Appendix — Blount v. Washington
Supreme Court brief1998
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\““ No.Qy? 790 Nov 1082
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1998
SYLVIA BLOUNT, Executive Director of Vacaville State Hospital,
and DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General,
Petitioners,
v.
TROY LEE WASHINGTON., Respondent.
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
APPENDICES TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DANIEL E. LUNGREN
Attorney General
GEORGE WILLIAMSON
Chief Assistant Attorney General
GARY W. SCHONS
Senior Assistant Attorney General
KEITH I. MOTLEY
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
LILIA E. GARCIA
Deputy Attorney General
Counsel of Record
110 West A St., Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92101
P.O. Box 85266
San Diego, CA 92186-5266
Telephone: (619) 645-2225
Fax: (619) 645-2191
Counsel for Petitioners
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX B
APPENDIX C
APPENDIX D
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A
[Filed August 28, 1997]
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TROY LEE WASHINGTON, No. 96-55275
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
94-01413-JSR
Vv.
MEMORANDUM*
JOE DEMORALES, Executive
Director,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
John S. Rhoades,
District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted August 8, 1997
Pasadena, California
Before: BROWNING, BRUNETTI, and TROTT, Circuit
Judges.
‘
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may
not be cited to or by the courts in this circuit, except as provided
by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
A-2
We examine de novo the district court’s decision to deny
Washington’s habeas petition, and apply the standards that
governed habeas relief prior to the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114
F.3d 1484, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997) (AEDPA not to be applied
retroactively); Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997).
The State concedes that Washington asserted his right to
remain silent during police interrogation. The California Court
of Appeal concluded that the videotaped confession thereafter
avulsed from him by the police was involuntary and improperly
admitted in evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded that the
police utterly failed to "scrupulously honor" Washington’s
constitutional rights as embodied in Miranda. Michigan v.
Molsey, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). A federal magistrate judge
agreed, as did the district court from which this appeal is taken.
However, the district court concluded, as did the Court of
Appeal, that the erroneous admission of the involuntary
confession was harmless.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the erroneous
admission of Washington’s videotaped confession was harmless.
On collateral review, an error is not "harmless" if it "had
substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).
In determining whether an error is harmless, "the question is not
‘were they [the jurors] right in their judgment, regardless of the
error or its effect on the verdict. It is rather what effect the
error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the
jury’s decision.” Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir.
1994) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 642-43 (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). An error is not harmless if we are "in grave
doubt" as to whether the error had "substantial and injurious
effect or influence." O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435
(1995).
The videotaped confession was powerful and convincing
evidence of Washington’s guilt, not only of the crimes charged
but also of the rape special circumstance. The inadmissible
confession described the crimes in greater and more graphic
detail than any other evidence offered at trial. It provided a
unique insight into Washington’s motive for committing the
crimes and his state of mind in doing so. Indeed, the state trial
judge who denied the defense’s motion for judgment of acquittal
A-3
said: "As to the special circumstance, the critical evidence really
comes, I think, from the defendant’s statement although there is
support from the other evidence in the case."
Moreover, the prosecutor carefully pointed out to the jurors
that Washington’s statements in the videotaped confession had a
particularly probative evidentiary significance:
As far as the substance of his confession and what he
says occurred or his admissions, you can certainly
consider those on the issues of deliberation and
premeditation.
Mr. Thoma also said that the defendant’s
statements are uncontroverted and, in large measure, I
cannot disagree with that; but I want you to understand
what that means. I mean, the only person who could
basically, with respect to the facts that occurred within
that condominium that night, dispute it is Miss
Barksdale, and Miss Barksdale isn’t here.
I think he was being credible for the most part
when he made that statement. That doesn’t mean that
he doesn’t have some impetus to hide some factors, for
example, whether he actually intended to rape her
when he went over there. That’s certainly a fact that
he may wish to keep to himself, but that’s a judgment
you have to make based on the evidence.
Now, that, Ladies and Gentlemen, as to the
circumstantial evidence is what that instruction is
talking about. But you got to stop and think for a
minute. When somebody is saying on the issue of
intent what was the intent involved, what that person,
namely, Mr. Washington tells you what his intent is, not
circumstantial evidence. He is the only person that can
give you direct evidence as I am on what I intend to do
and you are on what you intend to do.
That is not circumstantial evidence. That is direct
evidence, and that instruction does not apply to it. Mr.
Washington on what his intent was, direct evidence, not
circumstantial evidence. And that instruction does not
apply to it.
ee
A-4
This is where circumstantial evidence does apply
because you’re making an inference on that portion of
it. The only direct evidence is what Mr. Washington
tells you.... The only direct evidence you will ever
have on the issue of intent is what the individual
himself says, but the circumstantial evidence instruction
does not apply to direct evidence.
In other words, Mr. Washington’s statements as to
his intent you can consider on their full value. You
don’t have to weigh them, either two reasonable
intents, he’s telling you. If you believe them, then
that’s all you need. There’s no balancing acts. It’s a
question of whether you believe him or not. That’s it.
It’s direct evidence.
1/31/92 R.T. 266-269 (emphasis added).
The confession was the backbone of the prosecution’s
closing argument. Referring to express malice, the prosecutor
argued:
What does the defendant say to you?
Basically what he says in several different ways in
several different times in the interview: if you don’t
stop[,] I’m going to have to kill you. He says: I didn’t
want to, didn’t want to do it. But when she finally
wouldn’t stop, he killed her. He tells you himself.
That is express malice. That is murder.
Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
As to implied malice, the prosecutor argued:
He knew that the danger was. That’s the method he
was using and applying on Miss Barksdale when he’s
telling her: stop it or I’m going to kill you. He clearly
understood.
Id. at 201.
To prove that the murder occurred during the commission
of rape, the prosecutor argued:
ee
A-5
It must be a continuous course of conduct, one
continuous transaction, which is clearly all you have
here by Mr. Washington’s own statement. This is a
single event, a single course of conduct, a single
transaction. Therefore, he kills during the commission
of rape.
Now, even if this is not a continuous transaction, if
the killing was to facilitate escape or avoid detection,
that would also apply. .. .
Do we have circumstances that suggest that here?
You bet. That’s basically, ladies and gentlemen, I
submit to you why he killed her; it was the only way he
was going to get out of there. He could not stop the
conduct. He killed her to facilitate his escape and
avoid detection. She’s trying to pull his mask off.
That’s the reason he ends up doing it.
Id. at 204-05 (emphasis added).
As to the degree of murder, the prosecutor argued:
We're not talking about a particularly short period
of time here; we’re talking about one or two hours,
depending on which particular statement you’re looking
at in his, that is, Mr. Washington’s statement... .
The crucial thing is what was going through his
mind. He tells you almost in every breath throughout
the statement: stop fighting me or I’m going to kill
you. He doesn’t want to do it, but he’s weighing the
pros and cons of the result as he’s going through the
acts. And he finally does it. And that’s the truth of
the circumstances here. And that, I submit to you,
ladies and gentlemen, is a willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder, within the meaning of the law.
That is a first degree murder.
The second bases upon which you could find first
degree murder is murder, and I put with implied
malice, that was by means of lying in wait... .
I’m not going to go back through what I said
before, but that’s exactly what Mr. Washington was
doing here. He said that he went in to hurt her. This
A-6
is a murder at minimum with implied malice that was
accomplished by means of lying in wait.
Id. at 209-10.
The heart of the prosecution’s rebuttal was a statement-by-
statement verbatim recital of incriminating parts of Washington’s
confession to establish each element of the crimes. Id. at 271-
76. Virtually no properly admitted evidence was mentioned.
We note that a written transcript of the confession was also
admitted in evidence and was presumably in the jury’s hands.
The prosecutor relied upon Washington’s demeanor in the
videotaped confession as establishing his credibility:
The truth is, ladies and gentlemen, that he
probably didn’t want to have to kill her. Indeed, if you
watch his confession, I submit to you when he finally
gets it off his chest and tells you what happened, that
you have an impression of credibility in much of his
account. It’s what makes tragedies all the way around.
Indeed, his actual decision to kill comes only at the end
of the struggle when he’s finally realized that he isn’t
going to get out there unless he does it.
Id. at 207 (emphasis added). This point was reemphasized in
rebuttal:
I’ve already told you what my opinion is. And if you
watched that interview, I don’t really know how you
could come to a different conclusion.
I think he was being credible for the most part
when he made that statement.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
Strong circumstantial evidence linked Washington to the
crime, but the inadmissible confession was by far the most
influential proof before the jury and inevitably had a substantial
and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. We are mindful of the
Supreme Court’s observation that
Coo
A-7
[a] confessions is like no other evidence... .
‘[c]onfessions have profound impact on the jury so
much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put
them out of mind even if told to do so.’ While some
statements by a defendant may concern isolated
aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when
linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the
defendant discloses the motive for and means of the
crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence
alone in reaching its decision.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (Citations
Omitted). Justice Kennedy reminds us that when we conduct a
harmless error analysis with regard to an inadmissible
confession, we must appreciate "the indelible impact" it may
have on a jury. Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, the
erroneous admission of the confession destroyed any possibility
of a fair trial. Cf. Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.
1996) (inadmissible confession held not to have any substantial
or injurious effect or influence on a trial).
REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to grant
the writ.
ecpiudliisiniaderaiecesesce
APPENDIX B
C—O a
CC,
B-8
APPENDIX B
[Filed January 8, 1996]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TROY LEE WASHINGTON, CIVIL NO.
94-1413-R (RBB)
Petitioner,
v. ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR WRIT
JON DeMORALES, Warden, OF HABEAS
and CORPUS
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Respondents.
Petitioner filed the present motion for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner alleges that the
trial court committed constitutional error by admitting his
confession into evidence at trial.
On July 6, 1995, Magistrate Judge Brooks issued a Report
and Recommendation (hereafter “Recommendation") concluding
that Petitioner’s conviction should not be disturbed but that a
"retrial of the special circumstance [murder during the
commission of rape] allegation is required." Recommendation
at 17. Both Petitioner and Respondent filed Objections.
Petitioner objects to Magistrate Judge Brooks’ finding that the
admission of Petitioner’s confession was harmless at the guilt
phase.” Respondent objects to Magistrate Judge Brook’s
1. Petitioner also objects to Magistrate Judge Brooks’
conclusion that there was no constitutional error in the instruction
spe gah sal
B-9
finding that Petitioner’s confession prejudiced the jury’s finding
of the special circumstance. Respondent further objects to
Magistrate Judge Brooks’ finding that Petitioner’s second
statement, "I’m not gonna say anything,” was a revocation of
Petitioner’s waiver of his right to remain silent.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 636 (b)(1)(C), this Court has
reviewed the records and files herein and the Recommendation
of Magistrate Judge Brooks. Having made a de novo
determination of those portions of the Recommendation to
which objections have been made,” the Court agrees with
Magistrate Judge Brooks’ conclusion that admission of
Petitioner’s confession was harmless with respect to his
conviction However, this Court disagrees with Magistrate Judge
Brooks’ conclusion that the confession was not harmless with
respect to the jury’s finding that the special circumstance was
true. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s motion for writ
of habeas corpus is DENIED in its entirety.
I. Background
On November 6, 1990, the police found the dead body of
Deborah Barksdale in the trunk of her car, which was parked in
her condominium garage. Ms. Barksdale died as a result of
strangulation, her larynx had been fractured, and there was
evidence suggesting that some form of sexual intercourse
occurred. The time of Ms. Barksdale’s death was estimated to
be between 10:00 p.m. on Friday, November 2, 1990, and 1:30
a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990.
which omitted an essential element of the rape special
circumstances and that the admission of his confession was a
harmless error in the sanity phase of the trial. However, Petitioner
does not raise any arguments in addition to the arguments made to
Magistrate Judge Brooks. After reviewing the habeas corpus
petition, the traverse, the record below, and Magistrate Judge
Brooks’ Recommendation, this Court adopts the findings and
conclusions of Magistrate Judge Brooks as to these issues.
2. Section 636 (b)(1)(C) does not affirmatively require some
lesser review by the district court when no specific objections to
the magistrate’s report is filed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-
151 (1985).
B - 10
A resident of the victim’s condominium informed the police
that she had seen an unfamiliar black male near the
condominium complex on the night of the murder. The security
guard on duty that night also reported seeing a black male get
into a car -- later identified by the Department of Motor
Vehicle records as belonging to Petitioner -- parked across the
street at 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990.
On November 6, 1990, police detectives Richard Allen and
Louie Rodriguez contacted Petitioner, a black male, in front of
his residence. Petitioner agreed to accompany them to the
police station for an interview. Initially, the detectives asked
Petitioner general questions about himself and his relationship
with the victim. Petitioner told the detectives that he worked
for Barksdale Office Planning until he was laid off m August
1990. In addition, Petitioner admitted he and Ms. Sarksda®
argued before his employment was terminated. Pew . J als
admitted that in the week before the murder, Pettoner “ade
several attempts to contact Barksdale, but she failed to return
his phone calls. When Petitioner stopped by her office to visit,
she ran out the back door.
At this point, the detectives advised Washington of his
Miranda rights. Petitioner then asked if he was under arrest.
When the detectives told him he was not, Petitioner stated he
understood these rights as explained and agreed to continue
talking with them. (Clerk’s Tr. at 53-55.) Detective Rodriguez
then confronted Petitioner with the evidence that he was seen at
Barksdale’s condominium on the night of the murder. At one
point of the interrogation, the following exchange took place:
Detective Rodriguez: For what purpose did you go to her
place then? Did she call you over?
Petitioner: I’m not going to say anything.
Detective Rodriguez: Why not?
Petitioner: | Because I didn’t do it.
(Id. at 72) (emphasis added). The interrogation continued
| concerning Washington’s working relationship with Barksdale.
_ When Rodriguez again asked Petitioner what happened at
B-11
Barksdale’s house the night of the murder, Petitioner responded
as follows:
Petitioner: _[ told you if you just want to arrest me, you
can go ahead and arrest me but I didn’t do it.
I’m not gonna admit it.
Detective Allen: But that’s two different things, okay?
Petitioner: You're not gonna get it out of me because
I’m not gonna say anything. "Cause I didn’t do
it.
[Fifteen seconds of silence]
Detective Rodriguez: You were there. Ah if you did it,
you know, I wasn’t there. Ah but if
you didn’t do it, you know, you’re
gonna have to tell us, you know.
The only, the only thing that we
know at this time is that you were
there. Now how it happened, you
know, you know, that’s something
that you'll have to explain.
Detective Allen: This is your time to do that.
(Id. at 77-78) (emphasis added). Petitioner continued talking
and answering the detectives’ questions. A short time after, the
following exchange took place:
Detective Allen: So let’s talk about it and find out about
what, what happened and why it
happened. Okay? It’s easy once you
start.
Petitioner: I don’t want to talk about it.
Detective Rodriguez: You sure?
Petitioner: I didn’t do it.
‘ B - 12
Detective Rodriguez: Well, yeah that’s another story you
know.
Detective Allen: That’s like ah not being there in that car.
Okay? That’s like, that’s like denying you
were even there in the car. Okay?
Denying that you didn’t do it. That’s not,
that’s not solving the problem. Okay?
Like ah my partner says, there were
people there that saw you and we have
the description of your car. We have the
description of the person that was there.
The person saw you get in the car, saw
you drive away. Okay? The fact is you
were there. The fact is a lady is dead.
Okay? The fact is you did it. Now, you
have to be able to admit that to yourself.
All those, all those things occurred.
Okay?
Petitioner: Do you want me to lie? I mean...
Detective Allen: No, I don’t want you to lie.
Petitioner: Do you want me tell you a story?
Detective Allen: No, I don’t want you to tell us a story.
You know, we’re not sitting here to hear
a story. It’s like we’re not, we werent’
[sic], we’re not sitting here to hear
ourselves talk about where you were and
you say, ’No I wasn’t there. I don’t want
to talk about it.’
Petitioner: Okay, I'll tell you. I went there.
(Id. at 80-81.) (emphasis added). Petitioner then confessed to
the killing and the rape.
On January 13, 1992, Petitioner Troy Lee Washington was
charged by amended information in the San Diego Superior
Court with having committed murder, a violation of California
iisbaeabe Demat
B - 13
Penal Code § 187(a), rape, a violation of California Penal Code
§ 261(2), and first degree burglary, a violation of California
Penal Code § 459. Petitioner was also charged with a special
circumstance of committing murder during the commission of
rape.
During the trial, the videotaped interview containing
Petitioner’s confession was played for the jury. The trial court
also admitted a written transcript of the interview into evidence.
In addition, the prosecution introduced the results of DNA tests
performed on sperm samples retrieved from the victim and bed
clothing. These samples matched samples obtained from
Petitioner. Both parties stipulated that all DNA samples were
properly obtained, maintained and that there was no evidence of
testing error. The parties further stipulated that except for
identical twins, no persons have yet been found with matching
DNA patterns. |
The jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts charged by
information, including the special circumstance allegation. The
jury also found Petitioner sane at the time the crimes were
committed. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison
without the possibility of parole.
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of
Appeal. Petitioner raised several issues, including the admission
of his confession into evidence. Holding that the admission of
the confession was harmless error, the Court of Appeal affirmed
the conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus relief with the California Supreme Court. The California
Supreme Court denied the petition without opinion.
The present motion for habeas corpus relief was filed on
September 9, 1994. Respondent concedes that Petitioner has
exhausted his administrative remedies.
Essentially, Petitioner contends that the trial court
committed constitutional error by admitting Petitioner’s
confession obtained in violation of Miranda at the guilty and
sanity phases of the trial. After reviewing the motion for writ of
habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer, Petitioner’s traverse, the
transcript and the videotaped interview containing Petitioner’s
confession, Magistrate Judge Brooks issued Recommendation
granting in part and denying in part the motion for writ of
habeas corpus.
Il. Miranda Violation
Petitioner contends that the trial court committed error by
admitting the portion of the interview containing his confession
because Petitioner had invoked his right to remain silent prior to
confessing.
A. Applicable Legal Standard
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme
Court established a procedural mechanism that safeguards the
exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. See Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal
Procedure, 83 Geo. L.J. 665, 803 (1995). Before interrogating
a* suspect in custody,” Miranda requires law enforcement
officials to inform the suspect (1) that he has a right to remain
silent; (2) that his statements may be used against him at trial;
(3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (4)
that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for
him. The Supreme Court further explained:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At
this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth
Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person
invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of
compulsion, subtle or otherwise.
Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, a criminal
suspect may selectively revoke a comprehensive waiver of his or
3. Miranda warnings are necessary only when a suspect is in
custody and is subjected to interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at
477-78. Since neither party disputes whether Petitioner was in
“custody,” this Court will not inquire into it.
4. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. No other warnings are
necessary, "a defendant need not be informed of a right to stop
questioning after it has begun." United States v. Lares-Valdez, 939
F. 2d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 1991).
tithes Lala eel
B - 15
her right to remain silent by expressing a desire not to discuss a
particular topic. United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537,
541-42 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2453 (1993);
United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1980)
(quoting United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 297-98 (9th
Cir. 1978)).
B. Petitioner Invoked His Right to Remain Silent
By agreeing to continue talking with the detectives,
Petitioner waived his Miranda right to remain silent. Petitioner
contends that he thereafter revoked his waiver and invoked his
right to remain silent. United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019,
1022 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant explicitly waived his Miranda
rights by orally agreeing to speak to the federal agents, signing
of a Miranda waiver was not esscntial for waiver to occur), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 895 (1994); United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d
1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendant waived his Miranda rights
where defendant stated that he understood his rights and then
agreed to talk to agent). This Court agrees with the findings of
the California Court of Appeal and Magistrate Judge Brooks
that Petitioner’s first statement, "I’m not gonna say anything," in
response to specific factual questions was a selective revocation
of Petitioner’s waiver of the right to remain silent. When an
individual selectively revokes a waiver of the right to remain
silent, the police can continue the interview as long as they
avoid questions concerning subjects that the individual did not
wish to discuss. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d at 541-42.
The California Court of Appeal also interpreted Petitioner’s
second statement, "I’m not going to say anything" as a selective
revocation of Petitioner’s Miranda waiver to remain silent.
Judge Benke, in a concurring opinion, concluded that Petitioner
never invoked his right to terminate the interview.2 However,
this Court concurs with Magistrate Judge Brooks that Petitioner
5. After viewing the videotape and considering the demeanor
of Petitioner, Judge Benke concurred in the result reached by
Appeal Court of California, but concluded that Petitioner never
invoked his right to terminate the interview. Thus, the entire
Court confession would be admissible.
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B - 16
did invoke his right to remain silent by his second statement.
Although the state court’s determination of factual findings is
presumptively correct, the constitutional effect of Petitioner’s
statements is a legal question subject to independent review.
Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991).
Furthermore, the desire to halt an interrogation may be
indicated in various ways. No precise words or conduct is
necessary. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955 (1970),
overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478,
510 (1993). This Court concludes that Petitioner’s statement, in
conjunction with the several seconds of silence thereafter,
demonstrates Petitioner’s attempt to halt the questioning,
thereby invoking his right to remain silent. However, the
detectives continued to encourage Petitioner to "face up" to his
"mistake," at one point stating "[s]o let’s talk about it and find
out what .. . happened and why it happened." (Clerk’s Tr. at
80.) Petitioner then stated, "I don’t want to talk about it." (Id.)
Both the California Court of Appeal and Magistrate Judge
Brooks found the third statement expressed Petitioner’s desire
to stop talking. At this point, further questioning should have
ceased. The California Court of Appeal stated that "[i]f there
were ambiguity on this point, the detectives were entitled to
inquire whether Petitioner did intend" to revoke his Miranda
waiver. This Court agrees. Moreover, "[d]oubts must be
resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim."
Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting
Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986)).
Statements obtained after a person in custody indicates that
he wishes to remain silent may be admissible where the
individual’s right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously
honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07 (1975). The
detectives continued to interrogate Petitioner concerning the
same crime he refused to discuss. Therefore, they failed to
"scrupulously honor" Petitioner’s right to terminate questioning.
Accordingly, the detectives elicited the Petitioner’s confession in
violation of Miranda. The trial court erred when it allowed the
portions of the interview following Petitioner’s second statement
that he did not want to continue, and the ensuing confession
into evidence.
B- 17
III. Admission of Petitioner’s Confession Does Not Amount to
a Reversible Error
Federal habeas proceedings assure that constitutional rights
are observed. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719
(1993). The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the harmless
error standard:
When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave
doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury’s verdict," that error is not harmless. And, the
petitioner must win.
O’Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995) (quoting Brecht,
113 S. Ct. at 1722). Grave doubt exists in the judge’s mind if
"the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual
equipoise as to the harmlessness of error." Id. Thus, the critical
question this Court faces is "Do I, the judge, think that the error
substantially influenced the jury’s decision?" Id. at 995. I think
not.
A. Guilt Phase of Trial
The evidence against Petitioner other than his confession is
compelling. Petitioner had been employed by the victim and
had been discharged a few months before she was strangled.
The victim feared Petitioner, avoiding him and his phone calls.
Moreover, Petitioner knew the victim deliberately avoided him.
Petitioner also knew where the victim lived and had been
there before. The day before the murder, Petitioner
unsuccessfully attempted to contact the victim. On the night of
the murder, a resident of the condominium complex observed a
person matching Petitioner’s description in the garage area of
the victim’s residence. The security guard saw a person
matching Petitioner’s description using a key to enter a car that
was registered to Petitioner. Finally, the sperm found in the
victim’s body and on the bedding matched Petitioner’s DNA.
Defense Counsel stipulated to the admission of the DNA
evidence obtained by the Cellmark’s method of analyzing
samples under the restriction fragment-length polymorphism
B- 18
("RFLP") process. Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that he
stipulated to the admissibility of the DNA evidence only because
the trial court admitted the confession, making the identity of
the perpetrator a moot point.* (Petitioner’s Objections at 2.)
Petitioner argues that under Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
US. 279 (1991), the admission of his confession was prejudicial
error. In Fulminante, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a
conviction obtained after the trial court improperly admitted
evidence of a coerced confession. Id. at 284. The state court
reasoned that although a second uncoerced confession
established overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt,
when a confession is improperly admitted a conviction is not
subject to harmless error review. Id. The United States
Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. The Court ruled
that the matter was subject to harmless error review but that the
admission of Fulminante’s coerced confession was not harmless
error. Id. at 297. The Court reasoned that the admission of the
coerced confession not only corroborated the uncoerced
confession but also led to the admission of otherwise
inadmissible evidence which would not have been relevant but
for the admission of the coerced confession. Id. at 299-300. In
short "[a]bsent the confessions, it is unlikely that Fulminante
would have been prosecuted at all." Id. at 297.
In contrast to Fulminante, in the present case the DNA
evidence was not made relevant only because the confession was
admitted. The trial court in the present case admitted the DNA
evidence because Defense Counsel made a strategical decision
to stipulate to the admissibility of the DNA evidence.
Petitioner, therefore, waived his evidentiary objection to the
reliability of the RFLP analysis. The Supreme Court recently
explained:
Absent some “overriding procedural consideration that
prevents enforcement of the contract," courts have held that
agreements to waive evidentiary rules are generally
enforceable even over a party’s subsequent objections. 21
C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §
5039, pp. 207-208 (1977). Courts have "liberally enforced"
6. Although the same argument was raised on appeal, the
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
as Pasrce a vi SG SPE REC. tte Mee MR Oh re oe Pe eee ee
B - 19
agreements to waive various exclusionary rules of evidence.
Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 Harv. L.
Rev. 138, 139-140 (1933). ...
Indeed, evidentiary stipulations are a valuable and
integral part of everyday trial practice. Prior to trail parties
often agree in writing to the admission of otherwise
objectionable evidence, either in exchange for stipulations
from opposing counsel or for other strategic purposes.
United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 802 (1995)
(affirming conviction obtained with admission by stipulation of
otherwise inadmissible evidence of statements made in course of
plea discussions). Accordingly, a party’s stipulation to evidence
precludes subsequent objections as to authenticity. Id. Having
stipulated to the admissibility of the DNA evidence, Petitioner
cannot now object to the admission of that evidence. Federal
courts are not forums to relitigate state trials. Brecht, 113 S. Ct.
at 1719 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
The only support for Petitioner’s argument that but for the
admission of the confession the DNA would not have been
admitted, is his own speculation. Speculation as to what counsel
would have done and how the court would have ruled does not
amount to error of a constitutional dimension. Even if
defendant had not stipulated and even if the trial court
conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the DNA
evidence, this Court finds that the trial court could have
admitted the DNA evidence without the stipulation.
Magistrate Judge Brooks recognized that Petitioner
unsuccessfully objected to the use of the DNA evidence at his
preliminary hearing. See Recommendation at 14. Moreover,
during the time Petitioner’s case was pending, the Second
District Court of Appeal conducted a detailed analysis of
whether RFLP analysis evidence was admissible in People v.
Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 836 (1991). The Court of Appeal
found that RFLP and Cellmark’s method was generally accepted
in the scientific community and was thus admissible under the
Kelly/Frye standard.” Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 862.
7. In People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30 (1976), the court
adhered to the rule announced in Frye v. United Sates, 293 F.
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Petitioner objects to Magistrate Judge Brooks’ conclusion
that there is no basis for concluding that the DNA evidence
would not have been admitted if he had objected. Petitioner
asserts that at the time of his trial there was a debate in the
scientific community as to the accuracy of DNA evidence. At
the time of his trial, however, Axell was the law and the DNA
evidence was admissible. The First District Court of Appeal
disagreed with Axell six months after Petitioner’s trial. See
People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 821 (1992). Subsequent
to Barney, four Courts of Appeal embraced Axell and sharply
rebuked the First District’s decision in Barney.”
Petitioner’s conclusory speculations fail to provide any basis
to convince this Court that the DNA would not have been
admitted if the confession had been suppressed. In short, in
light of the overwhelming evidence in addition to the confession,
this Court finds that the trial court’s error in admitting the
confession did not substantially influence the jury’s decision.
Thus, the error was harmless.
B. Special Circumstance
In order for the jury to find the special circumstance, the
jury must find that the murder was committed to carry out or
advance the underlying rape. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61,
(1980) overruled on other grounds by People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d
826, 834 n.3 (1986). Petitioner contends that without the
confession, the jury could not have found the murder was
committed while the Petitioner was engaged in the commission
of rape. Finding that the Prosecutor argued the special
circumstance allegation based upon Petitioner’s confession,
1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) which allows evidence obtained
through a new scientific method to be admitted only after the
"general acceptance" of the technique has been shown.
8. The California Supreme Court has granted review in all
four cases to resolve the debate. See People v. Amundson, 43 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 827 (Cal. 1995) (appeal from 4th dist.); People v. Marlow,
43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. (1995) (appeal from 6th Dist.); People v.
Soto, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Cal. 1995) (appeal from 4th Dist.);
People v Wilds, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Cal. 1995) (appeal from 2d
Dist.).
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B - 21
Magistrate Judge Brooks concurred with the Petitioner and
recommended a retrial of the special circumstance finding.
Magistrate Judge Brooks found that without the confession,
it was impossible to tell whether the victim was dead or alive
when the sperm was deposited into victim’s vagina. Respondent
objected to the Recommendation and cites People v. Ramirez,
50 Cal. 3d 1158 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991). In
Ramirez, the_California Supreme Court created a presumption
that the jury could reasonable infer that an assailant engaged in
sexual conduct with a victim while she was alive in the absence
of evidence suggesting that the victim’s assailant intended to
have sexual conduct with a corpse. Id. at 1176. This Court
agrees with the Respondent that there is an absence of evidence
which suggests that Petitioner intended to have sexual conduct
with a corpse.
The victim was afraid of Petitioner to the point of avoiding
Petitioner. The victim was found only partially nude, with her
top still on. The victim’s sweatpants found at the floor of her
bed had been ripped. Petitioner would have had no need to rip
the victim’s sweatpants if the intercourse was consensual. Also,
most of the injuries on the victim occurred ante mortem and
were on the victim’s face, indicating a struggle. The jury could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had
nonconsensual intercourse with the victim.
Moreover, Petitioner would have had no need to rip the
victim’s sweatpants while removing them if Petitioner merely
raped a dead body. The victim’s body did not appear to be
defiled or mutilated in any extraordinary way which might have
been expected had Petitioner been a necrophilic. Petitioner
may be suffering from erotomania, but there is no evidence to
suggest that Petitioner was a necrophilic. The jury may
reasonably infer that Petitioner had nonconsensual intercourse
with the victim while she was alive.
Although the medical examiner found no sexual trauma on
the victim, a lack of sexual trauma does not imply that the
victim was dead during the intercourse. See People v. Rowland,
4 Cal. 4th 238, 265 (1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 138 (1993).
Even if the victim was dead at the time of the intercourse, a
special circumstance can be found when a murder is committed
during the attempted commission of rape if a defendant
intended or attempted to rape a live body. People v. Kelly, 1
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Cal. 4th 495, 524-525, 527 n.8 (1992). cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 232
(1992).
However, Magistrate Judge Brooks concluded that the
prosecution's use of Petitioner’s confession during the closing
argument allowed the jury to find the special circumstance. This
Court makes an "examination of the entire proceedings" to
determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks rendered the trial
“fundamentally unfair.". Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453,
1457 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1023 (1989). The
Prosecutor’s use of Petitioner’s confession was improper because
it was obtained through the Miranda violation. Nevertheless,
this Court concludes that the Prosecutor’s use of the Petitioner’s
confession during the closing argument did not so infect the trial
with unfairness as to make resulting conviction a denial of due
process.
Even assuming the confession was properly excluded, the
overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence supports
the special circumstance finding. Moreover, the Supreme Court
“clearly warn[s] against holding every improper and unfair
argument of a state prosecutor to be a federal due process
violation." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328 (1985); see
also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-182 (1986)
(prosecutor’s improper remarks did not deprive petitioner of a
fair trail); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-766 (1987)
(improper question followed immediately by an objection and
two curative instructions did not violate petitioner’s due process
right).
Notwithstanding the prosecutor’s reference to Petitioner’s
confession in the closing argument and notwithstanding the
admission of the confession, this Court finds that there is
sufficient evidence from which the jury could presume that a
victim was alive during a sexual assault when there is no
evidence to suggest Petitioner intended sexual conduct with a
corpse. The admission of the confession did not have a
substantial and injurious effect on the special circumstance
finding and was harmless.”
9. Petitioner raised a new argument that the admission of
the confession was prejudicial as to the degree of the murder as
well as the special circumstance. In California, intent to commit
an underlying felony may be proven by circumstantial evidence in
LAS Sie yeaa Si Sieg oa ene ete a aoa
IV. Conclusion
Although Petitioner established a violation of his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent, he has not established
prejudice sufficient to require a reversal. Petitioner’s writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is Denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED:
/s/
Date: 1/8/96 John S. Rhoades, Sr.
United States District Judge
Copies to:
All Parties
the prosecution for felony murder. Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F. 2d
343, 350 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982).
Because this Court finds the admission of Petitioner’s confession
harmless to the special circumstance finding, the confession did not
substantially affect the degree of murder.
APPENDIX C
[Filed July 6, 1995]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
TROY LEE WASHINGTON, Case No. 94-1413-R(RBB)
Petitioner,
REPORT AND
vs. RECOMMENDATION
GRANTING IN
JON DEMORALES Warden, PART PETITION FOR
and ATTORNEY, A WRIT OF HABEAS
GENERAL OF THE STATE CORPUS
OF CALIFORNIA
Respondents.
Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an
application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254 (1988).
On January 13, 1992, Petitioner Troy Lee Washington was
charged by amended information in the San Diego Superior
Court with having committed the offenses of murder, a violation
of California Penal Code section 187(a), rape, a violation of
California Penal Code section 261(2), and first degree burglary,
a violation of California Penal Code section 459.” Additionally,
Petitioner was charged with a special circumstance of
committing murder during the commission of rape within the
meaning of section 190.2(a)(17). (Clerk’s Tr. at 137.)
The jury convicted Petitioner of all counts charged,
including murder in the first degree, and found that he was sane
when he committed the crimes. (Clerk’s Tr. at 261-65, 359.)
1. All future statutory references refer to the California Penal
Code unless otherwise stated.
C - 25
Under section 190(a), every person guilty of murder in the first
degree shall be sentenced to death, life in prison without the
possibility of parole or imprisonment for 25 years to life. Under
section 190.2(a)(17)(iii), a defendant found guilty of murder in
the first degree with the special circumstance of committing the
murder while engaged in the commission of a rape shall be
punished by death or confinement for life without the possibility
of parole. On March 13, 1992, the court sentenced Petitioner to
life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Clerk’s Tr. at
324-25, 360.)
Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of
Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. Washington
raised several issues, including the admission of his confession
into evidence and the instructions given on the special
circumstance allegation. In his appellate brief, Petitioner argued
that the confession was the only evidence of what happened in
the victim’s condominium on the night of her death. (Answer at
164.) The court of appeal affirmed the conviction on October 6,
1993. (Answer at 43.) In footnote 7 of its opinion, the court
commented on the effect of the involuntary confession and
instruction:
This [special circumstance] instructional issue has
been argued by Washington by looking to the
circumstances as described by his confession. That is,
his disclaimer of any intent to rape or kill when he
accosted the sleeping victim. We have responded
accordingly. Neither party has suggested we should
analyze the prejudice of this instruction on a record
expurgating the inadmissible confession. Were we to
do so, the result would be the same.
(Id. at 61 n.7.)
Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the
California Supreme Court. In the petition for review to the
California Supreme Court, Petitioner contended that without the
confession, the jury could not find that the murder was
committed to carry out or advance commission of the rape.
(Answer at 87.) On January 13, 1994, the California Supreme
Court denied the petition without opinion. (Answer at 122.)
C - 26
This petition for habeas corpus relief was filed on
September 9, 1994. The Respondents concede that Washington
has exhausted his administrative remedies. (Answer at 3.)
I. Petitioner’s Contentions
In his application for a writ of habeas corpus filed with this
Court, Petitioner contends that the trial court committed
constitutional error by admitting his confession into evidence at
both the guilt and sanity phases of the trial. Additionally,
Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his right to due
process by giving a jury instruction which omitted an essential
element of the special circumstance allegation.
This Court has reviewed the petition for writ of habeas
corpus, Respondent’s answer, Petitioner’s traverse, the trial
transcript and the videotaped interview containing Petitioner’s
confession. After a thorough review of these items, the Court
finds that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be
granted in part.
II. Statement of Facts
On Tuesday morning, November 6, 1990, the police, after
receiving a report that Deborah Barksdale failed to show up at»
work the previous day, searched her car, which was parked in
her condominium garage. They found her body inside the truck.
Ms. Barksdale’s larynx had been fractured, and there was
evidence that she had engaged in sexual intercourse. (3 Rep.’s
Appeal Tr. at 134-35, 137-40.) The time of death was estimated
to be between the hours of 10:00 p.m. on Friday, November 2,
1990, and 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990. (Id. at 118-
19.)
A resident of the victim’s condominium complex told the
police that she had seen an unfamiliar black male late Friday
night in the complex garage. (Id. at 23, 26-28.) The security
guard on duty that night also reported seeing a black male leave
the condominium complex and get into a car parked across the
street at 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990. (Id. at 40-
46.) The security guard wrote down the vehicle’s license plate
number. (Id.) The car was identified from Department of
aca
+27
Motor Vehicles records as belonging to Petitioner Washington.
(Id. at 60-63.)
On Tuesday afternoon, November 6, i990, police detectives
Richard Allen and Louie Rodriguez contacted Petitioner in front
of his residence. (Id. at 60.) Petitioner was questioned at the
police station. (Id. at 63-65.) Petitioner was not placed under
arrest, so the detectives did not inform him of his Miranda
rights. Initially, the offices asked him general questions about
himself and his relationship with the victim. (Clerk’s Tr. at 35-
55.)
Washington cooperated with the detectives, but his answers
conflicted with information they received from other witnesses.
The detectives felt that Petitioner was not being truthful. (2
Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 21.) At this point, they informed Petitioner
of his Miranda rights. Petitioner asked if he was under arrest,
and the detectives told him he was not. Petitioner then agreed
to continue talking with them. (Clerk’s Tr. at 53-55.)
During the next part of the interview, Washington made
three statements that he asserts invoked his right to remain
silent. Petitioner made the first statement during a discussion
with Detective Rodriguez. Rodriguez asked, "For what purpose
did you go to her place then?" (Id. at 72.) Petitioner did not
respond. The following dialogue then took place:
Rodriguez: Did she call you over?
Petitioner: I’m not going to say anything.
Rodriguez: Why not?
Petitioner: Because I didn’t do it.
(Id.) The detectives continued to question and talk with
Washington. (Id. at 72-77.)
Later, during the following exchange with both detectives,
Petitioner made a second statement that he asserts invoked his
right to remain silent:
Petitioner: I told you if you just want to arrest me,
you can go ahead and arrest me but I
didn’t do it. I’m not gonna admit it.
Allen: But that’s two different things, okay?
Petitioner: You're not gonna get it out of me
because I’m not gonna say anything.
‘Cause I didn’t do it. [Fifteen seconds of
silence. }
C - 28
Rodriguez: You were there. Ah if you did it, you
know, I wasn’t there. You’re gonna have
to tell us yourself, you know. Ah but if
you didn’t do it, you know, you’re gonna
have to tell us, you know. The only, the
only thing that we know at this time is
that you were there. Now how it
happened, you know, how it happened,
you know, that’s something that you'll
have to explain.
Allen: This is your time to do that.
Petitioner: | Does Guy [a former co-worker] and
everybody know I was there?
(Id, at 77-78.) Petitioner continued talking and answering the
detectives’ questions.
A short time later, Petitioner made the third statement that
he asserts invoked his right to remain silent:
Allen: So let’s talk about it and find out about,
what happened and why it happened.
Okay? It’s easy once you start.
Petitioner: 1 don’t want to talk about it.
Rodriguez: You sure?
Petitioner: I didn’t do it.
Rodriguez: Well, yeah that’s another story you know.
Allen: That’s like ah not being there in that car.
| Okay? That’s like, that’s like denying you
| were even there in the car. Okay?
Denying that you didn’t do it. That’s not,
that’s not solving the problem. Okay?
Like ah my partner says, there were
people there that saw you and we have
the description of your car. We have the
description of the person that was there.
The person saw you get in the car, saw
you drive away. Now that was, you know,
that’s a fact. Okay? The fact is you
were there. The fact is a lady is dead.
Okay? The fact is you did it. Now, you
have to be able to admit that to yourself.
All those, all those things occurred.
RF ED TN OS I
C - 29
Okay?
Petitioner: Do you want me to lie? I mean...
Allen: No, I don’t want you to lie.
Petitioner: Do you want me to tell you a story?
Allen: No, I don’t want you to tell us a story.
You know, we’re not sitting here to hear
a story. It’s not like we’re not, we
werent’ [sic], we’re not sitting here to
hear ourselves talk about where you were
and you say, ‘No I wasn’t there. I don’t
want to talk about it.’
Petitioner: Okay, I'll tell you...
(Id, at 80-81.) Petitioner confessed to the killing and the rape.
(Id. at 81-106.)
During the trial, the videotaped interview containing
Washington’s confession was played for the jury. (3 Rep.’s
Appeal Tr. at 142-45.) The court also admitted a written
transcript of the interview into evidence. (Id. at 148.) In
addition, the prosecution introduced the results of DNA tests
performed on sperm samples retrieved from the victim and bed
clothing. These samples matched samples obtained from
Petitioner. (Id. at 137-40.) Both parties stipulated that all DNA
samples were properly obtained, maintained and that there was
no evidence of testing error. The parties further stipulated that
except for identical twins, no persons have yet been found with
matching DNA patterns.
As stated above, the jury found Petitioner guilty of all
counts charged by information, including the special
circumstance allegation. (Clerk’s Tr. at 261-64, 348-60.) The
jury also found him sane at the time the crimes were committed.
III. Analysis of Petitioner’s Contentions
A. Miranda Violation.
Petitioner contends that the portion of the interview
containing his confession was erroneously admitted into evidence
because he had invoked his right to remain silent prior to
confessing. This Court has reviewed the videotape and written
of
x
3
cee
ena
*
C - 30
transcript of Petitioner’s confession. The constitutional effect of
Petitioner’s statements is a legal question subject to independent
review. Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991). The Court analyzes his words
as ordinary people would understand them and examines the
entire context in which he spoke. United States v. De La Jara,
973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992); Bradley v. Meachum, 918
F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221 (1991).
The United States Supreme Court established that a
criminal suspect may invoke his or her right to remain silent at
any time during a police interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966). There, the Supreme Court held:
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be
other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise.
Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, a criminal
suspect may selectively revoke a comprehensive waiver of his or
her right to remain silent by expressing a desire not to discuss a
particular topic. United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537,
541-42 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2453 (1993);
United States v Lopz-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 664 & n.2 (9th Cir.
1980) (quoting United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 297-98
(9th Cir. 1978)).
Before confronting Petitioner with the information that he
and his car were seen at the victim’s residence, the detectives
informed him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner waived his right
to remain silent by agreeing to continue to talk with them.
However, Petitioner contends he later revoked his waiver and
invoked his right to remain silent. Washington said, "I’m not
gonna say anything" in response to being asked: "For what
purpose did you go to her place then? Did she [the victim] call
you over?" (Clerk’s Tr. at 72.)
C- 31
Petitioner’s statement could be interpreted as a selective
revocation of his waiver of the right to remain silent.
Washington had stated that he was not going to say anything
about going to the victim’s residence. Yet, questioning on this
subject continued. However, petitioner responded by talking
about a conversation that he had with the victim weeks before
the murder. (Clerk’s Tr. at 74.) Although the detective
questioned petitioner about going to the victim’s residence on
the night of the murder, Washington did not respond to that
question and talked about other matters. When an individual
selectively revokes a waiver of the right to remain silent, the
police can continue the interview as long as they avoid questions
concerning subjects that the individual did not wish to discuss.
Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d at 541-42.
Approximately seven minutes after Washington first said he
was not going to talk, one of the detectives continued to ask
questions about what happened at the victim’s residence, and
Petitioner made the second statement he asserts invoked his
right to remain silent. Petitioner stated, "You’re not g: 1a get
it out of me because I’m not going to say anything. Cause I
didn’t do it." After this statement, the detectives told
Washington that he was at the crime scene, and this was the
time to explain how the murder happened. The videotaped
interview shows that Washington sat silent for approximately
fifteen seconds -- while the detectives sat waiting for him to
speak. This statement, in the context of the interview,
demonstrates that Petitioner attempted to halt the questioning.
Petitioner invoked his right to remain silent.
About five minutes later, Washington made the third
statement he contends invoked his right to remain silent.
Detective Allen asked Petitioner to describe the details of the
crime. Petitioner did not immediately respond. He then stated,
"I don’t want to talk about it." The California Court of Appeal
disagreed with the trial court and found that this statement
expressed Petitioner’s desire to stop talking. (Answer at 50-52.)
Statements obtained after a person in custody indicates that
he wishes to remain silent may be admissible where the
individual’s right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously
honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07 (1975). In
Mosley, after being fully advised of his rights, the defendant
stated that he did not wish to discuss the offense for which he
C - 32
was being held. The police immediately ceased the
interrogation. They resumed questioning only after the passage
of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of
warnings. Furthermore, the police restricted the second
interrogation to a crime that had not been the subject of the
earlier interrogation. Id. at 104-05.
Unlike the defendant in Mosley, Washington’s invocation of
his right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored." After
each time he expressed his wish to remain silent, the detectives
continued to question him. No significant period of time had
elapsed, and no fresh warnings were given. The detectives
failed to honor Petitioner’s invocation of his right to remain
silent. Although Washington’s first statement can reasonably be
viewed as a selective revocation of his waiver, the same cannot
be said for the second and third statements. The videotaped
interview shows that these words, and the manner in which
Washington said them, demonstrate that he did not want to
answer any further questions about the crime. Accordingly, this
Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the
detectives obtained Petitioner’s confession in violation of
Miranda. The trial court erred when it allowed the portions of
the interview following Washington’s second statement that he
did not want to continue, (Clerk’s Tr. at 77), and ensuing
confession into evidence.
A federal habeas court may grant relief for a trial error
when the petitioner established that the error resulted in "actual
prejudice." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993)
(citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).
Federal habeas proceedings are important in assuring that
constitutional rights are observed; however, their role is
secondary and limited. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719. Furthermore,
federal courts are not forums to relitigate state trials. Id. at
1719 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).
To determine whether there has been actual prejudice, this
Court examines the record as a whole and applies the harmless
error test set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,
776 (1946). The test is whether the error had a "substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict."
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).
In O’Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995), the Supreme
Court recently explained, "When a federal judge in a habeas
C - 33
proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of
federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless. And,
the petitioner must win."
1. Evidence of Guilt.
Notwithstanding Washington’s confession, the evidence ot
guilt was compelling. The victim feared Petitioner. She avoided
him and his phone calls. Furthermore, Petitioner knew the
victim deliberately avoided him. The day before the murder,
Petitioner attempted to contact the victim, but was unsuccessful.
(Clerk’s Tr. at 69-70.) Washington knew where the victim lived
and had been there before. On the night of the murder, a
resident of the condominium complex observed a person
matching Washington’s general description in the garage area of
the victim’s residence. (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 26.) Later that
same night, the security guard also saw a person matching
Washington’s general description using a key to enter a car that
belonged to Petitioner. (Id. at 42-43, 46, 60-63). Petitioner
admitted that only he and his mother had a key to that vehicle.
(Clerk’s Tr. at 47). Additionally, the sperm found in the victim’s
body and on the bedding matched Petitioner’s DNA.
Washington stipulated to the admission of the DNA
evidence. (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 138-40.) Petitioner agues
that his Court should disregard the DNA evidence if it finds that
his confession was improperly admitted into evidence. The
record indicates that Petitioner stipulated to the DNA evidence
after the trial court decided to admit his confession into
evidence. (2 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. - Augment at 114.) If Petitioner
had not stipulated to the evidence and continued to assert
objections he made at the preliminary hearing, the trial court
would have conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility
of the DNA evidence. (1d.)
In California, the courts conduct Kelly/Frye hearings to
determine whether evidence based on a new scientific method
may be admitted. In People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P. 2d
1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976), the court affirmed California’s
adherence to the rule announced in Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (1923). The Kelly/Frye standard provides that
evidence obtained through the application of a new scientific
- EE SA Wit 2 PLATE Ste
C.s
method, such as DNA profiling, may be admitted only after the
“general acceptance" of the technique has been shown. To
establish "general acceptance," the proponent must demonstrate
that: (1) the method used was reliable, (2) the witnesses are
properly qualified to testify concerning the method, and (3) the
correct scientific procedures were used. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30,
549 P. 2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
The DNA evidence in this case came from sperm samples
taken froin the victim, her bed clothing and Petitioner.
Cellmark Diagnostic, a forensic laboratory, analyzed the samples
under the restriction fragment-length polymorphism ("RFLP")
process. At Washington’s preliminary hearing, he argued that
RFLP analysis and Cellmark’s method of calculating statistical
probabilities were not generally accepted in the scientific
community. The magistrate took judicial notice of several
California cases, as well as cases from other jurisdictions,
recognizing that RFLP analysis was generally accepted in the
scientific community. Although the magistrate did not require
the prosecution to lay a Kelly/Frye foundation for RFLP, it was
required to show that Cellmark used proper procedures in
conducting the test and that the experts were qualified to testify
on the matter. At the preliminary hearing, evidence of a DNA
match was admitted but evidence of statistical analysis was
excluded. (Rep.’s Tr. - Preliminary Examination at 728-32.)
During the time Petitioner’s case was pending, the
California Court of Appeal, in People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d
836, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1991), addressed whether RFLP
analysis evidence, and Cellmark’s method of calculating
statistical probabilities, met Kelly/Frye requirements. The court
of appeal conducted a detailed analysis of the following: DNA,
RFLP, expert testimony given at the Axell hearing, decisions in
other jurisdictions, procedures used by Cellmark, Cellmark’s
criteria for assigning frequencies and Cellmark’s calculation of
statistical probabilities. The court found that RFLP and
Cellmark’s method of calculating statistical probabilities were
generally accepted in the scientific community. Axell, 235 Cal.
App. 3d at 862, 868, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427, 431. Thus, the
Axell court held that the DNA evidence had been properly
admitted at trial.
Assuming that Petitioner had not stipulated to the DNA
evidence, there is no indication he would have raised objections
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other than those he raised at the preliminary hearing. There, he
argued that RFLP analysis and the method Cellmark used for
calculating statistical probabilities were not generally accepted in
the scientific community. These were the same procedures the
Axell court examined and determined were generally accepted.
Axell was the law at the time Petitioner’s case came to trial.
Even if Washington’s stipulation to admit DNA evidence is
overlooked, there is no basis for concluding that the DNA
evidence would not have been admitted and presented to the
jury. Therefore, this Court will not disregard the DNA
evidence.
Excluding Petitioner’s confession, the record contained
ample evidence from which the jury could find him guilty of the
crimes charged. Any error in admitting the confession was
harmless because it did not have a substantial and injurious
effect or influence in determining the jury’s guilty verdict.
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722. The same, however, cannot be said
for the jury’s finding that the special circumstance allegation was
true.
2. The Special Circumstance Finding
The jury found that the murder was committed while the
Petitioner was engaged in the commission of rape, which
elevated Petitioner’s minimum punishment on this charge from
twenty-five years to life to life without the possibility of parole.
(Clerk’s Tr. at 262.) To reach this conclusion, the jury had to
find that the murder was committed to carry out or advance the
underlying rape. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61, 609 P.2d
468, 505, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 38 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 834 n.3, 718 P.2d 99,
104 n.3, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 117 n.3 (1986). Washington’s
confession was the evidence that allowed the jury to find the
special circumstance. At the conclusion of the prosecution’s
case, the trial judge denied defense counsel’s motion for
judgment of acquittal and stated: "As to the special
circumstance, the critical evidence really comes, I think, from
the defendant’s statement although there is support from the
other evidence in the case." (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 157
(emphasis added).)
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During closing argument, the prosecution argued that the
jury should find the special circumstance allegation true basea
upon Washington’s confession. (4 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 205-07.)
The prosecution stated that he victim was killed because she was
trying to pull Petitioner’s mask off. (Id. at 205.) The prosecutor
argued: "Indeed, if you watch his confession, I submit to you
when he finally gets it off his chest and tells you what happened,
that you have an impression of credibility in much of his
account." (Id, at 207.) The prosecution pointed out that the
petitioner was fighting with the victim "for two hours." (Id. at
206.) In his closing remarks concerning the special circumstance
allegation, the prosecutor repeatedly quoted from Petitioner’s
confession. (Id. at 270-75.)
Without the confession, there was no basis for the jury to
find the special circumstance true. The medical examiner
testified that there was no evidence of sexual trauma and that it
was impossible to tell whether the victim was dead or alive when
sperm was deposited into her vagina. (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at
134-35.) The admission of the confession cannot be said to be
harmless and not have had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence on the special circumstance finding. See Brecht, 113
S. Ct. at 1722. At a minimum, this Court has grave doubt about
whether admission of the involuntary confession had a
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
jury’s verdict." O’Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. at 994.
Accordingly, Washington’s sentence, based on the special
circumstance finding, cannot stand. A retrial of the special
circumstance allegation is required.
3. The Sanity Determination
Petitioner bore the burden of convincing the jury, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that he was legally insane at the
time of the commission of the crime. Cal. Evid. Code § 115;
Cal. Penal Code § 25(b); People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 564,
268 P.2d 705, 714 (1954). Washington introduced testimony
from Dr. Phillip Solomon, psychiatrist; Dr. Thomas Mac
Speiden, clinical psychologist; Dr. Stephen Signer, psychiatrist;
Karl Plavetsky, Carlos Arzola, Charles Cleaves, Gerald Daniels,
Roger Pigott, Asmar Qawee, former co-workers of the
Petitioner; Dr. Arnold Starr, professor of neurology; and Dr.
C - 37
Monte Buchsbaum, professor of psychiatry and human behavior.
Qualifications and admissions by defense experts made it
difficult for Washington to carry his burden of proof. The
prosecution introduced testimony from Dr. Haig Koshkarian,
psychiatrist, and Dr. Gary Weissberg, general and forensic
psychiatrist.
Defense counsel introduced evidence that Washington
suffered from both a delusional disorder, erotomania, and an
organic defect. Dr. Solomon was of the opinion that
Washington had the delusional order all his life, but the
erotomanic aspect of it was more recent. (1 Rep.’s Appeal Tr.
at 324.) Dr. Mac Speiden, the clinical psychologist, testified that
Washington suffered from a neurological disfunction that
reduced his level of intellectual functioning. (Id. at 367.) Mac
Speiden reviewed Washington’s family background, upbringing
and interaction with others. Mac Speiden believed that
Washington did not know the quality of his acts, if quality is
defined as the end result of the nature of his acts. (Id. at 409.)
Mac Speiden testified that Washington was capable of knowing
right from wrong and the nature of his acts. (Id.) Mac Speiden
did say that "[i]f intent is not the issue, [Washington] knew the
quality of his act." (Id. at 444.)
Dr. Singer testified at length about erotic delusions and
erotomania, and felt that Washington suffered from erotomania.
(6 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 489.) He stated that Washington knew
he was performing a rape and choking the victim but was
operating under the force of his delusion. (Id. at 498, 515.)
Singer did not say that Washington was incapable of knowing or
understanding the nature and quality of his conduct.
Dr. Starr, the neurologist, examined Washington and found
“several soft signs indicating mental and cognitive impairments."
(Id. at 569.) Washington had a history of hearing voices. (Id. at
571, 575.)
Dr. Buchsbaum took a scan of Washington’s brain, (7
Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 595-96), and found damage to the frontal
lobe of the brain. (Id. at 611-14.) Individuals with frontal lobe
injuries tend to have poor judgment, poorly organized behavior
and abnormal sexual behavior. (Id. at 614.)
Dr. Solomon reviewed the findings of the other defense
doctors and admitted that Washington, intellectually, had the
capability of understanding right from wrong. (Id. at 632.) He
C - 38
also stated that Washington “could not understand what was
going on; he could do nothing but behave as his flaming
emotions forced him to behave." (Id. at 636.) Solomon equated
Washington’s conduct with "convulsive behavior." (Id. at 638-
39.)
One of the prosecution’s psychiatric experts, Dr. Haig
Koshkarian, interviewed Washington and reviewed reports of
Petitioner’s experts. Dr. Koshkarian testified that in his opinion
Washington was legally sane. (Id. at 649.) Dr. Gary Weissberg,
another expert called by the prosecution, practices general and
forensic psychiatry. (Id. at 658.) He also reviewed defense
doctors’ reports and interviewed Washington. (Id. at 660-61.)
Dr. Weissberg testified that Washington "was capable of
knowing the nature and quality of his actions and being able to
distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the incident."
(Id. at 662.)
The trial judge instructed the jury:
A person is legally insane when, by reason of
mental disease or mental defect he was
incapable of knowing or understanding the
nature and quality of his act or was incapable
of distinguishing right from wrong at the time
of the commission of the crime.
The defendant has the burden of proving
his legal insanity at the time of the
commission of the crime by a preponderance
of the evidence.
(Id. at 688.) Defense witnesses attempted to equate
Washington’s inability to control his conduct with legal insanity.
This is not the standard. The trial court instructed the jury "{iJf
a person is legally sane, then it is not a defense that he
committed the act of which he’s accused because of an
uncontrollable or irresistible impulse." (Id. at 689.)
Without reference to Washington’s confession, the jury
could find that Petitioner did not carry his burden of proof. The
jury’s consideration of the confession during the sanity phase of
the trial was harmless error.
B. Jury Instruction.
C - 39
Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his right to
due process because it gave the jury an instruction that omitted
an essential element of the special circumstance allegation. This
claim misconstrues the instruction.
A federal habeas court can provide relief where a
challenged jury instruction "by itself so infected the entire trial
that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v.
McGuire, 502. U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten,
414 US. 141, 147 (1973)). An omission or an incomplete
instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of
law. United States v. Cruz, 783 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); United State [sic] v. Witt, 648
F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431
U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). Furthermore, federal habeas courts do
not re-examine state court determinations on state law
questions. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Willard v.
California, 812 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1987); Gutierrez v.
Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). When examining
jury instructions for error, the Court evaluates the overall charge
to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. Prantil v.
California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
861 (1988) (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)).
Under California law, a jury may properly find a special
circumstance when a murder is committed to carry out or
advance a rape. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61, 609 P.2d
468, 505, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 38 (1980), overruled on other
grounds by People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 834 n.3, 718 P.2d 99,
104 n.3, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 117 n.3 (1986). The law requires
something more than merely determining that the murder was
committed during the commission of the underlying crime. Id.
at 61-62, 609 P.2d at 505-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. In other
words, if the underlying felony was incidental to the murder, the
jury may not find a special circumstance. Id. at 61, 609 P.2d at
505, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
During trial, the court gave the jury the following special
instruction:
The phrase "during the commission of
the crime of rape," as used in these
instructions, does not require that the
unlawful killing occur while the defendant is
vid mar sicapal sat ease ibe
C - 40
in the act of rape, and need not have resulted
as a natural and probable consequence of the
crime of rape. But, in order to find that an
unlawful killing did occur "during the
commission of the crime of rape," the
evidence must establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant harbored the intent
to rape either prior to or during the acts
which resulted in the victim’s death, and that
the killing and the rape were part of one
continuous transaction or occurred as a result
of efforts to avoid detection or facilitate
escape, whether such killing was done
intentionally, unintentionally or accidentally.
However, an unlawful killing does not
occur "during the commission of the crime or
rape," if the defendant’s intended [sic]
criminal purpose was to kill and the rape was
merely incidental to the intended commission
of that murder. On the other hand, if at the
time the defendant formed an intent to kill he
also formed a concurrent intent to rape, such
is “during the commission of the crime" within
the meaning of the law.
(Clerk’s Tr. at 222.) The court also gave the jury the following
instruction pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17):
To find that the special circumstance,
‘murder in the commission of rape’, is true,
the following must be proved:
1). That the murder was committed while
the defendant was engaged in the
commission of rape.
[The phrase ‘engaged in the commission or
[sic] rape’, as used in this instruction, has the
Same meaning as the phrase ‘during the
C- 41
commission of the crime of rape’, as the latter
was previously defined in these instructions.]
(Clerk’s Tr. at 195). The court gave these two instructions,
among others, instead of the standard California jury instruction
for the special circumstance allegation.
Petitioner argues that the court’s instruction omitted an
essential element of the special circumstance allegation, and that
the court should have given CALJIC No. 8.81.17,% which
properly states the law. Petitioner did not object to the special
instruction at trial and did not offer an alternative or modified
proposal. As noted above, the fact that the instruction was
allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas
relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Additionally, federal habeas
courts do not grant relief simply because the special instruction
may have been deficient in comparison to the CALJIC model.
Id. at 72. The erroneous jury instruction must so infect the
2. The 1991 Revision to CALJIC number 8.81.17 states as
follows:
To find that the special circumstance,
referred to in these instructions as murder in
the commission of , is true, it must be
proved:
[la, The murder was committed while
[the] [a] defendant was [engaged in] the
[commission] [or] [attempted commission] of
a __;] [or] [and]
[lb. The murder was committed during
the immediate flight after the [commission]
[attempted commission] of a _____ [by the
defendant] [to which [the] [a] defendant was
an accomplice]; and]
2. The murder was committed in order
to carry out or advance the commission of
the crime of or to facilitate the escape
therefrom or to avoid detection. In other
words, the special circumstance referred to in
these instructions is not established if the
[attempted] ___ was merely incidental to the
commission of the murder.]
California Jury Instructions - Criminal no. 8.81.17 (Supp. 1995).
C - 42
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.
Id.; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.
When reviewing an ambiguous instruction to determine if
due process was violated the Court asks "whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that he jury has applied the challenged
instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution." Estelle, 502
US. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380
(1990)). At trial, the state has the burden of proving every
element beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 US.
358, 364 (1970). When a trial judge deprives the jury of its fact-
finding duty, this violates due process. Carella v. California, 491
US. 263, 265 (1989).
Petitioner asserts that the court’s instruction omitted an
essential element of the special circumstance allegation because
it failed to advise the jury that it may only properly find a
special circumstance where the killing occurred in order to carry
out or advance the commission of the rape. According to
Petitioner, the court’s instruction allowed the jury to find the
special circumstance true merely because the killing and rape
were part of a continuous transaction and there was a
concurrent intent to rape and kill.
Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the court’s instruction
complied with California law. The instruction, as a whole,
correctly stated the law. It specifically stated that an unlawful
killing is not in the commission of a rape where the defendant’s
intended crimi- al purpose was to kill and the rape was merely
incidental to the intended murder. The instruction focused the
jury on the relationship between the rape and murder and
required more than merely finding that the two acts were part
of one continuous transaction. The concurrent intent portion of
the instruction did not negate the admonition that the rape
could not be merely incidental to the murder. The special
instruction left it to the jury to determine whether the rape was
incidental to the murder.
In a separate instruction the court told the jury that the
prosecution had the burden of proving the special circumstance
and that the jury may not make the finding if it had reasonable
doubt as to whether the special circumstance was true. (Clerk’s
Tr. at 211.) This instruction and the language contained in the
court’s special instruction demonstrates that the court did not
C - 43
lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof or deprive the jury of
its fact-finding duty.
After examining the Court’s instruction in the context of the
overall charge to the jury, it is unlikely that the jury applied the
special instruction in such a way that violated the Constitution.
Therefore, this Court holds that the instruction complained of
did not so infect the trial as to deny Petitioner due process of
law.
IV. Conclusion and Recommendation
The Court reviewed each of Petitioner’s contentions. For
the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that
Petitioner’s application be GRANTED IN PART. This matter
should be remanded to San Diego Superior Court for further
proceedings consistent with this report and recommendation.
This report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge
Brooks is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned
to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(1988). Within thirty days after this report and recommendation
is mailed, Petitioner and Respondents may file written
objections with the Court. These documents should be
captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."
Petitioner and Kespondents are advised that failure to file
objections within the specified time will waive their right to raise
those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v.
Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
Dated: July 6, 1995
/s/
Ruben B. Brooks
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: Judge John S. Rhoades
Martin Nebrida Buchanan Esq.
1050 University Avenue Suite 103
San Diego, CA 92103
Anne Marie Urrutia
Deputy Attorney General
110 West A Street Suite 1100
San Diego, CA 92186-5266
APPENDIX D
2 EEA aOR IR, RAH DADO ON IE BE
D - 44
APPENDIX D
[Filed October 6, 1993]
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
COURT OF APPEAL
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D016646
(Super. Ct.
Plaintiff and Respondent, No. CR123654)
v. OPINION
TROY LEE WASHINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
San Diego County, Michael Wellington, Judge. Affirmed.
Troy Lee Washington appeals a judgment convicting
him of first degree murder during the commission of rape (Pen.
Code,” §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), forcible rape (§
261, subd. (2)), and first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460).
Washington contends the court erred in admitting his confession,
because it was properly obtained after he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent. He also contends the court
erred in giving the jury a defective special instruction for murder
1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
D - 45
during the commission of rape. For the following reasons, we
affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of November 6, 1990, police found the
dead body of Debra Barksdale in the trunk of her car, which
was parked in her condominium garage. Barksdale died from
strangulation. She suffered a fracture to her larynx and minor
injuries to her face, upper chest and shoulders. She had been
raped.
The police received information a neighbor of Barksdale’s
noticed a black male, fitting Washington’s description, loitering
near the condominium complex on the night of the murder. A
security guard also reported seeing a black male getting into a
car belonging to Washington parked across the street from
Barksdale’s condominium later that evening.
When Detectives Richard Allen and Louis Rodriguez
contacted Washington at his residence, he agreed to accompany
them to the police station for an interview. Washington told the
detectives he worked as an installer for Barksdale Office
Planning until being "laid off’ in August 1990. Washington
admitted he and Barksdale argued before his employment was
terminated. In the week before the murder, Washington made
several attempts to contact Barksdale, but she failed to return
his phone calls. When he stopped by her office to visit, she ran
out the back door upon seeing him.
At this point, the detectives advised Washington of his
Miranda?” rights; they did not, however, tell him he could
terminate the questioning once he had agreed to the
interrogation. Washington admitted he understood these rights
as explained and agreed to continue with the interview.
Rodriguez confronted him with the evidence he was seen at
Barksdale’s condominium on the night of the murder.
Washington denied the allegation. He repeatedly stated, "I
wasn’t there," while the detectives continued to confront him
with the adverse evidence. |
At one point, Rodriguez told Washington: "Well, I’m not
saying that you, you know, wanted to kill her but we need to
2. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
find how it happened." Washington responded: "Well you can
arrest me. Go ahead and arrest me but I didn’t do it." A few
moments later, the following exchange took place:
"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: For what purpose did
you go to her place then? Did she call you over?
"WASHINGTON: Im not gonna say anything.
"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: Why not?
"WASHINGTON: Because I didn’t do it." (Italics
added.)
The interrogation then continued concerning Washington’s
working relationship with Barksdale. When Rodriguez again
asked what happened at Barksdale’s house the night of the
murder, Washington responded as follows:
"WASHINGTON: I didn’t go over [to] her house. I
swear.
"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: We have already, we
have already established that. Okay?
"WASHINGTON: I told you if you just want to arrest me,
you can go ahead and arrest me but I didn’t do it. I’m not
gonna admit it.
"DETECTIVE ALLEN: But that’s two different things,
okay?
"WASHINGTON: You're not gonna get it out of me
because I’m not gonna say anything. Cause I didn’t do it.
"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: You were there... if you
didn’t do it, you know, you’re gonna have to tell us, you
know. The only, the only thing that we know at this time is
that you were there... ." (Italics added.)
D-4/
Washington then asked whether other employees of
Barksdale Office Planning knew he was at the condominium,
and what would happen if he decided to "say something." When
told he would be arrested, Washington replied, "I can’t do it."
Shortly thereafter, the following exchange took place:
"DETECTIVE ALLEN: So let’s talk about it and find out
what, what happened and why it happened. Okay? It’s
easy once you start.
"WASHINGTON: I don’t want to talk about it.
"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: You sure?
"WASHINGTON: I didn’t do it.
"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: Well, yeah that’s another
story you know.
"DETECTIVE ALLEN: That’s like ah not being there in
that car. Okay? That’s like, denying that you were even
there in the car. Okay? Denying that you didn’t do it....
There were people there that saw you and we have the
description of your car. We have the description of the
person that was there. The person saw you get in the car,
saw you drive away. ... The fact is you were there. The
fact is a lady is dead. Okay? The fact is you did it. Now,
you have to be able to admit that to yourself. All those, all
those things occurred. Okay?
"WASHINGTON: Do you want me to lie? I mean --
"DETECTIVE ALLEN: No, I don’t want you to lie.
"WASHINGTON: "Do you want me to tell you a story?
"DETECTIVE ALLEN: No, I don’t want you to tell us a
story. You know, we’re not sitting here to hear a story. It’s
like we’re not, we weren’t, we’re not sitting here to hear
ourselves talk about where you were and you say, ’No I
wasn’t there. I don’t want to talk about it.’
D - 48
"WASHINGTON: Okay, I’ll tell you. I went there."
(Italics added.)
The questioning then resumed and Washington ultimately
confessed to all of the charged offenses. He admitted entering
Barksdale’s condominium through the front door with a key he
surreptitiously copied months before. Washington grabbed
Barksdale while she slept in her bed. Washington began
choking her and raped her.” When she started struggling
again, he choked her until she died. Washington then dragged
her body into the garage and threw it into the trunk of her car.
He planned to hide the body, but could not operate the car’s
manual transmission. Washington tossed Barksdale’s keys,
wallet and garage door opener in nearby garbage dumpster.
At the preliminary hearing and twice during trial, defense
counsel moved the suppress the confession, contending the
police continued questioning Washington after he invoked his
right to silence, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384
U.S. 436. Each motion was denied. The entire interview was
later played for the jury, and the videotape and transcript of the
interview were admitted into evidence.
WASHINGTON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN
SILENT DURING THE POLICE INTERROGATION
Washington contends his judgment of conviction should be
set aside because he invoked his constitutional right to remain
silent on three separate occasions during the police
interrogation, therefore making any further questioning by police
unlawful.
"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent
nrocedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that
3. At trial, the parties stipulated DNA of sperm samples taken
from Barksdale’s vagina and bed sheets matched DNA of blood
sample taken from Washington. The parties also stipulated no two
individuals have been found with matching DNA patterns except
identical twins.
D - 49
he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must
cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement
taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be
other than the product of compulsion, subtle or
otherwise." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at
pp. 473-474, fn. omitted.)
The Supreme Court later elaborated on this right: "[T]he
admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody
has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether
his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ’scrupulously honored.”
(Michigan v. Molsey (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 103-104, fn. omitted.)
The defendant may invoke the right through any words or
conduct which express a present lack of willingness to discuss
the case freely and completely. (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d
496, 515; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956; People v.
Porter (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1213, 1218.) Whether the
defendant invoked the right to remain silent is a question of fact
based on the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Benson
(1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 779; People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d
780, 784.) Therefore, we must independently review the record
in its entirety to determine whether Washington indeed invoked
that right. (People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 779.)
The People argue Washington was merely restating his
denials of guilt when he told police, "I’m not gonna say anything"
and "I don’t want to talk about it." They rely principally on In
re Joe R., supra, 27 Cal.3d 496, where the defendant denied
guilt and gave exculpatory answers, until the police confronted
him with adverse evidence, to which he stated, "That’s all I got
to say." Given his previous claims of innocence, the court
concluded the defendant was simply sticking by his story, rather
than invoking his Fifth Amendment right. (Id at p. 516.)
We agree Washington’s statement, "I’m not gonna say
anything," uttered twice during the interrogation in response to
specific factual questions, rather than a general request to talk,
could be interpreted as limited to answering those specific
questions. (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629-630 [no
invocation where defendant muitered, "I really don’t want to talk
about that" in response to a specific inquiry whether defendant
had driven a certain vehicle].) On both occasions, Washington
D - 50
had just been confronted with adverse evidence against him.
Both times, he denied culpability by stating, "I didn’t do it," and
then went on to discuss other subjects. The trial court
reasonably could conclude Washington sought to alter the
course of questioning, but not to stop it altogether even though
for several minutes Washington had slumped in his chair and
was exhibiting signs of severe stress. (People v. Ashmus (1991)
54 Cal.3d 932, 970 [no invocation where the defendant stated,
"now I ain’t saying no more" and without hesitation proceeded
to continue the conversation].)
After approximately 12 minutes of further questioning,
Washington was advised he was going to be arrested and stated
he might as well kill himself. At this point Rodriguez
discouraged that course, telling Washington he had to "face up"
to his "mistake." Allen then stated, "So let’s talk about it and
find out what, what happened and why it happened. Okay? It’s
easy once you start." In response to this solicitation for him to
describe the details of the crime, Washington stated flatly, "I
don’t want to talk about it."
On its face, Washington’s response to Allen’s general
exhortation to relate circumstances of the crime, is an
unambiguous assertion that he does not want to answer further
questions about the crime. If there were ambiguity on this
point, the detectives were entitled to inquire whether
Washington did intend his rejoinder to be an invocation of his
right to terminate the interrogation. They did not do so, instead
they continued to recite evidence against him to encourage him
to admit his involvement, finally advising him they were not
there to hear him say, "I don’t want to talk about it."
The desire to halt an interrogation may be indicated in
various ways. No precise form of words or conduct is necessary.
(People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955; People v. Marshall
(1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 129, 134.) We do not require a defendant
emphatically declare, "I hereby invoke my constitutional rights
pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in
Miranda v. Arizona." (People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d
99, 104-105. "To strictly limit the manner in which a suspect
may assert the privilege, or to demand that it be invoked with
unmistakable clarity . . . would subvert Miranda’s prophylactic
intent." (People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955.) Thus,
under analogous circumstances, an invocation of the right to
D - 51
remain silent was found where a suspect answered "No" when
asked whether he wanted police “to go back over the parts he
left out" (People v. Marshall, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 133);
where a defendant said, "I fee] bad answering the question"
(People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 931), "I ain’t got
nothin’ to say" People v. Carey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p.
105), and "he didn’t have anything to add or to say" (In re
Albert R. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 783, 790).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude Washington
unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to remain
silent when he told the interrogating officers, "I don’t want to
talk about it." At that point, further questioning concerning the
crimes should have ceased. However, the detectives continued
to interrogate Washington concerning the same crime he just
refused to discuss, finally emphasizing they were not sitting there
to hear him say "I don’t want to talk about it." In so doing, they
failed to "scrupulously honor" Washington’s right to terminate
questioning and quite plainly implied they were going to
continue the interrogation even though he declared he no longer
wanted to talk about the crime, an implication made even more
compelling because Washington was never informed he had the
right to terminate the interview once it began. (Michigan v.
Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104; People v. Royer (1989) 48
Cal.3d 247, 271.) Accordingly, we conclude the subsequent
confession was elicited in violation of Miranda and the court
erred in admitting it in evidence. That error is, however,
harmless.
The California rule requiring automatic reversal of a
conviction obtained at a trial in which an involuntary confession
was admitted in evidence no longer applies. Instead, the
prejudice flowing from the consideration of the tainted evidence
is to be determined by evaluating it by the harmless beyond
reasonable doubt standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386
U.S. 18, 23), where the confession has been obtained in violation
of federal constitution (People v. Cahill (1993) 4 Cal.4th 478).
The evidence against Washington other than his confession
is compelling. Washington had been employed by the victim
and had been discharged a few months before she was strangled.
The victim had told others she was afraid of Washington. Her
body was found in the trunk of her car inside the garage of her
condominium. A week before the murder, Washington called
D - 52
the victim’s office applying for part-time work and was told to
call back the following day. Instead, Washington went to the
office where he observed the victim talking to another
employee, who then came out and told Washington the victim
was not present and he would have to call the next day. When
he did so, he was informed she was “not it." The next night the
murder occurred.
On the night of the murder, Cynthia Campbell, a resident
of the condominium complex in which the victim resided, saw a
black male fitting Washington’s general description standing
near the victim’s unit in the garage area. Within minutes, she
notified a security guard who searched for, but was unable to
locate, this person. This contact was approximately 11 p.m. At
1:30 a.m., the security guard was driving from the complex when
he observed a black male leaving the complex and cross the
street. As this person used a key to unlock a car, the guard
noted the license number, "2GIS122," Washington’s personal
vehicle.
The victim had been raped. Washington denied being at the
murder scene, or even to have spoken to the victim during the
past two months. However, DNA tests performed on sperm
samples retrieved from the victim and bed clothing, revealed a
match with samples obtained from Washington. It was
stipulated that all samples were properly obtained, maintained
and that there was no evidence of testing error. Further, it was
agreed that except for identical twins, no persons to date had
been found with matching DNA patterns.“
Washington acknowledges he had heard the victim tell
others she was afraid of him, that he had sent her flowers after
being discharged to show he did not carry a grudge, and that he
had "beeped" her after he left work the night before the murder.
He knew where the victim lived and had been in her
condominium with another employee when still employed by
her.
4. Washington contends, somewhat obliquely, the DNA
evidence should be disregarded if the confession is deemed
involuntary because the stipulation would not have been made had
the court suppressed that evidence. However, the stipulation only
obviated the People’s need to pursue a hearing to establish a
foundation for admissibility of the DNA results. There is no
evidence to suggest they would not have succeeded.
D - 53
Washington put on no defense evidence at the guilt phase.
Thus, the undisputed evidence shows Washington’s
relationship with the victim was such that she openly expressed
fear of him, and avoided both his phone calls and seeing him in
person at the business premises, going so far as to have an
employee lie about her presence. Washington knew she was
deliberately avoiding him. Further, he knew where the victim
lived and a person exactly matching his age and general physical
description was seen near the victim’s residence approximately
11 p.m. the night of the murder, leaving that area at 1:30 a.m.
the next morning and entering Washington’s personal car which
he unlocked with a key. Washington admits only he and his
mother have keys to that car. Finally, DNA matching sperm
was found in the victim’s body and on the bedding. Washington
introduced no evidence to weaken the logical inference
established by the People’s case. Although the confession
contains direct, damning proof of his guilt, we are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt any error in its admission is harmless
in light of the convincing weight of other evidence of guilt.
(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.)
THE TRIAL COURT'S "SPECIAL" INSTRUCTION ON THE
ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO SATISFY THE FELONY-
MURDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER
DURING THE COMMISSION” OF RAPE DOES NOT
REQUIRE REVERSAL
The jury returned a true special circumstance finding that
Washington murdered his victim during the commission of a
rape, thus subjecting him to the additional punishment (here,
5. We reject the People’s contention appellate consideration of
this issue was waived by defense counsel’s failure to object during
trial. An appellate court may "review any instruction given, refused
or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the
[lower/trial] court [,] if the substantial rights of the defendant were
affected thereby." (§§ 1259, 1469.) Here, review of the special
instruction is warranted because it may have misstated the
governing law to Washington’s detriment, thus affecting his
substantial rights. (People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 33, fn.
10; People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1291-1292.)
D-54
life without possibility of parole) mandated for murders
committed during the commission of a felony. (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17).) The law is clear that a special circumstance imposed
for murders occurring during the commission of underlying
felonies applies only to those killings committed to carry out or
advance the commission of a felony. This simple precept was
established in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, in which the
court specifically rejected the People’s contention that it was
sufficient to merely establish the murder was committed "during
the commission" of the underlying crime. (Id. at p. 60.) The
court interpreted the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute
making a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder during the
commission of a robbery or other listed felony (former § 190.2,
subd. (c)(3)) a special circumstance, as expressing a belief it was
unconstitutionally arbitrary to permit the death penalty for
defendants who kill in cold blood "in order to advance an
independent felonious purpose, e.g., who carried out an
execution-style slaying of the victim of or witness to a holdup, a
kidnapping or a rape" to prevent identification as the
perpetrator of the underlying felony. (People v. Green, supra,
27 Cal.3d at p. 61.) The court determined the Legislature’s goal
of distinguishing between those murderers who deserve to be
considered for the death penalty and those who do not, i.e.,
between those who commit generic felony murders and those
who murder for the purpose of committing the underlying
felony, would not be achieved by finding the special
circumstance in cases where the underlying offense was merely
incidental to the murder. In Green, the court found a robbery
committed in the course of a first degree murder solely for the
purpose of facilitating that murder was not committed "during
the commission" of a robbery for the purpose of applying special
circumstances. (See also People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d
303, 324-325, where the court found no substantial evidence to
support a finding the defendant’s theft of the victim’s car and
keys after carrying out an apparent contract killing, represented
an independent purpose to steal, and reversed a special
circumstance finding.)
Here, the court gave a special instruction generally advising
jurors the special circumstance would be established if they
found beyond a reasonable doubt Washington formed an intent
to rape his victim either before or during the acts which caused
D - 55
her death, and the rape and killing occurred during a continuous
transaction or as a result of efforts to avoid detection or
facilitate escape. However, the instruction specified that "an
unlawful killing does not occur during the commission of the
crime of rape, if the defendant’s intended criminal purpose was
to kill and the rape was merely incidental to the intended
commission of that murder." Washington did not object to
the giving of this instruction, nor did he offer an alternative or
modified proposal, although he now claims the court erred in
not instructing on Green’s incidental felony theory in the
language of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1991 rev.) which incorporates
that holding. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501,
fn. 16.) In part, CALJIC No. 8.81.17 emphasizes that to find the
special circumstance it must be proved: "[2. The murder was
committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of
the crime of or to facilitate the escape therefrom
or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance
referred to in these instructions is not established if the
[attempted] was merely incidental to the
commission of the murder.]"
Washington first contends the court’s special instruction errs
by failing to advise jurors they could find the charged special
6. The special instruction read as follows:
"The phrase ‘during the commission of the crime of rape,’ as
used in these instructions, does not require that the unlawful
killing occur while the defendant is in the act of rape, and need not
have resulted as a natural and probable consequence of the crime
of rape. But, in order to find that an unlawful killing did occur
‘during the commission of the crime of rape,’ the evidence must
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant harbored
the intent to rape either prior to or during the acts which resulted
in the victim’s death, and that the killing and the rape were part of
one continuous transaction or occurred as a result of efforts to
avoid detection or facilitate escare, whether such killing was done
intentionally, unintentionally or accidentally.
"However, an unlawful killing does not occur ‘during the
commission of the crime of rape,’ if the defendant’s intended
criminal purpose was to kill and the rape was merely incidental to
the intended commission of that murder. On the other hand, if at
the time the defendant formed an intent to kill he also formed a
concurrent intent to rape, such is ‘during the commission of the
crime of rape’ within the meaning of the law."
D - 56
circumstance only if he killed in order to carry out or advance
the rape, and permits them to find a special circumstance
merely if the killing and rape were part of one continuous
transaction. This "continuous transaction" test, he asserts,
permitted the jurors to find the special circumstance even where
the purpose for the murder was completely unrelated to the
rape. This ignores the context of the instruction. The jurors
were specifically advised than an unlawful killing is not in the
commission of a rape where the defendant’s intended criminal
purpose was to kill and the rape merely incidental to the
intended murder.
Washington also faults the instruction because immediately
after correctly defining the incidental felony doctrine, it states:
"On the other hand, if at the time the defendant formed an
intent to kill he also formed a concurrent intent to rape, such is
‘during the commission of the crime of rape’ within the meaning
of the law." Thus, Washington contends this “other hand"
admonition effectively negated the preceding admonition and
told jurors that even if they found the rape was merely
incidental to Washington’s primary intent to commit murder, the
special circumstance could be proved solely by their finding he
intended to commit that rape at the time he formed the intent
to kill, whether the rape was merely peripheral to his intent to
murder, and that crime was not committed for an independent
purpose. However, while the robbery in Green can be
legitimately described as technical, only committed for the
purpose of concealing the murder, it defies logic to assume a
perpetrator of rape who kills his victim, is not motivated by an
urge for sexual gratification in committing that sexual act, a
motive independent of causing the victim’s death (e.g., People v.
Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 609.)
Thus, on this record, there is no evidence to support a
finding that the rape was only incidental to the murder. The
jury, erroneously but actually, was presented with Washington’s
version of the event. He wore a ski mask while alone with the
victim in her condominium solely because he did not wish to
have her identify him, a non-concern had his purpose in going
there been to kill. Further, under his version, and consistent
with the evidence, the rape occurred first and the ongoing
physical restraint necessary to choke the victim into submission
to his sexual attack resulted in her larynx being crushed, killing
D - 57
her by strangulation, an event not originally intended. In fact,
when the victim had indicated she would not struggle further, he
let go of her only to have her try to pull off his mask. He told
her she had better stop or he would kill her, and eventually
commenced choking her even further. Specifically, Washington
stated he was choking her.
"I was acting out this role like I was a rapist or
something and like I wanted to kill her and I did.
ae ie ee Be ee ee ee ee ee
", .. I struggled with her for over an hour. Just trying
to get her quiet and she wouldn’t kept fighting. I
couldn’t believe she kept fighting like that. That any
woman would know when you're getting attacked, you
should just be at ease so that way, you know, you’ve
got less chance of being hurt. I though she was gonna
do that. When she kept fighting, I just kept choking
her and I couldn’t believe I killed her."
Thus, Washington’s own words show he choked the victim
during her struggles while he was committing the rape. The
choking which Washington engaged for the purpose of initially
subduing the victim may have initially been motivated for
purposes other than rape or murder. However, Washington’s
version is during the struggle he formed the intent to rape and
he deliberately choked her into unconsciousness so that he could
consummate the rape and a continuation of the strangling led to
the victim’s death. Although Washington contends his
confession suggests the rape occurred as an incidental act during
the strangling, its clear implication is to the contrary. On the
facts of the case as presented to the jury, including Washington’s
confession, we are satisfied any error in the special instruction is
harmless beyond reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California
supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21.) While the killing may not have been
intended, the mechanism by which it was affected was the
ongoing force which was essential to disable the victim so
Washington could continue his intended rape during the attack
which ceased only upon her death. There is no substantial
evidence to support Washington’s theory on appeal! that a more
properly instructed jury may have found the rape merely
D - 58
incidental to the strangling.” While we conclude the court’s
instruction is confusing, on this record the error is harmless by
any standard. (People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 609.)
Disposition
Judgment affirmed.
/s/
WORK, Acting P. J.
I CONCUR:
/s/
NARES, J.
7. This instructional issue has been argued by Washington by
looking to the circumstances as described by this confession. That
is, his disclaimer of any intent to rape or kill when he accosted the
Sleeping victim. We have responded accordingly. Neither party
has suggested we should analyze the prejudice of this instruction
on a record expurgating the inadmissible confession. Were we to
do so, the result would be the same.
BENKE, J., concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. |
part company with my colleagues, however, with respect to
whether appellant invoked his right to terminate the interview. |
find this case remarkably similar to People v. Jennings (1988) 46
Cal.3d 963, where in the course of an interview the defendant
stated “I’m not saying shit to you no more, man. You, nothing
personal man, but I don’t like you. You're scaring the living shit
out of me.... That’s it. I shut up.” (Id. at p. 977, fn.
omitted.) The court concluded the statements reflected only
momentary animosity and frustration toward one of the officers.
I further observed that the trial court could, upon viewing the
entire tape of the interview, conclude other, incriminating
statements were voluntary and the defendant had not invoked
his right to terminate the interview. As the court there noted,
while appellate review requires an independent determination of
the issue, great weight may be given to the considered
conclusions of a lower court that has previously examined the
issued. (Id. at p. 979.) :
Viewing the tape and considering the demeanor of
appellant before, during and after the statements at issue here,
and considering the context in which the statements were made,
I conclude appellant was not invoking his right to terminate the
interview. In the context of the interview, his statements were
the product of momentary frustration in an otherwise lengthy
interview where it appears he is more than willing to joke, talk
and supply the officers with information. I would give great
weight to the conclusion of the lower court and conclude there
was no invocation of the right to terminate the interview.
/s/
BENKE, J.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.