Appendix — Blount v. Washington

Supreme Court brief1998

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1998

SYLVIA BLOUNT, Executive Director of Vacaville State Hospital,

and DANIEL E. LUNGREN, Attorney General,

Petitioners,

v.

TROY LEE WASHINGTON., Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

COURT OF APPEAL FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

APPENDICES TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DANIEL E. LUNGREN

Attorney General

GEORGE WILLIAMSON

Chief Assistant Attorney General

GARY W. SCHONS

Senior Assistant Attorney General

KEITH I. MOTLEY

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

LILIA E. GARCIA

Deputy Attorney General

Counsel of Record

110 West A St., Suite 1100

San Diego, CA 92101

P.O. Box 85266

San Diego, CA 92186-5266

Telephone: (619) 645-2225

Fax: (619) 645-2191

Counsel for Petitioners

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

[Filed August 28, 1997]

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TROY LEE WASHINGTON, No. 96-55275

Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.

94-01413-JSR

Vv.

MEMORANDUM*

JOE DEMORALES, Executive

Director,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of California

John S. Rhoades,

District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted August 8, 1997

Pasadena, California

Before: BROWNING, BRUNETTI, and TROTT, Circuit

Judges.

‘

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may

not be cited to or by the courts in this circuit, except as provided

by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

A-2

We examine de novo the district court’s decision to deny

Washington’s habeas petition, and apply the standards that

governed habeas relief prior to the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of 1996. See Jeffries v. Wood, 114

F.3d 1484, 1495 (9th Cir. 1997) (AEDPA not to be applied

retroactively); Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2063 (1997).

The State concedes that Washington asserted his right to

remain silent during police interrogation. The California Court

of Appeal concluded that the videotaped confession thereafter

avulsed from him by the police was involuntary and improperly

admitted in evidence. The Court of Appeal concluded that the

police utterly failed to "scrupulously honor" Washington’s

constitutional rights as embodied in Miranda. Michigan v.

Molsey, 423 U.S. 96, 104 (1975). A federal magistrate judge

agreed, as did the district court from which this appeal is taken.

However, the district court concluded, as did the Court of

Appeal, that the erroneous admission of the involuntary

confession was harmless.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the erroneous

admission of Washington’s videotaped confession was harmless.

On collateral review, an error is not "harmless" if it "had

substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993).

In determining whether an error is harmless, "the question is not

‘were they [the jurors] right in their judgment, regardless of the

error or its effect on the verdict. It is rather what effect the

error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the

jury’s decision.” Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312, 1322 (9th Cir.

1994) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 642-43 (Stevens, J.,

concurring)). An error is not harmless if we are "in grave

doubt" as to whether the error had "substantial and injurious

effect or influence." O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 435

(1995).

The videotaped confession was powerful and convincing

evidence of Washington’s guilt, not only of the crimes charged

but also of the rape special circumstance. The inadmissible

confession described the crimes in greater and more graphic

detail than any other evidence offered at trial. It provided a

unique insight into Washington’s motive for committing the

crimes and his state of mind in doing so. Indeed, the state trial

judge who denied the defense’s motion for judgment of acquittal

A-3

said: "As to the special circumstance, the critical evidence really

comes, I think, from the defendant’s statement although there is

support from the other evidence in the case."

Moreover, the prosecutor carefully pointed out to the jurors

that Washington’s statements in the videotaped confession had a

particularly probative evidentiary significance:

As far as the substance of his confession and what he

says occurred or his admissions, you can certainly

consider those on the issues of deliberation and

premeditation.

Mr. Thoma also said that the defendant’s

statements are uncontroverted and, in large measure, I

cannot disagree with that; but I want you to understand

what that means. I mean, the only person who could

basically, with respect to the facts that occurred within

that condominium that night, dispute it is Miss

Barksdale, and Miss Barksdale isn’t here.

I think he was being credible for the most part

when he made that statement. That doesn’t mean that

he doesn’t have some impetus to hide some factors, for

example, whether he actually intended to rape her

when he went over there. That’s certainly a fact that

he may wish to keep to himself, but that’s a judgment

you have to make based on the evidence.

Now, that, Ladies and Gentlemen, as to the

circumstantial evidence is what that instruction is

talking about. But you got to stop and think for a

minute. When somebody is saying on the issue of

intent what was the intent involved, what that person,

namely, Mr. Washington tells you what his intent is, not

circumstantial evidence. He is the only person that can

give you direct evidence as I am on what I intend to do

and you are on what you intend to do.

That is not circumstantial evidence. That is direct

evidence, and that instruction does not apply to it. Mr.

Washington on what his intent was, direct evidence, not

circumstantial evidence. And that instruction does not

apply to it.

ee

A-4

This is where circumstantial evidence does apply

because you’re making an inference on that portion of

it. The only direct evidence is what Mr. Washington

tells you.... The only direct evidence you will ever

have on the issue of intent is what the individual

himself says, but the circumstantial evidence instruction

does not apply to direct evidence.

In other words, Mr. Washington’s statements as to

his intent you can consider on their full value. You

don’t have to weigh them, either two reasonable

intents, he’s telling you. If you believe them, then

that’s all you need. There’s no balancing acts. It’s a

question of whether you believe him or not. That’s it.

It’s direct evidence.

1/31/92 R.T. 266-269 (emphasis added).

The confession was the backbone of the prosecution’s

closing argument. Referring to express malice, the prosecutor

argued:

What does the defendant say to you?

Basically what he says in several different ways in

several different times in the interview: if you don’t

stop[,] I’m going to have to kill you. He says: I didn’t

want to, didn’t want to do it. But when she finally

wouldn’t stop, he killed her. He tells you himself.

That is express malice. That is murder.

Id. at 200 (emphasis added).

As to implied malice, the prosecutor argued:

He knew that the danger was. That’s the method he

was using and applying on Miss Barksdale when he’s

telling her: stop it or I’m going to kill you. He clearly

understood.

Id. at 201.

To prove that the murder occurred during the commission

of rape, the prosecutor argued:

ee

A-5

It must be a continuous course of conduct, one

continuous transaction, which is clearly all you have

here by Mr. Washington’s own statement. This is a

single event, a single course of conduct, a single

transaction. Therefore, he kills during the commission

of rape.

Now, even if this is not a continuous transaction, if

the killing was to facilitate escape or avoid detection,

that would also apply. .. .

Do we have circumstances that suggest that here?

You bet. That’s basically, ladies and gentlemen, I

submit to you why he killed her; it was the only way he

was going to get out of there. He could not stop the

conduct. He killed her to facilitate his escape and

avoid detection. She’s trying to pull his mask off.

That’s the reason he ends up doing it.

Id. at 204-05 (emphasis added).

As to the degree of murder, the prosecutor argued:

We're not talking about a particularly short period

of time here; we’re talking about one or two hours,

depending on which particular statement you’re looking

at in his, that is, Mr. Washington’s statement... .

The crucial thing is what was going through his

mind. He tells you almost in every breath throughout

the statement: stop fighting me or I’m going to kill

you. He doesn’t want to do it, but he’s weighing the

pros and cons of the result as he’s going through the

acts. And he finally does it. And that’s the truth of

the circumstances here. And that, I submit to you,

ladies and gentlemen, is a willful, deliberate, and

premeditated murder, within the meaning of the law.

That is a first degree murder.

The second bases upon which you could find first

degree murder is murder, and I put with implied

malice, that was by means of lying in wait... .

I’m not going to go back through what I said

before, but that’s exactly what Mr. Washington was

doing here. He said that he went in to hurt her. This

A-6

is a murder at minimum with implied malice that was

accomplished by means of lying in wait.

Id. at 209-10.

The heart of the prosecution’s rebuttal was a statement-by-

statement verbatim recital of incriminating parts of Washington’s

confession to establish each element of the crimes. Id. at 271-

76. Virtually no properly admitted evidence was mentioned.

We note that a written transcript of the confession was also

admitted in evidence and was presumably in the jury’s hands.

The prosecutor relied upon Washington’s demeanor in the

videotaped confession as establishing his credibility:

The truth is, ladies and gentlemen, that he

probably didn’t want to have to kill her. Indeed, if you

watch his confession, I submit to you when he finally

gets it off his chest and tells you what happened, that

you have an impression of credibility in much of his

account. It’s what makes tragedies all the way around.

Indeed, his actual decision to kill comes only at the end

of the struggle when he’s finally realized that he isn’t

going to get out there unless he does it.

Id. at 207 (emphasis added). This point was reemphasized in

rebuttal:

I’ve already told you what my opinion is. And if you

watched that interview, I don’t really know how you

could come to a different conclusion.

I think he was being credible for the most part

when he made that statement.

Id. at 267 (emphasis added).

Strong circumstantial evidence linked Washington to the

crime, but the inadmissible confession was by far the most

influential proof before the jury and inevitably had a substantial

and injurious effect on the jury’s verdict. We are mindful of the

Supreme Court’s observation that

Coo

A-7

[a] confessions is like no other evidence... .

‘[c]onfessions have profound impact on the jury so

much so that we may justifiably doubt its ability to put

them out of mind even if told to do so.’ While some

statements by a defendant may concern isolated

aspects of the crime or may be incriminating only when

linked to other evidence, a full confession in which the

defendant discloses the motive for and means of the

crime may tempt the jury to rely upon that evidence

alone in reaching its decision.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (Citations

Omitted). Justice Kennedy reminds us that when we conduct a

harmless error analysis with regard to an inadmissible

confession, we must appreciate "the indelible impact" it may

have on a jury. Id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, the

erroneous admission of the confession destroyed any possibility

of a fair trial. Cf. Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1025 (9th Cir.

1996) (inadmissible confession held not to have any substantial

or injurious effect or influence on a trial).

REVERSED and REMANDED with instructions to grant

the writ.

ecpiudliisiniaderaiecesesce

APPENDIX B

C—O a

CC,

B-8

APPENDIX B

[Filed January 8, 1996]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY LEE WASHINGTON, CIVIL NO.

94-1413-R (RBB)

Petitioner,

v. ORDER DENYING

MOTION FOR WRIT

JON DeMORALES, Warden, OF HABEAS

and CORPUS

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Respondents.

Petitioner filed the present motion for a writ of habeas

corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner alleges that the

trial court committed constitutional error by admitting his

confession into evidence at trial.

On July 6, 1995, Magistrate Judge Brooks issued a Report

and Recommendation (hereafter “Recommendation") concluding

that Petitioner’s conviction should not be disturbed but that a

"retrial of the special circumstance [murder during the

commission of rape] allegation is required." Recommendation

at 17. Both Petitioner and Respondent filed Objections.

Petitioner objects to Magistrate Judge Brooks’ finding that the

admission of Petitioner’s confession was harmless at the guilt

phase.” Respondent objects to Magistrate Judge Brook’s

1. Petitioner also objects to Magistrate Judge Brooks’

conclusion that there was no constitutional error in the instruction

spe gah sal

B-9

finding that Petitioner’s confession prejudiced the jury’s finding

of the special circumstance. Respondent further objects to

Magistrate Judge Brooks’ finding that Petitioner’s second

statement, "I’m not gonna say anything,” was a revocation of

Petitioner’s waiver of his right to remain silent.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. $ 636 (b)(1)(C), this Court has

reviewed the records and files herein and the Recommendation

of Magistrate Judge Brooks. Having made a de novo

determination of those portions of the Recommendation to

which objections have been made,” the Court agrees with

Magistrate Judge Brooks’ conclusion that admission of

Petitioner’s confession was harmless with respect to his

conviction However, this Court disagrees with Magistrate Judge

Brooks’ conclusion that the confession was not harmless with

respect to the jury’s finding that the special circumstance was

true. For the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s motion for writ

of habeas corpus is DENIED in its entirety.

I. Background

On November 6, 1990, the police found the dead body of

Deborah Barksdale in the trunk of her car, which was parked in

her condominium garage. Ms. Barksdale died as a result of

strangulation, her larynx had been fractured, and there was

evidence suggesting that some form of sexual intercourse

occurred. The time of Ms. Barksdale’s death was estimated to

be between 10:00 p.m. on Friday, November 2, 1990, and 1:30

a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990.

which omitted an essential element of the rape special

circumstances and that the admission of his confession was a

harmless error in the sanity phase of the trial. However, Petitioner

does not raise any arguments in addition to the arguments made to

Magistrate Judge Brooks. After reviewing the habeas corpus

petition, the traverse, the record below, and Magistrate Judge

Brooks’ Recommendation, this Court adopts the findings and

conclusions of Magistrate Judge Brooks as to these issues.

2. Section 636 (b)(1)(C) does not affirmatively require some

lesser review by the district court when no specific objections to

the magistrate’s report is filed. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-

151 (1985).

B - 10

A resident of the victim’s condominium informed the police

that she had seen an unfamiliar black male near the

condominium complex on the night of the murder. The security

guard on duty that night also reported seeing a black male get

into a car -- later identified by the Department of Motor

Vehicle records as belonging to Petitioner -- parked across the

street at 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990.

On November 6, 1990, police detectives Richard Allen and

Louie Rodriguez contacted Petitioner, a black male, in front of

his residence. Petitioner agreed to accompany them to the

police station for an interview. Initially, the detectives asked

Petitioner general questions about himself and his relationship

with the victim. Petitioner told the detectives that he worked

for Barksdale Office Planning until he was laid off m August

1990. In addition, Petitioner admitted he and Ms. Sarksda®

argued before his employment was terminated. Pew . J als

admitted that in the week before the murder, Pettoner “ade

several attempts to contact Barksdale, but she failed to return

his phone calls. When Petitioner stopped by her office to visit,

she ran out the back door.

At this point, the detectives advised Washington of his

Miranda rights. Petitioner then asked if he was under arrest.

When the detectives told him he was not, Petitioner stated he

understood these rights as explained and agreed to continue

talking with them. (Clerk’s Tr. at 53-55.) Detective Rodriguez

then confronted Petitioner with the evidence that he was seen at

Barksdale’s condominium on the night of the murder. At one

point of the interrogation, the following exchange took place:

Detective Rodriguez: For what purpose did you go to her

place then? Did she call you over?

Petitioner: I’m not going to say anything.

Detective Rodriguez: Why not?

Petitioner: | Because I didn’t do it.

(Id. at 72) (emphasis added). The interrogation continued

| concerning Washington’s working relationship with Barksdale.

_ When Rodriguez again asked Petitioner what happened at

B-11

Barksdale’s house the night of the murder, Petitioner responded

as follows:

Petitioner: _[ told you if you just want to arrest me, you

can go ahead and arrest me but I didn’t do it.

I’m not gonna admit it.

Detective Allen: But that’s two different things, okay?

Petitioner: You're not gonna get it out of me because

I’m not gonna say anything. "Cause I didn’t do

it.

[Fifteen seconds of silence]

Detective Rodriguez: You were there. Ah if you did it,

you know, I wasn’t there. Ah but if

you didn’t do it, you know, you’re

gonna have to tell us, you know.

The only, the only thing that we

know at this time is that you were

there. Now how it happened, you

know, you know, that’s something

that you'll have to explain.

Detective Allen: This is your time to do that.

(Id. at 77-78) (emphasis added). Petitioner continued talking

and answering the detectives’ questions. A short time after, the

following exchange took place:

Detective Allen: So let’s talk about it and find out about

what, what happened and why it

happened. Okay? It’s easy once you

start.

Petitioner: I don’t want to talk about it.

Detective Rodriguez: You sure?

Petitioner: I didn’t do it.

‘ B - 12

Detective Rodriguez: Well, yeah that’s another story you

know.

Detective Allen: That’s like ah not being there in that car.

Okay? That’s like, that’s like denying you

were even there in the car. Okay?

Denying that you didn’t do it. That’s not,

that’s not solving the problem. Okay?

Like ah my partner says, there were

people there that saw you and we have

the description of your car. We have the

description of the person that was there.

The person saw you get in the car, saw

you drive away. Okay? The fact is you

were there. The fact is a lady is dead.

Okay? The fact is you did it. Now, you

have to be able to admit that to yourself.

All those, all those things occurred.

Okay?

Petitioner: Do you want me to lie? I mean...

Detective Allen: No, I don’t want you to lie.

Petitioner: Do you want me tell you a story?

Detective Allen: No, I don’t want you to tell us a story.

You know, we’re not sitting here to hear

a story. It’s like we’re not, we werent’

[sic], we’re not sitting here to hear

ourselves talk about where you were and

you say, ’No I wasn’t there. I don’t want

to talk about it.’

Petitioner: Okay, I'll tell you. I went there.

(Id. at 80-81.) (emphasis added). Petitioner then confessed to

the killing and the rape.

On January 13, 1992, Petitioner Troy Lee Washington was

charged by amended information in the San Diego Superior

Court with having committed murder, a violation of California

iisbaeabe Demat

B - 13

Penal Code § 187(a), rape, a violation of California Penal Code

§ 261(2), and first degree burglary, a violation of California

Penal Code § 459. Petitioner was also charged with a special

circumstance of committing murder during the commission of

rape.

During the trial, the videotaped interview containing

Petitioner’s confession was played for the jury. The trial court

also admitted a written transcript of the interview into evidence.

In addition, the prosecution introduced the results of DNA tests

performed on sperm samples retrieved from the victim and bed

clothing. These samples matched samples obtained from

Petitioner. Both parties stipulated that all DNA samples were

properly obtained, maintained and that there was no evidence of

testing error. The parties further stipulated that except for

identical twins, no persons have yet been found with matching

DNA patterns. |

The jury found Petitioner guilty of all counts charged by

information, including the special circumstance allegation. The

jury also found Petitioner sane at the time the crimes were

committed. The trial court sentenced Petitioner to life in prison

without the possibility of parole.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal. Petitioner raised several issues, including the admission

of his confession into evidence. Holding that the admission of

the confession was harmless error, the Court of Appeal affirmed

the conviction. Petitioner then filed a petition for writ of habeas

corpus relief with the California Supreme Court. The California

Supreme Court denied the petition without opinion.

The present motion for habeas corpus relief was filed on

September 9, 1994. Respondent concedes that Petitioner has

exhausted his administrative remedies.

Essentially, Petitioner contends that the trial court

committed constitutional error by admitting Petitioner’s

confession obtained in violation of Miranda at the guilty and

sanity phases of the trial. After reviewing the motion for writ of

habeas corpus, Respondent’s answer, Petitioner’s traverse, the

transcript and the videotaped interview containing Petitioner’s

confession, Magistrate Judge Brooks issued Recommendation

granting in part and denying in part the motion for writ of

habeas corpus.

Il. Miranda Violation

Petitioner contends that the trial court committed error by

admitting the portion of the interview containing his confession

because Petitioner had invoked his right to remain silent prior to

confessing.

A. Applicable Legal Standard

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme

Court established a procedural mechanism that safeguards the

exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-

incrimination. See Twenty-Fourth Annual Review of Criminal

Procedure, 83 Geo. L.J. 665, 803 (1995). Before interrogating

a* suspect in custody,” Miranda requires law enforcement

officials to inform the suspect (1) that he has a right to remain

silent; (2) that his statements may be used against him at trial;

(3) that he has the right to the presence of an attorney; and (4)

that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for

him. The Supreme Court further explained:

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent

procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any

manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he

wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At

this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth

Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person

invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of

compulsion, subtle or otherwise.

Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, a criminal

suspect may selectively revoke a comprehensive waiver of his or

3. Miranda warnings are necessary only when a suspect is in

custody and is subjected to interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at

477-78. Since neither party disputes whether Petitioner was in

“custody,” this Court will not inquire into it.

4. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. No other warnings are

necessary, "a defendant need not be informed of a right to stop

questioning after it has begun." United States v. Lares-Valdez, 939

F. 2d 688, 689 (9th Cir. 1991).

tithes Lala eel

B - 15

her right to remain silent by expressing a desire not to discuss a

particular topic. United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537,

541-42 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2453 (1993);

United States v. Lopez-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 1980)

(quoting United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 297-98 (9th

Cir. 1978)).

B. Petitioner Invoked His Right to Remain Silent

By agreeing to continue talking with the detectives,

Petitioner waived his Miranda right to remain silent. Petitioner

contends that he thereafter revoked his waiver and invoked his

right to remain silent. United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019,

1022 (9th Cir. 1993) (defendant explicitly waived his Miranda

rights by orally agreeing to speak to the federal agents, signing

of a Miranda waiver was not esscntial for waiver to occur), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 895 (1994); United States v. Gordon, 974 F.2d

1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1992) (defendant waived his Miranda rights

where defendant stated that he understood his rights and then

agreed to talk to agent). This Court agrees with the findings of

the California Court of Appeal and Magistrate Judge Brooks

that Petitioner’s first statement, "I’m not gonna say anything," in

response to specific factual questions was a selective revocation

of Petitioner’s waiver of the right to remain silent. When an

individual selectively revokes a waiver of the right to remain

silent, the police can continue the interview as long as they

avoid questions concerning subjects that the individual did not

wish to discuss. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d at 541-42.

The California Court of Appeal also interpreted Petitioner’s

second statement, "I’m not going to say anything" as a selective

revocation of Petitioner’s Miranda waiver to remain silent.

Judge Benke, in a concurring opinion, concluded that Petitioner

never invoked his right to terminate the interview.2 However,

this Court concurs with Magistrate Judge Brooks that Petitioner

5. After viewing the videotape and considering the demeanor

of Petitioner, Judge Benke concurred in the result reached by

Appeal Court of California, but concluded that Petitioner never

invoked his right to terminate the interview. Thus, the entire

Court confession would be admissible.

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B - 16

did invoke his right to remain silent by his second statement.

Although the state court’s determination of factual findings is

presumptively correct, the constitutional effect of Petitioner’s

statements is a legal question subject to independent review.

Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991).

Furthermore, the desire to halt an interrogation may be

indicated in various ways. No precise words or conduct is

necessary. People v. Randall, 1 Cal. 3d 948, 955 (1970),

overruled on other grounds by People v. Cahill, 5 Cal. 4th 478,

510 (1993). This Court concludes that Petitioner’s statement, in

conjunction with the several seconds of silence thereafter,

demonstrates Petitioner’s attempt to halt the questioning,

thereby invoking his right to remain silent. However, the

detectives continued to encourage Petitioner to "face up" to his

"mistake," at one point stating "[s]o let’s talk about it and find

out what .. . happened and why it happened." (Clerk’s Tr. at

80.) Petitioner then stated, "I don’t want to talk about it." (Id.)

Both the California Court of Appeal and Magistrate Judge

Brooks found the third statement expressed Petitioner’s desire

to stop talking. At this point, further questioning should have

ceased. The California Court of Appeal stated that "[i]f there

were ambiguity on this point, the detectives were entitled to

inquire whether Petitioner did intend" to revoke his Miranda

waiver. This Court agrees. Moreover, "[d]oubts must be

resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim."

Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986)).

Statements obtained after a person in custody indicates that

he wishes to remain silent may be admissible where the

individual’s right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously

honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07 (1975). The

detectives continued to interrogate Petitioner concerning the

same crime he refused to discuss. Therefore, they failed to

"scrupulously honor" Petitioner’s right to terminate questioning.

Accordingly, the detectives elicited the Petitioner’s confession in

violation of Miranda. The trial court erred when it allowed the

portions of the interview following Petitioner’s second statement

that he did not want to continue, and the ensuing confession

into evidence.

B- 17

III. Admission of Petitioner’s Confession Does Not Amount to

a Reversible Error

Federal habeas proceedings assure that constitutional rights

are observed. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1719

(1993). The Supreme Court recently elaborated on the harmless

error standard:

When a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave

doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had

"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining

the jury’s verdict," that error is not harmless. And, the

petitioner must win.

O’Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995) (quoting Brecht,

113 S. Ct. at 1722). Grave doubt exists in the judge’s mind if

"the matter is so evenly balanced that he feels himself in virtual

equipoise as to the harmlessness of error." Id. Thus, the critical

question this Court faces is "Do I, the judge, think that the error

substantially influenced the jury’s decision?" Id. at 995. I think

not.

A. Guilt Phase of Trial

The evidence against Petitioner other than his confession is

compelling. Petitioner had been employed by the victim and

had been discharged a few months before she was strangled.

The victim feared Petitioner, avoiding him and his phone calls.

Moreover, Petitioner knew the victim deliberately avoided him.

Petitioner also knew where the victim lived and had been

there before. The day before the murder, Petitioner

unsuccessfully attempted to contact the victim. On the night of

the murder, a resident of the condominium complex observed a

person matching Petitioner’s description in the garage area of

the victim’s residence. The security guard saw a person

matching Petitioner’s description using a key to enter a car that

was registered to Petitioner. Finally, the sperm found in the

victim’s body and on the bedding matched Petitioner’s DNA.

Defense Counsel stipulated to the admission of the DNA

evidence obtained by the Cellmark’s method of analyzing

samples under the restriction fragment-length polymorphism

B- 18

("RFLP") process. Nonetheless, Petitioner contends that he

stipulated to the admissibility of the DNA evidence only because

the trial court admitted the confession, making the identity of

the perpetrator a moot point.* (Petitioner’s Objections at 2.)

Petitioner argues that under Arizona v. Fulminante, 499

US. 279 (1991), the admission of his confession was prejudicial

error. In Fulminante, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed a

conviction obtained after the trial court improperly admitted

evidence of a coerced confession. Id. at 284. The state court

reasoned that although a second uncoerced confession

established overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt,

when a confession is improperly admitted a conviction is not

subject to harmless error review. Id. The United States

Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds. The Court ruled

that the matter was subject to harmless error review but that the

admission of Fulminante’s coerced confession was not harmless

error. Id. at 297. The Court reasoned that the admission of the

coerced confession not only corroborated the uncoerced

confession but also led to the admission of otherwise

inadmissible evidence which would not have been relevant but

for the admission of the coerced confession. Id. at 299-300. In

short "[a]bsent the confessions, it is unlikely that Fulminante

would have been prosecuted at all." Id. at 297.

In contrast to Fulminante, in the present case the DNA

evidence was not made relevant only because the confession was

admitted. The trial court in the present case admitted the DNA

evidence because Defense Counsel made a strategical decision

to stipulate to the admissibility of the DNA evidence.

Petitioner, therefore, waived his evidentiary objection to the

reliability of the RFLP analysis. The Supreme Court recently

explained:

Absent some “overriding procedural consideration that

prevents enforcement of the contract," courts have held that

agreements to waive evidentiary rules are generally

enforceable even over a party’s subsequent objections. 21

C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure §

5039, pp. 207-208 (1977). Courts have "liberally enforced"

6. Although the same argument was raised on appeal, the

Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling.

as Pasrce a vi SG SPE REC. tte Mee MR Oh re oe Pe eee ee

B - 19

agreements to waive various exclusionary rules of evidence.

Note, Contracts to Alter the Rules of Evidence, 46 Harv. L.

Rev. 138, 139-140 (1933). ...

Indeed, evidentiary stipulations are a valuable and

integral part of everyday trial practice. Prior to trail parties

often agree in writing to the admission of otherwise

objectionable evidence, either in exchange for stipulations

from opposing counsel or for other strategic purposes.

United States v. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct. 797, 802 (1995)

(affirming conviction obtained with admission by stipulation of

otherwise inadmissible evidence of statements made in course of

plea discussions). Accordingly, a party’s stipulation to evidence

precludes subsequent objections as to authenticity. Id. Having

stipulated to the admissibility of the DNA evidence, Petitioner

cannot now object to the admission of that evidence. Federal

courts are not forums to relitigate state trials. Brecht, 113 S. Ct.

at 1719 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).

The only support for Petitioner’s argument that but for the

admission of the confession the DNA would not have been

admitted, is his own speculation. Speculation as to what counsel

would have done and how the court would have ruled does not

amount to error of a constitutional dimension. Even if

defendant had not stipulated and even if the trial court

conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility of the DNA

evidence, this Court finds that the trial court could have

admitted the DNA evidence without the stipulation.

Magistrate Judge Brooks recognized that Petitioner

unsuccessfully objected to the use of the DNA evidence at his

preliminary hearing. See Recommendation at 14. Moreover,

during the time Petitioner’s case was pending, the Second

District Court of Appeal conducted a detailed analysis of

whether RFLP analysis evidence was admissible in People v.

Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 836 (1991). The Court of Appeal

found that RFLP and Cellmark’s method was generally accepted

in the scientific community and was thus admissible under the

Kelly/Frye standard.” Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d at 862.

7. In People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 30 (1976), the court

adhered to the rule announced in Frye v. United Sates, 293 F.

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Petitioner objects to Magistrate Judge Brooks’ conclusion

that there is no basis for concluding that the DNA evidence

would not have been admitted if he had objected. Petitioner

asserts that at the time of his trial there was a debate in the

scientific community as to the accuracy of DNA evidence. At

the time of his trial, however, Axell was the law and the DNA

evidence was admissible. The First District Court of Appeal

disagreed with Axell six months after Petitioner’s trial. See

People v. Barney, 8 Cal. App. 4th 798, 821 (1992). Subsequent

to Barney, four Courts of Appeal embraced Axell and sharply

rebuked the First District’s decision in Barney.”

Petitioner’s conclusory speculations fail to provide any basis

to convince this Court that the DNA would not have been

admitted if the confession had been suppressed. In short, in

light of the overwhelming evidence in addition to the confession,

this Court finds that the trial court’s error in admitting the

confession did not substantially influence the jury’s decision.

Thus, the error was harmless.

B. Special Circumstance

In order for the jury to find the special circumstance, the

jury must find that the murder was committed to carry out or

advance the underlying rape. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61,

(1980) overruled on other grounds by People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d

826, 834 n.3 (1986). Petitioner contends that without the

confession, the jury could not have found the murder was

committed while the Petitioner was engaged in the commission

of rape. Finding that the Prosecutor argued the special

circumstance allegation based upon Petitioner’s confession,

1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) which allows evidence obtained

through a new scientific method to be admitted only after the

"general acceptance" of the technique has been shown.

8. The California Supreme Court has granted review in all

four cases to resolve the debate. See People v. Amundson, 43 Cal.

Rptr. 2d 827 (Cal. 1995) (appeal from 4th dist.); People v. Marlow,

43 Cal. Rptr. 2d 679 (Cal. (1995) (appeal from 6th Dist.); People v.

Soto, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Cal. 1995) (appeal from 4th Dist.);

People v Wilds, 39 Cal. Rptr. 2d 406 (Cal. 1995) (appeal from 2d

Dist.).

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B - 21

Magistrate Judge Brooks concurred with the Petitioner and

recommended a retrial of the special circumstance finding.

Magistrate Judge Brooks found that without the confession,

it was impossible to tell whether the victim was dead or alive

when the sperm was deposited into victim’s vagina. Respondent

objected to the Recommendation and cites People v. Ramirez,

50 Cal. 3d 1158 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991). In

Ramirez, the_California Supreme Court created a presumption

that the jury could reasonable infer that an assailant engaged in

sexual conduct with a victim while she was alive in the absence

of evidence suggesting that the victim’s assailant intended to

have sexual conduct with a corpse. Id. at 1176. This Court

agrees with the Respondent that there is an absence of evidence

which suggests that Petitioner intended to have sexual conduct

with a corpse.

The victim was afraid of Petitioner to the point of avoiding

Petitioner. The victim was found only partially nude, with her

top still on. The victim’s sweatpants found at the floor of her

bed had been ripped. Petitioner would have had no need to rip

the victim’s sweatpants if the intercourse was consensual. Also,

most of the injuries on the victim occurred ante mortem and

were on the victim’s face, indicating a struggle. The jury could

conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner had

nonconsensual intercourse with the victim.

Moreover, Petitioner would have had no need to rip the

victim’s sweatpants while removing them if Petitioner merely

raped a dead body. The victim’s body did not appear to be

defiled or mutilated in any extraordinary way which might have

been expected had Petitioner been a necrophilic. Petitioner

may be suffering from erotomania, but there is no evidence to

suggest that Petitioner was a necrophilic. The jury may

reasonably infer that Petitioner had nonconsensual intercourse

with the victim while she was alive.

Although the medical examiner found no sexual trauma on

the victim, a lack of sexual trauma does not imply that the

victim was dead during the intercourse. See People v. Rowland,

4 Cal. 4th 238, 265 (1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 138 (1993).

Even if the victim was dead at the time of the intercourse, a

special circumstance can be found when a murder is committed

during the attempted commission of rape if a defendant

intended or attempted to rape a live body. People v. Kelly, 1

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Cal. 4th 495, 524-525, 527 n.8 (1992). cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 232

(1992).

However, Magistrate Judge Brooks concluded that the

prosecution's use of Petitioner’s confession during the closing

argument allowed the jury to find the special circumstance. This

Court makes an "examination of the entire proceedings" to

determine whether the prosecutor’s remarks rendered the trial

“fundamentally unfair.". Campbell v. Kincheloe, 829 F.2d 1453,

1457 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1023 (1989). The

Prosecutor’s use of Petitioner’s confession was improper because

it was obtained through the Miranda violation. Nevertheless,

this Court concludes that the Prosecutor’s use of the Petitioner’s

confession during the closing argument did not so infect the trial

with unfairness as to make resulting conviction a denial of due

process.

Even assuming the confession was properly excluded, the

overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence supports

the special circumstance finding. Moreover, the Supreme Court

“clearly warn[s] against holding every improper and unfair

argument of a state prosecutor to be a federal due process

violation." Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328 (1985); see

also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-182 (1986)

(prosecutor’s improper remarks did not deprive petitioner of a

fair trail); Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 765-766 (1987)

(improper question followed immediately by an objection and

two curative instructions did not violate petitioner’s due process

right).

Notwithstanding the prosecutor’s reference to Petitioner’s

confession in the closing argument and notwithstanding the

admission of the confession, this Court finds that there is

sufficient evidence from which the jury could presume that a

victim was alive during a sexual assault when there is no

evidence to suggest Petitioner intended sexual conduct with a

corpse. The admission of the confession did not have a

substantial and injurious effect on the special circumstance

finding and was harmless.”

9. Petitioner raised a new argument that the admission of

the confession was prejudicial as to the degree of the murder as

well as the special circumstance. In California, intent to commit

an underlying felony may be proven by circumstantial evidence in

LAS Sie yeaa Si Sieg oa ene ete a aoa

IV. Conclusion

Although Petitioner established a violation of his Fifth

Amendment right to remain silent, he has not established

prejudice sufficient to require a reversal. Petitioner’s writ of

habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is Denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED:

/s/

Date: 1/8/96 John S. Rhoades, Sr.

United States District Judge

Copies to:

All Parties

the prosecution for felony murder. Hinman v. McCarthy, 676 F. 2d

343, 350 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982).

Because this Court finds the admission of Petitioner’s confession

harmless to the special circumstance finding, the confession did not

substantially affect the degree of murder.

APPENDIX C

[Filed July 6, 1995]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

TROY LEE WASHINGTON, Case No. 94-1413-R(RBB)

Petitioner,

REPORT AND

vs. RECOMMENDATION

GRANTING IN

JON DEMORALES Warden, PART PETITION FOR

and ATTORNEY, A WRIT OF HABEAS

GENERAL OF THE STATE CORPUS

OF CALIFORNIA

Respondents.

Petitioner, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed an

application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2254 (1988).

On January 13, 1992, Petitioner Troy Lee Washington was

charged by amended information in the San Diego Superior

Court with having committed the offenses of murder, a violation

of California Penal Code section 187(a), rape, a violation of

California Penal Code section 261(2), and first degree burglary,

a violation of California Penal Code section 459.” Additionally,

Petitioner was charged with a special circumstance of

committing murder during the commission of rape within the

meaning of section 190.2(a)(17). (Clerk’s Tr. at 137.)

The jury convicted Petitioner of all counts charged,

including murder in the first degree, and found that he was sane

when he committed the crimes. (Clerk’s Tr. at 261-65, 359.)

1. All future statutory references refer to the California Penal

Code unless otherwise stated.

C - 25

Under section 190(a), every person guilty of murder in the first

degree shall be sentenced to death, life in prison without the

possibility of parole or imprisonment for 25 years to life. Under

section 190.2(a)(17)(iii), a defendant found guilty of murder in

the first degree with the special circumstance of committing the

murder while engaged in the commission of a rape shall be

punished by death or confinement for life without the possibility

of parole. On March 13, 1992, the court sentenced Petitioner to

life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Clerk’s Tr. at

324-25, 360.)

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the California Court of

Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One. Washington

raised several issues, including the admission of his confession

into evidence and the instructions given on the special

circumstance allegation. In his appellate brief, Petitioner argued

that the confession was the only evidence of what happened in

the victim’s condominium on the night of her death. (Answer at

164.) The court of appeal affirmed the conviction on October 6,

1993. (Answer at 43.) In footnote 7 of its opinion, the court

commented on the effect of the involuntary confession and

instruction:

This [special circumstance] instructional issue has

been argued by Washington by looking to the

circumstances as described by his confession. That is,

his disclaimer of any intent to rape or kill when he

accosted the sleeping victim. We have responded

accordingly. Neither party has suggested we should

analyze the prejudice of this instruction on a record

expurgating the inadmissible confession. Were we to

do so, the result would be the same.

(Id. at 61 n.7.)

Petitioner then filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the

California Supreme Court. In the petition for review to the

California Supreme Court, Petitioner contended that without the

confession, the jury could not find that the murder was

committed to carry out or advance commission of the rape.

(Answer at 87.) On January 13, 1994, the California Supreme

Court denied the petition without opinion. (Answer at 122.)

C - 26

This petition for habeas corpus relief was filed on

September 9, 1994. The Respondents concede that Washington

has exhausted his administrative remedies. (Answer at 3.)

I. Petitioner’s Contentions

In his application for a writ of habeas corpus filed with this

Court, Petitioner contends that the trial court committed

constitutional error by admitting his confession into evidence at

both the guilt and sanity phases of the trial. Additionally,

Petitioner alleges that the trial court violated his right to due

process by giving a jury instruction which omitted an essential

element of the special circumstance allegation.

This Court has reviewed the petition for writ of habeas

corpus, Respondent’s answer, Petitioner’s traverse, the trial

transcript and the videotaped interview containing Petitioner’s

confession. After a thorough review of these items, the Court

finds that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus should be

granted in part.

II. Statement of Facts

On Tuesday morning, November 6, 1990, the police, after

receiving a report that Deborah Barksdale failed to show up at»

work the previous day, searched her car, which was parked in

her condominium garage. They found her body inside the truck.

Ms. Barksdale’s larynx had been fractured, and there was

evidence that she had engaged in sexual intercourse. (3 Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. at 134-35, 137-40.) The time of death was estimated

to be between the hours of 10:00 p.m. on Friday, November 2,

1990, and 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990. (Id. at 118-

19.)

A resident of the victim’s condominium complex told the

police that she had seen an unfamiliar black male late Friday

night in the complex garage. (Id. at 23, 26-28.) The security

guard on duty that night also reported seeing a black male leave

the condominium complex and get into a car parked across the

street at 1:30 a.m. on Saturday, November 3, 1990. (Id. at 40-

46.) The security guard wrote down the vehicle’s license plate

number. (Id.) The car was identified from Department of

aca

+27

Motor Vehicles records as belonging to Petitioner Washington.

(Id. at 60-63.)

On Tuesday afternoon, November 6, i990, police detectives

Richard Allen and Louie Rodriguez contacted Petitioner in front

of his residence. (Id. at 60.) Petitioner was questioned at the

police station. (Id. at 63-65.) Petitioner was not placed under

arrest, so the detectives did not inform him of his Miranda

rights. Initially, the offices asked him general questions about

himself and his relationship with the victim. (Clerk’s Tr. at 35-

55.)

Washington cooperated with the detectives, but his answers

conflicted with information they received from other witnesses.

The detectives felt that Petitioner was not being truthful. (2

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 21.) At this point, they informed Petitioner

of his Miranda rights. Petitioner asked if he was under arrest,

and the detectives told him he was not. Petitioner then agreed

to continue talking with them. (Clerk’s Tr. at 53-55.)

During the next part of the interview, Washington made

three statements that he asserts invoked his right to remain

silent. Petitioner made the first statement during a discussion

with Detective Rodriguez. Rodriguez asked, "For what purpose

did you go to her place then?" (Id. at 72.) Petitioner did not

respond. The following dialogue then took place:

Rodriguez: Did she call you over?

Petitioner: I’m not going to say anything.

Rodriguez: Why not?

Petitioner: Because I didn’t do it.

(Id.) The detectives continued to question and talk with

Washington. (Id. at 72-77.)

Later, during the following exchange with both detectives,

Petitioner made a second statement that he asserts invoked his

right to remain silent:

Petitioner: I told you if you just want to arrest me,

you can go ahead and arrest me but I

didn’t do it. I’m not gonna admit it.

Allen: But that’s two different things, okay?

Petitioner: You're not gonna get it out of me

because I’m not gonna say anything.

‘Cause I didn’t do it. [Fifteen seconds of

silence. }

C - 28

Rodriguez: You were there. Ah if you did it, you

know, I wasn’t there. You’re gonna have

to tell us yourself, you know. Ah but if

you didn’t do it, you know, you’re gonna

have to tell us, you know. The only, the

only thing that we know at this time is

that you were there. Now how it

happened, you know, how it happened,

you know, that’s something that you'll

have to explain.

Allen: This is your time to do that.

Petitioner: | Does Guy [a former co-worker] and

everybody know I was there?

(Id, at 77-78.) Petitioner continued talking and answering the

detectives’ questions.

A short time later, Petitioner made the third statement that

he asserts invoked his right to remain silent:

Allen: So let’s talk about it and find out about,

what happened and why it happened.

Okay? It’s easy once you start.

Petitioner: 1 don’t want to talk about it.

Rodriguez: You sure?

Petitioner: I didn’t do it.

Rodriguez: Well, yeah that’s another story you know.

Allen: That’s like ah not being there in that car.

| Okay? That’s like, that’s like denying you

| were even there in the car. Okay?

Denying that you didn’t do it. That’s not,

that’s not solving the problem. Okay?

Like ah my partner says, there were

people there that saw you and we have

the description of your car. We have the

description of the person that was there.

The person saw you get in the car, saw

you drive away. Now that was, you know,

that’s a fact. Okay? The fact is you

were there. The fact is a lady is dead.

Okay? The fact is you did it. Now, you

have to be able to admit that to yourself.

All those, all those things occurred.

RF ED TN OS I

C - 29

Okay?

Petitioner: Do you want me to lie? I mean...

Allen: No, I don’t want you to lie.

Petitioner: Do you want me to tell you a story?

Allen: No, I don’t want you to tell us a story.

You know, we’re not sitting here to hear

a story. It’s not like we’re not, we

werent’ [sic], we’re not sitting here to

hear ourselves talk about where you were

and you say, ‘No I wasn’t there. I don’t

want to talk about it.’

Petitioner: Okay, I'll tell you...

(Id, at 80-81.) Petitioner confessed to the killing and the rape.

(Id. at 81-106.)

During the trial, the videotaped interview containing

Washington’s confession was played for the jury. (3 Rep.’s

Appeal Tr. at 142-45.) The court also admitted a written

transcript of the interview into evidence. (Id. at 148.) In

addition, the prosecution introduced the results of DNA tests

performed on sperm samples retrieved from the victim and bed

clothing. These samples matched samples obtained from

Petitioner. (Id. at 137-40.) Both parties stipulated that all DNA

samples were properly obtained, maintained and that there was

no evidence of testing error. The parties further stipulated that

except for identical twins, no persons have yet been found with

matching DNA patterns.

As stated above, the jury found Petitioner guilty of all

counts charged by information, including the special

circumstance allegation. (Clerk’s Tr. at 261-64, 348-60.) The

jury also found him sane at the time the crimes were committed.

III. Analysis of Petitioner’s Contentions

A. Miranda Violation.

Petitioner contends that the portion of the interview

containing his confession was erroneously admitted into evidence

because he had invoked his right to remain silent prior to

confessing. This Court has reviewed the videotape and written

of

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transcript of Petitioner’s confession. The constitutional effect of

Petitioner’s statements is a legal question subject to independent

review. Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 502 U.S. 868 (1991). The Court analyzes his words

as ordinary people would understand them and examines the

entire context in which he spoke. United States v. De La Jara,

973 F.2d 746, 750 (9th Cir. 1992); Bradley v. Meachum, 918

F.2d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1221 (1991).

The United States Supreme Court established that a

criminal suspect may invoke his or her right to remain silent at

any time during a police interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966). There, the Supreme Court held:

Once warnings have been given, the subsequent

procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any

manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that

he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must

cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to

exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement

taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be

other than the product of compulsion, subtle or

otherwise.

Id. at 473-74 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, a criminal

suspect may selectively revoke a comprehensive waiver of his or

her right to remain silent by expressing a desire not to discuss a

particular topic. United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537,

541-42 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2453 (1993);

United States v Lopz-Diaz, 630 F.2d 661, 664 & n.2 (9th Cir.

1980) (quoting United States v. Lorenzo, 570 F.2d 294, 297-98

(9th Cir. 1978)).

Before confronting Petitioner with the information that he

and his car were seen at the victim’s residence, the detectives

informed him of his Miranda rights. Petitioner waived his right

to remain silent by agreeing to continue to talk with them.

However, Petitioner contends he later revoked his waiver and

invoked his right to remain silent. Washington said, "I’m not

gonna say anything" in response to being asked: "For what

purpose did you go to her place then? Did she [the victim] call

you over?" (Clerk’s Tr. at 72.)

C- 31

Petitioner’s statement could be interpreted as a selective

revocation of his waiver of the right to remain silent.

Washington had stated that he was not going to say anything

about going to the victim’s residence. Yet, questioning on this

subject continued. However, petitioner responded by talking

about a conversation that he had with the victim weeks before

the murder. (Clerk’s Tr. at 74.) Although the detective

questioned petitioner about going to the victim’s residence on

the night of the murder, Washington did not respond to that

question and talked about other matters. When an individual

selectively revokes a waiver of the right to remain silent, the

police can continue the interview as long as they avoid questions

concerning subjects that the individual did not wish to discuss.

Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d at 541-42.

Approximately seven minutes after Washington first said he

was not going to talk, one of the detectives continued to ask

questions about what happened at the victim’s residence, and

Petitioner made the second statement he asserts invoked his

right to remain silent. Petitioner stated, "You’re not g: 1a get

it out of me because I’m not going to say anything. Cause I

didn’t do it." After this statement, the detectives told

Washington that he was at the crime scene, and this was the

time to explain how the murder happened. The videotaped

interview shows that Washington sat silent for approximately

fifteen seconds -- while the detectives sat waiting for him to

speak. This statement, in the context of the interview,

demonstrates that Petitioner attempted to halt the questioning.

Petitioner invoked his right to remain silent.

About five minutes later, Washington made the third

statement he contends invoked his right to remain silent.

Detective Allen asked Petitioner to describe the details of the

crime. Petitioner did not immediately respond. He then stated,

"I don’t want to talk about it." The California Court of Appeal

disagreed with the trial court and found that this statement

expressed Petitioner’s desire to stop talking. (Answer at 50-52.)

Statements obtained after a person in custody indicates that

he wishes to remain silent may be admissible where the

individual’s right to cut off questioning has been scrupulously

honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104-07 (1975). In

Mosley, after being fully advised of his rights, the defendant

stated that he did not wish to discuss the offense for which he

C - 32

was being held. The police immediately ceased the

interrogation. They resumed questioning only after the passage

of a significant period of time and the provision of a fresh set of

warnings. Furthermore, the police restricted the second

interrogation to a crime that had not been the subject of the

earlier interrogation. Id. at 104-05.

Unlike the defendant in Mosley, Washington’s invocation of

his right to remain silent was not "scrupulously honored." After

each time he expressed his wish to remain silent, the detectives

continued to question him. No significant period of time had

elapsed, and no fresh warnings were given. The detectives

failed to honor Petitioner’s invocation of his right to remain

silent. Although Washington’s first statement can reasonably be

viewed as a selective revocation of his waiver, the same cannot

be said for the second and third statements. The videotaped

interview shows that these words, and the manner in which

Washington said them, demonstrate that he did not want to

answer any further questions about the crime. Accordingly, this

Court agrees with the California Court of Appeal that the

detectives obtained Petitioner’s confession in violation of

Miranda. The trial court erred when it allowed the portions of

the interview following Washington’s second statement that he

did not want to continue, (Clerk’s Tr. at 77), and ensuing

confession into evidence.

A federal habeas court may grant relief for a trial error

when the petitioner established that the error resulted in "actual

prejudice." Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993)

(citing United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986)).

Federal habeas proceedings are important in assuring that

constitutional rights are observed; however, their role is

secondary and limited. Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719. Furthermore,

federal courts are not forums to relitigate state trials. Id. at

1719 (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 887 (1983)).

To determine whether there has been actual prejudice, this

Court examines the record as a whole and applies the harmless

error test set forth in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750,

776 (1946). The test is whether the error had a "substantial and

injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict."

Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722 (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776).

In O’Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. 992, 994 (1995), the Supreme

Court recently explained, "When a federal judge in a habeas

C - 33

proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of

federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in

determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless. And,

the petitioner must win."

1. Evidence of Guilt.

Notwithstanding Washington’s confession, the evidence ot

guilt was compelling. The victim feared Petitioner. She avoided

him and his phone calls. Furthermore, Petitioner knew the

victim deliberately avoided him. The day before the murder,

Petitioner attempted to contact the victim, but was unsuccessful.

(Clerk’s Tr. at 69-70.) Washington knew where the victim lived

and had been there before. On the night of the murder, a

resident of the condominium complex observed a person

matching Washington’s general description in the garage area of

the victim’s residence. (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 26.) Later that

same night, the security guard also saw a person matching

Washington’s general description using a key to enter a car that

belonged to Petitioner. (Id. at 42-43, 46, 60-63). Petitioner

admitted that only he and his mother had a key to that vehicle.

(Clerk’s Tr. at 47). Additionally, the sperm found in the victim’s

body and on the bedding matched Petitioner’s DNA.

Washington stipulated to the admission of the DNA

evidence. (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 138-40.) Petitioner agues

that his Court should disregard the DNA evidence if it finds that

his confession was improperly admitted into evidence. The

record indicates that Petitioner stipulated to the DNA evidence

after the trial court decided to admit his confession into

evidence. (2 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. - Augment at 114.) If Petitioner

had not stipulated to the evidence and continued to assert

objections he made at the preliminary hearing, the trial court

would have conducted a hearing to determine the admissibility

of the DNA evidence. (1d.)

In California, the courts conduct Kelly/Frye hearings to

determine whether evidence based on a new scientific method

may be admitted. In People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P. 2d

1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976), the court affirmed California’s

adherence to the rule announced in Frye v. United States, 293

F. 1013, 1014 (1923). The Kelly/Frye standard provides that

evidence obtained through the application of a new scientific

- EE SA Wit 2 PLATE Ste

C.s

method, such as DNA profiling, may be admitted only after the

“general acceptance" of the technique has been shown. To

establish "general acceptance," the proponent must demonstrate

that: (1) the method used was reliable, (2) the witnesses are

properly qualified to testify concerning the method, and (3) the

correct scientific procedures were used. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d at 30,

549 P. 2d at 1244, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 148.

The DNA evidence in this case came from sperm samples

taken froin the victim, her bed clothing and Petitioner.

Cellmark Diagnostic, a forensic laboratory, analyzed the samples

under the restriction fragment-length polymorphism ("RFLP")

process. At Washington’s preliminary hearing, he argued that

RFLP analysis and Cellmark’s method of calculating statistical

probabilities were not generally accepted in the scientific

community. The magistrate took judicial notice of several

California cases, as well as cases from other jurisdictions,

recognizing that RFLP analysis was generally accepted in the

scientific community. Although the magistrate did not require

the prosecution to lay a Kelly/Frye foundation for RFLP, it was

required to show that Cellmark used proper procedures in

conducting the test and that the experts were qualified to testify

on the matter. At the preliminary hearing, evidence of a DNA

match was admitted but evidence of statistical analysis was

excluded. (Rep.’s Tr. - Preliminary Examination at 728-32.)

During the time Petitioner’s case was pending, the

California Court of Appeal, in People v. Axell, 235 Cal. App. 3d

836, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 411 (1991), addressed whether RFLP

analysis evidence, and Cellmark’s method of calculating

statistical probabilities, met Kelly/Frye requirements. The court

of appeal conducted a detailed analysis of the following: DNA,

RFLP, expert testimony given at the Axell hearing, decisions in

other jurisdictions, procedures used by Cellmark, Cellmark’s

criteria for assigning frequencies and Cellmark’s calculation of

statistical probabilities. The court found that RFLP and

Cellmark’s method of calculating statistical probabilities were

generally accepted in the scientific community. Axell, 235 Cal.

App. 3d at 862, 868, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 427, 431. Thus, the

Axell court held that the DNA evidence had been properly

admitted at trial.

Assuming that Petitioner had not stipulated to the DNA

evidence, there is no indication he would have raised objections

C - 35

other than those he raised at the preliminary hearing. There, he

argued that RFLP analysis and the method Cellmark used for

calculating statistical probabilities were not generally accepted in

the scientific community. These were the same procedures the

Axell court examined and determined were generally accepted.

Axell was the law at the time Petitioner’s case came to trial.

Even if Washington’s stipulation to admit DNA evidence is

overlooked, there is no basis for concluding that the DNA

evidence would not have been admitted and presented to the

jury. Therefore, this Court will not disregard the DNA

evidence.

Excluding Petitioner’s confession, the record contained

ample evidence from which the jury could find him guilty of the

crimes charged. Any error in admitting the confession was

harmless because it did not have a substantial and injurious

effect or influence in determining the jury’s guilty verdict.

Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1722. The same, however, cannot be said

for the jury’s finding that the special circumstance allegation was

true.

2. The Special Circumstance Finding

The jury found that the murder was committed while the

Petitioner was engaged in the commission of rape, which

elevated Petitioner’s minimum punishment on this charge from

twenty-five years to life to life without the possibility of parole.

(Clerk’s Tr. at 262.) To reach this conclusion, the jury had to

find that the murder was committed to carry out or advance the

underlying rape. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61, 609 P.2d

468, 505, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 38 (1980), overruled on other

grounds by People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 834 n.3, 718 P.2d 99,

104 n.3, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 117 n.3 (1986). Washington’s

confession was the evidence that allowed the jury to find the

special circumstance. At the conclusion of the prosecution’s

case, the trial judge denied defense counsel’s motion for

judgment of acquittal and stated: "As to the special

circumstance, the critical evidence really comes, I think, from

the defendant’s statement although there is support from the

other evidence in the case." (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 157

(emphasis added).)

C - 36

During closing argument, the prosecution argued that the

jury should find the special circumstance allegation true basea

upon Washington’s confession. (4 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 205-07.)

The prosecution stated that he victim was killed because she was

trying to pull Petitioner’s mask off. (Id. at 205.) The prosecutor

argued: "Indeed, if you watch his confession, I submit to you

when he finally gets it off his chest and tells you what happened,

that you have an impression of credibility in much of his

account." (Id, at 207.) The prosecution pointed out that the

petitioner was fighting with the victim "for two hours." (Id. at

206.) In his closing remarks concerning the special circumstance

allegation, the prosecutor repeatedly quoted from Petitioner’s

confession. (Id. at 270-75.)

Without the confession, there was no basis for the jury to

find the special circumstance true. The medical examiner

testified that there was no evidence of sexual trauma and that it

was impossible to tell whether the victim was dead or alive when

sperm was deposited into her vagina. (3 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at

134-35.) The admission of the confession cannot be said to be

harmless and not have had a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the special circumstance finding. See Brecht, 113

S. Ct. at 1722. At a minimum, this Court has grave doubt about

whether admission of the involuntary confession had a

"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the

jury’s verdict." O’Neal v. McAninch, 115 S. Ct. at 994.

Accordingly, Washington’s sentence, based on the special

circumstance finding, cannot stand. A retrial of the special

circumstance allegation is required.

3. The Sanity Determination

Petitioner bore the burden of convincing the jury, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he was legally insane at the

time of the commission of the crime. Cal. Evid. Code § 115;

Cal. Penal Code § 25(b); People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 564,

268 P.2d 705, 714 (1954). Washington introduced testimony

from Dr. Phillip Solomon, psychiatrist; Dr. Thomas Mac

Speiden, clinical psychologist; Dr. Stephen Signer, psychiatrist;

Karl Plavetsky, Carlos Arzola, Charles Cleaves, Gerald Daniels,

Roger Pigott, Asmar Qawee, former co-workers of the

Petitioner; Dr. Arnold Starr, professor of neurology; and Dr.

C - 37

Monte Buchsbaum, professor of psychiatry and human behavior.

Qualifications and admissions by defense experts made it

difficult for Washington to carry his burden of proof. The

prosecution introduced testimony from Dr. Haig Koshkarian,

psychiatrist, and Dr. Gary Weissberg, general and forensic

psychiatrist.

Defense counsel introduced evidence that Washington

suffered from both a delusional disorder, erotomania, and an

organic defect. Dr. Solomon was of the opinion that

Washington had the delusional order all his life, but the

erotomanic aspect of it was more recent. (1 Rep.’s Appeal Tr.

at 324.) Dr. Mac Speiden, the clinical psychologist, testified that

Washington suffered from a neurological disfunction that

reduced his level of intellectual functioning. (Id. at 367.) Mac

Speiden reviewed Washington’s family background, upbringing

and interaction with others. Mac Speiden believed that

Washington did not know the quality of his acts, if quality is

defined as the end result of the nature of his acts. (Id. at 409.)

Mac Speiden testified that Washington was capable of knowing

right from wrong and the nature of his acts. (Id.) Mac Speiden

did say that "[i]f intent is not the issue, [Washington] knew the

quality of his act." (Id. at 444.)

Dr. Singer testified at length about erotic delusions and

erotomania, and felt that Washington suffered from erotomania.

(6 Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 489.) He stated that Washington knew

he was performing a rape and choking the victim but was

operating under the force of his delusion. (Id. at 498, 515.)

Singer did not say that Washington was incapable of knowing or

understanding the nature and quality of his conduct.

Dr. Starr, the neurologist, examined Washington and found

“several soft signs indicating mental and cognitive impairments."

(Id. at 569.) Washington had a history of hearing voices. (Id. at

571, 575.)

Dr. Buchsbaum took a scan of Washington’s brain, (7

Rep.’s Appeal Tr. at 595-96), and found damage to the frontal

lobe of the brain. (Id. at 611-14.) Individuals with frontal lobe

injuries tend to have poor judgment, poorly organized behavior

and abnormal sexual behavior. (Id. at 614.)

Dr. Solomon reviewed the findings of the other defense

doctors and admitted that Washington, intellectually, had the

capability of understanding right from wrong. (Id. at 632.) He

C - 38

also stated that Washington “could not understand what was

going on; he could do nothing but behave as his flaming

emotions forced him to behave." (Id. at 636.) Solomon equated

Washington’s conduct with "convulsive behavior." (Id. at 638-

39.)

One of the prosecution’s psychiatric experts, Dr. Haig

Koshkarian, interviewed Washington and reviewed reports of

Petitioner’s experts. Dr. Koshkarian testified that in his opinion

Washington was legally sane. (Id. at 649.) Dr. Gary Weissberg,

another expert called by the prosecution, practices general and

forensic psychiatry. (Id. at 658.) He also reviewed defense

doctors’ reports and interviewed Washington. (Id. at 660-61.)

Dr. Weissberg testified that Washington "was capable of

knowing the nature and quality of his actions and being able to

distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the incident."

(Id. at 662.)

The trial judge instructed the jury:

A person is legally insane when, by reason of

mental disease or mental defect he was

incapable of knowing or understanding the

nature and quality of his act or was incapable

of distinguishing right from wrong at the time

of the commission of the crime.

The defendant has the burden of proving

his legal insanity at the time of the

commission of the crime by a preponderance

of the evidence.

(Id. at 688.) Defense witnesses attempted to equate

Washington’s inability to control his conduct with legal insanity.

This is not the standard. The trial court instructed the jury "{iJf

a person is legally sane, then it is not a defense that he

committed the act of which he’s accused because of an

uncontrollable or irresistible impulse." (Id. at 689.)

Without reference to Washington’s confession, the jury

could find that Petitioner did not carry his burden of proof. The

jury’s consideration of the confession during the sanity phase of

the trial was harmless error.

B. Jury Instruction.

C - 39

Petitioner asserts that the trial court violated his right to

due process because it gave the jury an instruction that omitted

an essential element of the special circumstance allegation. This

claim misconstrues the instruction.

A federal habeas court can provide relief where a

challenged jury instruction "by itself so infected the entire trial

that the resulting conviction violates due process.” Estelle v.

McGuire, 502. U.S. 62, 72 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten,

414 US. 141, 147 (1973)). An omission or an incomplete

instruction is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of

law. United States v. Cruz, 783 F.2d 1470, 1472 (9th Cir.), cert.

denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986); United State [sic] v. Witt, 648

F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431

U.S. 145, 155 (1977)). Furthermore, federal habeas courts do

not re-examine state court determinations on state law

questions. Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Willard v.

California, 812 F.2d 461, 463 (9th Cir. 1987); Gutierrez v.

Griggs, 695 F.2d 1195, 1197 (9th Cir. 1983). When examining

jury instructions for error, the Court evaluates the overall charge

to the jury as a component of the entire trial process. Prantil v.

California, 843 F.2d 314, 317 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

861 (1988) (quoting Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1239 (9th

Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838 (1984)).

Under California law, a jury may properly find a special

circumstance when a murder is committed to carry out or

advance a rape. People v. Green, 27 Cal. 3d 1, 61, 609 P.2d

468, 505, 164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 38 (1980), overruled on other

grounds by People v. Hall, 41 Cal. 3d 826, 834 n.3, 718 P.2d 99,

104 n.3, 226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 117 n.3 (1986). The law requires

something more than merely determining that the murder was

committed during the commission of the underlying crime. Id.

at 61-62, 609 P.2d at 505-06, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 38-39. In other

words, if the underlying felony was incidental to the murder, the

jury may not find a special circumstance. Id. at 61, 609 P.2d at

505, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 38.

During trial, the court gave the jury the following special

instruction:

The phrase "during the commission of

the crime of rape," as used in these

instructions, does not require that the

unlawful killing occur while the defendant is

vid mar sicapal sat ease ibe

C - 40

in the act of rape, and need not have resulted

as a natural and probable consequence of the

crime of rape. But, in order to find that an

unlawful killing did occur "during the

commission of the crime of rape," the

evidence must establish beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant harbored the intent

to rape either prior to or during the acts

which resulted in the victim’s death, and that

the killing and the rape were part of one

continuous transaction or occurred as a result

of efforts to avoid detection or facilitate

escape, whether such killing was done

intentionally, unintentionally or accidentally.

However, an unlawful killing does not

occur "during the commission of the crime or

rape," if the defendant’s intended [sic]

criminal purpose was to kill and the rape was

merely incidental to the intended commission

of that murder. On the other hand, if at the

time the defendant formed an intent to kill he

also formed a concurrent intent to rape, such

is “during the commission of the crime" within

the meaning of the law.

(Clerk’s Tr. at 222.) The court also gave the jury the following

instruction pursuant to Penal Code section 190.2(a)(17):

To find that the special circumstance,

‘murder in the commission of rape’, is true,

the following must be proved:

1). That the murder was committed while

the defendant was engaged in the

commission of rape.

[The phrase ‘engaged in the commission or

[sic] rape’, as used in this instruction, has the

Same meaning as the phrase ‘during the

C- 41

commission of the crime of rape’, as the latter

was previously defined in these instructions.]

(Clerk’s Tr. at 195). The court gave these two instructions,

among others, instead of the standard California jury instruction

for the special circumstance allegation.

Petitioner argues that the court’s instruction omitted an

essential element of the special circumstance allegation, and that

the court should have given CALJIC No. 8.81.17,% which

properly states the law. Petitioner did not object to the special

instruction at trial and did not offer an alternative or modified

proposal. As noted above, the fact that the instruction was

allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas

relief. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 71-72. Additionally, federal habeas

courts do not grant relief simply because the special instruction

may have been deficient in comparison to the CALJIC model.

Id. at 72. The erroneous jury instruction must so infect the

2. The 1991 Revision to CALJIC number 8.81.17 states as

follows:

To find that the special circumstance,

referred to in these instructions as murder in

the commission of , is true, it must be

proved:

[la, The murder was committed while

[the] [a] defendant was [engaged in] the

[commission] [or] [attempted commission] of

a __;] [or] [and]

[lb. The murder was committed during

the immediate flight after the [commission]

[attempted commission] of a _____ [by the

defendant] [to which [the] [a] defendant was

an accomplice]; and]

2. The murder was committed in order

to carry out or advance the commission of

the crime of or to facilitate the escape

therefrom or to avoid detection. In other

words, the special circumstance referred to in

these instructions is not established if the

[attempted] ___ was merely incidental to the

commission of the murder.]

California Jury Instructions - Criminal no. 8.81.17 (Supp. 1995).

C - 42

entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.

Id.; Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147.

When reviewing an ambiguous instruction to determine if

due process was violated the Court asks "whether there is a

reasonable likelihood that he jury has applied the challenged

instruction in a way’ that violates the Constitution." Estelle, 502

US. at 72 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380

(1990)). At trial, the state has the burden of proving every

element beyond a reasonable doubt. In re Winship, 397 US.

358, 364 (1970). When a trial judge deprives the jury of its fact-

finding duty, this violates due process. Carella v. California, 491

US. 263, 265 (1989).

Petitioner asserts that the court’s instruction omitted an

essential element of the special circumstance allegation because

it failed to advise the jury that it may only properly find a

special circumstance where the killing occurred in order to carry

out or advance the commission of the rape. According to

Petitioner, the court’s instruction allowed the jury to find the

special circumstance true merely because the killing and rape

were part of a continuous transaction and there was a

concurrent intent to rape and kill.

Contrary to Petitioner’s contention, the court’s instruction

complied with California law. The instruction, as a whole,

correctly stated the law. It specifically stated that an unlawful

killing is not in the commission of a rape where the defendant’s

intended crimi- al purpose was to kill and the rape was merely

incidental to the intended murder. The instruction focused the

jury on the relationship between the rape and murder and

required more than merely finding that the two acts were part

of one continuous transaction. The concurrent intent portion of

the instruction did not negate the admonition that the rape

could not be merely incidental to the murder. The special

instruction left it to the jury to determine whether the rape was

incidental to the murder.

In a separate instruction the court told the jury that the

prosecution had the burden of proving the special circumstance

and that the jury may not make the finding if it had reasonable

doubt as to whether the special circumstance was true. (Clerk’s

Tr. at 211.) This instruction and the language contained in the

court’s special instruction demonstrates that the court did not

C - 43

lessen the prosecution’s burden of proof or deprive the jury of

its fact-finding duty.

After examining the Court’s instruction in the context of the

overall charge to the jury, it is unlikely that the jury applied the

special instruction in such a way that violated the Constitution.

Therefore, this Court holds that the instruction complained of

did not so infect the trial as to deny Petitioner due process of

law.

IV. Conclusion and Recommendation

The Court reviewed each of Petitioner’s contentions. For

the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that

Petitioner’s application be GRANTED IN PART. This matter

should be remanded to San Diego Superior Court for further

proceedings consistent with this report and recommendation.

This report and recommendation of Magistrate Judge

Brooks is submitted to the United States District Judge assigned

to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)

(1988). Within thirty days after this report and recommendation

is mailed, Petitioner and Respondents may file written

objections with the Court. These documents should be

captioned "Objections to Report and Recommendation."

Petitioner and Kespondents are advised that failure to file

objections within the specified time will waive their right to raise

those objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v.

Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

Dated: July 6, 1995

/s/

Ruben B. Brooks

United States Magistrate Judge

cc: Judge John S. Rhoades

Martin Nebrida Buchanan Esq.

1050 University Avenue Suite 103

San Diego, CA 92103

Anne Marie Urrutia

Deputy Attorney General

110 West A Street Suite 1100

San Diego, CA 92186-5266

APPENDIX D

2 EEA aOR IR, RAH DADO ON IE BE

D - 44

APPENDIX D

[Filed October 6, 1993]

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

COURT OF APPEAL

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D016646

(Super. Ct.

Plaintiff and Respondent, No. CR123654)

v. OPINION

TROY LEE WASHINGTON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of

San Diego County, Michael Wellington, Judge. Affirmed.

Troy Lee Washington appeals a judgment convicting

him of first degree murder during the commission of rape (Pen.

Code,” §§ 187, subd. (a), 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), forcible rape (§

261, subd. (2)), and first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460).

Washington contends the court erred in admitting his confession,

because it was properly obtained after he invoked his

constitutional right to remain silent. He also contends the court

erred in giving the jury a defective special instruction for murder

1. All statutory references are to the Penal Code.

D - 45

during the commission of rape. For the following reasons, we

affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the morning of November 6, 1990, police found the

dead body of Debra Barksdale in the trunk of her car, which

was parked in her condominium garage. Barksdale died from

strangulation. She suffered a fracture to her larynx and minor

injuries to her face, upper chest and shoulders. She had been

raped.

The police received information a neighbor of Barksdale’s

noticed a black male, fitting Washington’s description, loitering

near the condominium complex on the night of the murder. A

security guard also reported seeing a black male getting into a

car belonging to Washington parked across the street from

Barksdale’s condominium later that evening.

When Detectives Richard Allen and Louis Rodriguez

contacted Washington at his residence, he agreed to accompany

them to the police station for an interview. Washington told the

detectives he worked as an installer for Barksdale Office

Planning until being "laid off’ in August 1990. Washington

admitted he and Barksdale argued before his employment was

terminated. In the week before the murder, Washington made

several attempts to contact Barksdale, but she failed to return

his phone calls. When he stopped by her office to visit, she ran

out the back door upon seeing him.

At this point, the detectives advised Washington of his

Miranda?” rights; they did not, however, tell him he could

terminate the questioning once he had agreed to the

interrogation. Washington admitted he understood these rights

as explained and agreed to continue with the interview.

Rodriguez confronted him with the evidence he was seen at

Barksdale’s condominium on the night of the murder.

Washington denied the allegation. He repeatedly stated, "I

wasn’t there," while the detectives continued to confront him

with the adverse evidence. |

At one point, Rodriguez told Washington: "Well, I’m not

saying that you, you know, wanted to kill her but we need to

2. Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

find how it happened." Washington responded: "Well you can

arrest me. Go ahead and arrest me but I didn’t do it." A few

moments later, the following exchange took place:

"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: For what purpose did

you go to her place then? Did she call you over?

"WASHINGTON: Im not gonna say anything.

"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: Why not?

"WASHINGTON: Because I didn’t do it." (Italics

added.)

The interrogation then continued concerning Washington’s

working relationship with Barksdale. When Rodriguez again

asked what happened at Barksdale’s house the night of the

murder, Washington responded as follows:

"WASHINGTON: I didn’t go over [to] her house. I

swear.

"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: We have already, we

have already established that. Okay?

"WASHINGTON: I told you if you just want to arrest me,

you can go ahead and arrest me but I didn’t do it. I’m not

gonna admit it.

"DETECTIVE ALLEN: But that’s two different things,

okay?

"WASHINGTON: You're not gonna get it out of me

because I’m not gonna say anything. Cause I didn’t do it.

"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: You were there... if you

didn’t do it, you know, you’re gonna have to tell us, you

know. The only, the only thing that we know at this time is

that you were there... ." (Italics added.)

D-4/

Washington then asked whether other employees of

Barksdale Office Planning knew he was at the condominium,

and what would happen if he decided to "say something." When

told he would be arrested, Washington replied, "I can’t do it."

Shortly thereafter, the following exchange took place:

"DETECTIVE ALLEN: So let’s talk about it and find out

what, what happened and why it happened. Okay? It’s

easy once you start.

"WASHINGTON: I don’t want to talk about it.

"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: You sure?

"WASHINGTON: I didn’t do it.

"DETECTIVE RODRIGUEZ: Well, yeah that’s another

story you know.

"DETECTIVE ALLEN: That’s like ah not being there in

that car. Okay? That’s like, denying that you were even

there in the car. Okay? Denying that you didn’t do it....

There were people there that saw you and we have the

description of your car. We have the description of the

person that was there. The person saw you get in the car,

saw you drive away. ... The fact is you were there. The

fact is a lady is dead. Okay? The fact is you did it. Now,

you have to be able to admit that to yourself. All those, all

those things occurred. Okay?

"WASHINGTON: Do you want me to lie? I mean --

"DETECTIVE ALLEN: No, I don’t want you to lie.

"WASHINGTON: "Do you want me to tell you a story?

"DETECTIVE ALLEN: No, I don’t want you to tell us a

story. You know, we’re not sitting here to hear a story. It’s

like we’re not, we weren’t, we’re not sitting here to hear

ourselves talk about where you were and you say, ’No I

wasn’t there. I don’t want to talk about it.’

D - 48

"WASHINGTON: Okay, I’ll tell you. I went there."

(Italics added.)

The questioning then resumed and Washington ultimately

confessed to all of the charged offenses. He admitted entering

Barksdale’s condominium through the front door with a key he

surreptitiously copied months before. Washington grabbed

Barksdale while she slept in her bed. Washington began

choking her and raped her.” When she started struggling

again, he choked her until she died. Washington then dragged

her body into the garage and threw it into the trunk of her car.

He planned to hide the body, but could not operate the car’s

manual transmission. Washington tossed Barksdale’s keys,

wallet and garage door opener in nearby garbage dumpster.

At the preliminary hearing and twice during trial, defense

counsel moved the suppress the confession, contending the

police continued questioning Washington after he invoked his

right to silence, in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384

U.S. 436. Each motion was denied. The entire interview was

later played for the jury, and the videotape and transcript of the

interview were admitted into evidence.

WASHINGTON INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO REMAIN

SILENT DURING THE POLICE INTERROGATION

Washington contends his judgment of conviction should be

set aside because he invoked his constitutional right to remain

silent on three separate occasions during the police

interrogation, therefore making any further questioning by police

unlawful.

"Once warnings have been given, the subsequent

nrocedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any

manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that

3. At trial, the parties stipulated DNA of sperm samples taken

from Barksdale’s vagina and bed sheets matched DNA of blood

sample taken from Washington. The parties also stipulated no two

individuals have been found with matching DNA patterns except

identical twins.

D - 49

he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must

cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to

exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement

taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be

other than the product of compulsion, subtle or

otherwise." (Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at

pp. 473-474, fn. omitted.)

The Supreme Court later elaborated on this right: "[T]he

admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody

has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether

his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ’scrupulously honored.”

(Michigan v. Molsey (1975) 423 U.S. 96, 103-104, fn. omitted.)

The defendant may invoke the right through any words or

conduct which express a present lack of willingness to discuss

the case freely and completely. (In re Joe R. (1980) 27 Cal.3d

496, 515; People v. Randall (1970) 1 Cal.3d 948, 956; People v.

Porter (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 1213, 1218.) Whether the

defendant invoked the right to remain silent is a question of fact

based on the totality of the circumstances. (People v. Benson

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 779; People v. Hayes (1985) 38 Cal.3d

780, 784.) Therefore, we must independently review the record

in its entirety to determine whether Washington indeed invoked

that right. (People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 779.)

The People argue Washington was merely restating his

denials of guilt when he told police, "I’m not gonna say anything"

and "I don’t want to talk about it." They rely principally on In

re Joe R., supra, 27 Cal.3d 496, where the defendant denied

guilt and gave exculpatory answers, until the police confronted

him with adverse evidence, to which he stated, "That’s all I got

to say." Given his previous claims of innocence, the court

concluded the defendant was simply sticking by his story, rather

than invoking his Fifth Amendment right. (Id at p. 516.)

We agree Washington’s statement, "I’m not gonna say

anything," uttered twice during the interrogation in response to

specific factual questions, rather than a general request to talk,

could be interpreted as limited to answering those specific

questions. (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 629-630 [no

invocation where defendant muitered, "I really don’t want to talk

about that" in response to a specific inquiry whether defendant

had driven a certain vehicle].) On both occasions, Washington

D - 50

had just been confronted with adverse evidence against him.

Both times, he denied culpability by stating, "I didn’t do it," and

then went on to discuss other subjects. The trial court

reasonably could conclude Washington sought to alter the

course of questioning, but not to stop it altogether even though

for several minutes Washington had slumped in his chair and

was exhibiting signs of severe stress. (People v. Ashmus (1991)

54 Cal.3d 932, 970 [no invocation where the defendant stated,

"now I ain’t saying no more" and without hesitation proceeded

to continue the conversation].)

After approximately 12 minutes of further questioning,

Washington was advised he was going to be arrested and stated

he might as well kill himself. At this point Rodriguez

discouraged that course, telling Washington he had to "face up"

to his "mistake." Allen then stated, "So let’s talk about it and

find out what, what happened and why it happened. Okay? It’s

easy once you start." In response to this solicitation for him to

describe the details of the crime, Washington stated flatly, "I

don’t want to talk about it."

On its face, Washington’s response to Allen’s general

exhortation to relate circumstances of the crime, is an

unambiguous assertion that he does not want to answer further

questions about the crime. If there were ambiguity on this

point, the detectives were entitled to inquire whether

Washington did intend his rejoinder to be an invocation of his

right to terminate the interrogation. They did not do so, instead

they continued to recite evidence against him to encourage him

to admit his involvement, finally advising him they were not

there to hear him say, "I don’t want to talk about it."

The desire to halt an interrogation may be indicated in

various ways. No precise form of words or conduct is necessary.

(People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955; People v. Marshall

(1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 129, 134.) We do not require a defendant

emphatically declare, "I hereby invoke my constitutional rights

pursuant to the United States Supreme Court decision in

Miranda v. Arizona." (People v. Carey (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d

99, 104-105. "To strictly limit the manner in which a suspect

may assert the privilege, or to demand that it be invoked with

unmistakable clarity . . . would subvert Miranda’s prophylactic

intent." (People v. Randall, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 955.) Thus,

under analogous circumstances, an invocation of the right to

D - 51

remain silent was found where a suspect answered "No" when

asked whether he wanted police “to go back over the parts he

left out" (People v. Marshall, supra, 41 Cal.App.3d at p. 133);

where a defendant said, "I fee] bad answering the question"

(People v. Montano (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 914, 931), "I ain’t got

nothin’ to say" People v. Carey, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p.

105), and "he didn’t have anything to add or to say" (In re

Albert R. (1980) 112 Cal.App.3d 783, 790).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude Washington

unambiguously and unequivocally invoked his right to remain

silent when he told the interrogating officers, "I don’t want to

talk about it." At that point, further questioning concerning the

crimes should have ceased. However, the detectives continued

to interrogate Washington concerning the same crime he just

refused to discuss, finally emphasizing they were not sitting there

to hear him say "I don’t want to talk about it." In so doing, they

failed to "scrupulously honor" Washington’s right to terminate

questioning and quite plainly implied they were going to

continue the interrogation even though he declared he no longer

wanted to talk about the crime, an implication made even more

compelling because Washington was never informed he had the

right to terminate the interview once it began. (Michigan v.

Mosley, supra, 423 U.S. at p. 104; People v. Royer (1989) 48

Cal.3d 247, 271.) Accordingly, we conclude the subsequent

confession was elicited in violation of Miranda and the court

erred in admitting it in evidence. That error is, however,

harmless.

The California rule requiring automatic reversal of a

conviction obtained at a trial in which an involuntary confession

was admitted in evidence no longer applies. Instead, the

prejudice flowing from the consideration of the tainted evidence

is to be determined by evaluating it by the harmless beyond

reasonable doubt standard (Chapman v. California (1967) 386

U.S. 18, 23), where the confession has been obtained in violation

of federal constitution (People v. Cahill (1993) 4 Cal.4th 478).

The evidence against Washington other than his confession

is compelling. Washington had been employed by the victim

and had been discharged a few months before she was strangled.

The victim had told others she was afraid of Washington. Her

body was found in the trunk of her car inside the garage of her

condominium. A week before the murder, Washington called

D - 52

the victim’s office applying for part-time work and was told to

call back the following day. Instead, Washington went to the

office where he observed the victim talking to another

employee, who then came out and told Washington the victim

was not present and he would have to call the next day. When

he did so, he was informed she was “not it." The next night the

murder occurred.

On the night of the murder, Cynthia Campbell, a resident

of the condominium complex in which the victim resided, saw a

black male fitting Washington’s general description standing

near the victim’s unit in the garage area. Within minutes, she

notified a security guard who searched for, but was unable to

locate, this person. This contact was approximately 11 p.m. At

1:30 a.m., the security guard was driving from the complex when

he observed a black male leaving the complex and cross the

street. As this person used a key to unlock a car, the guard

noted the license number, "2GIS122," Washington’s personal

vehicle.

The victim had been raped. Washington denied being at the

murder scene, or even to have spoken to the victim during the

past two months. However, DNA tests performed on sperm

samples retrieved from the victim and bed clothing, revealed a

match with samples obtained from Washington. It was

stipulated that all samples were properly obtained, maintained

and that there was no evidence of testing error. Further, it was

agreed that except for identical twins, no persons to date had

been found with matching DNA patterns.“

Washington acknowledges he had heard the victim tell

others she was afraid of him, that he had sent her flowers after

being discharged to show he did not carry a grudge, and that he

had "beeped" her after he left work the night before the murder.

He knew where the victim lived and had been in her

condominium with another employee when still employed by

her.

4. Washington contends, somewhat obliquely, the DNA

evidence should be disregarded if the confession is deemed

involuntary because the stipulation would not have been made had

the court suppressed that evidence. However, the stipulation only

obviated the People’s need to pursue a hearing to establish a

foundation for admissibility of the DNA results. There is no

evidence to suggest they would not have succeeded.

D - 53

Washington put on no defense evidence at the guilt phase.

Thus, the undisputed evidence shows Washington’s

relationship with the victim was such that she openly expressed

fear of him, and avoided both his phone calls and seeing him in

person at the business premises, going so far as to have an

employee lie about her presence. Washington knew she was

deliberately avoiding him. Further, he knew where the victim

lived and a person exactly matching his age and general physical

description was seen near the victim’s residence approximately

11 p.m. the night of the murder, leaving that area at 1:30 a.m.

the next morning and entering Washington’s personal car which

he unlocked with a key. Washington admits only he and his

mother have keys to that car. Finally, DNA matching sperm

was found in the victim’s body and on the bedding. Washington

introduced no evidence to weaken the logical inference

established by the People’s case. Although the confession

contains direct, damning proof of his guilt, we are satisfied

beyond a reasonable doubt any error in its admission is harmless

in light of the convincing weight of other evidence of guilt.

(Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18.)

THE TRIAL COURT'S "SPECIAL" INSTRUCTION ON THE

ELEMENTS REQUIRED TO SATISFY THE FELONY-

MURDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE OF MURDER

DURING THE COMMISSION” OF RAPE DOES NOT

REQUIRE REVERSAL

The jury returned a true special circumstance finding that

Washington murdered his victim during the commission of a

rape, thus subjecting him to the additional punishment (here,

5. We reject the People’s contention appellate consideration of

this issue was waived by defense counsel’s failure to object during

trial. An appellate court may "review any instruction given, refused

or modified, even though no objection was made thereto in the

[lower/trial] court [,] if the substantial rights of the defendant were

affected thereby." (§§ 1259, 1469.) Here, review of the special

instruction is warranted because it may have misstated the

governing law to Washington’s detriment, thus affecting his

substantial rights. (People v. Satchell (1971) 6 Cal.3d 28, 33, fn.

10; People v. Fitzpatrick (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1285, 1291-1292.)

D-54

life without possibility of parole) mandated for murders

committed during the commission of a felony. (§ 190.2, subd.

(a)(17).) The law is clear that a special circumstance imposed

for murders occurring during the commission of underlying

felonies applies only to those killings committed to carry out or

advance the commission of a felony. This simple precept was

established in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, in which the

court specifically rejected the People’s contention that it was

sufficient to merely establish the murder was committed "during

the commission" of the underlying crime. (Id. at p. 60.) The

court interpreted the Legislature’s intent in enacting the statute

making a willful, deliberate and premeditated murder during the

commission of a robbery or other listed felony (former § 190.2,

subd. (c)(3)) a special circumstance, as expressing a belief it was

unconstitutionally arbitrary to permit the death penalty for

defendants who kill in cold blood "in order to advance an

independent felonious purpose, e.g., who carried out an

execution-style slaying of the victim of or witness to a holdup, a

kidnapping or a rape" to prevent identification as the

perpetrator of the underlying felony. (People v. Green, supra,

27 Cal.3d at p. 61.) The court determined the Legislature’s goal

of distinguishing between those murderers who deserve to be

considered for the death penalty and those who do not, i.e.,

between those who commit generic felony murders and those

who murder for the purpose of committing the underlying

felony, would not be achieved by finding the special

circumstance in cases where the underlying offense was merely

incidental to the murder. In Green, the court found a robbery

committed in the course of a first degree murder solely for the

purpose of facilitating that murder was not committed "during

the commission" of a robbery for the purpose of applying special

circumstances. (See also People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d

303, 324-325, where the court found no substantial evidence to

support a finding the defendant’s theft of the victim’s car and

keys after carrying out an apparent contract killing, represented

an independent purpose to steal, and reversed a special

circumstance finding.)

Here, the court gave a special instruction generally advising

jurors the special circumstance would be established if they

found beyond a reasonable doubt Washington formed an intent

to rape his victim either before or during the acts which caused

D - 55

her death, and the rape and killing occurred during a continuous

transaction or as a result of efforts to avoid detection or

facilitate escape. However, the instruction specified that "an

unlawful killing does not occur during the commission of the

crime of rape, if the defendant’s intended criminal purpose was

to kill and the rape was merely incidental to the intended

commission of that murder." Washington did not object to

the giving of this instruction, nor did he offer an alternative or

modified proposal, although he now claims the court erred in

not instructing on Green’s incidental felony theory in the

language of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 (1991 rev.) which incorporates

that holding. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 501,

fn. 16.) In part, CALJIC No. 8.81.17 emphasizes that to find the

special circumstance it must be proved: "[2. The murder was

committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of

the crime of or to facilitate the escape therefrom

or to avoid detection. In other words, the special circumstance

referred to in these instructions is not established if the

[attempted] was merely incidental to the

commission of the murder.]"

Washington first contends the court’s special instruction errs

by failing to advise jurors they could find the charged special

6. The special instruction read as follows:

"The phrase ‘during the commission of the crime of rape,’ as

used in these instructions, does not require that the unlawful

killing occur while the defendant is in the act of rape, and need not

have resulted as a natural and probable consequence of the crime

of rape. But, in order to find that an unlawful killing did occur

‘during the commission of the crime of rape,’ the evidence must

establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant harbored

the intent to rape either prior to or during the acts which resulted

in the victim’s death, and that the killing and the rape were part of

one continuous transaction or occurred as a result of efforts to

avoid detection or facilitate escare, whether such killing was done

intentionally, unintentionally or accidentally.

"However, an unlawful killing does not occur ‘during the

commission of the crime of rape,’ if the defendant’s intended

criminal purpose was to kill and the rape was merely incidental to

the intended commission of that murder. On the other hand, if at

the time the defendant formed an intent to kill he also formed a

concurrent intent to rape, such is ‘during the commission of the

crime of rape’ within the meaning of the law."

D - 56

circumstance only if he killed in order to carry out or advance

the rape, and permits them to find a special circumstance

merely if the killing and rape were part of one continuous

transaction. This "continuous transaction" test, he asserts,

permitted the jurors to find the special circumstance even where

the purpose for the murder was completely unrelated to the

rape. This ignores the context of the instruction. The jurors

were specifically advised than an unlawful killing is not in the

commission of a rape where the defendant’s intended criminal

purpose was to kill and the rape merely incidental to the

intended murder.

Washington also faults the instruction because immediately

after correctly defining the incidental felony doctrine, it states:

"On the other hand, if at the time the defendant formed an

intent to kill he also formed a concurrent intent to rape, such is

‘during the commission of the crime of rape’ within the meaning

of the law." Thus, Washington contends this “other hand"

admonition effectively negated the preceding admonition and

told jurors that even if they found the rape was merely

incidental to Washington’s primary intent to commit murder, the

special circumstance could be proved solely by their finding he

intended to commit that rape at the time he formed the intent

to kill, whether the rape was merely peripheral to his intent to

murder, and that crime was not committed for an independent

purpose. However, while the robbery in Green can be

legitimately described as technical, only committed for the

purpose of concealing the murder, it defies logic to assume a

perpetrator of rape who kills his victim, is not motivated by an

urge for sexual gratification in committing that sexual act, a

motive independent of causing the victim’s death (e.g., People v.

Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 609.)

Thus, on this record, there is no evidence to support a

finding that the rape was only incidental to the murder. The

jury, erroneously but actually, was presented with Washington’s

version of the event. He wore a ski mask while alone with the

victim in her condominium solely because he did not wish to

have her identify him, a non-concern had his purpose in going

there been to kill. Further, under his version, and consistent

with the evidence, the rape occurred first and the ongoing

physical restraint necessary to choke the victim into submission

to his sexual attack resulted in her larynx being crushed, killing

D - 57

her by strangulation, an event not originally intended. In fact,

when the victim had indicated she would not struggle further, he

let go of her only to have her try to pull off his mask. He told

her she had better stop or he would kill her, and eventually

commenced choking her even further. Specifically, Washington

stated he was choking her.

"I was acting out this role like I was a rapist or

something and like I wanted to kill her and I did.

ae ie ee Be ee ee ee ee ee

", .. I struggled with her for over an hour. Just trying

to get her quiet and she wouldn’t kept fighting. I

couldn’t believe she kept fighting like that. That any

woman would know when you're getting attacked, you

should just be at ease so that way, you know, you’ve

got less chance of being hurt. I though she was gonna

do that. When she kept fighting, I just kept choking

her and I couldn’t believe I killed her."

Thus, Washington’s own words show he choked the victim

during her struggles while he was committing the rape. The

choking which Washington engaged for the purpose of initially

subduing the victim may have initially been motivated for

purposes other than rape or murder. However, Washington’s

version is during the struggle he formed the intent to rape and

he deliberately choked her into unconsciousness so that he could

consummate the rape and a continuation of the strangling led to

the victim’s death. Although Washington contends his

confession suggests the rape occurred as an incidental act during

the strangling, its clear implication is to the contrary. On the

facts of the case as presented to the jury, including Washington’s

confession, we are satisfied any error in the special instruction is

harmless beyond reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California

supra, 386 U.S. at p. 21.) While the killing may not have been

intended, the mechanism by which it was affected was the

ongoing force which was essential to disable the victim so

Washington could continue his intended rape during the attack

which ceased only upon her death. There is no substantial

evidence to support Washington’s theory on appeal! that a more

properly instructed jury may have found the rape merely

D - 58

incidental to the strangling.” While we conclude the court’s

instruction is confusing, on this record the error is harmless by

any standard. (People v. Clark, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 609.)

Disposition

Judgment affirmed.

/s/

WORK, Acting P. J.

I CONCUR:

/s/

NARES, J.

7. This instructional issue has been argued by Washington by

looking to the circumstances as described by this confession. That

is, his disclaimer of any intent to rape or kill when he accosted the

Sleeping victim. We have responded accordingly. Neither party

has suggested we should analyze the prejudice of this instruction

on a record expurgating the inadmissible confession. Were we to

do so, the result would be the same.

BENKE, J., concurring.

I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. |

part company with my colleagues, however, with respect to

whether appellant invoked his right to terminate the interview. |

find this case remarkably similar to People v. Jennings (1988) 46

Cal.3d 963, where in the course of an interview the defendant

stated “I’m not saying shit to you no more, man. You, nothing

personal man, but I don’t like you. You're scaring the living shit

out of me.... That’s it. I shut up.” (Id. at p. 977, fn.

omitted.) The court concluded the statements reflected only

momentary animosity and frustration toward one of the officers.

I further observed that the trial court could, upon viewing the

entire tape of the interview, conclude other, incriminating

statements were voluntary and the defendant had not invoked

his right to terminate the interview. As the court there noted,

while appellate review requires an independent determination of

the issue, great weight may be given to the considered

conclusions of a lower court that has previously examined the

issued. (Id. at p. 979.) :

Viewing the tape and considering the demeanor of

appellant before, during and after the statements at issue here,

and considering the context in which the statements were made,

I conclude appellant was not invoking his right to terminate the

interview. In the context of the interview, his statements were

the product of momentary frustration in an otherwise lengthy

interview where it appears he is more than willing to joke, talk

and supply the officers with information. I would give great

weight to the conclusion of the lower court and conclude there

was no invocation of the right to terminate the interview.

/s/

BENKE, J.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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