Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Stroh Die Casting Co. v. Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1997

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97 +479 SEP 15 1997

No. ____ogeice OF THE CLERK

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1996

STROH DIE CASTING CoO.,

Petitioner,

v.

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Roy E. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way

Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

John H. Niebler

James J. Carrig

Of Counsel for Petitioner

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way

Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

inom y \

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the federal court have jurisdiction over a citizen suit

under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251

et. seq., where the only post-complaint violations are at an outfall

which the citizen-plaintiff never included in a 60-day notice of

intent to sue?

li

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CUS TI PUNE so wis ves 5 een ee i

Zee GE Ae 8 6 ae Rea iv

Ce A ns nv dwn da eee ee 1

i ee yr rem! 2

STATUCIARY COMPU on ce cae he ee eee ee 2

STATEMENT OF THE CAZES .. 2. cece ccc ws cus 2

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ........ 8

I. The Seventh Circuit’s loose reading of the

Clean Water Act notice requirement

conflicts with the Court’s _ strict

interpretation of the statute in Hallstrom v.

Se, gk a os ae a ee es 8

II. The Seventh Circuit’s failure to recognize

the important policy underlying strict

compliance with the notice provision will

flood the federal courts with Clean Water

ee Pr ere ee ee 13

COURS 58 6a 0s 0 wee ee eee 16

iid oat raed e .

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

I EL ee as C-1

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Atlantic States Legal Found. v. United

Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473,

a Ss. i. 13, 5

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,

484 U.S. 49, 108 S.Ct. 376,

Ge Rae CU og cok cc ee sek baweews 3, 14

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20,

110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989),

reh’g denied, 493 U.S. 1037,

bk a ee Oe. Se 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.

v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239,

ne ee a a chan 8, 12, 13

Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc.,

ee ee. fe . | 8, 12, 13

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

Be Be te ik kook ck 4WR bw ce bk es 2

a Oe Len sd so a. 6d wee oa er ok ee 3

a ula na a atin eta a 2,3,9

ee pe I eo ok a basa Ake Oe Oe 2, 3,43

No.

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1996

STROH DIE CASTING CO.,

Petitioner,

v.

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

Stroh Die Casting Co. ("Stroh") respectfully prays that a

writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit entered in

this proceeding on June 17, 1997 in which the Court reversed the

decision of the United States District Court Eastern District of

Wisconsin and remanded the case to the district court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the district court is not officially reported.

it is reproduced as Appendix A, infra. The opinion of the Court

of Appeals is reported as Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.

Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997). It is

reproduced as Appendix B, infra.

ee ee

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals entered its judgment on June 17,

1997. (Appendix B, infra). The petitioner invokes the jurisdiction

of this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

—---- =

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The pertinent provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1365 and 40

C.F.R. §135.3 are set forth in Appendix C.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a citizen suit under the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act ("Clean Water Act"). The plaintiff, Atlantic States

Legal Foundation, Inc. ("Atlantic States") seeks civil penalties,

injunctive relief, and attorneys fees from Stroh Die Casting Co.,

Inc. ("Stroh") for alleged post-complaint violations of permit

limitations and federal regulations. The allegations relate to

discharges at an outfall location which Atlantic States never

included in any of its pre-complaint notices to Stroh.

The plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin under 28

U.S.C. § 1331 and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). Under the Clean Water

Act and Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49,

62, 108 S.Ct. 376, 384, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987), the citizen-

plaintiff must allege that the defendant is an “ongoing violator" of

the Clean Water Act in order to invoke the subject matter

jurisdiction of the district court. Stroh maintains that because it is

not an "ongoing violator" of the Clean Water Act with respect to

the noticed outfalls, the district court lacks subject matter

jurisdiction to entertain this citizen suit.

In November, 1988, Atlantic States provided Stroh with a

60-day notice of intent to sue pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b).

In this first notice, Atlantic States identified alleged violations at

two of Stroh’s storm sewer outfalls (pipes): WDNR 001 and

WDNR 003. An outfall is a specific pipe location where

wastewater is discharged and test samples can be taken. On

January 23, 1989, Atlantic States filed suit for the alleged

exceedences of discharge standards at these two DNR storm sewer

outfalls.

The district court eventualiy dismissed the suit without

prejudice when Atlantic States failed to respond to Stroh’s motion

to dismiss. Stroh had argued in its motion that it was not a

"continuing violator" of the Clean Water Act, and that the district

court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case.

In April, 1989 Atlantic States sent a second 60-day notice

of intent to sue to Stroh. This notice alleged that Stroh was

discharging process wastewater to the Milwaukee Metropolitan

Sewage District ("MMSD") without a permit and that Stroh had

exceeded federal "categorical standards" in Noveinber, 1988, at

one outfall, MMSD 3.

In July, 1989, the MMSD issued Stroh an Industrial

Wastewater Discharge Permit which set specific parameters and

required testing and monitoring at the three outfalls from which

Stroh discharged process wastewater: MMSD 1, 3, and 4. In

addition, from late 1989 to early 1990, Stroh was designing and

implementing a new wastewater treatment system at its plant. In

June, 1990, Stroh completed this new treatment system which

combined the process wastewater previously discharged at MMSD

outfalls 1, 3 and 4 into a single stream which is now discharged at

MMSD outfall 4. Stroh no longer discharged industrial process

wastewater to MMSD outfall 3 and it was abandoned. In October,

1990, the MMSD issued Stroh a revised permit which reflected

these changes.

MMSD outfall 4 was the very same pipe from the time the

first permit was issued in 1989 as it is now. Since July, 1989,

MMSD outfall 4 was subject to its own set of effluent standards,

monitoring requirements, and reporting requirements. Its reports

were available to Atlantic States starting in 1989. However,

Atlantic States never provided Stroh with notice of intent to sue for

any MMSD outfall 4 violations.

Atlantic States’ last notice described alleged violations only

in 1988, before the initial permit was issued or the parameters

were set. Atlantic States has never provided Stroh with any notice

that Stroh exceeded the limitations set forth in the permits issued

to Stroh. Now Atlantic States has convinced the Seventh Circuit

that its pre-permit notice was sufficient to cover post-permit

violations of the 1989 permit. That is impossible.

In May, 1990, Atlantic States filed an amended complaint

which repeated the claims of the original suit relating to WDNR

outfalls 001 and 003 and also added claims relating to Stroh’s

discharges to the MMSD. This suit alleged that Stroh was an

"ongoing violator" of the Clean Water Act. However, the last

reported exceedence at MMSD outfall 3, the only MMSD outfall

ever noticed by Atlantic States, occurred in October, 1989, eight

months before the amended complaint. By June, 1990, as part of

the installation of the new treatment system, all process wastewater

was discharged, monitored, and reported at MMSD outfall 4.

Therefore, all post-complaint MMSD exceedences raised by

Atlantic States in its summary judgment motion papers occurred at

MMSD outfall 4, which was never identified in any notice from

Atlantic States.

—

Stroh has never been fined or sanctioned by the federal,

State, or local enforcement agencies having jurisdiction over

Stroh’s discharges.

On July 28, 1992, because Stroh could not be an "ongoing

violator" with respect to any of the noticed outfalls, Stroh moved

for summary judgment and the dismissal of Atlantic States’

complaint. In its March 22, 1996 decision, the district court found

that Atlantic States could only possibly allege post-complaint

violations at MMSD outfall 4 and that Atlantic States had never

provided the requisite 60-day notice for any violations at that

outfall. (Appendix A, A-14) The district court determined that

the alleged MMSD outfall 4 violations were beyond the scope of

the lawsuit, held that Stroh was not an "ongoing violator" at any

of the noticed outfalls, and dismissed Atlantic States’ complaint.

(Appendix A, A-14)

In a split decision, the United States Court of Appeals for

the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and

remanded the case. (Appendix B, B-14) The Seventh Circuit

recognized that neither of Atlantic States’ notices to Stroh

mentioned violations at MMSD outfall 4. (Appendix B, B-8)

However, the court found that because the April, 1989 notice

“sufficiently informed" Stroh and gave it an opportunity to correct

the problem, this notice satisfied the jurisdictional requirement of

the Clean Water Act. (Appendix B, B-10).

In his dissenting opinion, Circuit Judge Manion agreed

with the district court that Atlantic States’ complaint should be

dismissed. (Appendix B, B-15) Because the notice did not

identify the only outfall at which Atlantic States claimed post-

complaint MMSD violations, the district court lacked jurisdiction

to entertain those claims. (Appendix B, B-17)

The dissent also pointed out that Atlantic States had access

to all of the information it needed to provide Stroh, the EPA and

the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources with notice

regarding alleged exceedences at MMSD outfall 4, but failed to do

so. (Appendix B, B-18) Judge Manion criticized the court’s

“expansive reading" of the notice requirement and stated that any

MMSD outfall 4 violations should be excluded from the suit.

(Appendix B, B-20)

The question presented is whether the federal court has

jurisdiction over a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act, where

the citizen plaintiff seeks penalties for post-complaint exceedences

at an outfall it never included in any notice of intent to sue.

=

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. The Seventh Circuit’s loose reading of

the Clean Water Act notice requirement

conflicts with the Court’s _ strict

interpretation of the statute in Hallstrom

v. Tillamook County.

The Seventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of the notice

provision significantly conflicts with the Court’s direction to

strictly construe this jurisdictional requirement. Hallstrom v.

Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26, 110 S.Ct. 304, 308-9, 107

L.Ed.2d 237 (1989), reh’g denied, 493 U.S. 1037, 110 S.Ct. 761

(1990). The Seventh Circuit’s decision also conflicts with the

application of Hallstrom by the Sixth Circuit in Atlantic States

Legal Found. v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473, 478

(6th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit in Washington Trout v. McCain

Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351, 1354 (9th Cir. 1995), and the Third

Circuit in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.

Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239, 1248-49 (3rd Cir. 1995). This case

gives the Court the opportunity to resolve these conflicts and

provide needed guidance to the lower courts on the appropriate

interpretation of the notice requirement.

The Clean Water Act provides that citizens may act as

"private attorneys general" to enforce the provisions of the Act:

"any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf. . .

nant!

against any person . - . who is alleged to be in violation of . . . an

effluent standard or limitation under this Act." 33 U.S.C. §

1365(a)(1).

Before the citizen plaintiff proceeds with a suit, however,

it must provide notice of the alleged violation to three parties: the

alleged violator, the United States Environmental Protection

Agency ("EPA"), and the State in which the alleged violations

have occurred:

No action may be commenced -- (1) under

subsection (a)(1) of this section -- (A) prior to

sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the

alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to

the State in which the alleged violation occurs, and

(iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,

limitation, or order. . . .

33 U.S.C. § 1365(0). The specific contents of the notice are

prescribed by 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a):

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent

standard or limitation or of an order with respect

thereof, shall include sufficient information to

permit the recipient to ideatify the specific

standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been

violated, the activity alleged to constitute a

violation, the person or persons responsible for the

alleged violation, the location of the alleged

violation, the date or dates of such violation, and

the full name, address, and telephone number of

the person giving notice.

The Court has held that if the citizen plaintiff fails to

strictly adhere to the notice requirements, the citizen suit must be

dismissed. Proper notice, therefore, is a mandatory prerequisite

to suit.

In Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 26, 110

S.Ct. 304, 308-9, 107 L.Ed.2d 237 (1989), reh’g denied, 493 U.S.

1037, 110 S.Ct. 761 (1990), the citizen plaintiff failed to strictly

comply with the 60-day notice provision of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA") and the Court affirmed

the dismissal of the action. In Hallstrom, the citizen plaintiff

provided its notice to the defendant, but not to the EPA or State

authorities. The defect proved fatal to the citizen plaintiff’s suit:

The language of this provision could not be

clearer. A citizen may not commence an action

under RCRA until 60 days after the citizen has

notified the EPA, the State in which the alleged

violation occurred, and the alleged violator. .. .

Under a literal reading of the statute, compliance

with the 60-day notice provision is a mandatory,

not optional, condition precedent for suit.

[T]he notice and 60-day delay requirements are

mandatory conditions precedent to commencing

suit under the RCRA citizen suit provision; a

district court may not disregard these requirements

at its discretion.

Id. at 26, 31. The Court explicitly rejected the citizen plaintiff's

argument that the statute should be given a "flexible or pragmatic

construction.” Id. at 26.

Both the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have

recognized that under Hallstrom, the citizen plaintiff must not only

10

2 Ale hE MS

deliver the notice to the correct parties, but the notice must include

the information specified by the statute. In Atlantic States Legal

Foundation v. United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir.

1995), the Sixth Circuit examined the notice requirements of the

Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act of 1986

("EPCRA"). EPCRA’s notice requirement is substantially the

same as that in the RCRA and the Clean Water Act.

tm United Musical Instruments, Atlantic States provided

notice of its intent to sue for reporting violations for calendar years

1987-1990 and for “violations not yet known to ASLF of other

EPCRA reporting requirements. " Id., at 478. In its suit, Atlantic

States included an alleged violation for calendar year 1991.

The Sixth Circuit, relying upon Hallstrom, held that

Atlantic States’ "catch-all" notice was insufficient to confer

jurisdiction on the district court for the 1991 violation:

As the structure of EPCRA’s notice provision is

substantively identical to the analogous provision

of RCRA, it follows that sufficient notice is also a

mandatory prerequisite to filing an enforcement

action under EPCRA. ASLF does not dispute this

obvious implication of Hallstrom, but contends the

notice of its intention to hold UMI liable for

"violations not yet known" was sufficient to create

jurisdiction over the alleged 1991 violation. We

disagree.

United Musical Instruments, 61 F.3d at 478. Because the 1991

violation was not noticed, Atlantic States could not include it in the

suit.

In Washington Trout v. McCain Foods, Inc., 45 F.3d 1351

(9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s

ruling that the citizen plaintiff's notice was defective because it

failed to identify the two organizations that eventually became the

only plaintiffs in the case. The court read Hallstrom to require

strict compliance with the Clean Water Act notice requirement:

The issue in Hallstrom was whether the notice was

sufficient under the regulation’s mandate --

whether the notice requirement should be strictly

construed or liberally applied by the district

courts. The Court held that the notice requirement

under the regulations was to be strictly construed.

Washington Trout, 45 F.3d at 1354.

The Third Circuit has read the notice requirement more

broadly than the Sixth and Ninth Circuits. In Public Interest

Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d

1239, 1249 (3rd Cir. 1995), the court allowed a citizen plaintiff to

pursue violations not specifically noticed as long as they were

"interconnected" with noticed violations.

The Third Circuit held that if a citizen-plaintiff has

provided notice for a Clean Water Act "discharge" violation, it

may also sue for subsequent monitoring, reporting, or

recordkeeping violations of the same "type", even if these

violations have not been separately noticed:

[W]e hold that a notice letter which includes a list

of discharge violations, by parameter, provides

sufficient information for the recipients of the

notice to identify violations of the same type (same

12

ape intok,

parameter, same outfall) occurring during and after

the period covered by the notice letter.

Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1250.

These cases demonstrate the significant conflict among the

circuit courts regarding the interpretation of the notice

requirement. The Third Circuit and, in this case, the Seventh

Circuit, have departed from the strict construction mandated by the

Court in Hallstrom and further developed by the Sixth Circuit in

United Musical Instruments and the Ninth Circuit in Washington

Trout.

The Seventh Circuit has approved the blanket, “catch-all”

notice explicitly rejected as insufficient in United Musical

Instruments. In addition, the Seventh Circuit has moved far

beyond the restrictions of Hercules, which still required the notice

to identify the "same parameter, same outfall" to confer

jurisdiction. The Court should grant Stroh’s petition to resolve

this conflict among the circuits.

Il. The Seventh Circuit’s failure to

recognize the important policy

underlying strict compliance with the

notice provision will flood the federal

courts with Clean Water Act citizen

suits.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision ignores the important policy

considerations behind the notice requirement. in Hallstrom, the

Court recognized the two basic goals of the notice:

13

First, notice allows Government agencies to take

responsibility for enforcing environmental

regulations, thus obviating the need for citizen

Suits. . . . Second, notice gives the alleged

violator “an opportunity to bring itself into

complete compliance with the act and thus likewise

render unnecessary a citizen suit."

Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29, citing Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay

Found., 484 U.S. at 49, 60. Therefore, a proper notice must

inform not only the operator, but also the government entities of

the alleged violations.

The result reached by the Seventh Circuit in this case is

inconsistent with the function of the citizen suit contemplated by

the statute: "the citizen suit is meant to supplement, rather than to

supplant government action." Gwaltney _v. Chesapeake Bay

Found., 484 U.S. at 60. By allowing Atlantic States to proceed

without properly noticing Stroh, the EPA and the State of

Wisconsin, the Seventh Circuit has upset the statute’s deference to

government enforcement before allowing citizen suits.

By finding that the "key to notice is to give the accused

company the opportunity to correct the problem," the Seventh

Circuit has entirely ignored the first important purpose of notice

articulated by the Court in Hallstrom. (Appendix B, B-10) The

"key" is for the citizen plaintiff to notify not only the alleged

violator, but also the EPA and the State. __

A notice, like Atlantic States’, which fails to identify the

"location of the alleged violation" to the operator, the EPA and the

(f

baie Naan SE aah tot 2 ‘

Avia WEARS AY

State frustrates the operation of the statute. 40 C.F.R. § 135.3

This "catch-all" notice provides no real opportunity for potential

enforcement or compromise before suit.

Here, the Seventh Circuit has allowed Atlantic States to sue

for future violations not noticed. This result is 180 degrees

opposite from the policy considerations recognized in United

Musical Instruments and Hallstrom. Before Atlantic States filed its

amended complaint in May, 1990, it easily could have noticed the

violations it now claims -- and Stroh, the EPA, and the DNR could

have addressed them before suit.

It is most significant that none of the government

enforcement agencies ever imposed sanctions against Stroh for the

noticed "violations." Instead, they worked with Stroh to eliminate

the potential problems through the permitting process. This

resulted in Stroh’s new treatment system which eliminated the

earlier problems. As Judge Manion recognized in his dissent, the

only possible objective of this suit is to try to collect attorneys fees

for Atlantic States’ lawyers. (Appendix B, B-24)

In addition to frustrating the purpose of the notice

provision, the Seventh Circuit's approval of Atlantic States’ “catch

all" notice will result in a huge increase of citizen suits. As the

dissent recognized, the Seventh Circuit's "expansive reading” of

the statute may result in “catch-all notices sent to companies

which, if construed as broadly as the court has done here, would

encompass any violation, past or future." (Appendix B, B-20)

15

In this case and in others, the lower federal courts have

expressed divergent views on whether to be lax or strict in

applying the 60-day notice provision in the Clean Water Act. This

Court should provide some much needed guidance.

CONCLUSION

The petitioner, Stroh Die Casting Co., respectfully requests

that the Court grant the writ of certiorari.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin this 12th day of

September, 1997.

Roy E. Wagner

Counsel of Record

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way

Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

John H. Niebler

James J. Carrig

Of Counsel for Petitioner

Niebler, Pyzyk & Wagner

N95 W16975 Richfield Way

Menomonee Falls, Wisconsin 53051

16

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Plaintiff ,

-vS- Case No. 89-C-100

STROH DIE CASTING CO., INC.,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

This is a citizen suit brought by the plaintiff, Atlantic

States Legal Foundation, Inc. ("Atlantic"), under the Federal

Water Pollution Control Act, also known as the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. 1365. Atlantic seeks relief for defendant Stroh Die

Casting Co., Inc.’s ("Stroh") alleged repeated discharges of

pollutants into a tributary of the Menomonee River and into Lake

Michigan via the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District

("MMSD"), in violation of the National Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System ("NPDES") permits issued by the Wisconsin

Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") pursuant to the Act.

An initial action brought by Atlantic was dismissed without

prejudice by Judge Robert W. Warren on the Court’s own motion

on November 14, 1989. On May 7, 1990, Atlantic filed an

amended complaint. Leave to file this amended complaint was

granted by Judge Warren on April 16, 1992. Stroh answered, and

cross-motions for summary judgment were filed.

BACKGROUND

The Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., establishes

a system for regulating both direct discharges (to surface waters)

and indirect discharges (to municipal sewer systems) of pollutants

into United States waters. Section 505(a) of the Clean Water Act,

33 U.S.C. 1365(a), the citizen suit provision, provides, subject to

certain procedural requirements, that:

[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his

own behalf--

(1) against any person. . . who is

alleged to be in violation of (A) an

effluent standard or limitation

under this chapter or (B) an order

issued by the Administrator or a

State with respect to such a

standard or limitation, .

Atlantic sues under this provision.

To establish federal court jurisdiction, citizen plaintiffs,

such as Atlantic, must "allege a state of either continuous or

intermittent violation -- that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past

polluter will continue to pollute in the future." Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S.

49, 57 (1987).

The Fourth Circuit analyzed this Supreme Court decision

as follows:

The Supreme Court held that citizen-plaintiff suits

under § 505 could not be based on wholly past

violations, but carefully distinguished an allegation

of a wholly past violation from allegations of

intermittent or sporadic violations. The Court

A-2

ee OP tA AP a ae ne

Serr Ps

noted legislative history in support of the

proposition that

an intermittent polluter -- one who

violates permit limitations one

month of every three -is just as

much "in violation" of the Act, as

a continuous violator.

108 S.Ct. at 384.

The Supreme Court remanded in light of its

holding that "§ 505 confers jurisdiction over

citizen suits when citizen plaintiffs make a good

faith allegation of continuous or intermittent

violation. . . .” 108 S. Ct. at 385.

Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield.

Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 1988). Not only must

allegations of "continuous or intermittent" violations be made in

order to establish the Courts jurisdiction, but a 60-day notice of

those violations must be given to the alleged violator (among

others) before any action can be commenced.

Section 505 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1365(b),

provides:

No action may be commenced --

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this

section --

(A) prior to sixty days after the

plaintiff has given notice of the

alleged violation (i) to the

Administrator, (ii) to the State in

which the alleged violation occurs,

and (iii) to any alleged violator of

the standard, limitation, or order .

EE

Stroh contends that the aforementioned 60-day notice must

be given as to each offending source of discharge when there is

more than one offending source of discharge within a company.

A general notice that is given or directed to a company that houses

the various sources of discharge is inadequate. Specific notice

must be given to a company as to each offending source of

discharge, what Stroh labels as "point sources" or "“outfalls."

Therefore, the notice to the alleged violator must be on a "point

source-by-point source” basis, that is, the required notice must be

"point source’ specific before the Court has jurisdiction to hear the

alleged violation.

Stroh had three discharge pipes or "point sources" (point

sources/outfalls Nos. 1, 3 and 4) at its plant. According to Stroh,

while Atlantic provided Stroh with proper notice of violations as

to point sources/outfalls Nos. 1 and 3, Atlantic failed to provide

proper notice as to point source/outfall No. 4. As to point sources

Nos. 1 and 3, Stroh submits that it had no violations or

exceedences at those noticed point sources after the time Atlantic

filed its amended complaint on May 7, 1990. These "noticed"

violations thus became, under Gwaltney, "past" violations and not

actionable.

Atlantic argues that, for notification purposes, a “facility

or company can itself be considered a "point source." Atlantic

contends that each point source within a facility does not have to

be addressed by way of notice, pleadings and proof to determine

whether a particular point violation occurred and, therefore,

Stroh’s argument as to point source No. 4 must fail.

The Court accepts Stroh’s "point source-by-point source"

analysis and finds that Atlantic failed to provide the requisite 60-

day notice relative to point source/outfall No. 4. Stroh’s motion

for summary judgment related to point source No. 4 must be

granted. The Court further finds that no reasonable jury could

conclude from the undisputed facts that Stroh was an intermittent

and/or continuous violator relative to Stroh’s “point sources"

A-4

i Sati) ROW abc. RARER oe Nita Etats BAP AAA paced aig evoke

known as pipe outfalls Nos. 1 and 3. Therefore, Stroh’s motion for

summary judgment is granted in all respects and the case is

dismissed.

ANALYSIS

A. *Point Sources’ Nos. 1 and 3.

The discharges occurring at point sources/outfalls Nos. 1,

3, and as we see later, 4, are undisputed. Indeed, they are based

upon reports and records that Stroh was required to submit.

The reports establish two post-amended complaint "events F

at point source/outfall No. 3 which were offered by Atlantic as

“proof” of ongoing or intermittent permit exceedences. Because

the first event concerns PCBs and because Stroh’s permit contains

no daily effluent limitation as to PCBs, (Gene Sewalish Affidavit,

September 17, 1992, at Para. 2), Atlantic is unable to prove an

exceedence of Stroh’s daily effluent limitations relative to that

permit.

The second exceedence at point source/outfall No. 3 is

based on a faulty lab test. A laboratory letter verifying that this

result was due to “error” on the lab’s part is attached to the

supplemental Sewalish affidavit dated September 17, 1992.

Because the PCB annual monitoring result and the result of a faulty

lab test do not meet Atlantic’s burden to show that, Stroh was an

ongoing or intermittent violator at point sources Nos. | and 3 after

May 7, 1990, all of the exceedences noticed and alleged by

Atlantic at these "point sources" are "wholly past" within the

meaning of Gwaltney. Any claim based on these alleged violations

must be dismissed.

B. "Point Source" No. 4.

Both parties argue that the language of the Clean Water

Act, the regulatory structure of the Act, and United States Supreme

Court and other cases defining a "point source" support their

proffered definition of a "point source." Review of these

authorities compels the Court to side with Stroh.

Section 1365(a)(1) authorizes a citizen suit "against any

person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of an effluent standard

or limitation under this chapter . . . ." (Emphasis added.) This

Court accepts as the definition of “violation” in this section that

which is set out by the court in South Carolina Wildlife Federation

v. Alexander, 457 F.Supp 118 (D.S.C. 1978):

[I]n order for an act to be unlawful under s 301, it

must involve (1) the Addition of a Pollutant into

Navigable waters (2) from a Point source (3) by a

Person.

Id. at 125 (emphasis added). This definition coincides with 33

U.S.C. § 1362(11): "The term ’effluent limitation’ means any

restriction established by a State or the Administrator on quantities,

rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and

other constituents which are discharged from point sources... .’

(Emphasis added.) Effluent limitations generally are embodied in

permits that regulate discharge sites or point sources at a facility.

Violations of the standards of performance generally occur when

a company or facility exceeds the effluent limitations established

in permits and permit limitations applying to a particular "point

source" within any new source or facility.

This Court adopts the reasoning of Sierra Club v. Shell Oil

Co., 817 F.2d 1169 (Sth Cir. 1987), where that court stated:

A "point source" means the point of discharge of

the pollutant-containing effluent. Effluent

A-6

Bieri ess ideresit

limitations, which were developed for entire

industrial categories OF subcategories, are

transformed into limitations on individual plants

within the category or subcategory by

incorporation into the terms and conditions of

NPDES discharge permits. If a discharger is in

compliance with the effluent limitations contained

in its NPDES permit, it is deemed to be in

compliance with The Clean Water Act.

One industrial facility may have numerous point

sources of discharge. . . . [When determining

whether a permit-holder has violated an effluent

limitation, one must look at each parameter within

each point source independently.

Id., at 1173 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

. Notice.

In addition to losing the "point source" argument, Atlantic

also loses on “notice,” although this is a close case. It is

undisputed that Atlantic’s two notices to sue of November 8, 1988,

and April 13, 1989, do not specifically mention point

source/outfall No. 4. In the November 8, 1988, notice, reference

is only made to Stroh’s failure to comply with NPDES as it relates

to point sources or outfalls Nos. 1 and 3.

It states in pertinent part:

This lawsuit will allege that the Milwaukee County

plant of Stroh Die Casting Company, Inc., which

discharges into Bluemound Tributary of the

Menomonee River via a storm sewer and is located

in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has violated and

continues to violate an “effluent standard or

limitation," Section 505(a)(1)(A) of the Clean

A-7

Water Act, by not complying with its NPDES

(Section 402) permits WI 0042285 in the following

=

In addition to referencing violations related to outfall No. 3,

Atlantic’s April 13, 1989, notice states:

This lawsuit will allege that the Milwaukee County

plant of Stroh Die Casting Company, Inc., which

discharges process water into Lake Michigan via

the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District,

and which is located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, has

violated and continues to violate an ’effluent

standard or limitation,’ by discharging die casting

process waste-water to MMSD since October 31,

1988, without a pretreatment discharge permit and

in violation of the categorical standards set forth in

40 C.F.R. Chapter 464.

Stroh asserts that this is not enough. While admitting violations at

outfall No. 4, Stroh argues:

[I]t is clear that neither notice provided by Atlantic

included "(1)" sufficient information to permit the

recipient to identify the specific standard,

limitation, or order alleged to have been violated.

[And] Atlantic’s notices, on their face, fail to meet

this element as they apply to either the discharges,

permit, identification or separate permit limitation

of point source/outfall No. 4.

(Stroh Opposition Brief at 16.)

Absent such a notice as to point source/outfall No. 4, the

important policy supported by this prerequisite would be defeated.

A-8

One of the major purposes of the notice provision

is to allow for possible administrative resolution

prior to filing suit. Since the notice is

jurisdictional, such a significant omission divests

this Court of the authority to further proceed with

an adjudication of this matter... .

South Carolina Wildlife Federation, 457 F.Supp. at 124 (D.S.C.

1978)(emphasis added).

Atlantic argues that, under the facts of this case, the 60-day

notice requirement must be "interpreted flexibly” and must not be

*subject to technical or formalistic" requirements. In support of its

position, Atlantic offers the authority of Proffitt v. Commissioners,

Township of Bristol, 754 F.2d 504 (3rd Cir. 1985). Proffitt

involved allegations of violations of the Water Pollution Prevention

and Control Act at the defendant’s sewerage plant. Proffitt filed

an amended complaint on the same day he sent notice of the

alleged violation to the various defendants, the Environmental

Protection Agency ("EPA"), and the Pennsylvania Department of

Environmental Resources ("DER"). Even though Proffitt did not

give 60-day notice prior to filing suit, the court found there was

"notice in fact" or "actual notice" which defeated defendant’s

jurisdictional argument. The court found evidence that all

defendants knew of the violation and had discussed the violations

with Proffitt before he filed his suit and notice.

Proffitt appears to have been overturned by the Supreme

Court in Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989),

where failure to technically comply with a 60-day notice

requirement under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

("RCRA") (identical to the notice requirement under consideration

here) resulted in dismissal. In Hallstrom, the plaintiff, while

giving the allegedly offending landfill operators the requisite 60-

day notice, failed to notify the State of Oregon or the EPA as

required. The Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's contention that

since the actual offender was placed on proper notice "the 60-day

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notice provision should be subject to equitable modification and

cure." Id. at 27. However, the court determined that the notice

provision was not subject to a "flexible or pragmatic construction."

Id., at 26. To plaintiff's argument that "giving effect to the literal

meaning of the notice provisions would compel ’absurd or futile

results," Id. at 29, and would "defeat Congress’ intent," Id. at 23,

the Hallstrom Court responded:

[R]equiring citizens to comply with the notice and

delay requirements furthers Congress’ goal of

striking a balance between encouraging citizen

suits and avoiding burdening the federal courts

with excessive numbers of such suits, since notice

allows government agencies and alleged violators

to achieve compliance without the need for suit.

Petitioners’ assertion that giving effect to the literal

meaning of the notice provisions would allow

violations to go unchecked during the 60-day

waiting period is not persuasive, since this

problem results from the balance knowingly struck

by Congress in developing the citizen suit

provisions, and since it is likely that compliance

with the notice requirement will trigger appropriate

federal or state enforcement actions to prevent

serious damage.

The Hallstrom Court concluded that the "notice and 60-day

delay requirements are mandatory conditions precedent to

commencing suit under the [] citizen suit provision,” Id. at 31, and

that "[t]he equities do not weigh in favor of modifying statutory

requirements when the procedural default is caused by petitioners’

failure to take the minimal steps necessary’ to preserve their

claims." Id. at 27.

The Hallstrom Court suggests that the minimal effort

required to give proper notice will not thwart the access of citizens

to the courts (particularly sophisticated citizens like Atlantic) and

A-10

is the least costly way to preserve the other important policies

embodied in the statute. These are to encourage possible

administrative resolutions prior to filing suit and to "avoid []

burdening the federal courts with excessive numbers of citizen

suits." Id. at 29. Hallstrom’s strict interpretation of the ‘notice

and delay’ requirements are fatal to Atlantic.

Atlantic cites to National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers

Power Co., 657 F.Supp. 989 (W.D. Mich. 1987), as an example

of an actual notice standard that fits the facts of this case. The

court there stated:

This is not a case where the plaintiff either failed

entirely to give notice to the appropriate persons

(Hallstrom) or instituted suit prior to the expiration

of the sixty-day waiting period (Proffitt)... . In

this case, rather, plaintiff gave timely and

substantially complete, if not complete, notice to

the appropriate persons. Since plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged and established the actual

notice that the statute and the regulations require,

the Court will reject this aspect of defendant's

motion.

Id. at 998 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).

Even if the notice was "not complete," Atlantic argues, it

gave actual notice to Stroh of Stroh’s violations. Admitting that it

did not specifically mention point source/outfall No. 4 in either of

its notices, Atlantic asserts that the April 13, 1989, letter was

sufficient because of the context within which the notice occurred.

The second notice letter references discharges of “process water

into Lake Michigan via the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage

District" and that Atlantic [sic] "has violated and continues to

violate an “effluent standard or limitation" by discharging die

casting process waste-water to MMSD since October 31, 1988,

A-11

without a pretreatment discharge permit and in violation of

categorical standards set forth in 40 C.F.R. Chapter 464."

This information was given to Stroh at a time when Stroh

was correcting its discharge from point sources/outfalls Nos. 1 and

3, which emptied into the Bluemound Tributary of the Menomonee

River, by re-routing these offending discharges to outfall No. 4

which emptied into Lake Michigan via the MMSD’'. Stroh thus

The following is excerpted from the Sewalish deposition of September

9, 1992, pages 52-54:

Q: Now, Mr. Sewalish, is it correct that what you’ve

described to me as a history of Stroh Die Casting in which

some of the wastewater previously discharged via storm water

through outfalls one or three under the Wisconsin DNR

permit were rerouted sometime in 1990 to be discharged to

the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District via sanitary

sewer?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. If we look, for example, to outfall three as

defined in your initial MMSD’s permit, wastewater that was

discharged through that outfall under the initial permit has

subsequently been discharged and measured through a

different outfall under your revised permit, --

A: Correct.

Q: -- correct? Okay. It’s the same wastewater mixed

with additional water from other sources, correct?

A: Three waste streams are combined into one, correct.

Q: Okay. You have not ceased discharging the

wastewater which used to be discharged at old outfall three,

correct?

A: Correct.

Q: Okay. You have, as you said, rerouted it and

combined it with the discharge from other waste streams and

now discharge and measure it at outfall four, correct?

A: Going through a waste treatment process prior to

discharge, correct.

(Emphasis added.)

knew, or should have known, that the April 13, 1989, notice

objecting to discharge into Lake Michigan via the MMSD could

become the basis of a legal action and that point source No. 4

would be the subject of that action. Stroh was thus on actual

notice that Atlantic intended to sue for those discharges into the

MMSD even though point source/outfall No. 4 was not directly

named.

Given these facts, it would be umnecessary, argues

Atlantic, to give another 60-day notice by specifically referencing

outfall No. 4 and amending the complaint accordingly. But

Hallstrom, given its vision of the policies embodied in the statutes,

appears to hold otherwise. Hallstrom suggests that this is a

minimal effort to make in light of the policies harmed by a failure

to make it.

As the Sewalish affidavit makes clear, at the time of the

second notice Stroh was attempting to resolve the discharge

problems at point sources Nos. 1 and 3 by redirecting it through

a "waste treatment" system that ultimately discharged into point

source No. 4. (As the record and this decision reflects, Stroh did

resolve its violations at point sources Nos. 1 and 3.) Atlantic lists

a long series of violations since July 1, 1990, at point source No.

4. It highlights a letter dated May 29, 1990, from Stroh’s

manufacturing engineer Eric Silas to the MMSD indicating Stroh’s

failure to meet its deadline for start up of the wastewater treatment

system as evidence of Stroh’s inability to correct what was an

ongoing problem. Stroh concedes these violations in as much as

they are based on its own monitoring reports to the MMSD. All

of this was known to both parties. What is not known is whether

Stroh and the MMSD would have taken additional, different,

and/or quicker steps to resolve these problems at point source No.

4 had point source No. 4 specifically been mentioned in Atlantic’s

earlier notice (as was the case with point sources Nos. 1 and 3) or

in a subsequent notice.

Stroh and the MMSD should have been given that chance.

Atlantic had easy access to all the records of Stroh’s violations.

The imposition on Atlantic to give specific notice as to violations

at another point source and file an amended complaint was minimal

in light of the important goals that may have been achieved by that

notice (i.e., remedy of the violations and avoidance of a lawsuit.)

Like the Hallstrom plaintiff, Atlantic believes that such an

approach would compel "absurd or futile results." The reverse is

true. This approach, according to Hallstrom, strikes the

appropriate balance "between encouraging citizen enforcement of

environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal

courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits," Hallstrom, 493

U.S. at 29, since notice allows government agencies and alleged

violators to achieve compliance without the need for suit. Atlantic

could easily have preserved its claims at any time subsequent to the

deficient second notice by simply reviewing Stroh’s records,

putting them on a specific notice as to point source No. 4, and

filing an amended complaint. Because it did not do so, its claim

as to point source/outfall No. 4 cannot be considered by the Court

and must be dismissed.

NOW, THEREFORE, BASED ON THE FOREGOING,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

S Stroh’s motion for summary judgment is

GRANTED.

2. Case No. 89-C-100 is DISMISSED.

Dated at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, this 22nd day of March,

1996.

SO ORDERED,

HON. RUDOLPH T. RANDA

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

A-14

APPENDIX B

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2063

ATLANTIC STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, _INC.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

STROH DIE CASTING CO.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Wisconsin

No. 89-C-100 -- Rudolph T. Randa, Judge

Argued Oct. 21, 1996.

Decided June 17, 1997.

Before MANION, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS, Circuit

Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

Although this environmental case has been pending since

1989, during most of its life it has languished in the court. In the

meantime, not surprisingly, the conditions about which the citizen

plaintiffs originally complained have changed, perhaps

substantially. It began when the Atlantic States Legal Foundation

filed it as a citizen suit under the Federal Water Pollution Control

B-1

Act (or Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. § 1365, seeking relief for

past violations of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

(NPDES) permits by the Stroh Die Casting Company in

Milwaukee. Believing the statutory notice that Atlantic provided

to Stroh insufficient to encompass its complaint about the principal

point source at issue here, and further finding that no reasonable

jury could conclude that Stroh was an "intermittent or continuous"

violator with respect to the two other point sources Atlantic

identifies, the district court granted Stroh’s motion for summary

judgment and dismissed Atlantic’s suit. In our view, the district

court read Atlantic’s notice too narrowly. Furthermore, its

conclusion that at the time the suit was filed Stroh was not at least

an intermittent violator for one of the contested outfalls is

inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Gwaltney of

Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 108

S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). We therefore reverse and

remand.

I

Stroh produces zinc and aluminum castings at its

Milwaukee plant. In the course of its operations, it discharges

industrial wastewater through various outfalls to sanitary or

municipal sewers run by the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage

District (MMSD), which eventually empty into Lake Michigan.

It also discharges "non-contact cooling water," which is heated tap

water, through storm sewers regulated by the Wisconsin

Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) into the Bluemound

tributary of the Menomonee River. As of November 1988, Stroh

had a WDNR permit that allowed it to discharge the "non-contact

cooling water" into the Bluemound, but it had no permit at all to

discharge zinc- and phenol-contaminated industrial wastewater into

the MMSD sanitary sewerage system.

This prompted Atlantic, an environmental organization

with Wisconsin members, to send a letter on November 8, 1988

giving Stroh notice of violations of its WDNR discharge permit.

B-2

~s Vey

(Despite the implication from its name that Atlantic had little

connection with the Great Lakes, the complaint alleged that

members of Atlantic resided in Wisconsin, in the vicinity of Lake

Michigan, or they owned property or used Lake Michigan for

recreational purposes, and thus were affected by Stroh’s discharge

of pollutants into the Lake. Stroh did not challenge Atlantic’s

standing to sue in any of its motions for summary judgment.)

Under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b), Atlantic had to give Stroh notice at

least 60 days prior to suing it for those violations. The November

1988 notice alleged that Stroh had several times exceeded the daily

maximum discharge limits for oil, grease, and biological oxygen

demand 5 (BODS) allowed under the WDNR permit for WONR

outfalls (discharge points) 1 and 3. On January 23, 1989, Atlantic

filed a complaint against Stroh based on the November 1988

notice. Stroh moved shortly thereafter to dismiss Atlantic’s claims

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that it was not "in

violation" of the statute at the time of suit, because it was neither

a continuous nor an intermittent violator as required by Gwaltney.

Rather than submitting a brief in opposition to Stroh’s

motion to dismiss, Atlantic chose on April 13, 1989, to send Stroh

a second 60-day notice of intent to sue. The April 1989 notice

alleged that Stroh had exceeded its maximums for zinc, phenol, oil

and grease on several occasions at WDNR outfall 3. The April

notice also alleged that Stroh had been discharging die casting

process wastewater to the MMSD sanitary sewers since October

31, 1988, without a pretreatment discharge permit and in violation

of the categorical standards of 40 CFR Chapter 464. It itemized

certain specific violations at MMSD outfall 3 (not to be confused

with the WDNR storm sewer outfall 3 that was the subject of the

first notice) and accused Stroh of a “history of effluent standard

violations." Stroh’s own records, the notice claimed, showed that

its discharges were not in compliance as of January 31, 1989, and

that compliance was not expected until January 10, 1990. It

concluded that "[sJuch violations are known to the Discharger and

may be included in future legal actions by Notifier."

ee

Stroh responded by obtaining an MMSD permit on July

28, 1989, that authorized it to discharge die casting wastewater to

MMSD sewers through Stroh’s Abcor treatment unit. At this

point, the designation of outfalls becomes somewhat confusing,

because the MMSD outfalls defined under the July 1989 permit

were different from the identically numbered outfalls covered by

the WDNR discharge permit described in Atlantic’s November

1988 notice. Stroh’s MMSD permit defined the following outfalls:

MMSD Outfalls 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3: handled discharges

from the parts washer conversion coating, a three-stage

washer that discharged each tank separately

MMSD Outfall 2: handled domestic waste only, unlimit

ed under the MMSD permit

MMSD Outfall 3: handled discharge from the Abcor un

it, which treated waste from die casting, mold cooling

leakage, casting quench, and machining

MMSD Outfalls 4.0, 4.1, and 4.2: 4.0 was the sump pit

through which wastewater from the parts washer and the

deburring operation were directed; 4.1 and 4.2 were the

batch discharges from the two-stage parts washer

MMSD Outfall 5: handled cooling water only, unlimite

d under the MMSD permit

Stroh’s MMSD monitoring summary showed that it was

not able consistently to meet the discharge limitations for zinc that

applied to MMSD outfall 3, as violations occurred in June 1989

and October 1989.

Meanwhile, back in the district court, nothing was

happening with the lawsuit. On the assumption that the case had

been settled, the district court entered an order dismissing

Atlantic’s suit without prejudice on November 14, 1989, noting

that it had not filed a brief responding to Stroh’s motion to dismiss

and had thus waived the right to do so under the court’s local

rules. Six months later, on May 7, 1990, Atlantic filed an amended

complaint, which the district court accepted, reopening the case on

B-4

May 8, 1990. Stroh moved to vacate the order reopening the case

and to dismiss Atlantic’s amended complaint, but the court took no

action on the motion for two years. On April 16, 1992, Judge

Warren, before whom the case had been pending, denied Stroh’s

motions. Later in 1992, both parties filed motions for summary

judgment. Another four years passed, by which time the case had

been transferred to Judge Randa. On March 22, 1996, he granted

Stroh’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the amended

complaint and denied Atlantic’s motion. This time, final judgment

was entered on the order of dismissal on March 26, 1996 and this

appeal followed.

Time was not standing still between 1990 and 1996,

however, even if the case was. On May 29, 1990, shortly after

Atlantic filed its amended complaint, Stroh wrote to the MMSD

explaining why it had failed to meet the April 10, 1990, deadline

for starting up its wastewater treatment system. It conceded that

it was not in compliance with the MMSD permit at that time, but

it expressed the hope that the new system would cure the problem.

Then, on July 1, 1990, something reminiscent of the game of

hiding a pea under one of several cups occurred. On that date,

Stroh abandoned existing MMSD outfall 3 (which was the outfall

mentioned in the April 1989 notice and the MMSD permit) and re-

routed its industrial process wastewater to "outfall 4," necessitating

the issuance of a modified MMSD permit in October 1990 to

reflect the changes. The new outfall 4 was not the same outfall 4

that the July 1989 MMSD permit had described, however. Recall

that the July 1989 MMSD permit labeled “outfalls 4.0, 4.1, and

4.2" as the sump pump from the parts washer and deburring

operations and the batch discharges from the parts washer itself.

By contrast, the October 1990 modified MMSD permit

retroactively relabeled “outfall 4" as the sampling station located

downstream of Stroh’s pretreatment system. The discharge from

the Abcor unit, which had formerly gone through MMSD outfall

3, was rerouted first through the new (but as yet inoperative)

wastewater treatment system, where the zinc and phenols were to

B-5

be removed, and then it was to be piped to the new, single MMSD

outfall 4.

Samples taken from the new outfall 4 in July 1990 showed

continued violations of effluent standards for zinc, lead, and

phenols. MMSD issued notices of noncompliance to Stroh relating

to discharges from the new outfall 4 in October 1990, November

1990, January 1991, and June 1991. MMSD then published a

notice in the Milwaukee Journal on March 29, 1992, which listed

Stroh as one of 15 industrial users that were in significant

noncompliance with applicable effluent discharge standards during

1991.

Last, returning to the WDNR storm sewer system, Atlantic

presented evidence indicating that Stroh continued to discharge

nonprocessed water into the Bluemound tributary in violation of its

WDNR permit. A Discharge Monitoring Report, whose accuracy

Stroh contests, was received by the WDNR on April 16, 1992, in

which Stroh reported discharging 11 milligrams per liter of oil and

grease at WDNR storm sewer outfall 3 on February 6, 1992,

which was | milligram over the per liter daily maximum allowed

under its permit. Based on this contested evidence, Atlantic claims

that the district court should not have dismissed its claims relating

to WDNR outfalls 1 and 3.

II

Although the facts are somewhat complicated (made more

so by the proliferation of outfalls that seem to have the same

number until one takes a more careful look), the legal questions in

this case are fairly straightforward. The first and most important

question is whether Atlantic’s April 1989 notice satisfied the

jurisdictional prerequisite imposed by the Clean Water Act, 33

U.S.C. § 1365(b), for Atlantic’s citizen suit about industrial

discharges into the MMSD system. Within that general issue are

three subsidiary points: first, was Atlantic’s April 1989 notice

specific enough about the alleged violation to encompass its claims

B-6

atk,

eb he eth, nan scetnllly

about what eventually became new outfall 4; second, was Stroh

at the time suit was brought a “continuing or intermittent” violator

of the Act such that Atlantic would then have been entitled to an

injunction; and third, what is the effect, if any, of the long delay

between the November 1989 dismissal without prejudice (on which

no Rule 58 final judgment was ever entered) and the district

court’s discretionary decision to accept the filing of the amended

complaint in May 1990? The final question relates to the district

court’s decision to grant summary judgment on Atlantic’s claims

relating to WDNR outfalls 1 and 3. On these claims, Stroh

concedes that Atlantic’s notice was adequate to confer subject

matter jurisdiction, but it persuaded the district court that Atlantic

had not presented enough evidence of violations to survive

summary judgment.

A. The MMSD Claims

The Clean Water Act allows private citizens to sue any

person “alleged to be in violation" of the conditions of an effluent

standard or limitation under the Act or of an order issued with

respect to such a standard or limitation by the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or a state. See 33

U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). It is unlawful to discharge pollutants without

any permit, see 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Rueth v. United States

E.P.A., 13 F.3d 227, 229 (7th Cir. 1993); Hoffman Homes, Inc.

v. Administrator, United States E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256, 260 (7th

Cir. 1993), just as it is unlawful to discharge pollutants in violation

of the terms of an existing NPDES permit, see 33 U.S.C. §

1342(a); see generally Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U-S. 91, 105,

112 S.Ct. 1046, 1056, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992) (outlining federal

and state permitting scheme). Citizens may not bring suit,

however, unless and until they have given 60 days’ notice of their

intent to sue to the alleged violator (as well as to the Administrator

and the state). 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The purpose of this

notice requirement, the Supreme Court explained in Gwaltney, "is

to give [the alleged violator] an opportunity to bring itself into

compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a

B-7

citizen suit." 484 U.S. at 60, 108 S.Ct. at 383. See also Citizens

for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242 (7th

Cir. 1996) (explaining Gwaltney ), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 117

S.Ct. 1079, 137 L.Ed.2d 214 (1997). EPA regulations give

further guidance on the contents of the notice, at 40 CFR §

135.3(a):

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent

standard or limitation or of an order with respect thereto

, Shall include sufficient information to permit the recipi

ent to identify the specific standard, limitation, or order

alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons

responsible for the alleged violation, the date or dates of

such violation, and the full name, address, and telephone

number of the person giving notice.

In practical terms, the notice must be sufficiently specific

to inform the alleged violator about what it is doing wrong, so that

it will know what corrective actions will avert a lawsuit.

In this case, Atlantic claims that its April 1989 notice

clearly informed Stroh that it was complaining about Stroh’s

unauthorized discharges of die casting process wastewater to the

MMSD sewers. The fact that Stroh later (1) obtained a permit

covering those discharges from outfall 3, and then (2) re-routed the

discharges to the newly defined outfall 4 after it built its treatment

facility, does not change the adequacy of the original notice.

Indeed, if anything it suggests that Stroh knew exactly what

Atlantic was concerned about and it was actively taking steps to

address the matter. Stroh, for its part, argues that the April 1989

notice specifically mentioned MMSD outfall 3, which had been

closed down by the time the amended complaint (which was the

first one to raise claims about discharges into the MMSD system)

was filed in April 1990. Since Stroh had never received any-notice

mentioning new MMSD outfall 4 as a noncomplying "point

source" for purposes of the Act, it reasons that Atlantic failed to

meet the jurisdictional threshold for a citizen suit.

B-8

The premise of Stroh’s argument is that the §1365(b)(1)(A)

notice must specifically identify the point source from which the

allegedly offending discharge is emerging before the Act’s

jurisdictional requirements will be met. It relies on Hallstrom v.

Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 110 S.Ct. 304, 107 L.Ed.2d 237

(1989), for this proposition, which held that compliance with the

60-day notice provision of the Act is a mandatory precondition to

suit that cannot be disregarded by the district court. Hallstrom,

however, said nothing about the content of the notice. It was

undisputed that the plaintiffs there had given no notice at all to

either Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality or the

Administrator of the EPA, both of whom are clearly entitled to

notice under the statute. Stroh’s claim here is not that Atlantic

failed to send its notice to one of the parties entitled to receive it;

it is instead that the April 1989 notice was not specific enough to

alert it to the claimed violation, and thus for purposes of new

MMSD outfall 4 it was the equivalent of no notice at all.

With respect to content, Stroh argues that nothing less than

a specific identification of the offending outfall would have

sufficed. It finds support for this proposition in the Third Circuit’s

decision in Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. Vv.

Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir.1995), which held that a

citizen plaintiff's initial notice of discharge violations was broad

enough to encompass additional discharge violations and

monitoring, reporting and record keeping violations occurring after

the date of the notice letter. The claims, however, would have to

be of the same "type” for this rule to hold, as the court explained:

[W]e hold that a notice letter which includes a list of

discharge violations, by parameter, provides sufficient

information for the recipients of the notice to identify

violations of the same type (same parameter, same outfall)

occurring during and after the period covered by the notice

letter.

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50 F.3d at 1250. The court went on to say that the citizen’s

burden was "to provide sufficient information of a violation, such

as an excessive discharge, so that the permit holder and the agency

can identify it." Id. at 1252. If subsequent investigation reveals

a violation, then the court found that " *complete compliance’

should incorporate the correction of all such interconnected

violations." Id.

We do not read the Third Circuit as establishing an

inflexible rule that would require outfall-by-outfall notice in all

cases. It was not faced with a case where the alleged polluter,

upon receiving a notice about one offending outfall, simply

redirected the stream of contaminated water to another outfall.

The key to notice is to give the accused company the opportunity

to correct the problem. Here, there is no question that Atlantic’s

April 1989 notice sufficiently informed Stroh about Atlantic’s

claim that its handling of the die casting wastewater did not comply

with the statute. Stroh promptly secured a permit that covered

exactly these discharges, under the outfall numbered 3 in the first

MMSD permit. It began construction of a treatment facility,

which it compieted in June of 1990 (at least a month after the

amended complaint was filed). It then re-routed the very same die

casting wastewater to its newly numbered outfall 4. Moreover, it

admitted in its May 29, 1990 letter to the MMSD that it was not

in compliance and attempted to explain why it missed its deadline

for its wastewater treatment system. These are not the actions of

a company that has not received enough information for purposes

of the statutory notice provisions of the Act. Nothing in the statute

says that plaintiffs must refrain from filing suit when the company

is attempting to take corrective action. Even though Atlantic did

not file its amended complaint until well after the expiration of the

minimum 60-day statutory waiting period (and thus eleven months

after it could have sued), we find that the April 1989 notice

satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of the statute.

Even if the notice was broad enough in scope and was

timely, a second requirement for citizen suits is that the defendant

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must be “in violation" of a relevant standard, limitation, or order.

In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court held that "[tJhe most natural

reading of ‘to be in violation’ is a requirement that

citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent

violation-that is, a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will

continue to violate in the future." 484 U.S. at 57, 108 S.Ct. at

381. The Court held that this language precluded the possibility

of a citizen suit based on a wholly past violation; instead, the

plaintiff must allege that the violations are ongoing at the time suit

is brought. Justice Scalia would have gone further on the latter

point and would have required the plaintiff to substantiate an

allegation of an ongoing violation, if the point was contested. See

Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69, 108 S.Ct. at 387. He agreed, however,

that "[a] good or lucky day is not a state of compliance. Nor is

the dubious state in which a past effluent problem is not recurring

at the moment but the cause of that problem has not been

completely and clearly eradicated." Id. Furthermore, he noted,

without contradiction from the majority, that "it does not suffice

to defeat subject-matter jurisdiction that the success of the

attempted remedies becomes clear months or even weeks after the

suit is filed." Id.

If the violation is cured at some point while the suit is

pending, which for all we know may have occurred in this case,

the case nevertheless does not become moot. It may be possible

that the citizen plaintiffs would lose their right to an injunction, if,

as the Gwaltney majority put it, "it is ‘absolutely clear’ that the

allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to

recur." (Emphasis in original; quoting from United States v.

Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89

S.Ct. 361, 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968).) In addition to injunctive

relief, however, the statute provides for civil penalties under 33

U.S.C. § 1319(d), which would be recoverable for any time period

in which Stroh was found to be in violation. Thus, if Atlantic

adequately alleged that Stroh was either a continuous OF

intermittent violator at the time of suit--which we again take to be

the date of the amended complaint--it has satisfied this prerequisite

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for suit as well. Accord Atlantic States Legal Foundation Inc. v.

Tyson Foods Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1135 (11th Cir. 1990).

Looking only at the allegations, which would be pertinent

to a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), it is easy to conclude

that Atlantic adequately alleged that Stroh was "in violation" of the

Act in the sense that Gwaltney used the term. For purposes of

summary judgment, though, we think that the question whether the

defendant was in violation at the time of the suit is one of fact. In

keeping with the majority’s decision in the Supreme Court to

require the plaintiff only to allege in good faith the present nature

of the violation, the Fifth Circuit has concluded that the burden of

coming forward with evidence to show that the plaintiff's

allegation is false rests on the defendant at the summary judgment

stage. See Carr v. Alta Verde Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055 (Sth

Cir.1991). At the trial, of course, the burden of proving the

ultimate violation rests on the plaintiff, because at that point the

violation is an element of the substantive case rather than a

jurisdictional hurdle.

We think the Fifth Circuit’s approach sensibly

accommodates the Gwaltney holding and the nature of summary

judgment practice. Here, Stroh made no showing that Atlantic’s

allegations of the violations in connection with its discharges of die

casting wastewater were not made in good faith, and it is clear that

if the notice encompasses new outfall 4, the violation had certainly

not ceased by the time the amended complaint was filed.

This leaves only the effect of the various delays in this

proceeding on Atlantic’s ability now to proceed with its suit. As

we noted above, the delay has not made the case moot. Stroh

realizes that the district court had discretion to consider whether to

accept the filing of the amended complaint six months after it had

dismissed the original complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a); Otis

v. City of Chicago, 29 F.3d 1159, 1163 (7th Cir.1994). Bearing

in mind both the breadth of that discretion and the fact that Stroh

itself could have moved at any point after the November 14, 1989,

B-12

order of dismissal for entry of a Rule 58 final judgment (but did

not), we are not inclined to second-guess the district court’s

handling of the case. The greater part of the delay occurred

between the filing of the new motions for summary judgment in

1992 and the new district judge’s ruling in 1996. While this is

certainly regrettable, Atlantic is no more responsible for this

desuetude than Stroh (or the court). We therefore conclude that

Atlantic is entitled to go forward on its claims relating to the

discharges of die casting wastewater into the MMSD sewerage

system.

B. The WDNR Claims

The district court dismissed Atlantic’s claim relating to

discharges at WDNR outfalls 1 and 3 because it found that a

laboratory letter reporting that too much oil and grease had been

discharged at outfall 3 in February 1992 was based on a faulty test.

Stroh alleged that the sample result was in error, claiming that its

Discharge Monitoring Report on which the excess discharge was

reported had also contained the following notation: “Note:

Attached lab report shows lab process error. " No such report was

ever found in WDNR’s files. Stroh then submitted a letter dated

May 13, 1992, from the laboratory that performed the test, which

said:

As part of the method, an oil standard of known

concentration is analyzed along with the samples to

determine the accuracy of the analyses. The standard th

at was run on February 27 had a recovery of 50%. This

is below our acceptance level. This could indicate that

there was a problem with the O & G analyses that day,

meaning that the results for your two samples tested that

day may not be accurate.

Taking both the May letter and the lab report into account,

the district court concluded that Atlantic had not met its summary

judgment burden of coming forward with evidence to show that

Stroh was indeed a continuing or intermittent violator of the

WDNR permit covering WDNR outfalls 1 and 3.

We note initially that the record appears to be devoid of

any evidence from Atlantic that relates to WDNR outfall 1. The

district court therefore correctly dismissed Atlantic’s claims

relating to that outfall from the case. With respect to WDNR

outfall 3, the case is much closer. On the one hand, as Atlantic

points out, the lab letter, taken in the light most favorable to

Atlantic, implies that the flaw in the data led to an under-reporting

of the actual levels of oil and grease, not to an excessive report.

From that perspective, Stroh may have exceeded its permissible

limits by 2 or 3 milligrams, rather than the 1 milligram that the lab

found. On the other hand, Atlantic does not direct us to any other

evidence in the record that suggests either continuous or

intermittent violations at WDNR outfall 3. We must therefore

decide whether the lab report, taken alone, is enough to defeat

Stroh’s motion for summary judgment.

Bearing in mind both the court’s obligation on summary

judgment to view the facts in the light most favorable to the party

opposing the motion, and the legal requirement for the company

to show that it had "clearly achieved the effect of curing all past

violations by the time suit was brought,” Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at

69-70, 108 S.Ct. at 388 (Scalia, J., concurring), we think Atlantic

should have been entitled to proceed on its claims regarding

WDNR outfall 3. If Stroh discharged excess oil and grease into

the Bluemound tributary on one occasion after the date of the suit,

a finder of fact could infer that Stroh had not fully cured all past

violations by the time suit was brought. It is unclear how much

relief this will bring for Atlantic, if the provable violations are so

sparse, but that goes to the merits of the suit, not to the

jurisdictional threshold.

We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of

Atlantic’s claims with respect to WDNR outfall 1, and we

REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings with respect to

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WDNR outfall 3 and the claims regarding the die casting

wastewater that was routed to new MMSD outfall 4. Each party

is to bear its own costs on appeal.

MANION, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting

in part.

Although I agree that the dismissal of Atlantic’s claims

with respect to WDNR outfall | should be affirmed, I do not

concur with the court’s reversal of the district court’s dismissal of

claims with respect to outfall 3. In my opinion the court reads the

notice and continuing violator requirements of the Clean Water

Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 et seq., too broadly. Accordingly, I would

affirm the district court’s dismissal of Atlantic’s claims in total.

I.

Stroh Die Casting Company manufactures zinc and

aluminum castings in its Milwaukee, Wisconsin plant. The

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources ("WDNR") has issued

Stroh permits to discharge industrial wastewater through various

outfalls into storm sewers which flow into Lake Michigan.

The Clean Water Act enables citizens to seek injunctive

relief, civil penalties, and forfeitures (as well as attorneys’ fees) if

violations of the Act are proved. Atlantic States Legal Foundation

claims that Stroh violated the Act. Ina November 8, 1988 letter

from its law firm, Atlantic gave Stroh notice of its intent to sue in

60 days for certain purported violations of the Act, as 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(b) requires Atlantic to do. In that notice, Atlantic alleged

that Stroh had exceeded the daily maximum discharge limits for

oil, grease, and "biological oxygen demand 5" allowed under the

WDNR permit for WDNR outfalls 1 and 3. Nearly 3 months

later, Atlantic filed suit against Stroh based on the notice.

Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Stroh moved to dismiss

Atlantic’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing

that Atlantic could not satisfy the requirements for a citizen suit

B-15

under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) because any violations of the Act

occurred in the past; Atlantic had failed to allege a state of

continuing pollution, an impediment to recovery under the Act

after Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 57,

64, 108 S.Ct. 376, 381, 385, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987).

Rather than opposing Stroh’s motion to dismiss, on April

13, 1989, again in a letter from its law firm, Atlantic sent Stroh a

second 60-day notice of intent to sue. That letter alleged Stroh had

exceeded the maximum allowances for zinc, total phenol, and

again for oil and grease, as well as that Stroh discharged diecasting

wastewater into Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewerage District

("MMSD") sewers without a permit. As a location for this

discharge, the second notice mentions only "outfall 003"; the

parties agree this refers to MMSD outfall 3. Three months later,

the MMSD did issue Stroh an industrial wastewater discharge

permit which defined five separate outfalls and set their effluent

limitations. Under that permit, Stroh continued to discharge its

industrial wastewater through MMSD outfalls 1, 3, and 4. After

July 1989, these outfalls were monitored, tested, and reported to

the MMSD.

Because Atlantic never responded to Stroh’s motion to

dismiss and thus had waived the right to do so, the district court

dismissed Atlantic’s suit without prejudice on November 14, 1989.

Over six months later, on May 7, 1990, Atlantic filed an amended

complaint alleging the same violations noticed in the April 13,

1989 letter. The district court accepted the filing, reopening this

case.

In the meantime, Stroh had been designing and installing

a new wastewater treatment system for its plant. In May 1990,

Stroh wrote the MMSD explaining that it had failed to comply with

an April 10, 1990 deadline for completing the new system because

of a personnel difficulty, late delivery of the new system from the

manufacturer, and installation problems. In June 1990, Stroh

completed the installation of the new system, which combined the

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wastewater previously discharged at MMSD outfalls 1 and 3 with

that discharged at MMSD outfall 4, pumped it through an

ultrafiltration unit to extract all grease and oil, then through a

pretreatment system, and then discharged the water only from

MMSD outfall 4. MMSD outfalls 1 and 3 were later used for

expelling waste and water not limited by the permit.

On October 23, 1990, the MMSD issued Stroh a new

discharge permit which reflected the new outfalls and new

treatment system. The last reported exceedence at WDNR outfall

3 occurred on February 27, 1990, although a February 2, 1992

laboratory test revealed that Stroh had exceeded the 10 milligrams

per liter level for oil and grease at that outfall by 1 milligram.

Stroh challenged the accuracy of that test, submitting a March

1992 letter in which the laboratory admitted that their oil

measurements were off by 50% that day. Atlantic responded that

the lab’s admitted error could only cut in its favor-- that the flaw

in the data would have led to under-, not over-reporting.

When Atlantic filed the amended complaint and the district

court reopened the case, Stroh moved to vacate the court’s ruling

to reopen. The district court denied that motion, and the parties

filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court

granted Stroh’s summary judgment motion, denied Atlantic’s, and

dismissed Atlantic’s amended complaint.

Il.

The court first concludes that the April 1989 (second)

notice to Stroh satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of 33

U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). I agree with the district court that

Atlantic failed to fulfill the statutory condition precedent by

notifying the proper parties, including Stroh, of any alleged

violations at MMSD outfall 4, and therefore that any such

violations are beyond the scope of this suit.

ere eiaiiiiiiieiiamienaiaan

The court concludes that "there is no question that

Atlantic’s April 1989 notice sufficiently informed Stroh about

Atlantic’s claim that its handling of the die casting wastewater did

not comply with the statute." Ante at p. 820. It so concludes by

examining Stroh’s post-complaint actions: securing a permit that

covered the discharges, constructing a new wastewater treatment

facility, re-routing the diecasting wastewater to newly numbered

outfall 4, and admitting it was not in compliance in its May 1990

letter to the MMSD. Id. The court surmises that "these are not the

actions of a company that has not received enough information for

purposes of the statutory notice provisions of the Act." Ante at p.

820. But "[t]he mere chronological sequence of events does not

establish a causal connection." Brennan v. United Steelworkers of

America, 554 F.2d 586, 614 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).

It is undisputed that Atlantic’s first notice of intent to sue

on November 8, 1988 did not mention discharge into the MMSD,

and that the second notice on April 13, 1989 mentions only

MMSD outfall 3, not MMSD outfall 4. The April 13th letter

refers to discharges of "process water into Lake Michigan via the

[MMSD]" and that Stroh "has violated and continues to violate an

‘effluent standard or limitation’ by discharging die casting process

wastewater to MMSD without a pretreatment discharge permit."

The letter then lists six specific examples of exceedences, each

emitting from what the parties do not dispute is MMSD outfall 3.

But Atlantic notified Stroh of this information when Stroh was

correcting discharges from MMSD outfalls 1 and 3, not MMSD

outfall 4. And Atlantic had easy access to all records of Stroh’s

emissions, but made no mention of MMSD outfall 4 in this second

notice, while specifically mentioning MMSD outfall 3. After

specifically noticing only violations at outfall 3, it is wrong to

include in this suit alleged violations at MMSD outfall 4 without

notice to Stroh.

The Third Circuit more properly handled a situation similar

to this. In Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.

Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239 (3d Cir.1995), citizen plaintiffs sent

B-18

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out a notice of an intent to sue listing 68 discharges which

allegedly occurred in violation of Hercules’ permits. Id. at 1243.

As in this case, the district court held that pre- complaint discharge

violations not included in the plaintiffs’ notice letter could not be

included in the suit unless listed in a subsequent notice, and

granted the defendant summary judgment. Id. at 1250. The Third

Circuit reversed this holding, concluding that

a notice letter which includes a list of discharge

violations, by parameter, provides sufficient

information for the recipients of the notice to

identify violations of the same type (same

parameter, same outfall) occurring during and after

the period covered by the notice letter.

Id. (emphasis supplied). The Hercules decision supplies a

workable, bright-line rule to apply in cases such as this: violations

"which are of the same type (same parameter, same outfall) as the

alleged violations included in the plaintiffs’ 60-day notice letter,"

id., should be deemed properly noticed.

In attempting to distinguish Hercules, my colleagues assert

the Third Circuit "was not faced with a case where the alleged

polluter, upon receiving a notice about one offending outfall,

simply redirected the stream of contaminated water to another

outfall." Ante at p. 820. But the record does not support the

metaphor that Stroh played a shell game with the regulatory

authorities (and Atlantic) by constructing the new wastewater

treatment. Although Stroh’s new system was installed in June

1990, three weeks after the amended complaint, it was designed

from late 1989 to early 1990. During that time period only the

original complaint was on file, which had been dismissed for, in

effect, failure to prosecute. That complaint was based on the first

notice to sue, which concerned solely WDNR outfalls 1 and 3.

Further, the April 1989 notice made no mention of MMSD outfall

4. The installation of highly technical wastewater treatment

equipment cost Stroh hundreds of thousands of dollars and was

B-19

implemented on a schedule closely monitored by the MMSD. Its

purpose was to consolidate, update, and improve Stroh’s treatment

of wastewater. Stroh met with sewerage district officials

concerning the two month delay in installing the new system, and

explained the reasons for the delay in writing. To treat all of its

wastewater through the new system, Stroh combined the three

existing streams (which previously had been discharged at MMSD

outfalls 1, 3, and 4) and routed them through its new system, with

the treated water then discharged at new MMSD outfall 4. All of

these facts lead to the conclusion that Stroh methodically and

effectively addressed the problem, not that it hid the pea.

It is undisputed that MMSD outfall 4 was not a new outfall

through which Stroh creatively re-routed wastewater to discharge.

Stroh -had operated MMSD outfall 4 as a separate and distinct

outfall since July 1989, and it had separate effluent limitations

since the original MMSD permit. Because reports from MMSD

outfall 4 were available from July 1989 onward, Atlantic had

access to the information necessary to provide Stroh, the EPA, and

the WDNR with an appropriate notice of intent to sue for any

violations at MMSD outfall 4. Atlantic did not do so. As the

Supreme Court stated in Gwaltney, "the purpose of a notice to the

alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into

complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render

unnecessary a citizen suit." 484 U.S. at 60, 108 S.Ct. at 383.

For a notice to fulfill its function, the violator must be told what

the pollution is and where it occurred. This court should not

rewrite the second notice on Atlantic’s behalf to encompass

information it had the opportunity to but did not include.

The consequence of the court’s expansive reading could be

catch-all notices sent to companies which, if construed broadly as

the court has done here, would encompass any violation, past or

future. This, of course, would undermine the dual purposes of the

notice requirement: to provide governmental entities with the

opportunity to begin an enforcement action before the citizen suit

is filed, and to provide the alieged violator with enough

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information to be able to bring itself into compliance. See

Hercules, 50 F.3d at 1249. In Hercules, the Third Circuit judged

the sufficiency of the 60-day notice letter by “whether it

accomplishes these purposes." Id. Because the April 13, 1989

notice letter in this case could not have given the EPA, the

WDNR, or Stroh notice of a lack of compliance at MMSD outfall

4, this court should exclude from this suit any violations Atlantic

alleges occurred there.

Il.

Even if proper notice is given, the Clean Water Act only

permits a citizen to bring a civil action if a person is "in violation"

of a relevant standard, limitation, or order. 33 U.S.C. §

1365(a)(1)(A). If the person charged is not "in violation,” the

plaintiff does not have standing under the Act. In Gwaltney, the

Supreme Court set forth a test for standing under the Act: a

plaintiff must make a "good-faith allegation of continuous or

intermittent violation." 484 U.S. at 64, 108 S.Ct. at 385. This

means that a citizen plaintiff does not have standing to maintain a

suit for civil penalties for wholly past violations of the act.' Thus,

for purposes of federal subject matter jurisdiction, citizen plaintiffs

are required to show “a reasonable likelihood that a past polluter

will continue to pollute in the future." Id. at 57, 108 S.Ct. at 381.

Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor, concurred

in Gwaltney on exactly this issue. Id. at 67, 108 S.Ct. at 386-87.

To them, standing should not turn on the plaintiff's good faith, but

on the objective fact of whether the defendant was "in violation."

Id. at 69, 108 S.Ct. at 387-88.

. This court clearly recognized this in Citizens for a Better Environment

v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir.1996). That case discussed how the Supreme

Court in Gwaltney interpreted the present tense language of the Clean Water Act

io bar suits for past violations, and how such suits would render the Act’s

statutory notice provision meaningless. Id. at 1242-43.

B-21

On remand in Gwaltney, the Fourth Circuit held that a

citizen plaintiff may prove an ongoing violation in one of two

ways:

either (1) by proving violations that continue on or after

the date the complaint is filed, or (2) by adducing eviden

ce from which a reasonable trier of fact could find a

continuing likelihood of the recurrence in intermittent or

sporadic violations. Intermittent or sporadic violations d

O not cease to be ongoing until the date when there is no

real likelihood of repetition. . . .

890 F.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir.1989). "[E]very court thus far to

consider this question" has adopted this test. Carr v. Alta Verde

Indus., Inc., 931 F.2d 1055, 1062 (Sth Cir.1991).

The court decides that this case presents a fact question as

to whether Stroh was "in violation" at the time of the suit (which

I agree is the date of the amended complaint, May 7, 1990). It

adopts the approach from Carr that "the defendant has the burden

at the summary judgment stage to demonstrate that the plaintiff's

allegations of a continuous or intermittent violation do not raise a

genuine issue of material fact." 931 F.2d at 1062. The court has

inserted a new "fact." Because "the [April 1989] notice

encompasses new outfall 4, the violation had certainly not ceased

by the time the amended complaint was filed." Ante at p. 821.

Because no violations at MMSD outfall 4 were properly

noticed, this court should not conclude that any post-complaint

exceedences at outfall 4 qualify Stroh as a continuing violator.

Further, if Atlantic’s second notice is given its proper scope not to

include any exceedences at MMSD outfall 4, Atlantic does not

have standing to bring this suit.

It is undisputed that the last permit exceedence at WDNR

outfall 1 occurred in November 1986, 3+ years before Atlantic

filed its amended complaint. At MMSD outfall 3, there has not

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been a permit exceedence since June 1990, and there can be none,

for since that date that outfall has been used to expel _non- contact

cooling water, not wastewater. Stroh’s new wastewater treatment

system has been permanently connected and all industrial process

wastewater previously discharged at MMSD outfall 3 (which was

the subject of Atlantic’s April 13, 1989 notice) is discharged at

MMSD outfall 4.

Atlantic argues that there is one reported exceedence at

WDNR outfall 3 which was based on a faulty lab test, and that this

should preclude summary judgment. Even if Atlantic is correct

that any error in the lab test cuts in its favor, it has not met its

burden to show that Stroh was an "ongoing or intermittent

violator" at WDNR outfall 3. If those terms mean anything, they

require more than the single 1 mg per liter oil exceedence

identified by Atlantic. Only stretching “ongoing” and

"intermittent" beyond their breaking point could a court conclude

from a single, heavily disputed exceedence in February 1992 that

Stroh is currently "in violation" of the Clean Water Act. Cf.

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Yates Industries,

Inc., 757 F.Supp. 438, 447, modified on other grounds, 790

F.Supp. 511 (D.N.J.1991) (permit holder may avoid liability at

summary judgment if data in laboratory report presents direct

evidence of inaccuracies). Even if Atlantic is correct that there

was an exceedence in February 1992, according to the concurrence

in Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69, 108 S.Ct. at 387-88, Atlantic must

demonstrate that Stroh is in fact in violation of the Act. It should

take more than an admittedly faulty lab result to satisfy this

burden.

This case presents neither of the circumstances the Fourth

Circuit recognized on remand in Gwaltney would prove an ongoing

violation. It is undisputed that before Atlantic’s notices, there

were exceedences at WDNR outfall 3 and unauthorized discharge

of diecasting wastewater into sewers. Between the second notice

and the amended complaint, Stroh obtained a comprehensive and

demanding MMSD permit concerning its wastewater discharge.

B-23

It also designed and built at its own great expense an entirely new

MMSD wastewater processing facility which was put into place

less than a month after Atlantic filed the amended complaint.

Properly confining our review to noticed outfalls since the date of

the amended complaint, there was a single, disputed exceedence of

1 milligram of oil at one outfall, the finding for which was in an

admittedly erroneous lab report. These facts show Stroh "cleaned

up its act," and is not reasonably likely to pollute in the future.

The court’s expansive reading of the “in violation" requirement

places an unreasonable burden on the company. Under Gwaltney,

Stroh simply does not qualify as an "ongoing violator."

IV.

I concur that the dismissal of Atlantic’s claims with respect

to WDNR outfall 1 should be affirmed, but I would dismiss the

claim with regard to WDNR outfall 3 as well due to Atlantic’s lack

of standing.

For all of these reasons, I would affirm the opinion of the

district court in full.

P As the court recognizes, given that Stroh has had the new wastewater

treatment system in place since June 1990, what truly may be at issue in this case

is substantial attorneys’ fees.

B-24

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APPENDIX C

33 U.S.C. § 1365 provides, in relevant part:

Citizen Suits (a) Authorization; jurisdiction. Except as

provided in subsection (b) of this section and section 309(g)(6),

any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf --

(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any

other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent

permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is

alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation

under this Act or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a

State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or

(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of

the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which

is not discretionary with the Administrator.

The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the

amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce

such an effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to

order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case

may be, and to apply any oppo civil penalties under section

309(d) of this Act.

(b) Notice. No action may be commenced --

(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section --

(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the

alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which

the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the

standard, limitation, or order, or

(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently

prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United

States, or a State to require compliance with the standard,

limitation, or order, but in any such action in a court of the United

States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.

(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after

the plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,

C-1

except that such action may be brought immediately after such

notification in the case of an action under this section respecting a

violation of sections 306 and 307(a) of this Act. Notice under this

subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator shall

prescribe by regulation.

(d) Litigation costs. The court, in issuing any final order in any

action brought pursuant to this section may award costs of

litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to

any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the court

determines such award is appropriate. The court may, if a

temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is sought,

require the filing of a bond or equivalent security in accordance

with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

(f) Effluent standards or limitation. For purposes of this

section, the term "effluent standard or limitation under this Act"

means (1) effective July 1, 1973, an unlawful act under subsection

(a) of section 301 of this Act; (2) an effluent limitation or other

limitation under section 301 or 302 of this Act; (3) standard of

performance under section 306 of this Act; (4) prohibition, effluent

standard or pretreatment standards under section 307 of this Act;

(5) certification under section 401 of this Act; (6) a permit or

condition thereof issued under section 402 of this Act, which is in

effect under this Act (including a requirement applicable by reason

of section 313 of this Act); or (7) a regulation under section 405(d)

of this Act.

(g) Citizen. For the purposes of this section the term "citizen"

means a person or persons having an interest which is or may be

adversely affected.

40 C.F.R. § 135.3 provides:

Contents of notice. (a) Violation of standard, limitation or order.

Notice regarding an alleged violation of an effluent standard or

limitation or of an order with respect thereof, shall include

sufficient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific

standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated, the

activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons

responsible for the alleged violation, the location of the alleged

violation, the date or dates of such violation, and the full name,

address, and telephone number of the person giving notice.

(b) Failure to act. Notice regarding an alleged failure of the

Administrator to perform any act or duty under the Act which is

not discretionary with the Administrator shall identify the provision

of the Act which requires such act or creates such duty, shall

describe with reasonable specificity the action taken or not taken

by the Administrator which is alleged to constitute a failure to

perform such act or duty, and shall state the full name, address and

telephone number of the person giving the notice.

(c) Identification of counsel. The notice shall state the name,

address, and telephone number of the legal counsel, if any,

representing the person giving the notice.

C-3

LIST OF PARENT COMPANIES AND SUBSIDIARIES

The petitioner, Stroh Die Casting Co., Inc., pursuant to

Supreme Court Rule 29, states that it has no parent or subsidiary

companies.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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