Opposition Brief — American Airlines, Inc. v. Criales
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ORIGINAL , Supreme Court, U.S.
2 'V FILED
Wo. 97-152 Aug 1 #97
In The CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER Term, 1996
er * =
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
*
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
*
MAURICIO CRIALES
PRO-SE Respondent
37-57 61 Street, lst Floor
Woodside, New York 11377
Beeper (917) 419-1272
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OFFICE OF THE CLERK
SUPREME COURT, U.S.
Lid
a No. 97-152
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER Term, 1996
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Petitioner,
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
P United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
*
RFSPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
*
MAURICIO CRIALES
PRO-SE Respondent
37-57 61 Street, lst Floor
Woodside, New York 11377
Beeper (917) 419-1272
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
-l- Whether AMERICAN AIRLINES,INC. is acting in good
Faith or not by Misrepresenting Facts and Lying to had
Claimed in three separate Federal Lawsuits,(The most
recent one a 97-CV-1460 (ILG) EDNY Removed from the SU-
PREME COURT STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS 1072/97
On February 12, 1997) To Claimed to have NO KNOWLEDGE }
of the Worse case of National Origin Discrimination based
on Racial Hate, and Disparate Treatement Due to Race any
Colombian Hispanic has ever been subjected in the Entire
United States Aircraft Maintenance Aviation History.
--Including an ILLEGAL ARREST by the "FBI" Suffered
By the Plaintiff Respondent., on June 10,1996 without any
Warrants or the District Court Acknowledgement of their
intentions. AMERICAN AIRLINES,INC. VICIOUSLY made No men-
tion at all on their Petition of Writ about the "FBI"
Arrest NOR that such Illegal Actions Created the FEDERAL
LAWSUIT NOW PENDING at the Eastern District Of New York,
Based on Malicious Prosecution based on Defamation,Cons-
piracy to Defraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress and Constitutional Violations of the First (1)
and 14th Constitutional Ammendments Priviledges of the
United States of America. Against AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC;
EDWARD CERASIA II Esq. Counsel of Record here and the
Same "FBI" AGENTS Who Conspired to Arrested me.
-2- Whether there are enough causes to bring CRIMINAL
CHARGES Against American Airlines Inc, For Allowing a
Climate of Racial Discrimination to a Licensed Federal
Aviation Aircraft Maintenance Technician who performed
sensitive Maintenance to Hundreds of Transport Aircraft
at American Airlines Hangar 10 JFK Airport Under Extre-
mately Hostile,Dangerous,Severe,Highly Pervasive Working
conditions., for a long 13 months.
-3- Whether the Distric Court's dismissal of Criales I
or 93-CV-5340 On Statue of Limitations Grounds was NOT
an adjudication Upon the merits,but rather was a dismissal
for lack of Jurisdiction based on an untimely right to sue
letter Issue by the EEOC.
ii
PLAINTIFF RESPONDENT PRO-SE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Mauricio Criales is an American Citizen for 21 YEARS
Who was born in the Republic of Colombia, South America,
and is Hispanic by descent.
Respondent Criales Served in the United States NAVY for
Six (6) Years 1979-1985 .,All those Years Involved on
Aircraft Maintenance on the Lockeed P3 Electra Aircraft
used for Anti-submarine Welfare Missions around the World.
Also, I am a Licensed Federal Aviation Administration FAA
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN SINCE 1986.,Airframe and
Powerplants Licenbsed.
Mauricio Criales is a Family man with Inmense Family Values
Who's Four (4) Children 2 Boys and 2 Girls ages ranging from
1 1/2 to 10 Years, are all United States Born Citizens.
Respondent Criales has been forced to reside with his Chil-
dren BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL in the United States at the
Hands of American Airlines, Who has Defamed Plaintiff to all
US Airlines,when requesting references, as well as dozens of
Prosper Employers.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Ousstions PEORGHESE 2c occ reese cts corse oen dos
Respondent Statement ccccccccccsccccccccccs
Tete GE COBEGRES cc soho 5000 060066464 66 66088
Statement of CHE COBO cececccseeseesecsesenese
Reasons for Denying the Petition ...........
I.
II
III.
IV.
IV
Criales II Under No Circunstances can
ever be Bee JWGECRTR« 0.00 60h 0006 0 60808
The Second Circuit's Decision is Totally
Correct to REVERSE the Judgement Which
Dismissed Criales's Title VII Claims on
Res Judicata grounds and to Unanimously
VACATED the Dismissal of Two (2) New York
State ClOIMS cccccseconecocessvecvesess
The Second Circuit's Decision Do not
Conflict with any other Decision of any
other Court of Appeals ,were the SAFETY
of the Flying Public is in DANGER; Until
LAWS are change to better Protect all
Aircraft Maintenance Technicians From
any Source that can ENDANGER the Aircraft
Including VICIOUS Humans Who are RACISTS
The Arbitration Decision MOST BE OVERTURN
On Grounds That it WARRANTS A RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT IN DISTRICT COURT
Now REAFFIRMED by the Second Circuit ....
LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING e*eeeces83o§ee#ee#e#e##e#e# e*e@eeeeseeeee#ee#eesee#*e#ee#ee#ee#ee#e#
COnclUBEOR cccserve vette eeboawas badteceseseeseawes
10
12
14
15
18
Contents
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Cases Cited: Pages.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,47
94 8. Ct. 16131,10139 CiSFE).cccvcsececenecaut Appendix A-6
Avagliano v. Semi tano Shoji America,Inc 614F.
Supp.1397,1402 (SDNY 1985)....cccceee ;...--Appendix B.17
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohil, 484 U.S. 343,350 (1988
th. teeerrrrTTrrTryT TTT. Appendix A MINER 3
Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth., 890 F.2d
569,581 (26 Cic 1989) .cccvcscoscesscsses Appendix B... 19
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)..AppendixB24
Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S. Ct.
(29GL co cccucsetseneeseaes 11.AppendixA.Miner 1-2 8,9,10,14
Second Circuit Decision Rationalize Costello..all
Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802
P.26 21,29 (24 Cie. 1966) -cccscceseses Appendix A...... 14
Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8,10 (2d .Cir.1996).Appx a.7
Khan v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group.526 F.Supp.1268
(B.D.B.F. ISL}. cccsecvecossccessuscen 14..Appendix B.;..17
Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co of New York 152 A.D.
2d 169, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 513,521 (2d Dep't 1989)..Appx B..24
Hladki v. Jeffrey's Consol Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 388
392 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)..see .2,3,10 Appendix B............- 14
Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 wall.) 232,237 (1866),
365 U.S. at 286, 81 S. Ct. at 545.............-Appendix A..9
Criales v. American Airlines 93-CV-5340......not.,Printed????
Criales v. American Airlines 95-CV-1709 1995 WL 669900 *6
*6 E.D.N.Y. Nov 6,1995..2d. Cir.95-9170 Reversed & Remmand
at U.S.S.C. FOR Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorary.
Criales v. American Airlines ( 97-CV-0526;97-CV-1460)and
Supreme Court State of New York, County of Queens 1072/97
eocececesese coccc ccc cc ce ePONGING. ccccccccccccccccccccccccccs
vers Ss Pullman Co-,404 U.S. 522,527,92 S. Ct. 616, 619
1972).
€ :
Contents
Pages
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792,798
93 S. Ct.1817,1822 (1973)..... Appendix A.6
Appendix B.14,15...... 14-15
Nasser v. Isthm an Lines,331l F.2d 124,127 (2d Cir.1964).,
Ortiz. v. Cornetta, 867 F. 2d 146,149 (2d Cir.1989)
TUTE TETETTLTTTTTLILITTrriTittts Appendix B......24
Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 256-57 (2d Cir)
Cert. denied, 409U.S. 1077, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972).Appx A.10
Samuels v. Northenn Telecom Inc., 942 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
ROO J cccccswccccesnessccecensewveseenes 29 Cir Appendix A-14
Saylor v. Lindsley,391l F.2d 965,967,969 (2d Cir.1968)apxA-9
Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520,524
€ (Sth Circ. 1960). ccccccccesscenstseusesese Appendix A..... ll
Twitty v. Smith , 614 F. 2d 325, 335 n. 16 (2d Cir. 1979)
Silver v. Mohasco Corp.,602 F. 2d 1083.1090 =(2d Cir 1979)
Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1992)
woe cccccccccccccccc cee eco eceseeececs Appendix A....Miner...2
Yates v. Philip Morris Co., 690 F. Supp 180 , 184
CS.D.W.Y. 19BS) nccccccssesssesssnsue AppenGin B..cscccccnse 17
Zipes v. Trens World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397,102
102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1982)..Appx A..13 Miner.2
Appx B..aleccccecs ecccesccce 21
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji 481 U.S.
604,107 S. Ct 2022, 1987 .U.S............. WeTTTrreirer it
UNITED STATES RULES..........-.2--[**69]) & [**2387]
TG. at 3371-3372. Nlliscccccccccccecce escccscccoecos - 10-16
Contents
APPENODI X
Appendix A---Court of Appeals Decision Issue Jan.21,1997
---Denial of a 90 Day Stay Pending Petition for
Writ of Certiorari.
---Issue of the MANDATE May 13,1997
---BNA Employment Discrimination Report Pages
209-210. Court of Appeals Decision From other
Perspective
Appendix B--~-Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Response and
Opposition to Dismiss Based On Res Judicata
To the Easthern District of New York (ILG)
On September 13, 1995.
APPENDIX C---Memorandum and Order of Honorable I Leo Glasser
Granting a REMOVAL out State Court to the District
Court EDNY on February 12, 1997.
Appendix D---Front page of the United States District Court
Lawsuit ..Removed Now 97-CV-1460 (ILG) Since
January 15, 1997.
Appendix E---Memorandum of Law Submitted by Plaintiff
Respondent Criales on June ,1997 About the
Arbitration Desicion at the EDNY to Honorable
I Leo Glasser
Please Respondent Mauricio Criales is a Poor Person who at
the present time Can not affort any legal Professional and
Experience /Attorneys, Nevertheless I can Handle just fine
Pro se I read a lot as for the laws concern, I know my Rights
and Respecfully Request the Help of the United States
Supreme Court To Help me Prove My Claims., Since 1990 I Had
Collected Substantial Evidence to be WARRANT A TRIAL BY JURY
To be Schedule as Soon as Possible.
The Fact is American Airlines has Delay this Action ONLY SO
THEY CAN ABUSE THE “STATUE OF LIMITATIONS".THEY WILL NOT GET
AWAY., I LOVE THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA., I WILL NOT ALLOW
TO BE DISCRIMINATED BASED ON NEITHER MY RACE OR MY NATIONAL
ORIGIN.,OF HISPANIC ASCESTRY.
*****Additional Rules and Oppinions see., 9 Wright & Arthur
R.Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure. Civil 2d Sect.
2373, at 405 (1995)----and-- 18 Charles A. Wright et at
Federal Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction Sect. 4437,
Bt 347 (19G1) oo ccccccccccccccccccc cAPPONGAE AcocccceclO-l2
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Mauricio Criales respectfully submit the follo-
wing Brief In Opposition to Petition For Writ of
Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent concur in part and dissents in part in
the procedural history of the case set forth on pages
8 thru 20 of the petition for Writ of Certiorari sub-
mitted by Petitioners American Airlines, Inc. The
Petitioner have neglected to inform the Court of many
i extremely important facts necessary for permitting the
Court to determine whether a Writ of Certiorari should
be granted in this case.
This action for damages caused by employment Harras-
ment,Racial Discrimination,disparate treatment,and Wrog-
ful Termination of Employment,based on racial background |
and ancestry in Violation of the Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. 198l,and 2000(e),et seq. As
amended by the Civil Rights Act of 199l,as well for Inten-
tional Infliction of Emotional Distress,and for Defamation
and Slander per se.
Petitioner American Airlines,Inc an AMR Corporation
Has Failed to inform this Court That the Only Reazon Why
I was Provided.,Finally with a timely Right to Sue by the
EEOC IN New York was Only because I Contacted Mr. Paul
7 RAMSHAW EEOC in Washington D.C. Since November of 1995,
and Demanded that they finally provide a timely Right to |
Sue for a Complaint Rendered to them only 45 Days after |
American Airlines Singled me out and fired me 4 days be-
fore Chritmas of 1991.
I was Getting Nowhere as far as the EEOC in New York
concerns, Because I used to call at least Once a Month
and they kept telling me that the case was transfered to
Long Island Office and that it was still Under Investigation.
Frustated and tired of Getting no where I have no
choice but to complaint again this time with the New York
State Division of Human Rights on September 25,1992 , exa-
ctly 250 days after American Final Termination. Of Dec20,1991
as clearly explained in the Court of Appeals Brief and
Response in OPPOSITION to American Airlines Brief,Pages 7,
8,15 and pages 30,31,35,38,39 of my response in opposition
to Brief for Defendant American Airlines I claimed that it
was the EEOC Who Prevented me for Going Forward in the
District Court and that I Had No control of the situation.
bacause the EEOC Complaint filed February 5, i992 ,45 days
after American Ended my Job , and the Second Complaint to
the NYSDHR ON September 25,1992 was 250 days after termi-
nation. **"The two Complaints meet the 300 day period as
required by 42 U.S.C./2000-5[**8] In New York State Law.
The untimely Right to Sue Issued by the EEOC 160 93 0816
Clearly can apply in Hladki .v. Jeffrey Consol 652f.Supp
388,1987 U.S.Dis.Lexis 317;42 Fair emp #(5),
"When a Plaintiff" has in some extraordinary way been
Prevented from asserting his rights timely. 2nd circuit
Respondents Brief & Answer Page 38. 95-9170 (Jan 21, 1997).
on this one particular reazon using RES JUDICATA Manifest
Unfairness , “It refused to extent the Doctrine to a situ-
ation where it was Innapplicable.
Contrary to petitioners American Airlines Argument that
I never Claimed justify equitable modification in Hladki.v.
Jeffreys Consol Ltd. It is simply NOT TRUE TO THE Contrary
it was part of the Plaintiff's Brief pages 7,8,48 and again
on Pages 36,37 of the Response in Opposition toBrief for
Defendant-Appelle American, Even more important is the Fact
that it was part of the Oral Argument On April 19,.996.
I Argued that Hladki ,reviewed the reasons that would
justify equitable modification of the statutory prere-
quisites to a Title VII action:
Let it be a fact,
Amicus Curai, The EEOC,Argue.......
that res judicata should NOT apply
to situations like the one presented
here, because application of the
doctrine would be inconsistent with
the Scheme of Title VII. While this
~ Court is commited to giving ful! ef-
fect to the title VII administrative
scheme Set up by Congress, The EEOC
Opinion that the language and Poli-
cy of Title VII "DO NOT" Undercut
the application of res Judicata,and
we see No reazon Militating against
application of well-settled claim
preclusion Principles.
Title VII Prohibits employers from Discriminating on the
basis of race,color,Religion,Sex or National Origin,42 U.S.C.
2000 e-2(a) throug (d) While giving an aggrieved employee
access to the Federal Courts.
Res Judicata has Never been broader than the Transaction
to which it related. "claim".,Using res-Judicata to diss-
miss a Title VII Lawsuit here Presented....will be improper,
This result will put Future Title VII Plaintiffs to the imper-
missible "Hobson's" choice of either Leaving their charges in
the administrative process, Hoping that in the meantime there
will be no adverse Judgment on other claims which will pre-
clude their Title VII Claims.
AMERICAN AIRLINES ,INC.,intentions to use the doctrine of
res-Judicata here Presented Totally Violates Title VII Policys.
Please view the Law priciples based on the fact that res-
judicate here in Criales is innaplicable.
in a context of res judicata .,has never been broader than
the transaction to which it related.
***A plaintiff might have as many claims as there were
theories of the substantive Law upon which he could
seek relief against the defendant. Thus, defeated
in an action based on one theory,the Plaintiff might
be able to maintain another action based on a different
theory, even though both actions were grounded upon
the Defendants identical act or Connected acts forming
a single-Life-situation.***
REAZONS FOR THE DENIAL OF WRIT OF CERTIARARI
Petitioner American Airlines,Inc, request of Writ of
Certiorari was made Frivolous,without merit, for Vexatious
and for Delay for a MANDATE finally issue May 13, 1997
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after ha-
ving Denied American Airlines request on April 30,1997
for a 90 Day Stay of the Issuance of Mandate Pending Pe-
tition for Writ of Certiorari, as clearly explained in a
Respondents Opposition for that request “American” can
Not be granted a Writ , based on Dishonesty and misrepre-
sentation of facts with this Court, based on EVIDENCE
Submitted that Petitioners have a SUPREME COURT STATE OF
NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS. 1072/97 and a UNITED STATES
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Lawsuits 97-CV-1460 Pending
that are related to the same Continues Racial behavior
against Plaintiff Pro se Respondent.
American Airlines, Inc., Themselves Admits that the
Supreme Court State of New York County of Queens Complaint
dated January 15,1997 is related to the same causes of
action, when they requested Judge I Leo Glasser to REMOVED
it out of State Court to the E.D.N.¥. on February 12,1997
see Appendix "C".
Even more Intersting is How Petitioner “American”
FAILED to inform the Supreme Court of the United States
the Fact that "American" attorney Edward Cerasia II,Esq.
Here on record, CAN NOT be a Counsel of record in good
Standing here because he is one of the primary Defendants
charged in the Supreme Court Complaint 1072/97. He is ac-
cuse of Wrongful Conduct, Violating Ethics Rules and Mal-
Practice.
Counsel Edward Cerasia II, Esq.,Malicious Prosecution
Tactics were also reported to the,
SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE
41 Madison Ave
New York, New York 10010 Case # 97.2523
Since June 1997.
It was Requested based on Evidence that His Law Practice
License to be Revoke and or Suspended for been so Vicious
and Dishonest also.
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS "FBI" Illegally
arrested respondent Mauricio Criales June 10,1996, While
the Court of Appeals decision was Pending, on 95-9170.
Plaintiff Respondent was FALSELY ACCUSE by American
Airlines, Inc an AMR CORP., of the INFAMOUS LIES among
others of Displaying a Semi-Automatic Firearm at a busy
"American" La Guardia Airport Terminal sometime in May of 1996.
Plaintiff was Taken without any Warrants and was not
Encarcerated, Four Months Later the "FBI" Complaint was
Dismissed without Prejudice, because the Goverment find
Out that NO ONE PERSON can Display a Semi-Automatic Fire=
arm at a busy Airport Terminal and be Arrested 14 Days Later
after the alledge Act Occurred.???. American Airlines is
The Primary Defendant for such Vicious Bogus Fabricated |
Charges, Then, Failed to show up in Court to Prove it.
I Keep signing Extensions to give them the chance to find
causes for an Indictment,But thank to God the true Allways
Prevails., "FBI" Investigation showed The True., Respondent
Criales in Fact Does Not Own or ever carry any Handguns
of any Kind. I am like most of Japanese People who also
Don’t Believe in Guns. I don't even like to buy Toy guns
to any of my Children.
Edward Cerasia II Esq.,"Americas" Attorney on
Record here, is been charged with Malicious Prosecution,
Conspiracy to Defraud, among others charges for Vicious
Lies he told the "FBI" of Falsely making Threats to American
Airlines , Only Because Respondent Mauricio Criales, Born
in Santa Fe the Bogota-Colombia Expresed His Opinion and
Blame American Airlines of been Responsible of the DESTRUCTION
of the 757 Aircraft Fly 965 That Crashed in the Mountains
of Colombia December 20,1995.
I Claimed and Still do Today that 164 Inocent People who
were Miserably Killed ., Could have been SAVED,If “American”
were to follow the proper procedures.
Including the Fact that "American" Pilots FAILED to
Report their Position to Tulua's "VOR" to the Airtraffic
Controllers in Colombia, a city 4 minutes straight ahead to
Cali-Colombia Alfonso Bonilla Airport.
Instead the Pilot Error (Whos According with Colombian
Authorities was Intoxicated with high levels of alcohol)
Selected and Executed the wrong Command on the FMC Computer
"Flight Management Computer”. and that the Proyected
Route Line on the Electronic Map Display would have clearly
Showed a Sharp Turn to the Left or a gross Deviation as
the aircraft Turned 120 degrees EAST for 13 miles,Instead
Heading Straight ahead for 4 (Four) more minutes.,Yet the
approach Path and missed approach would have been VISIBLE
Straight ahead, If the Captain of fly 965 was using the MAP
But,apparently Not set to its 80 nautic miles or longer scale.
The crew had crossed over Tulua's "VOR" But Never
Reported to the air traffic Controllers in Colombia,as required
Instead they Fly over without even notice., I CLAIMED THAT
ONE PARTICULAR MISTAKE, IF CORRECTED WOULD IT HAD SAVED
EVERYONE., Including the Aircraft.
€ and..because Cockpit Conversations indicates the crew was
Confused about the Aircraft's Position and Failure to perceive
the "FMC" Iniciated Turn away from the intended routing Plan.
As Clearly Recorded the Pilot was more Interested
Talking about the Holiday Season.
In their Pilot Training American Airlines Crews are Trained |
but Not Require to ensure that "FMC" Commands "look Right"
before executing them.
Petitioner American Airlines, Inc., And AMR Corp.
had Respondent Arrested by the "FBI" only Because they Know
I was 100% Correct in my Claims; so, Fabricated the infamous,
Slanderous Claims of the so called Semi-Automatic Firegun
to Convense the "FBI" TO Arrested me June 10,1996. Monday
Morning as I was busy Working at my Place of Employment
as an FAA Part 145 Aircraft Accessories Repair Station
FAA Licensed Mechanic for Arkwin Industries Inc , In Westbury
é Long Island, New York. In Front of my Co-workers and entire
Staff, As if I was The "FBI MOST WANTED FUGITIVE CRIMINAL”
ENOUGH to be FIRED by arkwin Industries 4Days Later.after
Showing to work the next day of the Arrest based on......
As they Put it CONVENIENCE and SAFETY WORK ENVIRONMENT, as
the Verbal reazons for my Discharge.
American Airlines is Wrong, They got a Lot of Money ,so
They think they Own the Eastern District Court House,But You are
WRONG AMERICAN AIRLINES , No One is Above the Law in the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, so Help us God !!!
As to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable
in a Civilized Society ., American Airlines and Edward Cerasia II
HAD FAILED to "SHOW CAUSE" on Five Different Requests At the
E.D.N.Y¥. (ILG) Since February 1997 Made by Respondent-Plaintiff
to get to the bottom and the true about the so called semi-
Automatic Firegun, because such Slanderous Claim in particular
has caused respondents Criales Huge Inplications and Damaged
& to His Reputation for Life.
ii ial a ice mre
Respondent Criales Unemployed Since Arkwin Industries
Fired me June 16,1996 to Today Surviving BELOW THE
POVERTY LEVEL in the United States.
The Supreme Court of the United States Most Not
Ignore The Imformation Provided here, to the Contrary
As explained to the Court of Appeals, Only after “American”
and the District Court Easthern District Solve all the
Matters Pertaining to the Supreme Court State Of New York
County of Queens Lawsuit, Removed and Approved by the
E.D.N.Y. (ILGlasser) on February 12,1997, Only then this
case can be Heard by a Higher Court.
Because Let it be a Fact that Defendant's Petitioner
Circulation of the alledged "False and Defamatory" Complaint
agains Plaintiff at the E.D.N.Y. on June 10,1996 Was not
Protected as Fair and true report OF judicial Proceedings
where it was alledged; without denial that action had been
brought SOLELY to ruin Plaintiff's reputation and that
circulation was intended to accomplish this improper purpose.
I. CRIALES II UNDER NO CIRCUNSTANCES CAN EVER
BE RES JUDICATA
Dismissing Criales II, or 95-CV-1709 based on res judi-
cata will be a great mistake ., based on a timely right to
sue Issued by the EEOC , Plaintiff Claims were Never been
considered on any of the merits of the substantive claims
brought in District Court Since 1993. Judge I Leo Glasser
Told me Himself that it was only up to the Jury to hear
the merits of any case. But Five Years Later I Have been
Prevented From having this case hear at a trial on the merits.
The District Court Easthern District of New York
Kept SILENCE about any Options that we May have in Criales I,
or 93-CV-5340 (ILG) E.D.N.Y. NOT UNTIL Honorable Glasser
9
€ Had Already Issued his Memorandum and Order Dated November
14,1994 We Learned that the were Options available to Us
to Either Dismissed without Prejudice or Request to Stay
Pending the issue of a timely right to sue by the EEOC
eeeee BY THEN IT WAS TOO LATE------
the final decision was Issued , Been Abandom by my
Lawyer to-Appeal alone pro se at the Court of Appeals or
94-9289. I am a Very Poor person who have not been able
to keep Counsel all during this two Lawsuits, Criales I was
an Action entered in District Court in FORMA PAUPERIS
On a Status Conference E.D.N.Y. Magistrate CHREIN Urged the
the need for me to find Counsel.
The case was Taken by a Young recently appointed Lawyer,
without having the financial means of Getting a more
Title VII Experienced Lawyer.
I was Abandon to Appeal alone at the Court of Appeals
€ In Criales I or 94-9289. Only after I Contacted Paul Ramshaw
EEOC in Washington D.C. and Complained in Writing in a Letter
Dated December 8,1995 Only Then was Issue a Timely right to
sue letter for a Complaint Made timely to the EEOC IN New York
only 45 Days after American Racial Discrimination Singled out
Discharge.
Having been Issue a Timely right to sue on January 31,1995 by
the ZEOC. I Presentered to the Court of Appeals While an
Oral Argument was Pending, I Contacted the same Counsel who
Advised me to Drop the Court of Appeals Argument date without
Prejudice. ...Requested...and Denied..
The Young Counsel Warned me that Unless I Drop the Oral
Argument in the Court Of Appeals ,He will not be able to
Represent me back in the District Court for the Second time.
In Light of that _I Argue with him that I wanted to Argue Pro se
He Told me that Wont be Necessary because we had on our posetion
the Timely Right to Sue Letter Honorable Glasser so Desperly
a Requested and that with it we'll had complied with the requirement. ]
God Knows .,How many times If was Giving the chance to
Argue I would it have blame the EEOC and the NYDHR for having
caused a 250 days Complaint to be Untimely., In Fact I Claimed
EEE:
10
see, Court of Appeals Plaintiff's Brief and Opposition that
Claimed I was entitled to Justify equitable Modification in
Hladki .v. Jeffreys Consol Ltd. 652 /F. Supp 388,392 (EDNY.1987)
and Claimed equitable consideration on the basis of (1) (3)
(5) (7) & (8) Hladki factors.
Once Honorable Judge I.Leo Glasser Dismissed the second Lawsuit
Criales II or 95-CV-1709 Based on res judicata , I was abandon
to Appeal alone for the second time., or 95-9170.
. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS TOTALLY CORRECT
TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT WHICH DISMISSED CRIALES'S
TITLE VII CLAIMS ON RES JUDICATA GROUNDS AND TO
UNANIMOUSLY VACATED THE DISMISSAL OF TWO NEW YORK
STATE CLAIMS
The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ruled.,
"The Peculiarly damaging nature of
Employment discrimination is such,that
the individual, who is Frequently Forced
to face a large and powerful employer,
should [***69]
Be accorded every protection
that [**2387] the Law has in its purview;
and that the person Should not be forced
TO SEEK HIS REMEDY IN ONLY ONE PLACE"
Id;at 3371-3372.n11
Dismissing Respondent Mauricio Criales Tile VII Claims
Without Considering the Merits of this action will be a sin;
Petitioners American Airlines, Inc.,Intentions to use
the Doctrine of res judicata Violates Title VII policys.
"Title VII DO NOT Undercut the application of res
judicata, their is no reazon militating agains application
of well-settled claim Preclusion Principles,
American Airlines Use and abuse the Doctrine of res judicata
as a rule of Judicial Economy to avoid having to answer and
to defend itself on the merits as to the Substantive issues
raised by Criales I or 93-CV-5340 and Criales II 95-CVv-1709
and the two combined.
1l
The Second Circuit's decision was proper . and unique
based on a rather complex procedural history Contrary
to Costello .v. United States ,365 U.S. 265 (1961)
Rather the Court most view Plaintiffs Position and
Responsabilities at Work,That Makes it an entire dif-
ferent Issues. Contrary than Costello Please view this
National Security Issues, and Aircraft and Passenger Safety
Guide lines that has Costs the Lives of Thousands of Inocent
Passangers KILLED every year to most airliners. 73 % due
to Human Error.
aeeeeeeee Plaintiff Mauricio Criales is a Federal Aviation
Administration Aircraft Maintenance Technician,
Who for 13 Months employed at American Airlines
had Hundreds of Aircraft Inspected, Serviced,
Troubleshooted and repaired.
Who's Primary responsability was the safety of
Hundreds of Peoples Flying on those Aircraft
and the Airwhortiness and safety of those Aircraft
‘A Very Sensitive Position’
ENDURFD UNDER HEAVY Hostile work environment
conditions
EXTREMATELY DANGEROUS !!!S!!!8!!8!!!r!@rrrr!
SUPPICIENTLY SEVERE !!!2!22222828rrrerg:
HIGHLY PERVASIVE !!2!9!2!8!828errrrgrrgggsy
MOST CRIMINAL was American Airlines
Employees behavior Turns me
"The safety of Passengers was in Danger"
"The Aircraft Airworthtines was in Danger”
"the safety of the Aircraft was in Danger"
American Airlines Employees including Crew Chiefs and Supervisors
Worked Hard to Damaged my Credibility as a Knowledgeable Mechanic
but in the process the safety of the Airplane and People's Lives
were on my Hands, Not on the Hands of the Pilot who Flew that
airplane, but in the hands of the mechanic, who repaired,Trouble-
shooted,Inspected Service and Repaired that Particular airplane
during Overnight Maintenance.
-<--— That person was ME!
Title VII comes into play before the harrassing Conduct
Leads to a nervous breakdown. Conduct was so severe and Pervasive
that it created a work environment abusive that OFFENDS
Title VII BROAD RULE of Workplace equality.
12
Based on Evidence that we all had to live with .,in TWA 800,
The Valuejet trajedy in the Florida's Everglades, The American
Airlines Destruction of fly 965 December 20,1995 near Cali-
Colombia.,and thousands of close calls that never makes the
six o'clock news, Suffered by all the airlines of the World
" --NO EXCEPTIONS-- The FAA, Congress and the Supreme Court
need to MANDATE For the safety of the United States Airline
Aviation safety , to Issue an Order That who ever harrass,
discriminates,mistreates and Threats Aircraft Maintenance
Technicians , shall be Punish as any other Vicious Criminal
and be charge with a Criminal Indictment.
IIl. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION DO NOT CONFLICT
WITH ANY OTHER DECISIONS OF ANY OTHER COURT OF
APPEALS WERE THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC
IS IN DANGER,UNTIL LAWS ARE CHANGE TO BETTER
Protect AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS FROM
ANY SOURCE THAT CAN ENDANGER THE AIRCRAFT :
INCLUDING VICIOUS HUMANS
WHO ARE RACISTS
Respondent Tired of been mistreated at work and worry about the
safety of the Aircraft Complained for the third time to his im-
mediate Supervisor in September 10, 1991 and Threaten to call
the "PBI" or Port Authority Police To Investigate that my work
was been Sabotaged While I answer Daily Pranks in the Hangar's
Public Address System. My Ex-Supervisor Has Never Denied I made
Such Threats while Employed as an Aircraft Mechanic there.
Three (3) Months Later I was Fired for Life.
only because I was Doing my job properly by FEDERAL AVIATION
ADMINISTRATION MANDATES, AND STANDARDS.
So I got Punish for Believing in safety and Integrity., That is
Probably why The safety of Airtavel is in so much decline today.
Let it be a Pact for the /Record in this Supreme Court
that Respondent -Appellant ,Respondent Charged American Airlines
13
with Racketeering and Conspiracy to defraud Under the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")
I CHARGED see Second Circuit's Brief That Defendants secretly
conspired to deprive me of my Constitutionally Protected
rights in their ~---Hostile work environment
---In Investigating and Failed to Prosecute
offenders
---Was defamed in a way that will interfere
with future Job Possibilities.
---their activities was Criminal ,Danger,Life
Threatening for the safe of the aircraft
and the public Flying on them.
("RICO") ---for all the Illegal activities carry on at Kennedy |
International Airport New York by ORGANIZED
Crime Known for Years, even by the common Citizen |
---American Airlines Cocaine Trafficking Worlwide
---Alterations on Aircraft LOG BOOKS : , A Clear
Federal Aviation Administration Violations
OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA.
Plaintiff contends that his Complaint and motion papers
demostrate genuine issues of material fact warranting a trial
on the merits of two/1981 Claims: Criales 1981 Workplace
Harrassment with Hostile work environment based upon National
Origin and Wrongful Discharge from Employment based upon
National Origin Because the Disparate impact Due to Race that
May " Stand alone as a ground for relief”
When the work place is permeated with Discriminatory
Intimidation,ridicule, and insult 477. U.S. at 65 that is
*"Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive
to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment," at 67
TITLE VII IS VIOLATED!
Edward Cerasia II Attorney on Record Here Has Failed to
provide Plaintiff Criales with Valuable Documents requested
On a Discovery Request rule 26 on 93-CV-5340 dated back to June 28,
1994 ,Three Years Later On June 23, 1997 was Resubmitted
When the Second Circuit Remanded to the Easthern District Court
the Decision Reversed and Vacated.
I Charge that American
Continues Manipulating the Law and that such action has to
14
* Has to Stop , They are Provided and Ordered by Civil Procedures
and Rules by rule 26 and 34 to provide the Discovery requested
for three Years Now.
As for the Race Issue That I claimed in My Original EEOC
Timely Complaint was Titled Wrong by the EEOC . I Claimed
National Origin Based On Racial Hate for been of Hispanic
ancestry. On Nazir Kahn .v. Pepsi cola Bottling group
526.F Supp.1268,27 fair Empl.Prac cas (BNA) 770;28 Empl.Prac
(CCH) P 32,499 No. 81C1998 was a Highly Favorable Decision Against
Seyfarth,Shaw,Pairweather & Geraldson, New York city Dec 2, 1981
This case represented by the same law Firm that American Airlines
maintains in this action,
The Defendant moves to dismissed the
Title VII Claim account of race only because Plaintiff EEOC
Charge , did not allege discrimination on account of race.
Khan will not be penalized because the EEOC Misplaced his
= Title VII Charge.
Note how Defendant's Seyfarth,Shaw, Fairwheather
& Geraldson Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all respects.
I Support the Post-November 1991 Conduct to the
unfair, Illegal Arbitration on March 12, 1992 Until still
Today . Please Most see Respondent Appendix E THAT
Contrary to Amrican Airlines Arguments in their Petition for
Writ of Certiorari is Lying When they Claimed that I only
attacked the Arbitration Board's Non-neutrality It is a lie,
it is not True. Please see the Memorandum of Law Provided
to the District Court Easthern District of New York June 4.Here
in Appendix "E" Were it Clearly States.
IV. "THE ARBITRATION DECISION THAT I WAS SUBJECTED
BY AMERICAN AIRLINES TO TERMINATE MY EMPLOYMENT
MOST BE OVERTURN ON GROUNDS THAT IT WARRANT A
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT IN DISTRICT COURT
NOW REAFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT ON 95-9170
bee This Document in Appendix "E" Clearly Demostrates American
Tactics of Dishonesty by Misrepresenting Facts.
}
On Appeal at the second Circuit Please Notice that Honorable
Judge Miner Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part by Separate
Opinion Nevertheless.,ALL THREE CIRCUIT JUDGES UNANIMOUSLY
agreed that the New York State Violations by American Airlines
are actionables and were REVIVED as Judge Miner Put it
\
in his own words
"Criales May bring his State Claims in
State Court if he chooses to do so.”
ON Appeal Respondent Criales Attacked time after time |
The Arbitration Decision, See Plaintiff Brief Pages 44,45
|
MY STORY WAS THE SAME AT THE ARBITRATION
AS IT IS HERE NOW ; ALSO SEE
MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO THE E.D.N.Y.
HERE ON APPENDIX "E”" 95-CV-1709
The Judicial review of Arbitation awards CHAPTER XXV
IV. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
Robert A Gorman
* Professor of law *
University of Pennsylvania
American Casebook Series,Hornbook Series and
Legal Texts Nutshell Series of West Publishing
Company st Paul, Minnesota 55165
Section 1 Backgroud: General Standard of Judicial review
An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and
application of the Collective bargaining agree-
ment; He does not sit to dispense his own brand
of Industrial Justice. When the arbitrator's
words manifest an infidelity to his obligation,
Courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award.
Section 2 Lack of Arbitral Jurisdiction
In short, it is the task of the Court in an ac-
tion to confirm or to set aside an arbitrator's
award to determine wheter the arbitrator has re-
solve the grievance by considering the proper
sources, the contract and those circunstances out
of which cames the "Common Law of the Shop"
16
Section 5 Violation of Law or Public Policy
On occasions, a Court will Vacate and award
because of Unfair and Prejudicial exclusion
or admission of evidence. Plaintiff Respondent
Demanded that other Mechanics Expence Reports
be also Investigated--not so-- Criales was the
Only one nationwide. Singled out...Only as a
Pretextual excuse to terminate My Employment
They been out for Months. My Supervisor was
Tired of My Complaints , Only made in effords
TO Stop the Daily Constand Harrasement against
me, and YES, YES, YES I Risked Complaining for
The Safety Sensitive Maintenance Tasks Performed,
To Protect My Work and the Safety of the Airplane
That I was Assigned to work on. SAFETY FIRST.
A Court will also Vacate an arbitral award
which requires conduct in Violation of State Law,
Which are the Third and Fourth Causes of Ac-
tion Included in all Complaints In District
Court and the Second Circuit and=now the
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
the parties agreement BUT on Extrinsic
Statutory Policy exceeds his Powers and
render his award subject to Judicial attack.
& The Arbitrator who base his decision not on
The Supreme Court Rules[**69) and [**2387] Id.at 3371-3372.nll
and [**22] [**13] yag vioLaTeD at THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK SINCE 1993.
I did not get Such Treatment and or Protection on Either
93-CV-5340 or 95-CV-1709 E.D.N.Y¥. Brooklyn, New York.
The mistake I made While Employed at American Airlines
Hangar 10 JFK Int'l Airport on How to charge for Dry
Cleaning Incurred IT IS SO MICROSCOPIC Compare to the
Huge Violations that I was Victimized for 13 months
Including been subjected to Threats NOT TO COMPLAINT
by my own Supervisor.
17
I Have been Accuse by American Airlines Inc ,an AMR CORP.
of been a thief, Because of the Dry Cleaning receipts
SUT. oc cseeccces As clearly explained in the District Court
and the Court of Appeals Briefs and papers.,Including rule
26 and 34 Discovery Request is one Huge Fact that most not
be here be Ignored:
*** AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. NEVER PAY ME
FOR TWO WEEKS VACATION PAY ACRUED
DURING THE 13 MONTHS OF SERVICE TO
THEM AS A FAA AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE
TECHNICIAN. Including the -interest***
I Lost my job for a tiny mistake for the first time,
WHAT SHALL IT BE American Airlines Punishment be for
Theirs????2?2??
Because before they terminate my Employment for a First
time Error they have Several Options of Disciplinary po-
licies that Many other American Employees experienced, Who
today still work for the Airline, Including All the Individuals
Who Inflicted Permanent Damaged and who Discriminated me for
Months. the options given to other Non Hispanics at "American"
are ----Oral/Written Warnings
----Demotions
----Suspension and return to work
Criales was Never Given any of this Options.
BIAS AND PREJUDICE 100%
RACiSTS AND VICIOUS 100%
Plaintiff,Apellant,Respondent Criales Never Had a Day
in Court at the Eastern District of New York,Federal Court
against Hundreds of Violations Suffered at the Hands of
American Airlines Inc.
18
As to be regarded as atrocious
and utterly intolerable in
A CIVILIZED SOCIETY
CONCLUSION
I HAVE NOT INCLUDE THE MERITS OF THE CASE HERE, IF I DO THAT
THIS OPPOSITION BRIEF WILL BE HUNDREDS OF PAGES LONG, AMERICAN
AIRLINES KNOWS WHAT I AM SAYING IS TRUE BEEN THE PRIMARY
REAZONS FOR FIGHTING TO STAY AWAY FROM A TRIAL BY JURY, THEY
DO NOT WANT THE WORLD TO KNOW WHO THE REALLY ARE.
Please, I Respecfully request that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals be AFFIRMED for Justice and the true, by
Denying Petitioner's Petition for Writ.
The Second Circuit Issue a Mandate May 13,1997 and Remmanded
The Case to the District Court E.D.N.Y.
A Discovery Stage is Under way and all Discovery was Extended
to January 8, 1998. Although still today American has Failed
to Provide any Discovery Requested that by Federal Civil
Procedures they have to provide. A TRIAL BY JURY MOST BE
___PRESERVED___
Please, I further Respecfully request that the Supreme Court
Issue an Order to have this action Reassign by Lot
at the Unites States District Court Eastern District of New York
based on most Court of Appeals Rules, Example Rule 36 7th Circuit
on Reassigment of Remmanded Cases , Orders ,that whenever a
case tried in a District Court is remanded by this Court for
a new trial it shall be Reassigned by the District Court for
Trial before a Judge Other than the Judge who heard the prior
Trial, This rule shall apply on remand.
19
The Fact of the matter is Plaintiff, Respondent Already
Requested Orally and Later In Writting to Request Honorable
Judge I Leo Glasser to "Recuse” Himself and to Have this
case Reassigned by Lot But Honorable Glasser refused on
a Memorandum and Order Signed by Him July 1, 1997.
The Problem with that is this.,
Honorable Glasser Dismissed Not l. But 2. Federal
Lawsuits. He Never Took any Jurisdiction to Any New York
State Claims and Yet Removed From State Court an Action
Entered since January 15,1997. Removed to the E.D.N.Y. Why?
Supreme Court State Of New York County of Queens Judge LEVINE
was Already Assigned to the 1072/97 Action. Right now the
Complaint id DEAD in the District Court, Were I Requestedd
American Airlines and Edward Cerasia II Esq. To “SHOW CAUSE”
Of the Infamous Slanderous Lies Of Displaying a Semi Automatic
a Firegun at a Busy New York American Airlines Terminal. |
THEY FAILED TO SHOW CAUSED and Warned me He will not
Considered any other Requests ,because I Most follow the
Proper procedures, and that is fine .,The Problem with that
is that Has Prevented Plaintiff the Chance to Prove I was
Defamed and I am Still been Prevented from Working=
JUSTICE PLEASE, I HAVE A LARGE FAMILY TO SUPPORT
A WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN AGES 11/2, 6,8,10, THEY
ARE NO BABIES ANY MORE AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY
I AM BEEN ACCUSE OF CARRYING A GUN THEY NEVER SAW
AND WHY DADDY WHO'S AN Airplane Mechanic IS NOT
WORKING AND OR PREVENTED FROM WORKING In an Era
Were Aircraft Mechanic are in so Much Demand Now than ever
Before . Printed and Let It be for the Record that Mauricio
Criales SAFETY RECORD IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE IS IMPRESIVE
ONE OF A KIND-CLEAN- With a Training Record Full of Safety
AWARDS. Thanks to God I Never Been Injury on the Job, I Never
-) Been off Work For any Injury Suffered in the Job-,Thanks to GOD.
As for all the Bad things Poeple Talked About Colombians |
I can Tell you all,That the entire CRIALES FPAMILY IS THE BEST
EVER LEFT COLOMBIA. We all are Honest and Hard Working.,
Decent and Educated People.
a a aa ari it
20
I WILL SEEK JUSTICE I WILL NOT ALLOW PEOPLE TO
INSULT ME AND PAMILY. WHEN THEY SLANDERED MOMS
NAME ON THE WALLSAND BATROOMS AND LACKER ROOMS
OF AMERICAN AIRLINES., HANGAR 10 at JFK AIRPORT.
IN NEW YORK. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
a ST
| on mole, B-II-47
Respectfully submitted,
MAURICIO CRIALES
UNITED STATES CITIZEN
37-57 61 st lst Floor
WOODSIDE, New York 11377
Beeper (917) 419-1272
Respondent ,Apellant,Plaintiff
may God Bless the United States of
America
APPENDIX = *
INITED STATES COURT OF APPE’’S
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE
40 FOLEY SQUARE
ee NEW YORK 10007
GEORGE LANGE lil
CLERK
At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 21st day of January, one thousand nine hundred and
ninety-seven.
PRESENT: HON. Roger J. Miner
HON. Joseph M. McLaughlin
HON. Pierre N. Leval
Circuit Judges
Docket No: 95-9170
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from
the Eastern District of New York and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of said district court
be and it hereby is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded
to the said district court for further proceedings in accordance
with the opinion of this court.
For the Court
GEORGE LANGE III, Clerk
y,
Administrative Attorney
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE
40 FOLEY SQUARE
NEW YORK 10007
B....: LANGE Il!
CLERK
NOTICE
Local Rule effective July 1, 1992
0.40 Petitions for Rehearing
Each petition for rehearing shall include a copy of the opinion or
summary order to which the petition relates.
If a petition for rehearing be found to be wholly without merit,
vexatious and for delay, the court may tax a sum not exceeding $250
against petitioner in favor of his adversary, to be collected with
the costs in the case.
July 1, 1992
rehrg_frm
WNe
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
fe. i386 qj 4 snenne August Term, 1995
fee epee
(Argued: April 19, 1996 Decided: ya ae — )
Docket No. 95-9170 a:
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Vv.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Miner, McLaughlin, and Leval, uit J es.
Pro se plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Glasser, J.) dismissing his discrimination complaint primarily
on res judicata grounds.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.
Judge Miner concurs in part and dissents in part by separate
opinion.
MAURICIO CRIALES, Pro Se, Woodside,
N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.
EDWARD CERASIA II, New York, N.Y.,
(Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson, New York, N.Y., Of
Counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.
LEVAL, Circuit Judge:
Mauricio Criales, appearing pro se, appeals from a judgment
of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (I. Leo Glasser, Senior Judge), dismissing his
complaint. The complaint alleges in part that Criales's employer
American Airlines, Inc. ("AA"), discriminated against him by
reason of his Hispanic origin in viclation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et _ seq. (codifying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
The district court dismissed the complaint for a number of
reasons including that the Title VII claims were barred by res
judicata because of the Jrevious dismissal of similar claims. In
the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that the
Title VII claims were not barred by res judicata.
We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment which
dismissed Criales's Title VII claims on res judicata grounds.
ac °
This case has a rather complex procedural history, which we
explain here in some detail because it is crucial to our
decision.
Criales is an American citizen who was born in the Republic
of Colombia and is Hispanic. In November 1990, he was hired by
AA to work as an airline mechanic at John F. Kennedy
International Airport. The complaint alleges that his co-workers
harassed and ridiculed him because of his Latino origin, and that
AA officials condoned this harassment.
On December 7, 1991, AA suspended Criales while it
investigated an allegation that he had filed a false expense
report relating to his attendance at a training course in
Chicago. Criales maintains that, at the hearing on his alleged
misconduct, he tried unsuccessfully to assert his allegations of
discriminatory harassment. Criales was terminated on December
20, 1991. On March 12, 1992, he and his union contested the
termination before an arbitration panel, which upheld the
dismissal.
Without the aid of counsel, Criales filed two administrative
charges against AA alleging discrimination because of his
national origin. The first charge, dated February 5, 1992, was
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")
within the time allowed by Title VII. The EEOC transferred this
charge for processing to the New York State Division of Human
Rights ("NYSDHR"). After a number of months with no reaponee,
Criales filed a second similar charge, dated December 3, 1992,
this time with the New York City Commission on Human Rights
("NYCCHR"); it was transferred for processing to the EEOC. The
second charge was not filed within the time allowed by Title VII.
These two charges each alleged discrimination on the basis of
national origin, and were based substantially on the same
allegedly discriminatory conduct. Compare Brief of Appellant,
Exhibit B, with id., Exhibit C. The EEOC dismissed the December
1992 charge because it was not timely filed, and issued a right-
to-sue notice in connection with that charge on October 26, 1993.
On November 18, 1993, after receiving the right-to-sue
notice based on the untimely December 1992 charge (but before
receiving a right-to-sue notice on his timely charge), Criales
filed a pro se complaint in the district court. Criales then
retained counsel and amended his complaint in several respects,
adding claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and pendent state law
Claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. AA moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim. The district court granted the motion, ruling that
Criales's Title VII claims must be dismissed because the
underlying administrative charge (the one filed in December 1992)
was not timely filed. Criales v. American Airlines, Inc., 93
Civ. 5340 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994) ("Criales I"). The other
Claims were dismissed for various reasons that are not of
Significance to this opinion. On December 1, 1994, Criales, no
longer represented by counsel, filed a pro _se notice of appeal |
with this court.
Meanwhile, his first charge was making its way through the
administrative process. As noted above, this timely charge had
been referred by the EEOC for initial processing to the NYSDHR.
On August 29, 1994, recognizing that Criales's complaint stemming
from the second charge was being litigated in district court, the
NYSDHR dismissed the timely charge for "administrative
convenience" on the rationale that the litigation of the second
charge in the district court would resolve all the issues raised
in the first charge. On January 31, 1995, while his appeal was
pending, Criales received a right-to-sue notice on the timely
charge.
Apparently seeking to inform this court that he could now
proceed on the timely charge, Criales attempted to append his
right-to-sue notice on the timely charge to his appellate brief.
AA moved to strike the right-to-sue notice from Criales's brief
on the grounds that it had not been in the record below. Criales
then moved to withdraw his appeal without prejudice so that he
could, as he put it in his motion papers, "seék judicial remedy
in the Eastern District of New York on the basis of a newly
issued, timely 'Right to Sue' letter by the EEOC." AA opposed
the motion, and it was denied by this court on May 26, 1995, in
an order stating that Criales would be permitted to withdraw his
appeal with prejudice. On August 8, 1995, this court granted
Criales's pro se motion to withdraw his appeal with prejudice.'
Criales (represented again by counsel) then filed a new
complaint in the district court based on the new right-to-sue
notice granted on the first, timely charge. AA moved to dismiss
the complaint. The district court granted the motion, ruling
that Criales's claims of discrimination under Title VII were
barred by res judicata. Criales v. American Airlines, Inc., 95
Civ. 1709, 1995 WL 669900 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1995) ("Criales II").
The other federal claims were dismissed on various grounds, and
‘Although Criales filed this motion pro _ se, he indicated at
oral argument that he did so after receiving informal advice from
his former attorney.
1 the state claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, by
2 reason of the absence of a valid federal claim to which they
3 could be appended.
4 This appeal followed.
5 II. Discussion
6 The primary question raised by this appeal is as follows:
7 Where a plaintiff filed two administrative charges alleging
8 illegal discrimination under Title VII -- one timely, the other
9 untimely -- and instituted suit upon the agency's delivery of a
10 right-to-sue notice on the untimely charge, which suit was then
11 dismissed by reason of the untimeliness of that charge, does that
D. dismissal operate as an adjudication on the merits, barring the
13 plaintiff from proceeding upon the timely charge? The district
14 court believed it did. We disagree.
15 The prerequisites for a suit under Title VII include a
16 timely filed administrative charge and timely institution of the
17 suit after receipt of a right-to-sue notice. See 42 U.S.C. §
18 2000e-5(e) (1) (timely charge) & (f) (1) (right-to-sue notice) ;
19 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S. Ct. 1011,
20 10319 (1974): McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798,
21 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1822 (1973). Criales complied with both
22 requirements. The only reason for the dismissal was that he had
23 previously filed a suit, based on an untimely administrative
> charge, which suit was dismissed because of the untimeliness of
25 the charge. Although the district court viewed the problem as
eo one of untimeliness, it is more appropriately seen as one of
2 prematurity. Had Criales waited to file his suit until receipt
3 of the right-to-sue notice on the timely charge, there would have
4 been no defect. The superfluous untimely administrative charge
$ would have been irrelevant to Criales's right to proceed on his
6 timely charge. His problem was that he filed the initial
7 complaint without waiting for the issuance of the right-to-sue
8 notice based on his timely charge.
9 Like any other dismissal for failure to exhaust
10 administrative remedies, a dismissal of a TitYe VII action by
11 reason of a plaintiff's failure to wait for a right-to-sue notice
12 is not a bar to instituting the suit after the notice is
13 delivered. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 10 (2d
~ Cir. 1996) (noting district court's dismissal without prejudice
15 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see also Twitty
16 v. Smith, 614 F.2d 325, 335 n.16 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissal for
17 failure to exhaust state remedies is without prejudice). There
18 is no reason why the result should be different here merely
19 because plaintiff had filed a second administrative charge that
20 was superfluous and untimely.
21 The district court believed the bar to suit was mandated by
22 the terms of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
23 which provides
24 Unless the court in its order for dismissal
25 otherwise specifies, ... any dismissal
26 - « «, Other than a dismissal for lack of
27 jurisdiction, [or for other specified reasons
8 not here pertinent) operates as an adjudication
e on the merits.
The district court noted that courts have found the
administrative time limits of Title VII to be subject to
equitable tolling and estoppel and have thus considered them to
be "not jurisdictional." Criales II, 1995 WL 669900, at *6. The
court thus concluded that the dismissal for untimeliness of the
charge was not within the "lack of jurisdiction" exception of
Rule 41(b), and that it operated as an adjudication on the
merits.
The teachings of the Supreme Court in Costello v. United
States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S. Ct. 534 (1961), r@quire a different
analysis and result. The Court there considered whether a
district court's dismissal of a denaturalization action, because
of the government's failure to file an affidavit of good cause,
barred the government from filing a new complaint with the proper
affidavit. The district court had not designated the dismissal
as jurisdictional, nor had it stated whether the dismissal was
with or without prejudice. 365 U.S. at 268, 81 S.Ct. at 536.
The Court ruled that, despite the district court's silence on the
question, the dismissal was jurisdictional within the meaning
intended by Rule 41(b), and thus without prejudice. 365 U.S. at
285; 81S. Ct. at 544. The Court noted that the term "lack of
jurisdiction" as used in Rule 41(b) was a term of art, 365 U.S.
at 287, 81 S. Ct. at 546, encompassing failure to comply with
statutory prerequisites, 365 U.S. at 285, 81 S.Ct. at 545.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan referred to the exception
in Rule 41(b) for certain enumerated dismissals that are without
re) @ ..
10
11
12
prejudice, and explained:
We regard the exception as encompassing those
dismissals which are based on a plaintiff's
failure to comply with a precondition
requisite to the Court's going forward to
determine the merits of his substantive
clain.
365 U.S. at 285, 81 S.Ct. at 545. The origins of this exception,
according to Justice Brennan, were in the common law rule that
"dismissal on a ground not going to the merits was not ordinarily
a bar to a subsequent action on the same claim." Id. Justice
Brennan noted that this principle had been applied at common law
in many cases involving motions to dismiss by a defendant, and
that Rule 41(b) did not alter this rule. He quoted Hughes v.
United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866), accordingly:
"If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or
parties, or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the
want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did
not go to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will
prove no bar to another suit." 365 U.S. at 286, 81 S.Ct. at 545.
Shortly thereafter, we interpreted Costello to mean that
the preclusive effect afforded dismissals by
Rule 41(b) was intended to apply only to
those situations in which a defendant must
incur the inconvenience of preparing to meet
the merits of the plaintiff's claims because
there is no initial bar to the court's
reaching the merits as there would be, for
illustrative purposes, if there were a defect
in pleadings or parties.
Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964); see
also Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 967, 969 (2d Cir. 1968)
(in light of Costello, dismissal of derivative suit for failure
9
to post bond, despite being labeled "with prejudice," did not bar
subsequent suit by another stockholder because defendants were
not required to prepare defense and court did not reach merits of
plaintiff's substantive claim); Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251,
256-57 (2d Cir.) (similar), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077, 93 S.Ct.
689 (1972); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2373, at 405 (1995) ("[{C]jourts
have recognized that Rule 41(b) does not apply in situations in
which a case is dismissed because of some initial bar to reaching
the merits of the plaintiff's claims ... ."f; 18 Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction §
4437, at 347 (1981) ("In ordinary circumstances a second action
on the same claim is not precluded by dismissal of a first action
for prematurity or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit.").
Like the government's failure to file an affidavit of good
cause in Costello, Criales's filing of a complaint based on an
untimely underlying administrative charge, where he also had
filed a timely charge upon which he had not yet received his
right-to-sue notice, "simply constituted non-fulfillment of a
prerequisite to the initiation of the proceedings." Weston
Funding Corp. v. Lafavette Towers, Inc., 550 F.2d 710, 713 (2d
Cir. 1977) (interpreting Costello). AA had not been "put to the
necessity of preparing a defense." Costello, 365 U.S. at 287, 81
S. Ct. at 546. Plaintiff had not yet fulfilled a statutory
prerequisite to suit, but remained capable of fulfilling it. His
suit was premature.
10
The district court's initial characterization of the first
dismissal as being due to Criales's failure to satisfy a
“statutory prerequisite[]" was entirely correct. Criales I, slip
op. at 7, 8. The court described the dismissal in similar terms
when it dismissed the Title VII claims in Criales's second
complaint on res judicata grounds, stating that the first
dismissal had been “predicated on a lack of a statutory
prerequisite... .'" Crjiales JI, 1995 WL 669900, at *6. The
court went on, however, to conclude that a dismissal predicated
on lack of a statutory prerequisite was not bdsed on a "lack of
jurisdiction." Id.
In light of Costello, Nasser, and similar decisions, the
district court was drawing a distinction where one should not
have been drawn. cCriales simply had failed to comply "with a
precondition requisite to the Court's going forward to determine
the merits of his substantive claim." Costello, 365 U.S. at 285,
81S. Ct. at 545. Because he remained capable of complying with
that precondition by instituting his suit after receipt of the
right-to-sue notice on the timely charge, the dismissal of the
first complaint should not have been found to operate as an
adjudication upon the merits and as a bar to the subsequent
complaint filed after the precondition had been satisfied. It
was a dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction" within the special
meaning of that term in Rule 41(b), as explained in Costello.
See Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th
Cir. 1980) ("Because a dismissal for failure to meet a condition
11
1 for filing suit does not operate as an adjudication upon the
D: merits, it cannot bar a subsequent suit between the
3 parties.") (internal quotations omitted).
4 We recognize that the district court's dismissal of
5 Criales's complaint arising from his untimely charge was styled
6 as a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6)
7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that dismissals
8 under Rule 12(b)(6) are generally considered judgments on the
9 merits, unless the court specifies otherwise. See Federated
10 Dep't Stores, Inc., v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3, 101 S.Ct.
11 2424, 2428 n.3 (1981).
12 Nonetheless, we would not permit the choice of labels to
13 distort substance, especially where the consequence would be so
14 drastic as to deprive a party of the opportunity to be heard.
D. Regardless whether characterized as a failure to plead the
16 necessary elements of his cause of action, or as failure to
17 comply with all the statutory prerequisites, the reason for the
18 first dismissal was that plaintiff had not waited until receipt
19 of the right-to-sue notice on his timely administrative charce.
20 To consider it an adjudication on the merits of his
21 discrimination complaint is a distortion.
22 Furthermore, some authorities hold that a Rule 12(b) (6)
23 dismissal "will not bar a second action if new facts have come
24 into existence or have been alleged for the first time and it was
25 the absence of these facts that made the first complaint
26 defective." 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
p |
12
Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2373, at 408 (1995) (citing
cases). Here, the pertinent new fact was that Criales's second
complaint was based on the EEOC's delivery of a right-to-sue
notice upon Criales's timely charge.
The district court also noted that Criales had procedural
means at his disposal either to compel the issuance of a right-
to-sue notice on his timely complaint prior to the dismissal of
his first action, or to convince the court to stay, rather than
dismiss, the first action while awaiting the issuance of the
right-to-sue notice on the timely charge. These observations
were all true but, in our view, irrelevant to whether the
dismissal of the initial action should have been considered an
adjudication on the merits.* If anything, by stressing the
simple procedural devices by which Criales might have avoided the
drastic ruling, the district court's observations underscore the
inappropriateness of denying him the opportunity to have his
claim adjudicated- Cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455
U.S. 385, 397, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1982) ("a technical reading
(of Title VII] would be 'particularly inappropriate in a
statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,
initiate the process'") (quoting Love v. Pullman Caq., 404 U.S.
522, 527, 92 S. Ct. 616, 619 (1972)).
2No contrary inference may be drawn from this court's denial
of Criales's motion to withdraw his first appeal without prejudice.
The prejudice in question related to the appeal of the first
action. There was no suggestion that Criales's voluntary dismissal
of the appeal should bar him from proceeding to file suit upon his
timely charge, which is what he had told this court he intended to
do.
13
i We noted in Fay v. South Colonie Central School District,
e 802 F.2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1986), that "{ijn properly seeking to
3 deny a litigant two 'days in court’, courts must be careful not
4 to deprive him of one." (quotation marks and citation omitted).
5 Because plaintiff never had a day in court on his Title VII
6 Claims, and because his initial suit was dismissed by reason of a
7 curable defect -- his failure to satisfy a statutory prerequisite
8 -- we reverse the part of the judgment which held that res
21 unless it is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (as well as other
22 specified exclusions). As explained above, Costello makes clear
23 that a dismissal in these circumstances (for failure to comply with
24 a statutory prerequisite to suit) operates as a dismissal for "lack
25 of jurisdiction." Unlike the dismissal in Samuels, such a
26 dismissal was not on the merits. Indeed, the judge did not say the
27 dismissal was with prejudice. After the involuntary dismissal of
28 his first action by reason of his failure to comply with the
29 statutory prerequisite, Criales was free to file his second
30 complaint without preclusion.
9 judicata barred those claims.?
10 sSamuels_v. Northern Telecom Inc., 942 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
11 1991), does not require a different result. In that case, the
12 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his first action "with prejudice"
13 and his stipulation to this effect was so ordered by the court.
14 Under Rule 41(a) such a dismissal so ordered with prejudice acts as
15 an adjudication on the merits.
e In contrast, the dismissal of Criales's complaint did not
7 arise under Rule 41(a); rather, it was an jnvoluntary dismissal
18 under Rule 41(b), imposed because of Criales's failure to wait for
19 the right to sue letter on his first administrative complaint. By
20 the terms of Rule 41(b), an involuntary dismissal is on the merits
i
'
31 The dismissal “with prejudice" of Criales's appeal in his
32 first action did not convert the prior dismissal of that action
33 from one for lack of jurisdiction to one on the merits. The
34 judgment of the district court remained what it was -- a dismissal
35 for lack of jurisdiction without preclusive effect. It could not
36 be changed by the taking or dropping of an appeal. Thus, when
37 Criales voluntarily dismissed his appea] from the first action with
38 prejudice, that terminated the first action. It did not transform
39 the dismissal from one for lack of jurisdiction to one on the |
40 merits. |
e 14
1 We find no error in the district court's dismissal of the
remaining federal claims. As to the pendent state claims,
3 however, the district court dismissed these for lack of subject
4 matter jurisdiction because there was no federal claim to which
5 they could be appended. Our direction that Title VII claims be
6 reinstituted nullifies the rationale for that ruling. The
7 dismissal of the state claims is therefore also vacated.
8 III. Conclusion
9 The portions of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's Title
10 VII claims on grounds of res judicata and dismissing pendent
11 state claims are vacated. The dismissal of the remaining federal
12 Claims is affirmed. The action is remanded for further
@ proceedings.
Criales v. Americ: Airlines, Inc., 95-9170
MINER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
Because I agree with the district court that Criales’ Title
VII claims are barred by res judicata, I respectfully dissent
from so much of the majority opinion as vacates the judgment
dismissing the Title VII claims and pendent state claims. I
concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it dismisses
the remaining federal claims.
The prior action brought by Criales was dismissed as to the
Title VII claims for untimely filing of his second employment
discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The majority opinion
acknowledges that the dismissal of the Title VII portion of the
complaint in that action was grounded in Criales’ failure to
state a Title VII claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and that such
a dismissal generally is considered a judgment on the merits.
See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3
(1981).
My colleagues nevertheless see the dismissal of the prior
action as being for lack of jurisdiction within the intendment of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and therefore without prejudice to the
bringing of a new action based upon the earlier timely filing
with the EEOC. This analysis is predicated in the main upon the
decision of the Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, 365
U.S. 265 (1961). In that case, the Court held that dismissal for
the government’s failure to file a statutorily required affidavit
of good cause in a denaturalization action was for lack of
jurisdiction under 41(b) and therefore without prejudice. There,
the district court had not classified the dismissal as
without prejudice or for lack of jurisdiction.
Aside from the fact that the district court in the opinion
giving rise to this appeal makes it clear that the dismissal of
the previous action was not intended to have a jurisdictional
basis, precedent compels us to arrive at the same result. The
Supreme Court could not have been more clear on this subject:
We hold that filing a timely charge of
discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a
requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is
subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.
es Vv. Wo j ines ., 455 U.S. 365, 393 (1982).
Whatever may have been the rule in Costello, it cannot be applied
in a Title VII action involving untimely filing with the EEOC.
It is because the "statutory requirement is analogous to a
statute of limitations," Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80
F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996), that dismissal for failure to
comply with the requirement is a judgment on the merits. See PRC
arris c. v. Boei Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896-97 n.2 (2d Cir.
1983) (holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds
is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata).
Although the result envisioned by the foregoing is most
unfortunate, it could have been avoided. Criales could have
moved for a stay in the prior action in the district court
pending receipt of the right-to-sue letter that resulted from the
timely filing of his first administrative complaint. See Woods
v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1992). In the
alternative, Criales could have requested the district court to
12
13
dismiss the prior action without prejudice to renewal upon
receipt of the timely right-to-sue letter. Although Criales has
conducted the bulk of this litigation as a pro se litigant, he
did appear by counsel at various stages of the first action.
Whether the fault is that of counsel or Criales himself, the
failure to have considered these alternatives leaves Criales in
his present bind.
Because the district court properly dismissed Criales’
federal claims, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to
exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims. See Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Criales may
bring his state claims in state court if he chooses to do so.
APPENDIX
A
NITED STATES COURT OF ArPES’ ~ Sl 121709
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 95-cvel. 0%
UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE Glasser, DJ
40 FOLEY SQUARE
newvens “MANDATE
GEORGE LANGE iil
CLERK
At a Stated Term of she United States Court of Appeals for <=ne Secona
Circuit, heid at the United States Courthcuse, Foley Square, in the City <<
New Yorx, on the zlst day cf January, one thousand nine hunared anda
ninety-seven.
PRESENT: HON. Roger J. Miner
HON. Josepn M. McLaughlin
HON. Pierre N. Levai —..
Circuit cudges
Docket Ho: 95-9170
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Plaintiff-Lppeilant,
%
V eo
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,
Appeal from United Stetes
or New YOrX.
ct Court for the Eastern District
This cause came cn to be heard on the transcript of record from
the Eastern District of New Yerk and was argued by counsel.
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED. and DECREED that the judoment of said district court
be and it hereby is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remandea
to the said district court fer further proceedings in accordance
with the opinion cf this ccurt.
For the Court
GEORGE LANGE III, Clerk
4A
By,: '
CI “7 yr
Beth J. Meador
Administrative Attorney
5 AACR SALLIE BE ES RES DOBLE LRT
ISSUED AS SNORE + en £3 97 Nee
71980
a United States Court of Appeals ORIGINAL,
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Each motion must be eccompenied by
eS 5 8 supporting effidevt (Local Rule 27(s))
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Plaintiff-Appellantr, 95-9170
Docke! Number
- against - ; NOTICE OF MOTION
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ee ee sate 1798 of movin
Defendant~Appellee. ~~~ for Stay of Mandate
Use short title
as BPR3O499F ty
MOTION BY: (Name, adaress ond tel. no. of law fem and of SS ae G COUNSEL: (Name, address and tel. no. of law
attorney in cnarge of case) " _" wg Sirm and of attorney in charge of case)
Edward Cerasia II, Esq. es ee ee
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Gerakdsan ~ — hey auricio Criales, Pro Se
900 Third Avenue = 37-57 6lst Street —
New York, New York 10022-4728 Woodside, New York 11377
Has consent of opposing counsel:
A. been sought? ——- F No EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS &
B. been obtained? — Yes ¥ No INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL
Has service been effected? & Yes — No Has request for relief been made below? > ¥0S ~ NO
Is Orai argument desired? a wee 4 No (See F.R.A.P. Rule 8)
(Substantive motions only) Would expedited appeal eliminate need
Requested return date for this motion? — . No
(See Second Circuit Rule 27/b)) If No. explain why not:
Has argument date of appeal been set:
A. by scheduling order? E Yes — No
a B. by firm date of argument notice? x Yes = Oo Will the parties agree to maintain the
C. If Yes. enter date: April 19, 1996 status quo until the motion is heard? — Yes — No
Judge or agency whose order 1s being appeaiec
-_
I. Leo Glasser
Brief statement of the relief requested:
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 41(b), defendant-appellee American Airlines, Inc. seeks a
90-day stay of the issuance of mandate pending petition for writ of certiorari to the
United States Supreme Court.
Complete Page 2 of this Form
By: (Signature of attorney) Appearing for: (Name of party) Appellant or Petitioner:
C Plainiff Defendant
Carvivy, t_ Appellee or Respondent:
American Airlines, Inc, (= Plaintiff {Defendant
Signed nate must be printed beneath Date
Edward Cerasia II _April 30, 1997
ORDER
Kindly leave this space blank
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion be and it hereby is a denied |
( 7-2 Maer Asserts J
= © OOP OP man, |
DA.
> , ee ee Eng
9 —_— ..
ee Some C i Oe
EMPLOYMENT Dis
| i |
{| FEB 19 197 {1
Vol. 8, No. 7
February 12, 1997
The Bureau of National Angi¢
_—s.— 4
cy-making body. In consensus vote, ABA House of Delegates
also endorses due process standards for mediation and arbitra-
tion of statutory employment disputes. (Page 213)
EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS is
element in Age Discrimination in Employment Act case that
must be proven by plaintiff and decided by jury, Eleventh
Circuit rules. (Page 197)
NO DAMAGES FOR SEX HARASSMENT ARE AVAILABLE
for conduct that predates November 1991 effective date of Civil
qi Act of 1991, Eighth Circuit holds, as it vacates jury
wards for two female former workers at steel plant and orders
new trial. (Page 198)
FIRM’S LIST OF 18 WORKERS’ NAMES WITH AGES who
might be retained in event of layoffs did not create liability.
under ADEA, even though most younger workers on list ulti-
mately kept their jobs while most of older people did not,
Seventh Circuit rules. (Page 198)
CONSTRUCTION FIRM THAT WAS LOW-BIDDER on two
public sewer projects in New York but was denied contracts
awarded to minority business enterprises can sue city under
federal civil rights law even though sewer projects were nearly
completed when suit was filed, Second Circuit rules. (Page 199)
MANDATORY EEO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEES is part
of plan agreed to by Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-
ity and 25 unions in effort to address workplace discrimination
that was being invesfigated by state attorney general. New EEO
plan preempts union contracts in most cases. (Page 203)
MORBIDLY OBESE PRODUCTION MANAGER for New
York-based trade publication fails to convince federal judge
that her condition warrants protection under Americans with
Disabilities Act, but court allows her claim to proceed under
eo broadly worded state human rights law. (Page 201)
HISPANIC AIRLINE MECHANIC, whose first national origin
discrimination suit was dismissed because it was based on
untimely administrative charge, is not barred from bringing
second suit based on prior, timely charge, divided Second Circuit
rules.
(Page 209)
Copyright © 1997 by The Bureau of National
HU
SS YD ST; ——rJ
et ee
ee ae 2
ANALYSIS & PERSPECTIVE
Taxation: Because rules regard-
ing tax treatment of employment
recoveries have changed radically
over short period of time, confu-
sion exists about which rules apply
depending on when recovery was
received. San Francisco tax attor-
ney Robert Wood illustrates how
date of settlement or payment can
be critical and provides flowchart
for determining whether recovery
may or may not be excludabie
from income taxes. (Page 215)
ALSO IN THE NEWS
EEOC: Ciinton administration's
fiscal 1998 budget request of $246
million for Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission would keep
agency operating at about same
current spending level. (Page 194)
Sex Harassment: California jury
convicts woman of falsifying elec-
tronic-mail message in order to get
$100,000 settlement in case involv-
ing Oracle Corp.'s chief executive
Officer. (Page 208)
Affirmative Action: Shoney's
Inc. may omit from its 1997 proxy
materials shareholder proposal
seeking report on company’s affir-
mative action policies and pro-
grams because it deals with com-
pany's ordinary business,
Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion advises. (Page 196)
Sex Harassment: Two cases rais-
ing issue of employer's liability for
alleged sex harassment by
In one case, court vacates panel
liable under 1964 Civil Rights
despite lack of notice. (Page 212)
LITIGATION
(Vol. 8) 209
the grievance/arbitration procedure was “permis-
sive” rather than mandatory.
Judge Doumar ordered the dispute to be sent to
arbitration. He relied on the Fourth Circuit’s 1996
opinion in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Con-
tainer Inc. (6 EDR 364, 386, 3/20/96; 70 FEP Cases
272), which was recently left standing by the U.S.
Supreme Court (7 EDR 607, 11/13/96).
The appeals court in Austin dismissed an ADA
claim on the grounds that it must go to arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement. In Bright's
case, Doumar similarly rejected the argument that
the arbitration procedure is permissive rather than
mandatory. Contract language that the union “may”
submit a case to arbitration “is to give an aggrieved
party the choice between arbitration and abandon-
ment of his claim,” not a choice between arbitration
and litigation, the court said.
With access to the courts “neither affordable nor
expeditious, we should view arbitration not with suspi-
cion but with relief,” Doumar added. “Arbitration and
other alternative methods of dispute resolution pro-
vide for ordinary citizens and businesses what our
court system no longer produces with any regularity:
affordable, speedy justice.”
Agreement Does Not Cover Title Vil
In a separate opinion, however, Doumar rejected
Alamo Rent-A-Car’s argument that a former employ-
ee who resigned because of alleged sex harassment
must submit to arbitration.
The nonunion company requires workers to sign a
“Personal Alamo Family Member Pact,” or “Fam-
pact.” The document, prepared by Alamo but written
in the voice of the employee, includes an arbitration
clause that states: “If I claim that Alamo has violated
this FamPact, I agree that the dispute will be submit-
ted to and resolved through binding arbitration... .”
The company argued that the contract required
parties to submit all employment disputes to arbitra-
tion but plaintiff Percilla Rudolph contended that the
clause only referred to breaches of “Fampact” and
not to violations of statutory law.
Although “Fampact” stated that employees were
guaranteed “the right to be free from harassment”
and “the right to be free from discrimination,” the
court noted that there was no further mention of
statutory rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act or other federal laws.
“{Tjhe presumption in favor of arbitration is not a
mindless mantra repeated merely for the sake of
consistency,” Doumar wrote, and in this case, the
terms of Fampact did not apply to Rudolph’s statutory
‘{Bjecause Fampact neither required arbitration of
any employment tes nor specifically bound
Alamo to comply with Title VII and other statutes, the
court simply cannot overcome the elementary and
ultimate o tion: nowhere does Fampact memori-
alize an agreement to arbitrate the statutory claims
that Rudolph asserts before this court,” he wrote.
2-12-97
National Origin Discrimination
COURT HOLDS DISMISSAL OF FIRST CASE
NO BAR TO SUIT BASED ON TIMELY CHARGE
A Hispanic airline mechanic, whose first national
origin discrimination suit was dismissed because it
was based on an untimely administrative charge, is
not barred from bringing a second suit based on a
prior, timely charge, a divided U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has ruled (Criales v. Ameri-
can Airlines Inc., CA 2, No. 95-9170, 1/27/97).
In a case with “a rather complex procedural histo-
ry,” the court said that plaintiff Mauricio Criales’ first
suit against American Airlines Inc. was “premature”
and should not be given preclusive effect. The appeals
court reversed a lower court’s dismissal of Criales’
claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Writing for the majority, Judge Pierre N. Leval said
that because Criales “remained capable of complying
with [the statutory prerequisites] by instituting suit
after receipt of the right-to-sue notice on the timely
charge, the dismissal of the first complaint should not
have been found to operate as an adjudication upon
the merits and as a bar to the subsequent complaint
filed after the precondition had been satisfied.”
Two Charges Followed Separate Paths
Criales is a native of Colombia and U.S. citizen who
worked for American as a mechanic at John F. Kenne-
dy International rt. He alleged that his co-work-
ers harassed and ridiculed him because of his Latino
origin and that the airline condoned the conduct.
In December 1991, American suspended Criales
pending investigation of a charge that he filed a false
expense report for an out-of-town training course. He
was fired two weeks later and filed a union grievance,
but an arbitration 1 upheld the dismissal.
Criales filed his discrimination charge with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Feb-
ruary 1992 within the time allowed by Title VII, and it
was transferred for processing to the New York State
Division of Human ts. Because he did not hear
that anything was happening with the first charge, he
filed a second in December 1992, this time
with the New York City Commission on Human
Rights. The second charge was transferred to EEOC,
which dismissed it as untimely and issued a right-to-
sue notice in October 1993.
In November 1993, Criales filed suit pro se under
Title VII and, after retaining an attorney, added
claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 USC
1981) and state common law. Meanwhile, in August
1994, NYSDHR dismissed his first charge on the
ground that the same issues were being litigated in
In November 1994, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York dismissed the Title VII
claim because the underlying ove yep ene charge
was untimely. During the pendency of Criales’ pro se
appeal, he received a right-to-sue letter on the first,
timely charge and attempted to withdraw his appeal
without prejudice and go back to the district court.
210 (Vol. 8)
BNA’s EMF._ ¢MENT DISCRIMINATION REPORT
The Second Circuit denied the motion but allowed him
withdraw the appeal with prejudice.
After again obtaining counsel, Criales filed a second
suit based on his original, timely charge. The district
court granted American's motion to dismiss the Title
VII claims as barred by res judicata, and Criales
appealed a second time.
First Suit Was ‘Premature’
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a
court specifies otherwise, but an exception exists for
dismissals due to “lack of jurisdiction.” The district
court found that the first dismissal did not fall within
the Rule 41(b) exception because Title VII time limits
are subject to equitable tolling and are therefore not
jurisdictional.
The district court’s only reason for disrnissal of the
first suit was the untimeliness of the charge but the
problem “is more appropriately seen as one of prema-
turity,” Leval wrote. Criales’ “problem was that he
filed the initial complaint without waiting for the
issuance of the right-to-sue notice based on his timely
charge.”
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is no
bar to a later suit once the administrative process has
been completed, Leval said. “There is no reason why
the result should be different here merely because
ales] had filed a second administrative charge that
superfluous and untimely,” he found.
In Costello v. U.S., 81 S.Ct. 534 (1961), the US.
Supreme Court found that “lack of jurisdiction” was a
term of art that encompassed failure to comply with
statutory prerequisites, according to Leval. Rule
41(b)’s exception was based on the common law rule
that “dismissal on a ground not going to the merits
was not ordinarily a bar to a subsequent action on the
same claim,” Leval found.
The Second Circuit decided in several cases follow-
ing Costello that Rule 41(b)’s preclusive effect applied
only to cases dismissed after the defendant incurred
the inconvenience of deaeien to meet the merits of
the claims, Leval sai
Criales’ filing of a complaint based on an untimely
charge and his failure to wait for a right-to-sue notice
on his timely charge simply constituted nonfulfillment
of a prerequisite to determination of the merits of his
to the necasslty of prepering a Gafense, the court said
to the ty 0. a defense,
i wes 2 Gemlseal for lack ef juriediation Within the
meaning of Rule 41(b).
The a court also revived Criales’
Criales was not represented by an attorney on
appeal.
Edward Cerasia of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &
Geraldson in New York represented American.
Federal Procedure
CA 8 FINDS MAGISTRATE LACKED JURISDICTION
TO CONDUCT TRIAL WITHOUT PARTIES’ CONSENT
A federal magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to
conduct a jury trial on age and sex discrimination
claims when the parties did not consent to the refer-
ral, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
has ruled (Reiter v. Honeywell Inc., CA 8, Nos. 95-
2859 and 95-2884, 1/16/97).
A judge in the US. District Court for the District of
Minnesota referred plaintiff George Reiter’s discrimi-
nation and tort claims against Honeywell Inc. to a
magistrate judge. The parties neither consented nor
objected before a jury trial was conducted, which
resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The judge adopt-
ed the magistrate’s recommendations, which rejected
some of jury’s findings and reduced the verdict
from $765,000 to $261,281. Both sides appealed.
Although the district judge cited 28 USC 636(b\2)
and Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as authority for the referral, the Eighth Circuit said
that the requirements for neither rule were satisfied
since the parties did not consent and the judge did not
make the requisite findings. Without reaching the
merits of the case, the appeals court dismissed the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case
to the district court.
Writing for the appeals court, Judge C. Arlen Beam
commented that court’s holding “is in no way
meant to condone defendants’ actions.” He noted that
the defendants “only complained of the referral after
the jury rendered a hefty verdict against them.” “This
‘wait and see’ procedure is contrary to judicial effi-
ciency,” he wrote.
Consent Not Sought For Referral
|
f
Ht
ll
—____~—_—_—_—~_~—~_—_—_____
APPENDIX "* B
DePlenvec (3 (95
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
E EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SCARS EREESSEEEKAOKE De REMEO ROE SS Oe X
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Plaintiff, i
95-CV-1709 (ILG)
-against-
AMERICAN AIRLINES,
Defendant.
CESK e Desens eon eeUesssnneneneoenen aban xX
INTRODUCTION
Mauricio Criales ("Criales"), the Plaintiff herein, submits
this memorandum of law in response and opposition to defendant
American Airlines, Inc.’s ("American") motion to dismiss the
First and Second Causes of Action (Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981) in the complaint on
: principles of res judicata, and the Third and Fourth Causes of
Action (defamation and intentional infliction of emotional
distress) derivatively, through a lack of supplemental
jurisdiction over these state law claims. American alternatively
seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) or (6), or
dismissal of post-November 21, 1991 harassment claims pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons enunciated below, Criales
opposes dismissal in entirety,’ and seeks to move this matter
forward so that it may finally be heard on its merits.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Criales worked for American for over a year as a commercial
airplane mechanic before he was pretextually fired for expense
report improprieties which totalled at most $120.00. Known to the
company was the fact that other white, non-Hispanic employees of
the defendant engaged in misconduct that damaged aircraft,
jeopardized the safety of American’s passengers, and compromised
the very integrity of the company to its shareholders. After the
defendants employees’ one year reign of discriminatory terror
failed to force Criales to quit his job at American, he was
actively induced into filing inaccurate expense reports by the
company’s employees. The company subsequently singled Criales
out, and after it’s investigation terminated him for dishonesty
in filling out his expense reports, which in the aggregate were
Still $221.00 less than the total American had afforded him.
After his discharge, and an arbitration hearing conducted
without counsel, Criales immediately filed one charge of
discrimination based upon national origin against the defendant
with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC). This charge was filed on February 5, 1992, 45 days
after Criales’ December 21, 1991 termination, and challenged
Criales’ termination after countless episodes of harassment by
the defendant’s employees and managers (EEOC Charge No. 160-92-
1069). This charge was later referred to the New York State
Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") for initial processing._
Yet, somehow, this timely filed charge had not been
responded to by December 3, 1992, approximately 250 days after
Criales had filed it pro se. After Criales’ attempts to obtain
any information as to the status of his initial EEOC complaint
had failed, Criales went pro se to the New York City Commission
on Human Rights ("NYCCHR") and filed a second complaint. The
second complaint was then referred to the EEOC (Charge No. 160-
93-0816). This complaint then became the only complaint which the
EEOC had received from a New York agency for action thus far.
Accordingly, although this second complaint to the NYCCHR was
dismissed by the EEOC as untimely, and the initial complaint
referred to the NYSDHR by the EEOC was actually timely, a right
to sue notice was issued by the EEOC on the second complaint
(Charge No. 160-93-0816). The first complaint was ultimately
dismissed, as Criales had already sought judicial relief in this
Court.
After obtaining what he believed to be a valid Right-to-Sue
notice from the EEOC, and still pro se, Criales filed a complaint
in this Court, Criales v. American Airlines, Inc., 93-CV-5340
(ILG), ("Criales I") alleging Title VII violations. At the
commencement of Criales I, Criales did not have a right to sue
letter based upon his timely filed February 5, 1992 charge. The
defendant argues that Mr. Criales pro se should have realized
that he could have requested a right-to-sue letter under 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(f£) (1).
After the filing of his initial Complaint, Criales sought
and obtained counsel, and on July 29, 1994 an Amended Complaint
was filed. The Amended Complaint alleged Title VII and 42 U.S.C.
1981 violations, based on Criales’ Colombian national origin, and
State law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IIED").
Shortly thereafter, on September 1, 1994, the defendant
moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for dismissal of
Criales’ entire complaint. On November 14, 1994, in a written
memorandum, this Court dismissed Criales’ Title VII claims as
untimely, his Section 1981 claims as not encompassing national
Origin, and his state law claims for lack of jurisdiction in
light of dismissal of all federal causes of action. On November
21, 1994 judgement was entered in the District Court.
On December 1, 1994 Criales filed a pro se Notice of Appeal.
Criales and the defendant submitted their briefs, and prepared
for argument. On January 31, 1995, during the pendency of
Criales’ appeal, Criales personally returned to the EEOC and
finally managed to obtain a right to sue letter on his timely
filed, February 5, 1992 complaint. This right-to-sue letter was
appended to Criales’ brief. In response to Criales’ presenting
this right-to-sue letter to the Second Circuit, the defendant
moved to strike materials not contained in the lower court
record.
On April 25, 1995 Criales moved to withdraw his appeal
without prejudice, as he had already instituted a second suit
through counsel in district court. On May 3, 1995 the defendant
responded to Criales, seeking dismissal with prejudice and costs
to the defendant. The Second Circuit denied American’s request
for costs, but allowed Criales to withdraw his appeal with
prejudice. Criales, acting pro se, withdrew his appeal, and
American’s motion to strike materials not in the lower court
record was denied as moot, thereby terminating all outstanding
aspects of Criales’ appeal.
On April 28, 1995, Criales instituted the instant case,
Criales II, based on the January 31, 1995 right-to-sue notice and
his February 5, 1991 EEOC charge (Compl.,Ex. A). Criales II
alleges conduct similar to that alleged in Criales I, principally
violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, and supplemental
state law claims for defamation and IIED. Several key
distinctions may be drawn between Criales I and Criales II,
however.
—
First, each proceeding was predicated on a right to sue
letter from a different charge. Criales I was instituted with an
untimely right-to-sue notice based on Criales’ December 3, 1992
complaint to the NYCCHR, whereas Criales II was instituted on a
timely right-to-sue letter stemming from Criales’ initial
complaint to the EEOC on February 5, 1992. Secondly, Criales I
alleged national origin as the basis for recovery under Section
1981, whereas Criales II contains the significantly different
allegation of racial discrimination as a basis for recovery under
Section 1981. Third, Criales II alleges specific incidents of
disparate impact of the defendant’s employee regulations, whereas
Criales I does not.
The defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c), has
raised the affirmative defense of res judicata as to Criales II, |
arguing that Criales II meets its three prerequisites for
dismissal: first, American notes that the parties to both
actions are identical -- which fact is not in dispute; second,
the defendant argues that Criales I was adjudicated on its
merits. Criales, on the other hand, argues that Criales I was
dismissed as to its Title VII allegations for failure to meet the
condition precedent of obtaining a valid right-to-sue letter
before commencing suit in federal court. Not one of the
substantive issues raised by Criales was ever "adjudicated on its
merits." Third, the defendant urges that both the Title VII and
Section 1981 actions in Criales II are based on identical causes
of action as those in Criales I. The defendant argues that, as
Criales failed to assert the present Title VII and 1981 claims in
Criales I, that he is forever barred from litigating the merits
of these claims in Criales II.’ American is thus seeking to use
the doctrine of res judicata, a rule of judicial economy, to
avoid its having to defend itself on the merits as to the
substantive issues raised by Criales Il.
The defendant also proffers an additional seven alternative
bases for dismissing Criales II (Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
pp. 5-6). Each point raised by the defendant is meritless with
respect to Criales II, and will be examined in turn after the
1 Criales concedes that, if this Court should dismiss the
federal causes of action against the defendant, that it has no
supplemental jurisdictional basis for proceeding on the state law
Claims which Criales raises in his Third and Fourth Causes of
Action. Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 910-911 (2a
Cir. 1984). ~
4 backdrop against which these allegations are to be viewed has
been set.
ACKGR
A. The Parties
Criales is an American Citizen, Hispanic in descent and of
Colombian national origin (Compl., para. 5). Criales worked for
the defendant American as a union-represented aircraft mechanic
from November 10, 1990 to December 20, 1991 at John F. Kennedy
International Airport ("JFK"), in Jamaica, New York (Id., para.
6). After a year of enduring a racially discriminatory hostile
work environment, Criales was fired pretextually for $120.00 in
expense account improprieties (Id., para. 48-51).
a The defendant American is an air carrier, pursuant to the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et seg. American
operates a portion of its airline business at JFK (Compl., para.
4).
B. Th ri I
The First Cause of Action raised by Criales is that of
employment discrimination by the defendant American due to
Criales’ Hispanic, or Latin, ancestry or race (Compl., paras. 1,
7, 11, 12, 15, 19, 24, 32, 61). The Second Cause of Action
devolves around Criales’ wrongful discharge by the defendant, and
the disparate impact of its employee regulations upon him.
4 Criales was discriminated against, and wrongfully terminated by
Ee a rr Ee a ONE
the defendant due to his race (Compl., paras. 38-69) .*
Criales also asks the Court to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over his Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the
state law claims of defamation based upon libel and slander per
se, (Compl., paras. 71-79), and IIED (Compl., paras. 81-83).
1. The Workplace Harassment
In the First Cause of Action
From the second day of his employment, up until the last
mocking comment on the public address system on December 20, 1991
when Criales cleaned his personal effects out of his locker and
was terminated formally, Criales was pervasively, severely, and
degradingly harassed due to his Hispanic race.’ (Compl., paras.
7-29).
a. bh re-Nov xr
Admitted, Criales was only employed at defendant American
for one month after November 21, 1991, thirteen days of which
were spent on paid suspension pending final investigation of his
expense account improprieties. The pre-November 21, 1991 conduct
was constant, demeaning, and designed to drive Criales either
crazy or out of the defendant’s employ (Compl., paras. 11-34).
2 Obviously, Causes of Action One and Two implicate the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA of 1991"), 42 U.S.C. 1981 and all
subsections of the statute.
> Hispanic, Latin, and Race are all terms which are used
interchangeably throughout this memorandum, and which are not
mere "national origin."
It included the writing of epithets, public address pranks,
amplified insults, and personal confrontations. (Id.).
b. The post-November 21, 1991 conduct
Criales raises four specific allegations of post-November
21, 1991 abusive, discriminatory conduct. (Compl., paras. 16, 33,
34, 35). In an effort to render these allegations de minimis,
the defendant points to Criales’ deposition testimony, which was
given while he was pro se, without counsel, and under the
complete control of the defendant’s attorneys, in which he stated
that after September he had been subjected to no more incidents |
of harassment. Clearly, Criales’ deposition testimony is of
little value under the one-sided circumstances in which it was
taken. Criales was easily duped into confusion by American, and
he often did not understand the questions posed to him. Should
Criales be afforded the opportunity to put on his case, testimony
will substantiate his allegations of a continuing course of
discriminatory conduct up until December 20, 1991* through the
* The defendant attempts to question the integrity of
counsel in drafting the complaint in Criales II, with the
rhetorical question: "one wonders how paragraphs 16 and 33 of the
Complaint can allege that Criales was harassed at work up to
‘December 20, 1991’, when Criales’ last day of work at American
was December 7, 1991." (Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, page 10,
fn. 6). This bit of factual omission on the part of the
defendant is indicative of its trend in minimizing or ignoring
Criales’ allegations: what is earth shattering to Criales is
"Minuscule" to American. The fact remains that, when Criales was
formally terminated by American on December 20, 1991, he returned
to retrieve his possessions from American’s JFK location, and he
was publicly mocked again on the public address system by the
same person whom management already knew had been terrorizing
him.
testimony of the defendant’s own employees.
Y Discrimin Di r bh n £ Action
The Second Cause of Action stems from the circumstances of
Criales’ dismissal by the defendant. From September 20, 1991 to
October 18, 1991, Criales, as well as two other American
mechanics who worked with Criales, attended a special avionics
training course at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago,
Illinois. (Id., para. 44) Criales was given a $1,000.00 spending
allowance for the entire month. Of this $1,000.00, Criales spent
only $729.00 (Id., para. 46), yet somehow he was singled out for
investigation into his dry cleaning expenditures.
Criales had received oral instructions on the filling out of
his expense reports. He still, however, did include in his
itemized expenditures dry cleaning charges which he falsely
claimed to have incurred in Chicago, when the charges were
actually incurred in New York. (Id., para. 48). Criales included
these expenses because he had never filled out expense reports
before, and he was told that he could safely itemize dry cleaning
expenditures by the two employees of American who had accompanied
him to Chicago.
Upon Criales’ cebu, despite having spent only 73% of the
money allotted to him by American for an entire month, Criales
was singled out and investigated for expense account violations.
(Id., para. 49.) Criales was temporarily suspended by the
defendant on December 7, 1991, pending the outcome of its
10
investigation. Two weeks later, Criales was terminated in his
€ employment, American having held that he violated company rules
16 and 34 (Id.. para. 51.) After Criales’ union contested his
termination at Arbitration, on March 12, 1992, Criales was found
terminated for just cause pursuant to his employment contract.
Criales was not represented by counsel at this proceeding, but a
union representative did speak on his behalf, noting:
The compan, has agreed to in the letter of stipulation
and raised questions of harassment on the job, of being
a foreigner in this country....being made a fool of on
the PA system, having his mother’s name slandered,
things written on walls, hiss time card punched in and
out; what he perceives as a set up... (emphasis added)
(Ex. 2, Discharge Hearing, dated March 12, 1992, p. 219).
Clearly, Criales’ "story" was the same at his arbitration as it
is now. He has always maintained that he was discriminated
€ against, and that he had been set up for termination by the
defendant and its employees.
3. State Law Claims in the Third
and Fourth Causes of Action
In his Third Cause of Action, Criales states that he was
defamed upon termination by the defendant’s issuance of a "no-
comment letter," which had the effect of preventing him from
obtaining employment of any sort for over two years in an
industry where he had previously never had difficulty obtaining a
job. (Compl., para. 72).
In his Fourth Cause of Action, Criales alleges IIED, in that
he was conspired against by the defendant, its employees and
€ :
managers, who engaged in a continuing course of extreme and
malicious conduct, which degraded, humiliated, and scarred Mr.
Criales.
Cc. Criales’ February 5, 1992 EEOC Charge and
Criales’ initial, pro se February 5, 1992 charge (Charge No.
160-92-1069) with the EEOC alleged discrimination based on
national origin. The EEOC referred this charge to the NYSDHR for
initial processing, and at the time of Criales I, a right to sue
letter based upon this timely filed charge had not yet been
issued by the EEOC. Criales, still pro se, went forward in
Criales I, predicated solely upon the EEOC’s erroneous granting
of an untimely right to sue letter on Criales’ second, December
3, 1992 complaint to the NYCCHR.°*
After this Court granted American’s motion to dismiss in
Criales I, on January 31, 1995, Criales obtained a right-to-sue
letter on the February 5, 1992 timely complaint from the EEOC for
use in his appeal. Criales, pro se in the Second Circuit, then
was moved against by the defendant, who sought to strike the
timely EEOC right-to-sue letter from the appellate record.
Criales sought to withdraw without prejudice, American moved for
prejudice and costs. The Second Circuit then allowed Criales to
withdraw his appeal with prejudice, which he did. The present
* On August 29, 1994, Criales’ timely complaint of February
5, 1992 was dismissed by the NYSDHR, as he had already instituted
suit in federal court in Criales I.
12
action is based upon the timely right-to-sue letter, which
e Criales as a matter of law was entitled to, and which was a clear
by product of the timely filed February 5, 1992 charge known to
both the defendant and the Court during the disposition of
Criales I.
ARGUMENT
1
CRIALES’ TITLE VII AND 42 U.S.C. 1981 CLAIMS
IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION
ARE NOT PRECLUDED BY RES JUDICATA
A. Criales’ Title VII claims in the First and
Second Causes of Action are not Barred by Res Judicata _
Criales I was commenced in November, 1993. The Title VII
7 claims in Criales I were predicated solely on the untimely issued
right-to-sue letter of October 26, 1993, which relate back to his
untimely filed December 3, 1992 complaint with the NYCCHR.
Although Criales attempted to obtain a valid right to sue notice
during the pendency of Criales I, the EEOC failed to provide a-
timely right-to-sue notice before this Court’s dismissal of that
action. Although Criales II implicates similar issues under
Title VII, Criales’ previous inability to obtain a right-to-sue
notice constituted nothing more that failure to meet a condition
precedent to being heard upon the merits in Criales I. As this
infirmity in Criales I barred Criales from reaching the merits of
his case, the First and Second Causes of Action in Criales II
may not be dismissed as res judicata, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
4 13
eS Se ee NST ee F
Noting Woods v. Dunlop Tire Co., 972 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. denied, 113 §.Ct. 977 (1993), and its rule that: "A
judgement on the merits in one suit is res judicata in another
where the parties and the subject matter are the same," Id. at
38-39, Criales maintains that Criales I was not adjudicated on
its merits. Rather, Criales I was dismissed for failure to meet
a statutory prerequisite (Memorandum ai.d Order, p. 6). Arguing
that the EEOC had actually failed in its obligation to give
Criales a right-to-sue notice on his timely filed complaint,
Criales alleged that his situation was ripe for equitable
modification under Hladki v. Jeffrey’s Consol Ltd., 652 F. Supp.
388, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). The Court rejected this argument,
holding the Criales was not entitled to any equitable
modification of Title VII’s statutory prerequisites regarding his
failure to receive a right-to-sue notice. None of Criales’
substantive issues were ever raised.
In it’s motion to dismiss, counsel for the defendant
American indicates that:
It is well settled law that the filing of a charge with
the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private
civil action under Title VII...(emphasis added) (Id.,
Pp. 26)
See also, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47
(1974); Mc Donnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798
(1973) (a complainant’s right to bring suit under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 is not confined to charges as to which the
EEOC has made a reasonable-cause finding). Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
Rule 41(b), a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not
14
constitute an adjudication on the merits:
Unless the Court in its Order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subsection and any
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction...operates as an
adjudication upon the merits (emphasis added).
Criales failed to satisfy what this Court characterized as a
"Statutory prerequisite" in Criales I. Given the unique facts
Surrounding this litigation, failure to meet a "statutory
prerequisite" is arguably identical to failure to meet a
jurisdictional prerequisite under Rule 41(b). There was no
adjudication on the merits in Criales I whatsoever. The only
issue ever addressed by the Court as to Criales’ Title VII claims
was whether an equitable basis for waiving the right-to-sue
notice requirement was present. Criales’ subsequent obtaining of
a right-to-sue letter clearly contravenes this Court’s earlier
decision as to the merits of Criales’ argument regarding his
ability to maintain Criales I. Criales pro se then managed to
dismiss his appeal with prejudice, still never having presented
his timely right-to-sue letter as a basis for overturning this
Court’s earlier holding. Accordingly, given Criales I and II’s
unique procedural history, Criales should not be precluded on res
judicata grounds from bringing all Title VII allegations
contained in Criales II, such that they may be finally and fully
adjudicated upon their merits.
B. Criales’ Section 1981 Claims In the First and
Second Causes of Action are not Barred by Res Judicata
Criales II further alleges 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 claims,
15
which are also not dismissable under the doctrine of res
judicata.
As discussed at length above, the three prerequisites for
application of res judicata to Criales II have not been met.
Although the parties are identical, the factual occurrences
Surrounding Criales’ allegations in Criales II are substantially
different. Here, an entirely different set of issues is presented
to the Court. Rather than alleging the specific, pointed,
national origin discrimination of Criales I, Criales alleges
conduct which, if proven, does not encompass national origin
discrimination. This conduct is actionable under Section 1981,
and rules of judicial economy such as res judicata must yield to
Criales’ right to present the merits of his case. Also, in light
of Criales I’s termination without adjudication on its merits,
Criales should be allowed to go forward with his Section 1981
claims, in conjunction with the Title VII claims which he raises
above.
It.
THIS COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER CRIALES’
TITLE VII "RACE" DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION oo _
It is not so-well settled a principle that a pro se filing
of a complaint with the EEOC precludes a plaintiff from seeking
judicial relief for claims outside of the "four corners" of the
original EEOC complaint. In fact, within the Eastern District of
New York, at least one judge has held against the defendant’s
+ 16
e present counsel that:
the scope of a complaint in a Title VII suit is not
limited solely by the charge [contained in the EEOC
complaint] but by the ‘scope of the EEOC investigation
which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the
charge of discrimination.’"
Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group, 526 F. Supp. 1268
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), quoting Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083,
1090 (2d Cir. 1979), xyev’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.
Ct. 2486 (1980). See also, Yates v. Philip Morris Co., 690 F.
Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("under the law of this circuit,
courts should take a flexible approach in interpreting Title VII |
complaints so as to consider any claim of discrimination
reasonable related to the allegations in the complaint filed with
the EEOC"); Av Vv mi ij j , 614 F.
a Supp. 1397, 1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the Second Circuit has
embraced a flexible approach in interpreting Title VII complaints
filed with the EEOC"). Therefore, to the extent that Criales’
Claims before this Court of employment discrimination, disparate
impact. and harassment due to race could have been reasonable
outgrowths of the EEOC’s investigation of his admittedly limited
pro se EEOC complaint based upon national origin, these claims
must be maintained and adjudicated on their merits in the instant
case.
III. |
CRIALES’ TITLE VII HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE |
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ARE JUSTICIABLE _ |
Even in light of this Court’s jurisdiction to hear Criales’ |
a Title VII harassment claim, the defendant argues that: (a) with |
17
EO ee
respect to American’s pre-November 21, 1990 discriminatory
misconduct, Criales is entitled to no relief, and; (b) that
Criales’ post-November 21, 1990 discriminatory harassment was so
de minimis as to not be actionable.‘
The defendant then proffers a bifurcated approach to dealing
with pre-November 21, 1990 and post-November 21, 1990 conduct.’
American proposes that all of the discriminatory conduct which
Criales experienced pre-November 21, 1990 should be excluded from
any analysis as to the extent of Criales’ discriminatory
treatment post-November 21, 1990, and that the post-November 21,
1990 conduct must be viewed separately, in a vacuum.
The defendant’s argument in adopting this strict bifurcation
approach is that: (1) pre-November 21, 1991 conduct is not
properly to be taken into account in meting out compensatory or
punitive damages for post-November 21, 1991 damages under the
Civil Rights Act ("CRA") of 1991, and (2) if Criales was not
subject to "sufficiently severe or pervasive"*® discrimination
* The defendant also cites Criales’ deposition testimony as
a pro se plaintiff, without counsel, that he was not
discriminated against post-November 21, 1990 as a basis for
dismissal. However, as earlier noted, Criales’ deposition under
such one-sided and uneven circumstances has little evidentiary
value. A reading of the entire transcript is enlightening as,
when viewed in totality, it clearly demonstrates that Criales was
manipulated extensively during his questioning by American.
7 November 21, 1990 is a critical line of demarcation, in
that it is the date that the damages provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 took effect, entitling a plaintiff to, inter
alia, compensatory and punitive damages. Prior to this time,
equitable remedies alone were available to plaintiffs.
* See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 370
(1994). To satisfy the "pervasive" requirement under Harris, the
18
post-November 21, 1990, then none of the conduct he alleges post-
e November 21, 1990 is actionable.
Criales is not attempting to bootstrap pre-November 21, 1991
conduct to that which occurred later, in an attempt to recover
punitive and compensatory damages for this earlier conduct per
the CRA of 1991. Criales concedes that his pre-November 21, 1991
discrimination allegations, if successful, warrant only equitable
relief -- principally in the form of back pay and associated lost
benefits.
Criales does argue, however, that the pre-CRA of 1991
conduct must be taken into account as to the state that this
continued discrimination left Criales in on November 21, 1990.
The post-CRA Criales may be analogized to a tort victim with an
eggshell skull. It is a clearly settled principle that one
3 "takes their victim as they find them," regardless of their
feebleness at the time of the tort. Criales, after being put
through a solid year of abusive discrimination by the defendant,
entered into the post-CRA of 1991 period of his employment with
American, short as it was, in a considerably more fragile state
than he had when he commenced his employment with American in
November, 1990.
"incidents must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently
continuous and concerted." Carrero v, New York City Housing
Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581 (2d Cir. 1989). In this respect, the
pre-CRA of 1991 conduct is directly relevant to proof of
concerted, continued conduct. Even though these pre-CRA of 1991
events may not warrant compensatory or punitive damages, they
Clearly have evidentiary value in substantiating the
pervasiveness of Criales’ post-CRA of 1991 claims.
a 19
|
Therefore, what American callously characterized as four
non-pervasive acts of post-CRA discrimination by American and its
employees, actually carried the weight of the world with them.
It was these ultimate acts by the defendant which culminated a
year’s worth of psychological abuse. As such, without any
attempt to retroactively apply the CRA of 1991, Criales’
treatment during the two weeks that he was actively on the job
site at American, and the two weeks thereafter that he was on
temporary suspension, constituted among the greatest harms which
he suffered. We concede that damages for the pre-CRA of 1991
conduct is limited to equitable relief. However, bifurcation and
viewing in a vacuum is not consistent with "taking your victim as
you find them" and would only undercut the true impact which the
four alleged post-CRA acts had on Criales. Accordingly, Criales
maintains his demand for punitive and compensatory damages for
the post-November 21, 1991 conduct of the defendant.
Iv.
CRIALES’ SECTION 1981 CLAIMS, TO THE EXTENT THAT
THEY ARE OUTSIDE OF THE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS ARE
STILL ACTIONABLE UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE TOLLING
The defendant argues that, even though Criales may overcome
the res judicata doctrine in bringing Criales II’s Section 1981
claims, that the three year statue of limitations applicable to
these claims has passed and that therefore -riales must be barred
from litigating these issues. Admittedly, over three years have
passed since these claims accrued. However, statutes of
limitation are: "subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable
20
é tolling." Zipes v. Trans-World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398
(1982). Given Criales’ continued attempts to bring this case to
a trial on its merits, and its unique procedural history, we
respectfully urge that sufficient grounds for equitable
modification exist with regard to Criales’ present Section 1981
claims, and that they therefore be subject to equitable tolling
of the statute of limitations.
V.
CRIALES’ STATE LAW CLAIMS MAY BE WITHIN THE PURVIEW
OF THIS COURT’ S SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION
|
Should this Court maintain any aspect of Criales’ First and
Second, federal, Causes of Action, the Third and the Fourth state
law based Causes of action are properly within this Court’s
a supplemental jurisdiction. Criales concedes that, should
defendant’s motion be granted as to Causes of Action One and Two,
there is no jurisdictional basis for the state law claims before
this Court. Accordingly, maintenance of Criales’ Third and
Fourth Causes of Action is predicated entirely upon this Court’s
decision with respect to dismissal of its federal bases for
jurisdiction.
vi.
CRIALES’ STATE LAW CLAIMS, IF WITHIN THE COURT’S
SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION, ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO
Statutes of limitation are subject to equitable modification
"7 when appropriate. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
21
485. Should this Court allow Criales to reach the merits of his
federal Causes of Action, in light of Criales’ attempts to
adjudicate his complaints since they accrued and the tortured
procedural history of this litigation, we respectfully urge that
equitable tolling of his state claims is proper. Given the short
New York State one year statute of limitations applicable to
intentional torts, and the longer-term nature of bringing Title
VII actions, further reason to allow Criales to litigate all of
his claims exists. To not equitably toll the statute of
limitations regarding Criales’ state law claims under the
circumstances of this case would serve only to bar future
litigants from seeking a streamlined remedy in federal court for
wide ranging abuses that stemmed from the same, or related,
factual occurrences, but which were not capable of adjudication
in the federal forum until after the shorter state statute had
run.
vit.
CRIALES’ STATE LAW CAUSES OF ACTION BOTH STATE
CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED _
A. THE DEFAMATION CLAIM
American urges that its no-comment letter was: (1) not
alleged to be published to a third party, (2) protected under a
qualified immunity, even if it was purposefully inaccurate, and
(3) was an omission rather than a false or defamatory statement
of fact (Motion to Dismiss, pp. 47-49.) Criales retorts that
22
this letter was: (1) clearly "published" to third parties, in
e that each employer whom he interviewed with would receive it in
the course of investigating his credentials for employment; (2)
that these employers understood the meaning of a "no-comment"
letter, and also the importance of employers writing letters that
say absolutely nothing as a means of avoiding defamation actions
as Criales has raised herein; (3) that the purported silence of
the letter indicates to prospective employees that an individual
is unhireable due to, literally, unspeakable conduct at a
previous place of employment, and (4) that American’s qualified
immunity is not unlimited, and is actionable when, as here,
Criales has alleged from the onset that his employer’s conduct
has been effectuated with ill will and malicious intent.
2 Clearly, Criales has proffered a sufficient basis to survive
dismissal on the Third Cause of Action for defamation, and to
move this matter forward to the discovery stage.
B. THE ILED CLAIM
The defendant argues that, even if Criales’ IIED claim is
‘not time-barred, that it is not sufficiently "extreme and
outrageous" as a matter of law and thus should be dismissed
(Motion to Dismiss, p. 49). In support of its argument, the
defendant cites dismissal of IIED claims where (1) an employer
allowed crude and sexually derisive statements to occur in the
workplace, Shea v. Cornell Univ., 192 A.D.2d 857, 596 N.Y.S. 502,
Z ‘
ee
504 (3d Dep’t 1993), and (2) a plaintiff was subjected to the
religious slurs of "Kike" and "Hebe", Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi
Trust Co. of New York, 152 A.D.2d 169, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 521 (2d
Dep’t 1989).
Criales’ IIED claim is far more pervasive than those present
in either Shea or Liebowitz. The basis for his IIED claim is
stronger than those relied on by the defendant, the conduct which
Criales has sufferred was sufficiently pervasive and severe to
have had a lasting impact on him up until today, and is
regardless an issue properly preserved for the trier of fact.
Proof of Criales’ allegations should be presented at trial,
after he has presented his witnesses and evidence, and then this
motion may be re-instituted by the defendant.
For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss presently before the
court, though, all allegations contained in the complaint must be
viewed as true, and all reasonable inferences in favor of the
plaintiff must be drawn. Ortiz. v. Cornetta, 867 F. 2d 146, 149
(2d Cir. 1989). Furthermore, a complaint must not be dismissed
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Under this
standard for dismissal, Criales has clearly stated a claim for
IIED, and therefore dismissal for failure to state a claim is
improper.
24
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the
defendant’s motion to dismiss in entirety, schedule this matter
for discovery and trial on its merits, and grant unto the
Plaintiff any such other and further relief which it may deem
just and proper.
Dated: New York, New York
September 13, 1995
Respectfully submitted,
CANTON & JASPER, ESQS.
By
Joseph A Bondy (JB-6887)
276 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10001
(212) 629-6489
Attorneys for the plaintiff
Mauricio Criales
ro
i Pi. |
te a he TE Di le rT
»™
/ APPENDIX "C*
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
at al
MAURICIO CRIALES,
Plaintiff,
-against- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
97 CV 526
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
EDWARD CERASIA II, and
THOMAS MATTINA,
Defendants.
GLASSER, United States District Judge:
; From Naxember 1990 until December 1991, plaintiff Mauricio Criales worked for
defendant American Airlines as a commercial aircraft maintenance technician. Complaint ¢ 6.
On January 15 1997, Mr. Criales brought this action, pro s¢, in the New York State Supreme
Court of Queens County alleging that defendants American Airlines, Edward Cerasia I] and
Thomas Mattina defamed him, intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him, conspired to
defraud him, subjected him to malicious prosecution, and violated his rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. On January 31 1997, defendants American Airlines
and Edward Cerasia II filed a petition to remove this action to federal court pursuant to28 U.S.C. —
§ 144]. Mr. Criales now moves for a remand arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear
this case. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Criales’ motion is denied.
The statutory provisions relevant to this motion are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367 and 1441.
Section 144] provides, in part:
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a
ii
claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.
(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction
conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-
removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district
court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand al! matters in
which State law predominates.
Section 1331 provides that “[t}he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Section 1367 provides, in
part
(a) . . . in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are sb related
to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of fre same
case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
As is clear from the language of section 1441, an action may be removed to federal court
if it might have been brought in federal court originally. Box Tree So. Lid. v. Bitterman, 873 F.
Supp. 833, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Calhoon v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Hence, a case raising a federal question may be removed from state to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §
1331; Box Tree So. Lid. 873 F. Supp. at 837. Likewise, a case raising both federal question
claims and state law claims may be removed from state to federal court if the claims are related
to the same case or controversy and therefore subject to the federal court's supplemental
jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1367; Costantini v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 89, 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
To determine whether 2 case raises a federal question, the court examines the face of the
complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed. Westmoreland Hospital Ass'n v. Blue
Cross of Western Pennsylvania. 605 F.2d 119, 123 (10th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1077
2
(1980). If the adjudication of any claim requires the application of the law of the Constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States, the case raises a federal question. Box Tree So.. Ltd., 873 F.
Supp. at 837.
Accordingly, because the complaint in this case alleges Constitutional violations,
complaint §§ 46-50, this Court has jurisdiction over this action and the plaintiff's motion for
remand is denied.
SOORDERED. _
" “4
Dated: February ZL: 1997
a klyn, New York
asisn
I. Leo Glasser, U. S. D. J.
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum and Order was this day sent to:
Mr. Mauricio Criales
37-57 61 Street
Woodside, N.Y.
11377
Douglass B. Maynard
Joyce J. Sun
Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather
& Geraldson
900 Third Avenue
New York, N.Y.
10022-5728
APPENDIX" D*"*
FILED
, IN CLERKS OFFICE
UNITED STATES .STRICT COURT . US. f- va-ent ED, NY:
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
HK WR26 ST %&
ne ae
MAURICIO CRIALES. — mrs 1 SS Te
piainiteel GV 9” 14 (ILG-aSC)
nF
AMERICAN AIRLINES INC.,EDWARD COMPLAINT
CERASIA II Esq.,THOMAS MATTINA.
FRANK GRILLO. US CUSTOMS and
RODNEY DAVIS,FBI Agent JFK Airport
Defendants.
CHR = ve
PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS j 7 a ee:
This is an action for Gamages caused by the Defendants
G PLAINTIFF DEMANDS
pyr BY JURY _
» = eda “4 AN
SSSSSE64 £28 ES we me oe mo ee
Malicious prosecution based on Defamation.Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress; Conspiracy to Defraud; Constitutional Violatior
of the First (1). and 14th Constitutional Ammendments Priviledges
= of the United States of America.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
- Jurisdiction and venue are explicitly conferred upon
this Court by 28 U.S.C.A Section 1631 71404. ; 28 U.S.C.A. Sec.1332
Muitipiicity of parties; 28 U.S.c.A. 1331 constitutional laws end
treaties; “Federal question” Jurisdiction ,are made by,e.g.,28 U.S.C.A
Sections 1337,1339 and 1343; 42 U.S.c.A. Sect 1983.; 28 U.S.C.A.
Sections 1346-2674-2680; Becaused this Complaint was Removed by
the defendants and approved by honorable I. Leo Glasser , on
His MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Signed February 12,1997 to take full
Jurisdiction of the entire complaint Removed out from the SUPREME
a COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS Index No.001072/97
on January 15,1997 to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.
on January 31,1997. Respecfully Request that all the Jurisdictionals
B 1C6— summers with nouce. blank coun © 1993 Juuvs Bi umeena. inc.
J 1 ise rresacts| peronal or subsutuied service 12 pi nope 4-94 PUBLISYER. NYC 150:3
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK —— O01072 97
COUNTY OF QUEENS Date purchased
MAURICIO CRIALES Plaintiff(s) designate(s) QUEENS
County as the place of trial.
The basis of the venue is
based on the county in
Plaintiff(s) which the premises are situated.
— ummons
AMERICAN AIRLINES. ,ED CERASIA II,Esq.SEYFARTH, SHAW, with Notice
PAIRWEATHER, and GERALDSON. , Esty.
THOMAS MATTINA US CUSTOMS JPK AIRPORT AREA DIRECTOR Plaintiff(s) reside(s) at
RECE!VED
Defendant(s) County of
JAW i & 1897
To the above named Defendant(s) COUNTY CLERK
a Bou are hereby summoned to answer the complaint in this action and toterve scopy ig
your answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this summons. to serve a notice of appearance. on the Plaintiff's
Attomey(s) within (20) Gays after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service (or within 30
days after the service is complete if this summons is not personally delivered to you within the State of New
York): and in case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief
demanded in the complaint.
MAURICIO CRIALES
Dated. WOODSIDE, NEK YORK Attorney(s) for Plainuff , pro se
, sameasy 15,1997
Defendant's address: Office and Post Office Address
AMERICAN AIRLINES,La Guardia Airport
ED CERASIA II,Esq. 900Third Avenue New York,NY 10022
THOMAS MATTINA, JFK Airport US CUSTOMS Jamaica NY 11430
Notice: The nature of this action is
Based on Defamation on slander per se,Intentional infliction of Emctional distress,
Conspiracy to Gefraud,MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, Constitutional Violation of the
Pirst (1), and 14th Constitutional Ammendments priviledges of the United States.
37-57 61Street
WOODSIDE, NEW YORK 11377
(917)419-1272
The relief sought is to show a conspiracy to defraud is in progress and none of
the Gefendant,s can Genie me the right to work on my profession of 15 years
: as a licensed and qualify Aircraft Maintenance Thecnician.
Punity Damages .LIABLE for trying to destroy my reputation and responsible
for the suffering. Embarassment and Humiliation caused by AMERICAN AIRLINES.
failure to appear, judgment will be taken against you by default for the sum of $ 1' 997.000,00
eee January 1997 and the costs of this action.
© SD deem rte & _-_ a BECO he We gv Oe tvts.
State of Arw Bork, sup. £ court
SUPREME courT Court, County of ouEENS Index No. 001072/97
eo RECEIVED
MAURICIO CRIALES
FEB O06 1997
QUEERS COON ty
against
AMERICAN AIRLINES.,ED CERASIA II Esq,SEYFARTH
SHAW,FAIRWETHER AND GERALDSON Esqs.
THOMAS MATTINA US CUSTOMS JFK AIRPORT AREA DIREQTOR
Affidavit of Personal! Service
Defendant(s)
State of Mew Pork,
an:
County of QUEENS ;
TERESA QUISBERT and LUIS FERNANDO ARBOLEDA being duly sworn,
deposes and says that deponent is not a party to the action or proceeding, is over 18 years of age and re-
sides at 41-07 53 Street Woodside New York 11377
That on the 5th day of February 19 97 at all the defendants
last known address
deponent served the annexed NOTICE OF MOTION, SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT,RJI request
in this action, on SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT. ON Pebruary 5,1997
, Names above corporation, the defendant therein named, by delivering a true copy thereof to
personally,the Reoguest for Oral Argument on February 26, 1997
_ of said corporation: deponent knew the said corporation so served to be the corporation mentioned and
described as defendant thereinandknew of the charges against them »served January 15,
to be the February 26 at 9:30 A-thereof.
Sworn to before me, this
4 day of = A 197 7
hus [ a A crccheds °
Pesaro anrhe
sugnature
Teresa, Quisbect
APPENDIX "“E "
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
x
MAURICIO CRIALES, AT JUN -4 A 10
poe CLERK
Plaintiff, ws DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT
OF NEW YORK
~-against- 95-CV-1709 (ILG)
AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.
Defendant.
x
PLAINTIFF MAURICIO CRIALES
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT THE TITLE VII
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT REAFFIRMED BY THE
COURT OF APPEALS for THE SECOND CIRCUIT ON
95-9170 -
THE ARBITRATION DECISION THAT I WAS SUBJECTED BY AMERICAN AIRLINES; INC
ON MARCH 12, 1992 "MOST BE OVERTURN ON GROUNDS THAT WARRANTS A
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT IN DISTRICT COURT "
i. MARVIN HILL JR Alleged "neutral" arbitrator is far from
neutral he is Chairman AMERICAN AIRLINES —TWU New York area board of
adjustment.
2. Who FAILED to interpretate and applicate the collective
bargaining agreement. ;
3. HE SAT to dispense his own brand of industrial Justice.
4. HE FAILED to provide plaintiff Criales with any opportunity
to call to testify all Supervisors or Crew Chiefs Whom he had Complaint
of harrasement and Discrimination. . |
5. The Arbitrator did not resolve the Grievance by considering
the proper sources, the Contract and those circunstances out which came
the "Common law of the shop"
6. Documents were requested since January 21, 1992 but BILL GARY
Labor Relations Manager at la Guardia Airport "OBJECTED"
HIS EXACT WORDS jMr Criales I wont give you Anything......
You are a THIEF... You Stole from US AND hanged the telephone down.
7 The Distri. Court most Vacate the Arbitr. n award because
of Unfair and Prejudicial Exclusion or Admission of Evidence. I request
other Expense accounts Investigated. No ones Training Class Expense
receipts were ever Investigated.
Criales was Clearly Single-Out
8. a Court will also vacate an arbitral award which requires
conduct in Violation of State Law. In UAW .v. W.M.chase Co (E.D:Mich. 19¢6)
10. In Criales Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 95-9170
all three judges in the Pannel Agreed that all State Claims entered on
the District Court Complaint 95-CV-1709 are actionable and can be claim
Giving the District Court Eastern District the Jurisdiction for
State Claims, which are
ke Intentional Infliction of Emotional distress
2. Defamation and slander per se.
3 When the Arbitrators award and Words manifest an infedelity to
this obligation Courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the
award.
12. Courts had Vacated the arbitrator's award holding that once the
arbitrator had found cause for discipline ,He had no authority to
consider How Just was the discipline actually imposed by the Employer.
13. I Claimed the Discharge was Too Severe Punishment specially
when I was Never Reprimand for any wrong doing before., Like so many
other employees of American Airlines Who after having Violated American
Airlines Rules of Conduct And Rules of Safety, They were giving the
Chance to stay. and still today are American Airlines Employees
who after been reprimand,Suspended or even Fired were taken back by
Management....NO ONE HAD TO GO AS FAR AS COMPLAINING IN DISTRICT COURT
AS I HAD NO CHOICE TO DO SO:.......2200-
14.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
Section 5
“VIOLATION OF LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY"
The arbitrator who bases his decision
not on the parties agreement but on
extrinsic statutory policy exceeds his
Powers and renders his award subject to
Judicial attack.
Arbitration Awards
ae Marvin Hill JR
Section 5 of JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS
“VIOLATION OF LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY"
The arbitrator who bases his decision
not on the parties agreement but on
extrinsic statutory policy exceeds his
Powers and renders his award subject to
Judicial attack.
Supreme Court.
United Steelworkers -v-
Enterprise wheel and car Corp.
(US 1960)
A Court will also vacate an arbitral award
which requires conduct in violation of
State Law. UAW -v- W. M. Chace Co
(E.D Mich. 1966)
Dated: Woodside, Queens New York
June 1 ,1997
Respectfully submitted,
UA
MAURICIO CRIALES
37-57 61 Street
Woodside, New York |
(917) 419-1272
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.