Opposition Brief — Pollin v. Paralyzed Veterans of America

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Supreme Court. U S.

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FEB 9 1998

No. 97-834 tie

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

ABE POLLIN, et al.,

Petitioners,

Vv.

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, ef ai.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

WILLIAM H. JEFFRESS, JR.

Counsel of Record

Of Counsel: NIKI KUCKES

ROBERT L. NELSON DAVID S. COHEN

LAWRENCE B. HAGEL JODY MANIER KRIS

PARALYZED VETERANS MILLER, CASSIDY, LARROCA

OF AMERICA & Lewin, L.L.P.

801 18th Street, N.W. 2555 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 872-1300 (202) 293-6400

Attorneys for Respondents

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS ¢ WASHINGTON, D.C. @ 1-800-347-8208

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

eT Ge BI ra tieeccscctrcnssceseracissvenenesennsensen l

A. The Statute and the Regulation 2.0.2.0... 3

B. The Justice Department’s Consistent

EES aE REE oT 4

C. The Design of the MCI Conter....................-cccccccesess 6

SESE AEE 18 EY POT ROOT 6

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.................0............ 9

I. THE LAW IS CLEAR ON THE DEGREE OF

DEFERENCE DUE AN AGENCY’S

INTERPRETATION OF ITS OWN REGULATION ...... 9

A. For Halfa Century, This Court Has Applied

a Clear, Consistent Standard to Agency

Interpretations of Regulations ........................ccccc00 9

B. There Is No Open Issue as to the Deference

Afforded Regulatory Interpretations That Are

Issued in “Informal Formats”..............................---+. 1]

C. The Cases Cited by Petitioners Reveal

No Conflict on Any Issue Presented

a cscesscsesesaces 12

D. This Case Does Not Involve Chevron, and

the Alleged Conflict Cited by Petitioners

Could Not Be Decided Here ..........................cccceeee0 15

E. Petitioners Seek The Reversal of a

Half-Century of Unquestioned Decisions

PS OE 16

Il. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS ON

HOW TO DISTINGUISH “INTERPRETATIVE”

FROM “SUBSTANTIVE” RULES..................--..2eeeee 17

A. Petitioners Miscite and Misread Authority ................ 19

B. The Circuit Courts Agree That the “Impact”

of an Interpretation Is Not Determinative.................. 20

C. This Court Recently Has Offered Clear

Guidance On This Precise Issue...........................0.... 22

Ill. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE FOR

CONSIDERING THE QUESTIONS

REE LIS A EE RRS Re 24

IIIT stiicscsancnintiniacesénindeemcaacieiiadanamdainni amas 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

American Hospital Association v. Bowen,

834 F.2d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..........0...0.... 23

American Postal Workers Union v. United

States Postal Service, 707 F.2d 548

ce cc csnee 21

Anaheim Memorial Hospital v. Shalala,

130 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 1997)...00000 oo. 1]

Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena, 44 F.3d 437

(7th Cir. 1994), aff'd on other grounds

sub nom., Brotherhood of Locomotive

Engineers v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R.,

Ee ee 13

Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905

EE ARSE ts the le 2, passim

Avol v. HHS, 883 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1989).......... 14

Board of Trustees of Knox County Hospital

v. Shalala, 1998 WL 35149 (7th Cir. 1998)..... 11

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.,

325 U.S. 410 (1945) ooo ecco ecccccccceeceeseeeees 2,7, 10,11

Brown Express, Inc. v. United States,

607 F.2d 695 (Sth Cir. 1979)...00.0 0. 18

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA,

RES TS A 14

Cal-Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429

Pe ies cecsatcineecotephoceve coves. 18

Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment

Center, 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997).......... 25

Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level

Radioactive Waste Commission v. Pena,

113 F.3d 1468 (7th Cir. 1997)... eee. 13

Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331

aS a 18

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)............ 13, 15, 16

iV

Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala,

118 F.3d 1327 (9th Cir. 1997).....0....0. ee. 14, 21

Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,

Re es Mati rhiics tis tercncisiensinne. 22-23

Comet Enterprise Ltd. v. Air-A-Plane Corp.,

128 F.3d 855 (4th Cir. 1997)...................ccceee 1]

Datheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 521

a aia a dilaabralirctiinicbonnds 14

Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99 (1971)......... 10

Elaine ’s Cleaning Serv., Inc. v. Department of

Labor, 106 F.3d 726 (6th Cir. 1997) ............... 11

Elizabeth Blackwell Health Center v. Knoll,

61 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

ERT ee 13, 21

First National Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185

| REE i ean re 21

FLRA v. Department of the Navy, 966 F.2d 747

I i ae 18, 21

Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin,

GEG ULE. SES CIID ovvvcccccvicceceeesss..-.... 12, 14, 16, 24

General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus,

742 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (in banc),

cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985) ...........0---. 20

Headrick v. Rockwell International Corp.,

24 F.3d 1272 (10th Cir. 1994) ........ecccccscseesseees 13, 19

Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165 (7th Cir. 1996)...... 19, 20

Independent Living Resources v. Oregon

Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Ore. 1997) 25

INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62 (1969) ..............00000- 10

Interstate Brands Corp. v. Local 441 Retail,

Wholesale & Department Store Union,

AFL-CIO, 39 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir. 1994)........ 11

Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1997) .. 13

Kelley v. EI. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,

17 F.3d 836 (6th Cir. 1994).....................0....000 13

Knuizen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing

Center, 815 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1987) .......... 19

La Casa del Convaleciente v. Sullivan,

od ee By Te L&D.’ 1 Ieee 21, 22

Levesque v. Block, 723 F.2d 175 (1st Cir. 1983).. 21, 22

Love v. Tippy, 1998 WL 3141 (8th Cir. 1997) ..... 1]

Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926 (1986)... 10

Metropolitan School District v. Davila,

969 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1992)... eee. 18, 20, 21

Motor Vehicle Manufacturer Association v.

New York State Department of Environmental

Conservation, 17 F.3d 531 (2d Cir. 1994)....... 13

Mullins Coal Co. v. Department of Labor,

rt eee 10

New York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 1997) 11

Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v.

Izaak Walton League of America, Inc.,

423 U.S. 12 (1975) (per curiam) ...........0....... 10

Oklahoma v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 595

a iscesaws 11

P. Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC,

Eb pe Gf ls Ae, , Ocean 11

Ramey v. Gober, 120 F.3d 1239 (Fed. Cir. 1997). ll

Reich v. General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313

ERY ET ek a 14-15

Reich v. John Alden Life Insurance Co.,

be mR . : : a 13

Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50 (1995)...0.......0cccccceee. 14

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council,

I oi icintcnsannennnsnséniiscsvenseanece 10

Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA,

971 F.2d 544 (10th Cir. 1992)... ee. 18, 19

Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,

Eee a 10, passim

Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Medical Center,

50 P.36 522.(6@ Cir. 1995)......2..:..0:............... 14

Shell Oil Co. v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 172

I eee 11

Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc.,

71 F.3d 1134 (4th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,

PO Be Fe Ce vhs cisnsci seca iil ssecses 13

Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944)..... 13, 14

Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12

ho Ae. Ae a NO a ee 13

Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco

Production Co., 119 F.3d 816

ELIE PRED, nn ee eT 13

Stinson v. United States,

Fe es asi secdiintibasccpiceddesineies 10, 12, 23

Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,

es EE a Ona eee 7, 10, 15

Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham,

SOS a a cess 0 10

Transamerica Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller

Freight Systems, Inc., 423 U.S. 28 (1975)....... 12

Travelstead v. Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244

Ee REIRSON 9 Silo aie oe Oe 13

Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965)................00. 10

United States v. Century Offshore Management

Corp., 111 F.3d 443(6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,

66 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998)........... 18

United States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc.,

976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn. 1997)................. 25

United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864 (1977)... 10

United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611

PRE IESE 2 ke 18, 22

United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d 1279

Cy Biche RE AAR icissen ei 19

United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47(2d Cir. 1995) 18

United States Railroad Retirement Board

v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) .....0.......00 19

United Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714

te 8 ER aber eee an 20

Vii

Visiting Nurse Association of North Shore v.

Bullen, 93 F.3d 997 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied,

Lie es 2 Ce 14

White v. Bowen, 636 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),

aff'd, 835 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1987)... 21

WRT Energy Corp. v. FERC, 107 F.3d 314

Ce scales 11

Statutes:

Administrative Procedure Act,

Ds I ices csvaraccnravesececescececoceses 2

Americans With Disabilities Act,

RR a Ol vo) k 3

Se ooo as dans decsnsnasacjeceens 2

Fre Oe EE IAD ccs ssccssessarecsersccoveccessecess 1]

ES RETR 3

A REA nn ee oe 7

Ae re cig. curvcdicncyensacevncesoonse. 3

A ee ME oo cicecncsseaccnsensséccecosseresess 3

Oy Ne occ ciccsssncvncsassoccevcscorcecesnecs 3, 16

A se IE osvccscckccceccoscssccecccscoccsssseosess 3, 26

BE Ue I DD viccsisecsesccssesncssceccsconeccessees 3

i as cuicnsensoievasdermecniveernee 3

Oe Re I kaisssscsenedesessersscncssecosescscoass 3

Oe Ce We Dc occssncessssceonssssncssseccoeesiore 4

GE iis OF NI oessissnsvcnssnrcsescensenssonnsieces 3, 4, 16

Regulations:

28 C.F.R. Part 36, App. A, § 4.33.3.00000..c ccc. 4

yy CS 3

56 Fed. Reg. 35408 (1991).................................. 5

56 Fed. Reg. 35544 (1991) ...................0... cee. 4

viii

Notices:

FE BE, NE I a cccci sec acnsssectvencsanvvisens 5

SD FOG. FU, SIG TO CI9FF) .....5...000c0scccenseseescessesese 5

FP FOG. FOE, GEOG CIID 5s sesecceccccesscsscsessesepesenes 25

Miscellaneous:

3 ACCESS CURRENTS (Nov./Dec. 1997) ............... 26

Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements,

Guidances, Manuals and the Like—Should

FREE siiviesevve Agencies Use Them To Bind

The Public?, 41 DUKEL.J. 1311 (1992).......... 18

Manning, Constitutional Structure and

Judicial Deference to Agency

Interpretations of Agency Rules,

96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996)... 17

United States Department of Justice,

Title III Technical Assistance Manual

No. 97-834

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

ABE POLLIN, et ai,

Petitioners,

v.

PARALYZED VETERANS OF AMERICA, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

To implement the equal-access mandate of Title III of the

Americans With Disabilities Act, the Department of Justice

in 1991 promulgated a regulation requiring “assembly areas”

to provide wheelchair users “lines of sight comparable” to

those of other spectators. The Department has consistently

interpreted its regulation to mean that facilities where

spectators can be expected to stand during the show (e.g.,

professional sports arenas) must provide wheelchair users

lines of sight over standing spectators.

2

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for

District of Columbia Circuit (per Judge Silberman, joined by

Chief Judge Edwards and Judge Sentelle), held that the

Department’s “quite natural[]” interpretation of its regulation

was entitled to judicial deference. A. 8a.’ It thus affirmed an

injunction requiring a _ substantial percentage of the

wheelchair seating locations at the new MCI Center in

Washington, D.C., to provide lines of sight unobstructed by

standing spectators.

Petitioners now seek this Court’s review of two questions,

neither of which is in doubt. First, they ask the Court to

decide how much deference is due an agency’s interpretation

of its own regulations. The Court answered this precise

question, most recently, just last Term in Auer v. Robbins,

117 S. Ct. 905 (1997). Auer unanimously reaffirmed the

long-standing rule that an agency’s interpretation of its own

regulation is “controlling unless plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.” Jd. at 911. The D.C.

Circuit in this case relied on Auer and a half-century of

precedent dating back to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand

Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). A. 10a-lla. Petitioners offer

no good reason for the Court to revisit this established rule.

Second, Petitioners ask the Court to mle on what

distinguishes an “interpretative” rule from a “substantive”

rule for purposes of the notice-and-comment requirements of

the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b). Petitioners say there is a circuit split on this issue,

but base their assertion in large part on a passage from a

dissent that they portray as a holding. See p. 19, infra. In

truth, the D.C. Circuit in this case applied the settled doctrine

that a substantive rule “carries ‘the force and effect of law,””

while an interpretative rule “spells out a duty fairly

encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation

' “A.” refers to Petitioners’ appendix, and “C.A.A.” refers to the

Court of Appeals appendix.

3

purports to construe.” A. 18a. These same principles

appear—in slightly different language, but without any

practical distinction—in many decisions of this Court and the

various courts of appeals. There is no circuit split for this

Court to resolve.

A. The Statute and the Regulation.

Title II of the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

broadly prohibits disability-based discrimination, requiring

that persons with disabilities be provided “full and equal

enjoyment” of public accommodations. 42 US.C.

§ 12182(a); A. 83a. It requires buildings opened after

January 26, 1993, to be “readily accessible to and usable by

individuals with disabilities.” Jd. § 12183(a)(1); A. 87a.

Congress designated the United States Department of Justice

as the sole federal agency with authority to enforce these

requirements, and gave it responsibility to investigate and

bring enforcement actions against violators. 42 U.S.C.

§ 12188(b)(1).

Congress also expressly directed the Justice Department to

promulgate regulations “to carry out the provisions” of Title

Ill. Jd. § 12186(b); A. 88a. Congress gave the US.

Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board

(the “Access Board”) a subsidiary, “advisory” role in the

rulemaking process. 29 U.S.C. § 792(b). Congress directed

the Access Board to “issue minimum guidelines” consistent

with the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12204(a) & (b); A. 89a-90a, “to

assist the Department of Justice” in developing its Title III

regulations. 36 C.F.R. § 1191.1. Although the Justice

Department’s regulations must “be consistent with” the floor

set by the Board’s guidelines, 42 U.S.C. § 12186(c); A. 88a,

the Department is free to impose more stringent accessibility

obligations than contemplated by the Board. A. 16a.

Congress also tasked the Justice Department to provide

guidance to “individuals or entities with rights or duties

under” Title III. It instructed the Department, “as part of its

4

implementation responsibilities,” to “ensure the availability

of appropriate technical assistance manuals.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 12206(c)(3); A. 9Qla. Congress also directed the

Department to “render technical assistance” on a less formal

basis to those affected by Title III. /d. § 12206(c)(1); A. 90a.

On July 26, 1991, after notice and comment, the Justice

Department issued regulations implementing Title III. While

relying on the Access Board’s “minimum guidelines,” the

Department issued these rules as its own regulations. 56 Fed.

Reg. 35544 (1991), codified at 28 C.F.R. Part 36 & App. A;

A. 90a. The regulation addressing seating for wheelchair

users in assembly areas states:

Wheelchair areas... shall be provided so as to

provide people with physical disabilities . . . lines of

sight comparable to those for members of the

general public.

Id. App. A, § 4.33.3; A. 104a.

B. The Justice Department’s Consistent Interpretation.

The Department fulfilled the congressional directive to

furnish technical assistance by issuing an interpretation of the

comparable sightlines regulation in two basic forms:

First, beginning shortly after the new-construction

provisions of the ADA became effective in early 1993, the

Department alerted architects and developers through

correspondence that it interpreted “comparable” lines of sight

to mean “line[s] of sight over standing spectators.” C.A.A.

1224. The Department first expressed this interpretation in

letters concerning the Atlanta Olympic Stadium, and

reiterated it in dozens of letters issued in conjunction with

other Departmental investigations, and in response to

inquiries by Members of Congress and the public. C.A.A.

406-65. Notably, the Department sent one of these letters, in

November 1994, to the MCI Center’s architects and its ADA

attorney. C.A.A. 424.

5

Second, the Department interpreted its regulation in its

congressionally mandated Title IJ] Technical Assistance

Manual. In the September 1994 update to the Manual—

issued months before the first plans for the MCI Center were

drawn—the Department explained:

[This regulation] requires that wheelchair locations

provide people with disabilities lines of sight

comparable to those for members of the general

public. Thus, in assembly areas where spectators

can be expected to stand during the event or show

being viewed, the wheelchair locations must

provide lines of sight over spectators who stand.

This can be accomplished in many ways, including

placing wheelchair locations at the front of a seating

section, or by providing sufficient ad onal

elevation for wheelchair locations placed at the rear

of seating sections to allow those spectators to see

over the spectators who stand in front of them.

Title III Technical Assistance Manual, § TI-7.5180; A. 115a

(emphasis added).

In contrast to the Justice Department, the Access Board,

which has no enforcement or interpretative role under the

ADA, never offered an official interpretation of the phrase

“comparable line of sight” in its minimum guidelines, and

repeatedly declined to ascribe a specific meaning to it. 56

Fed. Reg. 35408, 35440 (1991); A. 97a; 57 Fed. Reg. 60612,

60618 (1992); 59 Fed. Reg. 31676, 31679 (1994).’

2 Petitioners imply that the Access Board excluded the possibility that

its guideline could be read to require lines of sight over standing

spectators. Pet. at 20. In fact, the Access Board has never resolved the

issue. Its staff and consultants, however, have opined repeatedly that the

Board’s “comparable line of sight” guideline—like the Justice

Department’s analogous regulation—requires unobstructed sightlines.

E.g., C.A.A. 470 (“A comparable line of sight allows a person using a

wheelchair to see the playing surface between the heads and over the

shoulders of persons standing in the row immediately in front . . .”), see

also id. at 423, 1422.

ooo

6

C. The Design of the MCI Center.

In late December 1994, the MCI Center’s architects

presented the Center’s owner, Petitioner Abe Pollin, with an

array of preliminary options for the arena’s seating bowl.

C.A.A. 968-77. Only one of these options offered well-

distributed wheelchair locations with lines of sight over

standing spectators.

Mr. Pollin initially selected this option, C.A.A. 968, but

quickly became concerned that in this bowl design, the

facility’s luxury suites would not attract a high enough price.

C.A.A. 978. To maximize revenues, Mr. Pollin abandoned

his initial selection and opted instead for a design that

provided obstructed sightlines for wheelchair users at most

locations. C.A.A. 991.

The architects and Mr. Pollin’s ADA attorney—all of

whom were aware of the Justice Department’s long-standing

interpretation of its comparable sightlines regulation and,

specifically, its September 1994 update to the Technical

Assistance Manual—warned Mr. Pollin that the Department

interpreted its regulation to mean that wheelchair users must

be provided lines of sight over standing spectators. As the

Court of Appeals rightly observed, “there is no question but

that [Petitioners] were on notice of Justice’s interpretation”

when they selected the design for the spectator seating bow!

that the District Court found to be unlawful. A. 17a.

Mr. Pollin nonetheless chose to defy the Department.

Notes of the design team meetings reveal Mr. Pollin saying

he “doesn’t want to lose seats for wheelchair seating.”

C.A.A. 501. Other notes of his statements are even more

explicit: “Abe says he’s not going ‘to do’ the handicapped

seating. Abe doesn’t think he’s going to have to comply.”

C.A.A. 497, 500.

D. The Litigation.

Four wheelchair users and the Paralyzed Veterans of

America, a congressionally chartered organization

7

representing honorably discharged veterans of the armed

forces with spinal cord injuries or disease, see 36 U.S.C.

§ 1151 et seq., filed this suit under the ADA. After a week-

long bench trial, the District Court (Hogan, J.) found that the

MCI Center’s original design “ghettoized” wheelchair users,

A. 58a, and was unlawful and discriminatory. A. 75a. The

Court entered a permanent injunction requiring design

changes, including modifications to the arena to provide

well-dispersed wheelchair locations, a substantial percentage

of which offer lines of sight over standing spectators. A. 76a.

The D.C. Circuit affirmed the District Court in all

respects. Judge Silberman, writing for the Court, held:

First, contrary to Petitioners’ claim that the term “lines of

sight comparable” had “for years . . . been understood” as not

requiring “views over spectators who stand,” Pet. at 3, at the

time the Justice Department issued its regulation “[t]he words

simply had not taken on a well-understood meaning.” A. 9a.

Thus, the regulation “quite naturally is interpreted to refer to

the ability of a wheelchair user to see a performance without

any obstruction,” as stated in the Justice Department’s

Technical Assistance Manual. A. 9a.

Second, the Department’s interpretation of its comparable

sightlines regulation is entitled to deference under principles

éstablished by a long line of Supreme Court precedents:

Agency interpretations of their own regulations

have been afforded deference by federal reviewing

courts for a very long time and are sustained unless

“plainly erroneous or inconsistent” with the

regulation. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ. v.

Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994); Bowles v.

Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414

(1945).

A. 10a.

Third, the regulation at issue is properly considered the

Justice Department’s “own regulation,” to which these

traditional deference rules apply. A. 13a. While the Access

8

Board played a role in drafting the regulation, “the doctrine

of deference is based primarily on the agency’s statutory role

as the sponsor of the regulation,” A. 12a, and on the agency’s

“delegated authority to administer the [regulation].” A. 13a.

Both lie with the Justice Department here.

Fourth, with respect to the deference analysis, it is also

“significant” that Congress “specifically requir[ed] the

publication of a technical manual that would further refine or

interpret in detail the regulation’s substantive obligations.”

A. 13a-14a. This reveals that Congress “contemplated a

continuing administration of the regulation that approaches,

if not equates with, the adjudicatory authority of other

statutory schemes.” Jd.

Fifth, the Department’s interpretation of the regulation in

the Technical Assistance Manual did not, as Petitioners

claimed, “constitute[] a fundamental modification of its

previous interpretation,” A. 14a, since the Department had

“never authoritatively adopted a position contrary to its

manual interpretation.” A. 18a. The agency’s interpretation

thus was not an improper attempt to amend that regulation.

Id?

Sixth, the Department’s explanation of the regulation’s

meaning in the Technical Assistance Manual “spells out a

duty fairly encompassed within the regulation” itself. A. 18a.

Accordingly, it is “interpretative,” not “substantive,” and did

not require notice-and-comment rulemaking. Indeed, “the

government could have relied on the regulation itself, even

without the manual interpretation, to seek lines of sight over

standing spectators.” A. 19a. Because the “interpretation is

> Although the Court of Appeals called the contention that the agency

had “switch[ed]” its interpretation Petitioners’ “most powerful

argument,” A. 14a, this contention is neither encompassed in the

questions presented nor addressed in the body of the Petition. Thus, the

legal standard applicable when an agency switches its interpretative

position is not presented for review in this case.

9

”

not sufficiently distinct or additive to the regulation,” it is a

valid interpretative rule. /d.

Petitioners’ request for rehearing and rehearing in banc by

the D.C. Circuit did not garner a single vote. A. 23a, 24a.

They now seek review solely of the appellate court’s second

and sixth holdings.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. THE LAW IS CLEAR ON THE DEGREE OF

DEFERENCE DUE AN AGENCY’S INTERPRETA-

TION OF ITS OWN REGULATION.

Petitioners ask the Court to provide “guidance” on “the

extent of agency power to make law by interpreting

regulations in issuances in informal formats.” Pet. at 9. But

there is absolutely no need for the Court to provide

“guidance” on the deference due an agency’s regulatory

interpretation, because it has done so already in an unbroken

string of decisions over the last fifty years—precedents the

D.C. Circuit correctly applied.

Judging from the only alleged circuit split Petitioners

identify, their real request is that the Court use this case to

decide the degree of deference due an agency’s interpretation

of its governing statute. This case, however, involves only a

dispute about an agency’s interpretation of its own

regulation, not a dispute about an agency’s interpretation of

statutory provisions. This Court has made clear that these

two distinct questions are governed by separate lines of

authority. The Court should not grant certiorari to resolve an

alleged circuit split on a question that has no bearing on this

case.

A. For Half a Century, This Court Has Applied a

Clear, Consistent Standard to Agency Interpreta-

tions of Regulations.

For over fifty years, the federal courts have consistently

applied a single test to describe the deference due to an

10

administrative agency when it interprets a regulation it

enforces. The test was first stated by this Court in 1945 in

Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 417

(1945), and the Court has reiterated it time and again, as

recently as last Term in Auer v. Robbins, 117 S. Ct. 905, 912

(1997). Under this established rule, an agency’s

interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless

‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.””

Auer, 117 S. Ct. at 911 (quoting Seminole Rock)“ As the

D.C. Circuit accurately stated, “[a]gency interpretations of

their own regulations have been afforded deference by

federal reviewing courts for a very long time.” A. 10a.

Given this Court’s frequent repetition of this principle, it

is scarcely surprising that the circuits unanimously follow it,

and have for decades. Each year, the federal courts confront

scores of cases involving agency interpretations of

regulations. Each circuit applies the same test in such

cases—the deferential standard first announced in Seminole

Rock. Contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, the federal circuits

are not “divided and confused” on this issue. Pet. at 8.°

* See also, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’! Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 94-

95 (1995); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994);

Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993); Robertson v. Methow

Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989); Mullins Coal Co. v.

Department of Labor, 484 U.S. 135, 159 (1987); Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S.

926, 939 (1986); United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977);

Northern Indiana Public Service Co. v. Izaak Walton League of America,

Inc., 423 U.S. 12, 15 (1975) (per curiam); Ehlert v. United States, 402

U.S. 99, 105 (1971); INS v. Stanisic, 395 U.S. 62, 72 (1969); Thorpe v.

Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 276 (1969); Udall v. Tallmar:,

380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965). Even the “dissenting Justices” cited by

Petitioners as questioning this standard, Pet. at 22, were in agreement that

the Seminole Rock cases provide the governing deference rule. See

Guernsey Memorial Hospital, supra, 514 U.S. at 103 (O’Connor, J.,

dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 519 (Thomas, J.,

dissenting).

° Every one of the federal circuits has recently applied the test

established in Seminole Rock and its progeny as the standard for

11

B. There Is No Open Issue as to the Deference

Afforded Regulatory Interpretations That Are

Issued in “Informal Formats.”

Notwithstanding a half-century of consistent case law

granting deference to agencies’ regulatory interpretations,

Petitioners conjure up a supposedly open question as to

whether regulatory interpretations issued in “informal

formats” should receive less deference. Pet. at 9. This

alleged conflict is nonexistent.

By definition, agency interpretations of regulations—

“interpretative rules” in the parlance of the APA, 5 U.S.C.

§ 553(b)(3)(A); A. 82a—are not required to go through

notice and comment. Jd. In fact, virtually all of them are

“issued without complying with the APA’s formal

rulemaking requirements.” Pet. at 10. This has never been

relevant to this Court’s deference analysis. In the landmark

case of Seminole Rock, this Court deferred to precisely such

an “informal” statement—an agency’s interpretation of its

regulation expressed in an administrative “bulletin” and a

“quarterly report” to Congress. 325 U.S. at 417. This Court

has deferred to similar “informal” agency statements in many

cases since Seminole Rock® Just last Term, in Aver v.

deference to an agency’s interpretation of its regulations: See, e.g., P.

Gioioso & Sons, Inc. v. OSHRC, 115 F.3d 100, 107 (1st Cir. 1997); New

York v. Shalala, 119 F.3d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1997), Shell Oil Co. v.

Babbitt, 125 F.3d 172, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1997); Comet Enter. Ltd. v. Air-A-

Plane Corp., 128 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1997); WRT Energy Corp. v.

FERC, 107 F.3d 314, 318 (Sth Cir. 1997); Elaine ’s Cleaning Serv., Inc. v.

Department of Labor, 106 F.3d 726, 729 (6th Cir. 1997). Board of

Trustees of Knox County Hosp. v. Shalala, 1998 WL 35149 at *5 (7th

Cir. 1998); Love v. Tippy, 1998 WL 3141 at *1 n6 (8th Cir. 1997);

Anaheim Memorial Hosp. v. Shalala, 130 F.3d 845, 849-50 (9th Cir.

1997); Oklahoma v. Shalala, 42 F.3d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1994),

Interstate Brands Corp. v. Local 44] Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store

Union, AFL-CIO, 39 F.3d 1159, 1163 (11th Cir. 1994); Ramey v. Gober,

120 F.3d 1239, 1246 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

6 See, e.g., Guernsey Mem’! Hosp., 514 U.S. at 90 (deferring to

agency’s “informal . . . guideline” that “does not purport to be a

12

Robbins, the Court deferred to an agency’s regulatory

interpretation explained in “a legal brief’ filed by the

Secretary of Labor as amicus curiae in the very litigation in

which the Court’s ruling was issued. 117 S. Ct. at 912.’

The Petitioners’ casual treatment of Aver is particularly

remarkable. See Pet. at 17-18. Far from failing to “decide”

the “unresolved issue presented here,” as Petitioners claim,

id., the Court expressly addressed the argument that the

“form” of the agency’s regulatory interpretation should

change the deference rule applied. The Court held,

unanimously, that an agency’s interpretation is not

“unworthy of deference” simply because it is announced in

an informal format, such as the amicus brief in Auer. 117 S.

Ct. at 912.

C. The Cases Cited by Petitioners Reveal No Conflict

on Any Issue Presented by this Case.

Not one of the dozens of cases cited by Petitioners actually

supports their claim that the Circuits are “deeply split” on the

deference due to an agency’s regulatory interpretation issued

in “informal interpretative statements.” Pet. at 10. Almost

all of Petitioners’ cases involve an agency’s interpretation of

regulation and has not been adopted pursuant to the notice-and-comment

procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act”); Ford Motor Credit

Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 563 & n.8 (1980) (deferring to agency

memo setting forth an “Official Staff Interpretation” and several “Public

Information Letters”); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993)

(deferring to agency’s interpretive “commentary”); Transamerica Freight

Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 42 n.7 (1975)

(deferring to agency interpretation expressed in amicus brief).

” Contrary to Petitioners’ suggestion, this Court has not assigned any

relevance to whether an agency’s regulatory interpretation was

announced in an “agency adjudication” or an interpretative rule. Pet. at 9.

In fact, this Court has treated these as equivalent, contrasting both with

notice-and-comment rulemaking. See, e.g., Guernsey Memorial Hosp.,

514 U.S. at 89-90 (addressing the agency’s “authority to resolve

certain .. . issues by adjudication and interpretive rules, rather than by

regulations”).

13

a statute, not an agency interpretation of its own regulation.

See Pet. at 11-15.

Since the 1940’s, the federal courts have observed a clear

distinction between the rules of deference for agency

interpretations of regulations, see Seminole Rock (decided in

1945), and the deference rules governing agency

interpretations of statutes, see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323

U.S. 134 (1944). This Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A.

Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837 (1984), governs only the latter line of cases.”

8 See, e.g., Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste

Comm'n v. Pena, 113 F.3d 1468, 1473 (7th Cir. 1997) (agency’s

“interpretation of an ambiguous statute”), Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Pena,

44 F.3d 437, 442 (7th Cir. 1994) (“agency’s adoption of its statutory

interpretation”), aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Brotherhood of

Locomotive Eng’rs v. Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R., 516 U.S. 152 (1996);

Headrick v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1994)

(agency’s “reading of the Act”); Southern Ute Indian Tribe v. Amoco

Production Co., 119 F.3d 816, 830 (10th Cir. 1997) (“agency

construction of a statutory term”); Reich v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 126

F.3d 1, 5, (Ist Cir. 1997) (agency’s interpretation of “*administrative

employees’ under the [Fair Labor Standards Act]”); Travelstead v.

Derwinski, 978 F.2d 1244, 1250 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (agency’s “[l]egal

interpretations of a statute”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. New York

State Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 531 (2d Cir. 1994)

(agency’s “statutory construction”); Kelley v. E-/. du Pont de Nemours &

Co., 17 F.3d 836, 841 (6th Cir. 1994) (agency’s “interpretation of a

statute”); Elizabeth Blackwell Health Ctr. v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170, 182 (3d

Cir. 1995) (agency’s “constnsction of a statutory scheme”), cert. denied,

516 U.S. 1093 (1996); Sidwell v. Express Container Services, Inc., 71

F.3d 1134, 1141 (4th Cir. 1995) (agency’s “interpretation of the statute”);

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2570 (1996); Jacks v. Crabtree, 114 F.3d 983,

984 (9th Cir. 1997) (agency construction of “enabling statute”); Soileau v.

Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 14 (Ist Cir. 1997) (agency’s

“interpretation of the ADA and of the Maine Human Rights Act”).

> Compare Auer, 117 S. Ct at 909 (applying Chevron to the

Secretary’s “interpretation of the statutory exemption”) with id. at 911

(applying Seminole Rock to an interpretation “of the Secretary’s own

regulations”).

14

It may or may not be an open question whether a

particular agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute

issued in an “informal format,” rather than through notice-

and-comment rulemaking, should get “Chevron-level”

deference, or should be subject to a less deferential standard

such as that set forth in Skidmore.'° But even if this statutory

interpretation issue were an open question, the law has been

clearly settled since at least 1945 in the context of regulatory

interpretations—Seminole Rock deference applies. The

federal courts are not confused on this question. See p. 13

n.8, supra."

‘Tn fact, this Court has already given “guidance” with respect to this

issue as well. See, e.g., Reno v. Koray, 115 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (1995)

(finding Chevron deference due agency’s interpretation of statute though

“[i]t is true that the Bureau’s interpretation appears only in a ‘Program

Statement’—an internal agency guideline—rather than in ‘published

regulations subject to the rigors of the Administrative Procedures Act”);

see also, e.g., Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms v. FLRA, 464 U.S.

89, 98 n.8 (1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 563, 566

& n.9 (1980).

''In the same vein, Petitioners try to sow the seeds of confusion by

suggesting, alternatively, that the issue in conflict is whether informal

agency interpretations are “binding” and have the “force and effect of

law.” See Pet. at 12-13 (citing Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala, 118

F.3d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1997); Avol v. HHS, 883 F.2d 659, 661 (9th

Cir. 1989); Dalheim v. KDFW-TV, 918 F.2d 521 1220, 1228 (Sth Cir.

1990)). The proposition that interpretative rules do not have the force of

law is both noncontroversial and undisputed. The question here is

whether the Technical Assistance Manual is entitled to deference, not

whether it is “binding,” a point the Court of Appeals well understood.

See A. 14a (“we . . . defer to the Department’s reasonable interpretations

of its regulation as set forth in the technical manual”). Other than the

foregoing precedents, which are irrelevant, the only other cases cited by

Petitioners actually support the Respondents’ point that the governing

deference test is not in controversy. See Shalala v. St. Paul-Ramsey Med.

Ctr., 50 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 1995) (regulatory interpretation is entitled

to deference unless “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with” the

regulation); Visiting Nurse Ass'n of North Shore v. Bullen, 93 F.3d 997,

1002 (1st Cir. 1996) (same), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 955 (1997); Reich v.

General Motors Corp., 89 F.3d 313, 315 (6th Cir. 1996) (“reasonable”

.

15

D. This Case Does Not Involve Chevron, and the

Alleged Conflict Cited by Petitioners Could Not Be

Decided Here.

Faced with fifty-years-worth of consistent precedent

following Seminole Rock, Petitioner tries to muddy these

clear waters by suggesting that this case actually involves the

application of Chevron. This argument is built upon a

seriously flawed reading of the decision below.

Chevron describes the degree of deference due “an

agency’s construction of the statute which it administers.”

467 US. at 842. There is no contention in this case,

however, that the agency misapplied the relevant statute, the

ADA, in promulgating its comparable sightlines regulation.

The only issue in this case is whether the Justice

Department’s interpretation of its regulation to require lines

of sight over standing spectators is entitled to deference. As

the D.C. Circuit accurately stated, this “case involves just the

proper interpretation of the regulation.” A. 7a. . Thus, the

court applied the established standard for deference to an

agency’s regulatory interpretation. A. 10a (citing Thomas

Jefferson Univ., 512 U.S. at 504, and Seminole Rock, 325

U:S. at 414).

Notwithstanding the clarity of Judge Silberman’s opinion,

Petitioners contend that the D.C. Circuit extends “Chevron-

level deference” to an informal agency regulatory

interpretation, Pet. at 10, and thereby “mandate[s] a level of

judicial deference to informally adopted agency

interpretations going beyond any that this Court has ever

prescribed or permitted.” Pet. at 19. Petitioners warn, in dire

terms, that “even the Seminole Rock line of cases never went

so far as the D.C. Circuit did here.” Jd. at 21.

There is no need for such hysteria. The D.C. Circuit

neither applied Chevron nor suggested that Chevron would

construction of ambiguous regulation is entitled to “substantial

deference”).

16

or should be the governing precedent in considering whether

to defer to an agency’s interpretation of a regulation. The

only two substantive mentions of Chevron in the D.C.

Circuit’s decision appear, first, in dicta comparing the levels

of deference afforded under Seminole Rock and Chevron, A.

10a, 15a, and, second, in the court’s rejection of the

government’s “bold, complete analogy to Chevron” on the

separate question whether notice and comment was required.

A. 15a.

Far from going beyond “even the Seminole Rock line of

cases,” Pet. at 21, this case is well within this Court’s prior

deference decisions. Congress expressly charged the Justice

Department to promulgate regulatory standards to implement

the ADA, and the Department duly issued its own

regulations, after notice and comment, to implement that Act.

42 U.S.C. § 12186(b). Thereafter, the Department complied

with a specific congressional mandate to issue “technical

assistance manuals” to provide guidance and explain its

interpretation of those standards. 42 U.S.C. § 12206(c)(3).

When the agency issued a regulatory interpretation to carry

out that express congressional directive, it was acting at the

height of its powers.'* This case, therefore, would be a

particularly unsuitable vehicle for this Court to reconsider

established deference principles, even if it were inclined to

do so.

E. Petitioners Seek The Reversal of a Half-Century of

Unquestioned Decisions Applying Seminole Rock.

Petitioners’ true intentions are revealed in their final

argument addressing deference, which relies heavily on a

recent law review article arguing that Seminole Rock should

be abandoned as the standard for deference to agency regu-

12 See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co., 444 U.S. at 567-68 (where

Congress evinces a “decided preference” to “treat administrative

rulemaking and interpretation as authoritative,” courts “should honor that

congressional choice” by deferring to the agency).

ee cl alt:

17

latory interpretations. Pet. at 19-22 (citing Manning, Consti-

tutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency

Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612,

614 (1996)). Petitioners ask this Court to reverse a half-

century of consistent case law that has “‘gone unquestioned’

since 1945” in order to adopt a provocative argument in a

law journal article whose author candidly admits that “Semi-

nole Rock deference . . . has long been one of the least

worried-about principles of administrative law.” Manning,

supra, at 614. Clearly, the views of a single law review

author that fifty years of “unquestioned” precedent should be

jettisoned is not an adequate basis for a grant of certiorari.

The D.C. Circuit rightly rejected the invitation to adopt

Professor Manning’s views. A. 10a n.2. So should this

Court.

II. THERE IS NO SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS ON HOW TO

DISTINGUISH “INTERPRETATIVE” FROM “SUB-

STANTIVE” RULES.

Citing a string of precedent stretching back almost two

decades, A. 18a-19a, the D.C. Circuit (acknowledged by

Petitioners as the “premier Circuit for federal regulatory

litigation,” Pet. at 8), applied the settled test to distinguish an

interpretative rule from a substantive rule. The court said:

We... look to whether the interpretation itself

carries “the force and effect of law,” or rather

whether it spells out a duty fairly encompassed

within the regulation that interpretation purports to

construe.... The distinction between an

interpretative and substantive rule. . . turns on how

tightly the agency’s interpretation is drawn

linguistically from the actual language of the statute

or rule.

A. 18a-19a (citations omitted). This description of the

governing standard is echoed in the decisions of the other

courts of appeals, which look to whether an interpretative

18

rule “clarifies,” “defines,” or “explains” a substantive rule.’

It is also the standard endorsed by Robert Anthony,

Petitioners’ commentator-of-choice. '“

Petitioners nevertheless claim that the D.C. Circuit’s

“linguistic test,” Pet. at 8, creates a three-way split in the

circuits. Petitioners never identify the three supposedly

3 See, e.g., United States v. Piper, 35 F.3d 611, 617 (ist Cir. 1994)

(interpretative rule valid because it “comports sufficiently with the letter,

spirit, and aim of the” regulation); United States v. Yuzary, 55 F.3d 47,

51-52 (2d Cir. 1995) (“it is the proper function of interpretative rules to

clarify ambiguities” in regulations); FLRA v. Department of the Navy,

966 F.2d 747, 762 n.14 (3d Cir. 1992) (in banc) (“In determining whether

a Tule is interpretive or substantive we may look to the nature of the rule

itself: If the rule in question merely clarifies or explains existing law or

regulations, it will be deemed interpretive”) (internal quotation omitted):

Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1340-41 (4th Cir. 1995)

(“interpretive rules simply state what the administrative agency thinks a

Statute means, and only remind affected parties of existing duties”):

Brown Express, Inc. v. United States, 607 F.2d 695, 700 & n.5 (Sth Cir.

1979) (finding rule not interpretative because it was not a “clarification”

that “defines ... [an] ambiguous term” in regulation); United States v.

Century Offshore Mgmt. Corp., 111 F.3d 443, 453 (6th Cir. 1997) (an

“interpretive rule is one issued by an agency to advise the public of the

agency’s construction of the... rules which it administers”) (internal

quotation omitted), cert. denied, 66 U.S.L.W. 3490 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1998);

Metropolitan School Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th Cir. 1992)

(“interpretive rules are statements as to what the administrative officer

thinks the... regulation means”) (internal quotation omitted); Cai-

Almond, Inc. v. USDA, 14 F.3d 429, 447-48 (9th Cir. 1993)

(interpretative rules are “those which merely clarify or explain

existing . . . regulations”); Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 971

F.2d 544, 546-47 (10th Cir. 1992) (“[a] rule is interpretative if... it

attempts to clarify an existing rule but does not change existing law,

policy, or practice”).

'*Professor Anthony, on whom Petitioners extensively rely, see Pet.

at ix, agrees that the APA does not mandate notice-and-comment

rulemaking for rules that interpret “tangible” or “specifically-worded” or

“sufficiently concrete” language in a regulation. Anthony, /nterpretive

Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals and the Like — Should

Federal Agencies Use Them To Bind The Public?, 41 Duke LJ. 1311,

1313, 1339, 1349 (1992).

19

conflicting standards—their second question presented

suggests only two competing approaches. More

fundamentally, Petitioners’ claim of a circuit split is

predicated entirely on improper citation and misreading of

relevant authority. There is no circuit split.

A. Petitioners Miscite and Misread Authority.

Petitioners rely heavily on what they say is the “hold[ing]”

of a Tenth Circuit case, United States v. Thompson, 687 F.2d

1279 (10th Cir. 1982), quoting it at length in their petition.

Pet. at 23. But Petitioners are quoting the dissenting opinion

in Thompson. Id. (quoting 687 F.2d at 1295). Chief Judge

Seth’s majority opinion for the in banc court—the Tenth

Circuit’s actual “holding” in Thompson—takes a very

different position from Judge McKay’s dissent on how to

distinguish an interpretative rule from a substantive one.

Compare 687 F.2d at 1283 (Seth, C.J.) with id. at 1295

(McKay, J., dissenting). As this Court has made clear, “(t}he

comments in the dissenting opinion .. . are just that: com-

ments in a dissenting opinion.” United States R. Retirement

Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 177 n.10 (1980).

Moreover, recent Tenth Circuit cases embrace a test

essentially identical to the rule applied by the D.C. Circuit

here: “A rule is interpretive if it... attempts to clarify an

existing rule but does not change existing law, policy, or

practice.” Rocky Mountain Helicopters, 971 F.2d 544, 546-

47 (10th Cir. 1992); see also, e.g., Headrick v. Rockwell Int 1

Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1282 (10th Cir. 1994) (per White, J.,

sitting by designation) (interpretive rules “help clarify the

meaning and application of . . . promulgated rules”); Knutzen

v. Eben Ezer Lutheran Housing Ctr., 815 F.2d 1343, 1351-52

(10th Cir. 1987) (same). Petitioners notably do not cite any

of these more recent, and controlling, Tenth Circuit opinions.

Petitioners’ reliance on Hoctor v. USDA, 82 F.3d 165 (7th

Cir. 1996), fares no better. Petitioners describe the “holding”

in Hoctor as “irreconcilable with the D.C. Circuit’s” holding

20

in this case. Pet. at 23. In fact, it is indistinguishable. The

Hoctor court defined an interpretive rule as one

that can be derived from the regulation by a process

reasonably described as interpretation. Metropoli-

tan School Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 490 (7th

Cir. 1992)... . “Interpretation” in the narrow sense

is the ascertainment of meaning.

82 F.3d at 170. There is no functional difference between

this definition and the one employed by the D.C. Circuit.

Both look to whether what purports to be an interpretation

can be “derived from the regulation” (or, in the D.C.

Circuit’s formulation, can be “drawn linguistically from the

actual language of the . . . rule”).

This similarity is hardly surprising, since the case Hoctor

cites as support for its rule, Davila, explicitly holds that the

D.C. Circuit “has set forth the general principles to be used to

determine whether a rule is interpretive, and, therefore,

exempt from APA’s notice and comment requirements.” See

Davila, 969 F.2d at 489 (citing, inter alia, General Motors

Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

(in banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1074 (1985), and United

Technologies Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 718 (D.C. Cir.

1987)). The D.C. Circuit, in this case, relied on the same

precedents. A. 18a-19a (citing, inter alia, United

Technologies, 821 F.2d at 719-20). Petitioners’ alleged

circuit split amounts to nothing more than nitpicking over

functionally identical language; they fail to identify any

substantive conflict.

B. The Circuit Courts Agree That the “Impact” of an

Interpretation Is Not Determinative.

Contrary to Petitioners’ claim, there is also no split in the

circuits on whether the “real-world impact” of an

interpretation determines whether it must go through notice-

and-comment rulemaking. Pet. at 25. Long ago, the D.C.

Circuit held that “the impact of a rule has no bearing on

whether it is legislative or interpretative; interpretative rules

21

may have a substantial impact on the rights of individuals.”

American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal

Service, 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C. Cir. 1983).

As Petitioners themselves note, the Third, Sixth, and

Ninth Circuits agree with the D.C. Circuit and have held

explicitly that an interpretative rule may be valid

notwithstanding its substantial impact on the regulated

community. Pet. at 24, citing Elizabeth Blackwell Health

Ctr. v. Knoll, 61 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.

Ct. 816 (1996); First Nat’l Bank v. Sanders, 946 F.2d 1185,

1189 n.2 (6th Cir. 1991); Chief Probation Officers v. Shalala,

118 F.3d 1327, 1335 (9th Cir. 1997). The Second and

Seventh Circuits also agree. See White v. Bowen, 636 F.

Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[iJn drawing the line

between substantive and interpretative rules, the Second

Circuit no longer looks to the impact of the rule”), aff'd, 835

F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1987); Davila, supra, 969 F.2d at 493

(“Prevailing authority rejects the proposition that a rule that

has substantial impact is necessarily legislative.”).

Petitioners cite only one case, La Casa del Convaleciente

v. Sullivan, 965 F.2d 1175, 1178 (ist Cir. 1992), that even

remotely considers a rule’s “impact.” Pet. at 23-24.'° But the

La Casa court, while citing dated First Circuit precedent

suggesting “impact may be relevant,” Levesque v. Block, 723

F.2d 175, 182 (1st Cir. 1983), did not say that “impact” could

ever be determinative, La Casa, 965 F.2d at 1178, and

Levesque itself makes clear that “substantial impact does not

'S Along with La Casa, Petitioners also rely (explicitly this time) on

the dissenting opinion in Elizabeth Blackwell, 61 F.3d at 187 (Nygaard,

J., dissenting). Pet. at 24. Needless to say, Judge Nygaard’s dissent is no

more probative of a circuit split than is Judge McKay’s. Furthermore, the

in banc Third Circuit has adopted a test to distinguish substantive from

interpretative rules, based on D.C. Circuit precedent, that is functionally

identical to the rule employed in this case. See FLRA v. Department of

the Navy, supra, 966 F.2d at 762 n. 14.

22

make a rule legislative....” 723 F.2d at 182 (emphasis

added).

Moreover, the La Casa court noted that “[o]ther

circuits... have moved away from considering the level of

impact on interested parties as a factor in correctly

classifying a rule or regulation.” 965 F.2d at 1178 (citing

cases). The court ultimately held that the rule before it was

interpretative, using a test that echoes the test applied by the

D.C. Circuit here: the interpretation was permissible because

it was “a form of interpolation necessary to fill in where

numbers are missing” from the regulation. Jd. at 1179

(internal quotation omitted). More recent First Circuit

precedent makes no mention of “impact” in assessing the

validity of an interpretative rule. Piper, 35 F.3d at 617

C. This Court Recently Has Offered Clear Guidance

On This Precise Issue.

Petitioners’ final claim, that this Court has offered “no

guidance... on what constitutes an ‘interpretative’ rule,”

Pet. at 22-23, is simply inaccurate.

Less than three years ago, this Court considered whether

an informal interpretive “guideline” issued by the Secretary

of Health and Human Services “is invalid because [the

Secretary] did not follow the notice-and-comment provisions

of the [APA] in issuing it.” Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial

Hospital, 514 U.S. 87, 90 (1995). This Court held that the

Secretary’s interpretation of her regulation was permissible

(and entitled to deference), notwithstanding its informal

origins, because it supplied details “unaddressed by the

otherwise comprehensive regulations on [the] particular

subject” of the regulation. Jd. at 97. The Court explained:

[The guideline] is a prototypical example of an

interpretive rule “‘issued by an agency to advise the

public of the agency’s construction of the . . . rules

which it administers.”” Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,

441 U.S. 281, 302, n. 31 (1979) (quoting Attorney

23

General’s Manual on the Administrative Procedure

Act 30, n. 3 (1947)).

Id. at 99. Justice O’Connor dissented, but her disagreement

focused on the application of the legal standard to the facts,

not the definition of an interpretative rule. In language

closely resembling the “linguistic” standard articulated by the

Court of Appeals here, Justice O’ Connor stated:

[I]nterpretive rules... describe what the agency

believes the... existing regulations require but. . .

do not alter the substantive obligations created

thereby. Such interpretive rules... must explain

existing law and not contradict what the regulations

require.

Id. at 111 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).'°

The 5-to-4 vote in Guernsey illustrates well that

determining whether a particular rule is substantive or

interpretative is often a difficult, fact-intensive, undertaking.

But the difficulty does not stem from any disagreement on

the governing legal standard. As Judge Wald has put it:

Determining whether a given agency action is

interpretive or legislative is an extraordinarily case-

specific endeavor... . [A]nalogizing to prior cases

is often of limited utility in light of the exceptional

degree to which decisions in this doctrinal area turn

on their precise facts.

American Hosp. Ass'n v. Bowen, %34 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.

Cir. 1987).

This observation applies perfectly here. The D.C. Circuit

carefully reviewed the record and, applying settled law, held

that the interpretation of the comparable sightlines regulation

in the Technical Assistance Manual was valid. Because

16 oe also Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993)

(“commentary in the Guidelines Manual that interprets or explains a

guideline is” an interpretative rule entitled to deference) (emphasis

added).

24

Petitioners are unable to show any real debate on the

applicable legal standard, and do not challenge the D.C.

Circuit’s application of the law to the complex facts of this

case, the Petition should be denied.

Ill. THIS CASE IS A POOR VEHICLE’ FOR

CONSIDERING THE QUESTIONS PRESENTED.

Even if Petitioners were able to identify an actual circuit

split on either of their questions presented, this Court should

decline to grart a writ of certioran for at least four

independent reasons.

First, the “undulated interplay,” A. 42a, between the

Access Board and the Justice Departreent—in which the

Access Board sets the foundation upon wnich the Department

builds its regulation—is rare, if not unique. See p. 3-4,

supra. In the lower courts, Petitioners focused much of their

attack on this unusual relationship, arguing that deference is

not due the Justice Department’s interpretation of a

regulation supposedly authored by another agency. See, e.g.,

Brief for Appellants, U.S.C.A, D.C. Cir., at 2, 19-23, 43-45.

The District Court rejected Petitioners’ argument, A. 45a-

47a, as did the Court of Appeals, A. 12a-13a, and Petitioners

do not ask this Court to consider the issue. See Pet. at i.

Nonetheless, even though the regulation at issue in this case

is unquestionably the Justice Department’s own, the

“interplay” between the Access Board and the Department in

the creation of the Title III regulation produced an extensive

administrative record that is not nearly as “clear and simple,”

Pet. at 10, as Petitioners suggest.

Second, the interpretation challenged by Petitioners

appears in the Justice Department’s Technical Assistance

Manual, the means chosen by Congress for the Department

to interpret its Title III regulation. See Ford Motor Credit,

supra, 444 U.S. at 563 & n8. The Assistant Attorney

General for Civil Rights specifically approved the Manual,

including the September 1994 update that contained the

interpretation of the comparable sightlines regulation.

25

C.A.A. 1387-94. Because of the degree of formality

associated with the Department’s interpretation of its

regulation, this case does not present the typical situation in

which an agency seeks deference to an interpretation

expressed in a less formal setting. E.g. Auer, 117 S. Ct. at

911 (amicus brief); Seminole Rock, 325 U.S. at 417

(“bulletin”). It thus would not provide a suitable vehicle for

the Court to consider what deference is due truly informal

agency interpretations.

Third, the fundamental issue in this case—namely,

whether the courts should defer to the Justice Department's

interpretation of its comparable sightlines regulation—is

currently being litigated in at least three circuits. One district

court has agreed with the D.C. Circuit’s holding, United

States v. Ellerbe Becket, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 1262 (D. Minn.

1997), one has disagreed, Caruso v. Blockbuster-Sony Music

Entertainment Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 210 (D.N.J. 1997), and one

has staked out a middle ground, Independent Living

Resources v. Oregon Arena Corp., 982 F. Supp. 698 (D. Ore.

1997). To date, the D.C. Circuit is the only appellate court to

have considered the issue, although the Caruso case is

currently on appeal to the Third Circuit. Caruso v.

Blockbuster-Sony Music Entertainment Ctr., No. 97-5764 (3d

Cir.). It is premature for this Court to review this issue while

it is still moving through the lower courts, particularly when

there have been no inconsistent results at the appellate level.

Finally, the Justice Department’s comparable sightlines

regulation is due for an overhaul in the near future. The

Access Board has already begun work on revising its

minimum guidelines in this area. In July 1994, the Board

published, as an Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

59 Fed. Reg. 48542 (1994), its Recreation Access Advisory

Committee’s Recommendations for Accessibility Guidelines

that specifically addressed the issue “comparable sightlines

in sports facilities.” Recommendations at 42-43. In

September 1996, the Access Board’s specially convened

26

Federal Advisory Committee issued its Recommendations for

a New ADAAG, which also addresses (in Section 802.8) the

sightlines issue. The Access Board is due to issue a Notice

of Proposed Rulemaking based on these reports “in the

summer of 1998.” 3 ACCESS CURRENTS at 3 (Nov./Dec.

1997). Given that the Justice Department’s Title III

regulations must “be consistent with” the Board’s guidelines,

42 U.S.C. § 12186(c), the Justice Department is expected to

initiate rulemaking revisions at the same time. As a result of

this ongoing regulatory activity, whatever decision this Court

renders if it accepts this case for review may quickly prove to

be irrelevant.

CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM H. JEFFRESS, JR.

Counsel of Record

Of Counsel: NIKI KUCKES

ROBERT L. NELSON DAVID S. COHEN

LAWRENCE B. HAGEL JODY MANIER KRIS E

PARALYZED VETERANS MILLER, CASSIDY, 3

OF AMERICA LARROCA & LEWIN, L.L.P.

801 18th Street, N.W. 2555 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006 Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 872-1300 (202) 293-6400

February 1998 Attorneys for Respondents

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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