Prologue — Taxpayers of King County v. King County

Supreme Court brief1998

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Text

TION

RIT OF

ORARI

——a

(‘) OF 812 nov 141997

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

+

TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY,

Petitioners,

KING COUNTY; WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR

LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC FACILITIES

DISTRICT; THE BASEBALL CLUB OF SEATTLE, LP;

THE STATE OF WASHINGTON; JOHN SCANNELL,

VINCE KOSKELA, AND FRANK RUANO; WILLIAM

C. SEVERSON; CARL B. NELSO?’

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Washington

*

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

+

JoHN D. BLANKINsSHIP*

MontTGOMERY, PurRDuUE, BLANKINSHIP

& Austin, P.L.L.C.

701 Fifth Avenue, 58th Floor

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 682-7090

Kris J. SUNDBERG

PO Box 1577

Mercer Island, WA 98040

(206) 230-0212

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Washington Supreme Court denied Peti-

tioners their right to a fair and impartial hearing

under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution by ret-

roactively creating and applying only to Petitioners

and this case new substantive rules and procedures,

including the denial of a right to discovery and a

reversal of established rules for the Court’s handling

of motions for summary judgment?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CRT ESR IEG. F MIIIEE EAD: 6 os 0a 0 bev gs 3S Ca saber deaeawe i

TARE GH AFI oo ho dos wesc eh tate ees iv

CORI SAFO os ta Ri nook ows ees eee ee ks 1

FU GI 6. hand diac eenaneee eae danas 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED....... 1

PEPE OE 68660 650505 ede dA eee 2

ee a eB eee re me pie ee 2

OU OE eT eT ene 4

C. How the Federal Question Was Presented to

oe Bt Re a oy ne Ene AC ee,

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION....... 10

A. The Washington Supreme Court Created New

Rules Applicable Only to This Case ......... 12

B. The Acts of the Washington Courts Show

Favoritism and Prejudgment for the County,

SRE NT © i 16

C. This Case Has Nationwide Importance....... 18

APPENDIX A - Washington Supreme Court

Majority and Dissenting Opin-

SOU 6 wig vs coe sa cer keane es seees App. 1

APPENDIX B —- Order Changing Opinion ..... App. 68

APPENDIX C - Judge Learned’s Decision, King

County’s Motion for Summary

FURIORE, 6 os iiswae severe incase App. 70

ao Ae atin ee ree ae,

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

APPENDIX D - Taxpayers’ Motion for Recon-

sideration .......--++-+eeeeeee App. 87

APPENDIX E - Taxpayers’ Statement of Addi-

tional Authorities..........--- App. 114

APPENDIX F - Washington Supreme Court

Order Denying Motions for

Reconsideration ....-.---+++:> App. 118

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Adams v. UW, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722 P.2d 24 (1986)..... 6

Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964)............... 14

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

GIS EE 40 en is he Fea Kas era eR CAR ees 14, 15

CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 F.2d 1054

PE Reh kava ¥ RAs Ada Eek eee a, 4 7

In re Estate of Pearl Fitzhugh Little, 106 Wn.2d 269,

Fae: Pee Wet LAO): on eh bo vb ook ene oe Ree eek 12

international Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310

Su. : BRR Rey Chem rr arin ne rane rey pe 16

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com. v. McGrath, 341 US.

DEE ASAIN crab on COS HAAR wOAR NERC ape eae hae ees 11

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980).......... 16

Nationwide Mutual v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 840

PG TR CEP. 55 55a ie Oe hs ERK ee bie ss 12

Sova v. First National Bank of Ferndale, 18 Wn.2d 88,

SOG Fae: TR CA os 6 ok Ee how ena tae sss 13

Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d 679, 743 P.2d 793

bog ERR Ren Oot abe ee Mime ces OT np yr See eae 6

CONSTITUTION

EES Cae: OE ee ies as 6k cn hen a weeaeshe t, 36

Wash, Gone, O00 Wa eo ooo ccd ee eka > devious 6, 12

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

STATUTES, RULES, ORDINANCES

9S US.C. § 1257 la) 0.0 c ese c sec ereseecnreecencees 1

Ch. 1, Laws of 1995, 3d Spec. Sess. (EHB 2115) ...... 3

Wash. Civ. R. 26(c) .......cccceewee cc ccerecncceerers 16

Wash. Civ. R. 56(a) ...... ccc ee sees ce ccccerccerereces 16

King County, Wash. Ordinance 12000 (October 25,

BO ey ip 655 ln pa ca Oe SAINTE N TERETE IS TA 13

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.25.....--seeeerereeneeeeceresees 2

MISCELLANEOUS

Quirk, Paydirt: The Business of Professional Team

Sports (Princeton University Press, 1992) .........>- 7

Rosentraub, Major League Losers, The Cost of Sports

and Who Pays For It (Basic Books, 1997)........ 11, 18

el ee ee

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

The Taxpayers of King County respectfully petition

for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and opin-

ion of the Supreme Court of Washington in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinions of the Supreme Court of Washington,

both majority and dissenting, are reported at 132 Wn.2d

360, 938 P.2d 309 (1997). The unreported memorandum

decision of the superior court is included in the appen-

dices.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Washington filed its opinions

on June 13, 1997 and entered an order denying Peti-

tioner’s motion for reconsideration on October 9, 1997.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution provides:

No state shall make or enforce any law which

shall abridge the privileges or immunities of

citizens of the United States; nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any

person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-

tion of the laws.

STATEMENT

King County (the “County”) filed this suit on January

13, 1997 seeking a judgment declaring valid its proposed

bond issue to provide the Washington State Major League

Baseball Stadium Public Facilities District (“District”)

$336 million to construct a new baseball stadium for the

exclusive use of the owners of the Seattle Mariners Base-

ball Club (“Club”) with amenities to increase the Club’s

profit opportunities. Pursuant to the declaratory judg-

ment statute, Wash. Rev. Code § 7.25, the court appointed

Mark Baerwaldt and Nicholas J. Licata as Taxpayer Rep-

resentatives of all taxpayers in King County to present all

issues to the court “fully and fairly.” The Supreme Court

of Washington, by a vote of 7 to 2, affirmed summary

judgment in favor of the County on all points.

A. History of the Case.

In 1995, the owners of the Seattle Mariners Profes-

sional Baseball Club demanded that the County enhance

their profit-making opportunities by providing them a

subsidy in the form of a new publicly funded baseball

stadium for the Club’s exclusive use and to its specifica-

tions. The Washington Legislature responded by authori-

zing the County to submit to the voters a proposal for a

local sales tax, the proceeds of which would fund con-

struction of a new baseball stadium for the Club.

In September 1995, the County submitted the pro-

posal to the voters, who rejected it. The owners of the

Club then announced that the team would be sold unless

by October 30, 1995 “a final acceptable solution” was in

place which would assure the Club that it would be

“financially successful.” The “solution” had to include

construction of a new ball park at public expense with

amenities to Club specifications, including a retractable

roof and natural turf.

Reacting to the Club’s letter, the state legislature

convened in special session; and, on October 14, 1995,

enacted Ch. 1, Laws of 1995, 3d Spec. Sess. (EHB 2115)

(the “State Act” or “Act”}, authorizing the County, with-

out voter approval, to impose taxes to fund a county

bond issue for a new stadium and to create the District to

handle its construction. The legislation included an emer-

gency clause which the State Supreme Court held to be a

bar to a citizen-initiated referendum on the Act. CLEAN v.

State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).

On October 25, 1995, King County adopted Ordi-

nance 12000 which imposed taxes as authorized by the

State Act to provide public funds for a new baseball

stadium offering the Club owners “revenue-generating

capabilities not presently available at the Kingdome.”

(The “Kingdome” is the stadium in which the Club cur-

rently plays.) The ordinance also created the District with

a seven-person board.

On December 12, 1996, four of the thirteen members

of the County Council urged the District board to reex-

amine the construction schedule for the proposed ball

park because of jeopardy to the County’s current expense

fund by premature issuance of bonds. Reacting to that

letter, the Club owners two days later announced in a

televised news conference that the team was for sale. On

behalf of the Club owners, United States Senator Slade

Gorton told County officials on December 20, 1996, that

the Club owners would withdraw their proposal to sell

the team if by January 6, 1997 the County authorized $336

million in bonds for construction of a new stadium and

adjacent parking garage for the Club. The County Execu-

tive and eight of the Council members announced on the

spot their agreement to the Club’s demands.

On December 20, 1996, the Supreme Court of Wash-

ington affirmed a lower court decision dismissing

CLEAN’s facial challenge to the State Act, but reserving

all issues for a later as-applied challenge relating to acts

of the County or District under the Act.

On December 23, 1996, the District approved a lease

with the Club under which the District would construct a

stadium and adjacent parking garage to Club specifica-

tions with money supplied by a County bond issue. The

Club would have exclusive control and management for

20 years, taking all revenues generated at the stadium

and parking garage. The County would receive nothing

on its $336 million contribution. The Club would pay the

District rent of $700,000 per year (equal to 0.2% per year

return on the $336 million public outlay).

On January 6, 1997, the County Council authorized

issuance of $336 million of County bonds for construction

of a new baseball stadium and adjacent parking garage

for the Club.

B. Proceedings Below.

On January 13, 1997, the County filed this declara-

tory judgment suit. The court designated Mark Baerwaldt

and Nicholas J. Licata as the Taxpayer Representatives

ee eee

DO a , FORE PE oP wre

ea eats Maths Carel RAR. 8S bey les

under the statute with the understanding that they would

“pursue this matter with due diligence and in a manner

which assures that all issues are fairly and fully pre-

sented.” Four days later, the County moved for an order

to schedule a February 7 hearing on its motion for sum-

mary judgment, which it proposed to file on January 23.

The County explained to the court that the proposed

accelerated schedule was needed to “complete construc-

tion of the stadium by March 1999 for the opening of the

baseball season.” The Taxpayer Petitioners objected that

profit enhancement for the Club did not justify putting

the case on a fast track and that the proposed accelerated

schedule gave them inadequate time to prepare their

response, which would “require the assistance of experts

in finance, construction costs, economics of the baseball

industry and related matters, and the time and ability to

perform discovery to elicit the facts.” On January 23,

1997, 10 days after the County filed its suit, the court set a

hearing for February 19, 1997 on the County’s motion for

summary judgment (to be filed the next day). The Peti-

tioners immediately issued notices, subpoenae, and inter-

rogatories for discovery relating to all aspects of the

dealings among the County, District, and Club. The

County, District, and Club immediately moved to block

all discovery by Petitioners. The court quickly complied

with an order which “stayed” all discovery except for a

requirement that the County answer some preliminary

written interrogatories of Petitioners.

A critical issue in the case is whether County transfer

of the bond proceeds to the District would be “in aid of”

the Club, in violation of the following state constitutional

prohibition:

No county, city, town or other municipal corpo-

ration shall hereafter give any money, or prop-

erty, or loan its money, or credit to or in aid of

any individual, association, company or corpo-

ration, except for the necessary support of the

poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly

the owner of any stock in or bonds of any asso-

ciation, company or corporation.

Wash. Const., art. VIII, § 7. The Washington State

Supreme Court previously formulated the following rule

to test compliance with that constitutional prohibition:

Unless there is proof of donative intent or a

grossly inadequate return, courts do not inquire

into the adequacy of consideration. . . . Absent a

showing of donative intent or gross inadequacy,

trial courts should only apply a legal sufficiency

test, under which a bargained-for act or fore-

bearance is considered sufficient consideration.

Adams v. UW, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722 P.2d 24 (1986) (italics

original); see Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d 679, 743 P.2d

793 (1987). In its decision in the CLEAN case involving a

facial challenge to the State Act, the Court commented

that

any tenant, including the Mariners, will be

required to pay reasonable rent to the District

for the privilege of conducting its activities in

the stadium.

The Court further commented that

if .. . the District should enter into an agreement

with the Mariners that would permit the ball

club to play its games in the stadium for only

nominal rent, then the constitutional prohibi-

tions against making a gift of state funds might

be implicated. Such a circumstance is not now

apparent and we will not speculate about the

future. In the unlikely event that this prediction

should come true, the issue can then be raised in

an appropriate manner.

CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 800, 928 P.2d at 1062 (1997).

Under the then-established substantive rules adopted

by the Washington Supreme Court, the Taxpayer Peti-

tioners directed their presentation in opposition to the

County’s motion for summary judgment to the issues of

“donative intent” and “grossly inadequate return.” They

submitted the declaration of a Seattle real estate appraiser

and the declarations of three nationally recognized

experts on the economics of professional sports and

sports stadiums, who characterized the “return” to the

County as zero (which the County admitted) and the rent

to be paid by the Club to the District as unreasonably low

(0.2% per year on a $336 million public investment) and

“only nominal.” The economists explained that the notion

that a community derives favorable economic ripple

effects from a new stadium is a myth. James Quirk,

retired Cal Tech economics professor and coauthor of

Paydirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports, Princeton

University Press (1992), testified by sworn declaration

that the public subsidy for the Mariners’ owners would

total over $27 million per year for 20 years. Those decla-

rations were never controverted by the County or the

District.

Under rules previously established by the Washing-

ton Supreme Court for the handling of motions for sum-

mary judgment, Petitioners argued that they were

entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts and a

summary judgment could not be granted to the County

or District because reasonable minds could reach differ-

ent conclusions as to whether there was “donative intent”

by the County or “grossly inadequate return” to it or

whether there was “reasonable rent” or “only nominal

rent” to the District. Under the then-existing rules, all of

the items were issues of material fact.

On February 24, 1997, the lower state court issued a

written opinion and two days later entered a declaratory

order in favor of the County. Later that same day, the

County and the District served and filed in the State

Supreme Court a joint motion to accelerate the 30-day

deadline for Taxpayers to file a notice of appeal. In their

motion, the County and District said they

request that the Court grant the following con-

densed briefing schedule so that the Court may

issue a decision, with opinion to follow, not later

than March 28, 1997:

* Notice of Appeal filed March 4, 1997

* Record filed March 7, 1997

* Brief of Appellant Taxpayers filed March

10, 1997

* Brief of Respondents filed March 17,

1997

* Reply brief filed March 21, 1997

* Oral argument scheduled for the week of

March 24, 1997

They said the Court should grant that extraordinary

motion so that the Club could play ball in the new sta-

dium by the opening of the 1999 major league baseball

season. Although the Court denied that request, when

a ia a eels

Petitioners filed their notice of appeal on March 26, 1997,

the State Supreme Court the next day issued an order

requiring Petitioners’ brief to be served and filed by April

18, 1997, with oral argument set for May 13, 1997.

On June 13, 1997, opinions were filed by a seven-

judge majority and a two-judge dissent. Petitioners

timely filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the

Court had denied them a fair and impartial hearing

under the Due Process Clause of the United States Consti-

tution by favoring the Club, County, and District with

shortcuts and special procedures, and by retroactively

creating and applying only to this case new substantive

and procedural rules not applicable to any other litigant

in the state. The Court denied the Petitioner’s motion for

reconsideration on October 9, 1997.

C. How the Federal Question Was Presented to the

State Court.

In both the superior court and the Washington

Supreme Court, the Petitioners objected that the courts’

rush to judgment, their denial of Taxpayers’ right to

conduct discovery, and the courts’ retroactive creation of

new substantive and procedural rules applicable only to

this case, denied Petitioners a fair and impartial hearing

in violation of the Due Process Clause of the United

States Constitution. After the Supreme Court opinions

were issued, the Petitioners emphasized the fact that the

Supreme Court decision denied them their right to a fair

and impartial hearing under the Due Process Clause of

10

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-

tion. In support of that argument, they cited to the Wash-

ington Supreme Court the decisions of the Supreme

Court of the United States now cited in this petition. A

copy of the Taxpayers’ Motion for Reconsideration and

their statement to the Washington Supreme Court of

Additional Authorities are set forth in the appendices.

+

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Washington courts denied Petitioners their right

to a fair and impartial hearing under the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution.

At the inception of this case, the superior court judge

hinted that she had prejudged the case in favor of the

Club, County, and District when she put the case on an

extraordinarily fast track to accommodate the Club’s con-

struction schedule. There has never been even a sugges-

tion that a new baseball stadium is necessary to protect

public health and safety - only that it is needed to

enhance the profit opportunities of the Club owners. That

initial hint of prejudgment for the Club became a strong

signal of favoritism for it when the judge prevented Peti-

tioners from using the court’s discovery rules in prepar-

ing their response to the County’s motion for summary

judgment. The superior court judge and seven of the nine

Supreme Court judges confirmed the earlier hint and

signal of prejudgment and favoritism for the Club owners

when they retroactively changed existing substantive and

procedural rules assuring a win for the Club.

A Ate R aba ie ce De Rowe

11

Because of its power to say who will play and where,

major league professional baseball is an unregulated

monopoly. Rosentraub, Major League Losers, The Cost of

Sports and Who Pays For It (Basic Books, 1997). Nation-

wide, it asserts its monopoly power to extract conces-

sions, special favors, and subsidies from local officials

fearful of “losing the team for our town.” Id. at pp. 8-17.

A judiciary truly independent of such pressures and fears

is constitutionally the ultimate guardian against private

extraction of public subsidies, concessions, and special

favors prohibited by law. As Justice Frankfurter said:

“(T]hose who founded this nation put their trust in a

judiciary truly independent — in judges not subject to the

fears or allurements of a limited tenure and by the very

nature of their function detached from passing and parti-

san influences.” Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Com. v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123 (1951). The decision of the Washington court

stands as an example that elected judges of the highest

court of a state, sworn to uphold the federal and state

constitutions, also yield to pressure and bend and break

established rules to accommodate the demands of the

professional baseball monopoly. Regrettably, it is an

insidious form of official corruption which only the

Supreme Court of the United States can stop. When the

highest court of a state willfully forsakes its sworn duty

to uphold the federal constitution, it is time for the

Supreme Court of the United States to step in and require

compliance with the constitution.

12

A. The Washington Supreme Court Created New

Rules Applicable Only to This Case.

The longstanding rule in Washington when the case

was presented to the Court was as follows:

On review of summary judgment, an appel-

late court engages in the same inquiry as the

trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate “if

the pleadings, depositions, . . . together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine

issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

law.” A material fact is one upon which the

outcome of the litigation depen’. The court

must consider the facts submitted and all rea-

sonable inferences from those facts in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party and the

motion should be granted only if, from all the

evidence, reasonable persons could reach but

one conclusion.

Nationwide Mutual v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 186, 840 P.2d

851 (1992).

Under the rule previously stated by the Court for

complying with Wash. Const. art. VIII, § 7, the outcome of

this case depended upon whether or not there was an

intent on the part of the County to make a gift of the

proceeds of its bond issue to the District in aid of the

Mariners or whether the County would receive a “grossly

inadequate return” on its $336 million investment. Major-

ity opinion, p. 12.

“Donative intent is a factual issue to be resolved by

the trier-of-fact.” In re Estate of Pearl Fitzhugh Little, 106

Wn.2d 269, 721 P.2d 950 (1986). Similarly, the question of

Aan RES ik ak ari ema

13

gross inadequacy is one for the jury, not the court, based

on all the evidence. Sova v. First National Bank of Ferndale,

18 Wn.2d 88, 138 P.2d 181 (1943). Even though the

“intent” and “return” issues presented factual (and not

legal) questions, the trial court denied Taxpayers their

right to conduct discovery on those issues. Despite this

unprecedented ruling, Petitioners, as the nonmoving

party, presented uncontroverted expert testimony which,

at a minimum, raised issues of fact.

Significantly, the majority of the Washington

Supreme Court did not discuss the factual record in arriv-

ing at the conclusion that “there is no donative intent

here.” Nor did it discuss the issue of “grossly inadequate

return,” holding that the state constitutional prohibition

is satisfied if the donee (the District) of the gift of public

funds from the donor (the County) receives “legally suffi-

cient consideration,” which the dissent pointed out can

be a promise of future delivery of a single peppercorn

Dissent, App. 45. Although the majority did not discuss

the factual record, the dissent did, summarizing the

record on “donative intent” and “grossly inadequate

return.” Dissent, App. 50-66. The dissenting judges con-

cluded: “Were the taxpayers not to receive a summary

judgment on this record in their favor, they have surely

raised at least a question of fact which only the trier of

fact can resolve on remand for trial.” Dissent, App. 39.

As indicated above, the majority did not seriously

review the record because it retroactively created a new

substantive rule for this case that an unconstitutional gift

of public funds does not occur if the donee (the District)

receives “legally sufficient consideration” from the ulti-

mate beneficiary of the gift (the Club) even though that

14

“consideration” is only a peppercorn and there is no

“return” to the original public donor. The Court thus

silently overruled the substantive requirement set forth in

its earlier cases that return to the public donor be

“grossly adequate.” That new rule was applied retroac-

tively to this case, assuring a win for the Mariners Ball-

club.

Likewise, the Court retroactively changed for the

case the long-established procedure for the Court’s han-

dling of summary judgment motions. Although the Court

agreed that the County as the moving party bore the

burden of proof on all issues, the majority judges refused

to consider the evidence presented and themselves drew

from thin air their own inferences that there was no

“donative intent” or “grossly inadequate return.” In

doing so the Court silently overruled its own long-estab-

lished rule that on summary judgment it must leave

reasonable fact inferences to the trier-of-facts. The Court's

creation and use of a new procedural rule for this case

(and apparently for this case only) is a per se deprivation

of due process. In Bouie v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353

(1964), the court said:

When a state court overrules a consistent line of

procedural decisions with the retroactive effect

of denying a litigant a hearing in a pending

case, it thereby deprives him of due process of

law “in its primary sense of an opportunity to

be heard and to defend [his] substantive right.”

Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S.

673, 678, 74 L.Ed. 1107, 1112, 50 S. Ct. 451.

nasties seas i K

Beis dedder RBIS Eat ean A 2 Bie BY

15

The Brinkerhoff-Faris decision cited by the court was a

civil case involving procedures for enjoining collection of

a discriminatory state tax. Six years before the Taxpayers’

suit, the Missouri Supreme Court hele that it was “pre-

posterous” and “unthinkable” that the state tax commis-

sion had power to give relief from a discriminatory tax.

In the face of that decision, Brinkerhoff-Faris sought a

court injunction against collection of the tax without sub-

mitting the matter to the state tax commission. The Mis-

souri Supreme Court overruled its prior decision, but

nevertheless held that Brinkerhoff-Faris could not have

equitable relief because it had an adequate legal remedy

available through what Justice Brandeis characterized as

“the newly found powers of the commission.” 74 L. Ed. at

812. Justice Brandeis said:

Undoubtedly, the state court had the power to

construe the statute dealing with the state tax

commission; and to re-examine and overrule the

Laclede Land & Improv. Co. Case. Neither of

these matters raises a federal question; neither is

subject to our review. But, while it is for the

state courts to determine the adjective as well as

the substantive law of the state, they must, in so

doing, accord the parties due process of law.

Whether acting through its judiciary or through

its legislature, a state may not deprive a person

of all existing remedies for the enforcement of a

right, which the state has no power to destroy,

unless there is, or was, afforded to him some

real opportunity to protect it. Compare Postal

Teleg. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 475,

476, 62 L. Ed. 1215, 1220, 1221, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep.

566.

16

B. The Acts of the Washington Courts Show

Favoritism and Prejudgment for the County,

District, and Club.

The Due Process Clause of the United States constitu-

tion entitles a person to an impartial tribunal. Marshall v.

Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238 (1980). Fairness and justice are

the essence of due process. International Shoe Co. v. Wash-

ington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

By their actions, the Washington courts have demon-

strated not only partiality for the Club, County, and Dis-

trict, but actual prejudgment in their favor. From this

case’s inception, they gave special procedural favors to

the Club and its surrogates (the County and the District),

at the same time denying the Taxpayers their rights under

the rules to have adequate time for preparation, to

engage in discovery, and have a trial on the merits. The

court rules permit filing of a motion for summary judg-

ment only after expiration of the 20-day summons and an

additional 28 days’ notice of hearing such motion. Wash.

Civ. R. 56(a) and Wash. Civ. R. 26(c). In the Superior

Court, this case went from filing of the suit through

denial of the Taxpayers’ motion for reconsideration in 59

days, during which the Superior Court denied Petitioners

their right to conduct discovery, which Petitioners had

then diligently initiated by deposition notices, requests

for production of-documents, and subpoenae duces

tecum, all of which were intended to elicit details regard-

ing County and District intent; and the precise “return”

which the County and/or District would or would not

receive. Rushing the Taxpayers’ preparation of the case,

while denying them the discovery tools to which they

were entitled under the rules, signaled prejudgment that

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17

the Club demands must be met and quickly; and that a

trial of the fact issues must be avoided because that might

entail delays unacceptable to the Club. In order to speed

the process to accommodate the Club’s deadlines, the

Superior Court Judge herself drew all inferences about

the key issues of “donative intent” and “grossly inade-

quate return” in favor of the County, District, and Club

and against the Taxpayers, contrary to the established

rules for the handling of summary judgment motions.

Although the Washington Supreme Court has a duty

to require fairness and compliance with established rules,

its majority capped the judicial deprivation of Taxpayers’

rights of due process by not only creating and applying to

the case a new substantive rule, but also by replacing the

established rule for handling motions for summary judg-

ment with a new one under which the court may select

and judge the evidence, and draw its own inferences

against the nonmoving party even though reasonable

persons can draw opposite inferences. The Washington

Supreme Court favored the County, District, and Club

with a favorable decision with a speed rarely, if ever,

available to another litigant in the state. The Court turned

out a favorable decision for the County, District, and Club

just 31 days after oral arguments. From the filing of the

County’s suit to Supreme Court decision took exactly 5

months, which may be a record, in view of the fact that

there was no emergency involving public health or safety.

The only emergency involved money for the Club’s

owners. The urgency was to provide the Club owners

more profit opportunities - and do it quickly. The

Supreme Court decision was filed on the very day the

District specified as a deadline for a favorable ruling by

18

the Court to avoid a construction shutdown. The deadline

was announced in all the media, press, TV and radio on

the day preceding filing of the Court’s decision. To con-

sider this coincidence strains one’s credulity.

C. This Case Has Nationwide Importance.

Major league professional baseball is an unregulated

monopoly by virtue of its franchise system under which

the league decides who may play and where. Its members

are now using that monopoly power throughout the

country to extract subsidies and concessions from local

politicians who fear being accused of “losing the team for

our town.” Rosentraub, Major League Losers, pp. 8-17.

When the highest court in a state approves special rules

and favored treatment for owners of a professional sports

team while denying citizens and taxpayers an impartial

and fair hearing on the propriety of public subsidies for

them, it sends a message to the rest of the country that

federal constitutional requirements need not be seriously

considered in dealing with public subsidies for profes-

sional sports teams. The decision of the Washington

Supreme Court will stand as a precedent nationwide

encouraging disregard of constitutional due process and

equal protection in dealings between local officials and

the owners of professional sports teams. It tells citizens

and Taxpayers that they have no protector under the

federal constitution because the state courts themselves

are overwhelmed or corrupted by the monopoly power of

professional sports. Left standing, the decision will feed

public cynicism and disillusionment about the courts and

the judicial system itself. It is time for the Supreme Court

19

of the United States to step in and make sure that does

not happen.

DATED this 13 day of November, 1997.

Respectfully submitted,

JoHN D. BLANKINSHIP*

MONTGOMERY, PURDUE, BLANKINSHIP

& Austin, P.L.L.C.

701 Fifth Avenue, 58th Floor

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 682-7090

Kris J. SUNDBERG

PO Box 1577

Mercer Island, WA 98040

(206) 230-0212

Counsel for Petitioners

*Counsel of Record

App. 1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF WASHINGTON

KING COUNTY,

Respondent,

No. 65062-4

V.

TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY, ) EN BANC

Appellants,

and

WASHINGTON STATE MAJOR

LEAGUE BASEBALL STADIUM

PUBLIC FACILITIES DISTRICT,

Intervenor/Respondent,

and

JOHN SCANNELL,

VINCE KOSKELA and

FRANK RUANO, et al.,

Intervenors/ Appellants. Filed Jun 13, 1997

ee ee ea ee ee eee ee ee ee”

TALMADGE, J - This is the third of a series of

challenges to state legislation and local implementing

ordinances for financing and constructing a new baseball

stadium in King County. We are asked in this action to

determine if King County’s issuance of $336 million in

bonds to finance stadium construction is “valid” under

RCW 7.25. To determine validity, we must decide if the

lease between the Mariners and the public facilities dis-

trict is an unconstitutional gift of public monies to a

App. 2

private organization; if the taxes authorized by the Legis-

lature to pay for the stadium financing bonds are consti-

tutionally imposed and properly collected; if the state

unconstitutionally delegated legislative authority to the

public facilities district; and if a proposed local initiative

establishing more stringent debt limitations for King

County than authorized by statute is applicable to the

baseball stadium project.

We hold the bonds issued by King County to finance

stadium construction are valid because the use of public

funds for a new baseball stadium here is not an uncon-

stitutional gift of public monies to a private organization.

Moreover, the taxes imposed to pay for the bonds are

constitutionally imposed and properly collected. The

state properly delegated authority to the public facilities

district. The proposed local initiative is invalid insofar as

it attempts to impose additional limitations on local debt

not authorized by statute. We therefore affirm the trial

court’s declaratory judgment validating the $336 million

in stadium construction bonds issued by King County.

ISSUES

1. What is the test for establishing the validity of

bonds in a declaratory judgment action under RCW 7.25?

2. Did the lease entered into by the parties here

constitute an unconstitutional gift of public funds to a

private organization?

3. Were the taxes authorized by the Legislature to

pay for the stadium financing bonds constitutionally

imposed and handled?

Lae ee

App. 3

4. Did the Legislature unconstitutionally delegate

legislative authority to the District?

5. Can King County establish by ordinance limita-

tions on debt beyond requirements set forth in statute?

FACTS

The Baseball Club of Seattle, L.P. (Mariners), is a

Washington limited partnership formed in early 1992 for

the express purpose of acquiring the Seattle Mariners

Baseball Club to keep it in Seattle. Soon after acquiring

the team, the Mariners began meeting with King County

officials to modify the Kingdome lease and develop long-

term capital plans. In 1994, a King County task force

developed a plan for a new home for the Mariners, to be

completed by 1999.

The 1995 Legislature considered legislation authoriz-

ing the financing of the new Mariners baseball stadium,

ultimately enacting a baseball financing program at a

special session on October 14, 1995. Laws of 1995, 3rd Sp.

Sess., ch. 1 (Stadium Act). The key provision of the Sta-

dium Act permits the “legislative authority” of a county

with a population of one million or more to impose a

sales and use tax in addition to other taxes under RCW

82.14, not to exceed .017 percent of the selling price in the

case of a sales tax, or value of the article used in the case

of a use tax. RCW 82.14.0485(a).’

1 The Court rejected numerous constitutional challenges to

the Stadium Act in CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054

(1996).

App. 4

Thereafter, Metropolitan King County Council

(Council) on October 25, 1995 enacted Ordinance 12000,

creating the Washington State Major League Baseball Sta-

dium Public Facilities District (District), and imposing

three special sales and use taxes the Stadium Act autho-

rized, including a .017 percent special stadium sales and

use tax, a special stadium sales and use tax on restau-

rants, bars, and taverns, and a special stadium sales and

use tax on car rentals. The special stadium sales and use

tax is a credit against the statewide sales and use tax as

both RCW 84.14.0485(2) and section 3 of Ordinance 12000

acknowledge.? Under the Stadium Act, the revenues from

these taxes may be used only to finance the stadium.

RCW 84.14.0485(3). The purpose of the District is to con-

struct and operate the new stadium.?

Pursuant to the comprehensive financing mechanism

established by the Stadium Act and Ordinance 12000, the

District by letter dated January 2, 1997, requested King

County to issue bonds in the amount of $336 million, the

amount necessary to finance construction of the baseball

stadium. The Council passed Ordinance 12593 on January

2 RCW 82.14.0485(2) states specifically that the special

stadium sales and use tax of .017 percent “shall be deducted”

from the amount of the statewide sales and use tax. Section 3(B)

of Ordinance 12000 also states:

The tax imposed under this section shall be

deducted from the amount of tax otherwise required

to be collected or paid over to the department of

revenue under chapter 82.08 or 82.12 RCW.

Clerk’s Papers at 28.

3 The Court rejected challenges to Ordinance 12000 in

Citizens for More Important Things v. King County, 131 Wn.2d 411,

932 P.2d 135 (1997).

App. 5

6, 1997, authorizing the issuance of limited tax general

obligation bonds in the requested amount.

Subsequently, on April 2, 1997, the Council passed

Ordinance 12686, providing for the issuance and sale of

the bonds. The County has already sold the bonds, but

the bond sale proceeds are being held in escrow for

release or refund, awaiting our decision in this action.

In addition to court challenges to the stadium, base-

ball stadium opponents have employed other methods to

invalidate the stadium funding and construction bonds.

On December 4, 1996, opponents filed a proposed initia-

tive petition with the clerk of the Council. The clerk

certified the petition as Initiative 16 on December 31,

1996. Section 1 of the initiative provides:

On or after January 1, 1997, King County shall

not issue bonds or otherwise incur debt in an

amount in excess of $50,000,000 for construction,

remodeling, maintenance, OF operation of any

building or other facility without first obtaining

approval of a majority of voters voting in an

election at which the number of voters voting in

said election equals at least one-half of the

number of voters who are registered to vote at

that election; nor shall King County impose or

levy any tax to pay any such bond or indebted-

ness without such voter approval.

Clerk’s Papers at 321. Initiative 16 purports retroactively

to invalidate Ordinances 12593 and 12686, which, respec-

tively, authorized and issued bonds in an amount in

excess of $50 million.*

4 The King County charter requires the Council to consider the

proposed initiative. If the Council does not enact the ordinance

App. 6

Intervenors in this case also filed a referendum peti-

tion with the Council clerk on January 7, 1997, proposing

that Ordinance 12593 (authorizing issuance of the bonds)

be put to a public vote. The Council clerk, based on

advice from the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s

office that Ordinance 12593 was not subject to referen-

dum, did not process the referendum petition.

On January 21, 1997, the County filed a complaint

seeking a declaratory judgment under RCW 7.25.020 val-

idating the bonds. Specifically, the County sought a dec-

laration:

a. confirming the right and authority of King

County to issue and sell bonds described in

King County Ordinance No. 12593 (the

“Bond Ordinance”) . . . adopted pursuant to

the provisions of the [Stadium] Act and

Ordinance No. 12000, and that such issuance

comports with the requirements of the state

constitution, state statutes and is within the

County’s authority;

b. determining that Initiative 16 is inapplicable

to the issuance of the Bonds as authorized

by the Bond Ordinance;

c. determining that the Bond Ordinance was law-

fully enacted and not subject to referendum.

Clerk’s Papers at 2.

within 90 days after presentation of petitions, the proposal “shall be

placed on the ballot at the next regular or special election occurring

more than one hundred thirty-five days after the petitions are filed

or at an earlier election designated by the county council.” Clerk’s

Papers at 624. Counsel for the County informed the Court at oral

argument the County has yet to act on the initiative.

App. 7

On February 19, 1997, the trial court heard cross-

motions for summary judgment. By memorandum deci-

sion dated February 24, 1997, the trial court granted the

County’s motion for summary judgment and denied the

defendants’ motion. The trial court entered a declaratory

judgment in favor of the County on February 26, 1997,

holding the bonds were valid and Initiative 16, if enacted,

would “irreconcilably conflict” with state law. Clerk’s

Papers at 1104. On March 26, 1997, after losing their

motion for reconsideration, the Taxpayers filed a notice of

appeal. We accepted direct review. RAP 4.2(b).

ANALYSIS

A. Declaratory Judgments of Local Bond Issues

This case is before us under RCW 7.25 providing for

declaratory judgments as to local bond issues:

Whenever the legislative or governing body

of any county, city, school district, other munici-

pal corporation, taxing district, or any agency,

instrumentality, or public corporation thereof

shall desire to issue bonds of any kind and shall

have passed an ordinance or resolution authori-

zing the same, the validity of such proposed

bond issue may be tested and determined in the

manner provided in this chapter.

RCW 7.25.010. The statute, by its wording, contemplates

an advisory opinion from a court as to the validity of an

ordinance authorizing an issuance of bonds. Courts in

other jurisdictions have articulated the purpose of bond

validation statutes. For instance, the Mississippi Supreme

Court said:

App. 8

The main purpose of a statutory validation pro-

ceeding is to provide a forum and course of

legal procedure to which a political district or

subdivision may resort for the purpose of hav-

ing the validity of the proposed bonds finally

determined and adjudicated in advance of their

issuance, “in order that the bonds so validated

might be readily sold in the market, to create in

the mind of the bond buyer a sense of security,

in that by the decree of the court and the fiat of

the Legislature there could be no further attack

upon the validity of the bond issue.”

Street v. Town of Ripley, 173 Miss. 225, 161 So. 855, 859, 102

A.L.R. 82 (1935) (quoting Love v. Mayor & Bd. of Aldermen,

162 Miss. 65, 138 So. 600, 603 (1932)). See also State v. City

of Miami, 113 Fla. 280, 152 So. 6, 8 (1933).5 “The desir-

ability of obtaining a judicial decree validating bonds

before they are issued is obvious: all parties may then

rely upon the decree as conclusive regarding the issue of

validity.” 3 M. Davip GELFAND, State & LocaL GOVERNMENT

Dest FINANCING § 14:05, at 14-17 (1994). We agree.

We have considered cases under RCW 7.25 on many

occasions,® but neither the statute nor our cases illuminate

5 A handful of states have statutes like Washington's

providing a procedure for bond validation. See Ata. Cope

§ 11-81-220 et seq. (1994); Cat. Crv. Proc. Cope §§ 860-871 (West

1980); Fra. Stat. ANN. § 75.01 et seq. (Wes: 1987); Ga. Cope ANN.

§ 50-17-25 (1994); La. Rev. Stat. ANN. § 13:5121 et seq. (West

1991); Miss. Cope ANn. § 31-15-5 et seq. (1972); Onto Rev. Cope

Ann. § 133.07 et seq. (Anderson 1994); W. Va. Cope § 13-1-25 et

seq. (1995). See 3 M. Davip GELranp, State & Locat GOVERNMENT

Dest FinaANncinc § 11:45, at 107 n. 1 (1994).

6 City of Spokane v. Taxpayers of City of Spokane, 111 Wash.2d

91, 758 P.2d 480 (1988); King County v. Taxpayers of King County,

ee

App. 9

what constitutes a “valid” bond for purposes of the statute.

Rather, the Court has simply dealt with particularized chal-

lenges to a bond issue’s validity advanced in each case.

Many courts have taken a cautious view of the scope

of bond validation proceedings, limiting such decisions to

basic questions involving the procedure for issuance of

the bonds and legal issues directly bearing on the bonds’

propriety. Ward v. Commonwealth, 685 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa.

Commw. 1996); Murphy v. City of Port St. Lucie, 666 So.2d

879, 880 (Fla. 1995) (collateral issues not within purview

of bond validity proceeding).

A leading treatise on municipal law offers the follow-

ing guidelines for testing the validity of a bond:

1. Is there legislative or constitutional

authority delegated to the municipality to issue

the bonds for the particular purpose?

2. Was the statute authorizing the bond

issue constitutionally enacted? If not constitu-

tionally enacted or if unconstitutional for any

other reason, the issue is void and recitals are of

no effect.

ee

104 Wn.2d 1, 700 P.2d 1143 (1985); Port of Longview v. Taxpayers of

Port of Longview, 84 Wn.2d 475, 85 Wn.2d 216, 527 P.2d 263

(1974); Pierce County v. Taxpayers of Lakes Dist. Recreation Service

Area, 70 Wn.2d 375, 423 P.2d 67 (1967); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers

of Tacoma, 60 Wn.2d 66, 371 P.2d 938 (1962); Port of Tacoma v.

Taxpayers of Port of Tacoma, 53 Wn.2d 734, 336 P.2d 872 (1959);

Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412 v. Taxpayers of Shoreline Sch. Dist. No.

412,52 Wn.2d 849, 329 P.2d 829 (1958); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers

of Tacoma, 49 Wn.2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957).

App. 10

3. Is the purpose for which the bonds are

issued, a public and corporate purpose, as dis-

tinguished from a private purpose?

15 Eucene McQurun, Municipat Corporations § 43.04, at

575 (3rd ed.1995).

Although we have held the plaintiff in a declaratory

judgment suit under RCW 7.24 has the burden of proof,

see Taylor v. State, 29 Wn.2d 638, 641, 188 P.2d 671 (1948);

Washington Beauty College v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 164, 80

P.2d 403 (1938), in the previous cases under RCW 7.25, we

have not discussed the burden of proof. The statute itself

is silent on the question; it requires only that the issuing

agency set forth in the complaint for declaratory judg-

ment the ordinance authorizing the bonds, and state it is

seeking a determination of the right to issue the bonds.

RCW 7.25.020. Courts discussing the burden of proof in

bond validation cases have held the burden of proof is on

the party seeking validation. See Harrell v. Town of

Whigham, 141 Ga. 322, 80 S.E. 1010 (1914); Fox v. Boyle

County, 245 Ky. 27, 53 S.W.2d 192 (1932).

For purposes of determining the validity under RCW

7.25 of bonds issued by a local government, we expressly

adopt the three-issue formulation for “validity” of bonds

articulated in McQuitun. Under RCW 7.25, our decision

regarding the validity of bonds is conclusive as to any

matter that is or should be brought within the ambit of

the validity inquiry. Thus, in the present case, we address

issues pertaining to whether the lease is a gift to the

Mariners, the validity of taxes to pay the stadium financ-

ing bonds, the delegation of legislative authority to the

District, and the local initiative/referendum measures

designed to forestall issuance of the bonds. Moreover, we

App. 11

hold the burden of proving the validity of the bonds rests

with King County and the District as the parties seeking

to establish validity.

B. Use of Public Funds to Build a New Stadium Does

Not Constitute Unconstitutional “Aid” to the Mari-

ners

In applying the test for validity set forth above to this

case, we note the Taxpayers do not challenge the legisla-

tive or constitutional authority of the County to issue the

bonds. Moreover, we have already determined the bonds

have a necessary public purpose. Citizens for More Impor-

tant Things, 131 Wn.2d at 416. Thus, the only item left to

consider from the three-issue formulation is whether the

statute authorizing the bond issue was constitutionally

enacted.

The Taxpayers initially contend the bond issue vio-

lates Const. art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7.7 “The ‘aid’ is in the form

” The two sections provide:

§5 Credit Not To Be Loaned. The credit of the state

shall not, in any manner be given or loaned to, or in

aid of, any individual, association, company or

corporation.

§ 7 Credit Not To Be Loaned. No county, city, town

or other municipal corporation shall hereafter give

any money, or property, or loan its money, or credit to

or in aid of any individual, association, company or

corporation, except for the necessary support of the

poor and infirm, or become directly or indirectly the

owner of any stock in or bonds of any association,

company or corporation.

App. 12

of construction at public expense of a new place of busi-

ness for the [Mariners] to enhance its chance of making

money.” Br. of Appellants at 9.

At oral argument, counsel for the Taxpayers

advanced the view that any benefit to a private organiza-

tion may be violative of these constitutional provisions.

We disagree. As we stated in City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of

Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 701-02, 743 P.2d 793 (1987), our

purpose in that case was to narrow the application of

these constitutional provisions to remedy more precisely

“the evils the framers sought to prevent.” An incidental

benefit to a private individual or organization will not

invalidate an otherwise valid public transaction. Id. at

705.

We held in CLEAN the stadium financing plan “does

not amount to a gift of state funds nor a lending of the

State’s credit.” CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 800. We suggested,

however, that should the District “enter into an agree-

ment with the Mariners that would permit the ball club to

play its games in the stadium for only nominal rent, then

the constitutional prohibitions against making a gift of

state funds might be implicated.” Id. This discussion in

CLEAN is essentially the test for an unconstitutional gift

of public funds we have articulated in numerous cases.

In deciding whether a public expenditure is a gift

under art. VIII, §§ 5 and 7, we have focused on two

factors: consideration and donative intent. City of Tacoma

v. Taxpayers of City, 108 Wn.2d 679, 702, 743 P.2d 793

(1987). Thus, to meet the burden of showing violation of

the constitutional prohibition against gifts, the Taxpayers

must show the lease amounts to “a transfer of property

App. 13

without consideration and with donative intent.” General

Tel. Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579, 588, 716 P.2d 879

(1986).

In assessing consideration, courts do not inquire into

the adequacy of consideration, but employ a legal suffi-

ciency test. Adams v. University of Wash., 106 Wn.2d 312,

327, 722 P.2d 74 (1986); Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City

of Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 857 P.2d 283 (1993). We have

been reluctant to engage in an in-depth analysis of the

adequacy of consideration because such an analysis inter-

feres unduly with governmental power to contract and

would establish a “burdensome precedent” of judicial

interference with government decisionmaking. City of

Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703.

Legal sufficiency “is concerned not with comparative

value but with that which will support a promise.”

Browning v. Johnson, 70 Wn.2d 145, 147, 422 P.2d 314,

amended, 430 P.2d 591 (1967) (“ ‘[A]nything which fulfills

the requirements of consideration will support a promise

whatever may be the comparative value of the consider-

ation, and of the thing promised.’ 1 Wiuuiston, ConTRACTS

§ 115, cited in Puget Mill Co. v. Kerry, 183 Wash. 542, 558,

49 P.2d 57, 64, 100 A.L.R. 1220 (1935).”). The adequacy of

the consideration for the lease is a question of law.

“Whether a contract is supported by consideration is a

question of law and may be properly determined by a

court on summary judgment.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.

Co. v. Watson, 120 Wn.2d 178, 195, 840 P.2d 851 (1992).

The Taxpayers now argue the lease agreement

between the District and the Mariners for the use of the

new stadium provides for only nominal rent and grossly

App. 14

inadequate consideration, thus implicating the constitu-

tional concern about gifts of state money we mentioned

in CLEAN. The Taxpayers argue both donative intent and

grossly inadequate return are present here.

A summary review of both the Stadium Act’s

requirements and the elements of the lease identifies the

Mariners’ obligations. The Stadium Act required (1) a

commitment from the Mariners to play at least 90 percent

of its games at the new stadium for the length of the term

of the bonds; (2) a contribution of $45 million towards

either pre-construction or construction costs of the sta-

dium or associated facilities; and (3) profit-sharing with

the District for the term of the bonds of profit earned

after accounting for team losses after the effective date of

the Act. RCW 82.14.360(4). These provisions all appeared

in the lease.

The lease between the Mariners and the District con-

tains the following additional obligations of the Mariners:

e payment of $700,000 in rent per annum

¢ payment of any construction cost overruns

¢ payment of any deficiencies on bonds for the

parking facility

¢ maintenance and operation of the ballpark as

a “first-class facility” in accordance with a

management plan, and with oversight by the

District, with enforcement mechanisms to

ensure compliance

e making major repairs and capital improve-

ments to the ballpark

¢ provision of insurance

— ey, ee ee ee

App. 15

Despite the Mariners’ obligations under the lease, the

Taxpayers call the lease “unconscionable,” Br. of Appel-

lants at 24-25, arguing the consideration for the lease in

favor of the County is so grossly inadequate the building

of the stadium at public expense amounts to an uncon-

stitutional gift.

The Taxpayers assert the County will receive nothing

in return for its investment; thus, donative intent is pre-

sent here. This assertion is simply another way of stating

their main point: that the lease is so much in favor of the

Mariners, it amounts to a gift. In CLEAN, the Court said,

“In our judgment, a plain reading of the Stadium Act

reveals no intent by the Legislature to donate public

funds to the Seattle Mariners.” CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 799.

The County and the District, in issuing bonds pursuant to

the Stadium Act, have implemented the Stadium Act by

obtaining the statutorily required commitments from the

Mariners. No donative intent is present here.

The Taxpayers assert the Mariners’ obligations under

the lease are a “sham and illusory,” and “truly do not

give the public anything of value.” Br. of Appellants at

26. Their arguments do not bear close scrutiny in light of

the Mariners’ contribution of $45 million to the project,

the profit-sharing provision, the 20-year lease obligation,

the stadium maintenance requirement, and their obliga-

tion to pay insurance.

The Taxpayers say the $45 million will not come out

of the pockets of the Mariners, but rather “from revenues

of the ballpark owned by the PFD.” Br. of Appellants at

27; Clerk’s Papers at 104. This argument is without merit.

Whether the money comes out of the Mariners’ coffers or

App. 16

from income the Mariners would have otherwise

received, the Mariners will contribute $45 million.

The Taxpayers claim the profit sharing requirement

in the lease is an “illusion,” because the Mariners can

doctor their books to pump up expenses as offsets to

revenues in a way that will never show a profit. Br. of

Appellants at 27. The County responds by noting the

lease requires the Mariners’ payments and expenses “be

determined in accordance with generally accepted

accounting principles[,]” Clerk’s Papers at 151, and that

the County has the right to audit the Mariners’ account-

ing to ensure compliance with GAAP. Moreover, the mere

possibility the Mariners may breach its promise in the

future on its obligation to share profits with the County

does not make this provision of the lease illusory. “An

illusory promise is one which according to its terms

makes performance optional with the promisor[.]” Mithen

v. Board Of Trustees Of Cent. Wash. State College, 23 Wn.

App. 925, 932, 599 P.2d 8 (1979). The Mariners made an

enforceable promise to share profits. The promise is not

illusory.

The Taxpayers argue “the Club’s promise to do busi-

ness in the new ballpark is illusory because it has escape

routes through the lease conditions[.]” Br. of Appellants

at 28. The Taxpayers’ argument is disingenuous. The cited

pages of the lease do not provide “escape” provisions

that allow the Mariners to leave of their own volition.

They merely set forth certain obligations of the District,

which, if not met, would allow the Mariners to terminate

the lease. There are no escape routes that make illusory

the Mariners’ promise to play 90 percent of their games in

App. 17

the new stadium over the term of the lease. The Tax-

payers neglect to mention the $700,000 annual rental due

from the Mariners.

The Taxpayers contend the Mariners’ agreement to be

exclusively responsible for operations and maintenance

of the ballpark is insignificant because the lease’s defini-

tion of operations and maintenance does not include

replacement or major repair. While the Operations and

Maintenance section of the lease does not contain a repair

obligation, the Major Maintenance and Capital Improve-

ments section of the lease does. The Mariners agree to

perform “all Major Maintenance and Capital Improve-

ments so that the Ballpark is maintained in a manner

consistent with [a first-class facility].” Clerk’s Papers at

156. “Major Maintenance and Capital Improvements” is

defined to include “any work that is reasonably required

to be performed . . . to repair, restore or replace compo-

nents of the [Ballpark] necessitated by any damage,

destruction, ordinary wear and tear, defects in construc-

tion or design, or any other cause, to the condition

required for consistency with [a first-class facility].”

Clerk’s Papers at 156-57. This obligation is substantial,

particularly given the very recent history of very substan-

tial public expenditures to repair the Kingdome roof.

Finally, the Taxpayers assert without argument the

requirement to maintain insurance is for the benefit of the

Mariners. In fact, the insurance the lease requires the

Mariners to procure must protect the District “from all

claims arising as a result of the ownership, use, manage-

ment and operation of the [stadium].” Clerk’s Papers at

175. The Mariners are required to name the District as an

App. 18

additional insured on its liability policy. Such insurance is

obviously not for the Mariners’ sole benefit.

At its core, the Taxpayers’ argument is the District

and the County made a bad deal. While that may or may

not be true, “The wisdom of the King County plan is not

for the consideration of this court — its constitutionality

is.” Louthan v. King County, 94 Wn.2d 422, 427, 617 P.2d

977 (1980). The Taxpayers have failed to demonstrate a

constitutional infirmity under Const. art. VIIL, §§ 5 and 7.

The Taxpayers’ assertion the Mariners’ promises pur-

suant to the lease are illusory is unsupported. In the

absence of donative intent or grossly inadequate return,

the Court’s review is limited to the legal sufficiency of the

consideration for the lease. City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at

703. This lease met the test of legal sufficiency. No viola-

tion of art. VIII, §§ 5 or 7 of our Constitution is present

here.

C. The Collection of Stadium Sales and Use Tax Does

Not Violate Constitutional Requirements

The Taxpayers make four arguments about the collec-

tion of the stadium sales and use tax. First, they argue the

funding scheme is unconstitutional because it imposes a

nonuniform state sales tax, requiring King County resi-

dents to pay state sales tax at a higher rate than residents

of other counties. Second, they argue in the alternative

the funding scheme is unconstitutional because King

County residents pay less than their proportionate share

of state sales tax. Third, they argue the .017 percent sales

tax is being unconstitutionally diverted to the County,

whereas the state constitution requires tax revenues to be

App. 19

deposited in the state treasury. Fourth, they argue the

handling of the .017 percent sales tax violates the state

constitution.§

The Stadium Act as implemented by Ordinance 12000

imposes a .017 percent sales tax in King County. The

Taxpayers claim this taxes King County residents at a

percentage rate higher than the rate residents of other

counties pay. The “distribution of the burdens of taxation

should be uniform. . .. A tax levied for state purposes

shall be uniform throughout the state[.]” Bond v. Burrows,

103 Wn.2d 153, 157, 690 P.2d 1168 (1984) (differential state

sales tax rate for counties bordering other states held

unconstitutional).

The Taxpayers’ argument is simply incorrect. The

State sales tax is 6.5 percent. RCW 82.08.020(1). The Tax-

payers say the Stadium Act and Ordinance 12000 impose

in King County a state sales tax .017 percent greater than

in other counties. The Taxpayers ignore the provision of

the Stadium Act that treats the .017 percent as a deduction

against the 6.5 percent the King County taxpayers con-

tribute to the state sales tax: “The tax imposed under

subsection (1) of this section [the .017 percent tax] shall

be deducted from the amount of tax otherwise required to

be collected or paid over to the department of revenue

under chapter 82.08 or 82.12 RCW.” RCW 82.14.0485(2).

* It is appropriate to resolve these issues in the present

RCW 7.25 suit, because if a court were later to sustain any of the

constitutional questions the Taxpayers raise now, and declare

the bonds invalid, default might occur. It is precisely the

purpose of RCW 7.25 to resolve for all time any questions about

the legality of the subject bonds.

App. 20

Thus, the taxpayers of King County do not pay more than

6.5 percent state sales tax.

Const. art. XI, § 9, reads: “No county, nor the inhabi-

tants thereof, nor the property therein, shall be released

or discharged from its or their proportionate share of

taxes to be levied for state purposes, nor shall commuta-

tion for such taxes be authorized in any form whatever.”

If, the Taxpayers argue, the .017 percent is deducted in

King County from the statewide 6.5 percent sales tax rate,

then King County residents are paying only 6.483 percent

sales tax for state purposes, and are essentially being

unconstitutionally “released or discharged” from their

fair share of taxes levied for state purposes.

This argument would have some force if the .017

percent were not being collected for a state purpose by a

political subdivision of the state. But the County, a politi-

cal subdivision of the state, is collecting revenues for a

state purpose. The building of the baseball stadium

serves a state purpose, as we stated in CLEAN:

If it is true that the existence of a major league

baseball team in a city improves the economy of

the state in which that city is located and

enhances the fabric of life of its citizens, and we

believe it is the prerogative of the Legislature to

conclude that it does, it is certainly within the

general police power of the State to construct a

publicly owned stadium in order to promote

those interests.

CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 806. The Taxpayers apparently

agree: “Since the .017% tax is imposed to fund part of the

State contribution to the Mariners stadium, the tax is

clearly for ‘state purposes.’” Br. of Appellants at 35.

App. 21

Given the Taxpayers’ concession on the issue, their argu-

ment that King County residents are paying less sales tax

to the State than the residents of other counties dissolves.

In summary, the sales tax rate the residents of King

County are paying pursuant to the Stadium Act and

Ordinance 12000 is neither more nor less than the sales

tax rate in other counties. It is the 6.5 percent, statewide,

Statutory rate.

Const. art. VII, § 6, requires “[a]ll taxes levied and

collected for state purposes shall be paid in money only

into the state treasury.” The Taxpayers claim the tax

revenues to be collected under the Stadium Act do not go

into the state treasury, yet they offer no facts to support

their claim. Taxes authorized by RCW 82.14 “shall be

deposited by the state department of revenue in the local

sales and use tax account hereby created in the state

treasury.” RCW 82.14.050 (emphasis added). Contrary to

the Taxpayers’ argument, the taxes are deposited in the

State Treasury.

The Taxpayers also claim Const. art. VIII, § 4 pre-

vents the diversion of the .017 percent sales tax to the

County. Article VIII, section 4, provides, in pertinent part:

“No moneys shall ever be paid out of the treasury of this

state, or any of its funds . . . except in pursuance of an

appropriation by law.” The Taxpayers assert, “diversion

to the County of up to .017% of whatever state sales taxes

the Department of Revenue collects in King County can-

not reasonably be considered a form of appropriation

because the amount will always vary and will never be a

distinct specific sum known to the Legislature.” Br. of

Appellants at 37.

App. 22

“The object of the constitution art. 8, § 4... is to

prevent expenditures of the public funds at the will of

those who have them in charge, and without legislative

direction.” State v. Clausen, 94 Wash. 166, 173, 162 P. 1

(1917). The state treasurer cannot spend those funds “at

will,” because state statute prescribes the disposition of

local sales and use taxes:

Monthly the state treasurer shall make dis-

tribution from the local sales and use tax

account to the counties, cities, transportation

authorities, and public facilities districts the

amount of tax collected on behalf of each taxing

authority, less the deduction provided for in

RCW 82.14.050 [administration and collection

expenses]. The state treasurer shall make the distri-

bution under this section without appropriation.

RCW 82.14.060 (emphasis added). Moreover, the funds

collected are paid into a special account in the state

treasury whose sole purpose is the payment of the bonds.

RCW 82.14.0485(3). We observed in Municipality of Metro.

Seattle v. O’Brien, 86 Wn.2d 339, 345, 544 P.2d 729 (1976):

Arguably the literal language of the constitution

would require a legislative appropriation to dis-

burse any funds from the state treasury under

the express words of [art. VIII, § 4]. However,

for many years, there has stood the common-

sense interpretation by this court that the Trea-

surer may be made custodian of particular

funds of a proprietary nature which are held for

a specific purpose. Funds so held are distributa-

ble without specific legislative appropriation.

In Metro, we approved the account within the state treas-

ury utilized by the Legislature in the Stadium Act. There,

App. 23

the state imposed a statewide excise tax on the value of

automobiles. The state also authorized local governments

to impose an additional local excise tax for public transit

and also receive a credit against the state excise tax.

Revenues thus derived were placed in an unappropriated

special account in the state treasury to be disbursed to

local governments for transit purposes, and did not vio-

late article VIII, section 4. Similarly, the statutory collec-

tion procedure here is constitutional.

In summary, the Taxpayers have made no compelling

constitutional or statutory arguments against the struc-

ture set up under the Stadium Act and Ordinance 12000

for the imposition and collection of sales and use taxes.

D. The Stadium Act Did Not Impermissibly Delegate

Legislative Authority to the District

The Taxpayers also assert the Stadium Act imper-

missibly delegates legislative authority to the District.

Const. art. II, § 1 vests legislative authority in the Legisla-

ture. “It is unconstitutional for the legislature to abdicate

or transfer to others its legislative function.” Keeting v.

Public Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clallam County, 49 Wn.2d 761,

767, 306 P.2d 762 (1957). The Taxpayers object to RCW

36.100.035(1), which gives the District the authority to

determine the site of the baseball stadium, and to RCW

36.100.035(2), which gives ihe District the authority to

determine the overall scope of the stadium project.

According to the Taxpayers, the District’s decisionmaking

authority “goes far beyond merely executing law already

in existence; the [District] is legislating.” Br. of Appel-

lants at 48.

App. 24

The Taxpayers apparently believe that only the Legis-

lature can decide where the stadium should be. They

have misunderstood the law. The case the Taxpayers cite,

American Fed’n of Teachers v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7, 74

Wn.2d 865, 447 P.2d 593 (1968), contains a quotation from

McQuli.un indicating that state government may delegate

authority to municipal corporations:

While the rule is fundamental that the

power to make laws cannot be delegated, the

creation of municipal corporations to exercise

local self-government has never been deemed to

violate this principle. Such legislation is not

regarded as a transfer of general legislative

power, but rather as a grant of the authority to

prescribe local regulations, supported by imme-

morial practice, but subject, of course, to the

interposition of the superior in cases of neces-

sity. Conferring proper powers upon municipal

corporations forms an exception to the rule

which forbids the legislature to delegate any of

its power to subordinate divisions.

Id. at 869, 447 P.2d 593, quoting 2 McQuiiun, § 4.09 (3rd

ed. 1966). The Legislature has properly delegated

authority to a local municipal corporation to carry out a

legislative determination. There is no unconstitutional

delegation here.

9 In any event, a delegation of legislative authority to an

agency, subject to appropriate standards, is permissible. Barry &

Barry, Inc. v. State, 81 Wn.2d 155, 159, 500 P.2d 540 (1972). The

delegation here was subject to appropriate standards.

App. 25

E. Initiative 16/Referendum

Initiative 16, if enacted at a future election, has the

potential to invalidate the bonds at issue here retroac-

tively by requiring a public vote before the County may

construct anything costing more than $50 million. The

initiative purports to take effect January 1, 1997, two

weeks before the bonds were issued in this case. The trial

court ruled Initiative 16 conflicts with state law and

therefore cannot, as a matter of law, affect the bonds.'°

Initiative 16 purports to create a mechanism - a pub-

lic vote - for retroactively invalidating an action autho-

rized by state law. While legislative bodies may enact

retroactive legislation in limited circumstances, such ret-

roactive legislation may not affect vested rights. Godfrey v.

State, 84 Wn.2d 959, 530 P.2d 630 (1975). There, we

defined a vested right as “a title, legal or equitable, to the

present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or a legal

exemption from a demand by another.” Id. at 963.

10 The Taxpayers argue the question is not yet justiciable,

but offer no argument contrary to the trial court’s conclusion

that Initiative 16 conflicts with state law. “Giving an opinion on

the legal consequences of the Initiative 16 ordinance if and

when adopted would be an advisory opinion (presumably for

the benefit of bond counsel) and contrary to law.” Br. of

Appellants at 40. But the underlying purpose of a RCW 7.25 suit

is to resolve all legal questions about the validity of the

proposed bond. If the Court does not decide the Initiative 16

question now, further legal controversy regarding the validity

of the bonds would likely ensue. RCW 7.25 is designed to

resolve such controversy in a single action. Because Initiative 16

has the potential to invalidate the bond issue here, the

initiative’s effect is ripe for decision under RCW 7.25.

App. 26

In this case, the right of the County to issue bonds

pursuant to the Stadium Act was such a vested right. The

issuance of bonds created a contract between the County

and bond holders. Legislation invalidating the issuance

of the stadium bonds would impermissibly impair that

contract. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10; WasH. Const. art. I, § 23.

In Ruano v. Spellman, 81 Wn.2d 820, 825, 505 P.2d 447

(1973), opponents of the proposed Kingdome sought to

place on the ballot an initiative that would have repealed

the resolution authorizing the project and the bonds to

finance it. Id. at 822. In rejecting the initiative, the Court

quoted Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554,

18 L. Ed. 403 (1866): “It is equally clear that where a State

has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to

exercise the power of local taxation to the extent neces-

sary to meet its engagements, the power thus given can-

not be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied.” Ruano,

81 Wn.2d at 827.

An additional basis for concluding Initiative 16 is

inapplicable to this bond issue is found in the trial court’s

analysis that Initiative 16 is in conflict with state law.

Initiative 16 proposes a county ordinance requiring a vote

of the people on projects costing more than $50 million.

The state constitution, however, permits counties to incur

indebtedness without a public vote if the indebtedness

does not exceed 1.5 percent of the assessed value of

property in the county: “No county, city, town, school

district, or other municipal corporation shall for any pur-

pose become indebted in any manner to an amount

exceeding one and one-half per centum of the taxable

property in such county, city, town, school district, or

other municipal corporation, without the assent of three-

App. 27

fifths of the voters therein voting at an election to be held

for that purpose.” Const. art. VIII, § 6 (amend 27). A state

statute is to the same effect: “Counties, cities, and towns

are limited to an indebtedness amount not exceeding one

and one-half percent of the value of the taxable property

in such counties, cities, or towns without the assent of

three-fifths of the voters therein voting at an election held

for that purpose.” RCW 39.36.020(2)(a)(ii).™

The positive corollary to Const. art. VIII, § 6 and the

statute is that a county may incur indebtedness of less

than 1.5 percent of the assessed value of property in the

county, without a vote of the people, by issuance of

councilmanic bonds. King County has done just that.

Initiative 16 purports to deprive the legislative authority

of King County of the power to do what the state consti-

tution and state statute specifically permit it to do — issue

bonds without a vote of the people, even though the bond

amount is below 1.5 percent of the assessed value of the

property in the county. If no vote is required, however, no

initiative or referendum could render invalid a decision

by the legislative authority to incur such indebtedness.

Thus, the trial court held Initiative 16 to be in irreconcil-

able conflict with state law, and held state law to be

controlling.

11 The Taxpayers do not dispute the declaration of the

Director of the Office of Budget and Strategic Planning for King

County: “Issuance of limited tax general obligation bonds in an

amount of $336,000,000 would not exceed the statutory

provisions (RCW 39.36.020(a)(2)(ii)[sic]) which allows counties

to incur debt up to 1.5% of the value of the taxable property

within the county without a vote of the people.” Clerk’s Papers

at 427.

App. 28

The Taxpayers argue the constitutional and statutory

debt limits provide a ceiling on the County’s ability to

incur debt without a vote of the people, but do not

prevent the County from lowering the ceiling if it wishes

to do so. They offer no authority for this argument.

A local government may not alter or restrict a legisla-

tive grant of power to that local government or its offi-

cers. “A general law enacted by the legislature is superior

to, and supersedes, all charter provisions inconsistent

therewith.” Neils v. City of Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 276, 53

P.2d 848 (1936) (ordinance concerning electric railways in

the city not subject to referendum because state law

granted exclusive power to city’s legislative authority to

control railways). In State ex rel. Guthrie v. City of Richland,

80 Wn.2d 382, 384, 494 P.2d 990 (1972), we said: “It is

settled that any charter provision which has the effect of

limiting or restricting a legislative grant of power to the

legislative authority or other officer of a city is invalid.” ?

In Guthrie, the Court considered whether a referendum

was permissible to challenge a Richland city ordinance

annexing contiguous territory as an addition to its water

utility. A statute, RCW 35.92.070, did not require voter

approval for proposed additions once the voters had

approved the initial acquisition of the utility. We held the

ordinance was not subject to referendum because the

referendum purported to limit powers the statute granted

to the legislative authority of the city.

12 Although the present case involves an ordinance and not a

charter provision, the principle of state law supremacy is the same.

App. 29

Similarly, in Benton v. Seattle Elec. Co., 50 Wash. 156,

96 P. 1033 (1908), a 1903 statute gave to the legislative

authority of cities the power to grant franchises for the

construction of street railways. A 1908 amendment to the

Seattle city charter purported to require the city council

to submit street railway franchises to the voters for their

approval. We held the amendment to the charter was

invalid because the city charter could not limit or surren-

der the specific grant of power by the Legislature to the

legislative authority to grant franchises. Id. at 163. Sim-

ilarly, Initiative 16 cannot have the effect of limiting the

positive implication of the debt limit provision in the

state constitution, i.e., the authority of the County to

issue bonds without a vote of the people when the

amount of the bonds is less than 1.5 percent of the

assessed value of property in the County.

In Bidwell v. City of Bellevue, 65 Wn. App. 43, 827 P.2d

339, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1023, 838 P.2d 690 (1992), a

case very close to the present facts, the Court of Appeals

employed the same reasoning as Guthrie in considering

the effect of a different statute. Plaintiffs sought to com-

pel the City of Bellevue to place an initiative on the ballot

concerning the financing of the Bellevue Convention Cen-

ter. The initiative would have required the Bellevue Con-

vention Center Authority to obtain voter approval before

issuing negotiable bonds or notes to finance the construc-

tion of the convention center. The debt resulting from the

lease was less than 1.5 percent of the taxable property in

Bellevue. Noting Guthrie found the proposed referendum

invalid “because if would have limited or restricted a

legislative grant of power to the City,” the Court of

Appeals held the initiative unlawfully conflicted with

App. 30

RCW 35.42.200, which permitted the city to execute leases

without submitting them to the voters if the lease did not

result in a total indebtedness in excess of 1.5 percent of

the value of the city’s taxable property. Bidwell, 65 Wn.

App. at 49.

In Whatcom County v. Brisbane, 125 Wn.2d 345, 884

P.2d 1326 (1994), the Whatcom County Council adopted a

Temporary Critical Areas Ordinance in 1992, pursuant to

the Growth Management Act, which required counties to

adopt comprehensive land use plans. Brisbane sought to

challenge parts of the ordinance by means of referendum.

We held the ordinance was not subject to referendum:

“Referendum rights do not exist when power has been

statutorily delegated to the ‘legislative authority’.” Id. at

350, quoting Citizens for Financially Responsible Gov't v.

City of Spokane, 99 Wn.2d 339, 344-45, 662 P.2d 845

(1983).35

13 An additional basis for this viewpoint is that the Stadium

Act mandates County issuance of the bonds once the County

decided to proceed with a new baseball stadium, and declared

this policy in Ordinance 12000. The trial court held, as a result,

Initiative 16 cannot countermand state law. RCW 82.14.360(3)

provides, in pertinent part:

The revenue from the taxes imposed under this

section shall be used for the purpose of principal and

interest payments on bonds, issued by the county, to

acquire, construct, own, remodel, maintain, equip,

reequip, repair, and operate a baseball stadium... .

The county shall issue bonds, in an amount

determined to be necessary by the public facilities

district, for the district to acquire, construct, own, and

equip the baseball stadium. The county shall have no

obligation to issue bonds in an amount greater than

that which would be supported by the tax revenues

App. 31

When the Legislature or state constitution has

granted a power to the legislative authority of a munici-

pality, the municipality may not limit the scope of that

power, or surrender any of it under Const. art. XI, § 11,

our state supremacy clause. Carrick v. Locke, 125 Wn.2d

129, 133, 882 P.2d 173 (1994); Clallam County Deputy Sher-

iff's Guild v. Board Of Clallam County Comm'rs, 92 Wn.2d

844, 849, 601 P.2d 943 (1979). Under Const. art. 11, § 11,

counties have the right to enact ordinances prohibiting

the same acts prohibited by state law so long as the state

enactment was not intended to be exclusive and the

county ordinance does not conflict with the general law

of the state. City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 118 Wn.2d 826, 833,

827 P.2d 1374 (1992).

An ordinance must yield to a statute on the same

subject on either of two grounds: if the statute preempts

the field, leaving no room for concurrent jurisdiction, or

if a conflict exists between the two that cannot be harmo-

nized. Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353

(1991).

Const. art. VIII, § 6 and RCW 39.36.020(2)(a)(ii) grant

to the legislative authority of counties the power to issue

bonds when the amount of the bonds is below 1.5 percent

of the assessed value of the property in the county. We

hold these constitutional and statutory grants of power

under this section, section 101 of this act, and RCW

36.38.010(3)(a) and (b).

(Emphasis added.) Once the County opted into the

comprehensive financing plan for the baseball stadium by

enacting Ordinance 12000 and imposing taxes under the

Stadium Act, state law required the County to issue the bonds.

App. 32

preempt the field, leaving no room for concurrent juris-

diction. That power is therefore not subject to referendum

or initiative.'*

14 The intervenors’ arguments regarding a referendum on

the issuance of the bonds fail for essentially the same reasons as

the arguments on Initiative 16. The intervenors filed a

referendum petition proposing that Ordinance 12593

(authorizing issuance of the bonds) be put to a public vote. The

referendum cannot affect Ordinance 12593 for the same reasons

Initiative 16 cannot affect the ordinance. However, the

intervenors also apparently attempted to file a referendum with

respect to Ordinance 12000. The trial court discussed this effort,

stating:

Intervenors Scannel! et al. suggest that Ordinance

12000 is subject to referendum; however, if that

ordinance could have been presented to the people[,]

the time has passed for so doing. It has been well over

a year since the request for referendum on Ordinance

12000 was made. There is pending no action to

require the County to send that Ordinance to the

people. The time to pursue that issue was in 1995 and

it cannot be revived indirectly now through a

challenge to the bonds to be issued to implement

policy decisions made in Ordinance 12000.

Clerk’s Papers at 1105.

Ordinance 12000 was enacted on October 25, 1995. This

ordinance represented King County’s policy decision to proceed

with the new stadium. The proper way for the Intervenors to

have challenged this policy decision was to have invoked the

referendum process in a timely fashion. Under King County

Charter § 230.40, in order to require a referendum vote,

Intervenors were obliged to file a valid petition with the Council

prior to the effective date of the ordinance. The effective date of

the ordinance was ten days after its enactment. King County

Charter § 230.70. No such referendum petition appears in the

record. Accordingly, Ordinance 12000 is no longer susceptible to

a referendum.

E

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a.

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3

App. 33

CONCLUSION

We hold the bonds for financing construction of a

baseball stadium in King County are valid under RCW

7.25. As a matter of law, the use of public funds to build

the new baseball stadium does not represent unconstitu-

tional aid to the Mariners. The Stadium Act and Ordi-

nance 12000 do not manifest donative intent, and the

return to the County is not grossly inadequate. There is

legally sufficient consideration to support the promises of

the Mariners. The Taxpayers’ arguments about violation

of constitutional requirements for the imposition and

handling of tax revenues are factually incorrect, and

without substance. The Legislature appropriately dele-

gated authority to the District. The trial court was correct

in holding Initiative 16, even if passed, cannot affect the

bond issue because any future action that may impair the

obligations contained in the bond contract is constitu-

tionally impermissible.

In short, the Taxpayers have presented no compelling

arguments to require reversal of the trial court’s declaratory

judgment under RCW 7.25 that the stadium financing

App. 34

bonds were valid. We affirm the trial court’s declaratory

judgment order validating the bonds.

/s/ Talmadge, J.

WE CONCUR:

/s/ Durham, C.J. /s/ Johnson J.

/s/ Dolliver, J. /s/

/s/ Smith, J. /s/ Alexander, J.

/s/ Guy, J. /s/

SANDERS, Justice (dissenting) - This action was

commenced by the King County government to finally,

permanently, and absolutely deny each of the million

plus? county taxpayers (Taxpayers) any lawful defense or

democratic remedy against imposition of $336,000,000 in

additional public debt. The Taxpayers were denied an

adequate and fair opportunity to present their case at the

trial court; and our constitutional prohibition against

public gifts to private parties has been overtly violated. I

dissent.

1 The 1996 population of King County was 1,628,800. 1996

Population Trends, Table 4, Office of Fiscal Management, State

of Washington (Oct.1996).

App. 35

The action proceeds as an inverted class action under

the authority of RCW 7.25.020, whereby the county gov-

ernment sues each of its taxpayers through the device of

naming two representatives to defend the interests of

every other county taxpayer. As this is truly an extraordi-

nary proceeding, I posit the courts have at least the

normal duty, if not an extraordinary one, to ensure that

the legal rights of all parties are fully recognized and

protected, not only in procedural form but also in sub-

stantive result. The factual and legal basis for my grave

concerns are summarized in this dissent.

Fast Track in Trial Court

To say the trial court track was fast is a gross under-

statement. The period from filing the complaint to sum-

mary judgment was only 37 days during which, for the

most part, the trial court denied the Taxpayers any right

to conduct discovery. Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 1048-49.

On January 6, 1997, the King County Council by a

vote of eight to five passed Ordinance 12593 authorizing

issuance of $336 million in construction oonds for the

new baseball stadium and adjacent parking garage. One

week later, on January 13, 1997, the County commenced

this suit. Bowing to virtually every governmental request

to shorten time, and foreclosing virtually any opportunity

for the Taxpayers to conduct even the most rudimentary

discovery, the trial court heard the government's argu-

ment in support of its motion for summary judgment on

February 19, 1997, 26 days after the government filed its

summary judgment motion. CP at 1074.

App. 36

Normally CR 56(f) would require reversal should it

appear from the affidavits of the party opposing the

motion (the Taxpayers) that they could not present by

affidavit those facts essential to justify their opposition

absent an opportunity to pursue discovery;? however, I

would not reverse on this basis since, all considered,

Taxpayers were not unfairly prejudiced because (1) the

Herculean efforts of defense counsel produced a more

than adequate factual record to avoid summary judgment

of dismissal if the appropriate legal standard had been

applied and (2) it really doesn’t matter what sort of

record the Taxpayers put together because the summary

judgment on the gift issue resulted from the application

of the wrong legal standard, not inadequacy of the

record.

I am not without compassion for the trial court how-

ever. The trial court, and equally the Supreme Court, is

asked to act in a summary fashion on a matter of great

2 CR 56(f) provides:

(f) When Affidavits Are Unavailable. Should it

appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the

motion that he cannot, for reasons stated, present by

affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the

court may refuse the application for judgment or may

order a continuance to permit affidavits to be

obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be

had or may make such other order as is just.

A trial court refusal to permit time for discovery is

reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Discretion is

abused when the trial court c.des not allow the nonmoving party

adequate opportunity to acquire discovery which could raise a

material factual issue. Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641

West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68, 91, 838 P.2d 111 (1992).

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App. 37

financial and political consequence under circumstances

where it is claimed that even the shortest delay will derail

a huge governmental public works project, regardless of

its legal merit.

Upon this reality I can only reflect, without further

commentary: haste makes waste; the best lawyers are

often deprived an adequate opportunity to represent the

interests of their clients if denied sufficient time; and

courts sometimes commit error which could be avoided

given an adequate opportunity to study the law, discern

‘he facts, think, and reflect. A rush to judgment defeats

justice.

Heightened Standard of Review

Noticeable by its absence from the majority opinion

is any reference to the applicable standard of review.

Here an extremely high standard is required by CR 56

and indirectly by RCW 7.25.010-.040.

A summary judgment will be sustained on review

only “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interroga-

tories, and admissions on file, together with the affi-

davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). The CR 56

standard has been applied by this court and appellate

courts on countless occasions and generally requires that

all facts or inferences therefrom be construed most favor-

ably to the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98

Wn.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982) (“A summary judg-

ment motion under CR 56(c) can be granted only if the

pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file

App. 38

demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material

fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. .. . The court must consider all facts

submitted and all reasonable inferences from the facts in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”). Klinke

v. Famous Recipe Fried Chicken, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 255, 256-57,

616 P.2d 644 (1980) (summary judgment is not appropri-

ate when reasonable minds might reach different conclu-

sions); Avrick v. Rockmont Envelope Co., 155 F.2d 568, 571

(10th Cir. 1946) (summary judgment should not be used

“to deprive litigants of their right to a full hearing” and

must be “temperately and cautiously used lest abuse reap

nullification.”); Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th

Cir. 1940) (cautioning against using summary judgment

as “a catch penny contrivance to take unwary litigants

into its toils and deprive them of a trial”); Stephen J.

Fortunato, Jr., Summary Judgment in Rhode Island: Is it Time

to Wrap the Mantra in Celotex?, 2 Roger Williams U. L. Rev.

153, 204 (1997) (“summary judgment is a drastic remedy

to be applied only with great caution.” (citations omit-

ted)).

The declaratory judgment proceeding contemplated

by RCW 7.25 is in the nature of a CR 23 class action. It

requires designation of representative defendants to rep-

resent (with government payment of defense attorney

fees) the interest of all similarly situated absent class

members. Although there is a paucity of precedent on

RCW 7.25.010-.040, the analogy to CR 23 class actions is

inescapably clear. CR 23 normally envisions a class of

plaintiffs proceeding against specifically named defen-

dants; however, in rare instances the device has been

used to proceed on behalf of named plaintiffs against

re OY iS i Sa ay ete

App. 39

representatives of a class of defendants. In either case the

court undertakes affirmative responsibilities to assure the

legal interest of each absent class: member is protected.

CR 23(b)(1)(B). Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir.

1973) (the trial court must ascertain that the “class repre-

sentative adequately represent the class so that the judg-

ment in the class suit will bind the absent members of the

class.”); Marquardt v. Fein, 25 Wn.App. 651, 656-57, 612

P.2d 378 (1980) (class representative must fairly and ade-

quately protect the interests of the class and respon-

sibility for ensuring adequate representation must

devolve upon the trial court).

It is therefore the court’s responsibility to apply the

summary judgment standard, with special deference

given to absent class members, to all factual questions.

Therefore, with a focus on whether the stadium is an

unconstitutional gift of public funds, on the text and

purpose of the pertinent constitutional provision, on

analysis of relevant case law, and on clarification of fac-

tual questions, I conclude: Were the Taxpayers not to

receive a summary judgment on this record in their favor,

they have surely raised at least a question of fact which

only the trier of fact can resolve on remand for trial.

Unconstitutional Public Aid to Private Parties

Constitution article VIII, section 7 provides: “No

county... shall... give any money, or property .. . to or

in aid of any individual . . . or corporation.” (Emphasis

added.)

App. 40

The issue here is what this means. Two alternative

theories are advanced. The government, trial court, and

majority of this court assert the constitution is satisfied if

there is legally sufficient consideration (a peppercorn will

do) to support the enforceability of a promise. This dis-

sent demonstrates the constitution not only requires more

consideration, it requires adequate consideration. The test

employed dictates the outcome.

Standard of Constitutional Interpretation

Although we have been frequently called upon to

apply this constitutional text to a variety of factual situa-

tions, the unambiguous language always controls. We

held in an early case:

The section of the constitution last quoted,

in most express terms, prohibits a county from

giving any money, property or credit to, or in

aid of, any corporation, except for the necessary

support of the poor and infirm.

Johns v. Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 354, 141 P. 892 (1914).

As has been clear since those days, the constitution

makes no distinction between purposes but simply,

directly, and unequivocally prohibits all gifts in aid of

any corporation. Id. at 354. In Wadsworth, for example, the

court struck down a grant to the Western Washington

Fair. While conceding the appropriation was for a worthy

purpose, educational in nature, “[t]here is no room, how-

ever, for construction. Unless plain, simple, direct words

have lost their meaning, the legislature was without

power to authorize the gift.” Id. at 355.

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App. 41

We must also recall that the constitution is an expres-

sion of the will of the people, State ex rel. Albright v. City

of Spokane, 64 Wn.2d 767, 394 P.2d 231 (1964), and the

court performs but a limited role to apply the constitution

as written. The court has no power to construe or inter-

pret a provision that is clear, plain, and unambiguous in

its terms. Anderson v. Chapman, 86 Wn.2d 189, 543 P.2d 229

(1975).

Evil Sought to Be Remedied

The majority correctly notes we should construe the

constitutional provision to remedy “the evils the framers

sought to prevent.” Majority at 12 (citing City of Tacoma v.

Taxpayers of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d 679, 705, 743 P.2d 793

(1987)).

An increased level of judicial scrutiny is required in

these situations “for the protection of public funds which

may be potentially wasted. The court has acted as a

watchdog to ensure the public funds will not be given

away.” City of Bellevue v. State, 92 Wn.2d 717, 724, 600 P.2d

1268 (1979) (Rosellini, J., dissenting).

Reversing a summary judgment in favor of municipal

defendants, we held in State ex rel. O'Connell v. Port of

Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 801, 806, 399 P.2d 623 (1965):

If Article 8, § 7 is too restrictive in its terms, that

is a matter for the citizens of this state to correct

through the amendatory process. It is not for

this court to engraft an exception where none is

expressed in the constitutional provision, no

matter how desirable or expedient such an

exception might seem.

App. 42

We recall “a recurrence to the history of the times

will show that many municipalities had become bankrupt

because of liabilities incurred in aid of railroads, ‘and

various other public improvements which were deemed

advantageous’ at the time.” Wadsworth, 80 Wash. at 354;

see also Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d at 701 (“[F]ramers

intended to prevent the harmful ‘effects on the public

purse of granting public subsidies to private commercial

enterprises, primarily railroads.’”) (citing City of Mar-

ysville v. State, 101 Wn.2d 50, 55, 676 P.2d 989 (1984)).

Justice Hale’s concurrence in State ex rel. Graham v.

City of Olympia, 80 Wn.2d 672, 687, 497 P.2d 924 (1972)

opined that the purpose of article 8, section 7 was to

prevent the use of public money by private entities for

private purposes. The article was designed to prevent the

use of public money for political favoritism, preferment,

and manipulations, and “[i]t is designed to protect the

public purse from private spending.” Id.

By the time our constitutional convention convened

in July 1889 many local governments had endured the

unfortunate experience of subsidizing private corpora-

tions, particularly railroads, to lure them and keep them.

See James M. Dolliver, Condemnation, Credit, and Corpora-

tions in Washington: 100 Years of Judicial Decisions — Have

the Framers’ Views Been Followed?, 12 U. Puget Sound

L.Rev. 163, 182 (1989). At the constitutional convention

the framers debated at length what was to be done. See

Journal of the Washington State Constitutional Convention,

1889 at 679-84 (Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962). The version

of article VIII, § 7, finally approved and popularly rat-

ified, is the same which comes to us unchanged today. It

was intended for the “protection of taxpayers and the

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App. 43

public purse from the consequences of corporate political

clout.” David D. Martin, Comment: Washington State Con-

stitutional Limitations on Gifting of Funds to Private Enter-

prise: A Need for Reform, 20 Seattle U. L. Rev. 199, 203

(1996); see also City of Marysville v. State, 101 Wn.2d 50, 55,

676 P.2d 989 (1984) (“[T]he framers of our constitution

were deeply concerned about the effects on the public

purse of granting public subsidies to private commercial

enterprises, primarily railroads” and drafted article 8,

sections 5 and 7 to prohibit the practice).

The motive and objective of this constitutional provi-

sion is to prevent the transfer of public assets from public

entities, resulting in an inadequate return, or net loss, to

the public. This has nothing to do with whether or not

there is present such minimal consideration legally neces-

sary to support a promise. If a public official may transfer

$100 of taxpayer property for a $5 return to the taxpayers,

they are $95 poorer. The return is inadequate regardless

of the legal sufficiency of the consideration. The purpose

of the provision is to avoid transactions which plunder

the public purse to the benefit of private corporate

wealth.

The constitutional text employs absolute and sweep-

ing language to avoid this eventuality through use of the

term “any,” a term of total exclusion, as well as the term

“aid,” defined as “[t]o support, help, assist, or

strengthen.” Black's Law Dictionary 68 (6th ed. 1990).

We have held it is the role of the courts to guard the

public purse from expenditures in controversion of this

article as it is a uniquely judicial responsibility to rig-

orously enforce this constitutional provision. See Miller v.

App. 44

City of Tacoma, 61 Wn.2d 374, 384, 378 P.2d 464 (1963)

(whether public expenditures amount to an unconstitu-

tional gift “is solely a judicial question and ultimately

must be decided by this court.”); see also Scott Paper Co. v.

City of Anacortes, 90 Wn.2d 19, 33, 578 P.2d 1292 (1978) (no

legislative attempt to define a gift for the constitutional

provision would be meaningful because construction of

the constitution is a judicial function); Washington Natural

Gas Co. v. Public Util. Dist. No. 1, 77 Wn.2d 94, 101, 459

P.2d 633 (1969) (“article 8, section 7, prohibiting any city,

county, town, or other municipal corporation from giving

away its money or property or lending its money or

credit to or in aid of any private entity is a mandatory

provision and must be strictly observed.”) (citing Johns v.

Wadsworth, 80 Wash. 352, 141 P. 892 (1914); and State ex

rel. Washington Navigation Co. v. Pierce County, 184 Wash.

414, 51 P.2d 407 (1935), modified by 187 Wash. 695, 60 P.2d

16 (1936)).

Sufficient Legal Consideration/Peppercorn Rule

Notwithstanding this text, history, and “evil sought

to be cured,” the majority claims “legally sufficient con-

sideration” is all that is necessary to satisfy the constitu-

tional provision. Majority at 18. Misplacing its reliance

upon Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wn.2d 312,

327, 722 P.2d 74 (1986) the majority asserts “[i]n assessing

consideration, courts do not inquire into the adequacy of

consideration, but employ a legal sufficiency test.” Major-

ity at 13. The majority also cites Browning v. Johnson, 70

Wn.2d 145, 147, 422 P.2d 314, 430 P.2d 591 (1967) (a

private contract case, not a constitutional gift case) for the

App. 45

rule that “[ljegal sufficiency ‘is concerned, not with com-

parative value, but with that which will support a prom-

ise.” Majority at 13.

Of course. Even a peppercorn? is legally sufficient

consideration to support a promise.* Under this standard,

all of the State’s timberland could be transferred to a

large timber company for a penny (which could buy

several peppercorns). While it is “legally sufficient” to

support enforcement of a contractual promise, it is inade-

quate to protect our public assets.

The legal sufficiency rule is designed to enforce a

bargain, but not necessarily to avoid a gift.

Mixture of bargain and gift. In most commer-

cial bargains there is a rough equivalence

between the value promised and the value

received as consideration. But the social func-

tions of bargains include the provision of oppor-

tunity for free individual action and exercise of

judgment and the fixing of values by private

action, either generally or for the purposes of

the particular transaction. Those functions

would be impaired by judicial review of the

3 The peppercorn is the classic example of “consideration

given” that does not match the value received and thus

represents nominal payment. Under English law a peppercorn

was the stated rent in many nominal lease contracts. Black’s Law

Dictionary 1135 (6th ed. 1990) (peppercorn is “the reservation of

a merely nominal rent, on a lease”); 2 William Blackstone,

Commentaries on the Laws of England not (1766) (referring to the

practice of requiring payment of a peppercorn for a leasehold as

nominal rent).

* 3 Samuel Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 7:2,

at 22 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed.1992).

App. 46

values so fixed. Ordinarily, therefore, courts do

not inquire into the adequacy of consideration,

particularly where one or both of the values

exchanged are difficult to measure. . . . Even

where both parties know that a transaction is in

part a bargain and in part a gift, the element of

bargain may nonetheless furnish consideration

for the entire transaction.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71, illus. c, at 174

(1979) (emphasis added).

Gross inadequacy of consideration may be rele-

vant to issues of capacity, fraud and the like, but

the requirement of consideration is not a safeguard

against imprudent and improvident contracts except

in cases where it appears that there is no bargain in

fact.

Id. § 79, illus. “c,” at 201-02 (emphasis added). The ratio-

nale behind requiring iegally sufficient consideration to

support a promise is therefore completely divergent from

the purpose behind the constitutional prohibition against

gifts: the former is to encourage and legally enforce free

action between private persons; the latter is to protect the

taxpaying public from public officials who would waste

the assets they are duty-bound to preserve. Moreover,

even a promise supported by legally sufficient consider-

ation is not enforceable when it violates public policy.

Williston, supra, § 4:42, at 672. Our state constitution is

the ultimate source of public policy.

If a peppercorn of legal sufficiency was the constitu-

tional barrier the framers devised to guard the public

purse, they certainly did not achieve their objective.

App. 47

Adequacy Rule

Contrary to the majority’s claim, the modern consti-

tutional test is stated and restated within the very cases

the majority principally purports to rely on: Adams v.

University of Washington, City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, and

CLEAN ov. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054 (1996).

None of this precedent has been overruled, nor does the

majority even attempt to distinguish it.

Adams v. University of Washington, 106 Wn.2d 312, 722

P.2d 74 (1986) is the mother of modern authority on this

topic. It articulates the rule quite differently from the

majority:

Unless there is proof of donative intent or a

grossly inadequate return, courts do not require

into the adequacy of consideration.

Id. at 327 (citations omitted). City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of

City of Tacoma, 108 Wn.2d at 703, citing Adams, says

almost the same:

Absent a showing of donative intent or gross

inadequacy, the trial court should only apply a

legal sufficiency test... .

CLEAN specifically relied upon Taxpayers, holding

“[iJt cannot be seriously contended that the development

of a baseball stadium for major league team is a ‘funda-

mental purpose’ of state government. Our inquiry must

concentrate, therefore, on donative intent and consider-

ation.” CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 798. CLEAN rejected a facial

challenge to the Stadium Act, speculated, absent a record

before it:

If .. . the [d]istrict should enter into an agree-

ment with the Mariners that would permit the

App. 48

ball club to play its games in the stadium for

only nominal rent, then the constitutional prohi-

bitions against making a gift of state funds

might be implicated. . . . In the unlikely event

that this prediction should come true, the issue

can then be raised in an appropriate manner.

CLEAN, 130 Wn.2d at 800. “Nominal rent,” like nominal

consideration of $1 or $10 on the face of a deed, is

“legally sufficient” consideration to support the promise.

Yet, as per CLEAN, it isn’t enough to pass the constitu-

tional adequacy test.

The majority concludes its analysis of case law by

blandly stating: “[t]his lease met the test of legal suffi-

ciency. No violation of art. VIII, §§ 5 or 7 of our Constitu-

tion is present here.” Majority at 18.

But what about the test for donative intent or gross

inadequacy? While it is true if there is no legal suffi-

ciency, there is no lawful transaction, that is not to say

that if there is legal sufficiency there can be no gift. In

short, the majority’s approach is absolutely irreconcilable

5 See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of

England 440 (1766) (“in case of leases, always reserving a rent,

though it be but a peppercorn [such] consideration will, in the

eyes of the law, convert the gift . . . into a contract.”); State v.

Teller Native Corp., 904 P.2d 847, 850 (Alaska 1995) ($10 nominal

rent paid under the lease is le _ ly sufficient consideration);

Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant Cuunty, 51 Wn.2d 285, 286, 317

P.2d 1069 (1957) (construing valid lease of “one hundred thirty-

eight acres leased from the Federal government for seventy- five

years, at a nominal rental of one hundred dollars a year or about

two cents per unit per month.”). See also Matter of Estate of Little,

106 Wn.2d 269, 286-87, 721 P.2d 950 (1986) ($10 paid for a $1

million property may be legally sufficient consideration to

uphold the sales contract).

App. 49

with Adams, Tacoma, and CLEAN. These cases hold if

there is proof of donative intent or a grossly inadequate

return, the courts must inquire into the adequacy of con-

sideration as they would any other question of fact.

Upon this single point the case at bar turns. While I

would concede there is sufficient legal consideration to

support a promise, I find overwhelming evidence - evi-

dence much beyond the simple inference necessary to

defeat a summary judgment motion - that there is not

only donative intent or® grossly inadequate return, but

both, and they require a trier of the facts.

Donative Intent

“[D]onative intent is a factual issue to be resolved by

the trier of fact.” In re Estate of Pearl Fitzhugh Little, 106

Wn.2d 269, 288, 721 P.2d 950 (1986).”

6 Although evidence of both, donative intent and grossly

inadequate return, is present in this record, I beg to differ with

the majority’s initial formulation of the rule that “a transfer of

property without consideration and with donative intent” is

required (citing General Tel. Co. v. City of Bothell, 105 Wn.2d 579,

588, 716 P.2d 879 (1986)). Majority at 13 (emphasis added).

Although General Telephone did say just that, its use of the term

“and” was a loose one corrected by more recent cases which

properly replaced “and” with “or.” Adams, 106 Wn.2d at 327;

City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 108 Wn.2d at 703. Moreover, the

majority recognizes that the discussion in CLEAN “is essentially

the test for an unconstitutional gift of public funds we have

articulated in numerous cases”; i.e., it is no departure from the

Adams rule. Majority at 12.

7? See also Brigade v. Economic Dev. Bd., 61 Wn. App. 615, 621,

811 P.2d 697 (1991) (whether or not the county had donative

intent plainly rested upon underlying material facts. CR 56(c)

App. 50

This record contains two different types of proof and

inferences therefrom which would support a finding of

donative intent: narrative statements and grossly inade-

quate return.

a. Narrative Evidence of Donative Intent

Narrative evidence is correspondence, business

records, and declarations, stating, in one form or another,

that the raison d’etre for the stadium project is to aid the

Mariners by making it more profitable for them to stay in

Seattle than to go elsewhere. Such supports an inference

of donative intent.

On September 28, 1995 Mariner chairman and CEO

John W. Ellis wrote King County Executive Gary Locke

requires the moving party to “show there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact.”). Lewis v. Estate of Lewis, 45 Wn. App. 387,

392, 725 P.2d 644 (1986) (record supported finding existence of

donative intent with respect to mother’s transfer of real

property to son); Matter of Estate of Little, 106 Wn.2d 269, 288,

721 P.2d 950 (1986) (“The existence or absence of a donative

intent is a factual issue to be resolved by the trier of the fact.”);

Bellevue v. State, 92 Wn.2d 717, 721, 600 P.2d 1268 (1979)

(donative intent is to be determined upon the evidence); Matter

of Hoffman's Estate, 15 Wn. App. 307, 312, 548 P.2d 1101 (1975)

(evidentiary finding on donative intent necessary at trial court),

review denied, 87 Wn.2d 1007 (1976); Buckerfield’s Ltd. v. B.C.

Goose & Duck Farm, Ltd., 9 Wn. App. 220, 223, 511 P.2d 1360

(1973) (the presence or absence of donative intent is a question

of fact for the trier of fact); Oman v. Yates, 70 Wn.2d 181, 182-83,

422 P.2d 489 (1967) (same); In re McDonald’s Estate, 60 Wn.2d

452, 456, 374 P.2d 365 (1962) (Whether or not there is donative

intent is a question for the trier of fact to be inferred from the

evidence.).

aateletane aed

App. 51

(now Governor), restating what the Mariners had stated

before, i.e., “we have clearly stated that a new stadium is

required if major league is to be competitive and finan-

cially successful in this region. . . . We made it clear that

without such a stadium we would have no alternative but

to offer the team for sale. . . . Nor can we further jeopard-

ize our investment. ... ” CP at 615. The Mariners then

complained about mounting financial losses, and stated

their intention to leave the area unless a new stadium was

built to cure their financial ills. The team sought aid to

remain.

The Stadium Act authorized a “solution” to the

team’s financial problems. CP at 19. Ordinance 12000

proclaimed the new ball park would offer the club “cer-

tain revenue generating capabilities not presently avail-

able at the Kingdome.” CP at 26. Why? - to aid the

Mariners. The county loaned the Public Facilities District

$33 million for preconstruction costs for the ball park,

even though the club could “walk away” from the pro-

ject. CP at 1155. Why? To encourage the Mariners to stay

because aid is on the way.

On December 20, 1996, United States Senator Slade

Gorton, a supporter of the project, wrote King County

Executive Locke, Mayor Rice, King County Council

Chairman Jane Hague, and Joan Enticknap, Chairman of

the Public Facilities District. Senator Gorton candidly

stated in this letter that “Governor Lowry, the Legisla-

ture, and the community came together in such magnifi-

cent fashion to authorize the construction of a new

baseball stadium and thus to save the Mariners more than

a year ago.” CP at 391. “Save the Mariners” through the

use of public funds is also evidence of donative intent.

App. 52

Senator Gordon [sic] related that he had recently

“had extensive conversations with John Ellis, a close

friend of more than 40 years,” and indicated that the

Mariners’ announcement that they would leave town

unless a stadium was constructed was “not a negotiating

ploy.” CP at 391-92. One inference: better provide the

financial benefit the Mariners want or they will leave.

Gorton further identified Hiroshi Yamauchi, princi-

pal owner of the Nintendo Corporation in Japan, as the

principal owner of the Mariners (although under the

terms of the lease, neither Mr. Yamauchi nor the Nin-

tendo Corporation has any direct or indirect liability. Nor

did either, or anyone, ever post a personal guaranty, or

any security, to assure the Mariners would perform their

obligations). Senator Gorton made a point that, since

these owners acquired the Mariners, they have incurred

more than “$70 million in operating losses in the five

seasons between 1992 and 1996.” CP at 392. Gorton pro-

jected “based on projected attendance at levels never

lower than 2,500,000 paid admissions per year for 20

years, under the terms of the agreement offered, the

owners of the team would still suffer at least moderate,

annual operating losses.”® CP at 392. The import of the

letter is that the Mariners are in financial trouble and they

need financial aid in the form of a new stadium if they are

going to remain in Seattle.

Further evidence of donative intent is supplied by

the resignation letter from Shelly Yapp dated December

8 Where are the profits to share?

App. 53

26, 1996, explaining her decision to resign from the Public

Facilities District Board of Directors. She states:

[T]he balance of public and private interests has

shifted radically and wrongly, in my view, to the

welfare of the Mariners ownership over that of

the public. . . . I cannot support the dramatic

shift in the relationship, because I do not believe

it serves the public interest for which the Board

is supposed to be a steward.

CP at 663. In an attachment to the letter, dated December

23, 1996, Board Member Yapp detailed her concern that

the government is spending $360 million to build a ball

park which will be turned over to a private corporation to

operate for private benefit. She said all the benefits are

shifted to the club, yet all the risk is not shifted to the

club; the lease provisions gut any oversight the PFD was

intended to exercise to ensure that the public’s asset is

properly maintained; and “the club even dictates how the

PFD spends the rent money it receives.” CP at 666. She

continued (I paraphrase):

1. Although it is nearly impossible for the PFD

to terminate the club’s lease for failure of the

club to meet its obligations, the club may escape

from its obligations through bankruptcy and

opposed any provisions in the lease to guard

against that eventuality.

: 2. The club has eliminated previously pro-

i posed lease conditions which require PFD

4 agreement with plans for operating and main-

taining the ball park. PFD does not have the

money to enforce the lease because the rent

won’t cover the costs of enforcement.

App. 54

3. The $700,000 per year rent for the brand new

facility is half of the $1.3 million the club paid in

1995 to play in a 20-year-old Kingdome. The

new lease, unlike the current one, entitles the

Mariners to control the property 365 days per

year, although the previous lease provided for

only 85 regular games. Nor is there any atten-

dance-based rent and “in fact, the PFD must pay

rent for office space in the ball park it owns.”

4. Although there is a profit sharing require-

ment in the Stadium Act “there will be no profit

sharing under this lease. The Mariners so-called

‘true profit’ is a numbers game that they control.

Their definitions ensure that the public will not

reap any returns in shared profits from the new

stadium.”

5. Contrary to public belief the Mariners are

not putting up any equity contribution for the

construction of the ball park. They will only put

up money for the prospective operation of the

ball park “and, if the experience of other recent

ball parks is any guide, they will get the entire

$45 million from naming rights of this public

ball park. If they get more than $45 million for

the naming rights, they keep it.”

6. This $45 million is treated as a “contribu-

tion” to the construction of the ball park and as

a “loss” which must be recouped before there is

any profit sharing.

7. There are few requirements ensuring low

cost public access to the stadium, and the Mari-

ners will exercise exclusive control of any non-

baseball uses or amateur baseball uses of the

ball park. The Mariners will retain all revenue

from any of these uses. “There is not even a

provision for free public tours of the ball park.”

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There are few enforcement or accountability

provisions in the lease to require public access

or public benefits.

8. The Mariners will operate the ball park as a

private operator and, thus, unlike the operator

of the Seattle Center or the Kingdome, are

exempt from competitive bidding, affirmative

action plans, etc.

9. Although the public contribution to the sta-

dium included a 10% contingency, they have

insisted on an increase in the County bond

amount by $15 million, which will ensure that

their pledge to pay cost overruns never arises.

They dropped the capital reserve fund from $15

million to $5 million, which means that in the

final year of the lease, funds will not be suffi-

cient to pay what we already know to be the

scheduled capital repair and replacement costs.

10. If the team sells, there will be no oppor-

tunity to find a suitable local buyer.

With the capitulation to the demands and

conditions of the Mariners, major league base-

ball may be saved for Seattle, but at the price of

honest dealing and, in my view, at the expense

of the interests of the public. Accordingly, I vote

no on this lease.

CP at 665-68.

Applying the CR 56 summary judgment standard, I

submit it is patently obvious that there is, at minimum, a

question of fact regarding whether or not this transfer of

a brand new baseball! stadium to the exclusive control of

a private, for-profit corporation for 20 years is motivated

by donative intent. This factual issue may be determined

App. 56

only by the trier of fact, not the trial court sitting in

summary judgment, nor this court.

Grossly Inadequate Return

Were this not enough, a further inference of donative

intent arises from the following facts.

Many, many Washington cases? apply the term

“grossly inadequate” by factual comparison to what is

9 For example, a home which is sold for substantially less

than its fair market value is sold for a purchase price which is

“grossly inadequate.” Casa del Rey v. Hart, 110 Wn.2d 65, 72, 750

P.2d 261 (1988). An award of five percent of the sale price of

windows plus $50,000 bond is “grossly inadequate.” Boeing v.

Sierracin Corp., 108 Wn.2d 38, 64 n.4, 738 P.2d 665 (1987). Gross

inadequacy is a relative concept measured against the value

transferred. Buckerfield’s Ltd.. 9 Wn.App. at 226. The sale of

timber property worth $94,000 for $35,000 is “grossly

inadequate.” Zucker v. Mitchell, 62 Wn.2d 819, 822, 384 P.2d 815

(1963). Competitive bidding furnishes protection to the seller

“and avoids the sacrifice of the property at a grossly inadequate

sale price.” Lee v. Barnes, 61 Wn.2d 581, 585, 379 P.2d 362 (1963).

Damages of $6,800 were “grossly inadequate” when the

evidence in the case would have sustained a verdict

considerably more than that. Rathke v. Roberts, 33 Wn.2d 858,

881, 207 P.2d 716 (1949). Return of a property’s fair market value

is adequate, not “grossly inadequate.” Washington State Hop

Producers v. Riel, 20 Wn.2d 624, 627, 148 P.2d 847 (1944). Where it

would cost $750 to construct roadway approaches, and the

respondent only receives $600, compensation is “grossly

inadequate.” Downing v. State, 9 Wn.2d 685, 687, 115 P.2d 972

(1941). Whether or not a personal injury verdict is “grossly

inadequate” depends upon the injuries and the pecuniary loss.

Silow v. Mau, 186 Wash. 258, 260, 57 P.2d 1059 (1936). If the

amount bid is fair under the circumstances, and there is no

reasonable probability that a greater amount could be obtained

on resale, the sale should be confirmed because the price was

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App. 57

“adequate” under the particular facts. The question of

gross inadequacy is one for the jury, not the court. Sova v.

First Nat'l Bank of Ferndale, 18 Wn.2d 88, 104, 138 P.2d 181

(1943). In sum, something is “grossly inadequate” if it is

less, by sufficient degree, than “adequate.” What degree

the jury must determine under all the facts and circum-

stances. Clearly we are measuring adequacy, not legal

sufficiency.

By dictionary definition, “inadequate” is “[ijnsuffi-

cient; disproportionate; lacking in effectiveness or in con-

formity to a prescribed standard or measure.” Black's Law

Dictionary 758 (6th ed. 1990).

The term “grossly inadequate” almost always refers

to a transaction with “legally sufficient” consideration yet

inadequate return. For example, in City of Tempe v. Pilot

Properties, Inc., 22 Ariz. App. 356, 527 P.2d 515, 518 (1974)

the court was faced with an alleged unconstitutional gift

under a similar constitutional provision where the city of

Tempe attempted to lease city land to the Seattle Pilots

for a spring training camp for $1 a year. While the $1

payment may have constituted “legally sufficient” con-

sideration, the court held a factual inquiry was required

not “grossly inadequate.” Blair v. Hewitt, 185 Wash. 430, 432, 55

P.2d 607 (1936). A transaction which is not “fair and just” is

grossly inadequate. In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 58, 28

P.2d 280 (1934). Where the consideration paid is not fairly

proportioned to the value of the property, the consideration is

“grossly inadequate.” Cannon v. Seattle Title Trust Co., 142 Wash.

213, 219, 252 P. 699 (1927). A sale of corporate property for a

grossly inadequate price should never be permitted over the

protest of minority stockholders. Cardiff v. Johnson, 126 Wash.

454, 463, 218 P. 269 (1923).

App. 58

to assess whether the consideration received by the gov-

ernment was sufficiently inequitable and unreasonable to

amount to an unconstitutional subsidy. Id. at 522.

By this standard let us turn to the question at hand;

i.e., is there any fact or inference in the record, when

construed most favorably to the nonmoving party, which

would indicate the consideration returned to the county

is “grossly inadequate?”

To answer we must view the transaction as a whole.

We do not have the luxury, as does the majority under the

legal sufficiency test, to simply pick one or two pennies

and say, “Aha! Here is some consideration, and we need

not inquire into its adequacy!”

I would be surprised if the majority would not con-

cede my point, as I did theirs: while there is legally

sufficient consideration to support a promise, there are

certainly facts and inferences in the record to support a

finding by the trier of fact that this return was “grossly

inadequate.”

The majority points to the following factors (I think

to establish legal sufficiency — which I concede — but not

to establish adequacy — which I contest):

1. The Mariners have committed to play at

least 90 percent of their games at the new sta-

dium.

2. They will contribute $45 million to the sta-

dium.

3. There is a provision for profit sharing with

the Public Facilities District.

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4. The annual rent to the Public Facilities Dis-

trict will be $700,000.

5. The Mariners are responsible for construc-

tion costs overruns on stadium construction.

6. They are responsible to pay any deficiencies

to construct the parking facilities after the bond

amount has been exhausted.

7. The Mariners have the responsibility to

operate the ball park as a first class facility.

8. The Mariners are responsible to make major

repairs and capital improvements, and

9. The Mariners must provide insurance.

Majority at 14-15.

None of these claimed benefits is even relevant to an

“adequacy” legal analysis which is primarily concerned

with (1) what the taxpayers give and (2) what they take in

return; not with the extent to which the Mariners will

prosper or what expenses they must pay before making a

profit. None of the above factors will result in any return

to the taxpayers; they basically relate to the cost of the

Mariners’ doing business, which includes the cost to

maintain a stadium provided to them at largely public

expense where they do business for nominal rent. But the

constitution requires us to protect the taxpayers. If the

Mariners incidentally benefit absent unconstitutional aid

- so much the better; if they falter, that is not a ground for

public expenditure. Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of

Seattle, 70 Wn. App. 491, 510, 857 P.2d 283 (1993). There-

fore questions relating to the operation of the stadium are

not relevant unless the taxpayers of the county will gain

or lose therefrom. In general Professor Baade concluded

App. 60

that there was no measurable economic benefit to the

county from the Mariners under this lease. CP at 710.

1. 90 Percent of Games

Whether or not the Mariners play 90 percent of their

games in the new stadium will have no fiscal impact on

the county.

2. $45 Million Contribution

A Mariner contribution of $45 million toward the con-

struction cost might make this a more valuable asset; how-

ever, the record shows at the expiration of the 20-year lease

the facility will have no value. Affidavit of James P. Quirk

(retired professor of economics), CP at 758 (the projected life

of the stadium is 20 years; “a 20 year old major league

baseball-only stadium without a major league baseball team

tenant has essentially no market value, especially in a small

market city such as Seattle. . . . ”).

3. Profit-Sharing

There will be no profits to share. Even the trial court

agreed the record demonstrated there would be no profit.

CP at 1082. After lengthy analysis, Professor Quirk con-

cluded there would be no profits, CP at 762-65; Professor

Baade opined there would be no profits. CP at 710. The

lease details numerous deductions to be applied prior to

arriving at net income. CP at 150, Lease, Paragraph 5.2.3.

All losses since 1995 are carried forward and must be

repaid to the Mariners before there is any profit. CP at

150-01, Lease, Paragraph 5.2.

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4. $700,000 Rent

A $700,000 per year annual rent to the PFD (1) is no

return to the taxpayers and (2) is nominal at that. CP at

709, 766, 788. The trial court found it is “very low.” CP at

1082. In answer to interrogatories, the county said it

would receive no rent whatsoever; all would go to the

Public Facilities District. CP at 687. Under terms of the

lease, the Public Facilities District must utilize the annual

rent for stadium purposes, not return it to the county. CP

at 149, Lease, Paragraph 5.1.3. According to the Declara-

tion of Professor Baade, a $700,000 annual rent is but a

nominal return on $336 million.!° Normal fair market

return on capital would be in the area of 10 percent,

which would require an annual rent of $33,600,000

(approximately one year of interest on the debt). If the

fair market value of the stadium were counted (including

the Mariners $45 million contribution and real estate

donated by the county), the 10 percent would be calcu-

lated on $414 million (CP at 759), for an annual rent of

$41,400,000. $700,000 measured against an even lower

capital value represented by only the $336,000,000 in

bonded debt is 0.2 percent, 50 times less than the fair

market rent. CP at 709. The trial court accepted this figure

as well. CP at 1100.

10 See Rainier Nat'l Bank v. Inland Mach. Co., 29 Wn. App.

725, 732, 631 P.2d 389 (1981) (“Consideration may be ‘nominal’

either in the absolute sense, e.g., $1 or relative to the value of the

machine. For example, consideration of $1,000 for a machine

worth $10,000 would be nominal.”).

App. 62

5. Cost Overruns

The payment of construction cost overruns does not

represent a return to the County, given the stadium will

be ubsolete at the expiration of the lease and under

exclusive private control until then. Moreover, construc-

tion cost overruns are very unlikely. See Declaration of

Professor Baerwaldt. CP at 732 (construction cost overrun

is unlikely because of $60 million contingency fund).

6. Parking Deficiencies

The Mariners will pocket all parking revenue, esti-

mated at $670,000 per year. CP at 146, 815, Lease, Para-

graph 3.7.2. Payment of the deficiencies, if any, for the

parking facility will not be a return to the taxpayers but

rather a value added to the stadium, which will be obso-

lete at the end of the lease and under private entrepre-

neurial control until then. Moreover, such an eventuality

is highly unlikely given the terms of the lease.

There will be no responsibility on the part of the

Mariners until all admission taxes are first expended on

this. CP at 146-47, Lease, Paragraph 3.7.3.

7. Operation of Ball Park

Maintenance and operation of the ball park as a “first

class facility,” once again, is not a return to the taxpayer,

but rather maintains the stadium for the benefit of its

exclusive occupant, the Mariners. Maintenance is routine

and includes sweeping up debris. CP at 140-41, Lease,

Paragraph 3.2.

App. 63

8. Major Repairs

Under the terms of the lease, the Mariners’ duty to

make major repairs and capital improvements to the ball

park will be first offset by excess construction funds held

by the PFD. CP at 159, Lease, Paragraph 7.2.3. Excess

admissions tax will be similarly used. Id. Replacement

and repairs due to ordinary wear and tear are excluded

by the lease. CP at 140, Lease, Paragraph 3.2. If repairs

become too expensive, the Mariners may break the lease

and walk away. CP at 167. There is a maximum club

obligation of $15,000,000. CP at 164, Lease, Paragraph

7.7.6.

9. Insurance

The requirement that the Mariners provide insurance

is at best an indemnification of the PFD against further

liabilities occasioned by the Mariners’ operation of the

stadium. The cost of this insurance is unknown, but will

not be a return to the taxpayers in any event. Absent a

stadium being operated exclusively for the Mariners’

benefit, such insurance would be unnecessary.

I suggest that a more appropriate analysis under the

gift provision of the constitution does not involve Mari-

ner finances, but only county finances, in the sense we

must compare county expenditures against the monetary

returns.!!

11 The drafters explicitly rejected the idea that we can

consider the intangible benefits resulting from subsidization of

private business. Johnson v. Johnson, 96 Wn.2d 255, 266, 634 P.2d

377 (1981). Case law has similarly rejected such arguments. See

State ex rel. O’Connell v. Port of Seattle, 65 Wn.2d 801, 806, 399

App. 64

The County will expend $336 million in bonded debt,

transfer $45 million in naming rights to the Mariners (CP

at 666), and transfer $6 million of image licensing rights

to the Mariners as well (CP at 815). Virtually all of the

Mariners’ obligations are associated with the construc-

tion, maintenance, and operation of a stadium which the

taxpayers built exclusively for their benefit over the use-

ful life of the stadium, 20 years. Not even the annual rent

will be returned to the taxpayers; it will go to the Public

Facilities District and be recycled for stadium use. How-

ever, even if those annual $700,000 rent payments went

directly to the taxpayers, they would amount to a total of

only $14,000,000 over the course of the lease, compared to

public expenditure of $336 million. $700,000 per annum

payment is approximately one-fiftieth of the interest on

the bonded debt. ($336 million times approximately 10%

interest equals $33,600,000.) It doesn’t amortize, or even

come close. No private entrepreneur would build this

stadium under these terms and conditions — unless (1) he

is crazy and/or (2) he wants to make a gift to the Mari-

ners.

P.2d 623 (1965) (“The trial court was much impressed by the

argument pressed by the respondents and the intervenors, that

the denial of the right to engage in promotional hosting would

result in the loss of business for the port. However, such a

consideration does not justify the courts in disregarding the

plain and unambiguous provisions of the constitution. If Article

8, § 7, is too restrictive in its terms, that is a matter for the

citizens of this state to correct through the amendatory

process.”). However, in any event there will be no additional

economic value to the Mariners’ presence in the community. See

Declaration of Professor Allan Sanderson. CP at 721.

App. 65

There are other ways to look at this picture as well,

but it is obvious the facts of record construed most favor-

ably to the nonmoving party amply support the inference

that the return to the taxpayers is “grossly inadequate”

when compared to taxpayer expenditure.

Professor of Economics James Quirk testifies in the

record, for example, “over the 20 year term of the lease

agreement, the Mariners will receive an average annual

subsidy (in constant 1999 dollars) of approximately

$27,600,000 per year.” CP at 757. He details this conclu-

sion in a ten-page, single spaced, typewritten report with

numerous schedules attached. For the purpose of the

summary judgment standard, this report and all reason-

able inferences therefrom must be accepted as true, at

least insofar as other portions of the record do not pre-

sent facts and inferences even more favorable to the

Taxpayers.

There are 1,199 pages of record here. The lease is 108

pages long. This cannot be shoehorned into a summary

judgment. If this record, construed most favorably to the

Taxpayers, does not present at least one fact or inference

of (1) donative intent or (2) a grossly inadequate return, I

can’t imagine what would.

Perhaps that is just the point.

The majority and the trial court never addressed the

question because both insist upon looking for (and easily

finding) a peppercorn of consideration rather than con-

sidering whether this transaction amounts to public aid

to a private entity. Nor does either apply the standard of

App. 66

donative intent or grossly inadequate return, notwith-

standing that is the constitution’s standard and our case

law’s standard.

Conclusion

I conclude with reference to the memorandum deci-

sion of the trial court. CP at 1078-1088. The trial court

basically recognized the facts as posited by the Taxpayers

would “at least” establish that the profit-sharing provi-

sion “will in fact result in little or no financial return to

the County and Taxpayers”; annual rent of $700,000 “is

very low compared to ordinary expectations of market

rates for rental property or return on investment” and

constitutes an annual rate of return in the neighborhood

of 0.2 percent; and the oversight functions of the PFD in

managing the stadium may be very difficult to carry out.

But in so doing, the trial court found the “adequacy of

consideration” irrelevant because it was not necessary to

submit this project to a “traditional market analysis.”

That is error. Such is the only method to determine

whether the return to the taxpayers is adequate or grossly

inadequate.

The bottom line of the trial court opinion is this: “The

constitution does not exist to protect the public from the

weaknesses or failings of their public officials.” CP at

1086. It is ultimately upon that false proposition that the

trial court and the majority of this court rest their case.

But this dissent submits the constitution was ratified

precisely to protect the public purse by “protect[ing] the

public from the weaknesses or failings of their public

officials.” It was enacted to protect the public from the

ESSER | REAL IOIOOIS

App. 67

misdeeds of public officials who squander the wealth of

the hardworking citizens of this state. That is the reason

we have this constitutional article, if we can keep it.

For these reasons I dissent.

/s/ Sanders, J.

I concur

/s/ Madsen, J.

App. 68

THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON

No. 65062-4

KING COUNTY, Respondent,

2 ORDER

TAXPAYERS OF KING COUNTY,

‘ CHANGING

et al., Appellants, WASHINGTON OPINION

STATE MAJOR LEAGUE

BASEBALL STADIUM PUBLIC (Filed

FACILITIES DISTRICT, Respondent. Oct. 9, 1997)

It is hereby ordered that the opinion in the above

cause, as the same appears at 132 Wn.2d 360, be changed

as follows: the last paragraph of footnote 14 beginning

with the words “Ordinance 12000” in the ninth line from

the bottom of page 388 is deleted, and the following

paragraphs are inserted in its place:

Ordinance 12000 was enacted on October

25, 1995. This ordinance represented King

County’s policy decision to proceed with the

new stadium. Intervenors Scannell and Ruano

apparently filed with the Metropolitan King

County Council clerk’s office a petition for refer-

endum regarding Ordinance 12000 (that docu-

ment is not in the Clerk’s Papers). By letter to

Scannell and Ruano dated October 27, 1995, the

clerk ruled the ordinance was not subject to

referendum and refused to process the petition.

Clerk’s Papers at 976. As noted above, the King

County trial court stated there is no action

pending in King County challenging the clerk’s

refusal and requiring the county to refer Ordi-

nance 12000 to the people. Nor have Intervenors

Ruano and Scannell brought the existence of any

such action to the Court’s attention. Laches now

App. 69

prevents subjecting Ordinance 12000 to a refer-

endum. Lopp v. Peninsula Sch. Dist., 90 Wn.2d

754, 585 P.2d 801 (1978) (suit to enjoin sale of

bonds barred by laches because unreasonable

delay in bringing suit resulted in changed con-

ditions that would damage defendant if injunc-

tion allowed.

Scannell and Ruano have had their day in

court as to the validity of Ordinance 12000. They

challenged the validity of Ordinance 12000 in a

Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint

for Declaratory Judgment, which they filed in

Thurston County on December 27, 1995. In that

suit, Ruano and Scannell alleged King County

was “without authority to pass [Ordinance

12000],” and asked the trial court for a judgment

declaring Ordinance 12000 “null and void.”

Clerk’s Papers at 898. The trial court dismissed

all their claims and this Court accepted direct

review, ultimately affirming the dismissal in

CLEAN v. State, 130 Wn.2d 782, 928 P.2d 1054

(1996).

Dated this 9th day of October, 1997

/s/ Durham, C.J.

Chief Justice

APPROVED:

/s/ Smith, J.

/s/ Dolliver, J.

/s/ Guy, J.

/s/ Johnson, J.

132 Wn.2d 360

/s/

/s/ Alexander, J.

/s/ Talmadge, J.

/s/

App. 70

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE

STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN AN FOR THE COUNTY OF KING

KING COUNTY,

Plaintiff,

vs.

THE TAXPAYERS OF

KING COUNTY,

Defendants,

WASHINGTON STATE

MAJOR LEAGUE

BASEBALL STADIUM

PUBLIC FACILITIES

DISTRICT, et al.

Intervenors.

No. 97-2-01127-2SEA

DECISION ON KING

COUNTY’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT AND

DEFENDANTS’ CROSS-

MOTION

wee” meee” See” See Nee” See” me” ee” Sie” Sree” ree” See” See ee ee”

This case comes on for hearing pursuant to the

County’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the Tax-

payers’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. Oral Argu-

ment was heard on February 19, 1997. The Court has

considered the files and pleadings herein and specifically

the submissions of the parties listed in Appendix A

hereto.

This case involves King County Ordinance 12593

relating to the issuance of bonds for the construction of a

new baseball stadium and associated parking facility.

King County has moved for summary judgment and a

declaration that the bond issuance is lawful and constitu-

tional; the Taxpayers oppose the motion and have filed a

App. 71

cross motion for summary judgment. The court has

reviewed over 150 pages of briefing plus several hundred

pages of exhibits, affidavits, declarations, and other docu-

mentation and has heard several hours of oral argument.

It is not the role of this court to provide a detailed

opinion regarding its legal rulings, that is an appellate

court function. What is provided below is a short explica-

tion of this court’s resolution of the case.

It is axiomatic in our system of separation of powers

that the judicial branch of government does not judge the

wisdom or popularity of legislative acts. If the people’s

elected legislators enact unpopular or controversial laws,

or pursue debatable or even foolish projects, it is not for

the courts to so declare. The role of the court is merely to

determine if the legislative action is lawfully enacted and

constitutional. This court expresses no opinion on the

relative merits of the decision to construct a new baseball

Stadium or its associated financing plan. Those policy

issues are not before the court. The relatively narrow

legal issues that are presented for this court’s review are

addressed below.

I. Does the Stadium Act Contain a Tax that Violates the

Constitutional Provision Regarding Uniformity of

Taxation and Distribution of State Funds From the

Treasury?

A. Res Judicata.

The County argues that it is too late to raise this issue

because the constitutionality of the Stadium Act was

already litigated and decided by the state Supreme Court

in CLEAN v. State of Washington No. 63842-0 (December

App. 72

20, 1996), and any related constitutional challenges

should have been raised in that litigation. Res Judicata

does not apply, however, if there is no identity of parties,

and application of the doctrine is still subject to the

discretion of the court if there are significant issues of

public concern that have not been addressed by the

courts. Although the prior case was brought by “tax-

payers,” they were individual taxpayers who were not

charged with the duty to represent all the taxpayers of

the County (in contrast with the taxpayers in this suit). In

addition, the issue raised here is a constitutional one in a

case of significant public importance and should be con-

sidered by the court.

B. Is the State Tax Diversion Unconstitutional?

Taxpayers argue that Articles XI, VII and VIII of the

state Constitution are violated by diverting .017% portion

of the retail sales tax for stadium financing. Article XI,

Sec. 9 requires all counties to share proportionately in

taxes levied for state purposes; Article VII, Sec. 6 and

Article 8, Sec. 4 require state funds to be deposited into

the Treasury and paid out only by appropriation of the

legislature. Taxpayers assert that the Stadium Act of 1995

is unconstitutional because the financing plan allows

King County a credit of .017% against the retail sales tax

that would otherwise go to the state, thereby reducing the

County’s payment into the general fund compared to

other counties and resulting in the State’s contribution of

funds to the stadium project not coming from dollars

paid into the Treasury or subsequently appropriated from

the Treasury.

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App. 73

State legislation is presumed to be constitutional and

anyone challenging the constitutionality of enacted state

law as the burden to show that the law is unconstitu-

tional beyond a reasonable doubt.

1. Uniform Taxation

The Stadium Act essentially allows the County to

“keep” a portion of the state sales tax rather than remit-

ting it to the State as the State’s way of contributing to the

funding package for the baseball stadium. The Act does

not actually reduce King County’s tax but directs or

diverts a portion of the tax to remain with the County for

stadium purposes rather than being paid to the State. The

end effect is exactly the same as if the County paid the

money to the state and then the legislature sent the

money back to the County. There are two important dis-

tinctions between this scenario and a non-uniform tax.

First is that the actual rate of taxation remains the same.

The taxpayers have the same rate of taxation as in any

other county. The diversion is not for the purpose of

returning money to the taxpayers. Secondly, the diversion

is for a specific purpose authorized and directed by the

legislature. In other words, the money is being returned

to the County not for any general unspecified purpose,

but only for the specific purpose authorized by the legis-

lature. Although the Constitution requires taxes to be

uniform it does not require expenditures to be uniform.

The legislature can spend state money on local projects

without offending these provisions of the constitution.

App. 74

2. Disbursement Through the Treasury

The Constitutional issue presented is truly only a

technical issue of whether or not the money must physi-

cally go through the treasury in order to satisfy the

constitution. The purpose of the constitutional provisions

requiring payment into and disbursement out of the Trea-

sury is to prevent the expenditure of State monies with-

out legislative direction. Here that purpose has been met

through the Stadium Act which specifies both the amount

to be spent and what it is to be spent on. There is no room

left for discretion, nor could the legislature in future

years change the commitment it has made. Annual remit-

tances and appropriations would result in not one iota

more legislative direction and accountability than has

already been built into the Stadium Act. Essentially both

the deposit into and the appropriations out of the State

Treasury have been done prospectively before the taxes

have been physically paid, making unnecessary the actual

physical transfer at a later date.

It is also most likely that the funds in question are

not subject to the requirements of Article VII and VIII in

the first place. Numerous appellate decisions in this state

have established that not every dollar that comes under

state control becomes part of “state funds” for purposes

of these constitutional provisions. For example several

cases have established that these constitutional provi-

sions apply only to property taxes, not excise taxes. Prop-

erty taxes cover items of property themselves whereas

excise taxes affect only the right to use or transfer items

of property. The taxes at issue here are clearly only excise

taxes. In addition, “state funds” are those monies that are

App. 75

collected as part of general revenue before the legislature

decides how they are to be disbursed. Monies that are

collected under specific programs as special funds for

special purposes are not general state revenues. When the

legislature sets up a fund or program and earmarks cer-

tain “taxes” for that program the funds are not longer

required to go into the Treasury but may go directly to

the program as designed. Examples of appellate court

approval of such arrangements are Robison v. Dwyer 58

Wash.2d 576 (1961) regarding the Agricultural Enabling

Act and State Ex Rel Washington Toll Bridge Authority v.

Yeils 61 Wash.2d 28 (1962) and other cases cited by the

County in its brief. It should also be noted that this is not

the first time that the legislature has set up a “credit” to

specific taxpayers for purposes of funding a particular

state program or furthering state purposes. For example,

the County draws the Court's attention to credits for

certain pollution control facilities and for employer spon-

sored ride-sharing programs. The key point is that the

constitutional requirement of legislative action has

occurred. It is legislative accountability and decision

making that the Constitution is aimed at. The substantive

concerns of uniformity of taxation, and accountability of

expenditures through legislative authorization, are not in

any way violated by the Stadium Acct.

App. 76

II. Does Financing the Stadium through the proposed

bonds and public taxation Violate the Constitutional

prohibition of a Gift of Public Funds?

A. The Lease

Article VIII, Sections 5 & 7 prohibits a “gift” of public

funds to private entities. The Supreme Court has already

ruled in CLEAN that the financing package set up

through the Stadium Act does not amount to a gift of

public funds. All that remains, therefor, for this court to

review is whether or not the actions taken to implement

the financing package have, de facto, changed the nature

of the financing to something other than what was con-

templated by the legislature and approved by the

Supreme Court. It is argued by the taxpayers that the

lease between the Public Facilities District and the Base-

ball Club does just that by providing insignificant consid-

eration and essentially divesting the PFD of all

meaningful control of the ballpark.

As this is a motion for Summary Judgment the court

must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most

favorable to the non-moving party, the taxpayers. Various

points raised by the taxpayers are factually arguable,

based on the lease provisions, declarations, and other

documents. For purpose of this motion, therefore, the

court must assume that at trial the Taxpayers could estab-

lish at least the following:

1. That the Mariners might make little or no profit

in the future, making the requirement to share profits

with the PFD a statutory provision that will in fact result

in little or no financial return to the County and tax-

payers.

Oe Pee ee el ay Oe ore Pen

App. 77

2. That the annual rent of $700,000, compared to the

overall investment in and cost of the facility, is very low

compared to ordinary expectations of market rates for

rental property or return on investment. Taxpayers’

experts estimate the proposed annual rent is a rate of

return in the neighborhood of .2%.

3. That oversight functions of the PFD in managing

the Stadium may be very difficult to carry out due to the

amount of discretion delegated to the Club, the ambiguity

of the standards to be applied and the cumbersome and

potentially expensive mechanisms for resolving disputes.

Taxpayers assert that they should be given the oppor-

tunity to prove these points at trial and that suminary

judgment is inappropriate. The County, however, asserts

that even if true, these facts would not change the out-

come, and that summary judgment should be granted.

B. Adequacy of Consideration.

The Supreme Court has already determined that the

County will receive consideration for the financing of the

stadium primarily through (1) the intangible benefit pro-

vided to the people of having major league baseball in

Seattle and (2) the associated economic benefits to the

community and the state. These issues may not be reliti-

gated. The court is dicta said that “if” rent for the sta-

dium were “nominal” it “might” change the equation.

While the existence of consideration is a pre-requisite to

the valid use of public funds, the adequacy of the consid-

eration is not to be scrutinized in the same way that one

would a normal market transaction. The court considers

App. 78

the evidence of a gift of public property or funds and

only looks at whether or not there is grossly inadequate

return for public expenditures. The Taxpayers assert that

the rent set out in the lease is nominal and grossly inade-

quate. There are several reasons however why they can-

not prevail on this point.

First, the word “nominal” itself actually means “in

name only.” A familiar example of a nominal charge

would be a $1 payment for the “sale” of property among

family members. The primary meaning of “nominal” is

essentially “having no value”. Under its classical defini-

tion, $700,000 is not nominal. That sum does have value.

It can purchase things of value, pay for salaries of certain

employees, and it may even be enough to fund the bud-

get of a small county department.

Second, even if one assumes that “nominal” has a

broader meaning, determining whether rent is nominal or

not must be considered “in context” and the context is

not the private market place. Public projects frequently

don’t yield themselves to traditional market analysis.

Public parks are one example. That the market is not the

standard in this case was implicitly recognized in the

Stadium Act which did not require that the Club be

charged market rate rents, and in fact did not specify rent

at all. Clearly the legislature did not intend that rent be

utilized as a source of repaying the public’s principle and

interest investments in the stadium even though a finan-

cier in the private sector might have such an expectation.

Rather the legislature contemplated that the County will

recoup its expenditures for the stadium from various tax

revenues, not from rent or other earnings of the Stadium.

App. 79

Therefor

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