petition — Zollo Drum Co. v. B. F. Goodrich Co.

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oy. 241 sur25 9m

No. SCE UF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER. TERM, 1996

ZOLLO DRUM COMPANY, INC. and

NRS CarRTING CoMPANY, INC.,

. Petitioners,

B.F. Goopricii Co., Dow CorNnInG Corp., HOECHST

CELANESE CoRP., REYNOLDS ALUMINUM BUILDING

Propucts Co., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.,

UPJOHN Co., and WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM G. BECK

Counsel of Record

ALOK AHUJA

LATHROP & GAGE L.C.

2345 Grand Boulevard

Kansas City, MO 64108

(816) 292-2000

NICHOLAS J. HARDING

KOSLOFF & HARDING

28 North Main Street

West Hartford, CT 06107

Dated: July 23, 1997 Counsel for the Petitioners

PEATIGDR PR

WILSON - Epes PRINTING Co., INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether federal common law overrides state corpora-

tion law limitations on the imposition of successor liability

on asset purchasers in cases under the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act

(“CERCLA” or “Superfund” ), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.

(i)

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The proceedings in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit consisted of four consolidated ap-

peals concerning the cleanups of the Beacon Heights and

Laurel Park Landfills in Connecticut. In addition to the

petitioners (who were defendants-appellees below) and

respondents (who were plaintiffs-appellants), the parties

to the proceedings below were: plaintiffs-appellants United

States of America, State of Connecticut, Environmental

Waste Resources, Inc., Kerite Company, Unisys Corpora-

tion, Risdon Corp., Cadbury Beverages, Inc., Coltec In-

dustries, Inc., Ken-Chas Reserve Co., Naugatuck Glass

Co., and Naugatuck Treatment Co.; and defendants-

appellees John Betkoski, George Clark, Armstrong Rub-

ber Company, Thomas Ashmore, Borough of Naugatuck,

Bristol Flowed Gaskei Company, Connecticut Resources

Recovery Authority, Dee’s, Inc., also known as Dee's

Refuse, Inc., Derby Tire Company, Eastern Company,

General Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc., Gerald Metals,

Inc., C.R. Gibson Company, Hospital Marketing Services

Co., Inc., Ideal Manufacturing Co., Jacob Brothers, Inc.,

Litton Systems, Inc., also Known as Winchester Electronics,

Manafort Brothers, Inc., NASCO, Inc., New Haven Hous-

ing Authority, Northeast Utilities, Frank Perrotti & Sons,

Inc., Quality Rubber Co., Sanitary Refuse Co., Inc., Sey-

mour Brass Turning Co., Sperry Rand Corporation, Stauf-

fer Chemical Company, Town of Middlebury, Town of

Thomaston, Town of Woodbury, Triangle Industries, Inc..,

Turner Construction Company, U.S. Prolam, Inc., Water-

bury Companies, Inc., Watertown Housing Authority,

Atlantic Richfield Co., Adam’s Service Station, Armand’s

Auto Service, High Ridge Apartments, Ashmore Trucking,

Beacon Outing Club, Boise Cascade Corporation, Brass

Rail Restaurant, Coffee Shop, Crelan Construction Co..,

Connecticut Sheet Metal/Wood Co., Daddio’s, David

Rupsis, Edward Betowski, Elk’s Lodge #967, George's

Floor Covering, Horizon Homes, Korvette Services, La-

iil

tella Carting Co., Lombard Bros., Inc., Long Meadow

Care, McDonald’s Restaurant, Meyers & Schwartz, Neal’s

Coffee Shoppe, Nelson Mendes, Portanova Trucking Co.,

Portuguese Club, Ray’s Hardware, Shore’s Auto Parts,

Steve’s Tires, Stop & Shop, Triangle Services, Trowbridge

Apts., Valley Motor Trailer Sales, Valley Mobile Homes

Park, Vieira Agency, Waterbury Pressed Metals, Town of

Bethany, City of Waterbury, Capozziello Brothers, Town

of Killingworth, Town of Beacon Falls, Naugatuck

Y.M.C.A., E. Eric Arsan Refuse, John Ashmore, Joseph

Betkoski, Connecticut Pharmacare, Inc. d/b/a Ford

Pharmacy, First National Supermarkets, Inc., P. Francini

Company, Town of Hamden, Jetzon Tire Co., City of Mil-

ford, Town of Orange, Peter Paul Cadbury, Town of

Plymouth, Town of Seymour, Town of Stratford, Town

of Watertown, and Town of Westport. Pursuant to Rule

12.6, petitioners have notified the Clerk of petitioners’

belief that these parties have no interest in the outcome

of this petition.

iv

RULE 29.6 STATEMENT

Petitioners Zollo Drum Company, Inc. and NRS Cart-

ing Company, Inc. have no parent companies or subsid-

laries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

fe) yt eg 9 keg ~ ) SIRNA PRE ees ontctwaes NNER fren i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW ........... ii

AEE Ae OR yy ew § 1 >» SCR emme Usa eamel mac nan RON ty iv

Re VER Qe ge ise ot he ei > ERM RENO wee R mpmeEr I ie vii

fog tiie 6 5 Fs | SUNN RD aici Mem mien Gaia leer Sse Mas 1

Bs I eisai a See 2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED ................... 2

as Te OO STR CRS acne 2

A. Federal imw Backeroune ..........:......:...... 3

hs SI TORN ioe ae 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION . 7

I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S CREATION OF

FEDERAL COMMON LAW TO OVERRIDE

STATE LAW UNDER CERCLA CONFLICTS

WITH DECISIONS OF THE FIRST, FIFTH,

SIXTH AND ELEVENTH CIRCUITS, AND

AGGRAVATES A CONFLICT WHICH HAS

EVENLY DIVIDED EIGHT COURTS OF

IR 8 BM oo Gciginntintninibectigtn cn ene, ; 10

Il. THE CONFUSED STATE OF EXISTING

LAW IN THE LOWER COURTS HAS CRE-

ATED AN UNACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF

SDV MRe Re URES ES ikea huenkinaccccthe (sis cilietanedactats 15

Ill. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPOR-

SIT EGAN ED RE MAID sreicsdiscsascepsiccueuseccs 20

RUDRA RIE PRD OEI cns-ti is serinseatne cies acisdl teed aopnioasabateie ela eeees 22

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit (Nov. 1, 1996) —........0000.........

APPENDIX B

Opinion of the United States District Court for

the District of Connecticut (Dec. 20, 1993) ..........

APPENDIX C

Opinion of the Second Circuit Denying Rehearing

eG Gel} eae ees Bie URE Sy ae Pes ek

APPENDIX D

Order of the Second Circuit Denying Rehearing in

ns SR Ws BU hee aaltepet

APPENDIX E

Statutory Provisions Involved ..................................

Page

la

63a

84a

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Pro-

ceedings re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp.

1010 (D. Mass. 1989) .. 33 17

Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Iue.. 812

F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Ill. 1993) .............. 17

Anderson v. City of Minnetonka, No. C Vv 3- 90-312,

19983 WL 95361 (D. Minn. Jan. 27, 1993) ..... 17

Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d

1240 (6th Cir. 1991) 5, 10, 12

Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Brown & Bryant,

Inc., No. 96-15529 (9th Cir. argued May 8,

1997) BUN SAAN 10

Atherton v. FDIC, 117 . Ct. 666 (1997) 6, 14, 21

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp.

1261 (E.D. Pa. 1904) 16, 18

Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) 13

Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous Fire & Cas. Co.,

68 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 1995) 11

City Mgmt. Corp. v. U.S. Chem. Co., 43 F.3d 244

(6th Cir. 1994) Sat 10

City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) 21

Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690

(ist Cir. 1984) ........... : Ue SR 10

The Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp.

994 (D. Utah 1996). ... 16, 17

Elf Atochem N. Am. v. U nited States, 908 F. Supp.

275 (E.D. Pa. 1996) ..... 18

Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482

U.S. 27 (1987) RRS Rv ORE ee ZR 19

Gould, Inc. v. Alter Metal Co.., No. 91 C 20! 371,

1994 WL 406576 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1994) . ._ 16,17

Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 950

F. Supp. 653 (M.D. Pa. 1997) ... ; 16, 17

Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec.

ling GEE Velie Be LARTER tentencnrace 19

HRW Systs., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light C 0., 823

F. Supp. 318 (D. Md. 1993) .. ae 17

Hunt’s Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox C. 0.

863 F. Supp. 879 (E.D. Wis. 1994) ..................... 16, 17

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power &

Light Co., 909 F. Supp. 1241 (N.D. Iowa 1993)... 17

John S. Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401

eT i 10 >

Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co., 893 F.2d 80

(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1108

2 | RNR ete RRR Ree ame pin pe Moe pee pa OA SIRE SSE SU 11,12

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90

2-2} feta iimtetaet cre etcrilesse saleaatent fer ace emcee be hie Pa 13

Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs. v. Total

Waste Mgmt. Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1136 (D.N.H.

SED il hes ROLE AT ARN II a cbad eho Me OS AR PN 17

Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli

Corp., 4 F.3d 1209 (3d Cir. 1998) ........... NR 11

Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d

Se: RUE Ss, BED ai bie a anda 10, 14, 16, 17

Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers

Corp., 195 B.R. 716 (N.D. Ind. 1996) ................ 17

NLRB v. Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910

Pf we ae, eee ene 19

NLRB v. Hospital San Rafael, Inc., 42 F. 3d 45 (1st

Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995)... 19

North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, 963 F. Supp. 694

(N.D. Til. 1997) ............. discs ectdicaueiclicadablltic ct teabaa vetoed 17

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers

CP GE Rely FE CEIIED ecctesisansSeesiectincnccets 21

Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Re-

search Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Va. 1994).. 16

O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994) ..passim

Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94

Pf Be Ree: Fo Re | Reece eee ener 11, 12

Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.8d 248 (2d Cir. 1996) .... 11

Smith Land & Imprevement Corp. v. Celotex Corp..,

851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.

SR II acta 8. chs cies Beta heieiedsl adi ice saaicoa 10, 14

Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100

5 MERRIE Oy SPO Saree eNae AE SUN Sp OPE 19

Southward v. South Central Ready Miz Supply

Corp., 7 F.3d 487 (6th Cir. 1993)

j

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

State of Arizona v. Esco, No. Civ. 98-0937, 1997

WL 259520 (D. Ariz. March 26, 1997) ...... 17

State of New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co.,

AVG ahem BOO: (ND, 2006) 18

State of New York v, Panex Indus., Inc., No. 94-

CV-0400E(H), 1996 WL 378172 (W.D.N.Y.

SE: i I a ee ee = 17

State of Washington v. United States, 930 F. Supp.

ee A PCa TOE a ie 17

United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc., 824

F. Supp. 46 (E.D. Pa. 1998) ee ; 2 38

United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978

F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1992) . 10, 14, 16

United States v. Cordova Chem. Co., 113 F.8d 572

(6th Cir. 1997) (en banc) AGORA ope mtonba y )Re?

United States v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24

(Ist Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1084

ko BN aM DSN RIN een Retr NAMM CAREC Lie 11

United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No.

1 :CV-93-1482, 1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 138651 (M.D.

Fra. Aug. 32, 1006) ............... 17

United States v. Kimbell Foods, Ine. 440 U. S., 715

(1979) . ..... passim

United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co.., 980 F.2d

478 (8th Cir. 1992) .............. PO Ey i

United States v. Peirce, Nos. 83- CV- 1623, 91- CV-

0039, 92-CV-0562, 1995 WL 356017 (N.D.N.Y.

I ME si ete ee ese hn, 18

Statutes

26 U.S.C. § 59A

oath tg ot Se OTTER TOS EN Ps

26 U.S.C. § 9507 (b) .

le NL SG 5 NRE SOS ee cetera cea

CERCLA § 101(11), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(11)

hh 68 DD CO CO Oo

CERCLA § 101(21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)_.. 2,

CERCLA § 106 (a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9606 (a)

CERCLA § 107 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)

CERCLA § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 9611...

ie)

Ls

co he 00

ae

x

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued

Page

CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (b) ........00........ 4

CERCLA § 113(f) (1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f) (1)...... 2,3

Other Materials

The Business Roundtable, 101 Terms and Facts

on Superfund (Nov. 1998) ................ ee RE ST Sa 20

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

No.

ZOLLO DruM COMPANY, INC. and

NRS CarTING Com PANY, INC.,

. Petitioners,

B.F. Goopricu Co., Dow CORNING CorP., HoECHsT

CELANESE Corp., REYNOLDS ALUMINUM BUILDING

Propucts Co., UNrIROYAL CHEMICAL COMPANY, INC.,

UPJOHN Co., and WHITE CONSOLIDATED INDUSTRIES,

Respondents.

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners Zollo Drum Company, Inc. and NRS Cart-

ing Company, Inc. petition for a writ of certiorari to re-

view the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals is reported at 99

F.3d 505, and is reprinted in the appendix at la-62a. The

court of appeals’ opinion denying rehearing is reported at

112 F.3d 88, and is reprinted in the appendix at 84a-87a.

The decision of the United States District Court for the

District of Connecticut is reported at 840 F. Supp. 180,

and is reprinted in the appendix at 63a-83a.

2

JURISDICTION

The court of appeals issued its decision on November 1,

1996, and denied rehearing on April 25, 1997. This

Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The appendix (at 89a-9la) sets forth verbatim the fol-

lowing statutory provisions: CERCLA § 101(21), 42

U.S.C. § 9601(21); CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C.

§$ 9607(a); and CERCLA §113(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9613(f)(1).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an action under the Comprehensive Environ-

mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CER-

CLA” or “Superfund”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ef seq., to re-

cover costs of remediating the Beacon Heights Landfill in

Connecticut. Respondents, plaintiffs below, seek to hold

petitioners liable under CERCLA for actions of other en-

tities, from whom petitioners purchased assets, based on a

federal common law theory of successor liability. Acknowl-

edging that its decision conflicts with that of another cir-

cuit, the Second Circuit held that federal common law

governs corporate successor liability under CERCLA, and

preempts fundamental, long-standing principles of state

corporation law protecting asset purchasers.

The Second Circuit’s decision to create federal common

law to displace state corporation law is in conflict with

decisions of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits,

and aggravates a circuit conflict that now has evenly

divided eight courts of appeals. The Second Circuit’s

decision to create federal common law also conflicts with

decisions of this Court which establish a strong presump-

tion against creating federal common law to displace state

corporate law, and which reject each of the specific argu-

ments in favor of creating federal common law on which

the Second Circuit relied.

3

While the Second Circuit acknowledged that most States

apply a “mere continuation” exception to the general rule

of asset purchaser nonliability (which protects an asset

purchaser from successor liability unless it shares, at a

minimum, common shareholders, directors, and officers

with the seller), the Second Circuit created a liberalized

federal common law “substantial continuity” standard of

liability, preempting the traditional rule.

A. Federal Law Background

CERCLA is a comprehensive statute intended to pro-

mote the remediation of hazardous waste sites. The stat-

ute established an excise tax on chemical and petroleum

feedstocks, the proceeds of which are placed into the

Hazardous Substance Superfund, and used to pay for

investigation and remediation of sites. See CERCLA

§§ 101(11), 111, 42 US.C. §§ 9601(11), 9611; 26

U.S.C. §§ 59A, 4611, 9507(b).

CERCLA authorizes the United States to recover its

Superfund expenditures from liable private parties, and

to compel such parties to perform remedial work in the

first instance. See CERCLA §§ 106(a), 107(a), 42

U.S.C. §§ 9606(a), 9607(a). CERCLA also allows pri-

vate parties that have incurred cleanup costs to obtain

contribution from other liable parties. CERCLA § 113

(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (1).

The statute imposes liability on any “person” within

the four classes identified in CERCLA § 107(a), 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a): (1) the current owner or operator of

the facility; (2) any “person” who owned or operated

the facility at the time of disposal of any hazardous sub-

stances; (3) any “person” who arranged for disposal of

hazardous substances it owned or possessed and which

were disposed at the facility; and (4) any “person” who

transported hazardous substances to disposal or treatment

facilities selected by such person. The statute defines a

“person” to include a corporation. CERCLA § 101(21),

4

42 U.S.C. § 9601(21). CERCLA does not define a “cor-

poration”, nor does it state any special rules as to when

a purchaser of assets is responsible for the CERCLA

liabilities of the asset seller.

B. Proceedings Below

Respondents are seven private corporations that have

conducted investigative and remedial work at the Beacon

Heights Landfill pursuant to a consent decree with the

United States and the State of Connecticut. Respondents

sued more than 200 defendants, including petitioners, to

compel them to contribute to the costs of remediating the

Landfill. The district court had exclusive original juris-

diction over respondents’ CERCLA contribution claims

pursuant to CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b).

Respondents do not allege that either petitioner itself

falls within any of the classes of liable persons identified

in CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Rather,

respondents’ claims against petitioners are based solely

on the actions of other entities from which petitioners had

purchased assets, after the site had closed but prior to this

litigation. Respondents contend that petitioners are liable

for the actions of the asset sellers under a theory of “suc-

cessor liability,” grounded solely in “federal common law.”

The district court granted petitioners summary judg-

ment on the successor liability issue. The court applied

the traditional state law rule that asset purchasers take

free of their sellers’ liabilities, and the traditional “mere

continuation” exception, under which a purchaser can

be liable for the seller’s actions only when there is an

“identity of officers, directors or shareholders between the

two corporations.” Pet. App. 67a.

As to petitioner NRS Carting Company, Inc., the dis-

trict court granted summary judgment because the requi-

site identity was not present, “and for the further reason

that [NRS] has shown, without contradiction, that it

EEE

5

came into existence after the disposal by Norwalk Service,

Inc., and only purchased limited assets of Norwalk Service,

Inc.” Id. at 79a.

As to petitioner Zollo Drum Company, Inc., since

“[s]tock ownership, officerships and directors [of the asset

seller and of Zollo] have not * * * been put into the

record,” id. at 82a, the court granted Zollo’s summary

judgment motion, “[a]s a distinct entity is involved.” 7d.

The Second Circuit reversed. The court of appeals

decided, in a single sentence, that federal common law,

rather than state law, should govern the successor liability

determination:

A number of courts have recognized the importance

of national uniformity and applied traditional rules of

successor liability, rather than the successor liability

law of a given state.

Pet. App. 20a-2la. The court acknowledged that this

ruling was in direct conflict with Anspec Co. v. Johnson

Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991). Pet. App.

21a.

The court of appeals then considered what the content

of its federal common law successor liability rule should

be. The court recognized that traditional state law gen-

erally protects an asset purchaser from the seller’s liabili-

ties, subject to limited exceptions. Pet. App. 2la. The

court also acknowledged that the traditional “mere con-

tinuation” exception “requires the existence of a single

corporation after the transfer of assets, with an identity

of stock, stockholders, and directors between the successor

and predecessor corporations.” /d.

Ironically, after deciding to create federal common

law on the basis that “courts have recognized the impor-

tance of national uniformity and applied traditional rules

of successor liability,” the Second Circuit specifically re-

jected the traditional rules of successor liability applied in

most States, and applied instead a liberalized “substantial

6

continuity” test for successor liability. Under this more

fluid formulation, the bright line “mere continuation” ex-

ception is replaced by a tabulation of factors: the court

asks “if the successor maintains the same business, with

the same employees doing the same jobs, under the same

supervisors, working conditions, and production processes,

and produces the same products for the same customers.”

Pet. App. 21a.

The court of appeals concluded that the “substantial

continuity” test was “more consistent” with CERCLA’s

“primary goals” than “the older and more inflexible

‘identity’ rule” applied in most States. Pet. App. 22a.

The court characterized CERCLA’s “overall purpose” as

“holding responsible parties liable for cleanup costs.” /d.

at 20a. Beyond this very general (and in application,

circular) principle, the court’s opinion does not identify

any specific objective of the statute which would be frus-

trated by- the application of traditional state successor

liability law. Evidently, the court of appeals concluded

that its liberalized federal common law test was “superior”

to “the older and more inflexible” state law rule because

more parties would be held liable under a more expansive

standard.

While a petition for rehearing was pending, this Court

decided Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666 (1997). Ath-

erton unanimously reaffirmed this Court’s core teachings

that creation of federal common law is justified only in

a “few and restricted” situations where a “significant con-

flict” between state law and federal policies is “specifically

shown.” /d. at 670. General claims of a “need for ‘uni-

formity’” do not satisfy this demanding standard. 17d.

at 671.

The court of appeals denied rehearing in a brief per

curiam opinion, written “to clarify our prior opinion.”

Pet. App. 86a. In its supplemental opinion, the court

acknowledged that under O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,

512 U.S. 79 (1994) (which it had not previously cited),

7

“a mere federal interest in uniformity is insufficient to

justify displacing state law in favor of a federal common

law rule.” Pet. App. 86a. Nevertheless, the court said

that its prior opinion had not relied principally on a

“need for uniformity” to justify creating federal common

law. Rather, “our primary reason for adopting a federal

common law rule was our concern that allowing state law

rules such as the inflexible and easily evaded ‘identity’

rule to control the question of successor liability would

defeat the goals of CERCLA.” 7d. at 86a-87a. The

Second Circuit also concluded, for the first time, that each

of the factors in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,

440 U.S. 715 (1979), favored its result:

Each of the Kimbell Foods factors supports our

decision—there is a significant need for a uniform

rule, allowing lenient state law rules to control would

defeat federal policy, and we perceive no danger that

our decision to adopt a federal rule of “substantial

continuity” will unduly upset existing corporate rela-

tionships.

Pet. App. 87a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The central issue in this case is whether the federal

courts are justified in creating federal common law rules

of successor liability applicable solely to CERCLA ac-

tions, thereby preempting generally applicable, established

rules of state corporation law. The Second Circuit held

that it was proper to create federal common law, based

on its view of “the importance of national uniformity”

in CERCLA actions, and its concern that the “inflexible

and easily evaded” successor liability rule prevailing in

most States would frustrate CERCLA’s overall purpose

of “holding responsible parties liable for cleanup costs.”

The Second Circuit also held that the federal common

law rule should be a liberalized “substantial continuity”

test, and not the traditional rule of nonliability for asset

purchasers applied in almost every State.

8

The Second Circuit’s rulings warrant review by this

Court for several reasons.

First, the Second Circuit’s decision conflicts with deci-

sions of the First, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.

Each of those courts has applied state law to determine

the CERCLA liability of state-created business organiza-

tions and their owners, and has refused to create federal

common law to supplement or preempt the traditional

state law rules. In total, eight courts of appeals are evenly

divided as to the propriety of creating federal common law

under CERCLA. Review by this Court is needed to re-

solve this deep-seated circuit conflict.

Second, the Second Circuit’s decision to create federal

common law ignores this Court’s repeated admonitions

that federal common law may displace state corporation

law only in truly extraordinary circumstances where neces-

sary to protect specific, identifiable, congressionally

adopted policies. Moreover, in O'Melveny & Myers v.

FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), this Court emphatically re-

jected each of the specific rationales on which the Second

Circuit relied to justify creating federal common law

under CERCLA. The Second Circuit is the only court

of appeals to create federal common law under CERCLA

in O’Melveny’s wake.

Third, review is warranted because of the conflicts

among the lower courts which have purported to adopt

“nationally uniform,” federal common law rules of

CERCLA successor liability. It is ironic that, under the

banner of “national uniformity,” these courts have cre-

ated such a balkanized, conflicting set of decisions, vary-

ing from circuit to circuit, district to district, and in some

instances even within individual districts. This confusion

is inherent in the unfocussed, malleable standards these

courts have adopted, and in the fact that little more than

the “polluter pays” slogan guides these courts’ wholesale

rewriting of the Nation’s corporate laws. The disarray

9

in the federal common law decisions stands in marked

contrast to the general uniformity of the law in the

several States concerning successor liability issues. As

a result of the confusion spawned by the federal common

law decisions, it is simply impossible for business entities

and their counsel to predict with any certainty how

successor liability and related corporate law issues will

be resolved under CERCLA.

Fourth, the question presented is important and re-

curring. Successor liability and related issues arise fre-

quently in Superfund cases. Individual CERCLA cases

typically allocate massive liabilities, and involve primary

conduct of private parties which occurred years before

CERCLA’s enactment, and long before the rise of a fed-

eral common law of successor liability. Given the fre-

quency with which CERCLA successor liability issues

arise, the number of Superfund cases currently being

litigated and the amount at stake in such cases, and the

importance of certainty to the success of the Superfund

program. the confusion engendered by the conflicts in the

lower courts should not be permitted to continue.

Moreover, the question whether a proposed asset acqui-

sition carries with it significant potential liability is a

matter that directly affects the negotiation and structure

of numerous transactions. It is therefore vital that the

Court resolve the question presented concerning the nature

and source of successor liability so that corporations in

performing due diligence can make informed decisions

whether to enter certain transactions and. if so, how to

structure them.

10

I. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S CREATION OF FED-

ERAL COMMON LAW TO OVERRIDE STATE LAW

UNDER CERC™A CONFLICTS WITH DECISIONS

OF THE FIRST, FIFTH, SIXTH AND ELEVENTH

CIRCUITS, AND AGGRAVATES A CONFLICT

WHICH HAS EVENLY DIVIDED EIGHT COURTS

OF APPEALS.

A. The Second Circuit’s decision to fashion federal

common law rules of CERCLA successor liability is con-

sistent with the decisions of three other courts of appeals

in pre-O’Melveny cases.’ However, as the court conceded,

its decision conflicts with Anspec Co. v. Johnson Con-

trols, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1991), which held

that state law governs successor liability under CERCLA.

Pet. App. 2la. The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed Anspec in

City Management Corp. v. U.S. Chemical Co., 43 F.3d

244, 250 (1994). The Second Circuit failed to recognize,

however, that its decision also conflicts with John S.

Boyd Co. v. Boston Gas Co., 992 F.2d 401 (lst Cir.

1993), a CERCLA action involving a Massachusetts site,

which applied the successor liability rule from an earlier

Massachusetts diversity case. /d. at 408-09 (following

Dayton v. Peck, Stow & Wilcox Co., 739 F.2d 690, 692

(Ist Cir. 1984) ).

But the conflict among the courts of appeals is not

limited to the successor liability issue-proper. Other courts

of appeals have refused to create federal common law in

closely related areas concerning the CERCLA liabilities of

state-created business organizations and their owners, and

have instead applied traditional, well-established state

1 United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 887-38

(4th Cir. 1992) ; Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,

1263 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex

Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029

(1989). The Ninth Circuit recently heard oral arguments in a case

raising the issue whether Louisiana-Pacific v. Asarco remains goods

law after O’Melveny. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Brown &

Bryant, Inc., No. 96-15529 (9th Cir. argued May 8, 1997).

1]

corporation law. Both the Fifth and Sixth Circuits

have refused to create federal common law to ex-

pand the CERCLA liability of parent corporations

beyond the liability imposed under state law governing

piercing the corporate veil. United States v. Cordova

Chem. Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579-80 (6th Cir. May 13,

1995) (en banc); Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. T.L. James & Co.,

893 F.2d 80, 82-83 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 1108 (1991). The Eleventh Circuit has applied

state law, rather than federal common law, to determine

whether limited partners are responsible for a_ limited

partnership’s CERCLA liabilities. Redwing Carriers, Inc.

v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1501-02 (11th

Cir. 1996). See also Citizens Elec. Corp. v. Bituminous

Fire & Cas. Co., 68 F.3d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1995)

(Easterbrook, J.) (dictum; under O’Melveny and Kim-

bell Foods, resort to state law “would be particularly ap-

propriate” to decide capacity of dissolved corporation to

sue or be sued under CERCLA).

Decisions relying upon state law stress that creation

of federal common law rules to displace state law “would

dramatically alter traditional concepts of corporation law,”

and in particular the bedrock corporate law principles of

limited liability and the separateness of corporate entities.

Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at 82-83. These decisions also

recognize that each of the factors identified in United

States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-29

2 Other circuits have created federal common law rules, and have

expanded a parent corporation’s responsibility for its subsidiary’s

CERCLA liabilities beyond the circumstances in which state law

would hold the parent liable. See Schiavone v. Pearce, 79 F.3d 248,

254 (2d Cir. 1996) ; Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. fonolli

Corp., 4 F.3d 1209, 1221 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Congress has expanded

the circumstances under which a corporation may be held liable for

the acts of an affiliated corporation such that * * * traditional rules

of limited liability for corporations do not apply.”); United States

v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 910 F.2d 24, 27 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 1084 (1991).

12

(1979), favors the application of state law to determine

the CERCLA liabilities of state-created business entities.

First, no federal policy requires the creation of a uniform

body of federal law, particularly because state law on these

issues is largely uniform.” Second, application of state law

would not frustrate any specific policy objective of

CERCLA." Third, the ad hoc creation of federal com-

mon law would frustrate the expectations of private par-

ties who had structured transactions in reliance on state

law:

Private parties have relied on state corporation law

when making corporate acquisitions and in forming

and dissolving corporations. The prices paid by the

buyers to the sellers in those transactions undoubtedly

reflected, in part, the parties’ understanding concern-

ing who retained the seller’s liabilities.

Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1250 (concurring opinion).® Fi-

nally, reliance upon federal common law would create

massive uncertainties for future transactions, because, un-

like state law which has “evolved over decades,” “at

least in the near term, there is no established body of

federal common law on the issues presented in this case.”

Id. at 1251 (concurring opinion). See also, Cordova

Chem., 113 F.3d at 579-80 (refusing to abandon state

3 Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1501; Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1249

(concurring opinion) (noting that the United States, as amicus,

had acknowledged that state law on successor liability is largely

uniform).

* Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1502 (application of state law

would not “permit action prohibited by the Act’); Anspec, 922

F.2d at 1249-51 (concurring opinion); Joslyn Mfg., 893 F.2d at &3

(there is no indication in CERCLA of congressional intent to dis-

place state corporation law).

5 See also, Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1502 (“Given the popu-

larity of the limited partnership structure as a means of organizing

businesses and attracting investment in this country, we hesitate to

upset the expectations investors have under current state law by

adopting a federal common law rule.’’).

13

law of piercing the corporate veil in favor of “a nebulous

‘control’ test” grounded in federal common law).

These decisions’ careful weighing of the Kimbell Foods

factors, and their recognition of a strong presumption

favoring the application of established state law, squarely

conflict with the Second Circuit’s cursory analysis in this

case. The conflict in the circuits warrants review by this

Court.

B. Besides being contrary to the decisions of four

courts of appeals, the Second Circuit’s decision to create a

federal common law of successor liability conflicts with

decisions of this Court.

As the analysis of the better reasoned opinions in the

lower courts reveals, reliance on federal common law in

this context is inconsistent with all three parts of the test

established by this Court in United States v. Kimbell

Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979).

Since Kimbell Foods, this Court has emphasized that

the presumption in favor of applying state law

is particularly strong in areas in which private parties

have entered legal relationships with the expectation

that their rights and obligations would be governed

by state law standards. * * * Corporation law is one

such area.

Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 98

(1991) (emphasis added).°

In O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994),

this Court specifically rejected every reason the Second

Circuit, and the other circuits adopting federal common

law, have offered to justify creating a federal common

law rule of CERCLA successor liability. These courts

® See also, Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979) (“Congress

has never indicated that the entire corpus of state corporation law

is to be replaced simply because a plaintiff's cause of action is based

upon a federal statute.’’).

14

first argue that federal common law is required by the

“importance of national uniformity” to the CERCLA

program.’ Second, they reason that application of state

law “would result in greater expense to the taxpayer,

which is contrary to CERCLA’s purposes.” * Finally, they

express the normative judgments that state law is “in-

flexible”, Pet. App. 22a, and “unduly restrictive,” * and

that “even legitimate resort to state law” could permit

“evasion” of a corporation’s rightful CERCLA liability.”

None of these rationales survives O’Melveny. Like this

case, O’Melveny arose in a context in which lower courts

had developed expansive, federal common law rules to

address a perceived national emergency threatening a

tax-financed insurance fund. This Court in O’Melveny

held that, while it might simplify litigation under federal

statutes, a generalized interest in “national uniformity”

cannot justify creating federal common law rules which

do not govern the primary conduct of the federal govern-

ment, but simply affect the United States’ rights “with

respect to primary conduct of private actors that has al-

ready occurred.” 512 U.S. at 88." O’Melveny rejected

the “more money” argument that federal common law

rules would improve the government’s ability to recoup

expenditures from a tax-financed insurance fund, because

7 Pet. App. 20a. See also, Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837;

Louisiana-Pac., 909 F.2d at 1263 n.2; Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92.

* Louisiana-Pac., 909 F.2d at 1263 n.2. See also, Smith Land, 851

F.2d at 91-92.

® Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 92; see also Louisiana-Pac., 909 F.2d

at 1263 n.2.

10 Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 837. See also, Pet. App. 87a

(state law “easily evaded’).

11 See also, e.g., Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 671 (1997)

(“To invoke the concept of ‘uniformity,’ however, is not to prove its

need.”); Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. at 730 (rejecting “generalized

pleas for uniformity as substitutes for concrete evidence that adopt-

ing state law would adversely affect [federal interests]’’).

15

“there is no federal policy that the fund should always

win.” Id. at 88. Finally, O’Melveny rejected outright the

“facile” argument that “it would ‘disserve the federal pro-

-gram’” to apply state laws, and counseled the lower

courts to refrain from making normative judgments about

the wisdom of state laws. Jd. at 89.

O’Melveny establishes that there is no basis for

creating a federal common law of corporations under

CERCLA. Yet the Second Circuit has begun fashioning

an ad hoc body of judge-made, federal corporate law from

whole cloth, with little more than the “polluter pays”

slogan to guide it. The court’s decision relies on court

of appeals decisions which predate, and have been super-

seded by, O'Melveny, and on arguments which O'Melveny

specifically rejected just three years ago. This Court

should grant the petition to reject this approach.

Il. THE CONFUSED STATE OF EXISTING LAW IN

THE LOWER COURTS HAS CREATED AN UN-

ACCEPTABLE DEGREE OF UNCERTAINTY.

A. The lower courts that have chosen to create federal

common law under CERCLA are in disarray as to the

proper content of the federal common law rule of suc-

cessor liability. This confusion provides an independent

justification for granting certiorari.

While purporting to champion the cause of “national

uniformity,” the courts which have adopted federal com-

mon law standards of successor liability in CERCLA

cases cannot agree among themselves as to the content

of the supposedly “uniform” federal rule. “This confusion

underscores the inevitable difficulty that arises when

courts attempt to erect new concepts of corporate liability

within the framework of CERCLA in the absence of di-

rection from Congress.” United States v. Cordova Chem.

Co., 113 F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. May 13, 1997) (en

banc).

Disagreements about the content of federal common

law in CERCLA cases are legion. For instance, whether

16

a continuity of ownership between the asset purchaser and

seller is necessary, or even relevant, to the “substantial

continuity” analysis has badly divided the lower courts.”

The lower courts also disagree whether the “substantial

continuity” test requires that the asset purchaser continue

the line of business which gave rise to the seller’s

CERCLA liability.” Similarly, the courts are split as

12 Compare United States *. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d

478, 488 n.10 (8th Cir. 1992) (“The test considers an identity of

stock, stockholders, and officers, but not determinatively.”) ; Hunt’s

Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp. 879, 884

(E.D. Wis. 1994) (despite continuity of management, employees,

production facilities, product and customers, refusing to find “sub-

stantial continuity” based in large part on lack of overlapping

ownership between asset seller and buyer); and The Ekotek Site

PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 F. Supp. 994, 1001 (D. Utah 1996) (same) ;

with United States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838

(4th Cir. 1992) (widely cited 8-factor “substantial continuity” test

does not include common ownership); Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.

Co. v. Atlantic Research Corp., 847 F. Supp. 389, 399-400 (E.D. Va.

1994) (finding “substantial continuity” despite lack of common

ownership between asset purchaser and seller); Atlantic Richfield

Co. v. Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (same) :

Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 950 F. Supp. 653, 661

(M.D. Pa. 1997) (same).

On a related point, courts in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

disagree whether the purported successor entity must bear a

“causal link” to the environmental harm before the “substantial

continuity” test is satisfied. Compare United States v. Atlas

Minerals & Chems., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 46, 51 (E.D. Pa. 1993)

(Cahn, J.) (“causal link” required) with Atlantic Richfield Co. v.

Blosenski, 847 F. Supp. 1261, 1287 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Giles, J.)

(rejecting “causal link” requirement).

13 Compare Louisiana-Pac. Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260,

1265-66 (9th Cir. 1990) (most important fact defeating successor

liability that “L-Bar did not continue IMP’s slag business”): and

Gould, Inc. v. Alter Metal Co., No. 91 C 20371, 1994 WL 406576,

at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 1994) (no “continuity of operations” where.

unlike seller, asset purchaser engaged in “no purchase and sale of

trailer loads of scrap batteries”); with United States v. Carolina

Transformer Co., 987 F.2d 832, 840 (4th Cir. 1992) (asset purchaser

cannot avoid liability “merely by splitting off the particular part

17

to whether the asset purchaser’s knowledge of the

seller’s potential CERCLA liability at the time of the

asset purchase (1) is a necessary precondition to “sub-

stantial continuity” liability,* (2) is merely relevant to

the determination,” or (3) has no bearing whatsoever on

the analysis."* Decisions within at least two districts are

of {seller’s] operations that resulted in its environmental prob-

lems”) : United States v. Keystone Sanitation Co., No. 1:CV-93-1482,

1996 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13651, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1996) (hold-

ing asset purchaser liable despite discontinuance of liability-creat-

ing operations); HRW Systs., Inc. v. Washington Gas Light Co.,

823 F. Supp. 318, 330-31 & n.11 (D. Md. 1993) (same) ; and In re

Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings re Alleged

PCB Pollution, 712 F. Supp. 1010, 1015 n.& (D. Mass, 1989) (same).

14 See, e.g., North Shore Gas Co. v. Salomon, 963 F. Supp. 694,

704 (N.D. Ill. 1997): State of New York v. Panex Indus., Inc.,

No. 94-CV-0400E(H), 1996 WL 378172, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. June 24,

1996): Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195

B.R. 716, 726 (N.D. Ind. 1996); Gould, Inc. v. Alter Metal Co.,

1994 WL 406576, at *3; Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming,

Inc., 812 F. Supp. 124, 129 «N.D. Ill. 1993).

15 See, e.g., United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980 F.2d

478, 489 (8th Cir. 1992); Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 909 F.2d at 1265

(asset purchaser’s lack of notice of seller’s CERCLA liabilities one

of “[t]wo key facts” supporting non-liability); The Ekotek Site

PRP Comm. v. Self, 948 TV. Supp. 994, 1001 (D. Utah 1996) ;

Hunt’s Generator Comm. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 863 F. Supp.

879, 884 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (knowledge of liability a “very signifi-

cant” factor) ; Interstate Power Co. v. Kansas City Power & Light

Co., 909 F. Supp. 1241, 1276 (N.D. Iowa 1993); Anderson v. City

of Minnetonka, No. CV 3-90-5312, 1993 WL 95361, at *8 (D. Minn.

Jan. 27, 1993).

16 See, e.g., Gould, Inc. v. A&M Battery & Tire Serv., 950 F. Supp.

652, 657 (M.D. Pa. 1997); State of Washington v. United States,

930 F. Supp. 474, 482 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (“The idea that a suc-

cessor must have knowledge of a potential for CERCLA liabilit:

before liability may attach to it, is illogical considering CERCLA’s

policies of strict liability and retroactive liability.”) ; State of Ariz.

v. Esco, No. Civ. 93-0937, 1997 WL 259520, at *2 (D. Ariz. March

26, 1997) (same); Kleen Laundry & Dry Cleaning Servs. v. Total

Waste Mgmt. Corp., 867 F. Supp. 1136, 1144 (D.N.H. 1994).

18

diametrically opposed on this issue.’ The “knowledge of

the liability” issue is critically important in CERCLA

cases, because many of the asset sales at issue in these

cases occurred before CERCLA was enacted in 1980,

when “knowledge of the liability” was impossible.

The disarray among the federal common law decisions

creates crippling uncertainty for litigants attempting to

assess or resolve their CERCLA liabilities, and for busi-

nesses seeking to structure asset-purchase transactions

which conform with the prevailing legal standard(s).

Absent review by this Court, this confusion and uncer-

tainty will persist for years as the lower courts (in those

jurisdictions committed to the federal common law) argue

among themselves as to which corporate law rules they

prefer.

B. In addition to its other flaws, the Second Circuit’s

decision conflicts with the very decision of this Court on

which it purports to rely. The court of appeals adopted

an expansive “substantial continuity” test for successor

17 Compare State of New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co., 174

B.R. 366, 387 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (McCurn, J.) (substantial con-

tinuity only applies if “the asset purchaser has knowledge of the

potential liability and responsibility for that liability” at the time

of asset sale); United States v. Atlas Minerals & Chems., Inc.,

824 F. Supp. 46, 50 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Cahn, J.) (“the ‘continuity

of enterprise’ exception is designed to prevent strategic behav-

ior by corporate actors who know of or anticipate CERCLA

problems”); and Elf Atochem N. Am. v. United States, 908

F. Supp. 275, 283 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (Joyner, J.) (“When a pur-

chaser has no knowledge of potential CERCLA liability, successor

liability is rarely found.”); with United States v. Peirce, Nos. 83-

CV-1623, 91-CV-0039, 92-CV-0562, 1995 WL 356017, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.

Feb. 21, 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (knowledge of liability “not [a]

determinative factor[] in deciding whether to apply the ‘continuity

of enterprise’ theory”) ; and Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Blosenski, 847

F. Supp. 1261, 1287 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Giles, J.) (rejecting view

that knowledge of liability necessary, but suggesting a constructive

knowledge requirement, whereby liability would only be imposed if

“purchaser * * * should have known after reasonable investigation

of the seller’s potential liability”).

aoe

19

liability, rather than the stricter standard prevailing in

most States, largely because “[t]he Supreme Court has

followed this approach in the labor law context.” Pet.

App. 21a (citing Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v.

NLRB, 482 US. 27, 43 (1987)). But Fall River used

a “substantial continuity” analysis solely to determine

whether a new employer was required to recognize the

bargaining unit of a former employer from whom the new

employer purchased assets. /d. at 41. Fall River empha-

sized that it was not formulating a rule of successor

liability at all: “although the successor has an obligation

to bargain with the union [if it satisfies the ‘substantial

continuity’ test], * * * it is not bound by the substantive

provisions of the predecessor's collective-bargaining agree-

ment.” Id. at 40 (emphasis added).

In Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec.

Bd., 417 U.S. 249 (1974), this Court explained this point

further. Howard Johnson held that a new employer is

“subject to all the legal and contractual obligations of the

predecessor” only if the new employer constitutes the pred-

ecessor’s “alter ego.” Id. at 260-61 n.5. “Such cases in-

volve a mere technical change in the structure or identity

of the employing entity, * * * without any substantial

change in its ownership or management.” Id. (emphasis

added), citing Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315

US. 100, 106 (1942) (‘a true change of ownership

* * * would terminate the duty of reinstatement created

by the Board’s order”)."*

This Court’s labor law decisions, unlike the Second

Circuit’s decision in this case, impose successor liability

18 The lower courts have recognized that, under this Court’s labor

cases, successor liability can only be imposed if the new employer

meets the “alter ego” standard; Fall River's “substantial conti-

nuity” analysis is irrelevant to this issue. See, e.g., NLRB v.

Hospital San Rafael, Inc., 42 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 1994), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 331 (1995); Southward v. South Central Ready

Mix Supply Corp., 7 F.3d 487, 493 (6th Cir. 1993); NLRB v.

Fullerton Transfer & Storage Ltd., 910 F.2d 331, 336 n.6 (6th

Cir. 1990).

20

on an asset purchaser only if the purchaser satisfies an

“alter ego” test functionally identical to the “mere con-

tinuation” exception prevailing in most States.

Ill. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IS IMPORTANT

AND RECURRING.

The Second Circuit’s decision concerns issues which are

frequently litigated under a federal program of primary

importance. Because of the retroactive application of the

statute, CERCLA litigation often involves waste disposal

which occurred decades earlier. Businesses frequently

have undergone reorganizations or transformations (in-

cluding mergers, asset sales, and dissolutions) in the

interim. For these reasons, the extent of the liability of

corporations and other state-created business entities and

their owners frequently arises in CERCLA lawsuits.

This case is typical: it concerns a landfill which closed

in 1979, and of approximately 200 parties respondents

sued, the case against at least 7 depends on the resolution

of successor liability issues.” A recent computer search

revealed eight appellate opinions, and over 60 reported

district court decisions, addressing successor liability issues

under CERCLA. It is no exaggeration to say that thou-

sands of parties at hundreds of Superfund sites are affected

by the issues raised by this petition.

The nature of Superfund liabilities adds further impor-

tance to the petition. The average cost of site remediation

at the Nation’s Superfund sites was recently estimated to

be between $25 and $30 million.” It is simply intolerable

that such a high degree of uncertainty prevails concerning

19 In addition to petitioners, the district court resolved successor

liability issues involving Axil Corp. (see Pet. App. 66a-67a), Con-

necticut Pharmacare, Inc. (id. at 68a), Sanitary Refuse, Inc. (id.

at 69a-70a), Jacob Brothers, Inc. (id. at 72a), and Seymour Brass,

Inc. (id. at 80a).

20 The Business Roundtable, 101 Terms and Facts on Superfund,

at 3 (Nov. 1993).

21

the basic legal standards that govern these massive lia-

bilities.

The court’s decision to create federal common law im-

plicates issues of judicial restraint, federalism, and the

separation of powers. The decision whether to adopt fed-

eral-judge-made rules to preempt state law raises quasi-

jurisdictional issues concerning the proper (and properly

limited) law-making power of the federal courts, and

concerning the appropriate division of authority between

federal and state governments and between the judicial

and legislative branches of the federal government.” The

impropriety of judicial lawmaking is heightened here,

where States have adopted a general rule of nonliability

for asset purchasers based on their weighing of the com-

peting interests in preserving the responsibility of true

successors—that is, mere continuations of the asset seller

in another form—against the goal of promoting the free

transferability of assets. Cf. O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC,

512 US. 79, 89 (1994) (stressing competing policy con-

siderations which must be weighed in developing rules of

legal malpractice ).

Besides their importance to administration of the

CERCLA program, the issue here is important to the

business community. Because of the unsettled state of

federal common law in different circuits, different districts,

and even within individual districts, the parties negotiating

21 See generally, Atherton v FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670 (1997)

(“Whether latent federal power should be exercised to displace

state law is primarily a decision for Congress, not the federal

courts.”) ; O’Melveny, 512 U.S. at 89 (“Within the federal system,

at least, we have decided that thf{e] function of weighing and

appraising [policy considerations] ‘is more appropriately for those

who write the laws, rather than for those who interpret them.’ ’

citation omitted); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers

Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981) (federal courts, “unlike their state

counterparts, are courts of limited jurisdiction that have not been

vested with open-ended lawmaking powers”); City of Milwaukee

v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).

22

and structuring asset-purchase transactions cannot know

with any certainty what the “federal common law,” as

interpreted in a particular district or circuit, will require,

and how that law may differ from the state common law

that will continue to govern all other aspects of the trans-

action. Ad hoc creation of federal common law injects

debilitating uncertainty into these common commercial

transactions. This Court alone can remedy this problem

and it should do so here.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM G. BECK

Counsel of Record

ALOK AHUJA

LATHROP & GAGE L.C.

2345 Grand Boulevard

Kansas City, MO 64108

(816) 292-2000

NICHOLAS J. HARDING

KOSLOFF & HARDING

28 North Main Street

West Hartford, CT 06107

Dated: July 23, 1997 Counsel for the Petitioners

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Nos. 1268, 1269, 1270, 1271—August Term 1995

(Argued March 13, 1996 Decided Nov. 1, 1996)

Docket Nos. 95-6074, 95-6088, 95-6090, 95-6098

B.F. GoopricH; UPJOHN CoMPANY; Dow CorNING Cor-

PORATION; ENVIRONMENTAL WASTE RESOURCES, INC.;

REYNOLDS ALUMINUM BUILDING PRopUCTS COMPANY;

UNIROYAL CHEMICAL Co., INC.; WHITE CONSOLIDATED

INDUSTRIES; KERITE COMPANY; UNISYS CORPORATION;

RISDON CorP.; HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION;

CADBURY BEVERAGES, INC.; COLTEC INDUSTRIES, INC.:

KEN-CHAS RESERVE Co.; UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

STATE OF CONNECTICUT; NAUGATUCK GLASS Co.;

NAUGATUCK TREATMENT Co.,

Plaintifjs-A ppellants,

V.

JOHN BETKOSKI; GEORGE CLARK; ARMSTRONG RUBBER

COMPANY; THOMAS ASHMORE; BOROUGH OF NAUGA-

TUCK; BRISTOL FLOWED GASKET COMPANY; CONNECTI-

: CUT RESOURCES RECOVERY AUTHORITY; DEE’s, INC.,

; also known as Dee’s Refuse, Inc.; DERBY TirE Com-

PANY; EASTERN COMPANY; GENERAL ROOFING & SHEET

METAL Co., INC.; GERALD METALS, INC.; C.R. GIBsoNn

CoMPANY; HosPITAL MARKETING SERVICES Co., INC.:

IDEAL MANUFACTURING Co.; JACOB BROTHERS, INC.;

LITTON SYSTEMS, INC., also known as Winchester Elec-

tronics; MANAFORT BROTHERS, INC.; NASCO, INc.;

New HAVEN HousING AUTHORITY; NORTHEAST UTILI-

2a

TIES; FRANK PERROTTI & SONS, INC.; QUALITY RUBBER

Co.; SANITARY REFUSE Co., INC.; SEYMOUR BRASS

TURNING Co.; SPERRY RAND CORPORATION; STAUFFER

CHEMICAL COMPANY; TOWN OF MIDDLEBURY; TOWN

OF THOMASTON; TOWN OF WoopBuRY; TRIANGLE IN-

DUSTRIES, INC.; TURNER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY;

U.S. PROLAM, INC.; WATERBURY COMPANIES, INC.;

WATERTOWN HouSING AUTHORITY; ZOLLO DRUM

CoMPANY, INC.; ATLANTIC RICHFIELD Co.; ADAM’S

SERVICE STATION; ARMAND’S AUTO SERVICE; HIGH

Rice APARTMENTS; ASHMORE TRUCKING; BEACON

OUTING CLUB; BoISE CASCADE CORPORATION; BRASS

RAIL RESTAURANT; COFFEE SHOP; CRELAN CONSTR.

Co.; CT. SHEET METAL/Woop Co.; DAppio’s; DAvip

Rupsis; EpDwARD BETOWSKI; ELK’s LopGE # 967;

GEORGE’S FLOOR COVERING; HORIZON HOMES; Kor-

VETTE SERVICES; LATELLA CARTING Co.; LOMBARD

Bros., INc.; LONG MEADOW CAFE; MCDONALD’s REs-

TAURANT; MEYERS & SCHWARTZ; NEAL’S COFFEE

SHOPPE; NELSON MENDES; PORTANOVA TRUCKING Co.;

PORTUGUESE CLUB; RAY’S HARDWARE; SHORE’S AUTO

PARTS; STEVE’S TrRES; STOP & SHOP; TRIANGLE SER-

VICES; TROWBRIDGE APTS.; VALLEY MOTOR TRAILER

SALES; VALLEY MOBILE HOMES PARK; VIEIRA AGENCY;

WATERBURY PRESSED METALS; TOWN OF BETHANY;

CITY OF WATERBURY; CAPOZZIELLO BROTHERS; TOWN

OF KILLINGWORTH; TOWN OF BEACON FALLS; NAUGA-

TUCK Y.M.C.A.; E. Eric ARSAN REFUSE; JOHN ASH-

MORE; JOSEPH BETKOSKI; CONNECTICUT PHARMACARE,

INc., doing business as Ford Pharmacy; First Na-

TIONAL SUPERMARKETS, INC.; P. FRANCINI COMPANY;

TOWN OF HAMDEN; JETZON TIRE Co.; CITY OF MIL-

FORD; NRS CArRTING Co., INC.; TOWN OF ORANGE;

PETER PAUL CADBURY; TOWN OF PLYMOUTH; TOWN

OF SEYMOUR; TOWN OF STRATFORD; TOWN OF WATER-

TOWN; TOWN OF WESTPORT,

Defendants-A ppellees.

Fak, SOE ce

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Before:

CARDAMONE, WALKER, and MCLAUGHLIN,

Circuit Judges.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

This appeal, arising originally from the disposal of

hazardous substances at two Connecticut landfills, Beacon

Heights and Laurel Park, requires us to determine whether

defendants accused of generating and transporting haz-

ardous substances deposited at the two landfill sites might

be liable under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-

sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) to

contribute to the costs of cleaning up the sites. Under

CERCLA, several classes of responsible parties are liable

for most costs incurred in responding to and remediating

sites where hazardous substances are found. We must, in

addition, decide if certain parties remain susceptible to

suit by the United States and the State of Connecticut for

response costs incurred by these governments.

Plaintiffs-appellants the United States the State of Con-

necticut, the Beacon Heights Coalition, and the Laurel

Park Coalition appeal from a judgment entered May 2,

1995 by the United States District Court for the District

of Conecticut (Dorsey, C.J). The court granted judgment

on the pleadings against the United States and Connecti-

cut and granted summary judgment against the Beacon

Heights Coalition and the Laurel Park Coalition and in

favor of nearly 100 defendants alleged in plaintiffs’ com-

plaints to be potentially responsible parties in an action

under CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §$§ 9601-9675, as amended by

the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of

1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).

The Beacon Heights and Laurel Park Coalitions are

groups of industrial waste generators that sought contribu-

tion from third parties after having settled their liability

4a

with the United States, the State of Connecticut, and the

Murthas and affiliated entities—the owners/operators of

the two landfill sites. The Laurel Park Coalition sought

initially to add 1151 other potentially responsible parties

to the litigation. The district court ground away at this

number slowly, yet it “ground exceeding small.” Insisting

that these plaintiffs only implead those parties against

whom they had a claim that was both legally and factually

substantiated, the district court reduced to 41 the 1151

third party defendants that these plaintiffs moved to add,

thus eliminating over 1000 potential parties from the suit.

Later, with motions for summary judgment before it,

the district court construed some of CERCLA’s basic

provisions in a manner inconsistent with our precedents

and, ruling that the coalitions had failed to advance suffi-

cient proof, thereby was able to grant summary judgment

to nearly all of the roughly 100 defendants, dismissing

plaintiffs’ complaints against them. The district court also

found that both governments had been fully reimbursed

by the industrial coalitions and the landfills’ owners and

therefore granted summary judgment against these gov-

ernments.

BACKGROUND

We assume the reader’s familiarity with our previous

decision in this case, B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958

F.2d 1192 (2d Cir. 1992) (Murtha 1), and with the pub-

lished decisions of the district court relevant to this appeal.

See B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 815 F. Supp. 539 (D.

Conn. 1993) (Murtha II); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha,

840 F. Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1993) (Murtha III); B.F.

Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 855 F. Supp. 545 (D. Conn.

1994) (Murtha IV). We detail only those background

facts necessary to an understanding of this appeal. Those

facts relevant to the discussion of a specific issue and nec-

essary to its disposition will be included in the analysis.

Sa

A. Initial Litigation

The Beacon Heights and Laurel Park landfills have

both been designated as Superfund sites by the Environ-

mental Protection Agency (EPA). Terrance and Harold

Murtha, and several corporations controlled by them (col-

lectively, Murtha), owned and operated Laurel Park from

1961 until 1987, and owned and operated Beacon Heights

from 1970 to 1987. In 1987 Murtha was sued in separate

actions by the EPA, the State of Connecticut's Depart-

ment of Environmental Protection (DEP), Uniroyal

Chemical Company, Inc., and a coalition of corporations

led by B.F. Goodrich Company. Murtha filed third party

actions for contribution or indemnification against some

200 third party defendants. These parties were accused

either of generating or of transporting hazardous sub-

stances to the landfills. Most of the defendants named in

the Murtha third party suits were not named by the EPA

as potentially responsible parties. Murtha I, 958 F.2d

at 1196.

In September 1987, when the Murtha litigation began,

the EPA entered into a consent decree concerning the

remediation of Beacon Heights with 33 potentially respon-

sible parties who may have generated hazardous sub-

stances that were later deposited in that landfill. These

parties, later known as the Beacon Heights Coalition,’

agreed to undertake the remediation of that site and to

reimburse the government for its future oversight costs in

excess of $500,000. Since this coalition did not provide

for past costs or for those future response costs unrelated

to oversight, the EPA sued several non-settling potentially

responsible parties * in a separate action to recover its past

and future remediation costs.

1 The Beacon Heights Coalition is today composed of seven mem-

bers: B.F. Goodrich Co.; Dew Corning Corp.; Hoechst Celanese

Corp.; Reynolds Aluminum Building Products Co.; Uniroyal Chem-

ical Company, Inc.; Upjohn Co.; and White Consolidated Industries.

2 These non-settling parties at Beacon Heights are: Armstrong

Rubber Co.: The Eastern Co.; Kerite, Inc.; Primerica, Inc.; Richard

Zollo; John Betkoski; Joseph Betkoski; and George Clark.

6a

The EPA also filed two lawsuits concerning the costs of

remediating the Laurel Park landfill. One led to a settle-

ment with another industrial coalition of various poten-

tially responsible parties, now known as the Laurel Park

Coalition.* In an August 1992 consent decree, the Laurel

Park Coalition agreed to perform remediation at the site,

pay for the government’s future oversight costs in excess of

$200,000, and pay the EPA $500,000 for its past response

costs. The EPA then sued, as it did in the Beacon Heights

case, the non-settling potentially responsible parties to re-

cover past costs and future response costs not addressed

by the consent decree. The State of Connecticut, which is

also involved in the Laurel Park cleanup, received over $1

million from the coalition for response costs and sued the

same non-settling parties for unreimbursed costs.

Murtha also settled its litigation with the United States,

with Connecticut, and with the two coalitions (coalitions,

plaintiffs, or appellants). The parties embodied their

agreement in a consent decree (Murtha consent decree)

which also was entered by the district court in August

1992. Murtha resolved its liability at both landfill sites

for $5,375,000; this amount was apportioned among sev-

eral parties. The Beacon Heights Coalition received

$1,875,000 and $322,500 was given to the EPA for un-

reimbursed costs relating to Beacon Heights. Murtha as-

signed its third party claims to the Beacon Heights Coali-

tion. The EPA also received $625,000 for unreimbursed

costs at Laurel Park, as did the State of Connecticut, with

the remaning $1,975,000 set aside for remediation at that

site. Although the Laurel Park Coalition had not been

8’ The Laurel Park Coalition members in this appeal are: Cad-

bury Beverages, Inc.; Coltec Industries, Inc.; Kerite Co.; Nauga-

tuck Glass Co.; Naugatuck Treatment Co.; Risdon Corp.; Ken-Chas

Reserve Co.; Uniroyal Chemical Co., Inc.; and Unisys Corp.

4 The non-settling parties at Laurel Park are: Atlantic Richfield

Co.; The Eastern Co.; Gerald Metals, Inc.; and Litton Systems,

Inc.

7a

formed when the Murtha consent decree was negotiated,

the parties agreed that should an industrial coalition form

within 18 months of the entry of Murtha’s consent decree,

the coalition would receive the funds. Because this condi-

tion was met, the Laurel Park Coalition received the

$1.975 million set aside by Murtha. See Murtha III, 840

F. Supp. at 183.

Many of the third party defendants were municipalities

and municipal corporations that generated and collected

municipal solid waste. They claimed that CERCLA ex-

empted municipal waste from its coverage and that an

exemption for household waste in the Resource Conserva-

tion and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 8§ 6901-

6992k, was incorporated into CERCLA. The district

court rejected these arguments, B.F. Goodrich Co. Vv.

Murtha, 754 F. Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991), and we

affirmed, Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1197. The municipal

generators therefore remained in the case as named de-

fendants and potentially responsible parties.

B. Summary Judgment Decisions

The Beacon Heights Coalition was already armed with

Murtha’s assignment of its third party claims against gen-

erators and transporters of hazardous substances. The

Laurel Park Coalition then moved to add to the action

as third party defendants 1151 potentially responsible par-

ties. The district court granted the motion to the extent

of allowing 41 parties to be joined, but denied it as to the

1110 other potential parties. Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at

546-61.

In April 1992, approximately six weeks after we re-

jected the municipal defendants’ claim of CERCLA ex-

emption, the district court decided sua sponte to permit

parties to file motions for summary judgment. Nearly all

of the original third party defendants filed such motions.

Both coalitions opposed the motions and in turn cross-

moved for the same relief. Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at

183.

8a

With dispositive motions before the trial court, the two

coalitions become increasingly concerned about their abil-

ity to present evidence in support of their contentions that

the third party defendants had generated or transported

hazardous substances to the landfills. Throughout the pro-

ceedings in the trial court, discovery had been limited

(independently and through a special master). Uniform

discovery orders and case management orders effectively

restricted discovery to a set of court-drafted interroga-

tories. The special master assured the coalitions on sev-

eral occasions that additional discovery would be per-

mitted. After initially denying the coalitions’ request for

expanded discovery, the district court in December 1992

allowed some limited deposition discovery. Summary judg-

ment motions were submitted to the court and decided in

a series of orders, beginning in December 1993. See

Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 183-191.

Summary judgment was eventually granted to every

third party defendant-appellee that had moved for such

relief, id., and the district court subsequently dismissed

sua sponte nearly all the remaining third party defendants,

including many that did not move for that relief. Of the

88 defendants sued by the coalitions who had not entered

into settlement agreements, all but four were dismissed.

Judgment on the pleadings was entered against the

United States and the State of Connecticut in their suits

against non-settling potentially responsible parties. Murtha

IV, 855 F. Supp. at 549. The district court reasoned that

the EPA and DEP had presented no figures for incurred

response costs that were not covered by the $3,500,000

net Murtha settlement, id. at 546, and therefore dismissed

both government’s claims for additional reimbursement.

It also granted summary judgment in favor of the remain-

ing three of the eight defendants at Beacon Heights sued

by the EPA.

From an amended judgment entered May 2, 1995, the

United States, the State of Connecticut, and both coali-

9a

tions appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and

remand for further proceedings.

DISCUSSION

The coalitions point to a number of reasons calling for

reversal. They contend the district court granted summary

judgment to many of the defendants based on a misappli-

cation of substantive CERCLA law, and that instead their

cross-motions for summary judgment should have been

granted. They also maintain that procedural errors were

committed that require reversal.

The trial court’s initial decision, Murtha II, 815 F.

Supp. 539, laid down several broad legal rules, which the

court applied, occasionally by reference, in deciding sub-

sequent cases. See Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 183

(“Many comments on the evidence in [Murtha II] are

pertinent to the present motions and will not be repeated

here.”). We address first the coalitions’ assertion that the

district court incorrectly interpreted CERCLA; second,

we consider the coalitions’ procedural contentions; third,

we review de novo the grants of summary judgment in 85

individual cases (with reference to an appendix incorpo-

rated in this opinion); and, finally, we address the appeals

of the United States and the State of Connecticut.

I. The Law of CERCLA

A. Basic Principles

Our construction of CERCLA does not begin with this

case. Rather, we are guided by previous writings on this

subject in this and other Circuits. CERCLA is a “broad

remedial statute,” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1197, and was

enacted with the purpose of “[f]irst, assuring that those

responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury

from chemical poisons bear the costs of their actions.”

S. Rep. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980) (Senate

Report), reprinted in 1 Senate Comm. on Env’t and Pub.

10a

Works, Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environ-

mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980

(Superfund), at 305, 320 (1983) (Leg. Hist.). As a

remedial statute, CERCLA should be construed liberally

to give effect to its purposes. Schiavone v. Pearce, 79

F.3d 248, 253 (2d Cir. 1996). These include facilitating

efficient responses to environmental harm, holding respon-

sible parties liable for the costs of the cleanup, see Murtha

I, 958 F.2d at 1198, and encouraging settlements that re-

duce the inefficient expenditure of public funds on lengthy

litigation, see In Re Cuyahoga Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d

110, 119 (2d Cir. 1992).

CERCLA makes four classes of persons liable—(1)

present owners and operators of facilities that accepted

hazardous substances, (2) past owners and operators of

such facilities, (3) generators of hazardous substances,

and (4) certain transporters of hazardous substances. 42

U.S.C. $ 9607(a). As we have noted, “[t]he Act’s broad

reach extends liability to all those contributing—from gen-

eration through disposal—to the problems caused by

hazardous substances.” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198. Re-

sponsible parties are liable for a broad range of remedia-

tion expenses, including all costs of removal of the sub-

stances not inconsistent with the national contingency

plan, other necessary response costs, damages for injury

to natural resources, and the cost of health assessments.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4).

The Act imposes strict liability. Strict liability is in-

tended to make sure that those who “benefit financially

from a commercial activity” internalize the environmental

costs of the activity as a cost of doing business. Senate

Report at 13, Leg. Hist. at 320; see New York v. Shore

Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (dis-

cussing legislative history). Liability under the Act is

joint and several, unless potentially responsible parties

can prove that the harm is divisible. See United States

v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721-22 (2d Cir.

1993); Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198.

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A CERCLA plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by

proving that (1) the defendant is within one of the four

categories of responsible parties enumerated in § 9607(a);

(2) the landfill site is a facility as defined in § 9601(9);

(3) there is a release or threatened release of hazardous

substances at the facility; (4) the plaintiff incurred costs

responding to the release or threatened release; and (5)

the costs and response actions conform to the national

contingency plan. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); Alcan, 990 F.2d

at 719-20; Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198.

Once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, a defend-

ant may avoid liability only if it establishes by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence that the release or threatened

release was caused by an act of God, an act of war, cer-

tain acts or omission of third parties other than those

with whom the defendant has a contractual relationship,

or a combination of these reasons. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b).

If the plaintiff can establish each of the prima facie ele-

ments on undisputed facts, and the defendant is unable

to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that

an affirmative defense applies, summary judgment on lia-

bility is appropriate. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720. Signifi-

cantly, it is “not required that the [plaintiff] show that a

specific defendant’s waste caused incurrence of clean-up

costs.” Id. at 721. Because CERCLA imposes strict lia-

bility, there is no causation requirement.

“Hazardous substance” is expansively defined to include

(A) any substance designated pursuant to section

1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element, com-

pound, mixture, solution, or substance designated

pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (c) any haz-

ardous waste having the characteristics identified

under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid

Waste Disposal Act . . ., (D) any toxic pollutant

listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any

hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of

the Clean Air Act . . ., and (F) any imminently

12a

hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect

to which the [EPA] Administrator has taken action

pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15.

42 U.S.C. § 9601(14). Pursuant to subsection (B), the

EPA has listed more than 700 hazardous substances in

Table 302.4 of 40 C.F.R. $302.4 (1995). We have noted

that “[t]he breadth of § 9601(14) cannot be easily

escaped, and we have expressly held that ‘[q]uantity or

concentration is not a factor.’” Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720

(quoting Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1200). In other words,

the Act’s definition includes “even minimal amounts of

pollution.” Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720.

These propositions presently govern CERCLA litigation

in this Circuit. If a district court grants summary judg-

ment based on an incorrect understanding of CERCLA,

we must reverse and remand. See Keywell Corp. v.

Weinstein, 33 F.3d 159, 163 (2d Cir. 1994) (reviewing

decision granting summary judgment includes determining

whether district court correctly applied the law).

B. Analysis of District Court’s CERCLA Interpretation

The coalitions aver that many third party defendants-

appellees were granted summary judgment based on an

erroneous application of CERCLA and the case law inter-

preting the statute. We address each claim of error.

1. Component Parts

The district court held, in Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at

546, that “[a]bsent a finding by EPA that a particular

product warrants classification as a [hazardous substance]

. .. It cannot be found that the product, notwithstanding

its constituent elements, is an [hazardous substance] or

[hazardous waste].” It later clarified that holding, by ex-

plaining that “mere presence of an element, a named

{hazardous substance], as a constitutent of a product does

not render the product a [hazardous substance].” Murtha

IIT, 840 F. Supp. at 184.

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In Murtha I we rejected the contention that a specific

mixture or waste solution must be listed within § 9601 (14)

or incorporated by reference in order to fall within

CERCLA’s coverage. We explained that “[w]hen a mix-

ture or waste solution contains hazardous substances, that

mixture is itself hazardous for purposes of determining

CERCLA liability. Liability under CERCLA depends

only on the presence in any form of listed hazardous sub-

stances.” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1201; see also United

States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259-61

(3d Cir. 1992) (rejecting quantitative requirement);

Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 669 (Sth

Cir. 1989) (same).

It is enough that a mixture or waste solution contain a

hazardous substance for that mixture to be deemed hazard-

ous under CERCLA. The waste product itself “need not

be listed by name—instead of its constituent components—

to fall within the Act.” Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1201; see

also Lousiana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco Inc., 24 F.3d 1565,

1573 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that even if product not

specifically listed as hazardous substance, if components

include hazardous substances, product is regulated by

CERCLA), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 780 (1995); Eagle-

Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 930-31 (D.C. Cir.

1985) (rejecting contention that because most mining

wastes and fly ash contain some hazardous substances,

mining wastes and fly ash must therefore be specifically

listed as hazardous substances).

Our understanding is also consistent with Congress’ plan.

Legislative history reveals that “the release of any [listed

hazardous or toxic substances] or any constituent of them

invokes the notice requirements and response provisions

and any costs of removal or remedial action or any dam-

ages are subject to the liability provisions of the bill.”

Senate Report at 24-27, Leg. Hist. at 331 (emphasis

added). In short, it makes no difference that the specific

wastes disposed of by the appellees were not themselves

14a

listed as hazardous substances, because so long as their

component parts were listed as hazardous substances there

may be CERCLA lability.

Appellees declare this approach will lead to CERCLA

liability if a discarded object had ‘any EPA listed hazard-

ous substance in its chemical genealogy, whether or not

the chemical component’s characteristics had been unalter-

ably changed in the manufacturing process. Even if this

objection is sound in theory, it is not relevant. The in-

stant case involves not only discarded objects like pens or

plastic containers that might include a hazardous sub-

stance in their chemical make-up. Appellees are accused

of dumping waste that contained hazardous substances in

separable, identifiable forms. According to an affidavit

submitted by the coalition, the cumulative waste stream

discarded in the Murtha’s landfills included municipal

sludge, incinerator ash, varnishes, paints, tar remover,

caulking compounds, pesticides, glues, degreasers, and au-

tomotive lubricants. Obviously, disposal of this sort of

waste poses a greater threat of releasing hazardous sub-

stances than is presented by—to use an example offered

by the appellees at oral argument—the disposal of a single

plastic pen.

In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, appellees invoke

Massachusetts v. Blackstone Valley Elec. Co., 67 F.3d

981, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1995). Blackstone held that the

EPA should make an initial determination of whether fer-

ric ferrocyanide (FFC)—in this case a blue-colored sub-

stance on wood chips—is a cyanide and therefore a hazard-

ous substance. The First Circuit ruled that even if FFC

contained cyanide as a chemical component, the cyanide

might not exist in a form convertible to free cyanide and

therefore might not be a CERCLA hazardous substance.

Id. at 990-91. However, in this case, the First Circuit

focused on whether FFC was a hazardous substance. It

did not suggest that were FFC found to be a hazardous

substance, liability might be avoided because “wood chips”

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—the product allegedly discarded by the polluter—were

not in themselves hazardous substances within the Act’s

definition. In short, the appellees’ reliance on Blackstone

is misplaced.

Thus, those dismissals in the present case that were

predicated on the notion that a waste product is not cov-

ered by CERCLA unless specifically listed as a hazardous

substance—even when its component parts are hazard-

ous substances—misconstrued CERCLA and must be re-

versed.

2. Releasability

The trial court ruled further that “[t]he absence of evi-

dence of breakdown of products that contain [hazardous

substances] . . . precludes a finding that disposal of that

product constitutes a disposal of [hazardous substances].”

Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at 545. Later, it explained that

statement by saying that “[I}iability does not lie if the ma-

terial disposed of would release a {hazardous substance]

only on the intervention of another force.” Murtha III,

840 F. Supp. at 188. The coalitions believe that these

pronouncements were wrong.

As noted, to make out a prima facie CERCLA case, a

plaintiff must show a “release, or a threatened release .. .

of a hazardous substance.” § 9607(a) (4). Accordingly,

if a hazardous substance is only used in a non-releasable

form in the manufacturing of a product, it may scientifi-

cally be impossible for the plaintiff to show a “threatened

release.” Hence, the district court properly required plain-

tiffs to show a release or threatened release. But, when it

required them to show an actual breakdown of products

containing hazardous substances, and determined there was

no liability if the hazardous substances would only be re-

leased by an intervening force, it acted in a manner con-

trary to precedent.

In Alcan, we held that proof that a defendant’s waste

did not release listed hazardous substances is only relevant

16a

to the issue of apportionment of damages, not to the issue

of liability. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 722. Independent releasi-

bility is not required to establish liability; a defendant

otherwise liable may show “nonreleasibility” in order to

mitigate its share of damages. It follows logically that a

defendant who disposes of hazardous substances that are

not independently releasable may still be held liable, even

though that defendant may not be required to pay dam-

ages when the cost apportionment phase of the litigation

is reached.

In addition, the trial court’s reading of CERCLA is in-

consistent with the Act’s language, which provides only

the four already recited causation-related defenses. 42

U.S.C. § 9607(b). The canon of construction that says

“expressio unius est exclusio alterius” cautions against

creating additional exceptions to complex statutory enact-

ments. Cf. Greene v. United States, 79 F.3d 1348, 1355

(2d Cir. 1996) (applying this principle in the context of

federal tax law).

Moreover, if we required a plaintiff to show more than

a release or threatened release, we essentially would be

asking the plaintiffs to prove that a specific defendant’s

hazardous substances caused the release of a hazardous

substance. No causation is needed, however, to establish

liability under CERCLA, see Alcan, 990 F.2d at 721, be-

cause it is, as stated, a strict liability statute. See Shore

Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042; see also Alcan Aluminum, 964

F.2d at 266 (requiring only that plaintiff prove that haz-

ardous substances were deposited at a site from which

there was a release or threatened release that caused re-

sponse costs to be incurred); Amoco, 889 F.2d at 670 n.8

(“[I]n cases involving multiple sources of contamination,

a plaintiff need not prove a specific causal link between

costs incurred and an individual generator’s waste.”’).

None of the lower court cases upon which the district

court relied as precedent for its view regarding releasability

3

%

3

BART OR UCM BA EPA BEES EO

17a

is persuasive. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle

County, 769 F. Supp. 591, 597 (D. Del. 1991); United

States v. Serafini, 750 F. Supp. 168, 171 (M.D. Pa. 1990).

Although appellants must show a release or threatened

release in order to make out a prima facie case, the addi-

tional releasability requirement of product breakdown finds

no support in CERCLA.

3. Negligible Amounts

The coalitions further contend that the district court

impermissibly required a showing that appellees disposed

of hazardous substances above a threshold amount. It

granted summary judgment to an appellee where the

amounts of hazardous substances it disposed of were

“minuscule,” Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 184, or “[n]om-

inal,” Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at 545. Twice we have said

that quantity “is not a factor” when determining CERCLA

liability because had Congress wanted to distinguish liabil-

ity on the basis of quantity, it would have so provided.

Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1200; see also Alcan, 990 F.2d at

720 (“The statute on its face applies to ‘any’ hazardous

substance, and it does not impose quantitative require-

ments.”). The absence of threshold quantity requirements

in CERCLA leads logically to the conclusion that the Act’s

“hazardous substance” definition includes even minimal

amounts. See Alcan, 990 F.2d at 720. The dismissals on

these grounds constitute legal error.

4. EPA Designation

The trial judge implied, in a few cases, that the EPA’s

decision not to designate a party as a potentially respon-

sible party is relevant in determining CERCLA liability.

See, e.g., Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 184 (“[Appellee]

was not designated as a PRP by the EPA.”) In Murtha I,

958 F.2d at 1205, we concluded that EPA policy “merely

indicates that the EPA presently does not intend to pursue

enforcement actions against” unnamed parties. However,

18a

here the district court weighed the plaintiffs’ evidence of

liability “against the backdrop of the EPA Municipal

Policy that a [party] would not be charged as a PRP ab-

sent evidence that its waste deposited at the site in ques-

tion contained specific [hazardous substances].” Murtha

III, 840 F. Supp. at 188.

EPA enforcement decisions are not helpful in deciding

whether a party is properly joined as a defendant in a

given action. See Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1205 (explaining

that EPA prosecutes only largest contributors or those with

the means to pay, leaving those defendants to seek con-

tribution from other potentially liable polluters). This is

consistent with the general understanding that “[a]n agency

generally cannot act against each technical violation of the

Statute it is charged with enforcing.” Heckler v. Chaney,

470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). Congress has explicitly auth-

orized private rights of action independent of EPA enforce-

ment decisions. For these reasons, the agency’s decision

not to initiate its own enforcement action is irrelevant in

determining whether a defendant might be liable under

CERCLA.

Appellees maintain that no decision was made in any

case in exclusive reliance on the EPA policy, and that the

court’s reference to that policy was merely illustrative. It

is difficult to see what the EPA policy illustrated, as we

have ruled that the policy is legally irrelevant when de-

termining CERCLA liability. To the extent the district

court relied upon an EPA designation in deciding whether

to grant summary judgment, it committed error.

5. Successor Liability

Several decisions were made regarding the scope of suc-

cessor liability. In the case of one appellee, it was found

that although the successor continued its predecessor’s busi-

ness “using its former assets, employees and customers,”

summary judgment in favor of that appellee on liability

19a

was proper. Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 185. In another

instance, no successor liability was found even when “[a]

prior sole proprietorship was conducted under a compar-

able name” and the predecessor “sold the business and re-

lated assets to [a successor].” Jd. at 191. A third case was

dismissed despite a successor’s purchase of assets and con-

tinuation of the predecessor’s business. Jd. at 190.

The district court did not explicitly formulate a test for

deciding when successor liability exists. See Murtha II],

840 F. Supp. at 185. And, although the question has

been addressed in other circuits, we have yet to decide

exactly what is required for successor liability under

CERCLA, see New York v. N. Storonske Cooperage Co.,

174 B.R. 366, 374 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing that

we have not decided this issue). We turn to this question

now.

We consider first the Act’s language, recognizing at the

outset that the Act has no provision explicitly governing

corporate successor liability. See Smith Land & Improve-

ment Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F. 2d 86, 91 (3d Cir.

1988) (“CERCLA failed to address many important is-

sues, including corporate successor liability.”), cert. denied,

488 U.S. 1029 (1989); see also United States v. Carolina

Transjormer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 1992)

(explaining that CERCLA is silent on this subject); Louis-

iana-Pacific Corp. v. Asarco, Inc., 909 F.2d 1260, 1263

(9th Cir. 1990) (“Congress has not addressed the’ issue of

successor liability under CERCLA.”).

Nonetheless, most courts have read CERCLA as mak-

ing successor corporations liable, in certain circumstances,

for their predecessors’ acts. Carolina Transformer, 978

F.2d at 837; Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922

F.2d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1991); Louisiana-Pacific, 909

F.2d at 1263; Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91-92: N. Storon-

ske, 174 B.R. at 374; In Re Acushnet River & New Bed-

ford Harbor Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 712

20a

F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (D. Mass. 1989) (following Smith

Land). See United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed Co., 980

F.2d 478, 487 (8th Cir. 1992) (successor corporations

are “persons” liable under CERCLA).

In our view CERCLA imposes successor liability. The

plain language of the Act imposes liability on any “person”

who fits within the four categories of liable parties. 42

U.S.C. § 9607(a). “Person” is defined to include, inter

alia, a “corporation, association, partnership, consortium,

joint venture, [or] commercial entity.” § 9601(21). Fur-

ther, federal law provides a rule of construction that when

the word “company” or “association” is used, it “em-

brace[s] the words ‘successors and assigns of such company

or association.”” 1 U.S.C. § 5; see Anspec, 922 F.2d at

1247 (applying § 5 in analyzing CERCLA liability).

Thus, CERCLA’s statutory language, properly read, pro-

vides for successor liability.

Moreover, the Act’s broad remedial purpose would be

sharply curtailed if the Act did not encompass successor

liability. As the Third Circuit has observed, “[t]he con-

cerns that have led to a corporation’s common law liability

.. . for the torts of its predecessor are equally applicable to

the assessment of responsibility for clean-up costs under

CERCLA.” Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91. In other words,

absent successor liability, a predecessor could benefit from

the illegal disposal of hazardous substances and later evade

responsibility for remediation simply by changing the form

in which it does business, thereby subverting the Act’s

purpose of holding responsible parties liable for cleanup

costs. See Murtha I, 958 F.2d at 1198. We will not read

§ 9607(a) in a manner that would defeat Congress’ overall

purpose, absent an express statement from the legislature

that we do so. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1045.

A number of courts have recognized the importance of

national uniformity and applied traditional rules of succes-

sor liability, rather than the successor liability law of a

& ay Rae ail

2la

given state. See Smith Land, 851 F.2d at 91 (instructing

district court to consider national uniformity in resolving

successor liability issues under CERCLA); see also Mexi-

co Feed, 980 F.2d at 487 n.9 (upholding the application

of federal law); Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at 1263 &

n.2 (deeming appropriate a federal rule that relies on tra-

ditional common law notions because of the need for na-

tional uniformity). But see Anspec, 922 F.2d at 1248

(applying successor liability law of forum state); N. Stor-

onske, 174 B.R. at 375 (applying a mixture of state and

traditional norms). The traditional common law rule states

that a corporation acquiring the assets of another corpora-

tion only takes on its liabilities if any of the following

apply: the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to as-

sume them; the transaction may be viewed as a de facto

merger or consolidation; the successor is a “mere continu-

ation” of the predecessor; or the transaction is fraudulent.

Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838; see also Mexico

Feed, 980 F.2d at 487; Louisiana-Pacific, 909 F.2d at

1263. Both sides agree that this is the standard.

The coalitions contend that when determining whether

there is a “mere continuation,” we should not use the com-

mon law test (sometimes referred to as the identity test),

which requires the existence of a single corporation after

the transfer of assets, with an identity of stock, stockhold-

ers, and directors between the successor and predecessor

corporations. See Carolina Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838

(explaining traditional rule). Rather, they urge that we

employ the “continuity of enterprise” approach, also called

the “substantial continuity” rule. The Supreme Court has

followed this approach in the labor law context by asking

if the successor maintains the same business, with the same

employees doing the same jobs, under the same supervis-

ors, working conditions, and production processes, and

produces the same products for the same customers. Fail

River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27,

43 (1987); see also Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp., 752

22a

F.2d 168, 175 (Sth Cir. 1985) (using a slightly different

version of substantial continuity test).

CERCLA is entitled to a construction that advances its

primary goals. Because the substantial continuity test is

more consistent with the Act’s goals, it is superior to the

older and more inflexible “identity” rule, see Carolina

Transformer, 978 F.2d at 838, 840 (endorsing this ap-

proach); see also Mexico Feed, 980 F.2d at 487-89

(same); United States v. Western Processing Co., 751 F.

Supp. 902, 905 (W.D. Wash. 1990) (looking to continu-

ing business test). But see Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v.

Burlington N. R.R., 772 F. Supp. 443, 447-49 (D. Minn.

1990) (declining to apply the “continuing business enter-

prise” test). We therefore adopt the substantial continuity

test as the appropriate legal test for successor liability

under CERCLA. Cf. Schiavone, 79 F.3d at 255 (recog-

nizing direct operator liability because it is compatible with

statutory language and consistent with CERCLA’s reme-

dial scheme).

The district court spent little time exploring this ques-

tion. It noted the coalitions’ citation to Turner v. Bitu-

minous Casualty Co., 244 N.W. 2d 873, 883 (Mich.

1976), an early case defining the “continuity of the enter-

prise” or substantial continuity approach, yet refused to

impose successor liability without “convincing authority.”

Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 185. Because an approach

quite similar to that used in Turner is the one we follow

in determining successor liability, we must reverse those

grants of summary judgment where the district court ap-

plied a different and more restrictive law of successor li-

ability.

6. Transporter Site-Selection

Summary judgment also was granted to several alleged

transporters of hazardous substances for various reasons,

including those we have already discussed. An additional

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23a

reason was offered for the decision concerning the trans-

porters—they were held not liable because “they were

directed to the sites or transfer stations by others.” /d.

Hence, we must address the legal question of whether site-

selection is a required element for transporter liability.

The Act imposes liability on

any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous

substances for transport to disposal or treatment fa-

cilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such

person, from which there is a release, or a threatened

release which causes the incurrence of response costs,

of a hazardous substance

42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). This awkwardly worded provi-

sion requires that we decide whether “selected by such

person” modifies the entire phrase “disposal or treatment

facilities, incineration vessels or sites” or only the imme-

diately antecedent word “sites.” If the latter reading is

correct, there is no basis for imposing a site-selection re-

quirement for transporter liability where the substances

were, as here, disposed of at a disposal or treatment fa-

cility.

The appellants offer two principal arguments in support

of this reading. First, they point out that the Act else-

where defines a facility as “any site .. . where a hazardous

substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or

placed.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9). They aver that reading

the “selected by such person” language to apply only to

sites other than those where hazardous substances have

been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, is therefore

necessary to prevent the word “sites” from being redund-

ant. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 507

(1995) (construing statute to avoid making words re-

dundant). Second, they urge that we keep in mind the

Act’s legislative purpose of making all who profit from

pollution pay for their conduct.

24a

Recently, a sister Circuit concluded that CERCLA in-

cludes a site-selection requirement for transporters. Tip-

pins Inc. v. USX Corp., 37 F.3d 87, 94 (3d Cir. 1994).

While noting the canon of statutory construction that “ab-

sent a clear intention to the contrary, a modifier’s refer-

ence is to the closest noun,” id. at 93, the court recognized

that this canon need not be followed in all instances. /d.;

see also Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324,

330-31 (1993) (reliance on the “rule of the last antece-

dent” is not “compelled”). Here, following the canon and

adopting the appellants’ rule would create an odd para-

dox: A transporter who brought hazardous substances to

a disposal facility would be strictly liable, while a trans-

porter who brought hazardous substances to some site

other than a facility would not be liable unless the trans-

porter itself selected the site. Tippins, 37 F.3d at 93-94.

Thus, the coalitions’ reading, while “quite sensible as a

matter of grammar,” Nobelman, 508 U.S. at 330, would

“lead to a curious result.” Tippins, 37 F.3d at 93.

The Third Circuit’s conclusion is consistent with most

other courts that have considered the subject. See id. (col-

lecting cases); see also United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d

1427, 1435 (10th Cir. 1993) (requiring site selection for

transporter liability); United States v. Petersen Sand &

Gravel, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 1346, 1356 (N.D. Ill. 1992)

(same); Alcatel Info. Sys. v. Arizona, 778 F. Supp. 1092,

1096 (D. Ariz. 1991) (same); United States v. Western

Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (W.D. Wash.

1991) (same). But see Prisco v. New York, 902 F. Supp.

374, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (stating test for transporter

liability without noting a site selection requirement); Jer-

sey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., No. CIV.A.

85-2014, 1987 WL 54410, at *5 (D. N.J. Sept. 3, 1987)

(finding that “selected by the transporter” modifies only

“sites”), aff'd without written opinion, 866 F.2d 1410,

1411 (3d Cir. 1988).

We are persuaded by the reasoning of Tippins and

hold that only transporters who select the disposal loca-

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25a

tion are liable under CERCLA. As a consequence, we

agree with the district court that unless the transporters

selected the facility or disposal site, they cannot be found

liable under the Act. However, the meaning of the word

“selected” is hardly clear. Tippins, 37 F.2d at 94, deter-

mined that a transporter is properly liable under the Act

when it ultimately selects the disposal facility or when its

active participation in the decision amounted to “sub-

stantial input into which facility was ultimately chosen.”

This view accords with the Act’s language and purpose.

First, a transporter can be said to select a facility or site

when it helps the generator choose a disposal facility by

recommending a facility or set of facilities. Second, a

transporter who plays an active role in choosing the dis-

posal facility is obviously more culpable and responsible

for the resultant harm than a transporter who simply does

the bidding of a given generator; the latter has a more

attenuated connection to the harm. An “active participa-

tion” standard recognizes the often significant role played

by transporters in choosing the disposal site. Hence, in

cases of transporter liability, we must vacate the grants

of summary judgment and remand for further considera-

tion in light of the above discussion.

II. Procedural Issues

We address next appellants’ procedural arguments that

are common to a great many of the cases before us.

A. Summary Judgment Standard

We have recognized in CERCLA’s context that sum-

mary judgment is a “powerful legal tooi[]” that can “avoid

lengthy and perhaps needless litigation.” Alcan, 990 F.2d

at 720. This tool is one well adapted to encouraging set-

tlement and speeding remediation. See In re Cuyahoga

Equip. Corp., 980 F.2d at 119 (CERCLA designed to

encourage settlement to reduce litigation costs). Its utility

in CERCLA litigation is not a license to use it when

26a

material facts are genuinely disputed. Just as there is no

heightened pleading standard in CERCLA cases, see

Warwick Admin. Group v. Avon Prods., Inc., 820 F.

Supp. 116, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); cf. Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination

Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (heightened pleading

requirement exists only in cases involving fraud or mis-

take), the showing required to survive summary judgment

also remains the same.

We now briefly describe the standard for summary

judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. A party moving for

summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence

of a genuine issue of material fact. Adickes v. S.H. Kress

& Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). When a court is con-

fronted with facts that permit several different conclusions,

all inferences from the underlying facts must be drawn in

the nonmovant’s favor. Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71

F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). The trial court must bear in

mind that “[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of

the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences

from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255

(1986).

If the movant demonstrates an absence of material is-

sues of fact, a limited burden of production shifts to the

non-movant, which must “demonstrate more than ‘some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, . . . [and]

must come forward with “specific facts showing that there

is a genuine issue for trial.”’” Aslandidis v. United

States Lines, Inc., 7 F.3d 1067, 1072 (2d Cir. 1993)

(citations and emphasis omitted). Summary judgment,

then is granted only when “there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case,” Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), or, in other words,

only if “no rational jury could find in favor of the non-

moving party because the evidence to support its case is

so slight.” Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d

1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994). The trial court’s task is

27a

“carefully limited to discerning whether there are any

genuine issues of material fact to be tried, not to deciding

them. Its duty, in short, is confined at this point to issue-

finding; it does not extend to issue-resolution.” Id.

B. Sua Sponte Summary Judgment

The district court granted summary judgment sua

sponte in a number of cases. A sua sponte grant of sum-

mary judgment may be appropriate so long as the losing

party was notified prior to its grant and given the oppor-

tunity to produce whatever proof it has in opposition.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326; see also FLLI Moretti Cereali

S.p.A. v. Continental Grain Co., 563 F.2d 563, 565 (2d

Cir. 1977) (power to grant summary judgment sua sponte

“must be exercised with great caution and with care taken

to give the parties an opportunity to present materials in

opposition”). To ensure the parties have notice and an

opportunity to be heard, we have established a policy of

adhering closely to the ten day notice period specified by

Rule 56(c). See Scottish Air Int'l, Inc. v. British

Caledonian Group, plc, 945 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1991)

(per curiam).

Notice furthers two important interests. First, it gives

the losing party an opportunity to develop the record to

demonstrate that genuine material issues are in dispute

or that determinative legal quesions should be resolved in

its favor, and thereby prevents the losing party from

suffering procedural prejudice. Second, the parties’ devel-

opment of a complete record facilitates de novo appellate

review. See Hispanics For Fair and Equitable Reappor-

tionment (H-FERA) v. Griffin, 958 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir.

1992) (per curiam). When the non-moving party asserts

that it cannot adequately respond to its opponent’s motion

for summary judgment in fewer than ten days, it should

be given the full ten days unless there is good reason to

believe that the assertion is a sham. See Gutwein v. Roche

Labs., 739 F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, the coali-

tions insist they were denied notice and an opportunity to

28a

be heard before the district court granted summary judg-

ment sua sponte against them in a number of cases.

Our review of the underlying procedural history indi-

cates that such was the case. On December 20, 1993, the

trial court ordered the coalitions to file a list of third

parties that the coalitions intended to pursue. Murtha

III, 840 F. Supp. at 191. Although it directed the coali-

tions to “be sure that [its prior] rulings . . . are fully

considered and accommodated,” id., this is too vague an

admonition to be deemed equivalent to notice. When the

coalitions asked for additional time, their request was

denied and the prior order was reaffirmed. Three weeks

later, on January 10, 1994, the coalitions were again or-

dered to review their files and “list” those third party

claims each intends to pursue as valid. The district court

further explained that “[a]ny third party claim not so

listed by January 21, 1994, will be dismissed as not in-

tended to be prosecuted further.”

The district court acknowledged—in an order dated

February 5, 1994—that appellants eventually prepared

and presented such lists but, rather than simply dismissing

those claims the coalitions did not intend to pursue, the

district court dismissed a great many others sua sponte.

In a case involving some 3000 filings, the coalitions were

no doubt dedicating most of their effort between December

20, 1993 and February 5, 1994 to sifting through their

records and compiling the list requested by the trial court.

The coalitions were not asked to produce supporting

papers or legal arguments to undergird their liability

claims—they were only directed to submit a list within

11 days of the January 10 order. It is hardly surprising

that the coalitions simply submitted the lists and did little

else.

A more prudent course for the district court would have

been to give the coalitions ten days’ notice to show good

cause why summary judgment should not be granted

against them. Such a course also would have given the

29a

district court the benefit of the arguments and evidence

of both sides and would have provided a more complete

record on appeal. See Herzog & Straus v. GRT Corp.,

553 F.2d 789, 792 & n.5 (2d Cir. 1977) (notice and

opportunity to make arguments are vital to making an

informed judgment); cf. Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men's

Int'l Professional Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 65 (2d

Cir. 1988) (ruling erroneous a decision to grant motion

to dismiss on ground neither raised nor briefed by par-

ties). As the record currently stands, we have no knowl-

edge of the precise reasons for the district court’s decision

to grant summary judgment sua sponte in those cases

where it took that course of action. It said only that there

was “want of substantiation,” a truism that necessarily

applies to all grants of summary judgment and which adds

nothing to our understanding of the trial court’s decision.

Because the coalitions’ claims are not demonstrably frivo-

lous, the summary judgment dismissals, made sua sponte

without ten days’ notice, were error.

C. Discovery Limitations

In the course of this litigation, the district court placed

certain restrictions on discovery. For over one year—from

March 6, 1991 until April 29, 1992— it did not allow

discovery outside of that permitted by the uniform dis-

covery orders. Showings of good cause for further dis-

covery were not entertained until April 29, 1992, when

the court solicited motions for summary judgment. Sev-

eral weeks later, it promised the coalitions additional dis-

covery for them to respond to the forthcoming summary

judgment motions. The special master repeated the prom-

ise in August, but refused to authorize discovery until the

motions for summary judgment were submitted and co-

ordinated. In December, appellants were given 60 days

within which to conduct limited deposition discovery.

They contend that these discovery limitations were so

severe as to be an abuse of the trial court’s discretion and

to constitute reversible error.

30a

A trial court necessarily has wide discretition in manag-

ing pre-trial discovery, see Cruden v. Bank of New York,

957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir. 1992), and we will not dis-

turb its orders absent a clear abuse of its discretion, id.;

Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 622 F.2d 34, 35-

36 (2d Cir. 1980). Reversal of a judgment because of an

improper order denying or curtailing discovery is “un-

usual.” 8 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and

Procedure § 2006, at 92 (2d ed. 1994).

We find »0 abuse of discretion in the district court’s

management of discovery. In complex multi-party litiga-

tion, a trial court often needs to use its broad authority to

control discovery. Some of the measures adopted here,

such as time limits, schedules for discovery, and limitations

on deposition discovery, have been specifically recom-

mended as acceptable options. See Manual For Complex

Litigation (Third) § 21.422 (1995); H.R. Rep. No.

253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 80 (1985), reprinted in

1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2862 (supporting the enact-

ment of amendments to CERCLA and urging district

courts to “carefully manage” CERCLA cases “to insure

that the litigation is conducted in an expeditious manner”

through, inter alia, the “exercise of strict judicial control

over multi-party proceedings . . . as well as use of the pro-

cedures set forth in the Manual For Complex Litigation”).

The district court sought to guard against what it

thought might be a wildfire of unwarranted discovery,

recognizing that unduly extensive use of discovery could

make the litigation expense disproportionate to the cost

of cleaning up the landfills. In order to have orderly and

reasonable discovery, the trial judge required that a high

standard of good cause be met before discovery beyond

that provided in the uniform orders would be permitted.

Its orders were tailored appropriately to meet this need.

Appellants also strongly challenge the denial of their

requests for additional discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P.

3la

56(f). Rule 56(f) allows a party faced with a motion

for summary judgment to request additional discovery, and

the Supreme Court has suggested that such a request be

granted when “the nonmoving party has not had an oppor-

tunity to make full discovery.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326.

Here too we will reverse only if there was an abuse of dis-

cretion. Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132,

1137 (2d Cir. 1994). Doubtless, more discovery might

have been helpful, but in a case this complex the informa-

tion falling within the broad purview of federal discovery

is almost without limit. In this light it is hard to fault the

district court for placing limitations on discovery. Given

the circumstances of this case, we see no abuse of discre-

tion either in its discovery orders or its decision rejecting

the appellants’ Rule 56(f) motions.

D. Expert Opinion

A final contested issue common to most of the claims

involved in the instant case concerns the district court’s

evaluation of the scientific expert opinion of Dr. Kirk W.

Brown, a Professor of Soil and Crop Sciences at Texas

A&M University. The coalitions relied on Dr. Brown’s

affidavit as crucial evidence in opposing the appellees’

summary judgment motions. Before discussing the district

court’s assessment of Dr. Brown’s affidavit, a brief review

of the contents of the affidavit is necessary.

1. Expert's Credentials and Methodology

Dr. Brown holds a masters degree from Cornell Uni-

versity and a doctorate in agronomy from the University

of Nebraska. He has written more than 150 scholarly,

scientific articles and a book dealing with the disposal and

treatment of hazardous waste substances. His professional

qualifications make him an expert witness, and the district

court so found. See Murtha II, 815 F. Supp. at 543.

Dr. Brown submitted an affidavit in support of the

coalitions’ position that appellees were potentially re-

32a

sponsible parties at both landfill sites. In preparing this

sworn statement, he reviewed numerous reports including,

most significantly, six reports relating to the Laurel Park

landfill and three reports discussing the Beacon Heights

landfill.” After examining these reports, the expert was of

the opinion that “there [were] CERCLA hazardous sub-

stances present in each and every leachate sample from

these landfills.” Dr. Brown did not personally visit the

landfills or dig up any shovelfuls of waste, but he was not

required to do so.

He studied EPA reports concerning municipal and in-

dustrial landfills in the United States and he set forth the

types of hazardous substances found in waste streams gen-

erated by households, commercial establishments, institu-

tions, and industries. He used these reports to generate

lists of the wastes and CERCLA hazardous substances rou-

tinely discarded by typical households, commercial estab-

lishments, institutions, and industries during the time pe-

riod relevant to this case. After comparing the concentra-

tions of hazardous substances in the leachates from the

two landfills with the concentrations generally found in

municipal solid waste landfills in the United States, he con-

cluded, in his expert opinion, that the waste streams dis-

posed of in the two landfills were similar to the landfills

he had studied and that they contained CERCLA hazard-

ous substances.

Further, Dr. Brown read the statements that the various

appellees made in their deposition testimony and read

other documents relevant to the kind of waste disposed of

by each appellee. His comments varied for each appellee.

5 Some appellees claimed that Brown never studied the two land-

fills involved in this litigation or that he failed to investigate the

landfill wastes. This is patently wrong. Particularly mendacious

is the implicit claim by Manafort Brothers, E. Eric Arsan Refuse,

NRS Carting, and Zollo Drum that none of the studies used by Dr.

Brown dealt with the relevant landfills. This contention is wholly

contradicted by the record.

33a

Based on the available information, he meticulously linked

the types of wastes, including identification of specific

products discarded by each defendant, with specific

CERCLA hazardous substances. His analysis relied on a

series of studies and reports that showed which known

CERCLA hazardous substances are in specfiic waste prod-

ucts. This allowed him to correlate the specific wastes dis-

posed of by each appellee to specific hazardous substances.

For example, when a party admitted to disposing of

tire products, Dr. Brown explained which hazardous sub-

stances are found in normal tire products. Although he

could not swear with absolute certainty that the tire prod-

ucts disposed by a specific appellee were similar to normal

tire products, such absolute certainty is not required to op-

pose successfully a summary judgment motion; rather, at

the summary judgment stage, the trial judge must decide

only whether a reasonable jury could find liability by a

preponderance of the evidence. Further, when the ap-

pellees failed to submit any evidence to distinguish the

products of which they disposed from those addressed by

Dr. Brown in his affidavit, Dr. Brown’s probabilistic evi-

dence stands largely uncontradicted. Moreover, each and

every type of product disposed of need not contain hazard-

ous substances. Any amount of such substances is suffi-

cient to create liability.

2. Admissibility of Brown Affidavit

Although the district court agreed that Dr. Brown was

an expert, and that his evidence could be admissible

against certain parties, it apparently did not place much

weight on the affidavit. It ruled that the expert’s sworn

statement was not controlling for non-municipal genera-

tors, id. at 544, and that it could not be applied to the

municipal generators because no adequate foundation for

its acceptance had been laid. Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at

189. More specifically, the district court added, Dr.

Brown’s “references to facts, without specification, in vari-

34a

ous documents relied on, are insufficient to make his

opinions relevant.” Jd. It therefore rejected the affidavit

as lacking “probative merit” because it did not rely on

“direct evidence.” /d. at 184. In addition, the court ex-

pressly weighted the affidavit against the backdrop of the

EPA Municipal Policy, according to which the EPA made

certain enforcement decisions. /d. at 188.

Our view of this affidavit and its probative worth differs

dramatically from that of the district court. This is partly

because it is difficult for us to imagine an expert with

more experience and knowledge in the hazardous sub-

stances field than Dr. Brown, and partly because we find

his affidavit to be carefully researched, detailed, and di-

rectly relevant to this case. As will become clear when we

consider each appellee’s case individually, we think the

trial court assessed the weight of conflicting proof, in effect

substituting its judgment for that of the jury. See /n Re

Joint E. & S§. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d 1124, 1133

(2d Cir. 1995) (applying the rule prohibiting such a prac-

tice). Environmental science, like epidemiology, “is ill-

suited to lead a factfinder toward definitive answers, deal-

ing as it does in statistical probabilities.” Jd. Here there

was only one expert opinion before the court, and the

court was obliged not to ignore it. Because Dr. Brown re-

viewed nine studies concerning the subject landfills, his

affidavit was laid on a proper foundation.

When deciding a motion for summary judgment, only

admissible evidence may be considered. Tamarin v. Adam

Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993). Where

scientific knowledge will assist a trier of fact to determine

an issue of fact, an expert witness “may testify . . . in the

form of an opinion or otherwise.” Fed. R. Evid. 702.

Summary evidence is admissible when the underlying docu-

ments are admissible and are made available to the ad-

verse party. Tamarin, 13 F.3d at 53. Here, where the

reports used by Dr. Brown are of the sort ordinarily relied

on by experts in forming opinions within their field of

pel tama bal

35a

expertise, the reports need not be admissible at trial, see

Fed. R. Evid. 703, and need not actually be attached to

the affidavit to satisfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See laco-

belli Constr., Inc. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25

(2d Cir. 1994). An expert’s testimony, in order to be

admissible under Rule 705, need not detail all the facts

and data underlying his opinion in order to present that

opinion. See Fed. R. Evid. 705; Ambrosini v. Labar-

rague, 966 F.2d 1464, 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1992). At any

rate, the Brown affidavit does provide the specific facts

required by Rule 56(e), see id. at 1470, when he explains

which specific hazardous substances are found in each

waste disposed of by each appellee.

Nor is the Brown affidavit “junk science” of the sort

that should be rejected under Daubert v. Merrell Dow

Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Dr. Brown

relied on the methodology and data typically used and ac-

cepted jn these sorts of cases, see lacobelli, 32 F.3d at 25,

and his testimony would therefore be admissible under

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95. Moreover, if the appellees

honestly believe this scientific evidence is weak, they

should cross-examine him vigorously at trial and present

contrary evidence to refute his findings and conclusions.

Id. at 596. This is the traditional and appropriate means

of attacking admissible evidence with which one disagrees.

Id. In addition, given that CERCLA hazardous substances

are listed at 40 C.F.R. § 302.4, Table 302.4, we cannot

agree that because the Brown affidavit stated whether a

given hazardous substance was one listed by CERCLA, it

therefore improperly drew a legal conclusion. See United

States v. Articles of Banned Hazardous Substances Consist-

ing of an Undetermined Number of Cans of Rainbow

Foam Paint, 34 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[{E]xperts

are not permitted to present testimony in the form of legal

conclusions.” ).

The cases appellees cite in opposition are unpersuasive.

For instance, Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exchange Nat’!

36a

Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (7th Cir.

1989), involved a seven-sentence-long expert affidavit de-

void of factual references or reasoning. By contrast, Dr.

Brown’s affidavit is 141 pages long, every conclusion in it

is drawn with reference to specific facts or explanations.

It explains precisely what was reviewed and the general

bases for his opinion.

The district court also incorrectly compared the affi-

davit with the “second-hand and factually spare” affidavit

involved in Chandler v. Coughlin, 763 F.2d 110, 113 (2d

Cir. 1985). See Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at 189. Dr.

Brown’s extensive use of reports from the relevant facili-

ties, the information found in discovery materials, and past

scientific studies make his expert opinion highly probative.

Dr. Brown relied in part on the information provided by

the appellees, and he considered what sorts of hazardous

substances are ordinarily found in the specific kinds of

waste disposed of by appellees. This is a permissible ap-

proach for an expert witness in a case such as this. An

examination of the Brown affidavit’s detail demonstrates

that the affidavit was thorough and well-supported, unlike

the affidavit in Chandler, which was only a few para-

graphs long.

Again, were the Brown affidavit the kind of evidence

insufficient for a case to survive summary judgment under

CERCLA, the Act’s scope would be sharply limited.

People and companies often dispose of waste without

knowing its contents. In future lawsuits, once hazardous

substances were discovered in a given facility, the gener-

ators would only need say that they could not recall what

was in their waste. Because plaintiffs usually lack direct

evidence that a defendant dumped hazardous substances,

the potentially responsible parties would only be found

liable in those rare instances in which a so-called “smoking

gun” is discovered, cf. Chambers v. TRM Copy Crtrs.

Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994) (“smoking guns”

rarely found in litigation), and the broad, remedial pur-

pose of the Act would thereby be defeated.

itt oan all

37a

Of course, a CERCLA plaintiff is not required to prove

its case with scientific certainty; a preponderance of the

evidence is enough. Cf. Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S.

385, 400 (1986) (per curiam) (Brennan, J., concurring)

(discussing Title VII cases). While certainty is an ideal

pursued by scientists and courts alike, it is not always a

realistic goal in environmental science, where certainty

can be elusive. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25

& n.52 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).

Although we find Dr. Brown’s affidavit highly probative,

it is not dispositive of the issues at bar. Defendants may

of course produce proof showing why their waste—tire

products, for example—did not include the hazardous sub-

stances ordinarily found in tire products. It is up to the

factfinder ultimately to determine whether Dr. Brown’s

opinion together with other evidence presented by the co-

alitions is sufficient to establish appellees’ liability.

Because disputed factual issues exist, summary judg-

ment—which the appellants request—may not be granted

in their favor either. Expert testimony was essential in

this complex environmental litigation to help comprehend

scientific data and determine whether the chemicals covered

by CERCLA as hazardous substances were contained in

appellees’ waste. It was error to reject Dr. Brown’s written

testimony that the wastes did contain such substances, par-

ticularly in the absence of any expert evidence to the con-

trary. The affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact

in most of the cases before us, and therefore the grants

of summary judgment in such cases were improper.

III. Case-By-Case Review

We pass to a review of 85 cases on an individual basis.

Our review of the district court’s decisions granting sum-

mary judgment is de novo. E.g., Randell v. United States,

64 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,

64 U.S.L.W. 3808 (U.S. May 28, 1996). Because their

disposition is duplicative of much of our earlier discussion,

38a

we have placed this review in the Appendix at the end of

this opinion. The Appendix contains a brief discussion of

the district court’s ruling, found generally in Murtha II],

840 F. Supp. at 183-91. In each case, unless otherwise

indicated, we reverse and remand the case to the district

court.

IV. The Governments’ Response Costs Claims

We turn next to the government’s litigation to recover

response costs. The United States and Connecticut (col-

lectively, the governments) both appeal the district court’s

decisions concerning their lawsuits against several non-

settling potentially responsible parties for unreimbursed

costs. Murtha IV, 855 F. Supp. at 546. We deal initially

with the claim raised by the United States (U.S.), and we

then consider briefly that of the State of Connecticut

(State).

The U.S. makes two principal claims of error. First, it

contends that the district court improperly considered the

$1.975 million received by the Laurel Park Coalition

under the Murtha consent decree as funds received by the

government. Second, the U.S. asserts that judgment on the

pleadings was inappropriate because the cost summaries it

submitted to the district court showed unreimbursed re-

sponse costs. Before we examine these specific conten-

tions, we begin with a review of the relevant CERCLA

law.

A. Governing CERCLA Law

The Act addresses the treatment of both settling and

non-settling defendants:

A person who has resolved its liability to the United

States or a State in an administrative or judicially

approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for

contribution regarding matters addressed in the settle-

ment. Such settlement does not discharge any of the

39a

other potentially liable persons unless its terms so

provide, but it reduces the potential liability of the

others by the amount of the settlement.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2). In short, the Act provides that

when, as here, a settlement addresses past and future

costs, the non-settling defendants’ liability to the govern-

ment for those costs is reduced by the amount of the settle-

ment. However, the non-settling defendants will still be

held accountable for the remainder of the government’s

response costs, and that liability will be reduced only by

the amount of the settlement rather than by the pro rata

share attributable to the settling parties. In other words,

non-settling defendants may bear disproportionate liability

for their acts. See United Technologies Corp. v. Browning-

Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 103 (1st Cir. 1994),

cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995). Further, as a means

of encouraging settlements, only settling parties are guar-

anteed not to be liable for future contributions regarding

the subjects addressed in the settlement.

As such, § 9613(f)(2) strengthens the federal policy

of encouraging CERCLA settlements. Elsewhere the Act

specifically asks that the government enter into CERCLA

settlements “in order to expedite effective remedial actions

and minimize litigation.” § 9622(a). Courts considering

CERCLA cases have recognized that the usual federal pol-

icy favoring settlements is even stronger in the CERCLA

context. See City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 697 F.

Supp. 677, 692-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); see also United

States v. Cannons Eng’g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 84 (1st Cir.

1990).

- Responsible parties are liable for “any . . . necessary

costs of response incurred [that are} consistent with the

national contingency plan.” § 9607(a)(4)(B). The

Act also states that “[t]he terms ‘respond’ or ‘response’

mean[{] remove, removal, remedy, and remedial action,”

and these terms include “enforcement activities related

40a

thereto.” §9601(25). Thus, the government’s recover-

able response costs properly include not only the obvious

costs of remediation, but also include inter alia, attorneys’

fees,” United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188, 1199-1200

(8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 73 (1995), in-

direct administrative costs, United States v. R.W. Meyer,

Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1504 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,

494 U.S. 1057 (1990), studies conducted for remedia-

tion, City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609,

618 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), and even prejudgment interest,

§$ 9607(a). The response costs’ consistency with the na-

tional contingency plan is presumed; the defendant bears

the burden of proving inconsistency, and it must show “that

the EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in choosing a

particular response action.” United States v. Hardage,

982 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510

U.S. 913 (1993); R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d at 1508. With

this legal background in mind, we consider the govern-

ment’s contentions.

B. District Court Decision

As discussed earlier, the Beacon Heights Coalition and

the U.S. agreed that the Beacon Heights Coalition would

pay for the remediation at the Beacon Heights landfill and

would pay the government for its future non-remediation

responses costs in excess of $500,000. The Laurel Park

Coalition agreed to conduct subsequent remediation at

Laurel Park and to pay for the U.S.’s future oversight

costs in excess of $200,000. Murtha paid $5,375,000 to

® The appellees contend that Key Tronic Corp. v. United States,

114 S. Ct. 1960 (1994), forecloses any claim by the government

that enforcement costs can include attorneys’ fees. We disagree.

Key Tronic denied private parties the right to recover attorneys’

fees in a suit for contribution brought against the United States.

The Court specifically “offer[ed] no comment on the extent to which

th[e] phrase [“enforcement activities”’] forms the basis for the

Government’s recovery of attorney’s fees through § [9607].” Jd. at

1967.

4la

discharge its owner and operator liability at both landfills.

The Murtha settlement proceeds were divided among

several parties: $1,875,000 went to the Beacon Heights

Coalition and $322,500 to the government for Beacon

Heights response costs. At Laurel Park, the U.S. and the

State were each paid $625,000 for past response costs. The

remaining $1,975,000, initially placed in a registry account

with the district court, was used for Laurel Park remedia-

tion by the Laurel Park Coalition. Had that coalition not

formed within 18 months, the governments would have

received the money for remediation at Laurel Park. How-

ever, when the coalition was formed, the precondition was

met, and the money moved directly from the registry ac-

count to the Laurel Park Coalition.

Several non-settling parties claimed that all response

costs incurred by both the U.S. and the State were covered

by the Murtha settlement and the settlements with the two

coalitions, accordingly those non-settling parties moved for

judgment on the pleadings. The district court agreed, find-

ing that the entire amount of the Murtha consent decree

($5.375 million) minus the amount paid to the Beacon

Heights Coalition ($1.875 million) had to be credited

against any unreimbursed past costs of the U.S. and Con-

necticut. Murtha IV, 855 F. Sup. at 546. By so holding,

the district court credited the $1.975 million set aside for

Laurel Park cleanup, and later given to the Laurel Park

Coalition, against the government’s response costs.

The district court stated that “[n]Jeither EPA nor DEP

present[ed] figures for incurred response costs not covered

by the net Murtha settlement” of $3.5 million ($5,375

million minus the $1.875 million given to the Beacon

Heights Coalition). /d. Holding that § 9613(f)(2) re-

quired that the non-settling defendants be credited with

the full amount of the settlement (instead of reducing the

government’s unreimbursed costs by only the amounts it

actually received), id. at 547, the trial court found that

42a

this amount, along with funds received from the coalitions,

totally wiped out all response costs incurred by the U.S.

and the State. It therefore granted judgment on the

pleadings.

On the government’s and the State’s response costs ap-

peal, Armstrong Rubber Company, The Eastern Company,

Kerite Company, Primerica, Inc., and George Clark are

Beacon Heights appellees, and Atlantic Ritchfield Com-

pany, The Eastern Company, and Gerald Metals, Inc., are

Laurel Park appellees.

C. Judgment on the Pleadings Reversed

The government contends first that the district court im-

properly included the $1.975 million that Murtha agreed

to pay for Laurel Park remediation as funds received by

the government. We agree with the government for several

reasons. In our view, the government had neither posses-

sion nor actual control over the $1.975 million given to

the Laurel Park Coalition. All parties agree that this por-

tion of the money from the Murtha decree was deposited

in a court registry account. It was then released to that

coalition upon its formation. The district court took a

contrary position, holding that the governments “had con-

trol and thus constructive possession of the settlement.”

Murtha IV, 855 F. Supp. at 547. Similarly, appellees con-

tend that because the United States did not have to enter

into an agreement with an industrial coalition for the

clean-up of Laurel Park, the government effectively con-

trolled the $1.975 million. However, because the Laurel

Park Coalition’s consent decree (forming the Laurel Park

Coalition) was entered by the court one day after the

Murtha consent decree was entered, the contingency re-

quired for the government to receive the Laurel Park

funds—non-formation of the coalition—never occurred.

We decline to adopt the district court’s expansive un-

derstanding of “possession.” Just as the district court did

hls We St PST

i te ih at oe es I RS

43a

not credit the government or the State with receipt of the

$1.875 million that the Murtha settlement allocated to the

Beacon Heights Coalition, it should not have credited the

government with receipt of the $1.975 million allocated

under the terms of the Murtha settlement to the Laurel

Park Coalition.

But even if we accepted the district court’s “construc-

tive possession” theory, we would still conclude that the

district court failed to consider that this money was spent

for remediation at the Laurel Park landfill. Hence, if the

$1.975 million had been received by the government, it

would follow that the government should then immediately

have been credited for spending the money for remediation

at Laurel Park—the money would have been part of the

incurred response costs. The government recognizes that

“[t]he sums cancel each other out,” and no one disputes

that the money was ultimately used for future response

costs at Laurel Park. The appellees may be correct that

this arrangement does not qualify as a mixed-funding re-

imbursement under § 9622(b)(1), but that does not make

the arrangement impermissible under CERCLA, a broad

remedial statute designed to promote settlements.

The settlements forged by the government furthered

important interests advanced by CERCLA: multi-party

settlements and quick remediation. By agreeing to the

Murtha settlement, in which Murtha set aside $1.975

million for the Laurel Park Coalition for oversight costs,

the government encouraged the formation of that coalition,

which will now undertake remediation. This is precisely

the sort of creative settlement that the government and

private parties should endeavor to craft in the future. In

sum, the district court should not have reduced the non-

settling defendants’ liability to the government by the

$1.975 million paid by Murtha to the Laurel Park Coali-

tion under the Murtha consent agreement.

44a

We also agree with the governments that unreimbursed

response costs at both facilities still may remain, and that

judgment on the pleadings was therefore inappropriate.

Judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(c), may only be granted when the pleadings show

that it is “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him

to relief.” See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46

(1957). Hence, if the cost summaries submitted by the

U.S. and the State support the relief sought, judgment

on the pleadings was inappropriate. The government con-

tends that the district court treated this motion as a sum-

mary judgment motion under Rule 56 without giving the

government notice of its intention to do such. If this is

what the district court did, it was error. See Sellers v.

M.C. Floor Crafters, Inc., 842 F.2d 639, 642 (2d Cir.

1988). However, because we believe the district court in-

correctly interpreted the Act, we need not address this

point.

The government submitted cost summaries on June 10,

1993 for both landfill sites. For Beacon Heights, the U.S.

claimed that even though it had collected $356,508.06

from the Murtha consent decree, $2,855,334.35 remained

as total outstanding costs. At Laurel Park, the U.S. col-

lected $690,906.02 from the Murtha consent decree and

$500,000.00 from the coalition for past costs, leaving the

U.S. with $2,187,109.01 in outstanding costs. These cost

summaries are supported by affidavits and other docu-

mentation. Based on its submissions, the government could

prove facts entitling it to relief.

It is true that the coalitions will be paying most of the

government’s future costs. The Laurel Park Coalition

will pay oversight costs in excess of $200,000, and the

Beacon Heights Coalition will pay oversight costs in excess

of $500,000. The Beacon Heights appellees claim that be-

cause the government incurred $1.1 million in response

45a

costs before the Beacon Heights Coalition’s consent decree

and because the Beacon Heights Coalition will pay for all

oversight costs over $500,000, the government’s costs are

effectively “capped” at $1.6 million. The Laurel Park

appellees make a similar argument regarding the govern-

ment’s response costs at that coalition’s landfill site, de-

claring they are capped at $4.5 million ($4.3 million spent

by the U.S. before the Laurel Park Coalition’s consent

decree and $200,000 not paid by that coalition). But the

government’s costs are not limited to the oversight costs

(which the coalitions have agreed to repay). The non-

settling defendants might still be liable for other enforce-

ment costs, such as attorneys’ fees and prejudgment

interest.

Further, even if future response costs are somewhat

speculative, the government is still entitled to declaratory

relief under CERCLA. See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de

Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 844-45 (6th Cir. 1994).

As the entry of a declaratory judgment of liability for

future costs is mandatory under the Act, the government

should (if ultimately successful on remand) be granted

declaratory relief in this action despite its failure properly

to preserve this issue for appeal. See United States v.

Restrepo, 986 F.2d 1462, 1463 (2d Cir.) (explaining

that where an issue was not properly preserved, appellate

court may grant relief where such relief would be available

in an independent action), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 843

(1993).

The Beacon Heights appellees also contend that the

provision in § 9613(f)(2) that non-settling defendants

should have their liability reduced by “the amount of the

settlement” refers to the total amount of money provided

to all parties in a settlement. As a consequence, they main-

tain, because the Murtha settlement did not just provide

money to the government for Beacon Heights remediation

but also allotted $1.875 million to the Beacon Heights

Coalition, this $1.875 million should also be counted

46a

when reducing the non-settlors’ liability. However, the

district court never questioned that the $1.875 million

given to the Beacon Heights Coalition should not be

counted against the government. The U.S. correctly ex-

plains that the appellees’ theory would lead to absurd re-

sults. Consider the following hypothetical: The govern-

ment and a state settle their claims with a landfill owner

for $2 million, with each receiving $1 million. Each

government has spent $2 million in response costs. Under

the appelles’ theory, even though the federal government

only received $1 million, its recoverable responses costs

would be reduced by $2 million and therefore erased. This

is too preposterous to be maintained.

Finally, we believe that the disputes in this case over

the accounting techniques used by the government raise

fact questions inappropriate for determination on a motion

for judgment on the pleadings. The government has met

the limited showing required to avoid judgment on the

pleadings.

D. State of Connecticut's Claim

Connecticut’s claims on this appeal arise exclusively out

of the Laurel Park landfill site. The State asserts it has

incurred a total of $2,546,224.02 in response costs, in-

cluding the costs for the installation of a water system and

a new sewerline, as well as investigation expenses. The

State contends that after it received funds from the Laurel

Park Coalition’s consent decree and the Murtha decree,

$760,125.00 of unreimbursed response costs remained.

As explained above, the district court incorrectly credited

to the State a portion of the Murtha settlement that was

paid to the Laurel Park Coalition. See Murtha IV, 855

F. Supp. at 547. Therefore, decision entering judgment

against the State must also be reversed.

47a

V. Summary Judgments Against United States

The government sued John and Joseph Betkoski, own-

ers of the Beacon Heights facility until 1970 (when

Murtha purchased the facility) and Richard Zollo, an

alleged transporter of hazardous substances to the same

landfill. All three were granted summary judgment by the

district court, which concluded that the government failed

to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact

as to their liability.

In the case of Richard Zollo, we again note that sua

sponte summary judgment should generally only be

granted after the losing party is given notice and an oppor-

tunity to present evidence and arguments in opposition.

In any event, here the evidence before the court was

sufficient for the government to survive summary judg-

ment. The government submitted an affidavit that sum-

marized certain EPA records concerning Zollo’s disposal

of waste at Beacon Heights. It also presented a letter

from a waste generator serviced by Zollo that listed the

chemicals present in its waste. This letter and other docu-

ments showed that Zollo transported to the landfill various

materials (such as waste oil, waste chemicals, liquid paint,

heavy sludges, paint residue, and latex scrap material)

containing hazardous substances. And, Zollo admitted in

an interrogatory submitted to the EPA he had transported

waste from several companies to Beacon Heights. These

papers raised a genuine issue of material fact, and sum-

mary judgment was therefore inappropriate.

We also conclude that the district court should not

have granted summary judgment to the Betkoskis. If gen-

uinely disputed material facts remain concerning whether

Zollo transported hazardous substances to Beacon Heights,

it is hard to see how the Betkoskis can obtain summary

judgment. They owned the Beacon Heights landfill during

the time when Zollo allegedly transported chemical wastes

to the site, and would therefore be directly liable under the

Act. Moreover, the Betkoskis did not show the absence of

48a

disputed material facts and therefore failed to carry their

burden at this stage of the litigation. Joseph Betkoski

only claimed that he “never disposed of any waste” at the

site and John Betkoski simply stated that he had no knowl-

edge that any hazardous waste was disposed at Beacon

Heights. However, the Betkoskis’ liability turns on neither

their disposal, nor their knowledge of any disposal of

hazardous substances at the landfill; it depends solely on

their ownership at a time when hazardous substances were

deposited at the landfill.

Because we hold that summary judgment was inappro-

priate, the rulings against the United States and in favor

of the Betkoskis and Richard Zollo must be reversed

and those cases must be remanded.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, as indicated, we affirm the judgment

appealed from in part, and reverse the judgment, in part,

and remand to the district court to conduct further pro-

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

49a

APPENDIX

Case-By-Case Review

Review of the grant of summary judgment in 85 cases

A. Successor Liability Cases

Earlier we explained the propert test for successor

liability under CERCLA. As the district court relied on a

different test, we must vacate all grants of summary judg-

ment premised on the absence of successor liability. On

remand, the district court should reconsider its decisions in

light of today’s opinion. Should any material facts remain

genuinely disputed, summary judgment should not be

cranted.

Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined Claims:

* Jacob Brothers, Inc.: The district court found that the

currently constituted Jacob Brothers, Inc. did not assume

the CERCLA liability of a previously formed corporation

with the same name. Specifically, in 1925 a corporation

named Jacob Brothers, Inc. was formed. This company

later became known as Brothers Scrap, Inc. In 1987, a

different company, Michael Schiavone & Sons, purchased

some of the assets of the original “Jacob Brothers, Inc.”

The acquiring company then assigned its rights and duties

under the acquisition to a newly formed corporation,

“Connecticut Iron and Metal, Inc.,” which later assumed

the name “Jacob Brothers, Inc.” Apparently there is a

factual dispute over whether this appellee purchased a por-

tion of the former Jacob Brothers’ assets or substantially

all of its assets. On remand the district court should de-

cide whether, in light of our opinion, there is a genuine

material fact in dispute.

* Seymour Brass, Inc.: This appellee, which purchased

the “assets and business” of The Seymour Brass Turning

Company, was granted summary judgment based on the

absence of successor liability.

50a

Beacon Heights Only:

* Connecticut Pharmacare, Inc. d/b/a Ford Pharmacy

and Medical Supply: This business acknowledged disposal

of general rubbish, including empty boxes, packing mate-

rials, empty or broken bottles of cleansers and prescription

medicines, empty containers and paper. The president of

the corporation denied sending hazardous substances to the

Beacon Heights landfill “with the possible exception of

such trace substances . . . alleged to be included in general

rubbish.” Dr. Brown concluded that several hazardous

substances were found in the appellee’s waste that were

also found in both landfills.

The district court ruled against the Beacon Heights

Coalition rejecting the proof in the Brown affidavit and

ruling that trace amounts of hazardous substances were

insufficient to create CERCLA liability. It also rejected

the coalition’s argument concerning successor liability

under CERCLA. We reverse and remand on all three

grounds.

* NRS Carting Co., Inc.: The district court granted sum-

mary judgment on the question of successor liability.

NRS’s contention that it was not a successor to Norwalk

Refuse Service (Norwalk), but only purchased some com-

mercial customer routes, equipment, and containers from

Norwatk, presents a fact question regarding successor

liability.

* Zollo Drum Company, Inc. (ZDC): The district court

granted summary judgment to ZDC (a corporation run by

Anthony Zollo) and rejected the Beacon Heights Coali-

tion’s argument that ZDC should be liable for the acts of

a prior sole proprietorship operated by Richard Zollo

(Anthony’s father) which was later sold to ZDC.

B. Transporter Liability Cases

The district court rejected the Beacon Heights Coali-

tion’s claims against three Beacon Heights appellees—Dee’s,

Inc., Frank Perrotti & Sons, Inc., and Manafort Brothers,

S5la

Inc./Connecticut Waste Processing, Inc.—partly for the

same reasons it rejected the claims against the generators

and partly because the court found that these transporters

did not select the site of disposal. On remand, the district

court should consider whether summary judgment remains

appropriate in these three cases in light of our discussion

of transporter liability and the other issues addressed in

our opinion.

C. Sua Sponte Dismissals

As noted, the district court dismissed claims sua sponte

against 32 appellees (listed below) for “want of substan-

tiation.” While district courts have authority to take such

action in complex cases involving dozens of summary

judgment motions, the district court could not grant sua

sponte summary judgment without giving the coalition

notice and an opportunity to adduce evidence in opposi-

tion. Here, because these appellees made no motion for

summary judgment, no opposition papers were prepared

by the coalitions. This procedure leaves us without the

benefit of a record in these cases.

These 32 sua sponte grants of summary judgment must

be reversed and the trial court may again consider sua

sponte summary judgment after giving appellants ten days

to come forward with their evidence. It should then con-

sider that evidence in light of the legal standards we have

enunciated and determine if summary judgment is appro-

priate.

°° Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined Claims:

* Ashmore Trucking Company, Thomas Ashmore, George

Clark, Gerald Metals.

** Laurel Park Only: John Ashmore, Northeast Utilities /

Connecticut Light & Power Co., Quality Rubber Prod-

ucts.

°° Beacon Heights Only: Armand’s Auto Service, Beacon

Outing Club, John Betkoski, Edward Betkoski, Boise

52a

Cascade, Brass Rail Restaurant/Cafe, Capozziello Broth-

ers, C.R. Gibson, E. Eric Arsan Refuse, Elk’s Lodge

# 967, George’s Floor Covering, High Ridge Homes/

Apartments, Korvette Services, Latella Carting Co., Long

Meadow Cafe, Nelson Mendes, Naugatuck, Y.M.C.A.,

Peter Paul Cadbury, Ray’s Hardware, David Rupsis,

Sperry Rand Corporation, Triangle Services, Turner Con-

struction, Vieria Agency.

D. Municipal Generators

The district court considered the municipal appellees as

a single group and granted summary judgment dismissing

the coalitions’ actions against them. In so doing it ruled

that wastes that were not themselves listed as hazardous,

but which incorporated components that were hazardous

wastes, did not bring disposers of such waste within

CERCLA. The court also ruled that liability does not lie

if the waste disposed of would release a hazardous sub-

stance only on the intervention of another force. Further,

it weighed the Brown affidavit with other evidence and

found it wanting. In our view these rulings were error.

“Liability under CERCLA depends only on the pres-

ence in any form of listed hazardous substances.” Murtha

I, 958 F.2d at 1201. The district court, in support of its

holding, stated that the coalitions “provided no analysis or

authority to the contrary.” Murtha III, 840 F. Supp. at

188. But in fact, the Beacon Heights Coalition referred

the court to the very passage in Murtha I just quoted.

The second ruling erroneously required the appellants

to prove causation for the release. Further, in weighing

the Brown affidavit against the backdrop of the EPA

Municipal Policy and deciding against pursuing the muni-

cipal generators as potentially responsible parties, the trial

court found that spot checks conducted by the municipali-

ties “substantially undercut” Brown’s affidavit. Murtha III,

840 F. Supp. at 189. This is precisely the sort of weighing

of evidence in which courts may not engage when deciding

53a

summary judgment motions. See United States v. Rem,

38 F.3d 634, 644 (2d Cir. 1994) (“On a motion for

summary judgment, the court is not to weigh the evidence

or . . . resolve issues of fact, but only to determine

whether there are issues to be tried.”). Moreover, the

EPA’s decision whether or not to charge these appellees

as potentially responsible parties is not relevant when

determining liability.

We remand as to the following 19 municipal generators:

°° Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined Claims:

Town of Beacon Falls, Town of Bethany, Connecticut Re-

source Recovery Authority, Town of Hamden, Town of

Killingworth, Town of Middlebury, Borough of Nauga-

tuck, Town of Orange, Town of Plymouth, Town of Sey-

mour, Town of Thomaston, City of Waterbury.

** Laurel Park only: New Haven Housing Authority,

Watertown Housing Authority, Town of Watertown, Town

of Woodbury.

** Beacon Heights only: City of Milford, Town of Strat-

ford, Town of Westport.

E. Remaining Cases"

1. Laurel Park and Beacon Heights Combined

Claims

There are 27 remaining cases for which a brief explana-

tion follows:

* Adams Service Station (Adams): This motorcycle

and snowmobile business was managed by Stanley P.

Radauskas from 1954 until 1982. Radauskas explained

that the service station disposed of “cardboard boxes, mis-

cellaneous packing materials, and a small amount of paper

office trash.” In deposition testimony, he also acknowl-

7 Cases against the following defendants were voluntarily dis-

missed: P. Francini & Co.; Ideal Manufacturing Co.; Jetzon Tire

Co.; Litton Systems, Inc.; and Sanitary Refuse Co.

54a

edged the disposal of windshield cleaning fluid, plastic

bags, used paper gaskets from motorcycles, spark plugs,

and light bulbs. Radauskas claimed that “none of the

[wastes] disposed of by the service station . . . contained

any [CERCLA hazardous substances].” After reviewing

these facts, Dr. Brown concluded that Adams’ waste in-

cluded lead, trichloroethane, and trichloroethylene, three

CERCLA hazardous substances found in the Beacon

Heights Landfill.

Although the district court concluded that none of the

products disposed of are listed by EPA as hazardous sub-

stances, the products have component parts that are haz-

ardous substances. Hence, the waste allegedly disposed of

by Adams falls within CERCLA.

* Bristol Flowed Gasket Company (BFGC): BFGC

produces metal stampings. Murtha removed BFGC’s “gen-

eral rubbish, including cardboard, [office] waste basket

contents, garbage from the company cafeteria, junk mail,

and floor sweepings.” Dr. Brown concluded that these

wastes commonly include several CERCLA hazardous

substances, including methylene chloride, benzene, tri-

chloroethane, and diethyl phthalate. All of these sub-

stances were found at the landfills.

The district court relied on the EPA’s decision not to

designate BFGC as a potentially responsible party and also

found that no direct evidence of BFGC’s disposal of haz-

ardous substances was produced.

* The Coffee Shop: This Wat

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