Opposition Brief — Maier v. Environmental Protection Agency

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Supreme Court, U-S.

FILED

NOV 3 1997

No. 97-378 | co

In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

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PETER MAIER, ETAL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

SETH P. WAXMAN

Acting Solicitor General

Lois J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID A. CARSON

Attorney

Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

(202) 514-2217

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Environmental Protection Agency

acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner by re-

fusing to amend its secondary treatment regula-

tions for publicly owned treatment works under

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seq., to include

technology-based limitations on nitrogenous _bio-

chemical oxygen demand.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992) ............ 3

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

a a aoisepetiebieieaiaaiion 6, 7,8

E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S.

I oir eihidk Gace nial dicanamabatebacesnabsuaciansadevices 2

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources

Control Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976) ................. ae Si

Statutes and regulations:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1251 et seg. ................000 1-2

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I ao anheamininuhens 2

§ 301(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B) ......... 3, 7, 8, 9, 10

§ 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. 13811(b)U)(C) ........ ee. $, 5

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40 C.F.R.:

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Miscellaneous:

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IV

Miscellaneous—Continued: Page

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48 Fed. Reg. (1983):

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49 Fed. Reg. (1984):

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3

Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-378

PETER MAIER, ET AL., PETITIONERS

Vv.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE RESPONDENTS IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-

A52) is reported at 114 F.3d 1032.

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals entered its decision on May 28,

1997. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

August 26, 1997. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

STATEMENT

Petitioners Peter Maier, et al., petitioned the Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) to initiate a new

rulemaking to amend regulations that the agency had

issued under the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.

(1)

1251 et seq., governing secondary treatment for pub-

licly owned treatment works (40 C.F.R. Pt. 130). See

Pet. App. B1-B21. The EPA denied petitioners’ re-

quest. Jd. at C1-C30. Petitioners sought review of

that decision in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the agency’s deci-

sion. Jd. at Al-A52.

1. Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA)

to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical,

and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”

CWA § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. 1251(a). To achieve that goal,

the CWA makes the discharge of pollutants by any

person unlawful unless the discharge is in compliance

with the CWA and regulatory requirements. CWA

§ 301, 33 U.S.C. 1311. Those requirements include

effluent limitations, which are restrictions “on quan-

tities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physi-

cal, biological, and other constituents which are

discharged from point sources.” CWA § 502(11), 33

U.S.C. 1362(11). The CWA imposes permitting re-

quirements under a program known as the National

Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).

See CWA § 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342. NPDES permits

“transform generally applicable effluent limitations

and other standards—including those based on water

quality—into the obligations * * * of the individual

discharger.” EPA v. California ex rel. State Water

Resources Control Board, 426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).

See Pet. App. A2-A3. :

NPDES permits typically include technology-based

limitations, which represent the degree of control

that can be achieved by point sources using various

levels of pollution control technology. See CWA

§§ 301, 304, 33 U.S.C. 1311, 1314; E.L. du Pont de

Nemours & Co. v. Train, 480 U.S. 112, 126-136 (1977).

3

For publicly owned treatment works (POTWs), Sec-

tion 301(b)(1)(B) specifies the applicable technology-

based control standard as effluent limitations based

upon “secondary treatment.” 33 U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B).

The CWA does not define the term “secondary treat-

ment” and, instead, delegates that task to the EPA.

See CWA § 304(d)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1314(d)(1). The EPA

has published regulations to define “the degree of

effluent reduction attainable through the application

of secondary treatment.” Jbid.; see generally 40

C.F.R. Pt. 133. In addition to technology-based limi-

tations, NPDES permits, including those for POTWs,

typically require dischargers to comply with any

more stringent limitations, including those neces-

Sary to meet water quality standards established

by state law. See CWA §301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C.

1311(b)(1)(C); see also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503

U.S. 91, 100 (1992). See generally Pet. App. A3-A4.

The EPA promulgated secondary treatment regula-

tions in 1973, and it revised those regulations in 1976,

1977, 1984, and 1985." The EPA’s regulations describe

sewage treatment processes as “primary” or “secon-

dary” based on the pollutant and the associated re-

moval technology. 40 Fed. Reg. 34,522 (1975). As

a general matter, primary treatment removes pol-

lutants through liquid-solid separation techniques,

See 38 Fed. Reg. 22,298 (1973) (initial regulations); 41

Fed. Reg. 30,786 (1976) (deleting limitation on fecal coliform

and limiting applicability of pH limitation); 42 Fed. Reg. 54,664

(1977) (allowing upward adjustment of suspended solids limita-

tion for certain POTWs); 49 Fed. Reg. 36,986 (1984) (allowing

substitution of five-day carbonaceous biochemical oxygen de-

mand (CBOD,) test for five-day biochemical oxygen demand

(BOD;) test); 50 Fed. Reg. 23,382 (1985) (modifying percent

removal requirement).

while secondary treatment eliminates remaining pol-

lutants (particularly degradable organic materials)

through biological treatment systems. Jbid. The

EPA imposes specific effluent parameters under the

POTW secondary treatment regulations. For exam-

ple, the current regulations limit total suspended

solids (TSS) on both a monthly and weekly basis, they

specify a pH range (which indicates the acidity or

alkalinity of the wastewater), and they impose limita-

tions on biochemical oxygen demand (BOD). See 40

C.F.R. 133.102. See generally Pet. App. A4-A5.

The BOD parameter measures “the amount of oxy-

gen used by microorganisms in metabolizing (con-

suming) wastewater constituents during a specified

time period.” 48 Fed. Reg. 52,258, 52,274 (1983). It

provides an indication of the effluent’s effect on the

receiving water’s dissolved oxygen content, which

must be sustained to support fish and other oxygen-

consuming aquatic organisms. BOD in wastewater

has two distinct components: carbonaceous biological

oxygen demand (CBOD) and nitrogenous oxygen

demand (NOD). CBOD is “the amount of oxygen

consumed by various microorganisms in metabolizing

organic (carbon) matter in the wastewater.” Ibid.

NOD is “the oxygen consumed by other types of

bacteria * * * in converting ammonia to nitrite and

then to nitrate, a process known as nitrification.”

Ibid. The EPA has historically focused on the CBOD

component of BOD in formulating secondary treat-

ment regulations because CBOD normally poses

the more serious water quality threat and because

POTWs have encountered greater difficulties in

developing and implementing effective NOD control

technology. Jd. at 52,275. See Pet. App. A5-A6.

5

The EPA initially adopted a specific BOD parame-

ter as the appropriate standard for BOD in its secon-

dary treatment regulations, and it rejected other

parameters, including a specific NOD parameter, that

it concluded were not useful measures of effective

secondary treatment because, due to the nature of the

parameter, NOD would not be removed at consistent

levels. 48 Fed. Reg. 52,273 (1983). In the course of the

EPA’s 1984 rulemaking, which revised the BOD

parameter in certain respects, one of the petitioners

in this case commented that the secondary treatment

standards should include direct limitations on NOD.

49 Fed. Reg. 36,999 (1984). The EPA concluded that

NOD was an inappropriate parameter for a generally

applicable technology-based standard. It reasoned

that the variation in local conditions, particularly the

characteristics of the receiving waters, prevented the

NOD parameter from providing, as a general matter,

an effective measure of the effluent’s impact on water

quality. Ibid. Accordingly, the EPA decided that re-

quirements for NOD control should be determined on

a case-by-case basis for each receiving water segment

under Section 301(b)(1)(C) and should not be applied

across-the-board through secondary treatment stan-

dards. Ibid. See Pet. App. A6-A8.

2. In 1993, petitioners filed the petition for rule-

making that is the subject of this case. Petitioners

renewed the past request that the EPA amend its

secondary treatment regulations to include standards

for NOD. See Pet. App. B1-B21. EPA denied the

petition. Jd. at C1-C30. It noted, among other things,

that the usefulness of the NOD parameter depended

on local water quality characteristics and that the

federal and state governments were successfully

regulating NOD through water-quality based effluent

limitations in individual NPDES permits. Jd. at C19-

C25. See id. at A8-A9,

3. Petitioners filed a petition for review in the

court of appeals challenging the EPA’s denial of its

petition for a rulemaking. The court of appeals denied

petitioners’ request for relief. The court first ascer-

tained its jurisdiction over the subject matter. Pet.

App. A9-A17. It then turned to the merits and re-

viewed the agency’s denial of the rulemaking petition

under the Administrative Procedure Act’s “arbitrary

and capricious” standard of review. Jd. at A18-A21.

Applying the analytical framework set out in Chev-

ron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the

court of appeals determined that Congress had not

precisely addressed the question whether the EPA

must regulate NOD in its secondary treatment re-

gulations. Pet. App. A22-A30. It concluded that the

agency’s decision to regulate NOD on a case-by-case

basis through the NPDES permitting process rested

on a reasonable construction of the statute and was

entitled to deference. Jd. at A30-A37. The court noted

that the EPA’s decision was appropriate in light of

the agency’s uncontroverted determinations that the

effects of NOD are highly variable and site-specific

and that NOD can be effectively controlled on a case-

by-case basis through the permitting process. Id. at

A32-A33. Judge Lucero dissented in part. Jd. at A38-

A52.

ARGUMENT

The decision of the court of appeals is correct, it

does not conflict with any decision of this Court or

another court of appeals, and it presents no recurring

legal issue of general importance warranting review

a

by this Court. Accordingly, the petition for a writ of

certiorari should be denied.

1. Petitioners assert that the court of appeals’ de-

cision is in conflict with this Court’s decision in

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984). That contention is incorrect. Chevron directs

that when a court reviews an agency’s interpretation

of a statute, it must first examine “whether Congress

has directiy spoken to the precise question at issue.”

467 U.S. at 842. If the statute “is silent or ambiguous

with respect to the specific issue, the question for the

eourt is whether the agency’s answer is based on a

permissible construction of the statute.” Jd. at 843.

The court of appeals correctly applied those princi-

ples in upholding the EPA’s action in this case.

Applying the first step of the Chevron framework,

the court correctly determined that Congress had not

directly addressed the precise question at issue here.

Pet. App. A23-A30. The court specifically examined

the relevant CWA provisions, Sections 301(b)(1)(B)

and 304(d)(1), and correctly determined that they do

not resolve the question whether EPA is required to

impose a generally applicable parameter for NOD in

its secondary treatment regulations. Jbid. Section

301(b)(1)(B) provides that POTWs must achieve efflu-

ent limitations “based upon secondary treatment as

defined by [EPA] pursuant to [Section 304(d)(1)].” 33

U.S.C. 1311(b)(1)(B). Section 304(d)(1) requires EPA

to publish “information, in terms of amounts of con-

stituents and chemical, physical, and biological char-

acteristics of pollutants, on the degree of effluent

reduction attainable through the application of secon-

dary treatment.” 33 U.S.C. 1314(d)(1). Those provi-

sions do not resolve whether EPA must regulate

NOD under its secondary treatment regulations.

8

Under the second step of the Chevron framework,

the courts must defer to the agency’s reasonable con-

struction of a statute that it is charged with ad-

ministering. 467 U.S. at 843. The court found that

the EPA had properly exercised its discretion in con-

cluding that a generally applicable standard for NOD

is inappropriate. As the agency explained in rejecting

petitioners’ request for a rulemaking, the effects

of NOD are site-specific and variable, and NOD

should therefore be regulated on a case-by-case basis

through water-quality-based effluent limitations. See

Pet. App. C1-C30. The court of appeals specifically

considered and rejected petitioners’ various chal-

lenges to the agency’s exercise of its discretion. /d.

at A30-A37.

Petitioners mistakenly assert that the court of ap-

peals erred in the second step of the Chevron analy-

sis. See Pet. 7-10. According to petitioners, the court

of appeals set forth an interpretation of Section

301(b)(1)(B) of the CWA that was not offered by EPA

and that (according to petitioners) is inconsistent

with the EPA’s view of the statute. Pet. 8n.3. Peti-

tioners specifically point to the court’s reliance on

the term “based upon” in Section 301(b)(1)(B) for its

conclusion that the CWA does not require EPA to

develop generally applicable effluent limitations for

all pollutants that could be addressed by secondary

treatment. See [bid.

Petitioners fail to recognize that the court inter-

preted Section 301(b)(1)(B) in the course of determin-

ing, under the first step of the Chevron analysis, that

the CWA does not address the precise question at

issue. The court concluded that the CWA does not

9

require that the EPA regulate all pollutants poten-

tially subject to secondary treatment, stating: —

The statute requires that generally-applicable

effluent limitations for POTWs be “based upon

secondary treatment.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B)

(emphasis added). Contrary to [petitioners’] as-

sertion, the statute does not on its face require

that the generally-applicable effluent limitations

address all pollutants that might be reduced by

secondary treatment.

Pet. App. A29. As that passage indicates, the court

construed Section 301(b)(1)(B) in response to the con-

trary analysis offered by petitioners under the first

step of the Chevron analysis.

The court also made that point explicitly in re-

sponse to the dissent’s claim that the court was

substituting its interpretation for that of EPA under

the second step of the Chevron analysis:

The dissent suggests that our analysis of sec-

tion [301] substitutes our own construction of the

statute for that advanced by the agency. In so

doing, the dissent fails to distinguish between the

source of agency discretion, which we must deter-

mine in the first instance under Chevron, and the

basis for the agency’s exercise of its discretion,

for which the dissent correctly observes we may

not supply our own rationale.

Pet. App. A30 n.17. As that passage indicates, the

court performed its judicial function under the Chev-

ron framework of determining whether the statute

confers discretion. Even if the EPA disagreed with

the court’s interpretation of the phrase “based upon”

in Section 301(b)(1)(B), the court was entitled under

10

Chevron to rely on its own judgment in determining

whether that provision addresses the precise issue

here. Having found that the provision does not

address the issue, the court properly deferred to the

agency’s reasonable interpretation of its statutory

obligations under the CWA.

In any event, petitioners’ assertion that the EPA

disagrees with the court of appeals’ construction of

Section 301(b)(1)(B) is incorrect. Petitioners rely on

the dissent’s representation of the EPA’s views. See

Pet. 9. The dissent, in turn, states that “the relevant

regulatory history strongly suggests” that the EPA

would take the position that secondary treatment

standards must be promulgated for any pollutant that

could be reduced through secondary treatment. Pet.

App. A41-A42. The dissent, however, is in error in its

assessment of the agency’s views.

The EPA specifically concluded that a generally-

applicable secondary treatment standard for NOD is

not appropriate—despite the fact that technologies

exist to reduce NOD—because the effects of NOD are

extremely variable and subject to local water condi-

tions. Pet. App. A32-A33, C16-C22. If the EPA held

the view suggested by the dissent, then the agency

would have to require all municipalities with POTWs

to expend resources on technologies that may not be

necessary to control pollution. The EPA has indi-

cated instead that water-quality-based effluent limita-

tions should be developed for POTWs on a case-by-

case basis where NOD actually leads to an impair-

ment of water quality. That point was not lost on the

majority:

The fact that Congress has * * * provided for

[water] quality-based permitting as a gap-filling

11

measure gives strong support to the EPA’s exer-

cise of delegated authority to fill the gap where it

has concluded that NOD should not be part of

standard secondary treatment. The fact that sec-

ondary treatment controls are technology-based

does not preclude the EPA from deciding that

certain technologically-attainable standards are

necessary and appropriate only for some POTWs.

We should not order the agency to develop

generally-applicable parameters based on the use

of new technology, even if cost-effective, in the

face of the agency’s reasoned judgment that the

use of such technology is irrelevant to the attain-

ment of water quality standards in many cir-

cumstances.

Id. at A834. In short, the court of appeals’ construction

of the relevant provisions of the CWA is consistent

with that of the EPA.

2. Petitioners also argue that the court of appeals’

decision conflicts with this Court’s decision in EPA

v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control

Board, 426 U.S. 200 (1976), which held that the

provisions of the CWA then in force did not subject

federal facilities to state permitting requirements.

426 U.S. at 227-228. The Court’s decision in that case

did not address POTW secondary treatment require-

ments. Petitioners nevertheless assert a “direct

conflict” based on a passage of the Court’s opinion

that describes the CWA’s regulatory scheme. Pet. 10.

As petitioners note, this Court observed that the

CWA differs from previous water pollution control

programs because it subjects point sources to

technology-based effluent limitations as well as to

limitations derived from water-quality standards.

12

Pet. 10 (citing EPA v. California, 426 U.S. at 204-

205). See 426 U.S. at 205 n.12. The Court did not sug-

gest, however, that the CWA requires the EPA to im-

pose technology-based effluent limitations on POTWs

in every instance in which they might conceivably be

applied. As the court of appeals correctly stated, the

specific provisions of the CWA that are applicable to

POTWs provide that “effluent limitations for POTWs

must be ‘based upon’ secondary treatment technology,

not co-extensive with it.” Pet. App. A383. There

is nothing in the CWA, or in this Court’s decisions

interpreting that statute, that would require the

EPA to impose generally applicable technology-based

effluent limitations on POTWs without examining

whether circumstances warrant applying those limi-

tations to all POTWs.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be

denied.

Respectfully submitted.

SETH P. WAXMAN

Acting Solicitor General

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID A. CARSON

Attorney

NOVEMBER 1997

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