Opposition Brief — Arrest the Incinerator Remediation (A. I. R.), Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency

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No. 97-541

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

ARREST THE INCINERATOR REMEDIATION (A.I.R.), INC..,

PETITIONER

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET. AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID C. SHILTON

EVELYN S. YING

JARED A. GOLDSTEIN

Attorneys

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Section 113(h) of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-

ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h), pre-

cludes federal court jurisdiction over an environ-

mental citizen suit that challenges ongoing govern-

ment cleanup actions at a CERCLA site.

2. Whether this Court’s decision in Leedom v.

Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), provides federal court

jurisdiction over a challenge to ongoing government

cleanup actions at a CERCLA site.

3. Whether the denial of jurisdiction over chal-

lenges to ongoing government cleanup actions at a

CERCLA site violates due process or any constitu-

tional right of access to the courts.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

RINE SENET shikai sinicicencirespnienaapiacbamiasneguiapunpedéimaeoiiabies 1

Tac ohadnemenssnaieanniiaioies l

a a saulesnenubeuiooads 2

EIIITE ssicibinipsédecssenektancespinnbdaseananctesbonnmsaateoseaiowmmsanee 7

RPMI « csstituninscdavcieadhauboinihnstedivimetieasthieksabeninaiendsessees 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989) .............. 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14

Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dep't of

Pollution Control and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1017 (1994) ........ 9, 10

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965) .............. 16

Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461

oe ME A EE osliese di ok cbtiks vesinbnticdnkxautidindboesuivesetncsscsee 16

Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc.,

Oe Ee ER RIIIED Si Nios Se ansanbincdsbincdithinicieiacccebeesisereiches 6, 14

Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011

RIPE Si RUT vccatcda dincascdlnncnksiascckeniddélamesiiibate 4, 6, 10, 14

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (197]) ............. 16

Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964) ........ 15

Briscoe v. Bell, 482 U.S. 404 (1977) ............ccccceeeees 6, 14

General Finance Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366 (7th

ne UI a i oleaiaemaioecansaiess 15

Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326 (19383) ............. 16

Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle,

BE Se Be AE WAIT s, RUUD. sbvtnvictccseasccccnsgenanetbecanees 16

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375

EAE all Ab ca iad bilis alsa darikslialdaastusisuneimenivesentnicdbscaccees 15

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958) ................. 6, 13, 14

Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422

iia es cobb eebapmadecne 16

(III)

ii i |

IV

Cases—Continued: Page

Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934) ........... 15

Maricopa County v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 318 US.

Pe RUINED cicenseensccninerigapenansabindiotenintdeninssbentpaninibest 15

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situtation v. Perry,

47 F.3d 325 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51

CRI ia sicrianscincaceneeista eens cicsenaecsder aan 8-9, 10

Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied; 498 U.S. 981 (1900) ..............ccscerseses 9, 10, 14, 16

Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 (1984) ......... 16

United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994) .. 10, 11, 12

United States v. City and County of Denver, 100

FE SD COE COIR, Id sh cisecneepnsistepvicsnsisctinsevavinns 11

United States v. Lovasco, 481 U.S. 783 (1977) ........ 15

United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc.,

BE Fae ee Ge Gare BOD serasscnsscccscvsonsiaabacginssenstions 4

Statutes and regulations:

Adminstrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 551 et seq. .... 10

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-

pensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.

9601 ef seq. ......... Shusdclnssabinsanadchioseehiih esod oe isbakédiowias ties 2

© BE, Be I eiacinrs cake nis cssiesichnkng ces veces 2

S$ LIBCh), 4B UBL, FOUR) cevecccesscsececcsacesansese passim

§ 113(h)(4), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4) ........ 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 17

S LEBER), 2B DC. FOI) ccevecvresasscocscccoserssticsvons 17

© 35G, Ge Ci itk RE padensecscnstcseasesensessensnsesns 11, 12

© LET Be Sea WET. piciiieseicancesiniainensdevsceisdicasssns 17

DF OE Fe Bras Ue baahbhiceuineosesnetsstindesntacsensinisnss 4,5

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.

SEE WE OIE ciscscsvandatessasschieatnpedstennnnauniceashbomsnsnenses 3

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,

4B UI BAL GRO Ob ON iisiicesiletiibcd ethane sticciseevcsinsee 3

§ 7002(a)(1)(B), 42 U.S.C. 6972(a)(1)(B) .............. 6

Se UE EEA). SID. shiccccep bisasnaturstiahiatassdddnananetlintnsantalel 14

Regulation—Continued: Page

40 C.F.R.:

Pt. 300:

SO Ne cdekeunmanc 17

I Re 17

Pes OE Gib careccnthendlbdapiasidaaiibascitnpstinarseinictaaseseamave 2

Miscellaneous:

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.

RRUMUE: vebbssoudidendentedbsaciosebbdereisabdnicduaaiabiiaewcnbdbocersss

) OO

H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985) ......... 8

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-541

ARREST THE INCINERATOR REMEDIATION (A.LR.), INC.,

PETITIONER

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET. AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The unanimous opinion of the en bane court of

appeals (Pet. App. la-25a) is reported at 116 F.3d 1018.

The orders of the district court (Pet. App. 26a-36a)

are unreported.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

June 26, 1997. The petition for a writ of certiorari

was filed on September 24, 1997. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

1. This litigation arises from the United States

Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) selec-

tion and implementation of remedial action addressing

soil and sediment contamination at the Drake Chemi-

cal Superfund site in Lock Haven, Pennsylvania.

After EPA conducted an initial emergency cleanup

pursuant to its authority under the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-

ity Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq., it

added the Drake site to the National Priorities List, a

list of sites that pose the greatest threat to public

health and the environment. Pet. App. 4a; see 42

U.S.C. 9605; 40 C.F.R. Pt. 300, App. B.

EPA’s investigation revealed extensive soil con-

tamination from industrial wastes, and that toxic

contaminants had migrated into groundwater. EPA

therefore concluded that the site soil must be decen-

taminated to protect human health and the environ-

ment. Gov’t C.A. Br. 10-11. In August of 1988, EPA

proposed to excavate the soil, to treat it on-site with

a mobile incinerator, and to place the remediated

soil back onto the site. Jd. at 11; Pet. App. 4a. Fol-

lowing an opportunity for public comment, EPA in

September of 1988 issued its Record of Decision,

which selected on-site incineration of contaminated

soils as a remedial action for the Drake site. Gov't

C.A. Br. 11.'

1 Based on public comment, EPA found that the community

was “pleased with the permanent destruction of the soil and

sludges” and was “pleased that the site will possibly be available

for some other use” upon completion of the selected remedial

action. Gov’t C.A. Br. 11 n.11.

3

A key step in EPA’s implementation of an incinera-

tion remedy is the “trial burn” process, where the in-

cinerator is operated for a limited period to generate

essential data. Those data are, among other things,

used to verify that the incinerator can meet required

performance standards, and to evaluate the potential

risks from operation of the incinerator. Pet. App. 4a.

Although not required to do so by statute or regula-

tion, EPA agreed to conduct an initial screening-level

risk assessment to evaluate the potential human

health risks from the trial burn itself. Jbid. EPA

released the draft risk assessment to the public for

comment in December 1995, held a public meeting and

responded to written comments in January 1996, and

then directed the contractor to proceed with the trial

burn. Jbid.; Gov’t C.A. Br. 12.

2. In February 1996, petitioner filed suit against

EPA in an effort to bar it from conducting the trial

burn and soil incineration remedy at the Drake site.

Pet. App. 4a.2 The complaint alleged that EPA’s

remedy violated CERCLA, the Resource Conserva-

tion and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901

et seqg., and the National Environmental Policy Act of

1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seg. Alleging that the

trial burn would pose a hazard to human health and

the environment, petitioner sought a preliminary

injunction and a temporary restraining order. Pet.

App. 5a; Gov’t C.A. Br. 12.

EPA opposed the motion for a preliminary injunc-

tion and moved to dismiss the complaint for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction. Gov't C.A. Br. 12-13.

EPA agreed not to commence the trial burn at the

2 The Clinton County Commissioners also joined the suit.

Pet. App. 4a. They, however, did not petition for certiorari.

4

site prior to the court’s resolution of those motions.

Id. at 138. After the district court held a hearing on

the preliminary injunction motion, EPA in March of

1996 notified the district court that the agency had

decided to delay the trial burn process and develop a

new risk assessment to respond more fully to the

concerns of petitioner and others. Jbid. In June of

1996, EPA issued, and filed with the district court, a

five-volume, comprehensive risk-assessment report,

which concluded that the trial burn process at the

Drake site would not pose a threat to human health.

Ibid.

In August of 1996, the district court dismissed the

complaint, holding that CERCLA Section 113(h),

42 U.S.C. 9613(h), expressly precludes judicial review

of petitioner’s challenges to EPA’s response actions

at the site. Pet. App. 3la-36a. In particular, the court

held that petitioner’s RCRA and NEPA claims were

barred by the Third Circuit’s decision in Boarhead

Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (1991). Pet. App. 34a.

Petitioner’s claims under the CERCLA citizen suit

provision, 42 U.S.C. 9659, the court held, were barred

by CERCLA Section 113(h)(4). That provision, by its

plain terms, allows citizen suits only after completion

of the remedial action, the court concluded; it does not

permit plaintiffs to use such suits to block EPA from

implementing its remedial action in the first place.

Pet. App. 33a-35a.

The district court acknowledged that its decision

might not be consistent with dictum in the Third Cir-

cuit’s opinion in United States v. Princeton Gamma-

Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (1994). Nonetheless, relying on

the decisions of the other courts of appeals that had

addressed the scope of Section 113(h) directly, the

court concluded that the Third Circuit “may well

5

reach a different result if [or when] directly faced”

with the question. Pet. App. 35a.°

3. After a panel of the Third Circuit urged the full

court to take this case en banc to reconsider Prince-

ton Gamma-Tech, the court of appeals agreed to re-

hear the case en banc. Pet. App. 3a. In a unanimous

decision, the en banc court then affirmed the district

court’s dismissal of the suit for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and overruled Princeton Gamma-Tech in

relevant part.

a. The court of appeals rejected petitioner’s

argument that CERCLA’s citizen suit provision,

42 U.S.C. 9659, provides the district court with ju-

risdiction. Pet. App. 7a-16a. The court based that

conclusion on CERCLA Section 113(h), 42 U.S.C.

9613(h), which states that “[nJo Federal court shall

have jurisdiction under Federal law * * * to review

any challenges to removal or remedial action selected

under section 9604 of this title, or to review any order

issued under section 9606(a) of this title, in any action

except [in certain enumerated proceedings].” See

Pet. App. 7a-16a.

The court recognized that Section 113(h)(4) pro-

vides an exception for CERCLA citizen suits, but it

held that the plain language of Section 113(h)(4)

allows such suits to proceed only after EPA has

3 Following the district court’s dismissal of petitioner’s

claims, EPA commenced the trial burn process, which was

completed in February 1997. EPA is using the data generated

thereby to assess the potential risks of remedial operation of the

incinerator. That risk assessment will undergo an external

peer review evaluation and will be released for public com-

ment. EPA will consider the results of the risk assessment,

along with all comments, prior to making its final decision on

whether to proceed with remedial operation of the incinerator.

6

completed its remedial action. Pet. App. 10a. Not

only is the statutory language unmistakeably clear,

the court explained, but the legislative history is as

well. Jd. at 10a-13a. The numerous courts of appeals

that have addressed the scope of Section 113(h)(4)’s

exception, the court continued, have come to the same

conclusion, holding that citizen suits challenging

EPA remedial actions can be brought only after the

remedial actions are completed. Jd. at 14a (citing de-

cisions of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh

Circuits).

b. The court of appeals similarly rejected peti-

tioner’s argument that jurisdiction could be based

on the citizen suit provision of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.

6972(a)(1)(B). Pet. App. 17a-2la. CERCLA Section

113(h), the court explained, by its plain terms “pre-

clude[s] the exercise of jurisdiction over a challenge

to an ongoing CERCLA removal or remedial action

under any federal law,” including RCRA. Id. at 19a

(citing Boarhead, 923 F.2d 1011).

c. The court of appeals then turned to petitioner’s

contention that this Court’s decision in Leedom v.

Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), provides a basis for juris-

diction. Pet. App. 22a-25a. Relying on this Court’s

decisions in Briscoe v. Bell, 482 U.S. 404 (1977), and

Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, Inc., 502

U.S. 32 (1991), the court of appeals concluded that the

Kyne doctrine does not apply in this case because

CERCLA Section 113(h) provides clear and convinc-

ing evidence that Congress intended to deny federal

court jurisdiction to review EPA’s ongoing remedial

actions. Pet. App. 23a-25a.

d. Finally, the court of appeals rejected peti-

tioner’s argument that the temporary preclusion of

judicial review violates petitioner’s constitutional

7

right of access to the courts. Pet. App. 16a-17a. The

court concluded that tre United States has sovereign

immunity, and that Congress is not constitutionally

obligated to waive that immunity by providing federal

courts with jurisdiction to hear petitioner’s claims

against EPA immediately.

ARGUMENT

Section 113(h) of CERCLA imposes a jurisdictional

limit on the manner and timing of federal district

court challenges to CERCLA removal and remedia-

tion actions. That Section provides in no uncertain

terms that “[nJo Federal court shall have jurisdiction

under Federal law * * * to review any challenges to

removal or remedial action selected under section

9604 of this title,” except in certain enumerated cir-

cumstances. 42 U.S.C. 9613(h). The court of appeals

below—joining every circuit that has considered the

issue—properly concluded that Section 113(h) bars

claims, such as petitioner’s, that seek to impede EPA

remedial actions providing for the cleanup of haz-

ardous substances under CERCLA. Further review,

accordingly, is not warranted.

1. Petitioner appears to contend (Pet. 15, 17, 25-26)

that jurisdiction can be founded on CERCLA Section

113(h)(4), 42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4), which provides an ex-

ception to the denial of jurisdiction contained in

Section 113(h). Under Section 113(h), the prohibition

against federal jurisdiction does not apply to:

(4) An action under section 9659 of this title

(relating to citizen suits) alleging that the

removal or remedial action taken under section

9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of

this title was in violation of any requirement of

this chapter. Such an action may not be brought

8

with regard to a removal where a remedial action

is to be undertaken at the site.

42 U.S.C. 9613(h)(4). By its plain terms, Sub-

section (4) provides jurisdiction only for CERCLA

citizen suits “alleging that the removal or remedial

action taken under section 9604 of this title or

secured under section 9606 of this title was in

violation of” CERCLA. Ibid. (emphasis added). As

the court of appeals correctly ruled, the use of the

past tense—allowing challenges alleging that an

action was in violation of law—and the reference to

removal or remedial action “taken” or “secured”

reveal that Congress intended to allow challenges to

removal or remedial actions only after those actions

are completed. Pet. App. 9a-10a. To the extent the

plain language may leave any doubt, the legislative

history is, as the court of appeals also recognized (id.

at 10a-13a), directly and specifically to the same

effect.’

4 See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., Pt. 1, at

81 (1985) (“there is no right of judicial review of the Adminis-

trator’s selection and implementation of response actions until

after the response action[s] have been completed”); H.R. Conf.

Rep. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 224 (1986) (judicial review

postponed until “all the activities set forth in the Record of

Decision for the surface clean up phase have been completed”);

Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir.) (citing and

quoting additional portions of the legislative history), cert.

denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989). Congress chose to delay review of

EPA remedial actions until after completion so as to ensure

that cleanup actions would not be delayed by lawsuits. See Pet.

App. 15a (“Congress apparently concluded that delays caused

by citizen suit challenges posed a greater risk to the public

welfare than the risk of EPA error in the selection of methods

of remediation.”); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.

Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th Cir.) (“Congress has already

9

Every court of appeals that has interpreted this

Statutory provision has reached precisely the same

conclusion. See Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 1095

(7th Cir.) (“The obvious meaning of this statute is

that when a remedy has been selected, no challenge to

the cleanup may occur prior to completion of the

remedy.”), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990); Alabama

v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir.) (the “plain lan-

guage of the statute indicates that section 113(h)(4)

applies only after a remedial action is actually com-

pleted”), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989); Arkansas

Peace Center v. Arkansas Dep’t of Pollution Control

and Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1216-1218 (8th Cir. 1993)

(court lacks subject matter jurisdiction where re-

medial action has not been completed), cert. denied,

511 U.S. 1017 (1994); McClellan Ecological Seepage

Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 328, 331 (9th Cir.) (the

“unqualified language” of Section 113(h) “withholds

federal jurisdiction to review citizen suits * * * that

challenge ongoing CERCLA clean up actions”), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995). Accordingly, no further

review is warranted.

2. Petitioner asserts (Pet. 15-16) that Section

113(h) does not bar this action because it was brought,

balanced all concerns” and concluded that “the need for swift

execution of CERCLA cleanup plans” outweighs the risk of

irreparable harm), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995). Pre-

remediation public participation, Congress determined, could

be accommodated through non-judicial processes. Pet. App.

14a-15a (“Congress made the policy choice to substitute elabo-

rate pre-remediation public review and comment procedures

for judicial review,” and also “gave the states, as representa-

tives of the public, a significant role in the enforcement, in

federal court, of the substantive standards established for

remedial actions”) (citations omitted).

10

at least in part, under RCRA rather than CERCLA.

But the plain language of Section 113(h) precludes

federal court jurisdiction “to review any challenges”

to CERCLA remedial actions under any “Federal

law,” including the citizen suit provisions of RCRA.

Pet. App. 20a-21a (emphasis added). Once again, the

courts of appeals unanimously agree. See Arkansas

Peace Center, 999 F.2d at 1217 (Section 113(h) bars

federal jurisdiction over RCRA challenge to ongoing

cleanup); Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011,

1020 (8d Cir. 1991) (Section 113(h) precludes review of

National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 claim

challenging ongoing cleanup); McClellan, 47 F.3d at

328-329 (“the unqualified language of [Section 113(h)]

precludes ‘any challenges’ to CERCLA Section 104

clean-ups”—including RCRA and Clean Water Act

challenges—“not just those brought under other pro-

visions of CERCLA”); Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1095, 1097

(NEPA and Administrative Procedure Act claims

barred).

3. Nonetheless, petitioner argues (Pet. 14-18) that

the Third Circuit’s interpretation of CERCLA Sec-

tion 113(h) conflicts with the decisions in United

States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 510 U.S. 1092 (1994), and Alabama v. EPA, 871

F.2d 1548 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 991 (1989).

There is no conflict.

a. The question before the Tenth Circuit in Colo-

rado was a narrow one: Whether a State could,

notwithstanding Section 113(h)’s bar against “chal-

lenges” to ongoing EPA cleanup actions, enforce its

EPA-authorized RCRA hazardous waste standards at

a federal facility where a CERCLA cleanup was being

conducted. 990 F.2d at 1568-1569. Answering that

question in the affirmative, the Tenth Circuit held

11

that Section 113(h) did not preclude the State’s en-

forcement of its hazardous waste program because

the State’s action did not constitute a “challenge” to

EPA’s remedial action within the meaning of Section

113(h). See id. at 1576 (action by State to enforce haz-

ardous waste laws is “not necessarily a challenge to

the CERCLA action”). In particular, the court em-

phasized, the suit did not seek to halt or delay EPA’s

remedial action. Jd. at 1577 (distinguishing Boarhead

on the ground that “the plaintiff’s complaint in Boar-

head sought to stay the CERCLA remedial action;

thus, the plaintiff’s action * * * clearly constituted

a challenge to the CERCLA remedial action”).

While the United States believes that the Tenth

Circuit’s decision in Colorado is incorrect, the hold-

ing in that case has not been adopted outside the

Tenth Circuit and is not implicated by this case in

any event.’ It is undisputed that petitioner here is

attempting to delay or block EPA from proceeding

with its remediation plan. Even the Tenth Circuit

has held that, where a plaintiff seeks to do so, Section

113(h)’s prohibition on federal jurisdiction unques-

tionably applies. See United States v. City and

County of Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996)

(finding Colorado “clearly distinguishable” and hold-

ing that the defendant’s attempt to stay EPA’s

response action “constitutes a challenge” barred by

Section 113(h)).° Because the courts of appeals

® The United States unsuccessfully petitioned for certiorari

in Colorado to address whether a State could dictate hazardous

substance response activities at a CERCLA site through state

law. See U.S. Pet. No. 93-786. That issue of federal-state rela-

tions is not raised by the present case.

6 Colorado is distinguishable for yet another reason. There,

the Tenth Circuit relied at least in part on 42 U.S.C. 9614(a),

12

universally agree that Section 113(h) deprives federal

courts of jurisdiction over citizen suits that, like

petitioner’s, challenge ongoing CERCLA remedial

actions, no further review is warranted.’

b. The asserted conflict with the Eleventh Cir-

cuit’s decision in Alabama v. EPA, 871 F.2d 1548,

similarly does not exist. In Alabama, the plaintiffs

sought to enjoin EPA from shipping hazardous

wastes from Texas to Alabama as part of the cleanup

of a Texas Superfund site. Jd. at 1553. The court of

appeals held that “Section 113(h) clearly removes this

challenge from federal jurisdiction” and the exception

provided by “[{SJection 113(h)(4) applies only after a

remedial action is actually completed.” Jd. at 1557.

While the plaintiffs contended that their action did

not “challenge” EPA’s remedial action, the court

disagreed, eventually adding that, “[t]o the extent

which provides that nothing in CERCLA preempts “a State

from imposing * * * additional liability or requirements with

respect to the release of hazardous substances within such

State.” See 990 F.2d at 1576. Because the court believed that

barring Colorado from enforcing its hazardous waste laws

would prevent Colorado from “imposing” its hazardous waste

“requirements” in contravention of 42 U.S.C. 9614(a), it read

Section 113(h) as allowing Colorado’s enforcement action to

proceed. Jbid. Because this case does not involve a State’s

efforts to “impos[e] * * * additional liability or require-

ments,” that rationale is inapplicable.

7 As petitioner points out (Pet. 16), Colorado suggests that

CERCLA Section 113(h) may not prohibit citizen suits under

RCRA. The Tenth Circuit, however, explicitly stated that it

“need not decide this issue.” 990 F.2d at 1578. The existence

of stray dictum in Colorado—dictum that is unlikely to be

followed given the contrary case law in the other circuits—does

not provide a sufficient justification for further review of this

case.

13

plaintiffs’ complaint may in part be read as not chal-

lenging the remedial action plan and therefore not

removed from federal jurisdiction,” the claims were

without merit. Jd. at 1559.

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Alabama thus

is entirely consistent with the Third Circuit’s deci-

sion here. The court there, like the Third Circuit

here, understood that it could not entertain chal-

lenges to the remedial action. Although petitioner

claims (Pet. 17-18) that the Eleventh Circuit’s brief

mention of the merits shows that the Eleventh Cir-

cuit must have had jurisdiction, the Eleventh Circuit

was careful to clarify that it would address plaintiff’s

claims on the merits only “[t]o the extent” they could

“be read as not challenging the remedial action plan.”

871 F.2d at 1560. Here, petitioner can claim no basis

for reading its complaint as “not challenging” the re-

medial action plan. To the contrary, as petitioner’s

name suggests, the entire purpose of its lawsuit is to

“arrest the incinerator remediation” that EPA in-

tends to use.

4. Petitioner’s claim (Pet. 9-14) that the lower

courts had jurisdiction under this Court’s decision in

Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), is similarly

without merit. In Leedom v. Kyne, this Court held

that the federal courts had the power to review a

National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision

that was “in excess of [the NLRB’s] delegated powers

and contrary to a specific Statutory prohibition,” 358

U.S. at 188, notwithstanding the fact that no federal

Statute expressly provided for a right of judicial

review.

As the court of appeals held below (Pet. App. 25a),

the narrow holding of Leedom v. Kyne does not per-

mit judicial review where there is a clear statutory

14

provision divesting the courts of jurisdiction. As this

Court explained in Board of Governors v. MCorp

Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991), Leedom v. Kyne

stands merely “for the familiar proposition” that

courts should not “restrict access to judicial review”

absent “clear and convincing evidence that Congress”

intended for them to do so. Jd. at 44. Where, as here,

the language and history of a federal statute provides

“clear and convincing evidence that Congress in-

tended to deny” federal courts “jurisdiction to review

and enjoin” ongoing agency action,®* judicial review is

unavailable. IJbid.; see also Briscoe v. Bell, 482 U.S.

404, 413-414 & n.13 (1977) (where statute “on its face

forecloses judicial review,” Leedom v. Kyne cannot be

invoked to circumvent it).

Moreover, Leedom v. Kyne itself clearly limits

review to cases in which an agency violates a “clear

and mandatory” statutory restriction on its author-

ity. 358 U.S. at 188.° Petitioner can cite no provision

in the environmental laws that clearly prohibits

EPA’s selection and implementation of a soil incin-

8 See, e.g., Boarhead, 923 F.2d at 1020 (“Congress could

hardly have chosen clearer language to express its intent gen-

erally to deprive the district court([s] of jurisdiction.”); Schalk,

900 F.2d at 1095 (“The obvious meaning of this statute is that

when a remedy has been selected, no challenge to the cleanup

may occur prior to completion of the remedy.”); Alabama, 871

F.2d at 1557 (“The plain language of the statute indicates that

section 113(h)(4) applies only after a remedial action is actually

completed.”).

® In Leedom v. Kyne, the statute barred the NLRB from

approving a certain union structure “unless a majority of such

professional employees vote for” it. 358 U.S. at 185; 29 U.S.C.

159(b)(1). The NLRB, notwithstanding that statutory require-

ment, attempted to approve the union structure without ever

holding a vote. 358 U.S. at 185.

15

eration remedial action in this case. If the mere alle-

gation that an agency’s discretionary action violates

the statute were sufficient to bring a challenge

within the exception provided by Leedom v. Kyne,

that “narrow” exception would swallow the rule. See

General Finance Corp. v. FTC, 700 F.2d 366, 370 (7th

Cir. 1983); Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473,

481 (1964).

5. Finally, petitioner contends (Pet. 19-24) that

Section 113(h)’s preclusion of judicial review violates

due process and a constitutional right of access to the

courts.” That contention is without merit.

Under our judicial system, “[f]ederal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction,” possessing authority

to assert only the jurisdiction provided them by stat-

ute or by the Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins, Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). While Congress

created in CERCLA and RCRA statutory rights to

sue the government under specified circumstances, it

has—under the doctrine of sovereign immunity,

among others—virtually unbridled discretion to with-

draw them. See, e.g., Maricopa County v. Valley

Nat'l Bank, 318 U.S. 357, 362 (1943) (“[T]he power to

withdraw the privilege of suing the United States or

its instrumentalities knows no limitations.”); Lynch

v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 581 (1934) (“[Clonsent

to sue the United States is a privilege accorded; not

the grant of a property right protected by the Fifth

Amendment. The consent may be withdrawn.”). For

10 Petitioner also argues (Pet. 27) that Section 113(h)’s

preclusion of judicial review deprives it of the equal protection

of the laws. That argument was not raised below and thus is

not properly before this Court. See United States v. Lovasco,

431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977).

16

this reason, the lower federal courts unanimously

agree that Section 113(h)’s limitation on the jurisdic-

tional grant—a limitation that existed before peti-

tioner brought its suit—is unquestionably constitu-

tional. See Pet. App. 17a; Schalk, 900 F.2d at 1098;

Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71

F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995).”

ll The cases cited by petitioner (Pet. 19, 22-23) are not to

the contrary. None involves the right to sue the United States,

and all are distinguishable on other grounds as well. Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), for example, held only that a

State could not restrict access to state court divorce proceed-

ings where the State itself had required use of “the judicial

process” in the first place. /d. at 382-383. The Court was care-

ful to explain that it was not holding that “access for all

individuals to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances,

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.” Jd. at 382. In Arm-

strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965), petitioner was given no

notice of adoption proceedings regarding his child, causing him

to lose his parental rights without due process of law. Peti-

tioner does not claim a similar loss of rights or similar lack of

notice here. In Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422

(1982), this Court held that it is arbitrary and therefore

unconstitutional for a State to preclude access to administrative

proceedings on the basis of its own procedural error. Here,

Congress even-handedly eliminated judicial review for a good

and non-arbitrary reason—to ensure that citizen suits would

not unnecessarily delay urgent and necessary cleanup efforts.

See note 4, supra. Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB,

461 U.S. 731 (1983), and Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 8838

(1984), both involve the propriety of activities conducted by

employers in retaliation for the employees’ union activities

protected under the federal labor laws; they have no applica-

tion here. Finally, Gibbes v. Zimmerman, 290 U.S. 326, 332

(1933), to the extent that it is relevant at all, stands for the

proposition that a plaintiff has no constitutionally protected

right “in any particular form of remedy.” It thus does not

support but rather undermines petitioner’s position.

17

Besides, CERCLA does provide petitioner with op-

portunities to be heard. Although Congress placed

limitations on judicial review of EPA’s response ac-

tions in Section 113(h)—and deprived federal courts of

jurisdiction over CERCLA citizen suit challenges to

ongoing EPA remedial efforts—it also established

extensive administrative opportunities for public

comment, and requirements for EPA to respond to

that comment. See 42 U.S.C. 9613(k), 9617; see also 40

C.F.R. 300.430(c) and (f)(3). Moreover, it is undis-

puted that, under Section 113(h)(4), petitioner will be

free to bring a CERCLA citizen suit once EPA has

completed its remedial action. No case cited by

petitioner entitles it to anything more.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Solicitor General

Lois J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID C. SHILTON

EVELYN S. YING

JARED A. GOLDSTEIN

Attorneys

NOVEMBER 1997

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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