Opposition Brief — Arrest the Incinerator Remediation (A. I. R.), Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency
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No. 97-541
In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
ARREST THE INCINERATOR REMEDIATION (A.I.R.), INC..,
PETITIONER
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET. AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LOIS J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID C. SHILTON
EVELYN S. YING
JARED A. GOLDSTEIN
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether Section 113(h) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h), pre-
cludes federal court jurisdiction over an environ-
mental citizen suit that challenges ongoing govern-
ment cleanup actions at a CERCLA site.
2. Whether this Court’s decision in Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), provides federal court
jurisdiction over a challenge to ongoing government
cleanup actions at a CERCLA site.
3. Whether the denial of jurisdiction over chal-
lenges to ongoing government cleanup actions at a
CERCLA site violates due process or any constitu-
tional right of access to the courts.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
RINE SENET shikai sinicicencirespnienaapiacbamiasneguiapunpedéimaeoiiabies 1
Tac ohadnemenssnaieanniiaioies l
a a saulesnenubeuiooads 2
EIIITE ssicibinipsédecssenektancespinnbdaseananctesbonnmsaateoseaiowmmsanee 7
RPMI « csstituninscdavcieadhauboinihnstedivimetieasthieksabeninaiendsessees 17
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989) .............. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14
Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dep't of
Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994) ........ 9, 10
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) .............. 16
Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461
oe ME A EE osliese di ok cbtiks vesinbnticdnkxautidindboesuivesetncsscsee 16
Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,
Oe Ee ER RIIIED Si Nios Se ansanbincdsbincdithinicieiacccebeesisereiches 6, 14
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011
RIPE Si RUT vccatcda dincascdlnncnksiascckeniddélamesiiibate 4, 6, 10, 14
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (197]) ............. 16
Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) ........ 15
Briscoe v. Bell, 482 U.S. 404 (1977) ............ccccceeeees 6, 14
General Finance Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366 (7th
ne UI a i oleaiaemaioecansaiess 15
Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (19383) ............. 16
Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle,
BE Se Be AE WAIT s, RUUD. sbvtnvictccseasccccnsgenanetbecanees 16
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375
EAE all Ab ca iad bilis alsa darikslialdaastusisuneimenivesentnicdbscaccees 15
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) ................. 6, 13, 14
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
iia es cobb eebapmadecne 16
(III)
ii i |
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) ........... 15
Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 318 US.
Pe RUINED cicenseensccninerigapenansabindiotenintdeninssbentpaninibest 15
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situtation v. Perry,
47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51
CRI ia sicrianscincaceneeista eens cicsenaecsder aan 8-9, 10
Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied; 498 U.S. 981 (1900) ..............ccscerseses 9, 10, 14, 16
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) ......... 16
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994) .. 10, 11, 12
United States v. City and County of Denver, 100
FE SD COE COIR, Id sh cisecneepnsistepvicsnsisctinsevavinns 11
United States v. Lovasco, 481 U.S. 783 (1977) ........ 15
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,
BE Fae ee Ge Gare BOD serasscnsscccscvsonsiaabacginssenstions 4
Statutes and regulations:
Adminstrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. .... 10
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.
9601 ef seq. ......... Shusdclnssabinsanadchioseehiih esod oe isbakédiowias ties 2
© BE, Be I eiacinrs cake nis cssiesichnkng ces veces 2
S$ LIBCh), 4B UBL, FOUR) cevecccesscsececcsacesansese passim
§ 113(h)(4), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4) ........ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17
S LEBER), 2B DC. FOI) ccevecvresasscocscccoserssticsvons 17
© 35G, Ge Ci itk RE padensecscnstcseasesensessensnsesns 11, 12
© LET Be Sea WET. piciiieseicancesiniainensdevsceisdicasssns 17
DF OE Fe Bras Ue baahbhiceuineosesnetsstindesntacsensinisnss 4,5
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
SEE WE OIE ciscscsvandatessasschieatnpedstennnnauniceashbomsnsnenses 3
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,
4B UI BAL GRO Ob ON iisiicesiletiibcd ethane sticciseevcsinsee 3
§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B) .............. 6
Se UE EEA). SID. shiccccep bisasnaturstiahiatassdddnananetlintnsantalel 14
Regulation—Continued: Page
40 C.F.R.:
Pt. 300:
SO Ne cdekeunmanc 17
I Re 17
Pes OE Gib careccnthendlbdapiasidaaiibascitnpstinarseinictaaseseamave 2
Miscellaneous:
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
RRUMUE: vebbssoudidendentedbsaciosebbdereisabdnicduaaiabiiaewcnbdbocersss
) OO
H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ......... 8
Jn the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
No. 97-541
ARREST THE INCINERATOR REMEDIATION (A.LR.), INC.,
PETITIONER
Vv.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET. AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The unanimous opinion of the en bane court of
appeals (Pet. App. la-25a) is reported at 116 F.3d 1018.
The orders of the district court (Pet. App. 26a-36a)
are unreported.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
June 26, 1997. The petition for a writ of certiorari
was filed on September 24, 1997. The jurisdiction of
this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
(1)
2
STATEMENT
1. This litigation arises from the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) selec-
tion and implementation of remedial action addressing
soil and sediment contamination at the Drake Chemi-
cal Superfund site in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania.
After EPA conducted an initial emergency cleanup
pursuant to its authority under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., it
added the Drake site to the National Priorities List, a
list of sites that pose the greatest threat to public
health and the environment. Pet. App. 4a; see 42
U.S.C. 9605; 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. B.
EPA’s investigation revealed extensive soil con-
tamination from industrial wastes, and that toxic
contaminants had migrated into groundwater. EPA
therefore concluded that the site soil must be decen-
taminated to protect human health and the environ-
ment. Gov’t C.A. Br. 10-11. In August of 1988, EPA
proposed to excavate the soil, to treat it on-site with
a mobile incinerator, and to place the remediated
soil back onto the site. Jd. at 11; Pet. App. 4a. Fol-
lowing an opportunity for public comment, EPA in
September of 1988 issued its Record of Decision,
which selected on-site incineration of contaminated
soils as a remedial action for the Drake site. Gov't
C.A. Br. 11.'
1 Based on public comment, EPA found that the community
was “pleased with the permanent destruction of the soil and
sludges” and was “pleased that the site will possibly be available
for some other use” upon completion of the selected remedial
action. Gov’t C.A. Br. 11 n.11.
3
A key step in EPA’s implementation of an incinera-
tion remedy is the “trial burn” process, where the in-
cinerator is operated for a limited period to generate
essential data. Those data are, among other things,
used to verify that the incinerator can meet required
performance standards, and to evaluate the potential
risks from operation of the incinerator. Pet. App. 4a.
Although not required to do so by statute or regula-
tion, EPA agreed to conduct an initial screening-level
risk assessment to evaluate the potential human
health risks from the trial burn itself. Jbid. EPA
released the draft risk assessment to the public for
comment in December 1995, held a public meeting and
responded to written comments in January 1996, and
then directed the contractor to proceed with the trial
burn. Jbid.; Gov’t C.A. Br. 12.
2. In February 1996, petitioner filed suit against
EPA in an effort to bar it from conducting the trial
burn and soil incineration remedy at the Drake site.
Pet. App. 4a.2 The complaint alleged that EPA’s
remedy violated CERCLA, the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901
et seqg., and the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seg. Alleging that the
trial burn would pose a hazard to human health and
the environment, petitioner sought a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order. Pet.
App. 5a; Gov’t C.A. Br. 12.
EPA opposed the motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Gov't C.A. Br. 12-13.
EPA agreed not to commence the trial burn at the
2 The Clinton County Commissioners also joined the suit.
Pet. App. 4a. They, however, did not petition for certiorari.
4
site prior to the court’s resolution of those motions.
Id. at 138. After the district court held a hearing on
the preliminary injunction motion, EPA in March of
1996 notified the district court that the agency had
decided to delay the trial burn process and develop a
new risk assessment to respond more fully to the
concerns of petitioner and others. Jbid. In June of
1996, EPA issued, and filed with the district court, a
five-volume, comprehensive risk-assessment report,
which concluded that the trial burn process at the
Drake site would not pose a threat to human health.
Ibid.
In August of 1996, the district court dismissed the
complaint, holding that CERCLA Section 113(h),
42 U.S.C. 9613(h), expressly precludes judicial review
of petitioner’s challenges to EPA’s response actions
at the site. Pet. App. 3la-36a. In particular, the court
held that petitioner’s RCRA and NEPA claims were
barred by the Third Circuit’s decision in Boarhead
Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (1991). Pet. App. 34a.
Petitioner’s claims under the CERCLA citizen suit
provision, 42 U.S.C. 9659, the court held, were barred
by CERCLA Section 113(h)(4). That provision, by its
plain terms, allows citizen suits only after completion
of the remedial action, the court concluded; it does not
permit plaintiffs to use such suits to block EPA from
implementing its remedial action in the first place.
Pet. App. 33a-35a.
The district court acknowledged that its decision
might not be consistent with dictum in the Third Cir-
cuit’s opinion in United States v. Princeton Gamma-
Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (1994). Nonetheless, relying on
the decisions of the other courts of appeals that had
addressed the scope of Section 113(h) directly, the
court concluded that the Third Circuit “may well
5
reach a different result if [or when] directly faced”
with the question. Pet. App. 35a.°
3. After a panel of the Third Circuit urged the full
court to take this case en banc to reconsider Prince-
ton Gamma-Tech, the court of appeals agreed to re-
hear the case en banc. Pet. App. 3a. In a unanimous
decision, the en banc court then affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and overruled Princeton Gamma-Tech in
relevant part.
a. The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s
argument that CERCLA’s citizen suit provision,
42 U.S.C. 9659, provides the district court with ju-
risdiction. Pet. App. 7a-16a. The court based that
conclusion on CERCLA Section 113(h), 42 U.S.C.
9613(h), which states that “[nJo Federal court shall
have jurisdiction under Federal law * * * to review
any challenges to removal or remedial action selected
under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order
issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action
except [in certain enumerated proceedings].” See
Pet. App. 7a-16a.
The court recognized that Section 113(h)(4) pro-
vides an exception for CERCLA citizen suits, but it
held that the plain language of Section 113(h)(4)
allows such suits to proceed only after EPA has
3 Following the district court’s dismissal of petitioner’s
claims, EPA commenced the trial burn process, which was
completed in February 1997. EPA is using the data generated
thereby to assess the potential risks of remedial operation of the
incinerator. That risk assessment will undergo an external
peer review evaluation and will be released for public com-
ment. EPA will consider the results of the risk assessment,
along with all comments, prior to making its final decision on
whether to proceed with remedial operation of the incinerator.
6
completed its remedial action. Pet. App. 10a. Not
only is the statutory language unmistakeably clear,
the court explained, but the legislative history is as
well. Jd. at 10a-13a. The numerous courts of appeals
that have addressed the scope of Section 113(h)(4)’s
exception, the court continued, have come to the same
conclusion, holding that citizen suits challenging
EPA remedial actions can be brought only after the
remedial actions are completed. Jd. at 14a (citing de-
cisions of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh
Circuits).
b. The court of appeals similarly rejected peti-
tioner’s argument that jurisdiction could be based
on the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
6972(a)(1)(B). Pet. App. 17a-2la. CERCLA Section
113(h), the court explained, by its plain terms “pre-
clude[s] the exercise of jurisdiction over a challenge
to an ongoing CERCLA removal or remedial action
under any federal law,” including RCRA. Id. at 19a
(citing Boarhead, 923 F.2d 1011).
c. The court of appeals then turned to petitioner’s
contention that this Court’s decision in Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), provides a basis for juris-
diction. Pet. App. 22a-25a. Relying on this Court’s
decisions in Briscoe v. Bell, 482 U.S. 404 (1977), and
Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502
U.S. 32 (1991), the court of appeals concluded that the
Kyne doctrine does not apply in this case because
CERCLA Section 113(h) provides clear and convinc-
ing evidence that Congress intended to deny federal
court jurisdiction to review EPA’s ongoing remedial
actions. Pet. App. 23a-25a.
d. Finally, the court of appeals rejected peti-
tioner’s argument that the temporary preclusion of
judicial review violates petitioner’s constitutional
7
right of access to the courts. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The
court concluded that tre United States has sovereign
immunity, and that Congress is not constitutionally
obligated to waive that immunity by providing federal
courts with jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s claims
against EPA immediately.
ARGUMENT
Section 113(h) of CERCLA imposes a jurisdictional
limit on the manner and timing of federal district
court challenges to CERCLA removal and remedia-
tion actions. That Section provides in no uncertain
terms that “[nJo Federal court shall have jurisdiction
under Federal law * * * to review any challenges to
removal or remedial action selected under section
9604 of this title,” except in certain enumerated cir-
cumstances. 42 U.S.C. 9613(h). The court of appeals
below—joining every circuit that has considered the
issue—properly concluded that Section 113(h) bars
claims, such as petitioner’s, that seek to impede EPA
remedial actions providing for the cleanup of haz-
ardous substances under CERCLA. Further review,
accordingly, is not warranted.
1. Petitioner appears to contend (Pet. 15, 17, 25-26)
that jurisdiction can be founded on CERCLA Section
113(h)(4), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4), which provides an ex-
ception to the denial of jurisdiction contained in
Section 113(h). Under Section 113(h), the prohibition
against federal jurisdiction does not apply to:
(4) An action under section 9659 of this title
(relating to citizen suits) alleging that the
removal or remedial action taken under section
9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of
this title was in violation of any requirement of
this chapter. Such an action may not be brought
8
with regard to a removal where a remedial action
is to be undertaken at the site.
42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4). By its plain terms, Sub-
section (4) provides jurisdiction only for CERCLA
citizen suits “alleging that the removal or remedial
action taken under section 9604 of this title or
secured under section 9606 of this title was in
violation of” CERCLA. Ibid. (emphasis added). As
the court of appeals correctly ruled, the use of the
past tense—allowing challenges alleging that an
action was in violation of law—and the reference to
removal or remedial action “taken” or “secured”
reveal that Congress intended to allow challenges to
removal or remedial actions only after those actions
are completed. Pet. App. 9a-10a. To the extent the
plain language may leave any doubt, the legislative
history is, as the court of appeals also recognized (id.
at 10a-13a), directly and specifically to the same
effect.’
4 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1, at
81 (1985) (“there is no right of judicial review of the Adminis-
trator’s selection and implementation of response actions until
after the response action[s] have been completed”); H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986) (judicial review
postponed until “all the activities set forth in the Record of
Decision for the surface clean up phase have been completed”);
Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir.) (citing and
quoting additional portions of the legislative history), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989). Congress chose to delay review of
EPA remedial actions until after completion so as to ensure
that cleanup actions would not be delayed by lawsuits. See Pet.
App. 15a (“Congress apparently concluded that delays caused
by citizen suit challenges posed a greater risk to the public
welfare than the risk of EPA error in the selection of methods
of remediation.”); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.
Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cir.) (“Congress has already
9
Every court of appeals that has interpreted this
Statutory provision has reached precisely the same
conclusion. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095
(7th Cir.) (“The obvious meaning of this statute is
that when a remedy has been selected, no challenge to
the cleanup may occur prior to completion of the
remedy.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); Alabama
v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir.) (the “plain lan-
guage of the statute indicates that section 113(h)(4)
applies only after a remedial action is actually com-
pleted”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); Arkansas
Peace Center v. Arkansas Dep’t of Pollution Control
and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-1218 (8th Cir. 1993)
(court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where re-
medial action has not been completed), cert. denied,
511 U.S. 1017 (1994); McClellan Ecological Seepage
Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328, 331 (9th Cir.) (the
“unqualified language” of Section 113(h) “withholds
federal jurisdiction to review citizen suits * * * that
challenge ongoing CERCLA clean up actions”), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995). Accordingly, no further
review is warranted.
2. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 15-16) that Section
113(h) does not bar this action because it was brought,
balanced all concerns” and concluded that “the need for swift
execution of CERCLA cleanup plans” outweighs the risk of
irreparable harm), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995). Pre-
remediation public participation, Congress determined, could
be accommodated through non-judicial processes. Pet. App.
14a-15a (“Congress made the policy choice to substitute elabo-
rate pre-remediation public review and comment procedures
for judicial review,” and also “gave the states, as representa-
tives of the public, a significant role in the enforcement, in
federal court, of the substantive standards established for
remedial actions”) (citations omitted).
10
at least in part, under RCRA rather than CERCLA.
But the plain language of Section 113(h) precludes
federal court jurisdiction “to review any challenges”
to CERCLA remedial actions under any “Federal
law,” including the citizen suit provisions of RCRA.
Pet. App. 20a-21a (emphasis added). Once again, the
courts of appeals unanimously agree. See Arkansas
Peace Center, 999 F.2d at 1217 (Section 113(h) bars
federal jurisdiction over RCRA challenge to ongoing
cleanup); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011,
1020 (8d Cir. 1991) (Section 113(h) precludes review of
National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 claim
challenging ongoing cleanup); McClellan, 47 F.3d at
328-329 (“the unqualified language of [Section 113(h)]
precludes ‘any challenges’ to CERCLA Section 104
clean-ups”—including RCRA and Clean Water Act
challenges—“not just those brought under other pro-
visions of CERCLA”); Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095, 1097
(NEPA and Administrative Procedure Act claims
barred).
3. Nonetheless, petitioner argues (Pet. 14-18) that
the Third Circuit’s interpretation of CERCLA Sec-
tion 113(h) conflicts with the decisions in United
States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994), and Alabama v. EPA, 871
F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989).
There is no conflict.
a. The question before the Tenth Circuit in Colo-
rado was a narrow one: Whether a State could,
notwithstanding Section 113(h)’s bar against “chal-
lenges” to ongoing EPA cleanup actions, enforce its
EPA-authorized RCRA hazardous waste standards at
a federal facility where a CERCLA cleanup was being
conducted. 990 F.2d at 1568-1569. Answering that
question in the affirmative, the Tenth Circuit held
11
that Section 113(h) did not preclude the State’s en-
forcement of its hazardous waste program because
the State’s action did not constitute a “challenge” to
EPA’s remedial action within the meaning of Section
113(h). See id. at 1576 (action by State to enforce haz-
ardous waste laws is “not necessarily a challenge to
the CERCLA action”). In particular, the court em-
phasized, the suit did not seek to halt or delay EPA’s
remedial action. Jd. at 1577 (distinguishing Boarhead
on the ground that “the plaintiff’s complaint in Boar-
head sought to stay the CERCLA remedial action;
thus, the plaintiff’s action * * * clearly constituted
a challenge to the CERCLA remedial action”).
While the United States believes that the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Colorado is incorrect, the hold-
ing in that case has not been adopted outside the
Tenth Circuit and is not implicated by this case in
any event.’ It is undisputed that petitioner here is
attempting to delay or block EPA from proceeding
with its remediation plan. Even the Tenth Circuit
has held that, where a plaintiff seeks to do so, Section
113(h)’s prohibition on federal jurisdiction unques-
tionably applies. See United States v. City and
County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996)
(finding Colorado “clearly distinguishable” and hold-
ing that the defendant’s attempt to stay EPA’s
response action “constitutes a challenge” barred by
Section 113(h)).° Because the courts of appeals
® The United States unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari
in Colorado to address whether a State could dictate hazardous
substance response activities at a CERCLA site through state
law. See U.S. Pet. No. 93-786. That issue of federal-state rela-
tions is not raised by the present case.
6 Colorado is distinguishable for yet another reason. There,
the Tenth Circuit relied at least in part on 42 U.S.C. 9614(a),
12
universally agree that Section 113(h) deprives federal
courts of jurisdiction over citizen suits that, like
petitioner’s, challenge ongoing CERCLA remedial
actions, no further review is warranted.’
b. The asserted conflict with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s decision in Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548,
similarly does not exist. In Alabama, the plaintiffs
sought to enjoin EPA from shipping hazardous
wastes from Texas to Alabama as part of the cleanup
of a Texas Superfund site. Jd. at 1553. The court of
appeals held that “Section 113(h) clearly removes this
challenge from federal jurisdiction” and the exception
provided by “[{SJection 113(h)(4) applies only after a
remedial action is actually completed.” Jd. at 1557.
While the plaintiffs contended that their action did
not “challenge” EPA’s remedial action, the court
disagreed, eventually adding that, “[t]o the extent
which provides that nothing in CERCLA preempts “a State
from imposing * * * additional liability or requirements with
respect to the release of hazardous substances within such
State.” See 990 F.2d at 1576. Because the court believed that
barring Colorado from enforcing its hazardous waste laws
would prevent Colorado from “imposing” its hazardous waste
“requirements” in contravention of 42 U.S.C. 9614(a), it read
Section 113(h) as allowing Colorado’s enforcement action to
proceed. Jbid. Because this case does not involve a State’s
efforts to “impos[e] * * * additional liability or require-
ments,” that rationale is inapplicable.
7 As petitioner points out (Pet. 16), Colorado suggests that
CERCLA Section 113(h) may not prohibit citizen suits under
RCRA. The Tenth Circuit, however, explicitly stated that it
“need not decide this issue.” 990 F.2d at 1578. The existence
of stray dictum in Colorado—dictum that is unlikely to be
followed given the contrary case law in the other circuits—does
not provide a sufficient justification for further review of this
case.
13
plaintiffs’ complaint may in part be read as not chal-
lenging the remedial action plan and therefore not
removed from federal jurisdiction,” the claims were
without merit. Jd. at 1559.
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Alabama thus
is entirely consistent with the Third Circuit’s deci-
sion here. The court there, like the Third Circuit
here, understood that it could not entertain chal-
lenges to the remedial action. Although petitioner
claims (Pet. 17-18) that the Eleventh Circuit’s brief
mention of the merits shows that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit must have had jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit
was careful to clarify that it would address plaintiff’s
claims on the merits only “[t]o the extent” they could
“be read as not challenging the remedial action plan.”
871 F.2d at 1560. Here, petitioner can claim no basis
for reading its complaint as “not challenging” the re-
medial action plan. To the contrary, as petitioner’s
name suggests, the entire purpose of its lawsuit is to
“arrest the incinerator remediation” that EPA in-
tends to use.
4. Petitioner’s claim (Pet. 9-14) that the lower
courts had jurisdiction under this Court’s decision in
Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), is similarly
without merit. In Leedom v. Kyne, this Court held
that the federal courts had the power to review a
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision
that was “in excess of [the NLRB’s] delegated powers
and contrary to a specific Statutory prohibition,” 358
U.S. at 188, notwithstanding the fact that no federal
Statute expressly provided for a right of judicial
review.
As the court of appeals held below (Pet. App. 25a),
the narrow holding of Leedom v. Kyne does not per-
mit judicial review where there is a clear statutory
14
provision divesting the courts of jurisdiction. As this
Court explained in Board of Governors v. MCorp
Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991), Leedom v. Kyne
stands merely “for the familiar proposition” that
courts should not “restrict access to judicial review”
absent “clear and convincing evidence that Congress”
intended for them to do so. Jd. at 44. Where, as here,
the language and history of a federal statute provides
“clear and convincing evidence that Congress in-
tended to deny” federal courts “jurisdiction to review
and enjoin” ongoing agency action,®* judicial review is
unavailable. IJbid.; see also Briscoe v. Bell, 482 U.S.
404, 413-414 & n.13 (1977) (where statute “on its face
forecloses judicial review,” Leedom v. Kyne cannot be
invoked to circumvent it).
Moreover, Leedom v. Kyne itself clearly limits
review to cases in which an agency violates a “clear
and mandatory” statutory restriction on its author-
ity. 358 U.S. at 188.° Petitioner can cite no provision
in the environmental laws that clearly prohibits
EPA’s selection and implementation of a soil incin-
8 See, e.g., Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1020 (“Congress could
hardly have chosen clearer language to express its intent gen-
erally to deprive the district court([s] of jurisdiction.”); Schalk,
900 F.2d at 1095 (“The obvious meaning of this statute is that
when a remedy has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup
may occur prior to completion of the remedy.”); Alabama, 871
F.2d at 1557 (“The plain language of the statute indicates that
section 113(h)(4) applies only after a remedial action is actually
completed.”).
® In Leedom v. Kyne, the statute barred the NLRB from
approving a certain union structure “unless a majority of such
professional employees vote for” it. 358 U.S. at 185; 29 U.S.C.
159(b)(1). The NLRB, notwithstanding that statutory require-
ment, attempted to approve the union structure without ever
holding a vote. 358 U.S. at 185.
15
eration remedial action in this case. If the mere alle-
gation that an agency’s discretionary action violates
the statute were sufficient to bring a challenge
within the exception provided by Leedom v. Kyne,
that “narrow” exception would swallow the rule. See
General Finance Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366, 370 (7th
Cir. 1983); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473,
481 (1964).
5. Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 19-24) that
Section 113(h)’s preclusion of judicial review violates
due process and a constitutional right of access to the
courts.” That contention is without merit.
Under our judicial system, “[f]ederal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing authority
to assert only the jurisdiction provided them by stat-
ute or by the Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian
Life Ins, Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). While Congress
created in CERCLA and RCRA statutory rights to
sue the government under specified circumstances, it
has—under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,
among others—virtually unbridled discretion to with-
draw them. See, e.g., Maricopa County v. Valley
Nat'l Bank, 318 U.S. 357, 362 (1943) (“[T]he power to
withdraw the privilege of suing the United States or
its instrumentalities knows no limitations.”); Lynch
v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581 (1934) (“[Clonsent
to sue the United States is a privilege accorded; not
the grant of a property right protected by the Fifth
Amendment. The consent may be withdrawn.”). For
10 Petitioner also argues (Pet. 27) that Section 113(h)’s
preclusion of judicial review deprives it of the equal protection
of the laws. That argument was not raised below and thus is
not properly before this Court. See United States v. Lovasco,
431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977).
16
this reason, the lower federal courts unanimously
agree that Section 113(h)’s limitation on the jurisdic-
tional grant—a limitation that existed before peti-
tioner brought its suit—is unquestionably constitu-
tional. See Pet. App. 17a; Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1098;
Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71
F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).”
ll The cases cited by petitioner (Pet. 19, 22-23) are not to
the contrary. None involves the right to sue the United States,
and all are distinguishable on other grounds as well. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), for example, held only that a
State could not restrict access to state court divorce proceed-
ings where the State itself had required use of “the judicial
process” in the first place. /d. at 382-383. The Court was care-
ful to explain that it was not holding that “access for all
individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances,
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” Jd. at 382. In Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), petitioner was given no
notice of adoption proceedings regarding his child, causing him
to lose his parental rights without due process of law. Peti-
tioner does not claim a similar loss of rights or similar lack of
notice here. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422
(1982), this Court held that it is arbitrary and therefore
unconstitutional for a State to preclude access to administrative
proceedings on the basis of its own procedural error. Here,
Congress even-handedly eliminated judicial review for a good
and non-arbitrary reason—to ensure that citizen suits would
not unnecessarily delay urgent and necessary cleanup efforts.
See note 4, supra. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,
461 U.S. 731 (1983), and Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 8838
(1984), both involve the propriety of activities conducted by
employers in retaliation for the employees’ union activities
protected under the federal labor laws; they have no applica-
tion here. Finally, Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332
(1933), to the extent that it is relevant at all, stands for the
proposition that a plaintiff has no constitutionally protected
right “in any particular form of remedy.” It thus does not
support but rather undermines petitioner’s position.
17
Besides, CERCLA does provide petitioner with op-
portunities to be heard. Although Congress placed
limitations on judicial review of EPA’s response ac-
tions in Section 113(h)—and deprived federal courts of
jurisdiction over CERCLA citizen suit challenges to
ongoing EPA remedial efforts—it also established
extensive administrative opportunities for public
comment, and requirements for EPA to respond to
that comment. See 42 U.S.C. 9613(k), 9617; see also 40
C.F.R. 300.430(c) and (f)(3). Moreover, it is undis-
puted that, under Section 113(h)(4), petitioner will be
free to bring a CERCLA citizen suit once EPA has
completed its remedial action. No case cited by
petitioner entitles it to anything more.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Lois J. SCHIFFER
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID C. SHILTON
EVELYN S. YING
JARED A. GOLDSTEIN
Attorneys
NOVEMBER 1997
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