Reply Brief — Marks v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 852 (1998) (No. 97-652)

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Z a a ae ae

S$ 1997

No. 97-652 DEC 25

— CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

€

LAWRENCE MARKS; SUN BANK/MIAMI, N.A. and

EDWARD A. MOSS, as personal representatives of the

estate of Eugene Marks; MORRIS S. MARLIN, as personal

representative of the estate of Paul Marks;

HERMAN MARKS; IRENE O. MARKS, individually and

as personal representative of the estate of Stanley Marks;

MARKS DEVELOPMENT, INC.; and ISLAND IN THE

SUN CONDOMINIUMS OF KEY WEST FLORIDA, INC.,

Petitioners,

THE UNITED STATES,

Responden t.

*

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

a

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

*

Jor: D. Eaton

Counsel of Record

Popuurst OrseCK JOSEFSBERG EATON

MeEapow OuIn & Perwin, P.A.

City National Bank Building,

Suite 800

25 West Flagler Street

Miami, Florida 33130-1780

(305) 358-2800

Attorney for Petitioners

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

EE 83s EE EEE ce eh EE 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 ey | Sp ]

United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482

Oe Eee Pe PLS oe EEE OP ee ee 2

Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 684 (5th

Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 2 <9 b ea eee 2

STATUTES

Clean Water Act of 1977 (§ 1, Pub. L. 95-217)........ 2

Rivers & Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33

Me NDAs Wines beds 2 Cy ces oie a 1

MISCELLANEOUS

Annotation, Authority of Secretary of Army to Deny

Dredging and Filling Permit for Ecological Reasons

Under § 10 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33

U.S.C.S. § 403, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 706 (1975)........... 2

ARGUMENT

1. With respect to the first question presented, the

plaintiffs and the government obviously differ in their

reading of this Court’s decision in Kaiser Aetna v. United

States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979). We will leave a reading of the

decision to the Court, confident that we have accurately

parsed it and that the government has not. We also

remind the Court that, with the singular exception of the

instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

has read Kaiser Aetna exactly as we have read it, so the

government's attempt to distinguish it here is plainly

suspect. We stand by our demonstration of conflict.

The government apparently lacks confidence in its

reading of Kaiser Aetna because it attempts to finesse the

first question presented here with an alternative argu-

ment. It argues that the conflict is irrelevant in any event

because the Corps halted the plaintiffs’ development “in

aid of navigation” rather than “in aid of environmental

protection”:

. the Corps has consistently justified

stopping petitioners’ fill activities due to the

potential for interference with navigation. See

Pet. App. 6a (invoking the Rivers & Harbors

Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. 403, not the

Clean Water Act, as the basis for Corps’ cease

and desist orders).

(Brief in Opposition, p. 8). We cannot allow this demon-

strably false statement to go unchallenged.

It is true that the 1973 cease and desist telegram

addressed “fill in the navigable waters of the United

States adjacent to the Riviera Canal” (Pet. App. 5a). How-

ever, the reference to “navigable waters” was simply a

reference to the property below the MHWL, which is the

line by which “navigable waters” is defined; it was not an

assertion of the Corps’ jurisdiction “in aid of navigation.”

The plaintiffs did not place any fill in the Riviera Canal;

the fill was placed on “wetlands,” and boats simply can-

not “navigate” on “wetlands.” Just as importantly, even a

cursory skimming of Judge Aronovitz’s 1982 decision will

reveal that the Corps asserted its jurisdiction over the

plaintiffs’ wetlands for environmental and ecological rea-

sons, and for no other purpose — and most certainly not

“in aid of navigation” or in furtherance of any other form

of interstate commerce which the government's “naviga-

tional servitude” is designed to protect.

And while it is also true that the Corps asserted its

jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors Act rather than

the Clean Water Act, it is no secret that the Rivers and

Harbors Act was being utilized by the Corps at the time

to extend its tentacles well beyond matters of navigation,

as a tool to promote environmental and ecological con-

cerns.* In addition, of course, the Corps relied upon the

Rivers and Harbors Act to promote its ecological con-

cerns for the plaintiffs’ wetlands, rather than the Clean

Water Act, because the “Clean Water Act of 1977” (§ 1,

Pub. L. 95-217) was not even in existence when the cease

* See, e. g., United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482

(1960); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 684 (5th Cir.

1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). See generally Annotation,

Authority of Secretary of Army to Deny Dredging and Filling Permit

for Ecological Reasons Under § 10 of Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,

33 U.S.C.S. § 403, 25 A.L.R. Fed. 706 (1975).

and desist telegram was sent four years before its enact-

ment, in 1973. We stand by our initial argument.

2. With respect to the second question presented,

and notwithstanding that the government placed nearly

all of its eggs in this basket below, the government has

now tacitly conceded our point - that the lower courts

erred in concluding that the temporary taking of the

plaintiffs’ property above the MHWL was not compens-

able because the property increased in value during the

period of taking and was sold for a profit after the taking

ceased. The government argues only that the profit was

“relevant in showing that the property had economically

viable uses, as the sale occurred during the period when

petitioners alleged that the government’s regulation

caused a temporary taking” (Brief in Opposition, p. 10).

We must respectfully disagree with this additional

attempt to finesse the now conceded error of the courts

below.

The plaintiffs’ property above the MHWL was ren-

dered undevelopable by the Corps’ actions in 1973. Its

use as developable property was not restored to the

plaintiffs until the federal courts ordered the government

to permit its development as planned, in 1984. The sales

which the government claims are “relevant” occurred in

1986 and 1989 — after the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Judge

Aronovitz’s decision restoring an economically viable use

of the property above the MHWL to the plaintiffs. The

sales may therefore have some bearing on the date the

temporary taking ceased, but they most certainly do not

demonstrate that the property had an economically viable

use from 1972 to 1984, as the lower courts plainly erred in

concluding below.

3. The bulk of the government’s argument is

devoted to distracting the Court from the principal ques-

tions presented. To that end, the government argues that

its favorable summary judgment was essentially a “fact-

bound application of settled law [that] does not warrant

this Court’s review,” and it attempts to justify the ruling

with several miscellaneous “facts” which purportedly

support the judgment despite the errors inherent in it

(Brief in Opposition, p. 9). Given the complexity of the

facts, the government can perhaps be excused for its

misunderstanding of them, but because this Court’s

determination of whether to grant or deny certiorari

should not rest upon a false factual foundation, we are

constrained to set the record straight briefly in conclu-

sion.

First, the government argues that the Corps’ 1973

cease and desist order did not preclude the plaintiffs

from developing the property above the MHWL. This

assertion flies squarely in the face of Judge Aronovitz’s

finding of fact in the underlying litigation that, because

the government had no idea of the location of the MHWL

at the time, “the developers of the project were unable to

proceed with the project for fear that additional imper-

missible filling would take place” (Pet. App. 69a). The

assertion also flies squarely in the face of the conclusion

of law bottomed upon this finding in the underlying

litigation:

... The government has argued that the Defen-

dants were free in January, 1973, to continue

development above the mean high water line

since the cease and desist order only addressed

land below the mean high water line demarca-

tion. Unfortunately, however, the government

was unable to inform the Defendants where that

elusive line might be, so the government was

inviting the Defendants to risk the possibility of

continuing to be in violation of the law. This

court does not believe that this course of action

was a feasible alternative or that any reasonably

prudent businessman weuld gamble on the loss

of additional time, labor and money... .

(Pet. App. 88a).

Most respectfully, the plaintiffs were plainly

deprived of their use of the property above the MHWL

by the Corps’ 1973 cease and desist order. Under settled

principles of the doctrine of “collateral estoppel,” the

government is plainly bound by that fact in this litigation.

And it is that fact to which the “settled law” should have

been applied below in ruling on the government's motion

for summary judgment - not the factual position squarely

rejected by the federal courts in the underlying litigation.

Second, the government argues that its favorable

summary judgment is supported by the plaintiffs’ conces-

sion that they did not develop the property due to a lack

of funds. Actually, what the trial court concluded was

that the property had an economically viable use during

the period of the temporary taking because Lawrence

Marks had admitted (in a discovery deposition taken in

the underlying litigation) that, in addition to the Corps’

actions, the property was not filled above the MHWL

after 1973, and before the date of the new wetlands

regulations, because he did not have the money, and

there was no money to proceed because of a recession

from 1973 to 1976 (Pet. App. 51a). Frankly, we fail to see

any connection between this observation and the conclu-

sion that the property had an economically viable use

during the period of temporary taking, but we will

address it nevertheless.

The fact of the matter (as the trial court’s factual

recitation reveals) is that the plaintiffs had entered into a

joint venture agreement with Context Industries in 1972,

and the money to proceed was thereby secured. And, as

Mr. Marks noted on the same page of the discovery

deposition upon which the trial court relied, “when we

first started to fill, we were going to build right away”

(Ct. App. App. 98-100). The Corps then intervened and

stopped development of the property; and because of the

Corps’ intervention, the plaintiffs’ financial backer, Con-

text Industries, successfully sued for rescission of the

joint venture agreement (id. 93-94). It was principally for

that reason, and only incidentally because replacement

financial backing was not readily obtainable because of

the ensuing recession (not to mention the cease and desist

order), that the plaintiffs did not have the money to

proceed.

In any event, this issue was actually litigated

between the parties in the underlying action, and Judge

Aronovitz squarely rejected the government's contention

in this regard — finding as a fact instead that “[h]ad the

Corps not intervened in January, 1973, without locating

the mean high water line[,] the land above the mean high

water line could have been developed, and once done, it

would have been grandfathered and exempt from the Corps’

revised wetlands policy” (Pet. App. 88a; emphasis sup-

plied). Most respectfully, this finding of fact, made after a

full-blown trial, renders any suggestion to the contrary

contained in a mere discovery deposition moot; and

because of the settled doctrine of “collateral estoppel,”

the trial court was not free to find to the contrary in this

case — especially on a motion for summary judgment.

In addition, whether the plaintiffs had the money to

proceed with their proposed development after 1973 is

plainly irrelevant to the question of whether a compens-

able temporary taking occurred. It is irrelevant because,

as Judge Aronovitz also found as a fact, the plaintiffs

could not have proceeded to develop the property in the

face of the Corps’ demands even if the money to do so

had been available. The availability of financial backing

after Context Industries withdrew because of the Corps’

actions may have some relevance to the question of the

amount of the plaintiffs’ damages, but it has no relevance

at all to the question of whether a compensable tempor-

ary taking occurred — and the unavailability of additional

financial backing for a mere three years most certainly

provides no relevant support for a conclusion that the

property had an economically viable use during the more

than a decade in which it remained a breeding ground for

mosquitoes and was rendered entirely useless to the

plaintiffs by the Corps’ actions.

The government’s remaining efforts to finesse the

important questions presented here are adequately

addressed in our petition, so we will not repeat ourselves

in reply. We simply submit once again that, although the

underlying facts are complex enough to confuse even the

most astute of courts (which, we believe, is most likely

what happened below), it should ultimately be as plain as

the nose on the government's face that the plaintiffs did

suffer a compensable temporary taking of their 52-acre

tract for more than a decade, until its use as developable

property was finally restored to them by the federal

courts. The Fifth Amendment requires that they be com-

pensated for that taking, and we respectfully urge the

Court to restore that important constitutional right to the

plaintiffs, and to similarly situated future litigants, by its

proper enforcement in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

Joe. D. Eaton, Esa.

Counsel of Record

PODHURST, ORSECK, JOSEFSBERG,

Eaton, Meapvow, OuIn &

Perwin, P.A.

25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800

Miami, Florida 33130

(305) 358-2800 / Fax (305) 358-2382

Counsel for Petitioners

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