Prologue — Taxpayers of King County v. King County
Supreme Court brief1998
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TION
RIT OF
ORARI
——a
(‘) OF 812 nov 141997
No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1997
+
TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY,
Petitioners,
KING COUNTY; WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISTRICT; THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LP;
THE STATE OF WASHINGTON; JOHN SCANNELL,
VINCE KOSKELA, AND FRANK RUANO; WILLIAM
C. SEVERSON; CARL B. NELSO?’
Respondents.
¢
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court Of Washington
*
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
+
JoHN D. BLANKINsSHIP*
MontTGOMERY, PurRDuUE, BLANKINSHIP
& Austin, P.L.L.C.
701 Fifth Avenue, 58th Floor
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 682-7090
Kris J. SUNDBERG
PO Box 1577
Mercer Island, WA 98040
(206) 230-0212
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Washington Supreme Court denied Peti-
tioners their right to a fair and impartial hearing
under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution by ret-
roactively creating and applying only to Petitioners
and this case new substantive rules and procedures,
including the denial of a right to discovery and a
reversal of established rules for the Court’s handling
of motions for summary judgment?
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CRT ESR IEG. F MIIIEE EAD: 6 os 0a 0 bev gs 3S Ca saber deaeawe i
TARE GH AFI oo ho dos wesc eh tate ees iv
CORI SAFO os ta Ri nook ows ees eee ee ks 1
FU GI 6. hand diac eenaneee eae danas 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED....... 1
PEPE OE 68660 650505 ede dA eee 2
ee a eB eee re me pie ee 2
OU OE eT eT ene 4
C. How the Federal Question Was Presented to
oe Bt Re a oy ne Ene AC ee,
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION....... 10
A. The Washington Supreme Court Created New
Rules Applicable Only to This Case ......... 12
B. The Acts of the Washington Courts Show
Favoritism and Prejudgment for the County,
SRE NT © i 16
C. This Case Has Nationwide Importance....... 18
APPENDIX A - Washington Supreme Court
Majority and Dissenting Opin-
SOU 6 wig vs coe sa cer keane es seees App. 1
APPENDIX B —- Order Changing Opinion ..... App. 68
APPENDIX C - Judge Learned’s Decision, King
County’s Motion for Summary
FURIORE, 6 os iiswae severe incase App. 70
ao Ae atin ee ree ae,
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
APPENDIX D - Taxpayers’ Motion for Recon-
sideration .......--++-+eeeeeee App. 87
APPENDIX E - Taxpayers’ Statement of Addi-
tional Authorities..........--- App. 114
APPENDIX F - Washington Supreme Court
Order Denying Motions for
Reconsideration ....-.---+++:> App. 118
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Adams v. UW, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722 P.2d 24 (1986)..... 6
Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)............... 14
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.
GIS EE 40 en is he Fea Kas era eR CAR ees 14, 15
CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 F.2d 1054
PE Reh kava ¥ RAs Ada Eek eee a, 4 7
In re Estate of Pearl Fitzhugh Little, 106 Wn.2d 269,
Fae: Pee Wet LAO): on eh bo vb ook ene oe Ree eek 12
international Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
Su. : BRR Rey Chem rr arin ne rane rey pe 16
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com. v. McGrath, 341 US.
DEE ASAIN crab on COS HAAR wOAR NERC ape eae hae ees 11
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980).......... 16
Nationwide Mutual v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 840
PG TR CEP. 55 55a ie Oe hs ERK ee bie ss 12
Sova v. First National Bank of Ferndale, 18 Wn.2d 88,
SOG Fae: TR CA os 6 ok Ee how ena tae sss 13
Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d 679, 743 P.2d 793
bog ERR Ren Oot abe ee Mime ces OT np yr See eae 6
CONSTITUTION
EES Cae: OE ee ies as 6k cn hen a weeaeshe t, 36
Wash, Gone, O00 Wa eo ooo ccd ee eka > devious 6, 12
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
STATUTES, RULES, ORDINANCES
9S US.C. § 1257 la) 0.0 c ese c sec ereseecnreecencees 1
Ch. 1, Laws of 1995, 3d Spec. Sess. (EHB 2115) ...... 3
Wash. Civ. R. 26(c) .......cccceewee cc ccerecncceerers 16
Wash. Civ. R. 56(a) ...... ccc ee sees ce ccccerccerereces 16
King County, Wash. Ordinance 12000 (October 25,
BO ey ip 655 ln pa ca Oe SAINTE N TERETE IS TA 13
Wash. Rev. Code § 7.25.....--seeeerereeneeeeceresees 2
MISCELLANEOUS
Quirk, Paydirt: The Business of Professional Team
Sports (Princeton University Press, 1992) .........>- 7
Rosentraub, Major League Losers, The Cost of Sports
and Who Pays For It (Basic Books, 1997)........ 11, 18
el ee ee
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
The Taxpayers of King County respectfully petition
for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Washington in this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinions of the Supreme Court of Washington,
both majority and dissenting, are reported at 132 Wn.2d
360, 938 P.2d 309 (1997). The unreported memorandum
decision of the superior court is included in the appen-
dices.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Washington filed its opinions
on June 13, 1997 and entered an order denying Peti-
tioner’s motion for reconsideration on October 9, 1997.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides:
No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws.
STATEMENT
King County (the “County”) filed this suit on January
13, 1997 seeking a judgment declaring valid its proposed
bond issue to provide the Washington State Major League
Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District (“District”)
$336 million to construct a new baseball stadium for the
exclusive use of the owners of the Seattle Mariners Base-
ball Club (“Club”) with amenities to increase the Club’s
profit opportunities. Pursuant to the declaratory judg-
ment statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 7.25, the court appointed
Mark Baerwaldt and Nicholas J. Licata as Taxpayer Rep-
resentatives of all taxpayers in King County to present all
issues to the court “fully and fairly.” The Supreme Court
of Washington, by a vote of 7 to 2, affirmed summary
judgment in favor of the County on all points.
A. History of the Case.
In 1995, the owners of the Seattle Mariners Profes-
sional Baseball Club demanded that the County enhance
their profit-making opportunities by providing them a
subsidy in the form of a new publicly funded baseball
stadium for the Club’s exclusive use and to its specifica-
tions. The Washington Legislature responded by authori-
zing the County to submit to the voters a proposal for a
local sales tax, the proceeds of which would fund con-
struction of a new baseball stadium for the Club.
In September 1995, the County submitted the pro-
posal to the voters, who rejected it. The owners of the
Club then announced that the team would be sold unless
by October 30, 1995 “a final acceptable solution” was in
place which would assure the Club that it would be
“financially successful.” The “solution” had to include
construction of a new ball park at public expense with
amenities to Club specifications, including a retractable
roof and natural turf.
Reacting to the Club’s letter, the state legislature
convened in special session; and, on October 14, 1995,
enacted Ch. 1, Laws of 1995, 3d Spec. Sess. (EHB 2115)
(the “State Act” or “Act”}, authorizing the County, with-
out voter approval, to impose taxes to fund a county
bond issue for a new stadium and to create the District to
handle its construction. The legislation included an emer-
gency clause which the State Supreme Court held to be a
bar to a citizen-initiated referendum on the Act. CLEAN v.
State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).
On October 25, 1995, King County adopted Ordi-
nance 12000 which imposed taxes as authorized by the
State Act to provide public funds for a new baseball
stadium offering the Club owners “revenue-generating
capabilities not presently available at the Kingdome.”
(The “Kingdome” is the stadium in which the Club cur-
rently plays.) The ordinance also created the District with
a seven-person board.
On December 12, 1996, four of the thirteen members
of the County Council urged the District board to reex-
amine the construction schedule for the proposed ball
park because of jeopardy to the County’s current expense
fund by premature issuance of bonds. Reacting to that
letter, the Club owners two days later announced in a
televised news conference that the team was for sale. On
behalf of the Club owners, United States Senator Slade
Gorton told County officials on December 20, 1996, that
the Club owners would withdraw their proposal to sell
the team if by January 6, 1997 the County authorized $336
million in bonds for construction of a new stadium and
adjacent parking garage for the Club. The County Execu-
tive and eight of the Council members announced on the
spot their agreement to the Club’s demands.
On December 20, 1996, the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington affirmed a lower court decision dismissing
CLEAN’s facial challenge to the State Act, but reserving
all issues for a later as-applied challenge relating to acts
of the County or District under the Act.
On December 23, 1996, the District approved a lease
with the Club under which the District would construct a
stadium and adjacent parking garage to Club specifica-
tions with money supplied by a County bond issue. The
Club would have exclusive control and management for
20 years, taking all revenues generated at the stadium
and parking garage. The County would receive nothing
on its $336 million contribution. The Club would pay the
District rent of $700,000 per year (equal to 0.2% per year
return on the $336 million public outlay).
On January 6, 1997, the County Council authorized
issuance of $336 million of County bonds for construction
of a new baseball stadium and adjacent parking garage
for the Club.
B. Proceedings Below.
On January 13, 1997, the County filed this declara-
tory judgment suit. The court designated Mark Baerwaldt
and Nicholas J. Licata as the Taxpayer Representatives
ee eee
DO a , FORE PE oP wre
ea eats Maths Carel RAR. 8S bey les
under the statute with the understanding that they would
“pursue this matter with due diligence and in a manner
which assures that all issues are fairly and fully pre-
sented.” Four days later, the County moved for an order
to schedule a February 7 hearing on its motion for sum-
mary judgment, which it proposed to file on January 23.
The County explained to the court that the proposed
accelerated schedule was needed to “complete construc-
tion of the stadium by March 1999 for the opening of the
baseball season.” The Taxpayer Petitioners objected that
profit enhancement for the Club did not justify putting
the case on a fast track and that the proposed accelerated
schedule gave them inadequate time to prepare their
response, which would “require the assistance of experts
in finance, construction costs, economics of the baseball
industry and related matters, and the time and ability to
perform discovery to elicit the facts.” On January 23,
1997, 10 days after the County filed its suit, the court set a
hearing for February 19, 1997 on the County’s motion for
summary judgment (to be filed the next day). The Peti-
tioners immediately issued notices, subpoenae, and inter-
rogatories for discovery relating to all aspects of the
dealings among the County, District, and Club. The
County, District, and Club immediately moved to block
all discovery by Petitioners. The court quickly complied
with an order which “stayed” all discovery except for a
requirement that the County answer some preliminary
written interrogatories of Petitioners.
A critical issue in the case is whether County transfer
of the bond proceeds to the District would be “in aid of”
the Club, in violation of the following state constitutional
prohibition:
No county, city, town or other municipal corpo-
ration shall hereafter give any money, or prop-
erty, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of
any individual, association, company or corpo-
ration, except for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly
the owner of any stock in or bonds of any asso-
ciation, company or corporation.
Wash. Const., art. VIII, § 7. The Washington State
Supreme Court previously formulated the following rule
to test compliance with that constitutional prohibition:
Unless there is proof of donative intent or a
grossly inadequate return, courts do not inquire
into the adequacy of consideration. . . . Absent a
showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy,
trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency
test, under which a bargained-for act or fore-
bearance is considered sufficient consideration.
Adams v. UW, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722 P.2d 24 (1986) (italics
original); see Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d 679, 743 P.2d
793 (1987). In its decision in the CLEAN case involving a
facial challenge to the State Act, the Court commented
that
any tenant, including the Mariners, will be
required to pay reasonable rent to the District
for the privilege of conducting its activities in
the stadium.
The Court further commented that
if .. . the District should enter into an agreement
with the Mariners that would permit the ball
club to play its games in the stadium for only
nominal rent, then the constitutional prohibi-
tions against making a gift of state funds might
be implicated. Such a circumstance is not now
apparent and we will not speculate about the
future. In the unlikely event that this prediction
should come true, the issue can then be raised in
an appropriate manner.
CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 800, 928 P.2d at 1062 (1997).
Under the then-established substantive rules adopted
by the Washington Supreme Court, the Taxpayer Peti-
tioners directed their presentation in opposition to the
County’s motion for summary judgment to the issues of
“donative intent” and “grossly inadequate return.” They
submitted the declaration of a Seattle real estate appraiser
and the declarations of three nationally recognized
experts on the economics of professional sports and
sports stadiums, who characterized the “return” to the
County as zero (which the County admitted) and the rent
to be paid by the Club to the District as unreasonably low
(0.2% per year on a $336 million public investment) and
“only nominal.” The economists explained that the notion
that a community derives favorable economic ripple
effects from a new stadium is a myth. James Quirk,
retired Cal Tech economics professor and coauthor of
Paydirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports, Princeton
University Press (1992), testified by sworn declaration
that the public subsidy for the Mariners’ owners would
total over $27 million per year for 20 years. Those decla-
rations were never controverted by the County or the
District.
Under rules previously established by the Washing-
ton Supreme Court for the handling of motions for sum-
mary judgment, Petitioners argued that they were
entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts and a
summary judgment could not be granted to the County
or District because reasonable minds could reach differ-
ent conclusions as to whether there was “donative intent”
by the County or “grossly inadequate return” to it or
whether there was “reasonable rent” or “only nominal
rent” to the District. Under the then-existing rules, all of
the items were issues of material fact.
On February 24, 1997, the lower state court issued a
written opinion and two days later entered a declaratory
order in favor of the County. Later that same day, the
County and the District served and filed in the State
Supreme Court a joint motion to accelerate the 30-day
deadline for Taxpayers to file a notice of appeal. In their
motion, the County and District said they
request that the Court grant the following con-
densed briefing schedule so that the Court may
issue a decision, with opinion to follow, not later
than March 28, 1997:
* Notice of Appeal filed March 4, 1997
* Record filed March 7, 1997
* Brief of Appellant Taxpayers filed March
10, 1997
* Brief of Respondents filed March 17,
1997
* Reply brief filed March 21, 1997
* Oral argument scheduled for the week of
March 24, 1997
They said the Court should grant that extraordinary
motion so that the Club could play ball in the new sta-
dium by the opening of the 1999 major league baseball
season. Although the Court denied that request, when
a ia a eels
Petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 26, 1997,
the State Supreme Court the next day issued an order
requiring Petitioners’ brief to be served and filed by April
18, 1997, with oral argument set for May 13, 1997.
On June 13, 1997, opinions were filed by a seven-
judge majority and a two-judge dissent. Petitioners
timely filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the
Court had denied them a fair and impartial hearing
under the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti-
tution by favoring the Club, County, and District with
shortcuts and special procedures, and by retroactively
creating and applying only to this case new substantive
and procedural rules not applicable to any other litigant
in the state. The Court denied the Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration on October 9, 1997.
C. How the Federal Question Was Presented to the
State Court.
In both the superior court and the Washington
Supreme Court, the Petitioners objected that the courts’
rush to judgment, their denial of Taxpayers’ right to
conduct discovery, and the courts’ retroactive creation of
new substantive and procedural rules applicable only to
this case, denied Petitioners a fair and impartial hearing
in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United
States Constitution. After the Supreme Court opinions
were issued, the Petitioners emphasized the fact that the
Supreme Court decision denied them their right to a fair
and impartial hearing under the Due Process Clause of
10
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion. In support of that argument, they cited to the Wash-
ington Supreme Court the decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States now cited in this petition. A
copy of the Taxpayers’ Motion for Reconsideration and
their statement to the Washington Supreme Court of
Additional Authorities are set forth in the appendices.
+
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Washington courts denied Petitioners their right
to a fair and impartial hearing under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
At the inception of this case, the superior court judge
hinted that she had prejudged the case in favor of the
Club, County, and District when she put the case on an
extraordinarily fast track to accommodate the Club’s con-
struction schedule. There has never been even a sugges-
tion that a new baseball stadium is necessary to protect
public health and safety - only that it is needed to
enhance the profit opportunities of the Club owners. That
initial hint of prejudgment for the Club became a strong
signal of favoritism for it when the judge prevented Peti-
tioners from using the court’s discovery rules in prepar-
ing their response to the County’s motion for summary
judgment. The superior court judge and seven of the nine
Supreme Court judges confirmed the earlier hint and
signal of prejudgment and favoritism for the Club owners
when they retroactively changed existing substantive and
procedural rules assuring a win for the Club.
A Ate R aba ie ce De Rowe
11
Because of its power to say who will play and where,
major league professional baseball is an unregulated
monopoly. Rosentraub, Major League Losers, The Cost of
Sports and Who Pays For It (Basic Books, 1997). Nation-
wide, it asserts its monopoly power to extract conces-
sions, special favors, and subsidies from local officials
fearful of “losing the team for our town.” Id. at pp. 8-17.
A judiciary truly independent of such pressures and fears
is constitutionally the ultimate guardian against private
extraction of public subsidies, concessions, and special
favors prohibited by law. As Justice Frankfurter said:
“(T]hose who founded this nation put their trust in a
judiciary truly independent — in judges not subject to the
fears or allurements of a limited tenure and by the very
nature of their function detached from passing and parti-
san influences.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951). The decision of the Washington court
stands as an example that elected judges of the highest
court of a state, sworn to uphold the federal and state
constitutions, also yield to pressure and bend and break
established rules to accommodate the demands of the
professional baseball monopoly. Regrettably, it is an
insidious form of official corruption which only the
Supreme Court of the United States can stop. When the
highest court of a state willfully forsakes its sworn duty
to uphold the federal constitution, it is time for the
Supreme Court of the United States to step in and require
compliance with the constitution.
12
A. The Washington Supreme Court Created New
Rules Applicable Only to This Case.
The longstanding rule in Washington when the case
was presented to the Court was as follows:
On review of summary judgment, an appel-
late court engages in the same inquiry as the
trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate “if
the pleadings, depositions, . . . together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” A material fact is one upon which the
outcome of the litigation depen’. The court
must consider the facts submitted and all rea-
sonable inferences from those facts in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party and the
motion should be granted only if, from all the
evidence, reasonable persons could reach but
one conclusion.
Nationwide Mutual v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 186, 840 P.2d
851 (1992).
Under the rule previously stated by the Court for
complying with Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 7, the outcome of
this case depended upon whether or not there was an
intent on the part of the County to make a gift of the
proceeds of its bond issue to the District in aid of the
Mariners or whether the County would receive a “grossly
inadequate return” on its $336 million investment. Major-
ity opinion, p. 12.
“Donative intent is a factual issue to be resolved by
the trier-of-fact.” In re Estate of Pearl Fitzhugh Little, 106
Wn.2d 269, 721 P.2d 950 (1986). Similarly, the question of
Aan RES ik ak ari ema
13
gross inadequacy is one for the jury, not the court, based
on all the evidence. Sova v. First National Bank of Ferndale,
18 Wn.2d 88, 138 P.2d 181 (1943). Even though the
“intent” and “return” issues presented factual (and not
legal) questions, the trial court denied Taxpayers their
right to conduct discovery on those issues. Despite this
unprecedented ruling, Petitioners, as the nonmoving
party, presented uncontroverted expert testimony which,
at a minimum, raised issues of fact.
Significantly, the majority of the Washington
Supreme Court did not discuss the factual record in arriv-
ing at the conclusion that “there is no donative intent
here.” Nor did it discuss the issue of “grossly inadequate
return,” holding that the state constitutional prohibition
is satisfied if the donee (the District) of the gift of public
funds from the donor (the County) receives “legally suffi-
cient consideration,” which the dissent pointed out can
be a promise of future delivery of a single peppercorn
Dissent, App. 45. Although the majority did not discuss
the factual record, the dissent did, summarizing the
record on “donative intent” and “grossly inadequate
return.” Dissent, App. 50-66. The dissenting judges con-
cluded: “Were the taxpayers not to receive a summary
judgment on this record in their favor, they have surely
raised at least a question of fact which only the trier of
fact can resolve on remand for trial.” Dissent, App. 39.
As indicated above, the majority did not seriously
review the record because it retroactively created a new
substantive rule for this case that an unconstitutional gift
of public funds does not occur if the donee (the District)
receives “legally sufficient consideration” from the ulti-
mate beneficiary of the gift (the Club) even though that
14
“consideration” is only a peppercorn and there is no
“return” to the original public donor. The Court thus
silently overruled the substantive requirement set forth in
its earlier cases that return to the public donor be
“grossly adequate.” That new rule was applied retroac-
tively to this case, assuring a win for the Mariners Ball-
club.
Likewise, the Court retroactively changed for the
case the long-established procedure for the Court’s han-
dling of summary judgment motions. Although the Court
agreed that the County as the moving party bore the
burden of proof on all issues, the majority judges refused
to consider the evidence presented and themselves drew
from thin air their own inferences that there was no
“donative intent” or “grossly inadequate return.” In
doing so the Court silently overruled its own long-estab-
lished rule that on summary judgment it must leave
reasonable fact inferences to the trier-of-facts. The Court's
creation and use of a new procedural rule for this case
(and apparently for this case only) is a per se deprivation
of due process. In Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353
(1964), the court said:
When a state court overrules a consistent line of
procedural decisions with the retroactive effect
of denying a litigant a hearing in a pending
case, it thereby deprives him of due process of
law “in its primary sense of an opportunity to
be heard and to defend [his] substantive right.”
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.
673, 678, 74 L.Ed. 1107, 1112, 50 S. Ct. 451.
nasties seas i K
Beis dedder RBIS Eat ean A 2 Bie BY
15
The Brinkerhoff-Faris decision cited by the court was a
civil case involving procedures for enjoining collection of
a discriminatory state tax. Six years before the Taxpayers’
suit, the Missouri Supreme Court hele that it was “pre-
posterous” and “unthinkable” that the state tax commis-
sion had power to give relief from a discriminatory tax.
In the face of that decision, Brinkerhoff-Faris sought a
court injunction against collection of the tax without sub-
mitting the matter to the state tax commission. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court overruled its prior decision, but
nevertheless held that Brinkerhoff-Faris could not have
equitable relief because it had an adequate legal remedy
available through what Justice Brandeis characterized as
“the newly found powers of the commission.” 74 L. Ed. at
812. Justice Brandeis said:
Undoubtedly, the state court had the power to
construe the statute dealing with the state tax
commission; and to re-examine and overrule the
Laclede Land & Improv. Co. Case. Neither of
these matters raises a federal question; neither is
subject to our review. But, while it is for the
state courts to determine the adjective as well as
the substantive law of the state, they must, in so
doing, accord the parties due process of law.
Whether acting through its judiciary or through
its legislature, a state may not deprive a person
of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a
right, which the state has no power to destroy,
unless there is, or was, afforded to him some
real opportunity to protect it. Compare Postal
Teleg. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 475,
476, 62 L. Ed. 1215, 1220, 1221, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep.
566.
16
B. The Acts of the Washington Courts Show
Favoritism and Prejudgment for the County,
District, and Club.
The Due Process Clause of the United States constitu-
tion entitles a person to an impartial tribunal. Marshall v.
Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). Fairness and justice are
the essence of due process. International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
By their actions, the Washington courts have demon-
strated not only partiality for the Club, County, and Dis-
trict, but actual prejudgment in their favor. From this
case’s inception, they gave special procedural favors to
the Club and its surrogates (the County and the District),
at the same time denying the Taxpayers their rights under
the rules to have adequate time for preparation, to
engage in discovery, and have a trial on the merits. The
court rules permit filing of a motion for summary judg-
ment only after expiration of the 20-day summons and an
additional 28 days’ notice of hearing such motion. Wash.
Civ. R. 56(a) and Wash. Civ. R. 26(c). In the Superior
Court, this case went from filing of the suit through
denial of the Taxpayers’ motion for reconsideration in 59
days, during which the Superior Court denied Petitioners
their right to conduct discovery, which Petitioners had
then diligently initiated by deposition notices, requests
for production of-documents, and subpoenae duces
tecum, all of which were intended to elicit details regard-
ing County and District intent; and the precise “return”
which the County and/or District would or would not
receive. Rushing the Taxpayers’ preparation of the case,
while denying them the discovery tools to which they
were entitled under the rules, signaled prejudgment that
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17
the Club demands must be met and quickly; and that a
trial of the fact issues must be avoided because that might
entail delays unacceptable to the Club. In order to speed
the process to accommodate the Club’s deadlines, the
Superior Court Judge herself drew all inferences about
the key issues of “donative intent” and “grossly inade-
quate return” in favor of the County, District, and Club
and against the Taxpayers, contrary to the established
rules for the handling of summary judgment motions.
Although the Washington Supreme Court has a duty
to require fairness and compliance with established rules,
its majority capped the judicial deprivation of Taxpayers’
rights of due process by not only creating and applying to
the case a new substantive rule, but also by replacing the
established rule for handling motions for summary judg-
ment with a new one under which the court may select
and judge the evidence, and draw its own inferences
against the nonmoving party even though reasonable
persons can draw opposite inferences. The Washington
Supreme Court favored the County, District, and Club
with a favorable decision with a speed rarely, if ever,
available to another litigant in the state. The Court turned
out a favorable decision for the County, District, and Club
just 31 days after oral arguments. From the filing of the
County’s suit to Supreme Court decision took exactly 5
months, which may be a record, in view of the fact that
there was no emergency involving public health or safety.
The only emergency involved money for the Club’s
owners. The urgency was to provide the Club owners
more profit opportunities - and do it quickly. The
Supreme Court decision was filed on the very day the
District specified as a deadline for a favorable ruling by
18
the Court to avoid a construction shutdown. The deadline
was announced in all the media, press, TV and radio on
the day preceding filing of the Court’s decision. To con-
sider this coincidence strains one’s credulity.
C. This Case Has Nationwide Importance.
Major league professional baseball is an unregulated
monopoly by virtue of its franchise system under which
the league decides who may play and where. Its members
are now using that monopoly power throughout the
country to extract subsidies and concessions from local
politicians who fear being accused of “losing the team for
our town.” Rosentraub, Major League Losers, pp. 8-17.
When the highest court in a state approves special rules
and favored treatment for owners of a professional sports
team while denying citizens and taxpayers an impartial
and fair hearing on the propriety of public subsidies for
them, it sends a message to the rest of the country that
federal constitutional requirements need not be seriously
considered in dealing with public subsidies for profes-
sional sports teams. The decision of the Washington
Supreme Court will stand as a precedent nationwide
encouraging disregard of constitutional due process and
equal protection in dealings between local officials and
the owners of professional sports teams. It tells citizens
and Taxpayers that they have no protector under the
federal constitution because the state courts themselves
are overwhelmed or corrupted by the monopoly power of
professional sports. Left standing, the decision will feed
public cynicism and disillusionment about the courts and
the judicial system itself. It is time for the Supreme Court
19
of the United States to step in and make sure that does
not happen.
DATED this 13 day of November, 1997.
Respectfully submitted,
JoHN D. BLANKINSHIP*
MONTGOMERY, PURDUE, BLANKINSHIP
& Austin, P.L.L.C.
701 Fifth Avenue, 58th Floor
Seattle, WA 98104
(206) 682-7090
Kris J. SUNDBERG
PO Box 1577
Mercer Island, WA 98040
(206) 230-0212
Counsel for Petitioners
*Counsel of Record
App. 1
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
KING COUNTY,
Respondent,
No. 65062-4
V.
TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY, ) EN BANC
Appellants,
and
WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR
LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM
PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT,
Intervenor/Respondent,
and
JOHN SCANNELL,
VINCE KOSKELA and
FRANK RUANO, et al.,
Intervenors/ Appellants. Filed Jun 13, 1997
ee ee ea ee ee eee ee ee ee”
TALMADGE, J - This is the third of a series of
challenges to state legislation and local implementing
ordinances for financing and constructing a new baseball
stadium in King County. We are asked in this action to
determine if King County’s issuance of $336 million in
bonds to finance stadium construction is “valid” under
RCW 7.25. To determine validity, we must decide if the
lease between the Mariners and the public facilities dis-
trict is an unconstitutional gift of public monies to a
App. 2
private organization; if the taxes authorized by the Legis-
lature to pay for the stadium financing bonds are consti-
tutionally imposed and properly collected; if the state
unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the
public facilities district; and if a proposed local initiative
establishing more stringent debt limitations for King
County than authorized by statute is applicable to the
baseball stadium project.
We hold the bonds issued by King County to finance
stadium construction are valid because the use of public
funds for a new baseball stadium here is not an uncon-
stitutional gift of public monies to a private organization.
Moreover, the taxes imposed to pay for the bonds are
constitutionally imposed and properly collected. The
state properly delegated authority to the public facilities
district. The proposed local initiative is invalid insofar as
it attempts to impose additional limitations on local debt
not authorized by statute. We therefore affirm the trial
court’s declaratory judgment validating the $336 million
in stadium construction bonds issued by King County.
ISSUES
1. What is the test for establishing the validity of
bonds in a declaratory judgment action under RCW 7.25?
2. Did the lease entered into by the parties here
constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds to a
private organization?
3. Were the taxes authorized by the Legislature to
pay for the stadium financing bonds constitutionally
imposed and handled?
Lae ee
App. 3
4. Did the Legislature unconstitutionally delegate
legislative authority to the District?
5. Can King County establish by ordinance limita-
tions on debt beyond requirements set forth in statute?
FACTS
The Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P. (Mariners), is a
Washington limited partnership formed in early 1992 for
the express purpose of acquiring the Seattle Mariners
Baseball Club to keep it in Seattle. Soon after acquiring
the team, the Mariners began meeting with King County
officials to modify the Kingdome lease and develop long-
term capital plans. In 1994, a King County task force
developed a plan for a new home for the Mariners, to be
completed by 1999.
The 1995 Legislature considered legislation authoriz-
ing the financing of the new Mariners baseball stadium,
ultimately enacting a baseball financing program at a
special session on October 14, 1995. Laws of 1995, 3rd Sp.
Sess., ch. 1 (Stadium Act). The key provision of the Sta-
dium Act permits the “legislative authority” of a county
with a population of one million or more to impose a
sales and use tax in addition to other taxes under RCW
82.14, not to exceed .017 percent of the selling price in the
case of a sales tax, or value of the article used in the case
of a use tax. RCW 82.14.0485(a).’
1 The Court rejected numerous constitutional challenges to
the Stadium Act in CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054
(1996).
App. 4
Thereafter, Metropolitan King County Council
(Council) on October 25, 1995 enacted Ordinance 12000,
creating the Washington State Major League Baseball Sta-
dium Public Facilities District (District), and imposing
three special sales and use taxes the Stadium Act autho-
rized, including a .017 percent special stadium sales and
use tax, a special stadium sales and use tax on restau-
rants, bars, and taverns, and a special stadium sales and
use tax on car rentals. The special stadium sales and use
tax is a credit against the statewide sales and use tax as
both RCW 84.14.0485(2) and section 3 of Ordinance 12000
acknowledge.? Under the Stadium Act, the revenues from
these taxes may be used only to finance the stadium.
RCW 84.14.0485(3). The purpose of the District is to con-
struct and operate the new stadium.?
Pursuant to the comprehensive financing mechanism
established by the Stadium Act and Ordinance 12000, the
District by letter dated January 2, 1997, requested King
County to issue bonds in the amount of $336 million, the
amount necessary to finance construction of the baseball
stadium. The Council passed Ordinance 12593 on January
2 RCW 82.14.0485(2) states specifically that the special
stadium sales and use tax of .017 percent “shall be deducted”
from the amount of the statewide sales and use tax. Section 3(B)
of Ordinance 12000 also states:
The tax imposed under this section shall be
deducted from the amount of tax otherwise required
to be collected or paid over to the department of
revenue under chapter 82.08 or 82.12 RCW.
Clerk’s Papers at 28.
3 The Court rejected challenges to Ordinance 12000 in
Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 131 Wn.2d 411,
932 P.2d 135 (1997).
App. 5
6, 1997, authorizing the issuance of limited tax general
obligation bonds in the requested amount.
Subsequently, on April 2, 1997, the Council passed
Ordinance 12686, providing for the issuance and sale of
the bonds. The County has already sold the bonds, but
the bond sale proceeds are being held in escrow for
release or refund, awaiting our decision in this action.
In addition to court challenges to the stadium, base-
ball stadium opponents have employed other methods to
invalidate the stadium funding and construction bonds.
On December 4, 1996, opponents filed a proposed initia-
tive petition with the clerk of the Council. The clerk
certified the petition as Initiative 16 on December 31,
1996. Section 1 of the initiative provides:
On or after January 1, 1997, King County shall
not issue bonds or otherwise incur debt in an
amount in excess of $50,000,000 for construction,
remodeling, maintenance, OF operation of any
building or other facility without first obtaining
approval of a majority of voters voting in an
election at which the number of voters voting in
said election equals at least one-half of the
number of voters who are registered to vote at
that election; nor shall King County impose or
levy any tax to pay any such bond or indebted-
ness without such voter approval.
Clerk’s Papers at 321. Initiative 16 purports retroactively
to invalidate Ordinances 12593 and 12686, which, respec-
tively, authorized and issued bonds in an amount in
excess of $50 million.*
4 The King County charter requires the Council to consider the
proposed initiative. If the Council does not enact the ordinance
App. 6
Intervenors in this case also filed a referendum peti-
tion with the Council clerk on January 7, 1997, proposing
that Ordinance 12593 (authorizing issuance of the bonds)
be put to a public vote. The Council clerk, based on
advice from the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s
office that Ordinance 12593 was not subject to referen-
dum, did not process the referendum petition.
On January 21, 1997, the County filed a complaint
seeking a declaratory judgment under RCW 7.25.020 val-
idating the bonds. Specifically, the County sought a dec-
laration:
a. confirming the right and authority of King
County to issue and sell bonds described in
King County Ordinance No. 12593 (the
“Bond Ordinance”) . . . adopted pursuant to
the provisions of the [Stadium] Act and
Ordinance No. 12000, and that such issuance
comports with the requirements of the state
constitution, state statutes and is within the
County’s authority;
b. determining that Initiative 16 is inapplicable
to the issuance of the Bonds as authorized
by the Bond Ordinance;
c. determining that the Bond Ordinance was law-
fully enacted and not subject to referendum.
Clerk’s Papers at 2.
within 90 days after presentation of petitions, the proposal “shall be
placed on the ballot at the next regular or special election occurring
more than one hundred thirty-five days after the petitions are filed
or at an earlier election designated by the county council.” Clerk’s
Papers at 624. Counsel for the County informed the Court at oral
argument the County has yet to act on the initiative.
App. 7
On February 19, 1997, the trial court heard cross-
motions for summary judgment. By memorandum deci-
sion dated February 24, 1997, the trial court granted the
County’s motion for summary judgment and denied the
defendants’ motion. The trial court entered a declaratory
judgment in favor of the County on February 26, 1997,
holding the bonds were valid and Initiative 16, if enacted,
would “irreconcilably conflict” with state law. Clerk’s
Papers at 1104. On March 26, 1997, after losing their
motion for reconsideration, the Taxpayers filed a notice of
appeal. We accepted direct review. RAP 4.2(b).
ANALYSIS
A. Declaratory Judgments of Local Bond Issues
This case is before us under RCW 7.25 providing for
declaratory judgments as to local bond issues:
Whenever the legislative or governing body
of any county, city, school district, other munici-
pal corporation, taxing district, or any agency,
instrumentality, or public corporation thereof
shall desire to issue bonds of any kind and shall
have passed an ordinance or resolution authori-
zing the same, the validity of such proposed
bond issue may be tested and determined in the
manner provided in this chapter.
RCW 7.25.010. The statute, by its wording, contemplates
an advisory opinion from a court as to the validity of an
ordinance authorizing an issuance of bonds. Courts in
other jurisdictions have articulated the purpose of bond
validation statutes. For instance, the Mississippi Supreme
Court said:
App. 8
The main purpose of a statutory validation pro-
ceeding is to provide a forum and course of
legal procedure to which a political district or
subdivision may resort for the purpose of hav-
ing the validity of the proposed bonds finally
determined and adjudicated in advance of their
issuance, “in order that the bonds so validated
might be readily sold in the market, to create in
the mind of the bond buyer a sense of security,
in that by the decree of the court and the fiat of
the Legislature there could be no further attack
upon the validity of the bond issue.”
Street v. Town of Ripley, 173 Miss. 225, 161 So. 855, 859, 102
A.L.R. 82 (1935) (quoting Love v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen,
162 Miss. 65, 138 So. 600, 603 (1932)). See also State v. City
of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6, 8 (1933).5 “The desir-
ability of obtaining a judicial decree validating bonds
before they are issued is obvious: all parties may then
rely upon the decree as conclusive regarding the issue of
validity.” 3 M. Davip GELFAND, State & LocaL GOVERNMENT
Dest FINANCING § 14:05, at 14-17 (1994). We agree.
We have considered cases under RCW 7.25 on many
occasions,® but neither the statute nor our cases illuminate
5 A handful of states have statutes like Washington's
providing a procedure for bond validation. See Ata. Cope
§ 11-81-220 et seq. (1994); Cat. Crv. Proc. Cope §§ 860-871 (West
1980); Fra. Stat. ANN. § 75.01 et seq. (Wes: 1987); Ga. Cope ANN.
§ 50-17-25 (1994); La. Rev. Stat. ANN. § 13:5121 et seq. (West
1991); Miss. Cope ANn. § 31-15-5 et seq. (1972); Onto Rev. Cope
Ann. § 133.07 et seq. (Anderson 1994); W. Va. Cope § 13-1-25 et
seq. (1995). See 3 M. Davip GELranp, State & Locat GOVERNMENT
Dest FinaANncinc § 11:45, at 107 n. 1 (1994).
6 City of Spokane v. Taxpayers of City of Spokane, 111 Wash.2d
91, 758 P.2d 480 (1988); King County v. Taxpayers of King County,
ee
App. 9
what constitutes a “valid” bond for purposes of the statute.
Rather, the Court has simply dealt with particularized chal-
lenges to a bond issue’s validity advanced in each case.
Many courts have taken a cautious view of the scope
of bond validation proceedings, limiting such decisions to
basic questions involving the procedure for issuance of
the bonds and legal issues directly bearing on the bonds’
propriety. Ward v. Commonwealth, 685 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa.
Commw. 1996); Murphy v. City of Port St. Lucie, 666 So.2d
879, 880 (Fla. 1995) (collateral issues not within purview
of bond validity proceeding).
A leading treatise on municipal law offers the follow-
ing guidelines for testing the validity of a bond:
1. Is there legislative or constitutional
authority delegated to the municipality to issue
the bonds for the particular purpose?
2. Was the statute authorizing the bond
issue constitutionally enacted? If not constitu-
tionally enacted or if unconstitutional for any
other reason, the issue is void and recitals are of
no effect.
ee
104 Wn.2d 1, 700 P.2d 1143 (1985); Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of
Port of Longview, 84 Wn.2d 475, 85 Wn.2d 216, 527 P.2d 263
(1974); Pierce County v. Taxpayers of Lakes Dist. Recreation Service
Area, 70 Wn.2d 375, 423 P.2d 67 (1967); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers
of Tacoma, 60 Wn.2d 66, 371 P.2d 938 (1962); Port of Tacoma v.
Taxpayers of Port of Tacoma, 53 Wn.2d 734, 336 P.2d 872 (1959);
Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412 v. Taxpayers of Shoreline Sch. Dist. No.
412,52 Wn.2d 849, 329 P.2d 829 (1958); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers
of Tacoma, 49 Wn.2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957).
App. 10
3. Is the purpose for which the bonds are
issued, a public and corporate purpose, as dis-
tinguished from a private purpose?
15 Eucene McQurun, Municipat Corporations § 43.04, at
575 (3rd ed.1995).
Although we have held the plaintiff in a declaratory
judgment suit under RCW 7.24 has the burden of proof,
see Taylor v. State, 29 Wn.2d 638, 641, 188 P.2d 671 (1948);
Washington Beauty College v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 164, 80
P.2d 403 (1938), in the previous cases under RCW 7.25, we
have not discussed the burden of proof. The statute itself
is silent on the question; it requires only that the issuing
agency set forth in the complaint for declaratory judg-
ment the ordinance authorizing the bonds, and state it is
seeking a determination of the right to issue the bonds.
RCW 7.25.020. Courts discussing the burden of proof in
bond validation cases have held the burden of proof is on
the party seeking validation. See Harrell v. Town of
Whigham, 141 Ga. 322, 80 S.E. 1010 (1914); Fox v. Boyle
County, 245 Ky. 27, 53 S.W.2d 192 (1932).
For purposes of determining the validity under RCW
7.25 of bonds issued by a local government, we expressly
adopt the three-issue formulation for “validity” of bonds
articulated in McQuitun. Under RCW 7.25, our decision
regarding the validity of bonds is conclusive as to any
matter that is or should be brought within the ambit of
the validity inquiry. Thus, in the present case, we address
issues pertaining to whether the lease is a gift to the
Mariners, the validity of taxes to pay the stadium financ-
ing bonds, the delegation of legislative authority to the
District, and the local initiative/referendum measures
designed to forestall issuance of the bonds. Moreover, we
App. 11
hold the burden of proving the validity of the bonds rests
with King County and the District as the parties seeking
to establish validity.
B. Use of Public Funds to Build a New Stadium Does
Not Constitute Unconstitutional “Aid” to the Mari-
ners
In applying the test for validity set forth above to this
case, we note the Taxpayers do not challenge the legisla-
tive or constitutional authority of the County to issue the
bonds. Moreover, we have already determined the bonds
have a necessary public purpose. Citizens for More Impor-
tant Things, 131 Wn.2d at 416. Thus, the only item left to
consider from the three-issue formulation is whether the
statute authorizing the bond issue was constitutionally
enacted.
The Taxpayers initially contend the bond issue vio-
lates Const. art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7.7 “The ‘aid’ is in the form
” The two sections provide:
§5 Credit Not To Be Loaned. The credit of the state
shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in
aid of, any individual, association, company or
corporation.
§ 7 Credit Not To Be Loaned. No county, city, town
or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give
any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to
or in aid of any individual, association, company or
corporation, except for the necessary support of the
poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the
owner of any stock in or bonds of any association,
company or corporation.
App. 12
of construction at public expense of a new place of busi-
ness for the [Mariners] to enhance its chance of making
money.” Br. of Appellants at 9.
At oral argument, counsel for the Taxpayers
advanced the view that any benefit to a private organiza-
tion may be violative of these constitutional provisions.
We disagree. As we stated in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 701-02, 743 P.2d 793 (1987), our
purpose in that case was to narrow the application of
these constitutional provisions to remedy more precisely
“the evils the framers sought to prevent.” An incidental
benefit to a private individual or organization will not
invalidate an otherwise valid public transaction. Id. at
705.
We held in CLEAN the stadium financing plan “does
not amount to a gift of state funds nor a lending of the
State’s credit.” CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 800. We suggested,
however, that should the District “enter into an agree-
ment with the Mariners that would permit the ball club to
play its games in the stadium for only nominal rent, then
the constitutional prohibitions against making a gift of
state funds might be implicated.” Id. This discussion in
CLEAN is essentially the test for an unconstitutional gift
of public funds we have articulated in numerous cases.
In deciding whether a public expenditure is a gift
under art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7, we have focused on two
factors: consideration and donative intent. City of Tacoma
v. Taxpayers of City, 108 Wn.2d 679, 702, 743 P.2d 793
(1987). Thus, to meet the burden of showing violation of
the constitutional prohibition against gifts, the Taxpayers
must show the lease amounts to “a transfer of property
App. 13
without consideration and with donative intent.” General
Tel. Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 588, 716 P.2d 879
(1986).
In assessing consideration, courts do not inquire into
the adequacy of consideration, but employ a legal suffi-
ciency test. Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wn.2d 312,
327, 722 P.2d 74 (1986); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City
of Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283 (1993). We have
been reluctant to engage in an in-depth analysis of the
adequacy of consideration because such an analysis inter-
feres unduly with governmental power to contract and
would establish a “burdensome precedent” of judicial
interference with government decisionmaking. City of
Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703.
Legal sufficiency “is concerned not with comparative
value but with that which will support a promise.”
Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147, 422 P.2d 314,
amended, 430 P.2d 591 (1967) (“ ‘[A]nything which fulfills
the requirements of consideration will support a promise
whatever may be the comparative value of the consider-
ation, and of the thing promised.’ 1 Wiuuiston, ConTRACTS
§ 115, cited in Puget Mill Co. v. Kerry, 183 Wash. 542, 558,
49 P.2d 57, 64, 100 A.L.R. 1220 (1935).”). The adequacy of
the consideration for the lease is a question of law.
“Whether a contract is supported by consideration is a
question of law and may be properly determined by a
court on summary judgment.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 195, 840 P.2d 851 (1992).
The Taxpayers now argue the lease agreement
between the District and the Mariners for the use of the
new stadium provides for only nominal rent and grossly
App. 14
inadequate consideration, thus implicating the constitu-
tional concern about gifts of state money we mentioned
in CLEAN. The Taxpayers argue both donative intent and
grossly inadequate return are present here.
A summary review of both the Stadium Act’s
requirements and the elements of the lease identifies the
Mariners’ obligations. The Stadium Act required (1) a
commitment from the Mariners to play at least 90 percent
of its games at the new stadium for the length of the term
of the bonds; (2) a contribution of $45 million towards
either pre-construction or construction costs of the sta-
dium or associated facilities; and (3) profit-sharing with
the District for the term of the bonds of profit earned
after accounting for team losses after the effective date of
the Act. RCW 82.14.360(4). These provisions all appeared
in the lease.
The lease between the Mariners and the District con-
tains the following additional obligations of the Mariners:
e payment of $700,000 in rent per annum
¢ payment of any construction cost overruns
¢ payment of any deficiencies on bonds for the
parking facility
¢ maintenance and operation of the ballpark as
a “first-class facility” in accordance with a
management plan, and with oversight by the
District, with enforcement mechanisms to
ensure compliance
e making major repairs and capital improve-
ments to the ballpark
¢ provision of insurance
— ey, ee ee ee
App. 15
Despite the Mariners’ obligations under the lease, the
Taxpayers call the lease “unconscionable,” Br. of Appel-
lants at 24-25, arguing the consideration for the lease in
favor of the County is so grossly inadequate the building
of the stadium at public expense amounts to an uncon-
stitutional gift.
The Taxpayers assert the County will receive nothing
in return for its investment; thus, donative intent is pre-
sent here. This assertion is simply another way of stating
their main point: that the lease is so much in favor of the
Mariners, it amounts to a gift. In CLEAN, the Court said,
“In our judgment, a plain reading of the Stadium Act
reveals no intent by the Legislature to donate public
funds to the Seattle Mariners.” CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 799.
The County and the District, in issuing bonds pursuant to
the Stadium Act, have implemented the Stadium Act by
obtaining the statutorily required commitments from the
Mariners. No donative intent is present here.
The Taxpayers assert the Mariners’ obligations under
the lease are a “sham and illusory,” and “truly do not
give the public anything of value.” Br. of Appellants at
26. Their arguments do not bear close scrutiny in light of
the Mariners’ contribution of $45 million to the project,
the profit-sharing provision, the 20-year lease obligation,
the stadium maintenance requirement, and their obliga-
tion to pay insurance.
The Taxpayers say the $45 million will not come out
of the pockets of the Mariners, but rather “from revenues
of the ballpark owned by the PFD.” Br. of Appellants at
27; Clerk’s Papers at 104. This argument is without merit.
Whether the money comes out of the Mariners’ coffers or
App. 16
from income the Mariners would have otherwise
received, the Mariners will contribute $45 million.
The Taxpayers claim the profit sharing requirement
in the lease is an “illusion,” because the Mariners can
doctor their books to pump up expenses as offsets to
revenues in a way that will never show a profit. Br. of
Appellants at 27. The County responds by noting the
lease requires the Mariners’ payments and expenses “be
determined in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles[,]” Clerk’s Papers at 151, and that
the County has the right to audit the Mariners’ account-
ing to ensure compliance with GAAP. Moreover, the mere
possibility the Mariners may breach its promise in the
future on its obligation to share profits with the County
does not make this provision of the lease illusory. “An
illusory promise is one which according to its terms
makes performance optional with the promisor[.]” Mithen
v. Board Of Trustees Of Cent. Wash. State College, 23 Wn.
App. 925, 932, 599 P.2d 8 (1979). The Mariners made an
enforceable promise to share profits. The promise is not
illusory.
The Taxpayers argue “the Club’s promise to do busi-
ness in the new ballpark is illusory because it has escape
routes through the lease conditions[.]” Br. of Appellants
at 28. The Taxpayers’ argument is disingenuous. The cited
pages of the lease do not provide “escape” provisions
that allow the Mariners to leave of their own volition.
They merely set forth certain obligations of the District,
which, if not met, would allow the Mariners to terminate
the lease. There are no escape routes that make illusory
the Mariners’ promise to play 90 percent of their games in
App. 17
the new stadium over the term of the lease. The Tax-
payers neglect to mention the $700,000 annual rental due
from the Mariners.
The Taxpayers contend the Mariners’ agreement to be
exclusively responsible for operations and maintenance
of the ballpark is insignificant because the lease’s defini-
tion of operations and maintenance does not include
replacement or major repair. While the Operations and
Maintenance section of the lease does not contain a repair
obligation, the Major Maintenance and Capital Improve-
ments section of the lease does. The Mariners agree to
perform “all Major Maintenance and Capital Improve-
ments so that the Ballpark is maintained in a manner
consistent with [a first-class facility].” Clerk’s Papers at
156. “Major Maintenance and Capital Improvements” is
defined to include “any work that is reasonably required
to be performed . . . to repair, restore or replace compo-
nents of the [Ballpark] necessitated by any damage,
destruction, ordinary wear and tear, defects in construc-
tion or design, or any other cause, to the condition
required for consistency with [a first-class facility].”
Clerk’s Papers at 156-57. This obligation is substantial,
particularly given the very recent history of very substan-
tial public expenditures to repair the Kingdome roof.
Finally, the Taxpayers assert without argument the
requirement to maintain insurance is for the benefit of the
Mariners. In fact, the insurance the lease requires the
Mariners to procure must protect the District “from all
claims arising as a result of the ownership, use, manage-
ment and operation of the [stadium].” Clerk’s Papers at
175. The Mariners are required to name the District as an
App. 18
additional insured on its liability policy. Such insurance is
obviously not for the Mariners’ sole benefit.
At its core, the Taxpayers’ argument is the District
and the County made a bad deal. While that may or may
not be true, “The wisdom of the King County plan is not
for the consideration of this court — its constitutionality
is.” Louthan v. King County, 94 Wn.2d 422, 427, 617 P.2d
977 (1980). The Taxpayers have failed to demonstrate a
constitutional infirmity under Const. art. VIIL, §§ 5 and 7.
The Taxpayers’ assertion the Mariners’ promises pur-
suant to the lease are illusory is unsupported. In the
absence of donative intent or grossly inadequate return,
the Court’s review is limited to the legal sufficiency of the
consideration for the lease. City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at
703. This lease met the test of legal sufficiency. No viola-
tion of art. VIII, §§ 5 or 7 of our Constitution is present
here.
C. The Collection of Stadium Sales and Use Tax Does
Not Violate Constitutional Requirements
The Taxpayers make four arguments about the collec-
tion of the stadium sales and use tax. First, they argue the
funding scheme is unconstitutional because it imposes a
nonuniform state sales tax, requiring King County resi-
dents to pay state sales tax at a higher rate than residents
of other counties. Second, they argue in the alternative
the funding scheme is unconstitutional because King
County residents pay less than their proportionate share
of state sales tax. Third, they argue the .017 percent sales
tax is being unconstitutionally diverted to the County,
whereas the state constitution requires tax revenues to be
App. 19
deposited in the state treasury. Fourth, they argue the
handling of the .017 percent sales tax violates the state
constitution.§
The Stadium Act as implemented by Ordinance 12000
imposes a .017 percent sales tax in King County. The
Taxpayers claim this taxes King County residents at a
percentage rate higher than the rate residents of other
counties pay. The “distribution of the burdens of taxation
should be uniform. . .. A tax levied for state purposes
shall be uniform throughout the state[.]” Bond v. Burrows,
103 Wn.2d 153, 157, 690 P.2d 1168 (1984) (differential state
sales tax rate for counties bordering other states held
unconstitutional).
The Taxpayers’ argument is simply incorrect. The
State sales tax is 6.5 percent. RCW 82.08.020(1). The Tax-
payers say the Stadium Act and Ordinance 12000 impose
in King County a state sales tax .017 percent greater than
in other counties. The Taxpayers ignore the provision of
the Stadium Act that treats the .017 percent as a deduction
against the 6.5 percent the King County taxpayers con-
tribute to the state sales tax: “The tax imposed under
subsection (1) of this section [the .017 percent tax] shall
be deducted from the amount of tax otherwise required to
be collected or paid over to the department of revenue
under chapter 82.08 or 82.12 RCW.” RCW 82.14.0485(2).
* It is appropriate to resolve these issues in the present
RCW 7.25 suit, because if a court were later to sustain any of the
constitutional questions the Taxpayers raise now, and declare
the bonds invalid, default might occur. It is precisely the
purpose of RCW 7.25 to resolve for all time any questions about
the legality of the subject bonds.
App. 20
Thus, the taxpayers of King County do not pay more than
6.5 percent state sales tax.
Const. art. XI, § 9, reads: “No county, nor the inhabi-
tants thereof, nor the property therein, shall be released
or discharged from its or their proportionate share of
taxes to be levied for state purposes, nor shall commuta-
tion for such taxes be authorized in any form whatever.”
If, the Taxpayers argue, the .017 percent is deducted in
King County from the statewide 6.5 percent sales tax rate,
then King County residents are paying only 6.483 percent
sales tax for state purposes, and are essentially being
unconstitutionally “released or discharged” from their
fair share of taxes levied for state purposes.
This argument would have some force if the .017
percent were not being collected for a state purpose by a
political subdivision of the state. But the County, a politi-
cal subdivision of the state, is collecting revenues for a
state purpose. The building of the baseball stadium
serves a state purpose, as we stated in CLEAN:
If it is true that the existence of a major league
baseball team in a city improves the economy of
the state in which that city is located and
enhances the fabric of life of its citizens, and we
believe it is the prerogative of the Legislature to
conclude that it does, it is certainly within the
general police power of the State to construct a
publicly owned stadium in order to promote
those interests.
CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 806. The Taxpayers apparently
agree: “Since the .017% tax is imposed to fund part of the
State contribution to the Mariners stadium, the tax is
clearly for ‘state purposes.’” Br. of Appellants at 35.
App. 21
Given the Taxpayers’ concession on the issue, their argu-
ment that King County residents are paying less sales tax
to the State than the residents of other counties dissolves.
In summary, the sales tax rate the residents of King
County are paying pursuant to the Stadium Act and
Ordinance 12000 is neither more nor less than the sales
tax rate in other counties. It is the 6.5 percent, statewide,
Statutory rate.
Const. art. VII, § 6, requires “[a]ll taxes levied and
collected for state purposes shall be paid in money only
into the state treasury.” The Taxpayers claim the tax
revenues to be collected under the Stadium Act do not go
into the state treasury, yet they offer no facts to support
their claim. Taxes authorized by RCW 82.14 “shall be
deposited by the state department of revenue in the local
sales and use tax account hereby created in the state
treasury.” RCW 82.14.050 (emphasis added). Contrary to
the Taxpayers’ argument, the taxes are deposited in the
State Treasury.
The Taxpayers also claim Const. art. VIII, § 4 pre-
vents the diversion of the .017 percent sales tax to the
County. Article VIII, section 4, provides, in pertinent part:
“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this
state, or any of its funds . . . except in pursuance of an
appropriation by law.” The Taxpayers assert, “diversion
to the County of up to .017% of whatever state sales taxes
the Department of Revenue collects in King County can-
not reasonably be considered a form of appropriation
because the amount will always vary and will never be a
distinct specific sum known to the Legislature.” Br. of
Appellants at 37.
App. 22
“The object of the constitution art. 8, § 4... is to
prevent expenditures of the public funds at the will of
those who have them in charge, and without legislative
direction.” State v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1
(1917). The state treasurer cannot spend those funds “at
will,” because state statute prescribes the disposition of
local sales and use taxes:
Monthly the state treasurer shall make dis-
tribution from the local sales and use tax
account to the counties, cities, transportation
authorities, and public facilities districts the
amount of tax collected on behalf of each taxing
authority, less the deduction provided for in
RCW 82.14.050 [administration and collection
expenses]. The state treasurer shall make the distri-
bution under this section without appropriation.
RCW 82.14.060 (emphasis added). Moreover, the funds
collected are paid into a special account in the state
treasury whose sole purpose is the payment of the bonds.
RCW 82.14.0485(3). We observed in Municipality of Metro.
Seattle v. O’Brien, 86 Wn.2d 339, 345, 544 P.2d 729 (1976):
Arguably the literal language of the constitution
would require a legislative appropriation to dis-
burse any funds from the state treasury under
the express words of [art. VIII, § 4]. However,
for many years, there has stood the common-
sense interpretation by this court that the Trea-
surer may be made custodian of particular
funds of a proprietary nature which are held for
a specific purpose. Funds so held are distributa-
ble without specific legislative appropriation.
In Metro, we approved the account within the state treas-
ury utilized by the Legislature in the Stadium Act. There,
App. 23
the state imposed a statewide excise tax on the value of
automobiles. The state also authorized local governments
to impose an additional local excise tax for public transit
and also receive a credit against the state excise tax.
Revenues thus derived were placed in an unappropriated
special account in the state treasury to be disbursed to
local governments for transit purposes, and did not vio-
late article VIII, section 4. Similarly, the statutory collec-
tion procedure here is constitutional.
In summary, the Taxpayers have made no compelling
constitutional or statutory arguments against the struc-
ture set up under the Stadium Act and Ordinance 12000
for the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes.
D. The Stadium Act Did Not Impermissibly Delegate
Legislative Authority to the District
The Taxpayers also assert the Stadium Act imper-
missibly delegates legislative authority to the District.
Const. art. II, § 1 vests legislative authority in the Legisla-
ture. “It is unconstitutional for the legislature to abdicate
or transfer to others its legislative function.” Keeting v.
Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clallam County, 49 Wn.2d 761,
767, 306 P.2d 762 (1957). The Taxpayers object to RCW
36.100.035(1), which gives the District the authority to
determine the site of the baseball stadium, and to RCW
36.100.035(2), which gives ihe District the authority to
determine the overall scope of the stadium project.
According to the Taxpayers, the District’s decisionmaking
authority “goes far beyond merely executing law already
in existence; the [District] is legislating.” Br. of Appel-
lants at 48.
App. 24
The Taxpayers apparently believe that only the Legis-
lature can decide where the stadium should be. They
have misunderstood the law. The case the Taxpayers cite,
American Fed’n of Teachers v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7, 74
Wn.2d 865, 447 P.2d 593 (1968), contains a quotation from
McQuli.un indicating that state government may delegate
authority to municipal corporations:
While the rule is fundamental that the
power to make laws cannot be delegated, the
creation of municipal corporations to exercise
local self-government has never been deemed to
violate this principle. Such legislation is not
regarded as a transfer of general legislative
power, but rather as a grant of the authority to
prescribe local regulations, supported by imme-
morial practice, but subject, of course, to the
interposition of the superior in cases of neces-
sity. Conferring proper powers upon municipal
corporations forms an exception to the rule
which forbids the legislature to delegate any of
its power to subordinate divisions.
Id. at 869, 447 P.2d 593, quoting 2 McQuiiun, § 4.09 (3rd
ed. 1966). The Legislature has properly delegated
authority to a local municipal corporation to carry out a
legislative determination. There is no unconstitutional
delegation here.
9 In any event, a delegation of legislative authority to an
agency, subject to appropriate standards, is permissible. Barry &
Barry, Inc. v. State, 81 Wn.2d 155, 159, 500 P.2d 540 (1972). The
delegation here was subject to appropriate standards.
App. 25
E. Initiative 16/Referendum
Initiative 16, if enacted at a future election, has the
potential to invalidate the bonds at issue here retroac-
tively by requiring a public vote before the County may
construct anything costing more than $50 million. The
initiative purports to take effect January 1, 1997, two
weeks before the bonds were issued in this case. The trial
court ruled Initiative 16 conflicts with state law and
therefore cannot, as a matter of law, affect the bonds.'°
Initiative 16 purports to create a mechanism - a pub-
lic vote - for retroactively invalidating an action autho-
rized by state law. While legislative bodies may enact
retroactive legislation in limited circumstances, such ret-
roactive legislation may not affect vested rights. Godfrey v.
State, 84 Wn.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975). There, we
defined a vested right as “a title, legal or equitable, to the
present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or a legal
exemption from a demand by another.” Id. at 963.
10 The Taxpayers argue the question is not yet justiciable,
but offer no argument contrary to the trial court’s conclusion
that Initiative 16 conflicts with state law. “Giving an opinion on
the legal consequences of the Initiative 16 ordinance if and
when adopted would be an advisory opinion (presumably for
the benefit of bond counsel) and contrary to law.” Br. of
Appellants at 40. But the underlying purpose of a RCW 7.25 suit
is to resolve all legal questions about the validity of the
proposed bond. If the Court does not decide the Initiative 16
question now, further legal controversy regarding the validity
of the bonds would likely ensue. RCW 7.25 is designed to
resolve such controversy in a single action. Because Initiative 16
has the potential to invalidate the bond issue here, the
initiative’s effect is ripe for decision under RCW 7.25.
App. 26
In this case, the right of the County to issue bonds
pursuant to the Stadium Act was such a vested right. The
issuance of bonds created a contract between the County
and bond holders. Legislation invalidating the issuance
of the stadium bonds would impermissibly impair that
contract. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; WasH. Const. art. I, § 23.
In Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wn.2d 820, 825, 505 P.2d 447
(1973), opponents of the proposed Kingdome sought to
place on the ballot an initiative that would have repealed
the resolution authorizing the project and the bonds to
finance it. Id. at 822. In rejecting the initiative, the Court
quoted Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554,
18 L. Ed. 403 (1866): “It is equally clear that where a State
has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to
exercise the power of local taxation to the extent neces-
sary to meet its engagements, the power thus given can-
not be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied.” Ruano,
81 Wn.2d at 827.
An additional basis for concluding Initiative 16 is
inapplicable to this bond issue is found in the trial court’s
analysis that Initiative 16 is in conflict with state law.
Initiative 16 proposes a county ordinance requiring a vote
of the people on projects costing more than $50 million.
The state constitution, however, permits counties to incur
indebtedness without a public vote if the indebtedness
does not exceed 1.5 percent of the assessed value of
property in the county: “No county, city, town, school
district, or other municipal corporation shall for any pur-
pose become indebted in any manner to an amount
exceeding one and one-half per centum of the taxable
property in such county, city, town, school district, or
other municipal corporation, without the assent of three-
App. 27
fifths of the voters therein voting at an election to be held
for that purpose.” Const. art. VIII, § 6 (amend 27). A state
statute is to the same effect: “Counties, cities, and towns
are limited to an indebtedness amount not exceeding one
and one-half percent of the value of the taxable property
in such counties, cities, or towns without the assent of
three-fifths of the voters therein voting at an election held
for that purpose.” RCW 39.36.020(2)(a)(ii).™
The positive corollary to Const. art. VIII, § 6 and the
statute is that a county may incur indebtedness of less
than 1.5 percent of the assessed value of property in the
county, without a vote of the people, by issuance of
councilmanic bonds. King County has done just that.
Initiative 16 purports to deprive the legislative authority
of King County of the power to do what the state consti-
tution and state statute specifically permit it to do — issue
bonds without a vote of the people, even though the bond
amount is below 1.5 percent of the assessed value of the
property in the county. If no vote is required, however, no
initiative or referendum could render invalid a decision
by the legislative authority to incur such indebtedness.
Thus, the trial court held Initiative 16 to be in irreconcil-
able conflict with state law, and held state law to be
controlling.
11 The Taxpayers do not dispute the declaration of the
Director of the Office of Budget and Strategic Planning for King
County: “Issuance of limited tax general obligation bonds in an
amount of $336,000,000 would not exceed the statutory
provisions (RCW 39.36.020(a)(2)(ii)[sic]) which allows counties
to incur debt up to 1.5% of the value of the taxable property
within the county without a vote of the people.” Clerk’s Papers
at 427.
App. 28
The Taxpayers argue the constitutional and statutory
debt limits provide a ceiling on the County’s ability to
incur debt without a vote of the people, but do not
prevent the County from lowering the ceiling if it wishes
to do so. They offer no authority for this argument.
A local government may not alter or restrict a legisla-
tive grant of power to that local government or its offi-
cers. “A general law enacted by the legislature is superior
to, and supersedes, all charter provisions inconsistent
therewith.” Neils v. City of Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 276, 53
P.2d 848 (1936) (ordinance concerning electric railways in
the city not subject to referendum because state law
granted exclusive power to city’s legislative authority to
control railways). In State ex rel. Guthrie v. City of Richland,
80 Wn.2d 382, 384, 494 P.2d 990 (1972), we said: “It is
settled that any charter provision which has the effect of
limiting or restricting a legislative grant of power to the
legislative authority or other officer of a city is invalid.” ?
In Guthrie, the Court considered whether a referendum
was permissible to challenge a Richland city ordinance
annexing contiguous territory as an addition to its water
utility. A statute, RCW 35.92.070, did not require voter
approval for proposed additions once the voters had
approved the initial acquisition of the utility. We held the
ordinance was not subject to referendum because the
referendum purported to limit powers the statute granted
to the legislative authority of the city.
12 Although the present case involves an ordinance and not a
charter provision, the principle of state law supremacy is the same.
App. 29
Similarly, in Benton v. Seattle Elec. Co., 50 Wash. 156,
96 P. 1033 (1908), a 1903 statute gave to the legislative
authority of cities the power to grant franchises for the
construction of street railways. A 1908 amendment to the
Seattle city charter purported to require the city council
to submit street railway franchises to the voters for their
approval. We held the amendment to the charter was
invalid because the city charter could not limit or surren-
der the specific grant of power by the Legislature to the
legislative authority to grant franchises. Id. at 163. Sim-
ilarly, Initiative 16 cannot have the effect of limiting the
positive implication of the debt limit provision in the
state constitution, i.e., the authority of the County to
issue bonds without a vote of the people when the
amount of the bonds is less than 1.5 percent of the
assessed value of property in the County.
In Bidwell v. City of Bellevue, 65 Wn. App. 43, 827 P.2d
339, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1023, 838 P.2d 690 (1992), a
case very close to the present facts, the Court of Appeals
employed the same reasoning as Guthrie in considering
the effect of a different statute. Plaintiffs sought to com-
pel the City of Bellevue to place an initiative on the ballot
concerning the financing of the Bellevue Convention Cen-
ter. The initiative would have required the Bellevue Con-
vention Center Authority to obtain voter approval before
issuing negotiable bonds or notes to finance the construc-
tion of the convention center. The debt resulting from the
lease was less than 1.5 percent of the taxable property in
Bellevue. Noting Guthrie found the proposed referendum
invalid “because if would have limited or restricted a
legislative grant of power to the City,” the Court of
Appeals held the initiative unlawfully conflicted with
App. 30
RCW 35.42.200, which permitted the city to execute leases
without submitting them to the voters if the lease did not
result in a total indebtedness in excess of 1.5 percent of
the value of the city’s taxable property. Bidwell, 65 Wn.
App. at 49.
In Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wn.2d 345, 884
P.2d 1326 (1994), the Whatcom County Council adopted a
Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance in 1992, pursuant to
the Growth Management Act, which required counties to
adopt comprehensive land use plans. Brisbane sought to
challenge parts of the ordinance by means of referendum.
We held the ordinance was not subject to referendum:
“Referendum rights do not exist when power has been
statutorily delegated to the ‘legislative authority’.” Id. at
350, quoting Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't v.
City of Spokane, 99 Wn.2d 339, 344-45, 662 P.2d 845
(1983).35
13 An additional basis for this viewpoint is that the Stadium
Act mandates County issuance of the bonds once the County
decided to proceed with a new baseball stadium, and declared
this policy in Ordinance 12000. The trial court held, as a result,
Initiative 16 cannot countermand state law. RCW 82.14.360(3)
provides, in pertinent part:
The revenue from the taxes imposed under this
section shall be used for the purpose of principal and
interest payments on bonds, issued by the county, to
acquire, construct, own, remodel, maintain, equip,
reequip, repair, and operate a baseball stadium... .
The county shall issue bonds, in an amount
determined to be necessary by the public facilities
district, for the district to acquire, construct, own, and
equip the baseball stadium. The county shall have no
obligation to issue bonds in an amount greater than
that which would be supported by the tax revenues
App. 31
When the Legislature or state constitution has
granted a power to the legislative authority of a munici-
pality, the municipality may not limit the scope of that
power, or surrender any of it under Const. art. XI, § 11,
our state supremacy clause. Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wn.2d
129, 133, 882 P.2d 173 (1994); Clallam County Deputy Sher-
iff's Guild v. Board Of Clallam County Comm'rs, 92 Wn.2d
844, 849, 601 P.2d 943 (1979). Under Const. art. 11, § 11,
counties have the right to enact ordinances prohibiting
the same acts prohibited by state law so long as the state
enactment was not intended to be exclusive and the
county ordinance does not conflict with the general law
of the state. City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 833,
827 P.2d 1374 (1992).
An ordinance must yield to a statute on the same
subject on either of two grounds: if the statute preempts
the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or
if a conflict exists between the two that cannot be harmo-
nized. Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353
(1991).
Const. art. VIII, § 6 and RCW 39.36.020(2)(a)(ii) grant
to the legislative authority of counties the power to issue
bonds when the amount of the bonds is below 1.5 percent
of the assessed value of the property in the county. We
hold these constitutional and statutory grants of power
under this section, section 101 of this act, and RCW
36.38.010(3)(a) and (b).
(Emphasis added.) Once the County opted into the
comprehensive financing plan for the baseball stadium by
enacting Ordinance 12000 and imposing taxes under the
Stadium Act, state law required the County to issue the bonds.
App. 32
preempt the field, leaving no room for concurrent juris-
diction. That power is therefore not subject to referendum
or initiative.'*
14 The intervenors’ arguments regarding a referendum on
the issuance of the bonds fail for essentially the same reasons as
the arguments on Initiative 16. The intervenors filed a
referendum petition proposing that Ordinance 12593
(authorizing issuance of the bonds) be put to a public vote. The
referendum cannot affect Ordinance 12593 for the same reasons
Initiative 16 cannot affect the ordinance. However, the
intervenors also apparently attempted to file a referendum with
respect to Ordinance 12000. The trial court discussed this effort,
stating:
Intervenors Scannel! et al. suggest that Ordinance
12000 is subject to referendum; however, if that
ordinance could have been presented to the people[,]
the time has passed for so doing. It has been well over
a year since the request for referendum on Ordinance
12000 was made. There is pending no action to
require the County to send that Ordinance to the
people. The time to pursue that issue was in 1995 and
it cannot be revived indirectly now through a
challenge to the bonds to be issued to implement
policy decisions made in Ordinance 12000.
Clerk’s Papers at 1105.
Ordinance 12000 was enacted on October 25, 1995. This
ordinance represented King County’s policy decision to proceed
with the new stadium. The proper way for the Intervenors to
have challenged this policy decision was to have invoked the
referendum process in a timely fashion. Under King County
Charter § 230.40, in order to require a referendum vote,
Intervenors were obliged to file a valid petition with the Council
prior to the effective date of the ordinance. The effective date of
the ordinance was ten days after its enactment. King County
Charter § 230.70. No such referendum petition appears in the
record. Accordingly, Ordinance 12000 is no longer susceptible to
a referendum.
E
=
a.
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3
App. 33
CONCLUSION
We hold the bonds for financing construction of a
baseball stadium in King County are valid under RCW
7.25. As a matter of law, the use of public funds to build
the new baseball stadium does not represent unconstitu-
tional aid to the Mariners. The Stadium Act and Ordi-
nance 12000 do not manifest donative intent, and the
return to the County is not grossly inadequate. There is
legally sufficient consideration to support the promises of
the Mariners. The Taxpayers’ arguments about violation
of constitutional requirements for the imposition and
handling of tax revenues are factually incorrect, and
without substance. The Legislature appropriately dele-
gated authority to the District. The trial court was correct
in holding Initiative 16, even if passed, cannot affect the
bond issue because any future action that may impair the
obligations contained in the bond contract is constitu-
tionally impermissible.
In short, the Taxpayers have presented no compelling
arguments to require reversal of the trial court’s declaratory
judgment under RCW 7.25 that the stadium financing
App. 34
bonds were valid. We affirm the trial court’s declaratory
judgment order validating the bonds.
/s/ Talmadge, J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Durham, C.J. /s/ Johnson J.
/s/ Dolliver, J. /s/
/s/ Smith, J. /s/ Alexander, J.
/s/ Guy, J. /s/
SANDERS, Justice (dissenting) - This action was
commenced by the King County government to finally,
permanently, and absolutely deny each of the million
plus? county taxpayers (Taxpayers) any lawful defense or
democratic remedy against imposition of $336,000,000 in
additional public debt. The Taxpayers were denied an
adequate and fair opportunity to present their case at the
trial court; and our constitutional prohibition against
public gifts to private parties has been overtly violated. I
dissent.
1 The 1996 population of King County was 1,628,800. 1996
Population Trends, Table 4, Office of Fiscal Management, State
of Washington (Oct.1996).
App. 35
The action proceeds as an inverted class action under
the authority of RCW 7.25.020, whereby the county gov-
ernment sues each of its taxpayers through the device of
naming two representatives to defend the interests of
every other county taxpayer. As this is truly an extraordi-
nary proceeding, I posit the courts have at least the
normal duty, if not an extraordinary one, to ensure that
the legal rights of all parties are fully recognized and
protected, not only in procedural form but also in sub-
stantive result. The factual and legal basis for my grave
concerns are summarized in this dissent.
Fast Track in Trial Court
To say the trial court track was fast is a gross under-
statement. The period from filing the complaint to sum-
mary judgment was only 37 days during which, for the
most part, the trial court denied the Taxpayers any right
to conduct discovery. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1048-49.
On January 6, 1997, the King County Council by a
vote of eight to five passed Ordinance 12593 authorizing
issuance of $336 million in construction oonds for the
new baseball stadium and adjacent parking garage. One
week later, on January 13, 1997, the County commenced
this suit. Bowing to virtually every governmental request
to shorten time, and foreclosing virtually any opportunity
for the Taxpayers to conduct even the most rudimentary
discovery, the trial court heard the government's argu-
ment in support of its motion for summary judgment on
February 19, 1997, 26 days after the government filed its
summary judgment motion. CP at 1074.
App. 36
Normally CR 56(f) would require reversal should it
appear from the affidavits of the party opposing the
motion (the Taxpayers) that they could not present by
affidavit those facts essential to justify their opposition
absent an opportunity to pursue discovery;? however, I
would not reverse on this basis since, all considered,
Taxpayers were not unfairly prejudiced because (1) the
Herculean efforts of defense counsel produced a more
than adequate factual record to avoid summary judgment
of dismissal if the appropriate legal standard had been
applied and (2) it really doesn’t matter what sort of
record the Taxpayers put together because the summary
judgment on the gift issue resulted from the application
of the wrong legal standard, not inadequacy of the
record.
I am not without compassion for the trial court how-
ever. The trial court, and equally the Supreme Court, is
asked to act in a summary fashion on a matter of great
2 CR 56(f) provides:
(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it
appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the
court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as is just.
A trial court refusal to permit time for discovery is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Discretion is
abused when the trial court c.des not allow the nonmoving party
adequate opportunity to acquire discovery which could raise a
material factual issue. Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641
West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68, 91, 838 P.2d 111 (1992).
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App. 37
financial and political consequence under circumstances
where it is claimed that even the shortest delay will derail
a huge governmental public works project, regardless of
its legal merit.
Upon this reality I can only reflect, without further
commentary: haste makes waste; the best lawyers are
often deprived an adequate opportunity to represent the
interests of their clients if denied sufficient time; and
courts sometimes commit error which could be avoided
given an adequate opportunity to study the law, discern
‘he facts, think, and reflect. A rush to judgment defeats
justice.
Heightened Standard of Review
Noticeable by its absence from the majority opinion
is any reference to the applicable standard of review.
Here an extremely high standard is required by CR 56
and indirectly by RCW 7.25.010-.040.
A summary judgment will be sustained on review
only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-
tories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-
davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). The CR 56
standard has been applied by this court and appellate
courts on countless occasions and generally requires that
all facts or inferences therefrom be construed most favor-
ably to the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98
Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982) (“A summary judg-
ment motion under CR 56(c) can be granted only if the
pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file
App. 38
demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. .. . The court must consider all facts
submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”). Klinke
v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 255, 256-57,
616 P.2d 644 (1980) (summary judgment is not appropri-
ate when reasonable minds might reach different conclu-
sions); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571
(10th Cir. 1946) (summary judgment should not be used
“to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing” and
must be “temperately and cautiously used lest abuse reap
nullification.”); Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th
Cir. 1940) (cautioning against using summary judgment
as “a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants
into its toils and deprive them of a trial”); Stephen J.
Fortunato, Jr., Summary Judgment in Rhode Island: Is it Time
to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.
153, 204 (1997) (“summary judgment is a drastic remedy
to be applied only with great caution.” (citations omit-
ted)).
The declaratory judgment proceeding contemplated
by RCW 7.25 is in the nature of a CR 23 class action. It
requires designation of representative defendants to rep-
resent (with government payment of defense attorney
fees) the interest of all similarly situated absent class
members. Although there is a paucity of precedent on
RCW 7.25.010-.040, the analogy to CR 23 class actions is
inescapably clear. CR 23 normally envisions a class of
plaintiffs proceeding against specifically named defen-
dants; however, in rare instances the device has been
used to proceed on behalf of named plaintiffs against
re OY iS i Sa ay ete
App. 39
representatives of a class of defendants. In either case the
court undertakes affirmative responsibilities to assure the
legal interest of each absent class: member is protected.
CR 23(b)(1)(B). Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir.
1973) (the trial court must ascertain that the “class repre-
sentative adequately represent the class so that the judg-
ment in the class suit will bind the absent members of the
class.”); Marquardt v. Fein, 25 Wn.App. 651, 656-57, 612
P.2d 378 (1980) (class representative must fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class and respon-
sibility for ensuring adequate representation must
devolve upon the trial court).
It is therefore the court’s responsibility to apply the
summary judgment standard, with special deference
given to absent class members, to all factual questions.
Therefore, with a focus on whether the stadium is an
unconstitutional gift of public funds, on the text and
purpose of the pertinent constitutional provision, on
analysis of relevant case law, and on clarification of fac-
tual questions, I conclude: Were the Taxpayers not to
receive a summary judgment on this record in their favor,
they have surely raised at least a question of fact which
only the trier of fact can resolve on remand for trial.
Unconstitutional Public Aid to Private Parties
Constitution article VIII, section 7 provides: “No
county... shall... give any money, or property .. . to or
in aid of any individual . . . or corporation.” (Emphasis
added.)
App. 40
The issue here is what this means. Two alternative
theories are advanced. The government, trial court, and
majority of this court assert the constitution is satisfied if
there is legally sufficient consideration (a peppercorn will
do) to support the enforceability of a promise. This dis-
sent demonstrates the constitution not only requires more
consideration, it requires adequate consideration. The test
employed dictates the outcome.
Standard of Constitutional Interpretation
Although we have been frequently called upon to
apply this constitutional text to a variety of factual situa-
tions, the unambiguous language always controls. We
held in an early case:
The section of the constitution last quoted,
in most express terms, prohibits a county from
giving any money, property or credit to, or in
aid of, any corporation, except for the necessary
support of the poor and infirm.
Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141 P. 892 (1914).
As has been clear since those days, the constitution
makes no distinction between purposes but simply,
directly, and unequivocally prohibits all gifts in aid of
any corporation. Id. at 354. In Wadsworth, for example, the
court struck down a grant to the Western Washington
Fair. While conceding the appropriation was for a worthy
purpose, educational in nature, “[t]here is no room, how-
ever, for construction. Unless plain, simple, direct words
have lost their meaning, the legislature was without
power to authorize the gift.” Id. at 355.
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App. 41
We must also recall that the constitution is an expres-
sion of the will of the people, State ex rel. Albright v. City
of Spokane, 64 Wn.2d 767, 394 P.2d 231 (1964), and the
court performs but a limited role to apply the constitution
as written. The court has no power to construe or inter-
pret a provision that is clear, plain, and unambiguous in
its terms. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wn.2d 189, 543 P.2d 229
(1975).
Evil Sought to Be Remedied
The majority correctly notes we should construe the
constitutional provision to remedy “the evils the framers
sought to prevent.” Majority at 12 (citing City of Tacoma v.
Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 705, 743 P.2d 793
(1987)).
An increased level of judicial scrutiny is required in
these situations “for the protection of public funds which
may be potentially wasted. The court has acted as a
watchdog to ensure the public funds will not be given
away.” City of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wn.2d 717, 724, 600 P.2d
1268 (1979) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).
Reversing a summary judgment in favor of municipal
defendants, we held in State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of
Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 801, 806, 399 P.2d 623 (1965):
If Article 8, § 7 is too restrictive in its terms, that
is a matter for the citizens of this state to correct
through the amendatory process. It is not for
this court to engraft an exception where none is
expressed in the constitutional provision, no
matter how desirable or expedient such an
exception might seem.
App. 42
We recall “a recurrence to the history of the times
will show that many municipalities had become bankrupt
because of liabilities incurred in aid of railroads, ‘and
various other public improvements which were deemed
advantageous’ at the time.” Wadsworth, 80 Wash. at 354;
see also Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d at 701 (“[F]ramers
intended to prevent the harmful ‘effects on the public
purse of granting public subsidies to private commercial
enterprises, primarily railroads.’”) (citing City of Mar-
ysville v. State, 101 Wn.2d 50, 55, 676 P.2d 989 (1984)).
Justice Hale’s concurrence in State ex rel. Graham v.
City of Olympia, 80 Wn.2d 672, 687, 497 P.2d 924 (1972)
opined that the purpose of article 8, section 7 was to
prevent the use of public money by private entities for
private purposes. The article was designed to prevent the
use of public money for political favoritism, preferment,
and manipulations, and “[i]t is designed to protect the
public purse from private spending.” Id.
By the time our constitutional convention convened
in July 1889 many local governments had endured the
unfortunate experience of subsidizing private corpora-
tions, particularly railroads, to lure them and keep them.
See James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corpora-
tions in Washington: 100 Years of Judicial Decisions — Have
the Framers’ Views Been Followed?, 12 U. Puget Sound
L.Rev. 163, 182 (1989). At the constitutional convention
the framers debated at length what was to be done. See
Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention,
1889 at 679-84 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962). The version
of article VIII, § 7, finally approved and popularly rat-
ified, is the same which comes to us unchanged today. It
was intended for the “protection of taxpayers and the
ae ee 9
4
3
:
App. 43
public purse from the consequences of corporate political
clout.” David D. Martin, Comment: Washington State Con-
stitutional Limitations on Gifting of Funds to Private Enter-
prise: A Need for Reform, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 199, 203
(1996); see also City of Marysville v. State, 101 Wn.2d 50, 55,
676 P.2d 989 (1984) (“[T]he framers of our constitution
were deeply concerned about the effects on the public
purse of granting public subsidies to private commercial
enterprises, primarily railroads” and drafted article 8,
sections 5 and 7 to prohibit the practice).
The motive and objective of this constitutional provi-
sion is to prevent the transfer of public assets from public
entities, resulting in an inadequate return, or net loss, to
the public. This has nothing to do with whether or not
there is present such minimal consideration legally neces-
sary to support a promise. If a public official may transfer
$100 of taxpayer property for a $5 return to the taxpayers,
they are $95 poorer. The return is inadequate regardless
of the legal sufficiency of the consideration. The purpose
of the provision is to avoid transactions which plunder
the public purse to the benefit of private corporate
wealth.
The constitutional text employs absolute and sweep-
ing language to avoid this eventuality through use of the
term “any,” a term of total exclusion, as well as the term
“aid,” defined as “[t]o support, help, assist, or
strengthen.” Black's Law Dictionary 68 (6th ed. 1990).
We have held it is the role of the courts to guard the
public purse from expenditures in controversion of this
article as it is a uniquely judicial responsibility to rig-
orously enforce this constitutional provision. See Miller v.
App. 44
City of Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 384, 378 P.2d 464 (1963)
(whether public expenditures amount to an unconstitu-
tional gift “is solely a judicial question and ultimately
must be decided by this court.”); see also Scott Paper Co. v.
City of Anacortes, 90 Wn.2d 19, 33, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978) (no
legislative attempt to define a gift for the constitutional
provision would be meaningful because construction of
the constitution is a judicial function); Washington Natural
Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 101, 459
P.2d 633 (1969) (“article 8, section 7, prohibiting any city,
county, town, or other municipal corporation from giving
away its money or property or lending its money or
credit to or in aid of any private entity is a mandatory
provision and must be strictly observed.”) (citing Johns v.
Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914); and State ex
rel. Washington Navigation Co. v. Pierce County, 184 Wash.
414, 51 P.2d 407 (1935), modified by 187 Wash. 695, 60 P.2d
16 (1936)).
Sufficient Legal Consideration/Peppercorn Rule
Notwithstanding this text, history, and “evil sought
to be cured,” the majority claims “legally sufficient con-
sideration” is all that is necessary to satisfy the constitu-
tional provision. Majority at 18. Misplacing its reliance
upon Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wn.2d 312,
327, 722 P.2d 74 (1986) the majority asserts “[i]n assessing
consideration, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of
consideration, but employ a legal sufficiency test.” Major-
ity at 13. The majority also cites Browning v. Johnson, 70
Wn.2d 145, 147, 422 P.2d 314, 430 P.2d 591 (1967) (a
private contract case, not a constitutional gift case) for the
App. 45
rule that “[ljegal sufficiency ‘is concerned, not with com-
parative value, but with that which will support a prom-
ise.” Majority at 13.
Of course. Even a peppercorn? is legally sufficient
consideration to support a promise.* Under this standard,
all of the State’s timberland could be transferred to a
large timber company for a penny (which could buy
several peppercorns). While it is “legally sufficient” to
support enforcement of a contractual promise, it is inade-
quate to protect our public assets.
The legal sufficiency rule is designed to enforce a
bargain, but not necessarily to avoid a gift.
Mixture of bargain and gift. In most commer-
cial bargains there is a rough equivalence
between the value promised and the value
received as consideration. But the social func-
tions of bargains include the provision of oppor-
tunity for free individual action and exercise of
judgment and the fixing of values by private
action, either generally or for the purposes of
the particular transaction. Those functions
would be impaired by judicial review of the
3 The peppercorn is the classic example of “consideration
given” that does not match the value received and thus
represents nominal payment. Under English law a peppercorn
was the stated rent in many nominal lease contracts. Black’s Law
Dictionary 1135 (6th ed. 1990) (peppercorn is “the reservation of
a merely nominal rent, on a lease”); 2 William Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws of England not (1766) (referring to the
practice of requiring payment of a peppercorn for a leasehold as
nominal rent).
* 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 7:2,
at 22 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.1992).
App. 46
values so fixed. Ordinarily, therefore, courts do
not inquire into the adequacy of consideration,
particularly where one or both of the values
exchanged are difficult to measure. . . . Even
where both parties know that a transaction is in
part a bargain and in part a gift, the element of
bargain may nonetheless furnish consideration
for the entire transaction.
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71, illus. c, at 174
(1979) (emphasis added).
Gross inadequacy of consideration may be rele-
vant to issues of capacity, fraud and the like, but
the requirement of consideration is not a safeguard
against imprudent and improvident contracts except
in cases where it appears that there is no bargain in
fact.
Id. § 79, illus. “c,” at 201-02 (emphasis added). The ratio-
nale behind requiring iegally sufficient consideration to
support a promise is therefore completely divergent from
the purpose behind the constitutional prohibition against
gifts: the former is to encourage and legally enforce free
action between private persons; the latter is to protect the
taxpaying public from public officials who would waste
the assets they are duty-bound to preserve. Moreover,
even a promise supported by legally sufficient consider-
ation is not enforceable when it violates public policy.
Williston, supra, § 4:42, at 672. Our state constitution is
the ultimate source of public policy.
If a peppercorn of legal sufficiency was the constitu-
tional barrier the framers devised to guard the public
purse, they certainly did not achieve their objective.
App. 47
Adequacy Rule
Contrary to the majority’s claim, the modern consti-
tutional test is stated and restated within the very cases
the majority principally purports to rely on: Adams v.
University of Washington, City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, and
CLEAN ov. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).
None of this precedent has been overruled, nor does the
majority even attempt to distinguish it.
Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722
P.2d 74 (1986) is the mother of modern authority on this
topic. It articulates the rule quite differently from the
majority:
Unless there is proof of donative intent or a
grossly inadequate return, courts do not require
into the adequacy of consideration.
Id. at 327 (citations omitted). City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of
City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703, citing Adams, says
almost the same:
Absent a showing of donative intent or gross
inadequacy, the trial court should only apply a
legal sufficiency test... .
CLEAN specifically relied upon Taxpayers, holding
“[iJt cannot be seriously contended that the development
of a baseball stadium for major league team is a ‘funda-
mental purpose’ of state government. Our inquiry must
concentrate, therefore, on donative intent and consider-
ation.” CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 798. CLEAN rejected a facial
challenge to the Stadium Act, speculated, absent a record
before it:
If .. . the [d]istrict should enter into an agree-
ment with the Mariners that would permit the
App. 48
ball club to play its games in the stadium for
only nominal rent, then the constitutional prohi-
bitions against making a gift of state funds
might be implicated. . . . In the unlikely event
that this prediction should come true, the issue
can then be raised in an appropriate manner.
CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 800. “Nominal rent,” like nominal
consideration of $1 or $10 on the face of a deed, is
“legally sufficient” consideration to support the promise.
Yet, as per CLEAN, it isn’t enough to pass the constitu-
tional adequacy test.
The majority concludes its analysis of case law by
blandly stating: “[t]his lease met the test of legal suffi-
ciency. No violation of art. VIII, §§ 5 or 7 of our Constitu-
tion is present here.” Majority at 18.
But what about the test for donative intent or gross
inadequacy? While it is true if there is no legal suffi-
ciency, there is no lawful transaction, that is not to say
that if there is legal sufficiency there can be no gift. In
short, the majority’s approach is absolutely irreconcilable
5 See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England 440 (1766) (“in case of leases, always reserving a rent,
though it be but a peppercorn [such] consideration will, in the
eyes of the law, convert the gift . . . into a contract.”); State v.
Teller Native Corp., 904 P.2d 847, 850 (Alaska 1995) ($10 nominal
rent paid under the lease is le _ ly sufficient consideration);
Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant Cuunty, 51 Wn.2d 285, 286, 317
P.2d 1069 (1957) (construing valid lease of “one hundred thirty-
eight acres leased from the Federal government for seventy- five
years, at a nominal rental of one hundred dollars a year or about
two cents per unit per month.”). See also Matter of Estate of Little,
106 Wn.2d 269, 286-87, 721 P.2d 950 (1986) ($10 paid for a $1
million property may be legally sufficient consideration to
uphold the sales contract).
App. 49
with Adams, Tacoma, and CLEAN. These cases hold if
there is proof of donative intent or a grossly inadequate
return, the courts must inquire into the adequacy of con-
sideration as they would any other question of fact.
Upon this single point the case at bar turns. While I
would concede there is sufficient legal consideration to
support a promise, I find overwhelming evidence - evi-
dence much beyond the simple inference necessary to
defeat a summary judgment motion - that there is not
only donative intent or® grossly inadequate return, but
both, and they require a trier of the facts.
Donative Intent
“[D]onative intent is a factual issue to be resolved by
the trier of fact.” In re Estate of Pearl Fitzhugh Little, 106
Wn.2d 269, 288, 721 P.2d 950 (1986).”
6 Although evidence of both, donative intent and grossly
inadequate return, is present in this record, I beg to differ with
the majority’s initial formulation of the rule that “a transfer of
property without consideration and with donative intent” is
required (citing General Tel. Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579,
588, 716 P.2d 879 (1986)). Majority at 13 (emphasis added).
Although General Telephone did say just that, its use of the term
“and” was a loose one corrected by more recent cases which
properly replaced “and” with “or.” Adams, 106 Wn.2d at 327;
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d at 703. Moreover, the
majority recognizes that the discussion in CLEAN “is essentially
the test for an unconstitutional gift of public funds we have
articulated in numerous cases”; i.e., it is no departure from the
Adams rule. Majority at 12.
7? See also Brigade v. Economic Dev. Bd., 61 Wn. App. 615, 621,
811 P.2d 697 (1991) (whether or not the county had donative
intent plainly rested upon underlying material facts. CR 56(c)
App. 50
This record contains two different types of proof and
inferences therefrom which would support a finding of
donative intent: narrative statements and grossly inade-
quate return.
a. Narrative Evidence of Donative Intent
Narrative evidence is correspondence, business
records, and declarations, stating, in one form or another,
that the raison d’etre for the stadium project is to aid the
Mariners by making it more profitable for them to stay in
Seattle than to go elsewhere. Such supports an inference
of donative intent.
On September 28, 1995 Mariner chairman and CEO
John W. Ellis wrote King County Executive Gary Locke
requires the moving party to “show there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact.”). Lewis v. Estate of Lewis, 45 Wn. App. 387,
392, 725 P.2d 644 (1986) (record supported finding existence of
donative intent with respect to mother’s transfer of real
property to son); Matter of Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 288,
721 P.2d 950 (1986) (“The existence or absence of a donative
intent is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of the fact.”);
Bellevue v. State, 92 Wn.2d 717, 721, 600 P.2d 1268 (1979)
(donative intent is to be determined upon the evidence); Matter
of Hoffman's Estate, 15 Wn. App. 307, 312, 548 P.2d 1101 (1975)
(evidentiary finding on donative intent necessary at trial court),
review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1007 (1976); Buckerfield’s Ltd. v. B.C.
Goose & Duck Farm, Ltd., 9 Wn. App. 220, 223, 511 P.2d 1360
(1973) (the presence or absence of donative intent is a question
of fact for the trier of fact); Oman v. Yates, 70 Wn.2d 181, 182-83,
422 P.2d 489 (1967) (same); In re McDonald’s Estate, 60 Wn.2d
452, 456, 374 P.2d 365 (1962) (Whether or not there is donative
intent is a question for the trier of fact to be inferred from the
evidence.).
aateletane aed
App. 51
(now Governor), restating what the Mariners had stated
before, i.e., “we have clearly stated that a new stadium is
required if major league is to be competitive and finan-
cially successful in this region. . . . We made it clear that
without such a stadium we would have no alternative but
to offer the team for sale. . . . Nor can we further jeopard-
ize our investment. ... ” CP at 615. The Mariners then
complained about mounting financial losses, and stated
their intention to leave the area unless a new stadium was
built to cure their financial ills. The team sought aid to
remain.
The Stadium Act authorized a “solution” to the
team’s financial problems. CP at 19. Ordinance 12000
proclaimed the new ball park would offer the club “cer-
tain revenue generating capabilities not presently avail-
able at the Kingdome.” CP at 26. Why? - to aid the
Mariners. The county loaned the Public Facilities District
$33 million for preconstruction costs for the ball park,
even though the club could “walk away” from the pro-
ject. CP at 1155. Why? To encourage the Mariners to stay
because aid is on the way.
On December 20, 1996, United States Senator Slade
Gorton, a supporter of the project, wrote King County
Executive Locke, Mayor Rice, King County Council
Chairman Jane Hague, and Joan Enticknap, Chairman of
the Public Facilities District. Senator Gorton candidly
stated in this letter that “Governor Lowry, the Legisla-
ture, and the community came together in such magnifi-
cent fashion to authorize the construction of a new
baseball stadium and thus to save the Mariners more than
a year ago.” CP at 391. “Save the Mariners” through the
use of public funds is also evidence of donative intent.
App. 52
Senator Gordon [sic] related that he had recently
“had extensive conversations with John Ellis, a close
friend of more than 40 years,” and indicated that the
Mariners’ announcement that they would leave town
unless a stadium was constructed was “not a negotiating
ploy.” CP at 391-92. One inference: better provide the
financial benefit the Mariners want or they will leave.
Gorton further identified Hiroshi Yamauchi, princi-
pal owner of the Nintendo Corporation in Japan, as the
principal owner of the Mariners (although under the
terms of the lease, neither Mr. Yamauchi nor the Nin-
tendo Corporation has any direct or indirect liability. Nor
did either, or anyone, ever post a personal guaranty, or
any security, to assure the Mariners would perform their
obligations). Senator Gorton made a point that, since
these owners acquired the Mariners, they have incurred
more than “$70 million in operating losses in the five
seasons between 1992 and 1996.” CP at 392. Gorton pro-
jected “based on projected attendance at levels never
lower than 2,500,000 paid admissions per year for 20
years, under the terms of the agreement offered, the
owners of the team would still suffer at least moderate,
annual operating losses.”® CP at 392. The import of the
letter is that the Mariners are in financial trouble and they
need financial aid in the form of a new stadium if they are
going to remain in Seattle.
Further evidence of donative intent is supplied by
the resignation letter from Shelly Yapp dated December
8 Where are the profits to share?
App. 53
26, 1996, explaining her decision to resign from the Public
Facilities District Board of Directors. She states:
[T]he balance of public and private interests has
shifted radically and wrongly, in my view, to the
welfare of the Mariners ownership over that of
the public. . . . I cannot support the dramatic
shift in the relationship, because I do not believe
it serves the public interest for which the Board
is supposed to be a steward.
CP at 663. In an attachment to the letter, dated December
23, 1996, Board Member Yapp detailed her concern that
the government is spending $360 million to build a ball
park which will be turned over to a private corporation to
operate for private benefit. She said all the benefits are
shifted to the club, yet all the risk is not shifted to the
club; the lease provisions gut any oversight the PFD was
intended to exercise to ensure that the public’s asset is
properly maintained; and “the club even dictates how the
PFD spends the rent money it receives.” CP at 666. She
continued (I paraphrase):
1. Although it is nearly impossible for the PFD
to terminate the club’s lease for failure of the
club to meet its obligations, the club may escape
from its obligations through bankruptcy and
opposed any provisions in the lease to guard
against that eventuality.
: 2. The club has eliminated previously pro-
i posed lease conditions which require PFD
4 agreement with plans for operating and main-
taining the ball park. PFD does not have the
money to enforce the lease because the rent
won’t cover the costs of enforcement.
App. 54
3. The $700,000 per year rent for the brand new
facility is half of the $1.3 million the club paid in
1995 to play in a 20-year-old Kingdome. The
new lease, unlike the current one, entitles the
Mariners to control the property 365 days per
year, although the previous lease provided for
only 85 regular games. Nor is there any atten-
dance-based rent and “in fact, the PFD must pay
rent for office space in the ball park it owns.”
4. Although there is a profit sharing require-
ment in the Stadium Act “there will be no profit
sharing under this lease. The Mariners so-called
‘true profit’ is a numbers game that they control.
Their definitions ensure that the public will not
reap any returns in shared profits from the new
stadium.”
5. Contrary to public belief the Mariners are
not putting up any equity contribution for the
construction of the ball park. They will only put
up money for the prospective operation of the
ball park “and, if the experience of other recent
ball parks is any guide, they will get the entire
$45 million from naming rights of this public
ball park. If they get more than $45 million for
the naming rights, they keep it.”
6. This $45 million is treated as a “contribu-
tion” to the construction of the ball park and as
a “loss” which must be recouped before there is
any profit sharing.
7. There are few requirements ensuring low
cost public access to the stadium, and the Mari-
ners will exercise exclusive control of any non-
baseball uses or amateur baseball uses of the
ball park. The Mariners will retain all revenue
from any of these uses. “There is not even a
provision for free public tours of the ball park.”
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There are few enforcement or accountability
provisions in the lease to require public access
or public benefits.
8. The Mariners will operate the ball park as a
private operator and, thus, unlike the operator
of the Seattle Center or the Kingdome, are
exempt from competitive bidding, affirmative
action plans, etc.
9. Although the public contribution to the sta-
dium included a 10% contingency, they have
insisted on an increase in the County bond
amount by $15 million, which will ensure that
their pledge to pay cost overruns never arises.
They dropped the capital reserve fund from $15
million to $5 million, which means that in the
final year of the lease, funds will not be suffi-
cient to pay what we already know to be the
scheduled capital repair and replacement costs.
10. If the team sells, there will be no oppor-
tunity to find a suitable local buyer.
With the capitulation to the demands and
conditions of the Mariners, major league base-
ball may be saved for Seattle, but at the price of
honest dealing and, in my view, at the expense
of the interests of the public. Accordingly, I vote
no on this lease.
CP at 665-68.
Applying the CR 56 summary judgment standard, I
submit it is patently obvious that there is, at minimum, a
question of fact regarding whether or not this transfer of
a brand new baseball! stadium to the exclusive control of
a private, for-profit corporation for 20 years is motivated
by donative intent. This factual issue may be determined
App. 56
only by the trier of fact, not the trial court sitting in
summary judgment, nor this court.
Grossly Inadequate Return
Were this not enough, a further inference of donative
intent arises from the following facts.
Many, many Washington cases? apply the term
“grossly inadequate” by factual comparison to what is
9 For example, a home which is sold for substantially less
than its fair market value is sold for a purchase price which is
“grossly inadequate.” Casa del Rey v. Hart, 110 Wn.2d 65, 72, 750
P.2d 261 (1988). An award of five percent of the sale price of
windows plus $50,000 bond is “grossly inadequate.” Boeing v.
Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 64 n.4, 738 P.2d 665 (1987). Gross
inadequacy is a relative concept measured against the value
transferred. Buckerfield’s Ltd.. 9 Wn.App. at 226. The sale of
timber property worth $94,000 for $35,000 is “grossly
inadequate.” Zucker v. Mitchell, 62 Wn.2d 819, 822, 384 P.2d 815
(1963). Competitive bidding furnishes protection to the seller
“and avoids the sacrifice of the property at a grossly inadequate
sale price.” Lee v. Barnes, 61 Wn.2d 581, 585, 379 P.2d 362 (1963).
Damages of $6,800 were “grossly inadequate” when the
evidence in the case would have sustained a verdict
considerably more than that. Rathke v. Roberts, 33 Wn.2d 858,
881, 207 P.2d 716 (1949). Return of a property’s fair market value
is adequate, not “grossly inadequate.” Washington State Hop
Producers v. Riel, 20 Wn.2d 624, 627, 148 P.2d 847 (1944). Where it
would cost $750 to construct roadway approaches, and the
respondent only receives $600, compensation is “grossly
inadequate.” Downing v. State, 9 Wn.2d 685, 687, 115 P.2d 972
(1941). Whether or not a personal injury verdict is “grossly
inadequate” depends upon the injuries and the pecuniary loss.
Silow v. Mau, 186 Wash. 258, 260, 57 P.2d 1059 (1936). If the
amount bid is fair under the circumstances, and there is no
reasonable probability that a greater amount could be obtained
on resale, the sale should be confirmed because the price was
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App. 57
“adequate” under the particular facts. The question of
gross inadequacy is one for the jury, not the court. Sova v.
First Nat'l Bank of Ferndale, 18 Wn.2d 88, 104, 138 P.2d 181
(1943). In sum, something is “grossly inadequate” if it is
less, by sufficient degree, than “adequate.” What degree
the jury must determine under all the facts and circum-
stances. Clearly we are measuring adequacy, not legal
sufficiency.
By dictionary definition, “inadequate” is “[ijnsuffi-
cient; disproportionate; lacking in effectiveness or in con-
formity to a prescribed standard or measure.” Black's Law
Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990).
The term “grossly inadequate” almost always refers
to a transaction with “legally sufficient” consideration yet
inadequate return. For example, in City of Tempe v. Pilot
Properties, Inc., 22 Ariz. App. 356, 527 P.2d 515, 518 (1974)
the court was faced with an alleged unconstitutional gift
under a similar constitutional provision where the city of
Tempe attempted to lease city land to the Seattle Pilots
for a spring training camp for $1 a year. While the $1
payment may have constituted “legally sufficient” con-
sideration, the court held a factual inquiry was required
not “grossly inadequate.” Blair v. Hewitt, 185 Wash. 430, 432, 55
P.2d 607 (1936). A transaction which is not “fair and just” is
grossly inadequate. In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 58, 28
P.2d 280 (1934). Where the consideration paid is not fairly
proportioned to the value of the property, the consideration is
“grossly inadequate.” Cannon v. Seattle Title Trust Co., 142 Wash.
213, 219, 252 P. 699 (1927). A sale of corporate property for a
grossly inadequate price should never be permitted over the
protest of minority stockholders. Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash.
454, 463, 218 P. 269 (1923).
App. 58
to assess whether the consideration received by the gov-
ernment was sufficiently inequitable and unreasonable to
amount to an unconstitutional subsidy. Id. at 522.
By this standard let us turn to the question at hand;
i.e., is there any fact or inference in the record, when
construed most favorably to the nonmoving party, which
would indicate the consideration returned to the county
is “grossly inadequate?”
To answer we must view the transaction as a whole.
We do not have the luxury, as does the majority under the
legal sufficiency test, to simply pick one or two pennies
and say, “Aha! Here is some consideration, and we need
not inquire into its adequacy!”
I would be surprised if the majority would not con-
cede my point, as I did theirs: while there is legally
sufficient consideration to support a promise, there are
certainly facts and inferences in the record to support a
finding by the trier of fact that this return was “grossly
inadequate.”
The majority points to the following factors (I think
to establish legal sufficiency — which I concede — but not
to establish adequacy — which I contest):
1. The Mariners have committed to play at
least 90 percent of their games at the new sta-
dium.
2. They will contribute $45 million to the sta-
dium.
3. There is a provision for profit sharing with
the Public Facilities District.
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App. 59
4. The annual rent to the Public Facilities Dis-
trict will be $700,000.
5. The Mariners are responsible for construc-
tion costs overruns on stadium construction.
6. They are responsible to pay any deficiencies
to construct the parking facilities after the bond
amount has been exhausted.
7. The Mariners have the responsibility to
operate the ball park as a first class facility.
8. The Mariners are responsible to make major
repairs and capital improvements, and
9. The Mariners must provide insurance.
Majority at 14-15.
None of these claimed benefits is even relevant to an
“adequacy” legal analysis which is primarily concerned
with (1) what the taxpayers give and (2) what they take in
return; not with the extent to which the Mariners will
prosper or what expenses they must pay before making a
profit. None of the above factors will result in any return
to the taxpayers; they basically relate to the cost of the
Mariners’ doing business, which includes the cost to
maintain a stadium provided to them at largely public
expense where they do business for nominal rent. But the
constitution requires us to protect the taxpayers. If the
Mariners incidentally benefit absent unconstitutional aid
- so much the better; if they falter, that is not a ground for
public expenditure. Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of
Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 510, 857 P.2d 283 (1993). There-
fore questions relating to the operation of the stadium are
not relevant unless the taxpayers of the county will gain
or lose therefrom. In general Professor Baade concluded
App. 60
that there was no measurable economic benefit to the
county from the Mariners under this lease. CP at 710.
1. 90 Percent of Games
Whether or not the Mariners play 90 percent of their
games in the new stadium will have no fiscal impact on
the county.
2. $45 Million Contribution
A Mariner contribution of $45 million toward the con-
struction cost might make this a more valuable asset; how-
ever, the record shows at the expiration of the 20-year lease
the facility will have no value. Affidavit of James P. Quirk
(retired professor of economics), CP at 758 (the projected life
of the stadium is 20 years; “a 20 year old major league
baseball-only stadium without a major league baseball team
tenant has essentially no market value, especially in a small
market city such as Seattle. . . . ”).
3. Profit-Sharing
There will be no profits to share. Even the trial court
agreed the record demonstrated there would be no profit.
CP at 1082. After lengthy analysis, Professor Quirk con-
cluded there would be no profits, CP at 762-65; Professor
Baade opined there would be no profits. CP at 710. The
lease details numerous deductions to be applied prior to
arriving at net income. CP at 150, Lease, Paragraph 5.2.3.
All losses since 1995 are carried forward and must be
repaid to the Mariners before there is any profit. CP at
150-01, Lease, Paragraph 5.2.
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App. 61
4. $700,000 Rent
A $700,000 per year annual rent to the PFD (1) is no
return to the taxpayers and (2) is nominal at that. CP at
709, 766, 788. The trial court found it is “very low.” CP at
1082. In answer to interrogatories, the county said it
would receive no rent whatsoever; all would go to the
Public Facilities District. CP at 687. Under terms of the
lease, the Public Facilities District must utilize the annual
rent for stadium purposes, not return it to the county. CP
at 149, Lease, Paragraph 5.1.3. According to the Declara-
tion of Professor Baade, a $700,000 annual rent is but a
nominal return on $336 million.!° Normal fair market
return on capital would be in the area of 10 percent,
which would require an annual rent of $33,600,000
(approximately one year of interest on the debt). If the
fair market value of the stadium were counted (including
the Mariners $45 million contribution and real estate
donated by the county), the 10 percent would be calcu-
lated on $414 million (CP at 759), for an annual rent of
$41,400,000. $700,000 measured against an even lower
capital value represented by only the $336,000,000 in
bonded debt is 0.2 percent, 50 times less than the fair
market rent. CP at 709. The trial court accepted this figure
as well. CP at 1100.
10 See Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 29 Wn. App.
725, 732, 631 P.2d 389 (1981) (“Consideration may be ‘nominal’
either in the absolute sense, e.g., $1 or relative to the value of the
machine. For example, consideration of $1,000 for a machine
worth $10,000 would be nominal.”).
App. 62
5. Cost Overruns
The payment of construction cost overruns does not
represent a return to the County, given the stadium will
be ubsolete at the expiration of the lease and under
exclusive private control until then. Moreover, construc-
tion cost overruns are very unlikely. See Declaration of
Professor Baerwaldt. CP at 732 (construction cost overrun
is unlikely because of $60 million contingency fund).
6. Parking Deficiencies
The Mariners will pocket all parking revenue, esti-
mated at $670,000 per year. CP at 146, 815, Lease, Para-
graph 3.7.2. Payment of the deficiencies, if any, for the
parking facility will not be a return to the taxpayers but
rather a value added to the stadium, which will be obso-
lete at the end of the lease and under private entrepre-
neurial control until then. Moreover, such an eventuality
is highly unlikely given the terms of the lease.
There will be no responsibility on the part of the
Mariners until all admission taxes are first expended on
this. CP at 146-47, Lease, Paragraph 3.7.3.
7. Operation of Ball Park
Maintenance and operation of the ball park as a “first
class facility,” once again, is not a return to the taxpayer,
but rather maintains the stadium for the benefit of its
exclusive occupant, the Mariners. Maintenance is routine
and includes sweeping up debris. CP at 140-41, Lease,
Paragraph 3.2.
App. 63
8. Major Repairs
Under the terms of the lease, the Mariners’ duty to
make major repairs and capital improvements to the ball
park will be first offset by excess construction funds held
by the PFD. CP at 159, Lease, Paragraph 7.2.3. Excess
admissions tax will be similarly used. Id. Replacement
and repairs due to ordinary wear and tear are excluded
by the lease. CP at 140, Lease, Paragraph 3.2. If repairs
become too expensive, the Mariners may break the lease
and walk away. CP at 167. There is a maximum club
obligation of $15,000,000. CP at 164, Lease, Paragraph
7.7.6.
9. Insurance
The requirement that the Mariners provide insurance
is at best an indemnification of the PFD against further
liabilities occasioned by the Mariners’ operation of the
stadium. The cost of this insurance is unknown, but will
not be a return to the taxpayers in any event. Absent a
stadium being operated exclusively for the Mariners’
benefit, such insurance would be unnecessary.
I suggest that a more appropriate analysis under the
gift provision of the constitution does not involve Mari-
ner finances, but only county finances, in the sense we
must compare county expenditures against the monetary
returns.!!
11 The drafters explicitly rejected the idea that we can
consider the intangible benefits resulting from subsidization of
private business. Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wn.2d 255, 266, 634 P.2d
377 (1981). Case law has similarly rejected such arguments. See
State ex rel. O’Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 801, 806, 399
App. 64
The County will expend $336 million in bonded debt,
transfer $45 million in naming rights to the Mariners (CP
at 666), and transfer $6 million of image licensing rights
to the Mariners as well (CP at 815). Virtually all of the
Mariners’ obligations are associated with the construc-
tion, maintenance, and operation of a stadium which the
taxpayers built exclusively for their benefit over the use-
ful life of the stadium, 20 years. Not even the annual rent
will be returned to the taxpayers; it will go to the Public
Facilities District and be recycled for stadium use. How-
ever, even if those annual $700,000 rent payments went
directly to the taxpayers, they would amount to a total of
only $14,000,000 over the course of the lease, compared to
public expenditure of $336 million. $700,000 per annum
payment is approximately one-fiftieth of the interest on
the bonded debt. ($336 million times approximately 10%
interest equals $33,600,000.) It doesn’t amortize, or even
come close. No private entrepreneur would build this
stadium under these terms and conditions — unless (1) he
is crazy and/or (2) he wants to make a gift to the Mari-
ners.
P.2d 623 (1965) (“The trial court was much impressed by the
argument pressed by the respondents and the intervenors, that
the denial of the right to engage in promotional hosting would
result in the loss of business for the port. However, such a
consideration does not justify the courts in disregarding the
plain and unambiguous provisions of the constitution. If Article
8, § 7, is too restrictive in its terms, that is a matter for the
citizens of this state to correct through the amendatory
process.”). However, in any event there will be no additional
economic value to the Mariners’ presence in the community. See
Declaration of Professor Allan Sanderson. CP at 721.
App. 65
There are other ways to look at this picture as well,
but it is obvious the facts of record construed most favor-
ably to the nonmoving party amply support the inference
that the return to the taxpayers is “grossly inadequate”
when compared to taxpayer expenditure.
Professor of Economics James Quirk testifies in the
record, for example, “over the 20 year term of the lease
agreement, the Mariners will receive an average annual
subsidy (in constant 1999 dollars) of approximately
$27,600,000 per year.” CP at 757. He details this conclu-
sion in a ten-page, single spaced, typewritten report with
numerous schedules attached. For the purpose of the
summary judgment standard, this report and all reason-
able inferences therefrom must be accepted as true, at
least insofar as other portions of the record do not pre-
sent facts and inferences even more favorable to the
Taxpayers.
There are 1,199 pages of record here. The lease is 108
pages long. This cannot be shoehorned into a summary
judgment. If this record, construed most favorably to the
Taxpayers, does not present at least one fact or inference
of (1) donative intent or (2) a grossly inadequate return, I
can’t imagine what would.
Perhaps that is just the point.
The majority and the trial court never addressed the
question because both insist upon looking for (and easily
finding) a peppercorn of consideration rather than con-
sidering whether this transaction amounts to public aid
to a private entity. Nor does either apply the standard of
App. 66
donative intent or grossly inadequate return, notwith-
standing that is the constitution’s standard and our case
law’s standard.
Conclusion
I conclude with reference to the memorandum deci-
sion of the trial court. CP at 1078-1088. The trial court
basically recognized the facts as posited by the Taxpayers
would “at least” establish that the profit-sharing provi-
sion “will in fact result in little or no financial return to
the County and Taxpayers”; annual rent of $700,000 “is
very low compared to ordinary expectations of market
rates for rental property or return on investment” and
constitutes an annual rate of return in the neighborhood
of 0.2 percent; and the oversight functions of the PFD in
managing the stadium may be very difficult to carry out.
But in so doing, the trial court found the “adequacy of
consideration” irrelevant because it was not necessary to
submit this project to a “traditional market analysis.”
That is error. Such is the only method to determine
whether the return to the taxpayers is adequate or grossly
inadequate.
The bottom line of the trial court opinion is this: “The
constitution does not exist to protect the public from the
weaknesses or failings of their public officials.” CP at
1086. It is ultimately upon that false proposition that the
trial court and the majority of this court rest their case.
But this dissent submits the constitution was ratified
precisely to protect the public purse by “protect[ing] the
public from the weaknesses or failings of their public
officials.” It was enacted to protect the public from the
ESSER | REAL IOIOOIS
App. 67
misdeeds of public officials who squander the wealth of
the hardworking citizens of this state. That is the reason
we have this constitutional article, if we can keep it.
For these reasons I dissent.
/s/ Sanders, J.
I concur
/s/ Madsen, J.
App. 68
THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON
No. 65062-4
KING COUNTY, Respondent,
2 ORDER
TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY,
‘ CHANGING
et al., Appellants, WASHINGTON OPINION
STATE MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC (Filed
FACILITIES DISTRICT, Respondent. Oct. 9, 1997)
It is hereby ordered that the opinion in the above
cause, as the same appears at 132 Wn.2d 360, be changed
as follows: the last paragraph of footnote 14 beginning
with the words “Ordinance 12000” in the ninth line from
the bottom of page 388 is deleted, and the following
paragraphs are inserted in its place:
Ordinance 12000 was enacted on October
25, 1995. This ordinance represented King
County’s policy decision to proceed with the
new stadium. Intervenors Scannell and Ruano
apparently filed with the Metropolitan King
County Council clerk’s office a petition for refer-
endum regarding Ordinance 12000 (that docu-
ment is not in the Clerk’s Papers). By letter to
Scannell and Ruano dated October 27, 1995, the
clerk ruled the ordinance was not subject to
referendum and refused to process the petition.
Clerk’s Papers at 976. As noted above, the King
County trial court stated there is no action
pending in King County challenging the clerk’s
refusal and requiring the county to refer Ordi-
nance 12000 to the people. Nor have Intervenors
Ruano and Scannell brought the existence of any
such action to the Court’s attention. Laches now
App. 69
prevents subjecting Ordinance 12000 to a refer-
endum. Lopp v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d
754, 585 P.2d 801 (1978) (suit to enjoin sale of
bonds barred by laches because unreasonable
delay in bringing suit resulted in changed con-
ditions that would damage defendant if injunc-
tion allowed.
Scannell and Ruano have had their day in
court as to the validity of Ordinance 12000. They
challenged the validity of Ordinance 12000 in a
Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint
for Declaratory Judgment, which they filed in
Thurston County on December 27, 1995. In that
suit, Ruano and Scannell alleged King County
was “without authority to pass [Ordinance
12000],” and asked the trial court for a judgment
declaring Ordinance 12000 “null and void.”
Clerk’s Papers at 898. The trial court dismissed
all their claims and this Court accepted direct
review, ultimately affirming the dismissal in
CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054
(1996).
Dated this 9th day of October, 1997
/s/ Durham, C.J.
Chief Justice
APPROVED:
/s/ Smith, J.
/s/ Dolliver, J.
/s/ Guy, J.
/s/ Johnson, J.
132 Wn.2d 360
/s/
/s/ Alexander, J.
/s/ Talmadge, J.
/s/
App. 70
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN AN FOR THE COUNTY OF KING
KING COUNTY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
THE TAXPAYERS OF
KING COUNTY,
Defendants,
WASHINGTON STATE
MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL STADIUM
PUBLIC FACILITIES
DISTRICT, et al.
Intervenors.
No. 97-2-01127-2SEA
DECISION ON KING
COUNTY’S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND
DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-
MOTION
wee” meee” See” See Nee” See” me” ee” Sie” Sree” ree” See” See ee ee”
This case comes on for hearing pursuant to the
County’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the Tax-
payers’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral Argu-
ment was heard on February 19, 1997. The Court has
considered the files and pleadings herein and specifically
the submissions of the parties listed in Appendix A
hereto.
This case involves King County Ordinance 12593
relating to the issuance of bonds for the construction of a
new baseball stadium and associated parking facility.
King County has moved for summary judgment and a
declaration that the bond issuance is lawful and constitu-
tional; the Taxpayers oppose the motion and have filed a
App. 71
cross motion for summary judgment. The court has
reviewed over 150 pages of briefing plus several hundred
pages of exhibits, affidavits, declarations, and other docu-
mentation and has heard several hours of oral argument.
It is not the role of this court to provide a detailed
opinion regarding its legal rulings, that is an appellate
court function. What is provided below is a short explica-
tion of this court’s resolution of the case.
It is axiomatic in our system of separation of powers
that the judicial branch of government does not judge the
wisdom or popularity of legislative acts. If the people’s
elected legislators enact unpopular or controversial laws,
or pursue debatable or even foolish projects, it is not for
the courts to so declare. The role of the court is merely to
determine if the legislative action is lawfully enacted and
constitutional. This court expresses no opinion on the
relative merits of the decision to construct a new baseball
Stadium or its associated financing plan. Those policy
issues are not before the court. The relatively narrow
legal issues that are presented for this court’s review are
addressed below.
I. Does the Stadium Act Contain a Tax that Violates the
Constitutional Provision Regarding Uniformity of
Taxation and Distribution of State Funds From the
Treasury?
A. Res Judicata.
The County argues that it is too late to raise this issue
because the constitutionality of the Stadium Act was
already litigated and decided by the state Supreme Court
in CLEAN v. State of Washington No. 63842-0 (December
App. 72
20, 1996), and any related constitutional challenges
should have been raised in that litigation. Res Judicata
does not apply, however, if there is no identity of parties,
and application of the doctrine is still subject to the
discretion of the court if there are significant issues of
public concern that have not been addressed by the
courts. Although the prior case was brought by “tax-
payers,” they were individual taxpayers who were not
charged with the duty to represent all the taxpayers of
the County (in contrast with the taxpayers in this suit). In
addition, the issue raised here is a constitutional one in a
case of significant public importance and should be con-
sidered by the court.
B. Is the State Tax Diversion Unconstitutional?
Taxpayers argue that Articles XI, VII and VIII of the
state Constitution are violated by diverting .017% portion
of the retail sales tax for stadium financing. Article XI,
Sec. 9 requires all counties to share proportionately in
taxes levied for state purposes; Article VII, Sec. 6 and
Article 8, Sec. 4 require state funds to be deposited into
the Treasury and paid out only by appropriation of the
legislature. Taxpayers assert that the Stadium Act of 1995
is unconstitutional because the financing plan allows
King County a credit of .017% against the retail sales tax
that would otherwise go to the state, thereby reducing the
County’s payment into the general fund compared to
other counties and resulting in the State’s contribution of
funds to the stadium project not coming from dollars
paid into the Treasury or subsequently appropriated from
the Treasury.
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App. 73
State legislation is presumed to be constitutional and
anyone challenging the constitutionality of enacted state
law as the burden to show that the law is unconstitu-
tional beyond a reasonable doubt.
1. Uniform Taxation
The Stadium Act essentially allows the County to
“keep” a portion of the state sales tax rather than remit-
ting it to the State as the State’s way of contributing to the
funding package for the baseball stadium. The Act does
not actually reduce King County’s tax but directs or
diverts a portion of the tax to remain with the County for
stadium purposes rather than being paid to the State. The
end effect is exactly the same as if the County paid the
money to the state and then the legislature sent the
money back to the County. There are two important dis-
tinctions between this scenario and a non-uniform tax.
First is that the actual rate of taxation remains the same.
The taxpayers have the same rate of taxation as in any
other county. The diversion is not for the purpose of
returning money to the taxpayers. Secondly, the diversion
is for a specific purpose authorized and directed by the
legislature. In other words, the money is being returned
to the County not for any general unspecified purpose,
but only for the specific purpose authorized by the legis-
lature. Although the Constitution requires taxes to be
uniform it does not require expenditures to be uniform.
The legislature can spend state money on local projects
without offending these provisions of the constitution.
App. 74
2. Disbursement Through the Treasury
The Constitutional issue presented is truly only a
technical issue of whether or not the money must physi-
cally go through the treasury in order to satisfy the
constitution. The purpose of the constitutional provisions
requiring payment into and disbursement out of the Trea-
sury is to prevent the expenditure of State monies with-
out legislative direction. Here that purpose has been met
through the Stadium Act which specifies both the amount
to be spent and what it is to be spent on. There is no room
left for discretion, nor could the legislature in future
years change the commitment it has made. Annual remit-
tances and appropriations would result in not one iota
more legislative direction and accountability than has
already been built into the Stadium Act. Essentially both
the deposit into and the appropriations out of the State
Treasury have been done prospectively before the taxes
have been physically paid, making unnecessary the actual
physical transfer at a later date.
It is also most likely that the funds in question are
not subject to the requirements of Article VII and VIII in
the first place. Numerous appellate decisions in this state
have established that not every dollar that comes under
state control becomes part of “state funds” for purposes
of these constitutional provisions. For example several
cases have established that these constitutional provi-
sions apply only to property taxes, not excise taxes. Prop-
erty taxes cover items of property themselves whereas
excise taxes affect only the right to use or transfer items
of property. The taxes at issue here are clearly only excise
taxes. In addition, “state funds” are those monies that are
App. 75
collected as part of general revenue before the legislature
decides how they are to be disbursed. Monies that are
collected under specific programs as special funds for
special purposes are not general state revenues. When the
legislature sets up a fund or program and earmarks cer-
tain “taxes” for that program the funds are not longer
required to go into the Treasury but may go directly to
the program as designed. Examples of appellate court
approval of such arrangements are Robison v. Dwyer 58
Wash.2d 576 (1961) regarding the Agricultural Enabling
Act and State Ex Rel Washington Toll Bridge Authority v.
Yeils 61 Wash.2d 28 (1962) and other cases cited by the
County in its brief. It should also be noted that this is not
the first time that the legislature has set up a “credit” to
specific taxpayers for purposes of funding a particular
state program or furthering state purposes. For example,
the County draws the Court's attention to credits for
certain pollution control facilities and for employer spon-
sored ride-sharing programs. The key point is that the
constitutional requirement of legislative action has
occurred. It is legislative accountability and decision
making that the Constitution is aimed at. The substantive
concerns of uniformity of taxation, and accountability of
expenditures through legislative authorization, are not in
any way violated by the Stadium Acct.
App. 76
II. Does Financing the Stadium through the proposed
bonds and public taxation Violate the Constitutional
prohibition of a Gift of Public Funds?
A. The Lease
Article VIII, Sections 5 & 7 prohibits a “gift” of public
funds to private entities. The Supreme Court has already
ruled in CLEAN that the financing package set up
through the Stadium Act does not amount to a gift of
public funds. All that remains, therefor, for this court to
review is whether or not the actions taken to implement
the financing package have, de facto, changed the nature
of the financing to something other than what was con-
templated by the legislature and approved by the
Supreme Court. It is argued by the taxpayers that the
lease between the Public Facilities District and the Base-
ball Club does just that by providing insignificant consid-
eration and essentially divesting the PFD of all
meaningful control of the ballpark.
As this is a motion for Summary Judgment the court
must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, the taxpayers. Various
points raised by the taxpayers are factually arguable,
based on the lease provisions, declarations, and other
documents. For purpose of this motion, therefore, the
court must assume that at trial the Taxpayers could estab-
lish at least the following:
1. That the Mariners might make little or no profit
in the future, making the requirement to share profits
with the PFD a statutory provision that will in fact result
in little or no financial return to the County and tax-
payers.
Oe Pee ee el ay Oe ore Pen
App. 77
2. That the annual rent of $700,000, compared to the
overall investment in and cost of the facility, is very low
compared to ordinary expectations of market rates for
rental property or return on investment. Taxpayers’
experts estimate the proposed annual rent is a rate of
return in the neighborhood of .2%.
3. That oversight functions of the PFD in managing
the Stadium may be very difficult to carry out due to the
amount of discretion delegated to the Club, the ambiguity
of the standards to be applied and the cumbersome and
potentially expensive mechanisms for resolving disputes.
Taxpayers assert that they should be given the oppor-
tunity to prove these points at trial and that suminary
judgment is inappropriate. The County, however, asserts
that even if true, these facts would not change the out-
come, and that summary judgment should be granted.
B. Adequacy of Consideration.
The Supreme Court has already determined that the
County will receive consideration for the financing of the
stadium primarily through (1) the intangible benefit pro-
vided to the people of having major league baseball in
Seattle and (2) the associated economic benefits to the
community and the state. These issues may not be reliti-
gated. The court is dicta said that “if” rent for the sta-
dium were “nominal” it “might” change the equation.
While the existence of consideration is a pre-requisite to
the valid use of public funds, the adequacy of the consid-
eration is not to be scrutinized in the same way that one
would a normal market transaction. The court considers
App. 78
the evidence of a gift of public property or funds and
only looks at whether or not there is grossly inadequate
return for public expenditures. The Taxpayers assert that
the rent set out in the lease is nominal and grossly inade-
quate. There are several reasons however why they can-
not prevail on this point.
First, the word “nominal” itself actually means “in
name only.” A familiar example of a nominal charge
would be a $1 payment for the “sale” of property among
family members. The primary meaning of “nominal” is
essentially “having no value”. Under its classical defini-
tion, $700,000 is not nominal. That sum does have value.
It can purchase things of value, pay for salaries of certain
employees, and it may even be enough to fund the bud-
get of a small county department.
Second, even if one assumes that “nominal” has a
broader meaning, determining whether rent is nominal or
not must be considered “in context” and the context is
not the private market place. Public projects frequently
don’t yield themselves to traditional market analysis.
Public parks are one example. That the market is not the
standard in this case was implicitly recognized in the
Stadium Act which did not require that the Club be
charged market rate rents, and in fact did not specify rent
at all. Clearly the legislature did not intend that rent be
utilized as a source of repaying the public’s principle and
interest investments in the stadium even though a finan-
cier in the private sector might have such an expectation.
Rather the legislature contemplated that the County will
recoup its expenditures for the stadium from various tax
revenues, not from rent or other earnings of the Stadium.
App. 79
Therefor
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