala, 130 F.3d 845, 849-50 (9th Cir.
1997); Oklahoma v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1994),
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Local 44] Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store
Union, AFL-CIO, 39 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 1994); Ramey v. Gober,
120 F.3d 1239, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
6 See, e.g., Guernsey Mem’! Hosp., 514 U.S. at 90 (deferring to
agency’s “informal . . . guideline” that “does not purport to be a
12
Robbins, the Court deferred to an agency’s regulatory
interpretation explained in “a legal brief’ filed by the
Secretary of Labor as amicus curiae in the very litigation in
which the Court’s ruling was issued. 117 S. Ct. at 912.’
The Petitioners’ casual treatment of Aver is particularly
remarkable. See Pet. at 17-18. Far from failing to “decide”
the “unresolved issue presented here,” as Petitioners claim,
id., the Court expressly addressed the argument that the
“form” of the agency’s regulatory interpretation should
change the deference rule applied. The Court held,
unanimously, that an agency’s interpretation is not
“unworthy of deference” simply because it is announced in
an informal format, such as the amicus brief in Auer. 117 S.
Ct. at 912.
C. The Cases Cited by Petitioners Reveal No Conflict
on Any Issue Presented by this Case.
Not one of the dozens of cases cited by Petitioners actually
supports their claim that the Circuits are “deeply split” on the
deference due to an agency’s regulatory interpretation issued
in “informal interpretative statements.” Pet. at 10. Almost
all of Petitioners’ cases involve an agency’s interpretation of
regulation and has not been adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment
procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act”); Ford Motor Credit
Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 563 & n.8 (1980) (deferring to agency
memo setting forth an “Official Staff Interpretation” and several “Public
Information Letters”); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993)
(deferring to agency’s interpretive “commentary”); Transamerica Freight
Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 42 n.7 (1975)
(deferring to agency interpretation expressed in amicus brief).
” Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion, this Court has not assigned any
relevance to whether an agency’s regulatory interpretation was
announced in an “agency adjudication” or an interpretative rule. Pet. at 9.
In fact, this Court has treated these as equivalent, contrasting both with
notice-and-comment rulemaking. See, e.g., Guernsey Memorial Hosp.,
514 U.S. at 89-90 (addressing the agency’s “authority to resolve
certain .. . issues by adjudication and interpretive rules, rather than by
regulations”).
13
a statute, not an agency interpretation of its own regulation.
See Pet. at 11-15.
Since the 1940’s, the federal courts have observed a clear
distinction between the rules of deference for agency
interpretations of regulations, see Seminole Rock (decided in
1945), and the deference rules governing agency
interpretations of statutes, see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134 (1944). This Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984), governs only the latter line of cases.”
8 See, e.g., Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Comm'n v. Pena, 113 F.3d 1468, 1473 (7th Cir. 1997) (agency’s
“interpretation of an ambiguous statute”), Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena,
44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (“agency’s adoption of its statutory
interpretation”), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Brotherhood of
Locomotive Eng’rs v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 516 U.S. 152 (1996);
Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1994)
(agency’s “reading of the Act”); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco
Production Co., 119 F.3d 816, 830 (10th Cir. 1997) (“agency
construction of a statutory term”); Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126
F.3d 1, 5, (Ist Cir. 1997) (agency’s interpretation of “*administrative
employees’ under the [Fair Labor Standards Act]”); Travelstead v.
Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (agency’s “[l]egal
interpretations of a statute”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York
State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 531 (2d Cir. 1994)
(agency’s “statutory construction”); Kelley v. E-/. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., 17 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir. 1994) (agency’s “interpretation of a
statute”); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d
Cir. 1995) (agency’s “constnsction of a statutory scheme”), cert. denied,
516 U.S. 1093 (1996); Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc., 71
F.3d 1134, 1141 (4th Cir. 1995) (agency’s “interpretation of the statute”);
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2570 (1996); Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983,
984 (9th Cir. 1997) (agency construction of “enabling statute”); Soileau v.
Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 14 (Ist Cir. 1997) (agency’s
“interpretation of the ADA and of the Maine Human Rights Act”).
> Compare Auer, 117 S. Ct at 909 (applying Chevron to the
Secretary’s “interpretation of the statutory exemption”) with id. at 911
(applying Seminole Rock to an interpretation “of the Secretary’s own
regulations”).
14
It may or may not be an open question whether a
particular agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute
issued in an “informal format,” rather than through notice-
and-comment rulemaking, should get “Chevron-level”
deference, or should be subject to a less deferential standard
such as that set forth in Skidmore.'° But even if this statutory
interpretation issue were an open question, the law has been
clearly settled since at least 1945 in the context of regulatory
interpretations—Seminole Rock deference applies. The
federal courts are not confused on this question. See p. 13
n.8, supra."
‘Tn fact, this Court has already given “guidance” with respect to this
issue as well. See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (1995)
(finding Chevron deference due agency’s interpretation of statute though
“[i]t is true that the Bureau’s interpretation appears only in a ‘Program
Statement’—an internal agency guideline—rather than in ‘published
regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedures Act”);
see also, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S.
89, 98 n.8 (1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 563, 566
& n.9 (1980).
''In the same vein, Petitioners try to sow the seeds of confusion by
suggesting, alternatively, that the issue in conflict is whether informal
agency interpretations are “binding” and have the “force and effect of
law.” See Pet. at 12-13 (citing Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala, 118
F.3d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1997); Avol v. HHS, 883 F.2d 659, 661 (9th
Cir. 1989); Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 521 1220, 1228 (Sth Cir.
1990)). The proposition that interpretative rules do not have the force of
law is both noncontroversial and undisputed. The question here is
whether the Technical Assistance Manual is entitled to deference, not
whether it is “binding,” a point the Court of Appeals well understood.
See A. 14a (“we . . . defer to the Department’s reasonable interpretations
of its regulation as set forth in the technical manual”). Other than the
foregoing precedents, which are irrelevant, the only other cases cited by
Petitioners actually support the Respondents’ point that the governing
deference test is not in controversy. See Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Med.
Ctr., 50 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 1995) (regulatory interpretation is entitled
to deference unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” the
regulation); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997,
1002 (1st Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 955 (1997); Reich v.
General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313, 315 (6th Cir. 1996) (“reasonable”
.
15
D. This Case Does Not Involve Chevron, and the
Alleged Conflict Cited by Petitioners Could Not Be
Decided Here.
Faced with fifty-years-worth of consistent precedent
following Seminole Rock, Petitioner tries to muddy these
clear waters by suggesting that this case actually involves the
application of Chevron. This argument is built upon a
seriously flawed reading of the decision below.
Chevron describes the degree of deference due “an
agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”
467 US. at 842. There is no contention in this case,
however, that the agency misapplied the relevant statute, the
ADA, in promulgating its comparable sightlines regulation.
The only issue in this case is whether the Justice
Department’s interpretation of its regulation to require lines
of sight over standing spectators is entitled to deference. As
the D.C. Circuit accurately stated, this “case involves just the
proper interpretation of the regulation.” A. 7a. . Thus, the
court applied the established standard for deference to an
agency’s regulatory interpretation. A. 10a (citing Thomas
Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 504, and Seminole Rock, 325
U:S. at 414).
Notwithstanding the clarity of Judge Silberman’s opinion,
Petitioners contend that the D.C. Circuit extends “Chevron-
level deference” to an informal agency regulatory
interpretation, Pet. at 10, and thereby “mandate[s] a level of
judicial deference to informally adopted agency
interpretations going beyond any that this Court has ever
prescribed or permitted.” Pet. at 19. Petitioners warn, in dire
terms, that “even the Seminole Rock line of cases never went
so far as the D.C. Circuit did here.” Jd. at 21.
There is no need for such hysteria. The D.C. Circuit
neither applied Chevron nor suggested that Chevron would
construction of ambiguous regulation is entitled to “substantial
deference”).
16
or should be the governing precedent in considering whether
to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation. The
only two substantive mentions of Chevron in the D.C.
Circuit’s decision appear, first, in dicta comparing the levels
of deference afforded under Seminole Rock and Chevron, A.
10a, 15a, and, second, in the court’s rejection of the
government’s “bold, complete analogy to Chevron” on the
separate question whether notice and comment was required.
A. 15a.
Far from going beyond “even the Seminole Rock line of
cases,” Pet. at 21, this case is well within this Court’s prior
deference decisions. Congress expressly charged the Justice
Department to promulgate regulatory standards to implement
the ADA, and the Department duly issued its own
regulations, after notice and comment, to implement that Act.
42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). Thereafter, the Department complied
with a specific congressional mandate to issue “technical
assistance manuals” to provide guidance and explain its
interpretation of those standards. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3).
When the agency issued a regulatory interpretation to carry
out that express congressional directive, it was acting at the
height of its powers.'* This case, therefore, would be a
particularly unsuitable vehicle for this Court to reconsider
established deference principles, even if it were inclined to
do so.
E. Petitioners Seek The Reversal of a Half-Century of
Unquestioned Decisions Applying Seminole Rock.
Petitioners’ true intentions are revealed in their final
argument addressing deference, which relies heavily on a
recent law review article arguing that Seminole Rock should
be abandoned as the standard for deference to agency regu-
12 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 567-68 (where
Congress evinces a “decided preference” to “treat administrative
rulemaking and interpretation as authoritative,” courts “should honor that
congressional choice” by deferring to the agency).
ee cl alt:
17
latory interpretations. Pet. at 19-22 (citing Manning, Consti-
tutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,
614 (1996)). Petitioners ask this Court to reverse a half-
century of consistent case law that has “‘gone unquestioned’
since 1945” in order to adopt a provocative argument in a
law journal article whose author candidly admits that “Semi-
nole Rock deference . . . has long been one of the least
worried-about principles of administrative law.” Manning,
supra, at 614. Clearly, the views of a single law review
author that fifty years of “unquestioned” precedent should be
jettisoned is not an adequate basis for a grant of certiorari.
The D.C. Circuit rightly rejected the invitation to adopt
Professor Manning’s views. A. 10a n.2. So should this
Court.
II. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS ON HOW TO
DISTINGUISH “INTERPRETATIVE” FROM “SUB-
STANTIVE” RULES.
Citing a string of precedent stretching back almost two
decades, A. 18a-19a, the D.C. Circuit (acknowledged by
Petitioners as the “premier Circuit for federal regulatory
litigation,” Pet. at 8), applied the settled test to distinguish an
interpretative rule from a substantive rule. The court said:
We... look to whether the interpretation itself
carries “the force and effect of law,” or rather
whether it spells out a duty fairly encompassed
within the regulation that interpretation purports to
construe.... The distinction between an
interpretative and substantive rule. . . turns on how
tightly the agency’s interpretation is drawn
linguistically from the actual language of the statute
or rule.
A. 18a-19a (citations omitted). This description of the
governing standard is echoed in the decisions of the other
courts of appeals, which look to whether an interpretative
18
rule “clarifies,” “defines,” or “explains” a substantive rule.’
It is also the standard endorsed by Robert Anthony,
Petitioners’ commentator-of-choice. '“
Petitioners nevertheless claim that the D.C. Circuit’s
“linguistic test,” Pet. at 8, creates a three-way split in the
circuits. Petitioners never identify the three supposedly
3 See, e.g., United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 617 (ist Cir. 1994)
(interpretative rule valid because it “comports sufficiently with the letter,
spirit, and aim of the” regulation); United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47,
51-52 (2d Cir. 1995) (“it is the proper function of interpretative rules to
clarify ambiguities” in regulations); FLRA v. Department of the Navy,
966 F.2d 747, 762 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc) (“In determining whether
a Tule is interpretive or substantive we may look to the nature of the rule
itself: If the rule in question merely clarifies or explains existing law or
regulations, it will be deemed interpretive”) (internal quotation omitted):
Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1340-41 (4th Cir. 1995)
(“interpretive rules simply state what the administrative agency thinks a
Statute means, and only remind affected parties of existing duties”):
Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 & n.5 (Sth Cir.
1979) (finding rule not interpretative because it was not a “clarification”
that “defines ... [an] ambiguous term” in regulation); United States v.
Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp., 111 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (an
“interpretive rule is one issued by an agency to advise the public of the
agency’s construction of the... rules which it administers”) (internal
quotation omitted), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998);
Metropolitan School Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“interpretive rules are statements as to what the administrative officer
thinks the... regulation means”) (internal quotation omitted); Cai-
Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993)
(interpretative rules are “those which merely clarify or explain
existing . . . regulations”); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 971
F.2d 544, 546-47 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[a] rule is interpretative if... it
attempts to clarify an existing rule but does not change existing law,
policy, or practice”).
'*Professor Anthony, on whom Petitioners extensively rely, see Pet.
at ix, agrees that the APA does not mandate notice-and-comment
rulemaking for rules that interpret “tangible” or “specifically-worded” or
“sufficiently concrete” language in a regulation. Anthony, /nterpretive
Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals and the Like — Should
Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind The Public?, 41 Duke LJ. 1311,
1313, 1339, 1349 (1992).
19
conflicting standards—their second question presented
suggests only two competing approaches. More
fundamentally, Petitioners’ claim of a circuit split is
predicated entirely on improper citation and misreading of
relevant authority. There is no circuit split.
A. Petitioners Miscite and Misread Authority.
Petitioners rely heavily on what they say is the “hold[ing]”
of a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d
1279 (10th Cir. 1982), quoting it at length in their petition.
Pet. at 23. But Petitioners are quoting the dissenting opinion
in Thompson. Id. (quoting 687 F.2d at 1295). Chief Judge
Seth’s majority opinion for the in banc court—the Tenth
Circuit’s actual “holding” in Thompson—takes a very
different position from Judge McKay’s dissent on how to
distinguish an interpretative rule from a substantive one.
Compare 687 F.2d at 1283 (Seth, C.J.) with id. at 1295
(McKay, J., dissenting). As this Court has made clear, “(t}he
comments in the dissenting opinion .. . are just that: com-
ments in a dissenting opinion.” United States R. Retirement
Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n.10 (1980).
Moreover, recent Tenth Circuit cases embrace a test
essentially identical to the rule applied by the D.C. Circuit
here: “A rule is interpretive if it... attempts to clarify an
existing rule but does not change existing law, policy, or
practice.” Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d 544, 546-
47 (10th Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., Headrick v. Rockwell Int 1
Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1994) (per White, J.,
sitting by designation) (interpretive rules “help clarify the
meaning and application of . . . promulgated rules”); Knutzen
v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1351-52
(10th Cir. 1987) (same). Petitioners notably do not cite any
of these more recent, and controlling, Tenth Circuit opinions.
Petitioners’ reliance on Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165 (7th
Cir. 1996), fares no better. Petitioners describe the “holding”
in Hoctor as “irreconcilable with the D.C. Circuit’s” holding
20
in this case. Pet. at 23. In fact, it is indistinguishable. The
Hoctor court defined an interpretive rule as one
that can be derived from the regulation by a process
reasonably described as interpretation. Metropoli-
tan School Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th
Cir. 1992)... . “Interpretation” in the narrow sense
is the ascertainment of meaning.
82 F.3d at 170. There is no functional difference between
this definition and the one employed by the D.C. Circuit.
Both look to whether what purports to be an interpretation
can be “derived from the regulation” (or, in the D.C.
Circuit’s formulation, can be “drawn linguistically from the
actual language of the . . . rule”).
This similarity is hardly surprising, since the case Hoctor
cites as support for its rule, Davila, explicitly holds that the
D.C. Circuit “has set forth the general principles to be used to
determine whether a rule is interpretive, and, therefore,
exempt from APA’s notice and comment requirements.” See
Davila, 969 F.2d at 489 (citing, inter alia, General Motors
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(in banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985), and United
Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 718 (D.C. Cir.
1987)). The D.C. Circuit, in this case, relied on the same
precedents. A. 18a-19a (citing, inter alia, United
Technologies, 821 F.2d at 719-20). Petitioners’ alleged
circuit split amounts to nothing more than nitpicking over
functionally identical language; they fail to identify any
substantive conflict.
B. The Circuit Courts Agree That the “Impact” of an
Interpretation Is Not Determinative.
Contrary to Petitioners’ claim, there is also no split in the
circuits on whether the “real-world impact” of an
interpretation determines whether it must go through notice-
and-comment rulemaking. Pet. at 25. Long ago, the D.C.
Circuit held that “the impact of a rule has no bearing on
whether it is legislative or interpretative; interpretative rules
21
may have a substantial impact on the rights of individuals.”
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal
Service, 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
As Petitioners themselves note, the Third, Sixth, and
Ninth Circuits agree with the D.C. Circuit and have held
explicitly that an interpretative rule may be valid
notwithstanding its substantial impact on the regulated
community. Pet. at 24, citing Elizabeth Blackwell Health
Ctr. v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 816 (1996); First Nat’l Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185,
1189 n.2 (6th Cir. 1991); Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala,
118 F.3d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). The Second and
Seventh Circuits also agree. See White v. Bowen, 636 F.
Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[iJn drawing the line
between substantive and interpretative rules, the Second
Circuit no longer looks to the impact of the rule”), aff'd, 835
F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1987); Davila, supra, 969 F.2d at 493
(“Prevailing authority rejects the proposition that a rule that
has substantial impact is necessarily legislative.”).
Petitioners cite only one case, La Casa del Convaleciente
v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1178 (ist Cir. 1992), that even
remotely considers a rule’s “impact.” Pet. at 23-24.'° But the
La Casa court, while citing dated First Circuit precedent
suggesting “impact may be relevant,” Levesque v. Block, 723
F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983), did not say that “impact” could
ever be determinative, La Casa, 965 F.2d at 1178, and
Levesque itself makes clear that “substantial impact does not
'S Along with La Casa, Petitioners also rely (explicitly this time) on
the dissenting opinion in Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 187 (Nygaard,
J., dissenting). Pet. at 24. Needless to say, Judge Nygaard’s dissent is no
more probative of a circuit split than is Judge McKay’s. Furthermore, the
in banc Third Circuit has adopted a test to distinguish substantive from
interpretative rules, based on D.C. Circuit precedent, that is functionally
identical to the rule employed in this case. See FLRA v. Department of
the Navy, supra, 966 F.2d at 762 n. 14.
22
make a rule legislative....” 723 F.2d at 182 (emphasis
added).
Moreover, the La Casa court noted that “[o]ther
circuits... have moved away from considering the level of
impact on interested parties as a factor in correctly
classifying a rule or regulation.” 965 F.2d at 1178 (citing
cases). The court ultimately held that the rule before it was
interpretative, using a test that echoes the test applied by the
D.C. Circuit here: the interpretation was permissible because
it was “a form of interpolation necessary to fill in where
numbers are missing” from the regulation. Jd. at 1179
(internal quotation omitted). More recent First Circuit
precedent makes no mention of “impact” in assessing the
validity of an interpretative rule. Piper, 35 F.3d at 617
C. This Court Recently Has Offered Clear Guidance
On This Precise Issue.
Petitioners’ final claim, that this Court has offered “no
guidance... on what constitutes an ‘interpretative’ rule,”
Pet. at 22-23, is simply inaccurate.
Less than three years ago, this Court considered whether
an informal interpretive “guideline” issued by the Secretary
of Health and Human Services “is invalid because [the
Secretary] did not follow the notice-and-comment provisions
of the [APA] in issuing it.” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial
Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 90 (1995). This Court held that the
Secretary’s interpretation of her regulation was permissible
(and entitled to deference), notwithstanding its informal
origins, because it supplied details “unaddressed by the
otherwise comprehensive regulations on [the] particular
subject” of the regulation. Jd. at 97. The Court explained:
[The guideline] is a prototypical example of an
interpretive rule “‘issued by an agency to advise the
public of the agency’s construction of the . . . rules
which it administers.”” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,
441 U.S. 281, 302, n. 31 (1979) (quoting Attorney
23
General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act 30, n. 3 (1947)).
Id. at 99. Justice O’Connor dissented, but her disagreement
focused on the application of the legal standard to the facts,
not the definition of an interpretative rule. In language
closely resembling the “linguistic” standard articulated by the
Court of Appeals here, Justice O’ Connor stated:
[I]nterpretive rules... describe what the agency
believes the... existing regulations require but. . .
do not alter the substantive obligations created
thereby. Such interpretive rules... must explain
existing law and not contradict what the regulations
require.
Id. at 111 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).'°
The 5-to-4 vote in Guernsey illustrates well that
determining whether a particular rule is substantive or
interpretative is often a difficult, fact-intensive, undertaking.
But the difficulty does not stem from any disagreement on
the governing legal standard. As Judge Wald has put it:
Determining whether a given agency action is
interpretive or legislative is an extraordinarily case-
specific endeavor... . [A]nalogizing to prior cases
is often of limited utility in light of the exceptional
degree to which decisions in this doctrinal area turn
on their precise facts.
American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, %34 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.
Cir. 1987).
This observation applies perfectly here. The D.C. Circuit
carefully reviewed the record and, applying settled law, held
that the interpretation of the comparable sightlines regulation
in the Technical Assistance Manual was valid. Because
16 oe also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)
(“commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a
guideline is” an interpretative rule entitled to deference) (emphasis
added).
24
Petitioners are unable to show any real debate on the
applicable legal standard, and do not challenge the D.C.
Circuit’s application of the law to the complex facts of this
case, the Petition should be denied.
Ill. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE’ FOR
CONSIDERING THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED.
Even if Petitioners were able to identify an actual circuit
split on either of their questions presented, this Court should
decline to grart a writ of certioran for at least four
independent reasons.
First, the “undulated interplay,” A. 42a, between the
Access Board and the Justice Departreent—in which the
Access Board sets the foundation upon wnich the Department
builds its regulation—is rare, if not unique. See p. 3-4,
supra. In the lower courts, Petitioners focused much of their
attack on this unusual relationship, arguing that deference is
not due the Justice Department’s interpretation of a
regulation supposedly authored by another agency. See, e.g.,
Brief for Appellants, U.S.C.A, D.C. Cir., at 2, 19-23, 43-45.
The District Court rejected Petitioners’ argument, A. 45a-
47a, as did the Court of Appeals, A. 12a-13a, and Petitioners
do not ask this Court to consider the issue. See Pet. at i.
Nonetheless, even though the regulation at issue in this case
is unquestionably the Justice Department’s own, the
“interplay” between the Access Board and the Department in
the creation of the Title III regulation produced an extensive
administrative record that is not nearly as “clear and simple,”
Pet. at 10, as Petitioners suggest.
Second, the interpretation challenged by Petitioners
appears in the Justice Department’s Technical Assistance
Manual, the means chosen by Congress for the Department
to interpret its Title III regulation. See Ford Motor Credit,
supra, 444 U.S. at 563 & n8. The Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights specifically approved the Manual,
including the September 1994 update that contained the
interpretation of the comparable sightlines regulation.
25
C.A.A. 1387-94. Because of the degree of formality
associated with the Department’s interpretation of its
regulation, this case does not present the typical situation in
which an agency seeks deference to an interpretation
expressed in a less formal setting. E.g. Auer, 117 S. Ct. at
911 (amicus brief); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417
(“bulletin”). It thus would not provide a suitable vehicle for
the Court to consider what deference is due truly informal
agency interpretations.
Third, the fundamental issue in this case—namely,
whether the courts should defer to the Justice Department's
interpretation of its comparable sightlines regulation—is
currently being litigated in at least three circuits. One district
court has agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s holding, United
States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.
1997), one has disagreed, Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music
Entertainment Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997), and one
has staked out a middle ground, Independent Living
Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Ore.
1997). To date, the D.C. Circuit is the only appellate court to
have considered the issue, although the Caruso case is
currently on appeal to the Third Circuit. Caruso v.
Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Ctr., No. 97-5764 (3d
Cir.). It is premature for this Court to review this issue while
it is still moving through the lower courts, particularly when
there have been no inconsistent results at the appellate level.
Finally, the Justice Department’s comparable sightlines
regulation is due for an overhaul in the near future. The
Access Board has already begun work on revising its
minimum guidelines in this area. In July 1994, the Board
published, as an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
59 Fed. Reg. 48542 (1994), its Recreation Access Advisory
Committee’s Recommendations for Accessibility Guidelines
that specifically addressed the issue “comparable sightlines
in sports facilities.” Recommendations at 42-43. In
September 1996, the Access Board’s specially convened
26
Federal Advisory Committee issued its Recommendations for
a New ADAAG, which also addresses (in Section 802.8) the
sightlines issue. The Access Board is due to issue a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking based on these reports “in the
summer of 1998.” 3 ACCESS CURRENTS at 3 (Nov./Dec.
1997). Given that the Justice Department’s Title III
regulations must “be consistent with” the Board’s guidelines,
42 U.S.C. § 12186(c), the Justice Department is expected to
initiate rulemaking revisions at the same time. As a result of
this ongoing regulatory activity, whatever decision this Court
renders if it accepts this case for review may quickly prove to
be irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM H. JEFFRESS, JR.
Counsel of Record
Of Counsel: NIKI KUCKES
ROBERT L. NELSON DAVID S. COHEN
LAWRENCE B. HAGEL JODY MANIER KRIS E
PARALYZED VETERANS MILLER, CASSIDY, 3
OF AMERICA LARROCA & LEWIN, L.L.P.
801 18th Street, N.W. 2555 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 872-1300 (202) 293-6400
February 1998 Attorneys for Respondents
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