petition — Zollo Drum Co. v. B. F. Goodrich Co.
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oy. 241 sur25 9m
No. SCE UF THE CLERK
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER. TERM, 1996
ZOLLO DRUM COMPANY, INC. and
NRS CarRTING CoMPANY, INC.,
. Petitioners,
B.F. Goopricii Co., Dow CorNnInG Corp., HOECHST
CELANESE CoRP., REYNOLDS ALUMINUM BUILDING
Propucts Co., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.,
UPJOHN Co., and WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES,
Respondents.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM G. BECK
Counsel of Record
ALOK AHUJA
LATHROP & GAGE L.C.
2345 Grand Boulevard
Kansas City, MO 64108
(816) 292-2000
NICHOLAS J. HARDING
KOSLOFF & HARDING
28 North Main Street
West Hartford, CT 06107
Dated: July 23, 1997 Counsel for the Petitioners
PEATIGDR PR
WILSON - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether federal common law overrides state corpora-
tion law limitations on the imposition of successor liability
on asset purchasers in cases under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(“CERCLA” or “Superfund” ), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.
(i)
ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit consisted of four consolidated ap-
peals concerning the cleanups of the Beacon Heights and
Laurel Park Landfills in Connecticut. In addition to the
petitioners (who were defendants-appellees below) and
respondents (who were plaintiffs-appellants), the parties
to the proceedings below were: plaintiffs-appellants United
States of America, State of Connecticut, Environmental
Waste Resources, Inc., Kerite Company, Unisys Corpora-
tion, Risdon Corp., Cadbury Beverages, Inc., Coltec In-
dustries, Inc., Ken-Chas Reserve Co., Naugatuck Glass
Co., and Naugatuck Treatment Co.; and defendants-
appellees John Betkoski, George Clark, Armstrong Rub-
ber Company, Thomas Ashmore, Borough of Naugatuck,
Bristol Flowed Gaskei Company, Connecticut Resources
Recovery Authority, Dee’s, Inc., also known as Dee's
Refuse, Inc., Derby Tire Company, Eastern Company,
General Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc., Gerald Metals,
Inc., C.R. Gibson Company, Hospital Marketing Services
Co., Inc., Ideal Manufacturing Co., Jacob Brothers, Inc.,
Litton Systems, Inc., also Known as Winchester Electronics,
Manafort Brothers, Inc., NASCO, Inc., New Haven Hous-
ing Authority, Northeast Utilities, Frank Perrotti & Sons,
Inc., Quality Rubber Co., Sanitary Refuse Co., Inc., Sey-
mour Brass Turning Co., Sperry Rand Corporation, Stauf-
fer Chemical Company, Town of Middlebury, Town of
Thomaston, Town of Woodbury, Triangle Industries, Inc..,
Turner Construction Company, U.S. Prolam, Inc., Water-
bury Companies, Inc., Watertown Housing Authority,
Atlantic Richfield Co., Adam’s Service Station, Armand’s
Auto Service, High Ridge Apartments, Ashmore Trucking,
Beacon Outing Club, Boise Cascade Corporation, Brass
Rail Restaurant, Coffee Shop, Crelan Construction Co..,
Connecticut Sheet Metal/Wood Co., Daddio’s, David
Rupsis, Edward Betowski, Elk’s Lodge #967, George's
Floor Covering, Horizon Homes, Korvette Services, La-
iil
tella Carting Co., Lombard Bros., Inc., Long Meadow
Care, McDonald’s Restaurant, Meyers & Schwartz, Neal’s
Coffee Shoppe, Nelson Mendes, Portanova Trucking Co.,
Portuguese Club, Ray’s Hardware, Shore’s Auto Parts,
Steve’s Tires, Stop & Shop, Triangle Services, Trowbridge
Apts., Valley Motor Trailer Sales, Valley Mobile Homes
Park, Vieira Agency, Waterbury Pressed Metals, Town of
Bethany, City of Waterbury, Capozziello Brothers, Town
of Killingworth, Town of Beacon Falls, Naugatuck
Y.M.C.A., E. Eric Arsan Refuse, John Ashmore, Joseph
Betkoski, Connecticut Pharmacare, Inc. d/b/a Ford
Pharmacy, First National Supermarkets, Inc., P. Francini
Company, Town of Hamden, Jetzon Tire Co., City of Mil-
ford, Town of Orange, Peter Paul Cadbury, Town of
Plymouth, Town of Seymour, Town of Stratford, Town
of Watertown, and Town of Westport. Pursuant to Rule
12.6, petitioners have notified the Clerk of petitioners’
belief that these parties have no interest in the outcome
of this petition.
iv
RULE 29.6 STATEMENT
Petitioners Zollo Drum Company, Inc. and NRS Cart-
ing Company, Inc. have no parent companies or subsid-
laries.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
fe) yt eg 9 keg ~ ) SIRNA PRE ees ontctwaes NNER fren i
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW ........... ii
AEE Ae OR yy ew § 1 >» SCR emme Usa eamel mac nan RON ty iv
Re VER Qe ge ise ot he ei > ERM RENO wee R mpmeEr I ie vii
fog tiie 6 5 Fs | SUNN RD aici Mem mien Gaia leer Sse Mas 1
Bs I eisai a See 2
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................... 2
as Te OO STR CRS acne 2
A. Federal imw Backeroune ..........:......:...... 3
hs SI TORN ioe ae 4
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . 7
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CREATION OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO OVERRIDE
STATE LAW UNDER CERCLA CONFLICTS
WITH DECISIONS OF THE FIRST, FIFTH,
SIXTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS, AND
AGGRAVATES A CONFLICT WHICH HAS
EVENLY DIVIDED EIGHT COURTS OF
IR 8 BM oo Gciginntintninibectigtn cn ene, ; 10
Il. THE CONFUSED STATE OF EXISTING
LAW IN THE LOWER COURTS HAS CRE-
ATED AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF
SDV MRe Re URES ES ikea huenkinaccccthe (sis cilietanedactats 15
Ill. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPOR-
SIT EGAN ED RE MAID sreicsdiscsascepsiccueuseccs 20
RUDRA RIE PRD OEI cns-ti is serinseatne cies acisdl teed aopnioasabateie ela eeees 22
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit (Nov. 1, 1996) —........0000.........
APPENDIX B
Opinion of the United States District Court for
the District of Connecticut (Dec. 20, 1993) ..........
APPENDIX C
Opinion of the Second Circuit Denying Rehearing
eG Gel} eae ees Bie URE Sy ae Pes ek
APPENDIX D
Order of the Second Circuit Denying Rehearing in
ns SR Ws BU hee aaltepet
APPENDIX E
Statutory Provisions Involved ..................................
Page
la
63a
84a
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Pro-
ceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp.
1010 (D. Mass. 1989) .. 33 17
Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Iue.. 812
F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1993) .............. 17
Anderson v. City of Minnetonka, No. C Vv 3- 90-312,
19983 WL 95361 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 1993) ..... 17
Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d
1240 (6th Cir. 1991) 5, 10, 12
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant,
Inc., No. 96-15529 (9th Cir. argued May 8,
1997) BUN SAAN 10
Atherton v. FDIC, 117 . Ct. 666 (1997) 6, 14, 21
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp.
1261 (E.D. Pa. 1904) 16, 18
Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) 13
Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Cas. Co.,
68 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1995) 11
City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244
(6th Cir. 1994) Sat 10
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) 21
Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690
(ist Cir. 1984) ........... : Ue SR 10
The Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp.
994 (D. Utah 1996). ... 16, 17
Elf Atochem N. Am. v. U nited States, 908 F. Supp.
275 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ..... 18
Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482
U.S. 27 (1987) RRS Rv ORE ee ZR 19
Gould, Inc. v. Alter Metal Co.., No. 91 C 20! 371,
1994 WL 406576 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1994) . ._ 16,17
Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 950
F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Pa. 1997) ... ; 16, 17
Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec.
ling GEE Velie Be LARTER tentencnrace 19
HRW Systs., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light C 0., 823
F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993) .. ae 17
Hunt’s Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox C. 0.
863 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ..................... 16, 17
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power &
Light Co., 909 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Iowa 1993)... 17
John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401
eT i 10 >
Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108
2 | RNR ete RRR Ree ame pin pe Moe pee pa OA SIRE SSE SU 11,12
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90
2-2} feta iimtetaet cre etcrilesse saleaatent fer ace emcee be hie Pa 13
Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs. v. Total
Waste Mgmt. Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.H.
SED il hes ROLE AT ARN II a cbad eho Me OS AR PN 17
Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli
Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1998) ........... NR 11
Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d
Se: RUE Ss, BED ai bie a anda 10, 14, 16, 17
Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers
Corp., 195 B.R. 716 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ................ 17
NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910
Pf we ae, eee ene 19
NLRB v. Hospital San Rafael, Inc., 42 F. 3d 45 (1st
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995)... 19
North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, 963 F. Supp. 694
(N.D. Til. 1997) ............. discs ectdicaueiclicadablltic ct teabaa vetoed 17
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
CP GE Rely FE CEIIED ecctesisansSeesiectincnccets 21
Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Re-
search Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1994).. 16
O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) ..passim
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94
Pf Be Ree: Fo Re | Reece eee ener 11, 12
Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.8d 248 (2d Cir. 1996) .... 11
Smith Land & Imprevement Corp. v. Celotex Corp..,
851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
SR II acta 8. chs cies Beta heieiedsl adi ice saaicoa 10, 14
Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100
5 MERRIE Oy SPO Saree eNae AE SUN Sp OPE 19
Southward v. South Central Ready Miz Supply
Corp., 7 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 1993)
j
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
State of Arizona v. Esco, No. Civ. 98-0937, 1997
WL 259520 (D. Ariz. March 26, 1997) ...... 17
State of New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co.,
AVG ahem BOO: (ND, 2006) 18
State of New York v, Panex Indus., Inc., No. 94-
CV-0400E(H), 1996 WL 378172 (W.D.N.Y.
SE: i I a ee ee = 17
State of Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp.
ee A PCa TOE a ie 17
United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., 824
F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ee ; 2 38
United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978
F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992) . 10, 14, 16
United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.8d 572
(6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) AGORA ope mtonba y )Re?
United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24
(Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084
ko BN aM DSN RIN een Retr NAMM CAREC Lie 11
United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No.
1 :CV-93-1482, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 138651 (M.D.
Fra. Aug. 32, 1006) ............... 17
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Ine. 440 U. S., 715
(1979) . ..... passim
United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co.., 980 F.2d
478 (8th Cir. 1992) .............. PO Ey i
United States v. Peirce, Nos. 83- CV- 1623, 91- CV-
0039, 92-CV-0562, 1995 WL 356017 (N.D.N.Y.
I ME si ete ee ese hn, 18
Statutes
26 U.S.C. § 59A
oath tg ot Se OTTER TOS EN Ps
26 U.S.C. § 9507 (b) .
le NL SG 5 NRE SOS ee cetera cea
CERCLA § 101(11), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11)
hh 68 DD CO CO Oo
CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)_.. 2,
CERCLA § 106 (a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 (a)
CERCLA § 107 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)
CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611...
ie)
Ls
co he 00
ae
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued
Page
CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (b) ........00........ 4
CERCLA § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f) (1)...... 2,3
Other Materials
The Business Roundtable, 101 Terms and Facts
on Superfund (Nov. 1998) ................ ee RE ST Sa 20
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1996
No.
ZOLLO DruM COMPANY, INC. and
NRS CarTING Com PANY, INC.,
. Petitioners,
B.F. Goopricu Co., Dow CORNING CorP., HoECHsT
CELANESE Corp., REYNOLDS ALUMINUM BUILDING
Propucts Co., UNrIROYAL CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.,
UPJOHN Co., and WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES,
Respondents.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners Zollo Drum Company, Inc. and NRS Cart-
ing Company, Inc. petition for a writ of certiorari to re-
view the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 99
F.3d 505, and is reprinted in the appendix at la-62a. The
court of appeals’ opinion denying rehearing is reported at
112 F.3d 88, and is reprinted in the appendix at 84a-87a.
The decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut is reported at 840 F. Supp. 180,
and is reprinted in the appendix at 63a-83a.
2
JURISDICTION
The court of appeals issued its decision on November 1,
1996, and denied rehearing on April 25, 1997. This
Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED
The appendix (at 89a-9la) sets forth verbatim the fol-
lowing statutory provisions: CERCLA § 101(21), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21); CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.
§$ 9607(a); and CERCLA §113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9613(f)(1).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action under the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CER-
CLA” or “Superfund”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ef seq., to re-
cover costs of remediating the Beacon Heights Landfill in
Connecticut. Respondents, plaintiffs below, seek to hold
petitioners liable under CERCLA for actions of other en-
tities, from whom petitioners purchased assets, based on a
federal common law theory of successor liability. Acknowl-
edging that its decision conflicts with that of another cir-
cuit, the Second Circuit held that federal common law
governs corporate successor liability under CERCLA, and
preempts fundamental, long-standing principles of state
corporation law protecting asset purchasers.
The Second Circuit’s decision to create federal common
law to displace state corporation law is in conflict with
decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits,
and aggravates a circuit conflict that now has evenly
divided eight courts of appeals. The Second Circuit’s
decision to create federal common law also conflicts with
decisions of this Court which establish a strong presump-
tion against creating federal common law to displace state
corporate law, and which reject each of the specific argu-
ments in favor of creating federal common law on which
the Second Circuit relied.
3
While the Second Circuit acknowledged that most States
apply a “mere continuation” exception to the general rule
of asset purchaser nonliability (which protects an asset
purchaser from successor liability unless it shares, at a
minimum, common shareholders, directors, and officers
with the seller), the Second Circuit created a liberalized
federal common law “substantial continuity” standard of
liability, preempting the traditional rule.
A. Federal Law Background
CERCLA is a comprehensive statute intended to pro-
mote the remediation of hazardous waste sites. The stat-
ute established an excise tax on chemical and petroleum
feedstocks, the proceeds of which are placed into the
Hazardous Substance Superfund, and used to pay for
investigation and remediation of sites. See CERCLA
§§ 101(11), 111, 42 US.C. §§ 9601(11), 9611; 26
U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611, 9507(b).
CERCLA authorizes the United States to recover its
Superfund expenditures from liable private parties, and
to compel such parties to perform remedial work in the
first instance. See CERCLA §§ 106(a), 107(a), 42
U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a). CERCLA also allows pri-
vate parties that have incurred cleanup costs to obtain
contribution from other liable parties. CERCLA § 113
(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1).
The statute imposes liability on any “person” within
the four classes identified in CERCLA § 107(a), 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a): (1) the current owner or operator of
the facility; (2) any “person” who owned or operated
the facility at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-
stances; (3) any “person” who arranged for disposal of
hazardous substances it owned or possessed and which
were disposed at the facility; and (4) any “person” who
transported hazardous substances to disposal or treatment
facilities selected by such person. The statute defines a
“person” to include a corporation. CERCLA § 101(21),
4
42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). CERCLA does not define a “cor-
poration”, nor does it state any special rules as to when
a purchaser of assets is responsible for the CERCLA
liabilities of the asset seller.
B. Proceedings Below
Respondents are seven private corporations that have
conducted investigative and remedial work at the Beacon
Heights Landfill pursuant to a consent decree with the
United States and the State of Connecticut. Respondents
sued more than 200 defendants, including petitioners, to
compel them to contribute to the costs of remediating the
Landfill. The district court had exclusive original juris-
diction over respondents’ CERCLA contribution claims
pursuant to CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b).
Respondents do not allege that either petitioner itself
falls within any of the classes of liable persons identified
in CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Rather,
respondents’ claims against petitioners are based solely
on the actions of other entities from which petitioners had
purchased assets, after the site had closed but prior to this
litigation. Respondents contend that petitioners are liable
for the actions of the asset sellers under a theory of “suc-
cessor liability,” grounded solely in “federal common law.”
The district court granted petitioners summary judg-
ment on the successor liability issue. The court applied
the traditional state law rule that asset purchasers take
free of their sellers’ liabilities, and the traditional “mere
continuation” exception, under which a purchaser can
be liable for the seller’s actions only when there is an
“identity of officers, directors or shareholders between the
two corporations.” Pet. App. 67a.
As to petitioner NRS Carting Company, Inc., the dis-
trict court granted summary judgment because the requi-
site identity was not present, “and for the further reason
that [NRS] has shown, without contradiction, that it
EEE
5
came into existence after the disposal by Norwalk Service,
Inc., and only purchased limited assets of Norwalk Service,
Inc.” Id. at 79a.
As to petitioner Zollo Drum Company, Inc., since
“[s]tock ownership, officerships and directors [of the asset
seller and of Zollo] have not * * * been put into the
record,” id. at 82a, the court granted Zollo’s summary
judgment motion, “[a]s a distinct entity is involved.” 7d.
The Second Circuit reversed. The court of appeals
decided, in a single sentence, that federal common law,
rather than state law, should govern the successor liability
determination:
A number of courts have recognized the importance
of national uniformity and applied traditional rules of
successor liability, rather than the successor liability
law of a given state.
Pet. App. 20a-2la. The court acknowledged that this
ruling was in direct conflict with Anspec Co. v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). Pet. App.
21a.
The court of appeals then considered what the content
of its federal common law successor liability rule should
be. The court recognized that traditional state law gen-
erally protects an asset purchaser from the seller’s liabili-
ties, subject to limited exceptions. Pet. App. 2la. The
court also acknowledged that the traditional “mere con-
tinuation” exception “requires the existence of a single
corporation after the transfer of assets, with an identity
of stock, stockholders, and directors between the successor
and predecessor corporations.” /d.
Ironically, after deciding to create federal common
law on the basis that “courts have recognized the impor-
tance of national uniformity and applied traditional rules
of successor liability,” the Second Circuit specifically re-
jected the traditional rules of successor liability applied in
most States, and applied instead a liberalized “substantial
6
continuity” test for successor liability. Under this more
fluid formulation, the bright line “mere continuation” ex-
ception is replaced by a tabulation of factors: the court
asks “if the successor maintains the same business, with
the same employees doing the same jobs, under the same
supervisors, working conditions, and production processes,
and produces the same products for the same customers.”
Pet. App. 21a.
The court of appeals concluded that the “substantial
continuity” test was “more consistent” with CERCLA’s
“primary goals” than “the older and more inflexible
‘identity’ rule” applied in most States. Pet. App. 22a.
The court characterized CERCLA’s “overall purpose” as
“holding responsible parties liable for cleanup costs.” /d.
at 20a. Beyond this very general (and in application,
circular) principle, the court’s opinion does not identify
any specific objective of the statute which would be frus-
trated by- the application of traditional state successor
liability law. Evidently, the court of appeals concluded
that its liberalized federal common law test was “superior”
to “the older and more inflexible” state law rule because
more parties would be held liable under a more expansive
standard.
While a petition for rehearing was pending, this Court
decided Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997). Ath-
erton unanimously reaffirmed this Court’s core teachings
that creation of federal common law is justified only in
a “few and restricted” situations where a “significant con-
flict” between state law and federal policies is “specifically
shown.” /d. at 670. General claims of a “need for ‘uni-
formity’” do not satisfy this demanding standard. 17d.
at 671.
The court of appeals denied rehearing in a brief per
curiam opinion, written “to clarify our prior opinion.”
Pet. App. 86a. In its supplemental opinion, the court
acknowledged that under O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
512 U.S. 79 (1994) (which it had not previously cited),
7
“a mere federal interest in uniformity is insufficient to
justify displacing state law in favor of a federal common
law rule.” Pet. App. 86a. Nevertheless, the court said
that its prior opinion had not relied principally on a
“need for uniformity” to justify creating federal common
law. Rather, “our primary reason for adopting a federal
common law rule was our concern that allowing state law
rules such as the inflexible and easily evaded ‘identity’
rule to control the question of successor liability would
defeat the goals of CERCLA.” 7d. at 86a-87a. The
Second Circuit also concluded, for the first time, that each
of the factors in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715 (1979), favored its result:
Each of the Kimbell Foods factors supports our
decision—there is a significant need for a uniform
rule, allowing lenient state law rules to control would
defeat federal policy, and we perceive no danger that
our decision to adopt a federal rule of “substantial
continuity” will unduly upset existing corporate rela-
tionships.
Pet. App. 87a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The central issue in this case is whether the federal
courts are justified in creating federal common law rules
of successor liability applicable solely to CERCLA ac-
tions, thereby preempting generally applicable, established
rules of state corporation law. The Second Circuit held
that it was proper to create federal common law, based
on its view of “the importance of national uniformity”
in CERCLA actions, and its concern that the “inflexible
and easily evaded” successor liability rule prevailing in
most States would frustrate CERCLA’s overall purpose
of “holding responsible parties liable for cleanup costs.”
The Second Circuit also held that the federal common
law rule should be a liberalized “substantial continuity”
test, and not the traditional rule of nonliability for asset
purchasers applied in almost every State.
8
The Second Circuit’s rulings warrant review by this
Court for several reasons.
First, the Second Circuit’s decision conflicts with deci-
sions of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.
Each of those courts has applied state law to determine
the CERCLA liability of state-created business organiza-
tions and their owners, and has refused to create federal
common law to supplement or preempt the traditional
state law rules. In total, eight courts of appeals are evenly
divided as to the propriety of creating federal common law
under CERCLA. Review by this Court is needed to re-
solve this deep-seated circuit conflict.
Second, the Second Circuit’s decision to create federal
common law ignores this Court’s repeated admonitions
that federal common law may displace state corporation
law only in truly extraordinary circumstances where neces-
sary to protect specific, identifiable, congressionally
adopted policies. Moreover, in O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), this Court emphatically re-
jected each of the specific rationales on which the Second
Circuit relied to justify creating federal common law
under CERCLA. The Second Circuit is the only court
of appeals to create federal common law under CERCLA
in O’Melveny’s wake.
Third, review is warranted because of the conflicts
among the lower courts which have purported to adopt
“nationally uniform,” federal common law rules of
CERCLA successor liability. It is ironic that, under the
banner of “national uniformity,” these courts have cre-
ated such a balkanized, conflicting set of decisions, vary-
ing from circuit to circuit, district to district, and in some
instances even within individual districts. This confusion
is inherent in the unfocussed, malleable standards these
courts have adopted, and in the fact that little more than
the “polluter pays” slogan guides these courts’ wholesale
rewriting of the Nation’s corporate laws. The disarray
9
in the federal common law decisions stands in marked
contrast to the general uniformity of the law in the
several States concerning successor liability issues. As
a result of the confusion spawned by the federal common
law decisions, it is simply impossible for business entities
and their counsel to predict with any certainty how
successor liability and related corporate law issues will
be resolved under CERCLA.
Fourth, the question presented is important and re-
curring. Successor liability and related issues arise fre-
quently in Superfund cases. Individual CERCLA cases
typically allocate massive liabilities, and involve primary
conduct of private parties which occurred years before
CERCLA’s enactment, and long before the rise of a fed-
eral common law of successor liability. Given the fre-
quency with which CERCLA successor liability issues
arise, the number of Superfund cases currently being
litigated and the amount at stake in such cases, and the
importance of certainty to the success of the Superfund
program. the confusion engendered by the conflicts in the
lower courts should not be permitted to continue.
Moreover, the question whether a proposed asset acqui-
sition carries with it significant potential liability is a
matter that directly affects the negotiation and structure
of numerous transactions. It is therefore vital that the
Court resolve the question presented concerning the nature
and source of successor liability so that corporations in
performing due diligence can make informed decisions
whether to enter certain transactions and. if so, how to
structure them.
10
I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S CREATION OF FED-
ERAL COMMON LAW TO OVERRIDE STATE LAW
UNDER CERC™A CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS
OF THE FIRST, FIFTH, SIXTH AND ELEVENTH
CIRCUITS, AND AGGRAVATES A CONFLICT
WHICH HAS EVENLY DIVIDED EIGHT COURTS
OF APPEALS.
A. The Second Circuit’s decision to fashion federal
common law rules of CERCLA successor liability is con-
sistent with the decisions of three other courts of appeals
in pre-O’Melveny cases.’ However, as the court conceded,
its decision conflicts with Anspec Co. v. Johnson Con-
trols, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991), which held
that state law governs successor liability under CERCLA.
Pet. App. 2la. The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed Anspec in
City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co., 43 F.3d
244, 250 (1994). The Second Circuit failed to recognize,
however, that its decision also conflicts with John S.
Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (lst Cir.
1993), a CERCLA action involving a Massachusetts site,
which applied the successor liability rule from an earlier
Massachusetts diversity case. /d. at 408-09 (following
Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 692
(Ist Cir. 1984) ).
But the conflict among the courts of appeals is not
limited to the successor liability issue-proper. Other courts
of appeals have refused to create federal common law in
closely related areas concerning the CERCLA liabilities of
state-created business organizations and their owners, and
have instead applied traditional, well-established state
1 United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 887-38
(4th Cir. 1992) ; Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,
1263 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex
Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029
(1989). The Ninth Circuit recently heard oral arguments in a case
raising the issue whether Louisiana-Pacific v. Asarco remains goods
law after O’Melveny. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Brown &
Bryant, Inc., No. 96-15529 (9th Cir. argued May 8, 1997).
1]
corporation law. Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits
have refused to create federal common law to ex-
pand the CERCLA liability of parent corporations
beyond the liability imposed under state law governing
piercing the corporate veil. United States v. Cordova
Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579-80 (6th Cir. May 13,
1995) (en banc); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co.,
893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 1108 (1991). The Eleventh Circuit has applied
state law, rather than federal common law, to determine
whether limited partners are responsible for a_ limited
partnership’s CERCLA liabilities. Redwing Carriers, Inc.
v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-02 (11th
Cir. 1996). See also Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous
Fire & Cas. Co., 68 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1995)
(Easterbrook, J.) (dictum; under O’Melveny and Kim-
bell Foods, resort to state law “would be particularly ap-
propriate” to decide capacity of dissolved corporation to
sue or be sued under CERCLA).
Decisions relying upon state law stress that creation
of federal common law rules to displace state law “would
dramatically alter traditional concepts of corporation law,”
and in particular the bedrock corporate law principles of
limited liability and the separateness of corporate entities.
Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 82-83. These decisions also
recognize that each of the factors identified in United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29
2 Other circuits have created federal common law rules, and have
expanded a parent corporation’s responsibility for its subsidiary’s
CERCLA liabilities beyond the circumstances in which state law
would hold the parent liable. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248,
254 (2d Cir. 1996) ; Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. fonolli
Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Congress has expanded
the circumstances under which a corporation may be held liable for
the acts of an affiliated corporation such that * * * traditional rules
of limited liability for corporations do not apply.”); United States
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1084 (1991).
12
(1979), favors the application of state law to determine
the CERCLA liabilities of state-created business entities.
First, no federal policy requires the creation of a uniform
body of federal law, particularly because state law on these
issues is largely uniform.” Second, application of state law
would not frustrate any specific policy objective of
CERCLA." Third, the ad hoc creation of federal com-
mon law would frustrate the expectations of private par-
ties who had structured transactions in reliance on state
law:
Private parties have relied on state corporation law
when making corporate acquisitions and in forming
and dissolving corporations. The prices paid by the
buyers to the sellers in those transactions undoubtedly
reflected, in part, the parties’ understanding concern-
ing who retained the seller’s liabilities.
Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250 (concurring opinion).® Fi-
nally, reliance upon federal common law would create
massive uncertainties for future transactions, because, un-
like state law which has “evolved over decades,” “at
least in the near term, there is no established body of
federal common law on the issues presented in this case.”
Id. at 1251 (concurring opinion). See also, Cordova
Chem., 113 F.3d at 579-80 (refusing to abandon state
3 Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1501; Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249
(concurring opinion) (noting that the United States, as amicus,
had acknowledged that state law on successor liability is largely
uniform).
* Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1502 (application of state law
would not “permit action prohibited by the Act’); Anspec, 922
F.2d at 1249-51 (concurring opinion); Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at &3
(there is no indication in CERCLA of congressional intent to dis-
place state corporation law).
5 See also, Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1502 (“Given the popu-
larity of the limited partnership structure as a means of organizing
businesses and attracting investment in this country, we hesitate to
upset the expectations investors have under current state law by
adopting a federal common law rule.’’).
13
law of piercing the corporate veil in favor of “a nebulous
‘control’ test” grounded in federal common law).
These decisions’ careful weighing of the Kimbell Foods
factors, and their recognition of a strong presumption
favoring the application of established state law, squarely
conflict with the Second Circuit’s cursory analysis in this
case. The conflict in the circuits warrants review by this
Court.
B. Besides being contrary to the decisions of four
courts of appeals, the Second Circuit’s decision to create a
federal common law of successor liability conflicts with
decisions of this Court.
As the analysis of the better reasoned opinions in the
lower courts reveals, reliance on federal common law in
this context is inconsistent with all three parts of the test
established by this Court in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
Since Kimbell Foods, this Court has emphasized that
the presumption in favor of applying state law
is particularly strong in areas in which private parties
have entered legal relationships with the expectation
that their rights and obligations would be governed
by state law standards. * * * Corporation law is one
such area.
Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98
(1991) (emphasis added).°
In O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994),
this Court specifically rejected every reason the Second
Circuit, and the other circuits adopting federal common
law, have offered to justify creating a federal common
law rule of CERCLA successor liability. These courts
® See also, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (“Congress
has never indicated that the entire corpus of state corporation law
is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based
upon a federal statute.’’).
14
first argue that federal common law is required by the
“importance of national uniformity” to the CERCLA
program.’ Second, they reason that application of state
law “would result in greater expense to the taxpayer,
which is contrary to CERCLA’s purposes.” * Finally, they
express the normative judgments that state law is “in-
flexible”, Pet. App. 22a, and “unduly restrictive,” * and
that “even legitimate resort to state law” could permit
“evasion” of a corporation’s rightful CERCLA liability.”
None of these rationales survives O’Melveny. Like this
case, O’Melveny arose in a context in which lower courts
had developed expansive, federal common law rules to
address a perceived national emergency threatening a
tax-financed insurance fund. This Court in O’Melveny
held that, while it might simplify litigation under federal
statutes, a generalized interest in “national uniformity”
cannot justify creating federal common law rules which
do not govern the primary conduct of the federal govern-
ment, but simply affect the United States’ rights “with
respect to primary conduct of private actors that has al-
ready occurred.” 512 U.S. at 88." O’Melveny rejected
the “more money” argument that federal common law
rules would improve the government’s ability to recoup
expenditures from a tax-financed insurance fund, because
7 Pet. App. 20a. See also, Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837;
Louisiana-Pac., 909 F.2d at 1263 n.2; Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.
* Louisiana-Pac., 909 F.2d at 1263 n.2. See also, Smith Land, 851
F.2d at 91-92.
® Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92; see also Louisiana-Pac., 909 F.2d
at 1263 n.2.
10 Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837. See also, Pet. App. 87a
(state law “easily evaded’).
11 See also, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 671 (1997)
(“To invoke the concept of ‘uniformity,’ however, is not to prove its
need.”); Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 730 (rejecting “generalized
pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopt-
ing state law would adversely affect [federal interests]’’).
15
“there is no federal policy that the fund should always
win.” Id. at 88. Finally, O’Melveny rejected outright the
“facile” argument that “it would ‘disserve the federal pro-
-gram’” to apply state laws, and counseled the lower
courts to refrain from making normative judgments about
the wisdom of state laws. Jd. at 89.
O’Melveny establishes that there is no basis for
creating a federal common law of corporations under
CERCLA. Yet the Second Circuit has begun fashioning
an ad hoc body of judge-made, federal corporate law from
whole cloth, with little more than the “polluter pays”
slogan to guide it. The court’s decision relies on court
of appeals decisions which predate, and have been super-
seded by, O'Melveny, and on arguments which O'Melveny
specifically rejected just three years ago. This Court
should grant the petition to reject this approach.
Il. THE CONFUSED STATE OF EXISTING LAW IN
THE LOWER COURTS HAS CREATED AN UN-
ACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY.
A. The lower courts that have chosen to create federal
common law under CERCLA are in disarray as to the
proper content of the federal common law rule of suc-
cessor liability. This confusion provides an independent
justification for granting certiorari.
While purporting to champion the cause of “national
uniformity,” the courts which have adopted federal com-
mon law standards of successor liability in CERCLA
cases cannot agree among themselves as to the content
of the supposedly “uniform” federal rule. “This confusion
underscores the inevitable difficulty that arises when
courts attempt to erect new concepts of corporate liability
within the framework of CERCLA in the absence of di-
rection from Congress.” United States v. Cordova Chem.
Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. May 13, 1997) (en
banc).
Disagreements about the content of federal common
law in CERCLA cases are legion. For instance, whether
16
a continuity of ownership between the asset purchaser and
seller is necessary, or even relevant, to the “substantial
continuity” analysis has badly divided the lower courts.”
The lower courts also disagree whether the “substantial
continuity” test requires that the asset purchaser continue
the line of business which gave rise to the seller’s
CERCLA liability.” Similarly, the courts are split as
12 Compare United States *. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d
478, 488 n.10 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The test considers an identity of
stock, stockholders, and officers, but not determinatively.”) ; Hunt’s
Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp. 879, 884
(E.D. Wis. 1994) (despite continuity of management, employees,
production facilities, product and customers, refusing to find “sub-
stantial continuity” based in large part on lack of overlapping
ownership between asset seller and buyer); and The Ekotek Site
PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D. Utah 1996) (same) ;
with United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838
(4th Cir. 1992) (widely cited 8-factor “substantial continuity” test
does not include common ownership); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389, 399-400 (E.D. Va.
1994) (finding “substantial continuity” despite lack of common
ownership between asset purchaser and seller); Atlantic Richfield
Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same) :
Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 950 F. Supp. 653, 661
(M.D. Pa. 1997) (same).
On a related point, courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
disagree whether the purported successor entity must bear a
“causal link” to the environmental harm before the “substantial
continuity” test is satisfied. Compare United States v. Atlas
Minerals & Chems., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 46, 51 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(Cahn, J.) (“causal link” required) with Atlantic Richfield Co. v.
Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Giles, J.)
(rejecting “causal link” requirement).
13 Compare Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,
1265-66 (9th Cir. 1990) (most important fact defeating successor
liability that “L-Bar did not continue IMP’s slag business”): and
Gould, Inc. v. Alter Metal Co., No. 91 C 20371, 1994 WL 406576,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1994) (no “continuity of operations” where.
unlike seller, asset purchaser engaged in “no purchase and sale of
trailer loads of scrap batteries”); with United States v. Carolina
Transformer Co., 987 F.2d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1992) (asset purchaser
cannot avoid liability “merely by splitting off the particular part
17
to whether the asset purchaser’s knowledge of the
seller’s potential CERCLA liability at the time of the
asset purchase (1) is a necessary precondition to “sub-
stantial continuity” liability,* (2) is merely relevant to
the determination,” or (3) has no bearing whatsoever on
the analysis."* Decisions within at least two districts are
of {seller’s] operations that resulted in its environmental prob-
lems”) : United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No. 1:CV-93-1482,
1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13651, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996) (hold-
ing asset purchaser liable despite discontinuance of liability-creat-
ing operations); HRW Systs., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
823 F. Supp. 318, 330-31 & n.11 (D. Md. 1993) (same) ; and In re
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged
PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 n.& (D. Mass, 1989) (same).
14 See, e.g., North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, 963 F. Supp. 694,
704 (N.D. Ill. 1997): State of New York v. Panex Indus., Inc.,
No. 94-CV-0400E(H), 1996 WL 378172, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. June 24,
1996): Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195
B.R. 716, 726 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Gould, Inc. v. Alter Metal Co.,
1994 WL 406576, at *3; Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 124, 129 «N.D. Ill. 1993).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d
478, 489 (8th Cir. 1992); Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 909 F.2d at 1265
(asset purchaser’s lack of notice of seller’s CERCLA liabilities one
of “[t]wo key facts” supporting non-liability); The Ekotek Site
PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 TV. Supp. 994, 1001 (D. Utah 1996) ;
Hunt’s Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp.
879, 884 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (knowledge of liability a “very signifi-
cant” factor) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light
Co., 909 F. Supp. 1241, 1276 (N.D. Iowa 1993); Anderson v. City
of Minnetonka, No. CV 3-90-5312, 1993 WL 95361, at *8 (D. Minn.
Jan. 27, 1993).
16 See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 950 F. Supp.
652, 657 (M.D. Pa. 1997); State of Washington v. United States,
930 F. Supp. 474, 482 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (“The idea that a suc-
cessor must have knowledge of a potential for CERCLA liabilit:
before liability may attach to it, is illogical considering CERCLA’s
policies of strict liability and retroactive liability.”) ; State of Ariz.
v. Esco, No. Civ. 93-0937, 1997 WL 259520, at *2 (D. Ariz. March
26, 1997) (same); Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs. v. Total
Waste Mgmt. Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1136, 1144 (D.N.H. 1994).
18
diametrically opposed on this issue.’ The “knowledge of
the liability” issue is critically important in CERCLA
cases, because many of the asset sales at issue in these
cases occurred before CERCLA was enacted in 1980,
when “knowledge of the liability” was impossible.
The disarray among the federal common law decisions
creates crippling uncertainty for litigants attempting to
assess or resolve their CERCLA liabilities, and for busi-
nesses seeking to structure asset-purchase transactions
which conform with the prevailing legal standard(s).
Absent review by this Court, this confusion and uncer-
tainty will persist for years as the lower courts (in those
jurisdictions committed to the federal common law) argue
among themselves as to which corporate law rules they
prefer.
B. In addition to its other flaws, the Second Circuit’s
decision conflicts with the very decision of this Court on
which it purports to rely. The court of appeals adopted
an expansive “substantial continuity” test for successor
17 Compare State of New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., 174
B.R. 366, 387 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (McCurn, J.) (substantial con-
tinuity only applies if “the asset purchaser has knowledge of the
potential liability and responsibility for that liability” at the time
of asset sale); United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc.,
824 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Cahn, J.) (“the ‘continuity
of enterprise’ exception is designed to prevent strategic behav-
ior by corporate actors who know of or anticipate CERCLA
problems”); and Elf Atochem N. Am. v. United States, 908
F. Supp. 275, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Joyner, J.) (“When a pur-
chaser has no knowledge of potential CERCLA liability, successor
liability is rarely found.”); with United States v. Peirce, Nos. 83-
CV-1623, 91-CV-0039, 92-CV-0562, 1995 WL 356017, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 21, 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (knowledge of liability “not [a]
determinative factor[] in deciding whether to apply the ‘continuity
of enterprise’ theory”) ; and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847
F. Supp. 1261, 1287 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Giles, J.) (rejecting view
that knowledge of liability necessary, but suggesting a constructive
knowledge requirement, whereby liability would only be imposed if
“purchaser * * * should have known after reasonable investigation
of the seller’s potential liability”).
aoe
19
liability, rather than the stricter standard prevailing in
most States, largely because “[t]he Supreme Court has
followed this approach in the labor law context.” Pet.
App. 21a (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.
NLRB, 482 US. 27, 43 (1987)). But Fall River used
a “substantial continuity” analysis solely to determine
whether a new employer was required to recognize the
bargaining unit of a former employer from whom the new
employer purchased assets. /d. at 41. Fall River empha-
sized that it was not formulating a rule of successor
liability at all: “although the successor has an obligation
to bargain with the union [if it satisfies the ‘substantial
continuity’ test], * * * it is not bound by the substantive
provisions of the predecessor's collective-bargaining agree-
ment.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec.
Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974), this Court explained this point
further. Howard Johnson held that a new employer is
“subject to all the legal and contractual obligations of the
predecessor” only if the new employer constitutes the pred-
ecessor’s “alter ego.” Id. at 260-61 n.5. “Such cases in-
volve a mere technical change in the structure or identity
of the employing entity, * * * without any substantial
change in its ownership or management.” Id. (emphasis
added), citing Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315
US. 100, 106 (1942) (‘a true change of ownership
* * * would terminate the duty of reinstatement created
by the Board’s order”)."*
This Court’s labor law decisions, unlike the Second
Circuit’s decision in this case, impose successor liability
18 The lower courts have recognized that, under this Court’s labor
cases, successor liability can only be imposed if the new employer
meets the “alter ego” standard; Fall River's “substantial conti-
nuity” analysis is irrelevant to this issue. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Hospital San Rafael, Inc., 42 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995); Southward v. South Central Ready
Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 1993); NLRB v.
Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 336 n.6 (6th
Cir. 1990).
20
on an asset purchaser only if the purchaser satisfies an
“alter ego” test functionally identical to the “mere con-
tinuation” exception prevailing in most States.
Ill. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT
AND RECURRING.
The Second Circuit’s decision concerns issues which are
frequently litigated under a federal program of primary
importance. Because of the retroactive application of the
statute, CERCLA litigation often involves waste disposal
which occurred decades earlier. Businesses frequently
have undergone reorganizations or transformations (in-
cluding mergers, asset sales, and dissolutions) in the
interim. For these reasons, the extent of the liability of
corporations and other state-created business entities and
their owners frequently arises in CERCLA lawsuits.
This case is typical: it concerns a landfill which closed
in 1979, and of approximately 200 parties respondents
sued, the case against at least 7 depends on the resolution
of successor liability issues.” A recent computer search
revealed eight appellate opinions, and over 60 reported
district court decisions, addressing successor liability issues
under CERCLA. It is no exaggeration to say that thou-
sands of parties at hundreds of Superfund sites are affected
by the issues raised by this petition.
The nature of Superfund liabilities adds further impor-
tance to the petition. The average cost of site remediation
at the Nation’s Superfund sites was recently estimated to
be between $25 and $30 million.” It is simply intolerable
that such a high degree of uncertainty prevails concerning
19 In addition to petitioners, the district court resolved successor
liability issues involving Axil Corp. (see Pet. App. 66a-67a), Con-
necticut Pharmacare, Inc. (id. at 68a), Sanitary Refuse, Inc. (id.
at 69a-70a), Jacob Brothers, Inc. (id. at 72a), and Seymour Brass,
Inc. (id. at 80a).
20 The Business Roundtable, 101 Terms and Facts on Superfund,
at 3 (Nov. 1993).
21
the basic legal standards that govern these massive lia-
bilities.
The court’s decision to create federal common law im-
plicates issues of judicial restraint, federalism, and the
separation of powers. The decision whether to adopt fed-
eral-judge-made rules to preempt state law raises quasi-
jurisdictional issues concerning the proper (and properly
limited) law-making power of the federal courts, and
concerning the appropriate division of authority between
federal and state governments and between the judicial
and legislative branches of the federal government.” The
impropriety of judicial lawmaking is heightened here,
where States have adopted a general rule of nonliability
for asset purchasers based on their weighing of the com-
peting interests in preserving the responsibility of true
successors—that is, mere continuations of the asset seller
in another form—against the goal of promoting the free
transferability of assets. Cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,
512 US. 79, 89 (1994) (stressing competing policy con-
siderations which must be weighed in developing rules of
legal malpractice ).
Besides their importance to administration of the
CERCLA program, the issue here is important to the
business community. Because of the unsettled state of
federal common law in different circuits, different districts,
and even within individual districts, the parties negotiating
21 See generally, Atherton v FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670 (1997)
(“Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace
state law is primarily a decision for Congress, not the federal
courts.”) ; O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 89 (“Within the federal system,
at least, we have decided that thf{e] function of weighing and
appraising [policy considerations] ‘is more appropriately for those
who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.’ ’
citation omitted); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers
Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (federal courts, “unlike their state
counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been
vested with open-ended lawmaking powers”); City of Milwaukee
v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).
22
and structuring asset-purchase transactions cannot know
with any certainty what the “federal common law,” as
interpreted in a particular district or circuit, will require,
and how that law may differ from the state common law
that will continue to govern all other aspects of the trans-
action. Ad hoc creation of federal common law injects
debilitating uncertainty into these common commercial
transactions. This Court alone can remedy this problem
and it should do so here.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM G. BECK
Counsel of Record
ALOK AHUJA
LATHROP & GAGE L.C.
2345 Grand Boulevard
Kansas City, MO 64108
(816) 292-2000
NICHOLAS J. HARDING
KOSLOFF & HARDING
28 North Main Street
West Hartford, CT 06107
Dated: July 23, 1997 Counsel for the Petitioners
APPENDICES
la
APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
Nos. 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271—August Term 1995
(Argued March 13, 1996 Decided Nov. 1, 1996)
Docket Nos. 95-6074, 95-6088, 95-6090, 95-6098
B.F. GoopricH; UPJOHN CoMPANY; Dow CorNING Cor-
PORATION; ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE RESOURCES, INC.;
REYNOLDS ALUMINUM BUILDING PRopUCTS COMPANY;
UNIROYAL CHEMICAL Co., INC.; WHITE CONSOLIDATED
INDUSTRIES; KERITE COMPANY; UNISYS CORPORATION;
RISDON CorP.; HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION;
CADBURY BEVERAGES, INC.; COLTEC INDUSTRIES, INC.:
KEN-CHAS RESERVE Co.; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
STATE OF CONNECTICUT; NAUGATUCK GLASS Co.;
NAUGATUCK TREATMENT Co.,
Plaintifjs-A ppellants,
V.
JOHN BETKOSKI; GEORGE CLARK; ARMSTRONG RUBBER
COMPANY; THOMAS ASHMORE; BOROUGH OF NAUGA-
TUCK; BRISTOL FLOWED GASKET COMPANY; CONNECTI-
: CUT RESOURCES RECOVERY AUTHORITY; DEE’s, INC.,
; also known as Dee’s Refuse, Inc.; DERBY TirE Com-
PANY; EASTERN COMPANY; GENERAL ROOFING & SHEET
METAL Co., INC.; GERALD METALS, INC.; C.R. GIBsoNn
CoMPANY; HosPITAL MARKETING SERVICES Co., INC.:
IDEAL MANUFACTURING Co.; JACOB BROTHERS, INC.;
LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., also known as Winchester Elec-
tronics; MANAFORT BROTHERS, INC.; NASCO, INc.;
New HAVEN HousING AUTHORITY; NORTHEAST UTILI-
2a
TIES; FRANK PERROTTI & SONS, INC.; QUALITY RUBBER
Co.; SANITARY REFUSE Co., INC.; SEYMOUR BRASS
TURNING Co.; SPERRY RAND CORPORATION; STAUFFER
CHEMICAL COMPANY; TOWN OF MIDDLEBURY; TOWN
OF THOMASTON; TOWN OF WoopBuRY; TRIANGLE IN-
DUSTRIES, INC.; TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;
U.S. PROLAM, INC.; WATERBURY COMPANIES, INC.;
WATERTOWN HouSING AUTHORITY; ZOLLO DRUM
CoMPANY, INC.; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD Co.; ADAM’S
SERVICE STATION; ARMAND’S AUTO SERVICE; HIGH
Rice APARTMENTS; ASHMORE TRUCKING; BEACON
OUTING CLUB; BoISE CASCADE CORPORATION; BRASS
RAIL RESTAURANT; COFFEE SHOP; CRELAN CONSTR.
Co.; CT. SHEET METAL/Woop Co.; DAppio’s; DAvip
Rupsis; EpDwARD BETOWSKI; ELK’s LopGE # 967;
GEORGE’S FLOOR COVERING; HORIZON HOMES; Kor-
VETTE SERVICES; LATELLA CARTING Co.; LOMBARD
Bros., INc.; LONG MEADOW CAFE; MCDONALD’s REs-
TAURANT; MEYERS & SCHWARTZ; NEAL’S COFFEE
SHOPPE; NELSON MENDES; PORTANOVA TRUCKING Co.;
PORTUGUESE CLUB; RAY’S HARDWARE; SHORE’S AUTO
PARTS; STEVE’S TrRES; STOP & SHOP; TRIANGLE SER-
VICES; TROWBRIDGE APTS.; VALLEY MOTOR TRAILER
SALES; VALLEY MOBILE HOMES PARK; VIEIRA AGENCY;
WATERBURY PRESSED METALS; TOWN OF BETHANY;
CITY OF WATERBURY; CAPOZZIELLO BROTHERS; TOWN
OF KILLINGWORTH; TOWN OF BEACON FALLS; NAUGA-
TUCK Y.M.C.A.; E. Eric ARSAN REFUSE; JOHN ASH-
MORE; JOSEPH BETKOSKI; CONNECTICUT PHARMACARE,
INc., doing business as Ford Pharmacy; First Na-
TIONAL SUPERMARKETS, INC.; P. FRANCINI COMPANY;
TOWN OF HAMDEN; JETZON TIRE Co.; CITY OF MIL-
FORD; NRS CArRTING Co., INC.; TOWN OF ORANGE;
PETER PAUL CADBURY; TOWN OF PLYMOUTH; TOWN
OF SEYMOUR; TOWN OF STRATFORD; TOWN OF WATER-
TOWN; TOWN OF WESTPORT,
Defendants-A ppellees.
Fak, SOE ce
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3a
Before:
CARDAMONE, WALKER, and MCLAUGHLIN,
Circuit Judges.
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:
This appeal, arising originally from the disposal of
hazardous substances at two Connecticut landfills, Beacon
Heights and Laurel Park, requires us to determine whether
defendants accused of generating and transporting haz-
ardous substances deposited at the two landfill sites might
be liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to
contribute to the costs of cleaning up the sites. Under
CERCLA, several classes of responsible parties are liable
for most costs incurred in responding to and remediating
sites where hazardous substances are found. We must, in
addition, decide if certain parties remain susceptible to
suit by the United States and the State of Connecticut for
response costs incurred by these governments.
Plaintiffs-appellants the United States the State of Con-
necticut, the Beacon Heights Coalition, and the Laurel
Park Coalition appeal from a judgment entered May 2,
1995 by the United States District Court for the District
of Conecticut (Dorsey, C.J). The court granted judgment
on the pleadings against the United States and Connecti-
cut and granted summary judgment against the Beacon
Heights Coalition and the Laurel Park Coalition and in
favor of nearly 100 defendants alleged in plaintiffs’ com-
plaints to be potentially responsible parties in an action
under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §$§ 9601-9675, as amended by
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
The Beacon Heights and Laurel Park Coalitions are
groups of industrial waste generators that sought contribu-
tion from third parties after having settled their liability
4a
with the United States, the State of Connecticut, and the
Murthas and affiliated entities—the owners/operators of
the two landfill sites. The Laurel Park Coalition sought
initially to add 1151 other potentially responsible parties
to the litigation. The district court ground away at this
number slowly, yet it “ground exceeding small.” Insisting
that these plaintiffs only implead those parties against
whom they had a claim that was both legally and factually
substantiated, the district court reduced to 41 the 1151
third party defendants that these plaintiffs moved to add,
thus eliminating over 1000 potential parties from the suit.
Later, with motions for summary judgment before it,
the district court construed some of CERCLA’s basic
provisions in a manner inconsistent with our precedents
and, ruling that the coalitions had failed to advance suffi-
cient proof, thereby was able to grant summary judgment
to nearly all of the roughly 100 defendants, dismissing
plaintiffs’ complaints against them. The district court also
found that both governments had been fully reimbursed
by the industrial coalitions and the landfills’ owners and
therefore granted summary judgment against these gov-
ernments.
BACKGROUND
We assume the reader’s familiarity with our previous
decision in this case, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958
F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (Murtha 1), and with the pub-
lished decisions of the district court relevant to this appeal.
See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539 (D.
Conn. 1993) (Murtha II); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,
840 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1993) (Murtha III); B.F.
Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 855 F. Supp. 545 (D. Conn.
1994) (Murtha IV). We detail only those background
facts necessary to an understanding of this appeal. Those
facts relevant to the discussion of a specific issue and nec-
essary to its disposition will be included in the analysis.
Sa
A. Initial Litigation
The Beacon Heights and Laurel Park landfills have
both been designated as Superfund sites by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). Terrance and Harold
Murtha, and several corporations controlled by them (col-
lectively, Murtha), owned and operated Laurel Park from
1961 until 1987, and owned and operated Beacon Heights
from 1970 to 1987. In 1987 Murtha was sued in separate
actions by the EPA, the State of Connecticut's Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection (DEP), Uniroyal
Chemical Company, Inc., and a coalition of corporations
led by B.F. Goodrich Company. Murtha filed third party
actions for contribution or indemnification against some
200 third party defendants. These parties were accused
either of generating or of transporting hazardous sub-
stances to the landfills. Most of the defendants named in
the Murtha third party suits were not named by the EPA
as potentially responsible parties. Murtha I, 958 F.2d
at 1196.
In September 1987, when the Murtha litigation began,
the EPA entered into a consent decree concerning the
remediation of Beacon Heights with 33 potentially respon-
sible parties who may have generated hazardous sub-
stances that were later deposited in that landfill. These
parties, later known as the Beacon Heights Coalition,’
agreed to undertake the remediation of that site and to
reimburse the government for its future oversight costs in
excess of $500,000. Since this coalition did not provide
for past costs or for those future response costs unrelated
to oversight, the EPA sued several non-settling potentially
responsible parties * in a separate action to recover its past
and future remediation costs.
1 The Beacon Heights Coalition is today composed of seven mem-
bers: B.F. Goodrich Co.; Dew Corning Corp.; Hoechst Celanese
Corp.; Reynolds Aluminum Building Products Co.; Uniroyal Chem-
ical Company, Inc.; Upjohn Co.; and White Consolidated Industries.
2 These non-settling parties at Beacon Heights are: Armstrong
Rubber Co.: The Eastern Co.; Kerite, Inc.; Primerica, Inc.; Richard
Zollo; John Betkoski; Joseph Betkoski; and George Clark.
6a
The EPA also filed two lawsuits concerning the costs of
remediating the Laurel Park landfill. One led to a settle-
ment with another industrial coalition of various poten-
tially responsible parties, now known as the Laurel Park
Coalition.* In an August 1992 consent decree, the Laurel
Park Coalition agreed to perform remediation at the site,
pay for the government’s future oversight costs in excess of
$200,000, and pay the EPA $500,000 for its past response
costs. The EPA then sued, as it did in the Beacon Heights
case, the non-settling potentially responsible parties to re-
cover past costs and future response costs not addressed
by the consent decree. The State of Connecticut, which is
also involved in the Laurel Park cleanup, received over $1
million from the coalition for response costs and sued the
same non-settling parties for unreimbursed costs.
Murtha also settled its litigation with the United States,
with Connecticut, and with the two coalitions (coalitions,
plaintiffs, or appellants). The parties embodied their
agreement in a consent decree (Murtha consent decree)
which also was entered by the district court in August
1992. Murtha resolved its liability at both landfill sites
for $5,375,000; this amount was apportioned among sev-
eral parties. The Beacon Heights Coalition received
$1,875,000 and $322,500 was given to the EPA for un-
reimbursed costs relating to Beacon Heights. Murtha as-
signed its third party claims to the Beacon Heights Coali-
tion. The EPA also received $625,000 for unreimbursed
costs at Laurel Park, as did the State of Connecticut, with
the remaning $1,975,000 set aside for remediation at that
site. Although the Laurel Park Coalition had not been
8’ The Laurel Park Coalition members in this appeal are: Cad-
bury Beverages, Inc.; Coltec Industries, Inc.; Kerite Co.; Nauga-
tuck Glass Co.; Naugatuck Treatment Co.; Risdon Corp.; Ken-Chas
Reserve Co.; Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc.; and Unisys Corp.
4 The non-settling parties at Laurel Park are: Atlantic Richfield
Co.; The Eastern Co.; Gerald Metals, Inc.; and Litton Systems,
Inc.
7a
formed when the Murtha consent decree was negotiated,
the parties agreed that should an industrial coalition form
within 18 months of the entry of Murtha’s consent decree,
the coalition would receive the funds. Because this condi-
tion was met, the Laurel Park Coalition received the
$1.975 million set aside by Murtha. See Murtha III, 840
F. Supp. at 183.
Many of the third party defendants were municipalities
and municipal corporations that generated and collected
municipal solid waste. They claimed that CERCLA ex-
empted municipal waste from its coverage and that an
exemption for household waste in the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 8§ 6901-
6992k, was incorporated into CERCLA. The district
court rejected these arguments, B.F. Goodrich Co. Vv.
Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991), and we
affirmed, Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1197. The municipal
generators therefore remained in the case as named de-
fendants and potentially responsible parties.
B. Summary Judgment Decisions
The Beacon Heights Coalition was already armed with
Murtha’s assignment of its third party claims against gen-
erators and transporters of hazardous substances. The
Laurel Park Coalition then moved to add to the action
as third party defendants 1151 potentially responsible par-
ties. The district court granted the motion to the extent
of allowing 41 parties to be joined, but denied it as to the
1110 other potential parties. Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at
546-61.
In April 1992, approximately six weeks after we re-
jected the municipal defendants’ claim of CERCLA ex-
emption, the district court decided sua sponte to permit
parties to file motions for summary judgment. Nearly all
of the original third party defendants filed such motions.
Both coalitions opposed the motions and in turn cross-
moved for the same relief. Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at
183.
8a
With dispositive motions before the trial court, the two
coalitions become increasingly concerned about their abil-
ity to present evidence in support of their contentions that
the third party defendants had generated or transported
hazardous substances to the landfills. Throughout the pro-
ceedings in the trial court, discovery had been limited
(independently and through a special master). Uniform
discovery orders and case management orders effectively
restricted discovery to a set of court-drafted interroga-
tories. The special master assured the coalitions on sev-
eral occasions that additional discovery would be per-
mitted. After initially denying the coalitions’ request for
expanded discovery, the district court in December 1992
allowed some limited deposition discovery. Summary judg-
ment motions were submitted to the court and decided in
a series of orders, beginning in December 1993. See
Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 183-191.
Summary judgment was eventually granted to every
third party defendant-appellee that had moved for such
relief, id., and the district court subsequently dismissed
sua sponte nearly all the remaining third party defendants,
including many that did not move for that relief. Of the
88 defendants sued by the coalitions who had not entered
into settlement agreements, all but four were dismissed.
Judgment on the pleadings was entered against the
United States and the State of Connecticut in their suits
against non-settling potentially responsible parties. Murtha
IV, 855 F. Supp. at 549. The district court reasoned that
the EPA and DEP had presented no figures for incurred
response costs that were not covered by the $3,500,000
net Murtha settlement, id. at 546, and therefore dismissed
both government’s claims for additional reimbursement.
It also granted summary judgment in favor of the remain-
ing three of the eight defendants at Beacon Heights sued
by the EPA.
From an amended judgment entered May 2, 1995, the
United States, the State of Connecticut, and both coali-
9a
tions appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand for further proceedings.
DISCUSSION
The coalitions point to a number of reasons calling for
reversal. They contend the district court granted summary
judgment to many of the defendants based on a misappli-
cation of substantive CERCLA law, and that instead their
cross-motions for summary judgment should have been
granted. They also maintain that procedural errors were
committed that require reversal.
The trial court’s initial decision, Murtha II, 815 F.
Supp. 539, laid down several broad legal rules, which the
court applied, occasionally by reference, in deciding sub-
sequent cases. See Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 183
(“Many comments on the evidence in [Murtha II] are
pertinent to the present motions and will not be repeated
here.”). We address first the coalitions’ assertion that the
district court incorrectly interpreted CERCLA; second,
we consider the coalitions’ procedural contentions; third,
we review de novo the grants of summary judgment in 85
individual cases (with reference to an appendix incorpo-
rated in this opinion); and, finally, we address the appeals
of the United States and the State of Connecticut.
I. The Law of CERCLA
A. Basic Principles
Our construction of CERCLA does not begin with this
case. Rather, we are guided by previous writings on this
subject in this and other Circuits. CERCLA is a “broad
remedial statute,” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1197, and was
enacted with the purpose of “[f]irst, assuring that those
responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury
from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.”
S. Rep. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) (Senate
Report), reprinted in 1 Senate Comm. on Env’t and Pub.
10a
Works, Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(Superfund), at 305, 320 (1983) (Leg. Hist.). As a
remedial statute, CERCLA should be construed liberally
to give effect to its purposes. Schiavone v. Pearce, 79
F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996). These include facilitating
efficient responses to environmental harm, holding respon-
sible parties liable for the costs of the cleanup, see Murtha
I, 958 F.2d at 1198, and encouraging settlements that re-
duce the inefficient expenditure of public funds on lengthy
litigation, see In Re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d
110, 119 (2d Cir. 1992).
CERCLA makes four classes of persons liable—(1)
present owners and operators of facilities that accepted
hazardous substances, (2) past owners and operators of
such facilities, (3) generators of hazardous substances,
and (4) certain transporters of hazardous substances. 42
U.S.C. $ 9607(a). As we have noted, “[t]he Act’s broad
reach extends liability to all those contributing—from gen-
eration through disposal—to the problems caused by
hazardous substances.” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198. Re-
sponsible parties are liable for a broad range of remedia-
tion expenses, including all costs of removal of the sub-
stances not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan, other necessary response costs, damages for injury
to natural resources, and the cost of health assessments.
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4).
The Act imposes strict liability. Strict liability is in-
tended to make sure that those who “benefit financially
from a commercial activity” internalize the environmental
costs of the activity as a cost of doing business. Senate
Report at 13, Leg. Hist. at 320; see New York v. Shore
Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (dis-
cussing legislative history). Liability under the Act is
joint and several, unless potentially responsible parties
can prove that the harm is divisible. See United States
v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-22 (2d Cir.
1993); Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198.
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A CERCLA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by
proving that (1) the defendant is within one of the four
categories of responsible parties enumerated in § 9607(a);
(2) the landfill site is a facility as defined in § 9601(9);
(3) there is a release or threatened release of hazardous
substances at the facility; (4) the plaintiff incurred costs
responding to the release or threatened release; and (5)
the costs and response actions conform to the national
contingency plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Alcan, 990 F.2d
at 719-20; Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198.
Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, a defend-
ant may avoid liability only if it establishes by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the release or threatened
release was caused by an act of God, an act of war, cer-
tain acts or omission of third parties other than those
with whom the defendant has a contractual relationship,
or a combination of these reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).
If the plaintiff can establish each of the prima facie ele-
ments on undisputed facts, and the defendant is unable
to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that
an affirmative defense applies, summary judgment on lia-
bility is appropriate. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720. Signifi-
cantly, it is “not required that the [plaintiff] show that a
specific defendant’s waste caused incurrence of clean-up
costs.” Id. at 721. Because CERCLA imposes strict lia-
bility, there is no causation requirement.
“Hazardous substance” is expansively defined to include
(A) any substance designated pursuant to section
1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, com-
pound, mixture, solution, or substance designated
pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (c) any haz-
ardous waste having the characteristics identified
under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid
Waste Disposal Act . . ., (D) any toxic pollutant
listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any
hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of
the Clean Air Act . . ., and (F) any imminently
12a
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect
to which the [EPA] Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Pursuant to subsection (B), the
EPA has listed more than 700 hazardous substances in
Table 302.4 of 40 C.F.R. $302.4 (1995). We have noted
that “[t]he breadth of § 9601(14) cannot be easily
escaped, and we have expressly held that ‘[q]uantity or
concentration is not a factor.’” Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720
(quoting Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1200). In other words,
the Act’s definition includes “even minimal amounts of
pollution.” Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720.
These propositions presently govern CERCLA litigation
in this Circuit. If a district court grants summary judg-
ment based on an incorrect understanding of CERCLA,
we must reverse and remand. See Keywell Corp. v.
Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (reviewing
decision granting summary judgment includes determining
whether district court correctly applied the law).
B. Analysis of District Court’s CERCLA Interpretation
The coalitions aver that many third party defendants-
appellees were granted summary judgment based on an
erroneous application of CERCLA and the case law inter-
preting the statute. We address each claim of error.
1. Component Parts
The district court held, in Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at
546, that “[a]bsent a finding by EPA that a particular
product warrants classification as a [hazardous substance]
. .. It cannot be found that the product, notwithstanding
its constituent elements, is an [hazardous substance] or
[hazardous waste].” It later clarified that holding, by ex-
plaining that “mere presence of an element, a named
{hazardous substance], as a constitutent of a product does
not render the product a [hazardous substance].” Murtha
IIT, 840 F. Supp. at 184.
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In Murtha I we rejected the contention that a specific
mixture or waste solution must be listed within § 9601 (14)
or incorporated by reference in order to fall within
CERCLA’s coverage. We explained that “[w]hen a mix-
ture or waste solution contains hazardous substances, that
mixture is itself hazardous for purposes of determining
CERCLA liability. Liability under CERCLA depends
only on the presence in any form of listed hazardous sub-
stances.” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1201; see also United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259-61
(3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting quantitative requirement);
Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (Sth
Cir. 1989) (same).
It is enough that a mixture or waste solution contain a
hazardous substance for that mixture to be deemed hazard-
ous under CERCLA. The waste product itself “need not
be listed by name—instead of its constituent components—
to fall within the Act.” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1201; see
also Lousiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 24 F.3d 1565,
1573 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that even if product not
specifically listed as hazardous substance, if components
include hazardous substances, product is regulated by
CERCLA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 780 (1995); Eagle-
Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 930-31 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (rejecting contention that because most mining
wastes and fly ash contain some hazardous substances,
mining wastes and fly ash must therefore be specifically
listed as hazardous substances).
Our understanding is also consistent with Congress’ plan.
Legislative history reveals that “the release of any [listed
hazardous or toxic substances] or any constituent of them
invokes the notice requirements and response provisions
and any costs of removal or remedial action or any dam-
ages are subject to the liability provisions of the bill.”
Senate Report at 24-27, Leg. Hist. at 331 (emphasis
added). In short, it makes no difference that the specific
wastes disposed of by the appellees were not themselves
14a
listed as hazardous substances, because so long as their
component parts were listed as hazardous substances there
may be CERCLA lability.
Appellees declare this approach will lead to CERCLA
liability if a discarded object had ‘any EPA listed hazard-
ous substance in its chemical genealogy, whether or not
the chemical component’s characteristics had been unalter-
ably changed in the manufacturing process. Even if this
objection is sound in theory, it is not relevant. The in-
stant case involves not only discarded objects like pens or
plastic containers that might include a hazardous sub-
stance in their chemical make-up. Appellees are accused
of dumping waste that contained hazardous substances in
separable, identifiable forms. According to an affidavit
submitted by the coalition, the cumulative waste stream
discarded in the Murtha’s landfills included municipal
sludge, incinerator ash, varnishes, paints, tar remover,
caulking compounds, pesticides, glues, degreasers, and au-
tomotive lubricants. Obviously, disposal of this sort of
waste poses a greater threat of releasing hazardous sub-
stances than is presented by—to use an example offered
by the appellees at oral argument—the disposal of a single
plastic pen.
In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, appellees invoke
Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d
981, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1995). Blackstone held that the
EPA should make an initial determination of whether fer-
ric ferrocyanide (FFC)—in this case a blue-colored sub-
stance on wood chips—is a cyanide and therefore a hazard-
ous substance. The First Circuit ruled that even if FFC
contained cyanide as a chemical component, the cyanide
might not exist in a form convertible to free cyanide and
therefore might not be a CERCLA hazardous substance.
Id. at 990-91. However, in this case, the First Circuit
focused on whether FFC was a hazardous substance. It
did not suggest that were FFC found to be a hazardous
substance, liability might be avoided because “wood chips”
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—the product allegedly discarded by the polluter—were
not in themselves hazardous substances within the Act’s
definition. In short, the appellees’ reliance on Blackstone
is misplaced.
Thus, those dismissals in the present case that were
predicated on the notion that a waste product is not cov-
ered by CERCLA unless specifically listed as a hazardous
substance—even when its component parts are hazard-
ous substances—misconstrued CERCLA and must be re-
versed.
2. Releasability
The trial court ruled further that “[t]he absence of evi-
dence of breakdown of products that contain [hazardous
substances] . . . precludes a finding that disposal of that
product constitutes a disposal of [hazardous substances].”
Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at 545. Later, it explained that
statement by saying that “[I}iability does not lie if the ma-
terial disposed of would release a {hazardous substance]
only on the intervention of another force.” Murtha III,
840 F. Supp. at 188. The coalitions believe that these
pronouncements were wrong.
As noted, to make out a prima facie CERCLA case, a
plaintiff must show a “release, or a threatened release .. .
of a hazardous substance.” § 9607(a) (4). Accordingly,
if a hazardous substance is only used in a non-releasable
form in the manufacturing of a product, it may scientifi-
cally be impossible for the plaintiff to show a “threatened
release.” Hence, the district court properly required plain-
tiffs to show a release or threatened release. But, when it
required them to show an actual breakdown of products
containing hazardous substances, and determined there was
no liability if the hazardous substances would only be re-
leased by an intervening force, it acted in a manner con-
trary to precedent.
In Alcan, we held that proof that a defendant’s waste
did not release listed hazardous substances is only relevant
16a
to the issue of apportionment of damages, not to the issue
of liability. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 722. Independent releasi-
bility is not required to establish liability; a defendant
otherwise liable may show “nonreleasibility” in order to
mitigate its share of damages. It follows logically that a
defendant who disposes of hazardous substances that are
not independently releasable may still be held liable, even
though that defendant may not be required to pay dam-
ages when the cost apportionment phase of the litigation
is reached.
In addition, the trial court’s reading of CERCLA is in-
consistent with the Act’s language, which provides only
the four already recited causation-related defenses. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(b). The canon of construction that says
“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” cautions against
creating additional exceptions to complex statutory enact-
ments. Cf. Greene v. United States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1355
(2d Cir. 1996) (applying this principle in the context of
federal tax law).
Moreover, if we required a plaintiff to show more than
a release or threatened release, we essentially would be
asking the plaintiffs to prove that a specific defendant’s
hazardous substances caused the release of a hazardous
substance. No causation is needed, however, to establish
liability under CERCLA, see Alcan, 990 F.2d at 721, be-
cause it is, as stated, a strict liability statute. See Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042; see also Alcan Aluminum, 964
F.2d at 266 (requiring only that plaintiff prove that haz-
ardous substances were deposited at a site from which
there was a release or threatened release that caused re-
sponse costs to be incurred); Amoco, 889 F.2d at 670 n.8
(“[I]n cases involving multiple sources of contamination,
a plaintiff need not prove a specific causal link between
costs incurred and an individual generator’s waste.”’).
None of the lower court cases upon which the district
court relied as precedent for its view regarding releasability
3
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3
BART OR UCM BA EPA BEES EO
17a
is persuasive. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle
County, 769 F. Supp. 591, 597 (D. Del. 1991); United
States v. Serafini, 750 F. Supp. 168, 171 (M.D. Pa. 1990).
Although appellants must show a release or threatened
release in order to make out a prima facie case, the addi-
tional releasability requirement of product breakdown finds
no support in CERCLA.
3. Negligible Amounts
The coalitions further contend that the district court
impermissibly required a showing that appellees disposed
of hazardous substances above a threshold amount. It
granted summary judgment to an appellee where the
amounts of hazardous substances it disposed of were
“minuscule,” Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 184, or “[n]om-
inal,” Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at 545. Twice we have said
that quantity “is not a factor” when determining CERCLA
liability because had Congress wanted to distinguish liabil-
ity on the basis of quantity, it would have so provided.
Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1200; see also Alcan, 990 F.2d at
720 (“The statute on its face applies to ‘any’ hazardous
substance, and it does not impose quantitative require-
ments.”). The absence of threshold quantity requirements
in CERCLA leads logically to the conclusion that the Act’s
“hazardous substance” definition includes even minimal
amounts. See Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720. The dismissals on
these grounds constitute legal error.
4. EPA Designation
The trial judge implied, in a few cases, that the EPA’s
decision not to designate a party as a potentially respon-
sible party is relevant in determining CERCLA liability.
See, e.g., Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 184 (“[Appellee]
was not designated as a PRP by the EPA.”) In Murtha I,
958 F.2d at 1205, we concluded that EPA policy “merely
indicates that the EPA presently does not intend to pursue
enforcement actions against” unnamed parties. However,
18a
here the district court weighed the plaintiffs’ evidence of
liability “against the backdrop of the EPA Municipal
Policy that a [party] would not be charged as a PRP ab-
sent evidence that its waste deposited at the site in ques-
tion contained specific [hazardous substances].” Murtha
III, 840 F. Supp. at 188.
EPA enforcement decisions are not helpful in deciding
whether a party is properly joined as a defendant in a
given action. See Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1205 (explaining
that EPA prosecutes only largest contributors or those with
the means to pay, leaving those defendants to seek con-
tribution from other potentially liable polluters). This is
consistent with the general understanding that “[a]n agency
generally cannot act against each technical violation of the
Statute it is charged with enforcing.” Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Congress has explicitly auth-
orized private rights of action independent of EPA enforce-
ment decisions. For these reasons, the agency’s decision
not to initiate its own enforcement action is irrelevant in
determining whether a defendant might be liable under
CERCLA.
Appellees maintain that no decision was made in any
case in exclusive reliance on the EPA policy, and that the
court’s reference to that policy was merely illustrative. It
is difficult to see what the EPA policy illustrated, as we
have ruled that the policy is legally irrelevant when de-
termining CERCLA liability. To the extent the district
court relied upon an EPA designation in deciding whether
to grant summary judgment, it committed error.
5. Successor Liability
Several decisions were made regarding the scope of suc-
cessor liability. In the case of one appellee, it was found
that although the successor continued its predecessor’s busi-
ness “using its former assets, employees and customers,”
summary judgment in favor of that appellee on liability
19a
was proper. Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 185. In another
instance, no successor liability was found even when “[a]
prior sole proprietorship was conducted under a compar-
able name” and the predecessor “sold the business and re-
lated assets to [a successor].” Jd. at 191. A third case was
dismissed despite a successor’s purchase of assets and con-
tinuation of the predecessor’s business. Jd. at 190.
The district court did not explicitly formulate a test for
deciding when successor liability exists. See Murtha II],
840 F. Supp. at 185. And, although the question has
been addressed in other circuits, we have yet to decide
exactly what is required for successor liability under
CERCLA, see New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co.,
174 B.R. 366, 374 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing that
we have not decided this issue). We turn to this question
now.
We consider first the Act’s language, recognizing at the
outset that the Act has no provision explicitly governing
corporate successor liability. See Smith Land & Improve-
ment Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F. 2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.
1988) (“CERCLA failed to address many important is-
sues, including corporate successor liability.”), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 1029 (1989); see also United States v. Carolina
Transjormer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992)
(explaining that CERCLA is silent on this subject); Louis-
iana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263
(9th Cir. 1990) (“Congress has not addressed the’ issue of
successor liability under CERCLA.”).
Nonetheless, most courts have read CERCLA as mak-
ing successor corporations liable, in certain circumstances,
for their predecessors’ acts. Carolina Transformer, 978
F.2d at 837; Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922
F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); Louisiana-Pacific, 909
F.2d at 1263; Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91-92: N. Storon-
ske, 174 B.R. at 374; In Re Acushnet River & New Bed-
ford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712
20a
F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (D. Mass. 1989) (following Smith
Land). See United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980
F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992) (successor corporations
are “persons” liable under CERCLA).
In our view CERCLA imposes successor liability. The
plain language of the Act imposes liability on any “person”
who fits within the four categories of liable parties. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a). “Person” is defined to include, inter
alia, a “corporation, association, partnership, consortium,
joint venture, [or] commercial entity.” § 9601(21). Fur-
ther, federal law provides a rule of construction that when
the word “company” or “association” is used, it “em-
brace[s] the words ‘successors and assigns of such company
or association.”” 1 U.S.C. § 5; see Anspec, 922 F.2d at
1247 (applying § 5 in analyzing CERCLA liability).
Thus, CERCLA’s statutory language, properly read, pro-
vides for successor liability.
Moreover, the Act’s broad remedial purpose would be
sharply curtailed if the Act did not encompass successor
liability. As the Third Circuit has observed, “[t]he con-
cerns that have led to a corporation’s common law liability
.. . for the torts of its predecessor are equally applicable to
the assessment of responsibility for clean-up costs under
CERCLA.” Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91. In other words,
absent successor liability, a predecessor could benefit from
the illegal disposal of hazardous substances and later evade
responsibility for remediation simply by changing the form
in which it does business, thereby subverting the Act’s
purpose of holding responsible parties liable for cleanup
costs. See Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198. We will not read
§ 9607(a) in a manner that would defeat Congress’ overall
purpose, absent an express statement from the legislature
that we do so. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1045.
A number of courts have recognized the importance of
national uniformity and applied traditional rules of succes-
sor liability, rather than the successor liability law of a
& ay Rae ail
2la
given state. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91 (instructing
district court to consider national uniformity in resolving
successor liability issues under CERCLA); see also Mexi-
co Feed, 980 F.2d at 487 n.9 (upholding the application
of federal law); Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1263 &
n.2 (deeming appropriate a federal rule that relies on tra-
ditional common law notions because of the need for na-
tional uniformity). But see Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1248
(applying successor liability law of forum state); N. Stor-
onske, 174 B.R. at 375 (applying a mixture of state and
traditional norms). The traditional common law rule states
that a corporation acquiring the assets of another corpora-
tion only takes on its liabilities if any of the following
apply: the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to as-
sume them; the transaction may be viewed as a de facto
merger or consolidation; the successor is a “mere continu-
ation” of the predecessor; or the transaction is fraudulent.
Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838; see also Mexico
Feed, 980 F.2d at 487; Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at
1263. Both sides agree that this is the standard.
The coalitions contend that when determining whether
there is a “mere continuation,” we should not use the com-
mon law test (sometimes referred to as the identity test),
which requires the existence of a single corporation after
the transfer of assets, with an identity of stock, stockhold-
ers, and directors between the successor and predecessor
corporations. See Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838
(explaining traditional rule). Rather, they urge that we
employ the “continuity of enterprise” approach, also called
the “substantial continuity” rule. The Supreme Court has
followed this approach in the labor law context by asking
if the successor maintains the same business, with the same
employees doing the same jobs, under the same supervis-
ors, working conditions, and production processes, and
produces the same products for the same customers. Fail
River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,
43 (1987); see also Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752
22a
F.2d 168, 175 (Sth Cir. 1985) (using a slightly different
version of substantial continuity test).
CERCLA is entitled to a construction that advances its
primary goals. Because the substantial continuity test is
more consistent with the Act’s goals, it is superior to the
older and more inflexible “identity” rule, see Carolina
Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838, 840 (endorsing this ap-
proach); see also Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d at 487-89
(same); United States v. Western Processing Co., 751 F.
Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (looking to continu-
ing business test). But see Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v.
Burlington N. R.R., 772 F. Supp. 443, 447-49 (D. Minn.
1990) (declining to apply the “continuing business enter-
prise” test). We therefore adopt the substantial continuity
test as the appropriate legal test for successor liability
under CERCLA. Cf. Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255 (recog-
nizing direct operator liability because it is compatible with
statutory language and consistent with CERCLA’s reme-
dial scheme).
The district court spent little time exploring this ques-
tion. It noted the coalitions’ citation to Turner v. Bitu-
minous Casualty Co., 244 N.W. 2d 873, 883 (Mich.
1976), an early case defining the “continuity of the enter-
prise” or substantial continuity approach, yet refused to
impose successor liability without “convincing authority.”
Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 185. Because an approach
quite similar to that used in Turner is the one we follow
in determining successor liability, we must reverse those
grants of summary judgment where the district court ap-
plied a different and more restrictive law of successor li-
ability.
6. Transporter Site-Selection
Summary judgment also was granted to several alleged
transporters of hazardous substances for various reasons,
including those we have already discussed. An additional
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23a
reason was offered for the decision concerning the trans-
porters—they were held not liable because “they were
directed to the sites or transfer stations by others.” /d.
Hence, we must address the legal question of whether site-
selection is a required element for transporter liability.
The Act imposes liability on
any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances for transport to disposal or treatment fa-
cilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such
person, from which there is a release, or a threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response costs,
of a hazardous substance
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). This awkwardly worded provi-
sion requires that we decide whether “selected by such
person” modifies the entire phrase “disposal or treatment
facilities, incineration vessels or sites” or only the imme-
diately antecedent word “sites.” If the latter reading is
correct, there is no basis for imposing a site-selection re-
quirement for transporter liability where the substances
were, as here, disposed of at a disposal or treatment fa-
cility.
The appellants offer two principal arguments in support
of this reading. First, they point out that the Act else-
where defines a facility as “any site .. . where a hazardous
substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or
placed.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). They aver that reading
the “selected by such person” language to apply only to
sites other than those where hazardous substances have
been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, is therefore
necessary to prevent the word “sites” from being redund-
ant. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 507
(1995) (construing statute to avoid making words re-
dundant). Second, they urge that we keep in mind the
Act’s legislative purpose of making all who profit from
pollution pay for their conduct.
24a
Recently, a sister Circuit concluded that CERCLA in-
cludes a site-selection requirement for transporters. Tip-
pins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 1994).
While noting the canon of statutory construction that “ab-
sent a clear intention to the contrary, a modifier’s refer-
ence is to the closest noun,” id. at 93, the court recognized
that this canon need not be followed in all instances. /d.;
see also Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,
330-31 (1993) (reliance on the “rule of the last antece-
dent” is not “compelled”). Here, following the canon and
adopting the appellants’ rule would create an odd para-
dox: A transporter who brought hazardous substances to
a disposal facility would be strictly liable, while a trans-
porter who brought hazardous substances to some site
other than a facility would not be liable unless the trans-
porter itself selected the site. Tippins, 37 F.3d at 93-94.
Thus, the coalitions’ reading, while “quite sensible as a
matter of grammar,” Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 330, would
“lead to a curious result.” Tippins, 37 F.3d at 93.
The Third Circuit’s conclusion is consistent with most
other courts that have considered the subject. See id. (col-
lecting cases); see also United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d
1427, 1435 (10th Cir. 1993) (requiring site selection for
transporter liability); United States v. Petersen Sand &
Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(same); Alcatel Info. Sys. v. Arizona, 778 F. Supp. 1092,
1096 (D. Ariz. 1991) (same); United States v. Western
Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (W.D. Wash.
1991) (same). But see Prisco v. New York, 902 F. Supp.
374, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating test for transporter
liability without noting a site selection requirement); Jer-
sey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., No. CIV.A.
85-2014, 1987 WL 54410, at *5 (D. N.J. Sept. 3, 1987)
(finding that “selected by the transporter” modifies only
“sites”), aff'd without written opinion, 866 F.2d 1410,
1411 (3d Cir. 1988).
We are persuaded by the reasoning of Tippins and
hold that only transporters who select the disposal loca-
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25a
tion are liable under CERCLA. As a consequence, we
agree with the district court that unless the transporters
selected the facility or disposal site, they cannot be found
liable under the Act. However, the meaning of the word
“selected” is hardly clear. Tippins, 37 F.2d at 94, deter-
mined that a transporter is properly liable under the Act
when it ultimately selects the disposal facility or when its
active participation in the decision amounted to “sub-
stantial input into which facility was ultimately chosen.”
This view accords with the Act’s language and purpose.
First, a transporter can be said to select a facility or site
when it helps the generator choose a disposal facility by
recommending a facility or set of facilities. Second, a
transporter who plays an active role in choosing the dis-
posal facility is obviously more culpable and responsible
for the resultant harm than a transporter who simply does
the bidding of a given generator; the latter has a more
attenuated connection to the harm. An “active participa-
tion” standard recognizes the often significant role played
by transporters in choosing the disposal site. Hence, in
cases of transporter liability, we must vacate the grants
of summary judgment and remand for further considera-
tion in light of the above discussion.
II. Procedural Issues
We address next appellants’ procedural arguments that
are common to a great many of the cases before us.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
We have recognized in CERCLA’s context that sum-
mary judgment is a “powerful legal tooi[]” that can “avoid
lengthy and perhaps needless litigation.” Alcan, 990 F.2d
at 720. This tool is one well adapted to encouraging set-
tlement and speeding remediation. See In re Cuyahoga
Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d at 119 (CERCLA designed to
encourage settlement to reduce litigation costs). Its utility
in CERCLA litigation is not a license to use it when
26a
material facts are genuinely disputed. Just as there is no
heightened pleading standard in CERCLA cases, see
Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon Prods., Inc., 820 F.
Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); cf. Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination
Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (heightened pleading
requirement exists only in cases involving fraud or mis-
take), the showing required to survive summary judgment
also remains the same.
We now briefly describe the standard for summary
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A party moving for
summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress
& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). When a court is con-
fronted with facts that permit several different conclusions,
all inferences from the underlying facts must be drawn in
the nonmovant’s favor. Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71
F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). The trial court must bear in
mind that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences
from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986).
If the movant demonstrates an absence of material is-
sues of fact, a limited burden of production shifts to the
non-movant, which must “demonstrate more than ‘some
metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, . . . [and]
must come forward with “specific facts showing that there
is a genuine issue for trial.”’” Aslandidis v. United
States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993)
(citations and emphasis omitted). Summary judgment,
then is granted only when “there is an absence of evidence
to support the nonmoving party’s case,” Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), or, in other words,
only if “no rational jury could find in favor of the non-
moving party because the evidence to support its case is
so slight.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d
1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). The trial court’s task is
27a
“carefully limited to discerning whether there are any
genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding
them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-
finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Id.
B. Sua Sponte Summary Judgment
The district court granted summary judgment sua
sponte in a number of cases. A sua sponte grant of sum-
mary judgment may be appropriate so long as the losing
party was notified prior to its grant and given the oppor-
tunity to produce whatever proof it has in opposition.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326; see also FLLI Moretti Cereali
S.p.A. v. Continental Grain Co., 563 F.2d 563, 565 (2d
Cir. 1977) (power to grant summary judgment sua sponte
“must be exercised with great caution and with care taken
to give the parties an opportunity to present materials in
opposition”). To ensure the parties have notice and an
opportunity to be heard, we have established a policy of
adhering closely to the ten day notice period specified by
Rule 56(c). See Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British
Caledonian Group, plc, 945 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1991)
(per curiam).
Notice furthers two important interests. First, it gives
the losing party an opportunity to develop the record to
demonstrate that genuine material issues are in dispute
or that determinative legal quesions should be resolved in
its favor, and thereby prevents the losing party from
suffering procedural prejudice. Second, the parties’ devel-
opment of a complete record facilitates de novo appellate
review. See Hispanics For Fair and Equitable Reappor-
tionment (H-FERA) v. Griffin, 958 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir.
1992) (per curiam). When the non-moving party asserts
that it cannot adequately respond to its opponent’s motion
for summary judgment in fewer than ten days, it should
be given the full ten days unless there is good reason to
believe that the assertion is a sham. See Gutwein v. Roche
Labs., 739 F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, the coali-
tions insist they were denied notice and an opportunity to
28a
be heard before the district court granted summary judg-
ment sua sponte against them in a number of cases.
Our review of the underlying procedural history indi-
cates that such was the case. On December 20, 1993, the
trial court ordered the coalitions to file a list of third
parties that the coalitions intended to pursue. Murtha
III, 840 F. Supp. at 191. Although it directed the coali-
tions to “be sure that [its prior] rulings . . . are fully
considered and accommodated,” id., this is too vague an
admonition to be deemed equivalent to notice. When the
coalitions asked for additional time, their request was
denied and the prior order was reaffirmed. Three weeks
later, on January 10, 1994, the coalitions were again or-
dered to review their files and “list” those third party
claims each intends to pursue as valid. The district court
further explained that “[a]ny third party claim not so
listed by January 21, 1994, will be dismissed as not in-
tended to be prosecuted further.”
The district court acknowledged—in an order dated
February 5, 1994—that appellants eventually prepared
and presented such lists but, rather than simply dismissing
those claims the coalitions did not intend to pursue, the
district court dismissed a great many others sua sponte.
In a case involving some 3000 filings, the coalitions were
no doubt dedicating most of their effort between December
20, 1993 and February 5, 1994 to sifting through their
records and compiling the list requested by the trial court.
The coalitions were not asked to produce supporting
papers or legal arguments to undergird their liability
claims—they were only directed to submit a list within
11 days of the January 10 order. It is hardly surprising
that the coalitions simply submitted the lists and did little
else.
A more prudent course for the district court would have
been to give the coalitions ten days’ notice to show good
cause why summary judgment should not be granted
against them. Such a course also would have given the
29a
district court the benefit of the arguments and evidence
of both sides and would have provided a more complete
record on appeal. See Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp.,
553 F.2d 789, 792 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1977) (notice and
opportunity to make arguments are vital to making an
informed judgment); cf. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's
Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 65 (2d
Cir. 1988) (ruling erroneous a decision to grant motion
to dismiss on ground neither raised nor briefed by par-
ties). As the record currently stands, we have no knowl-
edge of the precise reasons for the district court’s decision
to grant summary judgment sua sponte in those cases
where it took that course of action. It said only that there
was “want of substantiation,” a truism that necessarily
applies to all grants of summary judgment and which adds
nothing to our understanding of the trial court’s decision.
Because the coalitions’ claims are not demonstrably frivo-
lous, the summary judgment dismissals, made sua sponte
without ten days’ notice, were error.
C. Discovery Limitations
In the course of this litigation, the district court placed
certain restrictions on discovery. For over one year—from
March 6, 1991 until April 29, 1992— it did not allow
discovery outside of that permitted by the uniform dis-
covery orders. Showings of good cause for further dis-
covery were not entertained until April 29, 1992, when
the court solicited motions for summary judgment. Sev-
eral weeks later, it promised the coalitions additional dis-
covery for them to respond to the forthcoming summary
judgment motions. The special master repeated the prom-
ise in August, but refused to authorize discovery until the
motions for summary judgment were submitted and co-
ordinated. In December, appellants were given 60 days
within which to conduct limited deposition discovery.
They contend that these discovery limitations were so
severe as to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and
to constitute reversible error.
30a
A trial court necessarily has wide discretition in manag-
ing pre-trial discovery, see Cruden v. Bank of New York,
957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir. 1992), and we will not dis-
turb its orders absent a clear abuse of its discretion, id.;
Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 622 F.2d 34, 35-
36 (2d Cir. 1980). Reversal of a judgment because of an
improper order denying or curtailing discovery is “un-
usual.” 8 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2006, at 92 (2d ed. 1994).
We find »0 abuse of discretion in the district court’s
management of discovery. In complex multi-party litiga-
tion, a trial court often needs to use its broad authority to
control discovery. Some of the measures adopted here,
such as time limits, schedules for discovery, and limitations
on deposition discovery, have been specifically recom-
mended as acceptable options. See Manual For Complex
Litigation (Third) § 21.422 (1995); H.R. Rep. No.
253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862 (supporting the enact-
ment of amendments to CERCLA and urging district
courts to “carefully manage” CERCLA cases “to insure
that the litigation is conducted in an expeditious manner”
through, inter alia, the “exercise of strict judicial control
over multi-party proceedings . . . as well as use of the pro-
cedures set forth in the Manual For Complex Litigation”).
The district court sought to guard against what it
thought might be a wildfire of unwarranted discovery,
recognizing that unduly extensive use of discovery could
make the litigation expense disproportionate to the cost
of cleaning up the landfills. In order to have orderly and
reasonable discovery, the trial judge required that a high
standard of good cause be met before discovery beyond
that provided in the uniform orders would be permitted.
Its orders were tailored appropriately to meet this need.
Appellants also strongly challenge the denial of their
requests for additional discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P.
3la
56(f). Rule 56(f) allows a party faced with a motion
for summary judgment to request additional discovery, and
the Supreme Court has suggested that such a request be
granted when “the nonmoving party has not had an oppor-
tunity to make full discovery.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326.
Here too we will reverse only if there was an abuse of dis-
cretion. Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132,
1137 (2d Cir. 1994). Doubtless, more discovery might
have been helpful, but in a case this complex the informa-
tion falling within the broad purview of federal discovery
is almost without limit. In this light it is hard to fault the
district court for placing limitations on discovery. Given
the circumstances of this case, we see no abuse of discre-
tion either in its discovery orders or its decision rejecting
the appellants’ Rule 56(f) motions.
D. Expert Opinion
A final contested issue common to most of the claims
involved in the instant case concerns the district court’s
evaluation of the scientific expert opinion of Dr. Kirk W.
Brown, a Professor of Soil and Crop Sciences at Texas
A&M University. The coalitions relied on Dr. Brown’s
affidavit as crucial evidence in opposing the appellees’
summary judgment motions. Before discussing the district
court’s assessment of Dr. Brown’s affidavit, a brief review
of the contents of the affidavit is necessary.
1. Expert's Credentials and Methodology
Dr. Brown holds a masters degree from Cornell Uni-
versity and a doctorate in agronomy from the University
of Nebraska. He has written more than 150 scholarly,
scientific articles and a book dealing with the disposal and
treatment of hazardous waste substances. His professional
qualifications make him an expert witness, and the district
court so found. See Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at 543.
Dr. Brown submitted an affidavit in support of the
coalitions’ position that appellees were potentially re-
32a
sponsible parties at both landfill sites. In preparing this
sworn statement, he reviewed numerous reports including,
most significantly, six reports relating to the Laurel Park
landfill and three reports discussing the Beacon Heights
landfill.” After examining these reports, the expert was of
the opinion that “there [were] CERCLA hazardous sub-
stances present in each and every leachate sample from
these landfills.” Dr. Brown did not personally visit the
landfills or dig up any shovelfuls of waste, but he was not
required to do so.
He studied EPA reports concerning municipal and in-
dustrial landfills in the United States and he set forth the
types of hazardous substances found in waste streams gen-
erated by households, commercial establishments, institu-
tions, and industries. He used these reports to generate
lists of the wastes and CERCLA hazardous substances rou-
tinely discarded by typical households, commercial estab-
lishments, institutions, and industries during the time pe-
riod relevant to this case. After comparing the concentra-
tions of hazardous substances in the leachates from the
two landfills with the concentrations generally found in
municipal solid waste landfills in the United States, he con-
cluded, in his expert opinion, that the waste streams dis-
posed of in the two landfills were similar to the landfills
he had studied and that they contained CERCLA hazard-
ous substances.
Further, Dr. Brown read the statements that the various
appellees made in their deposition testimony and read
other documents relevant to the kind of waste disposed of
by each appellee. His comments varied for each appellee.
5 Some appellees claimed that Brown never studied the two land-
fills involved in this litigation or that he failed to investigate the
landfill wastes. This is patently wrong. Particularly mendacious
is the implicit claim by Manafort Brothers, E. Eric Arsan Refuse,
NRS Carting, and Zollo Drum that none of the studies used by Dr.
Brown dealt with the relevant landfills. This contention is wholly
contradicted by the record.
33a
Based on the available information, he meticulously linked
the types of wastes, including identification of specific
products discarded by each defendant, with specific
CERCLA hazardous substances. His analysis relied on a
series of studies and reports that showed which known
CERCLA hazardous substances are in specfiic waste prod-
ucts. This allowed him to correlate the specific wastes dis-
posed of by each appellee to specific hazardous substances.
For example, when a party admitted to disposing of
tire products, Dr. Brown explained which hazardous sub-
stances are found in normal tire products. Although he
could not swear with absolute certainty that the tire prod-
ucts disposed by a specific appellee were similar to normal
tire products, such absolute certainty is not required to op-
pose successfully a summary judgment motion; rather, at
the summary judgment stage, the trial judge must decide
only whether a reasonable jury could find liability by a
preponderance of the evidence. Further, when the ap-
pellees failed to submit any evidence to distinguish the
products of which they disposed from those addressed by
Dr. Brown in his affidavit, Dr. Brown’s probabilistic evi-
dence stands largely uncontradicted. Moreover, each and
every type of product disposed of need not contain hazard-
ous substances. Any amount of such substances is suffi-
cient to create liability.
2. Admissibility of Brown Affidavit
Although the district court agreed that Dr. Brown was
an expert, and that his evidence could be admissible
against certain parties, it apparently did not place much
weight on the affidavit. It ruled that the expert’s sworn
statement was not controlling for non-municipal genera-
tors, id. at 544, and that it could not be applied to the
municipal generators because no adequate foundation for
its acceptance had been laid. Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at
189. More specifically, the district court added, Dr.
Brown’s “references to facts, without specification, in vari-
34a
ous documents relied on, are insufficient to make his
opinions relevant.” Jd. It therefore rejected the affidavit
as lacking “probative merit” because it did not rely on
“direct evidence.” /d. at 184. In addition, the court ex-
pressly weighted the affidavit against the backdrop of the
EPA Municipal Policy, according to which the EPA made
certain enforcement decisions. /d. at 188.
Our view of this affidavit and its probative worth differs
dramatically from that of the district court. This is partly
because it is difficult for us to imagine an expert with
more experience and knowledge in the hazardous sub-
stances field than Dr. Brown, and partly because we find
his affidavit to be carefully researched, detailed, and di-
rectly relevant to this case. As will become clear when we
consider each appellee’s case individually, we think the
trial court assessed the weight of conflicting proof, in effect
substituting its judgment for that of the jury. See /n Re
Joint E. & S§. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1133
(2d Cir. 1995) (applying the rule prohibiting such a prac-
tice). Environmental science, like epidemiology, “is ill-
suited to lead a factfinder toward definitive answers, deal-
ing as it does in statistical probabilities.” Jd. Here there
was only one expert opinion before the court, and the
court was obliged not to ignore it. Because Dr. Brown re-
viewed nine studies concerning the subject landfills, his
affidavit was laid on a proper foundation.
When deciding a motion for summary judgment, only
admissible evidence may be considered. Tamarin v. Adam
Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). Where
scientific knowledge will assist a trier of fact to determine
an issue of fact, an expert witness “may testify . . . in the
form of an opinion or otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.
Summary evidence is admissible when the underlying docu-
ments are admissible and are made available to the ad-
verse party. Tamarin, 13 F.3d at 53. Here, where the
reports used by Dr. Brown are of the sort ordinarily relied
on by experts in forming opinions within their field of
pel tama bal
35a
expertise, the reports need not be admissible at trial, see
Fed. R. Evid. 703, and need not actually be attached to
the affidavit to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See laco-
belli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25
(2d Cir. 1994). An expert’s testimony, in order to be
admissible under Rule 705, need not detail all the facts
and data underlying his opinion in order to present that
opinion. See Fed. R. Evid. 705; Ambrosini v. Labar-
rague, 966 F.2d 1464, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1992). At any
rate, the Brown affidavit does provide the specific facts
required by Rule 56(e), see id. at 1470, when he explains
which specific hazardous substances are found in each
waste disposed of by each appellee.
Nor is the Brown affidavit “junk science” of the sort
that should be rejected under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Dr. Brown
relied on the methodology and data typically used and ac-
cepted jn these sorts of cases, see lacobelli, 32 F.3d at 25,
and his testimony would therefore be admissible under
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95. Moreover, if the appellees
honestly believe this scientific evidence is weak, they
should cross-examine him vigorously at trial and present
contrary evidence to refute his findings and conclusions.
Id. at 596. This is the traditional and appropriate means
of attacking admissible evidence with which one disagrees.
Id. In addition, given that CERCLA hazardous substances
are listed at 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, Table 302.4, we cannot
agree that because the Brown affidavit stated whether a
given hazardous substance was one listed by CERCLA, it
therefore improperly drew a legal conclusion. See United
States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances Consist-
ing of an Undetermined Number of Cans of Rainbow
Foam Paint, 34 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[{E]xperts
are not permitted to present testimony in the form of legal
conclusions.” ).
The cases appellees cite in opposition are unpersuasive.
For instance, Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat’!
36a
Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (7th Cir.
1989), involved a seven-sentence-long expert affidavit de-
void of factual references or reasoning. By contrast, Dr.
Brown’s affidavit is 141 pages long, every conclusion in it
is drawn with reference to specific facts or explanations.
It explains precisely what was reviewed and the general
bases for his opinion.
The district court also incorrectly compared the affi-
davit with the “second-hand and factually spare” affidavit
involved in Chandler v. Coughlin, 763 F.2d 110, 113 (2d
Cir. 1985). See Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 189. Dr.
Brown’s extensive use of reports from the relevant facili-
ties, the information found in discovery materials, and past
scientific studies make his expert opinion highly probative.
Dr. Brown relied in part on the information provided by
the appellees, and he considered what sorts of hazardous
substances are ordinarily found in the specific kinds of
waste disposed of by appellees. This is a permissible ap-
proach for an expert witness in a case such as this. An
examination of the Brown affidavit’s detail demonstrates
that the affidavit was thorough and well-supported, unlike
the affidavit in Chandler, which was only a few para-
graphs long.
Again, were the Brown affidavit the kind of evidence
insufficient for a case to survive summary judgment under
CERCLA, the Act’s scope would be sharply limited.
People and companies often dispose of waste without
knowing its contents. In future lawsuits, once hazardous
substances were discovered in a given facility, the gener-
ators would only need say that they could not recall what
was in their waste. Because plaintiffs usually lack direct
evidence that a defendant dumped hazardous substances,
the potentially responsible parties would only be found
liable in those rare instances in which a so-called “smoking
gun” is discovered, cf. Chambers v. TRM Copy Crtrs.
Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (“smoking guns”
rarely found in litigation), and the broad, remedial pur-
pose of the Act would thereby be defeated.
itt oan all
37a
Of course, a CERCLA plaintiff is not required to prove
its case with scientific certainty; a preponderance of the
evidence is enough. Cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.
385, 400 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(discussing Title VII cases). While certainty is an ideal
pursued by scientists and courts alike, it is not always a
realistic goal in environmental science, where certainty
can be elusive. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25
& n.52 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
Although we find Dr. Brown’s affidavit highly probative,
it is not dispositive of the issues at bar. Defendants may
of course produce proof showing why their waste—tire
products, for example—did not include the hazardous sub-
stances ordinarily found in tire products. It is up to the
factfinder ultimately to determine whether Dr. Brown’s
opinion together with other evidence presented by the co-
alitions is sufficient to establish appellees’ liability.
Because disputed factual issues exist, summary judg-
ment—which the appellants request—may not be granted
in their favor either. Expert testimony was essential in
this complex environmental litigation to help comprehend
scientific data and determine whether the chemicals covered
by CERCLA as hazardous substances were contained in
appellees’ waste. It was error to reject Dr. Brown’s written
testimony that the wastes did contain such substances, par-
ticularly in the absence of any expert evidence to the con-
trary. The affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact
in most of the cases before us, and therefore the grants
of summary judgment in such cases were improper.
III. Case-By-Case Review
We pass to a review of 85 cases on an individual basis.
Our review of the district court’s decisions granting sum-
mary judgment is de novo. E.g., Randell v. United States,
64 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
64 U.S.L.W. 3808 (U.S. May 28, 1996). Because their
disposition is duplicative of much of our earlier discussion,
38a
we have placed this review in the Appendix at the end of
this opinion. The Appendix contains a brief discussion of
the district court’s ruling, found generally in Murtha II],
840 F. Supp. at 183-91. In each case, unless otherwise
indicated, we reverse and remand the case to the district
court.
IV. The Governments’ Response Costs Claims
We turn next to the government’s litigation to recover
response costs. The United States and Connecticut (col-
lectively, the governments) both appeal the district court’s
decisions concerning their lawsuits against several non-
settling potentially responsible parties for unreimbursed
costs. Murtha IV, 855 F. Supp. at 546. We deal initially
with the claim raised by the United States (U.S.), and we
then consider briefly that of the State of Connecticut
(State).
The U.S. makes two principal claims of error. First, it
contends that the district court improperly considered the
$1.975 million received by the Laurel Park Coalition
under the Murtha consent decree as funds received by the
government. Second, the U.S. asserts that judgment on the
pleadings was inappropriate because the cost summaries it
submitted to the district court showed unreimbursed re-
sponse costs. Before we examine these specific conten-
tions, we begin with a review of the relevant CERCLA
law.
A. Governing CERCLA Law
The Act addresses the treatment of both settling and
non-settling defendants:
A person who has resolved its liability to the United
States or a State in an administrative or judicially
approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settle-
ment. Such settlement does not discharge any of the
39a
other potentially liable persons unless its terms so
provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the
others by the amount of the settlement.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). In short, the Act provides that
when, as here, a settlement addresses past and future
costs, the non-settling defendants’ liability to the govern-
ment for those costs is reduced by the amount of the settle-
ment. However, the non-settling defendants will still be
held accountable for the remainder of the government’s
response costs, and that liability will be reduced only by
the amount of the settlement rather than by the pro rata
share attributable to the settling parties. In other words,
non-settling defendants may bear disproportionate liability
for their acts. See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-
Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). Further, as a means
of encouraging settlements, only settling parties are guar-
anteed not to be liable for future contributions regarding
the subjects addressed in the settlement.
As such, § 9613(f)(2) strengthens the federal policy
of encouraging CERCLA settlements. Elsewhere the Act
specifically asks that the government enter into CERCLA
settlements “in order to expedite effective remedial actions
and minimize litigation.” § 9622(a). Courts considering
CERCLA cases have recognized that the usual federal pol-
icy favoring settlements is even stronger in the CERCLA
context. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 677, 692-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also United
States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir.
1990).
- Responsible parties are liable for “any . . . necessary
costs of response incurred [that are} consistent with the
national contingency plan.” § 9607(a)(4)(B). The
Act also states that “[t]he terms ‘respond’ or ‘response’
mean[{] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action,”
and these terms include “enforcement activities related
40a
thereto.” §9601(25). Thus, the government’s recover-
able response costs properly include not only the obvious
costs of remediation, but also include inter alia, attorneys’
fees,” United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200
(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 73 (1995), in-
direct administrative costs, United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1504 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1057 (1990), studies conducted for remedia-
tion, City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609,
618 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and even prejudgment interest,
§$ 9607(a). The response costs’ consistency with the na-
tional contingency plan is presumed; the defendant bears
the burden of proving inconsistency, and it must show “that
the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in choosing a
particular response action.” United States v. Hardage,
982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 913 (1993); R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1508. With
this legal background in mind, we consider the govern-
ment’s contentions.
B. District Court Decision
As discussed earlier, the Beacon Heights Coalition and
the U.S. agreed that the Beacon Heights Coalition would
pay for the remediation at the Beacon Heights landfill and
would pay the government for its future non-remediation
responses costs in excess of $500,000. The Laurel Park
Coalition agreed to conduct subsequent remediation at
Laurel Park and to pay for the U.S.’s future oversight
costs in excess of $200,000. Murtha paid $5,375,000 to
® The appellees contend that Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994), forecloses any claim by the government
that enforcement costs can include attorneys’ fees. We disagree.
Key Tronic denied private parties the right to recover attorneys’
fees in a suit for contribution brought against the United States.
The Court specifically “offer[ed] no comment on the extent to which
th[e] phrase [“enforcement activities”’] forms the basis for the
Government’s recovery of attorney’s fees through § [9607].” Jd. at
1967.
4la
discharge its owner and operator liability at both landfills.
The Murtha settlement proceeds were divided among
several parties: $1,875,000 went to the Beacon Heights
Coalition and $322,500 to the government for Beacon
Heights response costs. At Laurel Park, the U.S. and the
State were each paid $625,000 for past response costs. The
remaining $1,975,000, initially placed in a registry account
with the district court, was used for Laurel Park remedia-
tion by the Laurel Park Coalition. Had that coalition not
formed within 18 months, the governments would have
received the money for remediation at Laurel Park. How-
ever, when the coalition was formed, the precondition was
met, and the money moved directly from the registry ac-
count to the Laurel Park Coalition.
Several non-settling parties claimed that all response
costs incurred by both the U.S. and the State were covered
by the Murtha settlement and the settlements with the two
coalitions, accordingly those non-settling parties moved for
judgment on the pleadings. The district court agreed, find-
ing that the entire amount of the Murtha consent decree
($5.375 million) minus the amount paid to the Beacon
Heights Coalition ($1.875 million) had to be credited
against any unreimbursed past costs of the U.S. and Con-
necticut. Murtha IV, 855 F. Sup. at 546. By so holding,
the district court credited the $1.975 million set aside for
Laurel Park cleanup, and later given to the Laurel Park
Coalition, against the government’s response costs.
The district court stated that “[n]Jeither EPA nor DEP
present[ed] figures for incurred response costs not covered
by the net Murtha settlement” of $3.5 million ($5,375
million minus the $1.875 million given to the Beacon
Heights Coalition). /d. Holding that § 9613(f)(2) re-
quired that the non-settling defendants be credited with
the full amount of the settlement (instead of reducing the
government’s unreimbursed costs by only the amounts it
actually received), id. at 547, the trial court found that
42a
this amount, along with funds received from the coalitions,
totally wiped out all response costs incurred by the U.S.
and the State. It therefore granted judgment on the
pleadings.
On the government’s and the State’s response costs ap-
peal, Armstrong Rubber Company, The Eastern Company,
Kerite Company, Primerica, Inc., and George Clark are
Beacon Heights appellees, and Atlantic Ritchfield Com-
pany, The Eastern Company, and Gerald Metals, Inc., are
Laurel Park appellees.
C. Judgment on the Pleadings Reversed
The government contends first that the district court im-
properly included the $1.975 million that Murtha agreed
to pay for Laurel Park remediation as funds received by
the government. We agree with the government for several
reasons. In our view, the government had neither posses-
sion nor actual control over the $1.975 million given to
the Laurel Park Coalition. All parties agree that this por-
tion of the money from the Murtha decree was deposited
in a court registry account. It was then released to that
coalition upon its formation. The district court took a
contrary position, holding that the governments “had con-
trol and thus constructive possession of the settlement.”
Murtha IV, 855 F. Supp. at 547. Similarly, appellees con-
tend that because the United States did not have to enter
into an agreement with an industrial coalition for the
clean-up of Laurel Park, the government effectively con-
trolled the $1.975 million. However, because the Laurel
Park Coalition’s consent decree (forming the Laurel Park
Coalition) was entered by the court one day after the
Murtha consent decree was entered, the contingency re-
quired for the government to receive the Laurel Park
funds—non-formation of the coalition—never occurred.
We decline to adopt the district court’s expansive un-
derstanding of “possession.” Just as the district court did
hls We St PST
i te ih at oe es I RS
43a
not credit the government or the State with receipt of the
$1.875 million that the Murtha settlement allocated to the
Beacon Heights Coalition, it should not have credited the
government with receipt of the $1.975 million allocated
under the terms of the Murtha settlement to the Laurel
Park Coalition.
But even if we accepted the district court’s “construc-
tive possession” theory, we would still conclude that the
district court failed to consider that this money was spent
for remediation at the Laurel Park landfill. Hence, if the
$1.975 million had been received by the government, it
would follow that the government should then immediately
have been credited for spending the money for remediation
at Laurel Park—the money would have been part of the
incurred response costs. The government recognizes that
“[t]he sums cancel each other out,” and no one disputes
that the money was ultimately used for future response
costs at Laurel Park. The appellees may be correct that
this arrangement does not qualify as a mixed-funding re-
imbursement under § 9622(b)(1), but that does not make
the arrangement impermissible under CERCLA, a broad
remedial statute designed to promote settlements.
The settlements forged by the government furthered
important interests advanced by CERCLA: multi-party
settlements and quick remediation. By agreeing to the
Murtha settlement, in which Murtha set aside $1.975
million for the Laurel Park Coalition for oversight costs,
the government encouraged the formation of that coalition,
which will now undertake remediation. This is precisely
the sort of creative settlement that the government and
private parties should endeavor to craft in the future. In
sum, the district court should not have reduced the non-
settling defendants’ liability to the government by the
$1.975 million paid by Murtha to the Laurel Park Coali-
tion under the Murtha consent agreement.
44a
We also agree with the governments that unreimbursed
response costs at both facilities still may remain, and that
judgment on the pleadings was therefore inappropriate.
Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(c), may only be granted when the pleadings show
that it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957). Hence, if the cost summaries submitted by the
U.S. and the State support the relief sought, judgment
on the pleadings was inappropriate. The government con-
tends that the district court treated this motion as a sum-
mary judgment motion under Rule 56 without giving the
government notice of its intention to do such. If this is
what the district court did, it was error. See Sellers v.
M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.
1988). However, because we believe the district court in-
correctly interpreted the Act, we need not address this
point.
The government submitted cost summaries on June 10,
1993 for both landfill sites. For Beacon Heights, the U.S.
claimed that even though it had collected $356,508.06
from the Murtha consent decree, $2,855,334.35 remained
as total outstanding costs. At Laurel Park, the U.S. col-
lected $690,906.02 from the Murtha consent decree and
$500,000.00 from the coalition for past costs, leaving the
U.S. with $2,187,109.01 in outstanding costs. These cost
summaries are supported by affidavits and other docu-
mentation. Based on its submissions, the government could
prove facts entitling it to relief.
It is true that the coalitions will be paying most of the
government’s future costs. The Laurel Park Coalition
will pay oversight costs in excess of $200,000, and the
Beacon Heights Coalition will pay oversight costs in excess
of $500,000. The Beacon Heights appellees claim that be-
cause the government incurred $1.1 million in response
45a
costs before the Beacon Heights Coalition’s consent decree
and because the Beacon Heights Coalition will pay for all
oversight costs over $500,000, the government’s costs are
effectively “capped” at $1.6 million. The Laurel Park
appellees make a similar argument regarding the govern-
ment’s response costs at that coalition’s landfill site, de-
claring they are capped at $4.5 million ($4.3 million spent
by the U.S. before the Laurel Park Coalition’s consent
decree and $200,000 not paid by that coalition). But the
government’s costs are not limited to the oversight costs
(which the coalitions have agreed to repay). The non-
settling defendants might still be liable for other enforce-
ment costs, such as attorneys’ fees and prejudgment
interest.
Further, even if future response costs are somewhat
speculative, the government is still entitled to declaratory
relief under CERCLA. See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1994).
As the entry of a declaratory judgment of liability for
future costs is mandatory under the Act, the government
should (if ultimately successful on remand) be granted
declaratory relief in this action despite its failure properly
to preserve this issue for appeal. See United States v.
Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir.) (explaining
that where an issue was not properly preserved, appellate
court may grant relief where such relief would be available
in an independent action), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843
(1993).
The Beacon Heights appellees also contend that the
provision in § 9613(f)(2) that non-settling defendants
should have their liability reduced by “the amount of the
settlement” refers to the total amount of money provided
to all parties in a settlement. As a consequence, they main-
tain, because the Murtha settlement did not just provide
money to the government for Beacon Heights remediation
but also allotted $1.875 million to the Beacon Heights
Coalition, this $1.875 million should also be counted
46a
when reducing the non-settlors’ liability. However, the
district court never questioned that the $1.875 million
given to the Beacon Heights Coalition should not be
counted against the government. The U.S. correctly ex-
plains that the appellees’ theory would lead to absurd re-
sults. Consider the following hypothetical: The govern-
ment and a state settle their claims with a landfill owner
for $2 million, with each receiving $1 million. Each
government has spent $2 million in response costs. Under
the appelles’ theory, even though the federal government
only received $1 million, its recoverable responses costs
would be reduced by $2 million and therefore erased. This
is too preposterous to be maintained.
Finally, we believe that the disputes in this case over
the accounting techniques used by the government raise
fact questions inappropriate for determination on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings. The government has met
the limited showing required to avoid judgment on the
pleadings.
D. State of Connecticut's Claim
Connecticut’s claims on this appeal arise exclusively out
of the Laurel Park landfill site. The State asserts it has
incurred a total of $2,546,224.02 in response costs, in-
cluding the costs for the installation of a water system and
a new sewerline, as well as investigation expenses. The
State contends that after it received funds from the Laurel
Park Coalition’s consent decree and the Murtha decree,
$760,125.00 of unreimbursed response costs remained.
As explained above, the district court incorrectly credited
to the State a portion of the Murtha settlement that was
paid to the Laurel Park Coalition. See Murtha IV, 855
F. Supp. at 547. Therefore, decision entering judgment
against the State must also be reversed.
47a
V. Summary Judgments Against United States
The government sued John and Joseph Betkoski, own-
ers of the Beacon Heights facility until 1970 (when
Murtha purchased the facility) and Richard Zollo, an
alleged transporter of hazardous substances to the same
landfill. All three were granted summary judgment by the
district court, which concluded that the government failed
to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to their liability.
In the case of Richard Zollo, we again note that sua
sponte summary judgment should generally only be
granted after the losing party is given notice and an oppor-
tunity to present evidence and arguments in opposition.
In any event, here the evidence before the court was
sufficient for the government to survive summary judg-
ment. The government submitted an affidavit that sum-
marized certain EPA records concerning Zollo’s disposal
of waste at Beacon Heights. It also presented a letter
from a waste generator serviced by Zollo that listed the
chemicals present in its waste. This letter and other docu-
ments showed that Zollo transported to the landfill various
materials (such as waste oil, waste chemicals, liquid paint,
heavy sludges, paint residue, and latex scrap material)
containing hazardous substances. And, Zollo admitted in
an interrogatory submitted to the EPA he had transported
waste from several companies to Beacon Heights. These
papers raised a genuine issue of material fact, and sum-
mary judgment was therefore inappropriate.
We also conclude that the district court should not
have granted summary judgment to the Betkoskis. If gen-
uinely disputed material facts remain concerning whether
Zollo transported hazardous substances to Beacon Heights,
it is hard to see how the Betkoskis can obtain summary
judgment. They owned the Beacon Heights landfill during
the time when Zollo allegedly transported chemical wastes
to the site, and would therefore be directly liable under the
Act. Moreover, the Betkoskis did not show the absence of
48a
disputed material facts and therefore failed to carry their
burden at this stage of the litigation. Joseph Betkoski
only claimed that he “never disposed of any waste” at the
site and John Betkoski simply stated that he had no knowl-
edge that any hazardous waste was disposed at Beacon
Heights. However, the Betkoskis’ liability turns on neither
their disposal, nor their knowledge of any disposal of
hazardous substances at the landfill; it depends solely on
their ownership at a time when hazardous substances were
deposited at the landfill.
Because we hold that summary judgment was inappro-
priate, the rulings against the United States and in favor
of the Betkoskis and Richard Zollo must be reversed
and those cases must be remanded.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, as indicated, we affirm the judgment
appealed from in part, and reverse the judgment, in part,
and remand to the district court to conduct further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
49a
APPENDIX
Case-By-Case Review
Review of the grant of summary judgment in 85 cases
A. Successor Liability Cases
Earlier we explained the propert test for successor
liability under CERCLA. As the district court relied on a
different test, we must vacate all grants of summary judg-
ment premised on the absence of successor liability. On
remand, the district court should reconsider its decisions in
light of today’s opinion. Should any material facts remain
genuinely disputed, summary judgment should not be
cranted.
Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined Claims:
* Jacob Brothers, Inc.: The district court found that the
currently constituted Jacob Brothers, Inc. did not assume
the CERCLA liability of a previously formed corporation
with the same name. Specifically, in 1925 a corporation
named Jacob Brothers, Inc. was formed. This company
later became known as Brothers Scrap, Inc. In 1987, a
different company, Michael Schiavone & Sons, purchased
some of the assets of the original “Jacob Brothers, Inc.”
The acquiring company then assigned its rights and duties
under the acquisition to a newly formed corporation,
“Connecticut Iron and Metal, Inc.,” which later assumed
the name “Jacob Brothers, Inc.” Apparently there is a
factual dispute over whether this appellee purchased a por-
tion of the former Jacob Brothers’ assets or substantially
all of its assets. On remand the district court should de-
cide whether, in light of our opinion, there is a genuine
material fact in dispute.
* Seymour Brass, Inc.: This appellee, which purchased
the “assets and business” of The Seymour Brass Turning
Company, was granted summary judgment based on the
absence of successor liability.
50a
Beacon Heights Only:
* Connecticut Pharmacare, Inc. d/b/a Ford Pharmacy
and Medical Supply: This business acknowledged disposal
of general rubbish, including empty boxes, packing mate-
rials, empty or broken bottles of cleansers and prescription
medicines, empty containers and paper. The president of
the corporation denied sending hazardous substances to the
Beacon Heights landfill “with the possible exception of
such trace substances . . . alleged to be included in general
rubbish.” Dr. Brown concluded that several hazardous
substances were found in the appellee’s waste that were
also found in both landfills.
The district court ruled against the Beacon Heights
Coalition rejecting the proof in the Brown affidavit and
ruling that trace amounts of hazardous substances were
insufficient to create CERCLA liability. It also rejected
the coalition’s argument concerning successor liability
under CERCLA. We reverse and remand on all three
grounds.
* NRS Carting Co., Inc.: The district court granted sum-
mary judgment on the question of successor liability.
NRS’s contention that it was not a successor to Norwalk
Refuse Service (Norwalk), but only purchased some com-
mercial customer routes, equipment, and containers from
Norwatk, presents a fact question regarding successor
liability.
* Zollo Drum Company, Inc. (ZDC): The district court
granted summary judgment to ZDC (a corporation run by
Anthony Zollo) and rejected the Beacon Heights Coali-
tion’s argument that ZDC should be liable for the acts of
a prior sole proprietorship operated by Richard Zollo
(Anthony’s father) which was later sold to ZDC.
B. Transporter Liability Cases
The district court rejected the Beacon Heights Coali-
tion’s claims against three Beacon Heights appellees—Dee’s,
Inc., Frank Perrotti & Sons, Inc., and Manafort Brothers,
S5la
Inc./Connecticut Waste Processing, Inc.—partly for the
same reasons it rejected the claims against the generators
and partly because the court found that these transporters
did not select the site of disposal. On remand, the district
court should consider whether summary judgment remains
appropriate in these three cases in light of our discussion
of transporter liability and the other issues addressed in
our opinion.
C. Sua Sponte Dismissals
As noted, the district court dismissed claims sua sponte
against 32 appellees (listed below) for “want of substan-
tiation.” While district courts have authority to take such
action in complex cases involving dozens of summary
judgment motions, the district court could not grant sua
sponte summary judgment without giving the coalition
notice and an opportunity to adduce evidence in opposi-
tion. Here, because these appellees made no motion for
summary judgment, no opposition papers were prepared
by the coalitions. This procedure leaves us without the
benefit of a record in these cases.
These 32 sua sponte grants of summary judgment must
be reversed and the trial court may again consider sua
sponte summary judgment after giving appellants ten days
to come forward with their evidence. It should then con-
sider that evidence in light of the legal standards we have
enunciated and determine if summary judgment is appro-
priate.
°° Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined Claims:
* Ashmore Trucking Company, Thomas Ashmore, George
Clark, Gerald Metals.
** Laurel Park Only: John Ashmore, Northeast Utilities /
Connecticut Light & Power Co., Quality Rubber Prod-
ucts.
°° Beacon Heights Only: Armand’s Auto Service, Beacon
Outing Club, John Betkoski, Edward Betkoski, Boise
52a
Cascade, Brass Rail Restaurant/Cafe, Capozziello Broth-
ers, C.R. Gibson, E. Eric Arsan Refuse, Elk’s Lodge
# 967, George’s Floor Covering, High Ridge Homes/
Apartments, Korvette Services, Latella Carting Co., Long
Meadow Cafe, Nelson Mendes, Naugatuck, Y.M.C.A.,
Peter Paul Cadbury, Ray’s Hardware, David Rupsis,
Sperry Rand Corporation, Triangle Services, Turner Con-
struction, Vieria Agency.
D. Municipal Generators
The district court considered the municipal appellees as
a single group and granted summary judgment dismissing
the coalitions’ actions against them. In so doing it ruled
that wastes that were not themselves listed as hazardous,
but which incorporated components that were hazardous
wastes, did not bring disposers of such waste within
CERCLA. The court also ruled that liability does not lie
if the waste disposed of would release a hazardous sub-
stance only on the intervention of another force. Further,
it weighed the Brown affidavit with other evidence and
found it wanting. In our view these rulings were error.
“Liability under CERCLA depends only on the pres-
ence in any form of listed hazardous substances.” Murtha
I, 958 F.2d at 1201. The district court, in support of its
holding, stated that the coalitions “provided no analysis or
authority to the contrary.” Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at
188. But in fact, the Beacon Heights Coalition referred
the court to the very passage in Murtha I just quoted.
The second ruling erroneously required the appellants
to prove causation for the release. Further, in weighing
the Brown affidavit against the backdrop of the EPA
Municipal Policy and deciding against pursuing the muni-
cipal generators as potentially responsible parties, the trial
court found that spot checks conducted by the municipali-
ties “substantially undercut” Brown’s affidavit. Murtha III,
840 F. Supp. at 189. This is precisely the sort of weighing
of evidence in which courts may not engage when deciding
53a
summary judgment motions. See United States v. Rem,
38 F.3d 634, 644 (2d Cir. 1994) (“On a motion for
summary judgment, the court is not to weigh the evidence
or . . . resolve issues of fact, but only to determine
whether there are issues to be tried.”). Moreover, the
EPA’s decision whether or not to charge these appellees
as potentially responsible parties is not relevant when
determining liability.
We remand as to the following 19 municipal generators:
°° Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined Claims:
Town of Beacon Falls, Town of Bethany, Connecticut Re-
source Recovery Authority, Town of Hamden, Town of
Killingworth, Town of Middlebury, Borough of Nauga-
tuck, Town of Orange, Town of Plymouth, Town of Sey-
mour, Town of Thomaston, City of Waterbury.
** Laurel Park only: New Haven Housing Authority,
Watertown Housing Authority, Town of Watertown, Town
of Woodbury.
** Beacon Heights only: City of Milford, Town of Strat-
ford, Town of Westport.
E. Remaining Cases"
1. Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined
Claims
There are 27 remaining cases for which a brief explana-
tion follows:
* Adams Service Station (Adams): This motorcycle
and snowmobile business was managed by Stanley P.
Radauskas from 1954 until 1982. Radauskas explained
that the service station disposed of “cardboard boxes, mis-
cellaneous packing materials, and a small amount of paper
office trash.” In deposition testimony, he also acknowl-
7 Cases against the following defendants were voluntarily dis-
missed: P. Francini & Co.; Ideal Manufacturing Co.; Jetzon Tire
Co.; Litton Systems, Inc.; and Sanitary Refuse Co.
54a
edged the disposal of windshield cleaning fluid, plastic
bags, used paper gaskets from motorcycles, spark plugs,
and light bulbs. Radauskas claimed that “none of the
[wastes] disposed of by the service station . . . contained
any [CERCLA hazardous substances].” After reviewing
these facts, Dr. Brown concluded that Adams’ waste in-
cluded lead, trichloroethane, and trichloroethylene, three
CERCLA hazardous substances found in the Beacon
Heights Landfill.
Although the district court concluded that none of the
products disposed of are listed by EPA as hazardous sub-
stances, the products have component parts that are haz-
ardous substances. Hence, the waste allegedly disposed of
by Adams falls within CERCLA.
* Bristol Flowed Gasket Company (BFGC): BFGC
produces metal stampings. Murtha removed BFGC’s “gen-
eral rubbish, including cardboard, [office] waste basket
contents, garbage from the company cafeteria, junk mail,
and floor sweepings.” Dr. Brown concluded that these
wastes commonly include several CERCLA hazardous
substances, including methylene chloride, benzene, tri-
chloroethane, and diethyl phthalate. All of these sub-
stances were found at the landfills.
The district court relied on the EPA’s decision not to
designate BFGC as a potentially responsible party and also
found that no direct evidence of BFGC’s disposal of haz-
ardous substances was produced.
* The Coffee Shop: This Wat
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