Opposition Brief — American Airlines, Inc. v. Criales

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ORIGINAL , Supreme Court, U.S.

2 'V FILED

Wo. 97-152 Aug 1 #97

In The CLERK

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER Term, 1996

er * =

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

*

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*

MAURICIO CRIALES

PRO-SE Respondent

37-57 61 Street, lst Floor

Woodside, New York 11377

Beeper (917) 419-1272

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

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a No. 97-152

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER Term, 1996

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Petitioner,

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

P United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

*

RFSPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

*

MAURICIO CRIALES

PRO-SE Respondent

37-57 61 Street, lst Floor

Woodside, New York 11377

Beeper (917) 419-1272

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

-l- Whether AMERICAN AIRLINES,INC. is acting in good

Faith or not by Misrepresenting Facts and Lying to had

Claimed in three separate Federal Lawsuits,(The most

recent one a 97-CV-1460 (ILG) EDNY Removed from the SU-

PREME COURT STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS 1072/97

On February 12, 1997) To Claimed to have NO KNOWLEDGE }

of the Worse case of National Origin Discrimination based

on Racial Hate, and Disparate Treatement Due to Race any

Colombian Hispanic has ever been subjected in the Entire

United States Aircraft Maintenance Aviation History.

--Including an ILLEGAL ARREST by the "FBI" Suffered

By the Plaintiff Respondent., on June 10,1996 without any

Warrants or the District Court Acknowledgement of their

intentions. AMERICAN AIRLINES,INC. VICIOUSLY made No men-

tion at all on their Petition of Writ about the "FBI"

Arrest NOR that such Illegal Actions Created the FEDERAL

LAWSUIT NOW PENDING at the Eastern District Of New York,

Based on Malicious Prosecution based on Defamation,Cons-

piracy to Defraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional

Distress and Constitutional Violations of the First (1)

and 14th Constitutional Ammendments Priviledges of the

United States of America. Against AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC;

EDWARD CERASIA II Esq. Counsel of Record here and the

Same "FBI" AGENTS Who Conspired to Arrested me.

-2- Whether there are enough causes to bring CRIMINAL

CHARGES Against American Airlines Inc, For Allowing a

Climate of Racial Discrimination to a Licensed Federal

Aviation Aircraft Maintenance Technician who performed

sensitive Maintenance to Hundreds of Transport Aircraft

at American Airlines Hangar 10 JFK Airport Under Extre-

mately Hostile,Dangerous,Severe,Highly Pervasive Working

conditions., for a long 13 months.

-3- Whether the Distric Court's dismissal of Criales I

or 93-CV-5340 On Statue of Limitations Grounds was NOT

an adjudication Upon the merits,but rather was a dismissal

for lack of Jurisdiction based on an untimely right to sue

letter Issue by the EEOC.

ii

PLAINTIFF RESPONDENT PRO-SE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Mauricio Criales is an American Citizen for 21 YEARS

Who was born in the Republic of Colombia, South America,

and is Hispanic by descent.

Respondent Criales Served in the United States NAVY for

Six (6) Years 1979-1985 .,All those Years Involved on

Aircraft Maintenance on the Lockeed P3 Electra Aircraft

used for Anti-submarine Welfare Missions around the World.

Also, I am a Licensed Federal Aviation Administration FAA

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN SINCE 1986.,Airframe and

Powerplants Licenbsed.

Mauricio Criales is a Family man with Inmense Family Values

Who's Four (4) Children 2 Boys and 2 Girls ages ranging from

1 1/2 to 10 Years, are all United States Born Citizens.

Respondent Criales has been forced to reside with his Chil-

dren BELOW THE POVERTY LEVEL in the United States at the

Hands of American Airlines, Who has Defamed Plaintiff to all

US Airlines,when requesting references, as well as dozens of

Prosper Employers.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Ousstions PEORGHESE 2c occ reese cts corse oen dos

Respondent Statement ccccccccccsccccccccccs

Tete GE COBEGRES cc soho 5000 060066464 66 66088

Statement of CHE COBO cececccseeseesecsesenese

Reasons for Denying the Petition ...........

I.

II

III.

IV.

IV

Criales II Under No Circunstances can

ever be Bee JWGECRTR« 0.00 60h 0006 0 60808

The Second Circuit's Decision is Totally

Correct to REVERSE the Judgement Which

Dismissed Criales's Title VII Claims on

Res Judicata grounds and to Unanimously

VACATED the Dismissal of Two (2) New York

State ClOIMS cccccseconecocessvecvesess

The Second Circuit's Decision Do not

Conflict with any other Decision of any

other Court of Appeals ,were the SAFETY

of the Flying Public is in DANGER; Until

LAWS are change to better Protect all

Aircraft Maintenance Technicians From

any Source that can ENDANGER the Aircraft

Including VICIOUS Humans Who are RACISTS

The Arbitration Decision MOST BE OVERTURN

On Grounds That it WARRANTS A RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT IN DISTRICT COURT

Now REAFFIRMED by the Second Circuit ....

LABOR LAW UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE

BARGAINING e*eeeces83o§ee#ee#e#e##e#e# e*e@eeeeseeeee#ee#eesee#*e#ee#ee#ee#ee#e#

COnclUBEOR cccserve vette eeboawas badteceseseeseawes

10

12

14

15

18

Contents

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited: Pages.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,47

94 8. Ct. 16131,10139 CiSFE).cccvcsececenecaut Appendix A-6

Avagliano v. Semi tano Shoji America,Inc 614F.

Supp.1397,1402 (SDNY 1985)....cccceee ;...--Appendix B.17

Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohil, 484 U.S. 343,350 (1988

th. teeerrrrTTrrTryT TTT. Appendix A MINER 3

Carrero v. New York City Housing Auth., 890 F.2d

569,581 (26 Cic 1989) .cccvcscoscesscsses Appendix B... 19

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)..AppendixB24

Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S. Ct.

(29GL co cccucsetseneeseaes 11.AppendixA.Miner 1-2 8,9,10,14

Second Circuit Decision Rationalize Costello..all

Fay v. South Colonie Central School District, 802

P.26 21,29 (24 Cie. 1966) -cccscceseses Appendix A...... 14

Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8,10 (2d .Cir.1996).Appx a.7

Khan v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group.526 F.Supp.1268

(B.D.B.F. ISL}. cccsecvecossccessuscen 14..Appendix B.;..17

Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi Trust Co of New York 152 A.D.

2d 169, 548 N.Y.S. 2d 513,521 (2d Dep't 1989)..Appx B..24

Hladki v. Jeffrey's Consol Ltd., 652 F. Supp. 388

392 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)..see .2,3,10 Appendix B............- 14

Hughes v. United States, 71 U.S. (4 wall.) 232,237 (1866),

365 U.S. at 286, 81 S. Ct. at 545.............-Appendix A..9

Criales v. American Airlines 93-CV-5340......not.,Printed????

Criales v. American Airlines 95-CV-1709 1995 WL 669900 *6

*6 E.D.N.Y. Nov 6,1995..2d. Cir.95-9170 Reversed & Remmand

at U.S.S.C. FOR Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorary.

Criales v. American Airlines ( 97-CV-0526;97-CV-1460)and

Supreme Court State of New York, County of Queens 1072/97

eocececesese coccc ccc cc ce ePONGING. ccccccccccccccccccccccccccs

vers Ss Pullman Co-,404 U.S. 522,527,92 S. Ct. 616, 619

1972).

€ :

Contents

Pages

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792,798

93 S. Ct.1817,1822 (1973)..... Appendix A.6

Appendix B.14,15...... 14-15

Nasser v. Isthm an Lines,331l F.2d 124,127 (2d Cir.1964).,

Ortiz. v. Cornetta, 867 F. 2d 146,149 (2d Cir.1989)

TUTE TETETTLTTTTTLILITTrriTittts Appendix B......24

Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251, 256-57 (2d Cir)

Cert. denied, 409U.S. 1077, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972).Appx A.10

Samuels v. Northenn Telecom Inc., 942 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.

ROO J cccccswccccesnessccecensewveseenes 29 Cir Appendix A-14

Saylor v. Lindsley,391l F.2d 965,967,969 (2d Cir.1968)apxA-9

Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520,524

€ (Sth Circ. 1960). ccccccccesscenstseusesese Appendix A..... ll

Twitty v. Smith , 614 F. 2d 325, 335 n. 16 (2d Cir. 1979)

Silver v. Mohasco Corp.,602 F. 2d 1083.1090 =(2d Cir 1979)

Woods v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1992)

woe cccccccccccccccc cee eco eceseeececs Appendix A....Miner...2

Yates v. Philip Morris Co., 690 F. Supp 180 , 184

CS.D.W.Y. 19BS) nccccccssesssesssnsue AppenGin B..cscccccnse 17

Zipes v. Trens World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 397,102

102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1982)..Appx A..13 Miner.2

Appx B..aleccccecs ecccesccce 21

Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji 481 U.S.

604,107 S. Ct 2022, 1987 .U.S............. WeTTTrreirer it

UNITED STATES RULES..........-.2--[**69]) & [**2387]

TG. at 3371-3372. Nlliscccccccccccecce escccscccoecos - 10-16

Contents

APPENODI X

Appendix A---Court of Appeals Decision Issue Jan.21,1997

---Denial of a 90 Day Stay Pending Petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

---Issue of the MANDATE May 13,1997

---BNA Employment Discrimination Report Pages

209-210. Court of Appeals Decision From other

Perspective

Appendix B--~-Plaintiffs Memorandum of Law in Response and

Opposition to Dismiss Based On Res Judicata

To the Easthern District of New York (ILG)

On September 13, 1995.

APPENDIX C---Memorandum and Order of Honorable I Leo Glasser

Granting a REMOVAL out State Court to the District

Court EDNY on February 12, 1997.

Appendix D---Front page of the United States District Court

Lawsuit ..Removed Now 97-CV-1460 (ILG) Since

January 15, 1997.

Appendix E---Memorandum of Law Submitted by Plaintiff

Respondent Criales on June ,1997 About the

Arbitration Desicion at the EDNY to Honorable

I Leo Glasser

Please Respondent Mauricio Criales is a Poor Person who at

the present time Can not affort any legal Professional and

Experience /Attorneys, Nevertheless I can Handle just fine

Pro se I read a lot as for the laws concern, I know my Rights

and Respecfully Request the Help of the United States

Supreme Court To Help me Prove My Claims., Since 1990 I Had

Collected Substantial Evidence to be WARRANT A TRIAL BY JURY

To be Schedule as Soon as Possible.

The Fact is American Airlines has Delay this Action ONLY SO

THEY CAN ABUSE THE “STATUE OF LIMITATIONS".THEY WILL NOT GET

AWAY., I LOVE THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA., I WILL NOT ALLOW

TO BE DISCRIMINATED BASED ON NEITHER MY RACE OR MY NATIONAL

ORIGIN.,OF HISPANIC ASCESTRY.

*****Additional Rules and Oppinions see., 9 Wright & Arthur

R.Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure. Civil 2d Sect.

2373, at 405 (1995)----and-- 18 Charles A. Wright et at

Federal Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction Sect. 4437,

Bt 347 (19G1) oo ccccccccccccccccccc cAPPONGAE AcocccceclO-l2

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Mauricio Criales respectfully submit the follo-

wing Brief In Opposition to Petition For Writ of

Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondent concur in part and dissents in part in

the procedural history of the case set forth on pages

8 thru 20 of the petition for Writ of Certiorari sub-

mitted by Petitioners American Airlines, Inc. The

Petitioner have neglected to inform the Court of many

i extremely important facts necessary for permitting the

Court to determine whether a Writ of Certiorari should

be granted in this case.

This action for damages caused by employment Harras-

ment,Racial Discrimination,disparate treatment,and Wrog-

ful Termination of Employment,based on racial background |

and ancestry in Violation of the Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1965,42 U.S.C. 198l,and 2000(e),et seq. As

amended by the Civil Rights Act of 199l,as well for Inten-

tional Infliction of Emotional Distress,and for Defamation

and Slander per se.

Petitioner American Airlines,Inc an AMR Corporation

Has Failed to inform this Court That the Only Reazon Why

I was Provided.,Finally with a timely Right to Sue by the

EEOC IN New York was Only because I Contacted Mr. Paul

7 RAMSHAW EEOC in Washington D.C. Since November of 1995,

and Demanded that they finally provide a timely Right to |

Sue for a Complaint Rendered to them only 45 Days after |

American Airlines Singled me out and fired me 4 days be-

fore Chritmas of 1991.

I was Getting Nowhere as far as the EEOC in New York

concerns, Because I used to call at least Once a Month

and they kept telling me that the case was transfered to

Long Island Office and that it was still Under Investigation.

Frustated and tired of Getting no where I have no

choice but to complaint again this time with the New York

State Division of Human Rights on September 25,1992 , exa-

ctly 250 days after American Final Termination. Of Dec20,1991

as clearly explained in the Court of Appeals Brief and

Response in OPPOSITION to American Airlines Brief,Pages 7,

8,15 and pages 30,31,35,38,39 of my response in opposition

to Brief for Defendant American Airlines I claimed that it

was the EEOC Who Prevented me for Going Forward in the

District Court and that I Had No control of the situation.

bacause the EEOC Complaint filed February 5, i992 ,45 days

after American Ended my Job , and the Second Complaint to

the NYSDHR ON September 25,1992 was 250 days after termi-

nation. **"The two Complaints meet the 300 day period as

required by 42 U.S.C./2000-5[**8] In New York State Law.

The untimely Right to Sue Issued by the EEOC 160 93 0816

Clearly can apply in Hladki .v. Jeffrey Consol 652f.Supp

388,1987 U.S.Dis.Lexis 317;42 Fair emp #(5),

"When a Plaintiff" has in some extraordinary way been

Prevented from asserting his rights timely. 2nd circuit

Respondents Brief & Answer Page 38. 95-9170 (Jan 21, 1997).

on this one particular reazon using RES JUDICATA Manifest

Unfairness , “It refused to extent the Doctrine to a situ-

ation where it was Innapplicable.

Contrary to petitioners American Airlines Argument that

I never Claimed justify equitable modification in Hladki.v.

Jeffreys Consol Ltd. It is simply NOT TRUE TO THE Contrary

it was part of the Plaintiff's Brief pages 7,8,48 and again

on Pages 36,37 of the Response in Opposition toBrief for

Defendant-Appelle American, Even more important is the Fact

that it was part of the Oral Argument On April 19,.996.

I Argued that Hladki ,reviewed the reasons that would

justify equitable modification of the statutory prere-

quisites to a Title VII action:

Let it be a fact,

Amicus Curai, The EEOC,Argue.......

that res judicata should NOT apply

to situations like the one presented

here, because application of the

doctrine would be inconsistent with

the Scheme of Title VII. While this

~ Court is commited to giving ful! ef-

fect to the title VII administrative

scheme Set up by Congress, The EEOC

Opinion that the language and Poli-

cy of Title VII "DO NOT" Undercut

the application of res Judicata,and

we see No reazon Militating against

application of well-settled claim

preclusion Principles.

Title VII Prohibits employers from Discriminating on the

basis of race,color,Religion,Sex or National Origin,42 U.S.C.

2000 e-2(a) throug (d) While giving an aggrieved employee

access to the Federal Courts.

Res Judicata has Never been broader than the Transaction

to which it related. "claim".,Using res-Judicata to diss-

miss a Title VII Lawsuit here Presented....will be improper,

This result will put Future Title VII Plaintiffs to the imper-

missible "Hobson's" choice of either Leaving their charges in

the administrative process, Hoping that in the meantime there

will be no adverse Judgment on other claims which will pre-

clude their Title VII Claims.

AMERICAN AIRLINES ,INC.,intentions to use the doctrine of

res-Judicata here Presented Totally Violates Title VII Policys.

Please view the Law priciples based on the fact that res-

judicate here in Criales is innaplicable.

in a context of res judicata .,has never been broader than

the transaction to which it related.

***A plaintiff might have as many claims as there were

theories of the substantive Law upon which he could

seek relief against the defendant. Thus, defeated

in an action based on one theory,the Plaintiff might

be able to maintain another action based on a different

theory, even though both actions were grounded upon

the Defendants identical act or Connected acts forming

a single-Life-situation.***

REAZONS FOR THE DENIAL OF WRIT OF CERTIARARI

Petitioner American Airlines,Inc, request of Writ of

Certiorari was made Frivolous,without merit, for Vexatious

and for Delay for a MANDATE finally issue May 13, 1997

by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, after ha-

ving Denied American Airlines request on April 30,1997

for a 90 Day Stay of the Issuance of Mandate Pending Pe-

tition for Writ of Certiorari, as clearly explained in a

Respondents Opposition for that request “American” can

Not be granted a Writ , based on Dishonesty and misrepre-

sentation of facts with this Court, based on EVIDENCE

Submitted that Petitioners have a SUPREME COURT STATE OF

NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS. 1072/97 and a UNITED STATES

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Lawsuits 97-CV-1460 Pending

that are related to the same Continues Racial behavior

against Plaintiff Pro se Respondent.

American Airlines, Inc., Themselves Admits that the

Supreme Court State of New York County of Queens Complaint

dated January 15,1997 is related to the same causes of

action, when they requested Judge I Leo Glasser to REMOVED

it out of State Court to the E.D.N.¥. on February 12,1997

see Appendix "C".

Even more Intersting is How Petitioner “American”

FAILED to inform the Supreme Court of the United States

the Fact that "American" attorney Edward Cerasia II,Esq.

Here on record, CAN NOT be a Counsel of record in good

Standing here because he is one of the primary Defendants

charged in the Supreme Court Complaint 1072/97. He is ac-

cuse of Wrongful Conduct, Violating Ethics Rules and Mal-

Practice.

Counsel Edward Cerasia II, Esq.,Malicious Prosecution

Tactics were also reported to the,

SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

FIRST DEPARTMENT

DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE

41 Madison Ave

New York, New York 10010 Case # 97.2523

Since June 1997.

It was Requested based on Evidence that His Law Practice

License to be Revoke and or Suspended for been so Vicious

and Dishonest also.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS "FBI" Illegally

arrested respondent Mauricio Criales June 10,1996, While

the Court of Appeals decision was Pending, on 95-9170.

Plaintiff Respondent was FALSELY ACCUSE by American

Airlines, Inc an AMR CORP., of the INFAMOUS LIES among

others of Displaying a Semi-Automatic Firearm at a busy

"American" La Guardia Airport Terminal sometime in May of 1996.

Plaintiff was Taken without any Warrants and was not

Encarcerated, Four Months Later the "FBI" Complaint was

Dismissed without Prejudice, because the Goverment find

Out that NO ONE PERSON can Display a Semi-Automatic Fire=

arm at a busy Airport Terminal and be Arrested 14 Days Later

after the alledge Act Occurred.???. American Airlines is

The Primary Defendant for such Vicious Bogus Fabricated |

Charges, Then, Failed to show up in Court to Prove it.

I Keep signing Extensions to give them the chance to find

causes for an Indictment,But thank to God the true Allways

Prevails., "FBI" Investigation showed The True., Respondent

Criales in Fact Does Not Own or ever carry any Handguns

of any Kind. I am like most of Japanese People who also

Don’t Believe in Guns. I don't even like to buy Toy guns

to any of my Children.

Edward Cerasia II Esq.,"Americas" Attorney on

Record here, is been charged with Malicious Prosecution,

Conspiracy to Defraud, among others charges for Vicious

Lies he told the "FBI" of Falsely making Threats to American

Airlines , Only Because Respondent Mauricio Criales, Born

in Santa Fe the Bogota-Colombia Expresed His Opinion and

Blame American Airlines of been Responsible of the DESTRUCTION

of the 757 Aircraft Fly 965 That Crashed in the Mountains

of Colombia December 20,1995.

I Claimed and Still do Today that 164 Inocent People who

were Miserably Killed ., Could have been SAVED,If “American”

were to follow the proper procedures.

Including the Fact that "American" Pilots FAILED to

Report their Position to Tulua's "VOR" to the Airtraffic

Controllers in Colombia, a city 4 minutes straight ahead to

Cali-Colombia Alfonso Bonilla Airport.

Instead the Pilot Error (Whos According with Colombian

Authorities was Intoxicated with high levels of alcohol)

Selected and Executed the wrong Command on the FMC Computer

"Flight Management Computer”. and that the Proyected

Route Line on the Electronic Map Display would have clearly

Showed a Sharp Turn to the Left or a gross Deviation as

the aircraft Turned 120 degrees EAST for 13 miles,Instead

Heading Straight ahead for 4 (Four) more minutes.,Yet the

approach Path and missed approach would have been VISIBLE

Straight ahead, If the Captain of fly 965 was using the MAP

But,apparently Not set to its 80 nautic miles or longer scale.

The crew had crossed over Tulua's "VOR" But Never

Reported to the air traffic Controllers in Colombia,as required

Instead they Fly over without even notice., I CLAIMED THAT

ONE PARTICULAR MISTAKE, IF CORRECTED WOULD IT HAD SAVED

EVERYONE., Including the Aircraft.

€ and..because Cockpit Conversations indicates the crew was

Confused about the Aircraft's Position and Failure to perceive

the "FMC" Iniciated Turn away from the intended routing Plan.

As Clearly Recorded the Pilot was more Interested

Talking about the Holiday Season.

In their Pilot Training American Airlines Crews are Trained |

but Not Require to ensure that "FMC" Commands "look Right"

before executing them.

Petitioner American Airlines, Inc., And AMR Corp.

had Respondent Arrested by the "FBI" only Because they Know

I was 100% Correct in my Claims; so, Fabricated the infamous,

Slanderous Claims of the so called Semi-Automatic Firegun

to Convense the "FBI" TO Arrested me June 10,1996. Monday

Morning as I was busy Working at my Place of Employment

as an FAA Part 145 Aircraft Accessories Repair Station

FAA Licensed Mechanic for Arkwin Industries Inc , In Westbury

é Long Island, New York. In Front of my Co-workers and entire

Staff, As if I was The "FBI MOST WANTED FUGITIVE CRIMINAL”

ENOUGH to be FIRED by arkwin Industries 4Days Later.after

Showing to work the next day of the Arrest based on......

As they Put it CONVENIENCE and SAFETY WORK ENVIRONMENT, as

the Verbal reazons for my Discharge.

American Airlines is Wrong, They got a Lot of Money ,so

They think they Own the Eastern District Court House,But You are

WRONG AMERICAN AIRLINES , No One is Above the Law in the

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, so Help us God !!!

As to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable

in a Civilized Society ., American Airlines and Edward Cerasia II

HAD FAILED to "SHOW CAUSE" on Five Different Requests At the

E.D.N.Y¥. (ILG) Since February 1997 Made by Respondent-Plaintiff

to get to the bottom and the true about the so called semi-

Automatic Firegun, because such Slanderous Claim in particular

has caused respondents Criales Huge Inplications and Damaged

& to His Reputation for Life.

ii ial a ice mre

Respondent Criales Unemployed Since Arkwin Industries

Fired me June 16,1996 to Today Surviving BELOW THE

POVERTY LEVEL in the United States.

The Supreme Court of the United States Most Not

Ignore The Imformation Provided here, to the Contrary

As explained to the Court of Appeals, Only after “American”

and the District Court Easthern District Solve all the

Matters Pertaining to the Supreme Court State Of New York

County of Queens Lawsuit, Removed and Approved by the

E.D.N.Y. (ILGlasser) on February 12,1997, Only then this

case can be Heard by a Higher Court.

Because Let it be a Fact that Defendant's Petitioner

Circulation of the alledged "False and Defamatory" Complaint

agains Plaintiff at the E.D.N.Y. on June 10,1996 Was not

Protected as Fair and true report OF judicial Proceedings

where it was alledged; without denial that action had been

brought SOLELY to ruin Plaintiff's reputation and that

circulation was intended to accomplish this improper purpose.

I. CRIALES II UNDER NO CIRCUNSTANCES CAN EVER

BE RES JUDICATA

Dismissing Criales II, or 95-CV-1709 based on res judi-

cata will be a great mistake ., based on a timely right to

sue Issued by the EEOC , Plaintiff Claims were Never been

considered on any of the merits of the substantive claims

brought in District Court Since 1993. Judge I Leo Glasser

Told me Himself that it was only up to the Jury to hear

the merits of any case. But Five Years Later I Have been

Prevented From having this case hear at a trial on the merits.

The District Court Easthern District of New York

Kept SILENCE about any Options that we May have in Criales I,

or 93-CV-5340 (ILG) E.D.N.Y. NOT UNTIL Honorable Glasser

9

€ Had Already Issued his Memorandum and Order Dated November

14,1994 We Learned that the were Options available to Us

to Either Dismissed without Prejudice or Request to Stay

Pending the issue of a timely right to sue by the EEOC

eeeee BY THEN IT WAS TOO LATE------

the final decision was Issued , Been Abandom by my

Lawyer to-Appeal alone pro se at the Court of Appeals or

94-9289. I am a Very Poor person who have not been able

to keep Counsel all during this two Lawsuits, Criales I was

an Action entered in District Court in FORMA PAUPERIS

On a Status Conference E.D.N.Y. Magistrate CHREIN Urged the

the need for me to find Counsel.

The case was Taken by a Young recently appointed Lawyer,

without having the financial means of Getting a more

Title VII Experienced Lawyer.

I was Abandon to Appeal alone at the Court of Appeals

€ In Criales I or 94-9289. Only after I Contacted Paul Ramshaw

EEOC in Washington D.C. and Complained in Writing in a Letter

Dated December 8,1995 Only Then was Issue a Timely right to

sue letter for a Complaint Made timely to the EEOC IN New York

only 45 Days after American Racial Discrimination Singled out

Discharge.

Having been Issue a Timely right to sue on January 31,1995 by

the ZEOC. I Presentered to the Court of Appeals While an

Oral Argument was Pending, I Contacted the same Counsel who

Advised me to Drop the Court of Appeals Argument date without

Prejudice. ...Requested...and Denied..

The Young Counsel Warned me that Unless I Drop the Oral

Argument in the Court Of Appeals ,He will not be able to

Represent me back in the District Court for the Second time.

In Light of that _I Argue with him that I wanted to Argue Pro se

He Told me that Wont be Necessary because we had on our posetion

the Timely Right to Sue Letter Honorable Glasser so Desperly

a Requested and that with it we'll had complied with the requirement. ]

God Knows .,How many times If was Giving the chance to

Argue I would it have blame the EEOC and the NYDHR for having

caused a 250 days Complaint to be Untimely., In Fact I Claimed

EEE:

10

see, Court of Appeals Plaintiff's Brief and Opposition that

Claimed I was entitled to Justify equitable Modification in

Hladki .v. Jeffreys Consol Ltd. 652 /F. Supp 388,392 (EDNY.1987)

and Claimed equitable consideration on the basis of (1) (3)

(5) (7) & (8) Hladki factors.

Once Honorable Judge I.Leo Glasser Dismissed the second Lawsuit

Criales II or 95-CV-1709 Based on res judicata , I was abandon

to Appeal alone for the second time., or 95-9170.

. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS TOTALLY CORRECT

TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENT WHICH DISMISSED CRIALES'S

TITLE VII CLAIMS ON RES JUDICATA GROUNDS AND TO

UNANIMOUSLY VACATED THE DISMISSAL OF TWO NEW YORK

STATE CLAIMS

The SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Ruled.,

"The Peculiarly damaging nature of

Employment discrimination is such,that

the individual, who is Frequently Forced

to face a large and powerful employer,

should [***69]

Be accorded every protection

that [**2387] the Law has in its purview;

and that the person Should not be forced

TO SEEK HIS REMEDY IN ONLY ONE PLACE"

Id;at 3371-3372.n11

Dismissing Respondent Mauricio Criales Tile VII Claims

Without Considering the Merits of this action will be a sin;

Petitioners American Airlines, Inc.,Intentions to use

the Doctrine of res judicata Violates Title VII policys.

"Title VII DO NOT Undercut the application of res

judicata, their is no reazon militating agains application

of well-settled claim Preclusion Principles,

American Airlines Use and abuse the Doctrine of res judicata

as a rule of Judicial Economy to avoid having to answer and

to defend itself on the merits as to the Substantive issues

raised by Criales I or 93-CV-5340 and Criales II 95-CVv-1709

and the two combined.

1l

The Second Circuit's decision was proper . and unique

based on a rather complex procedural history Contrary

to Costello .v. United States ,365 U.S. 265 (1961)

Rather the Court most view Plaintiffs Position and

Responsabilities at Work,That Makes it an entire dif-

ferent Issues. Contrary than Costello Please view this

National Security Issues, and Aircraft and Passenger Safety

Guide lines that has Costs the Lives of Thousands of Inocent

Passangers KILLED every year to most airliners. 73 % due

to Human Error.

aeeeeeeee Plaintiff Mauricio Criales is a Federal Aviation

Administration Aircraft Maintenance Technician,

Who for 13 Months employed at American Airlines

had Hundreds of Aircraft Inspected, Serviced,

Troubleshooted and repaired.

Who's Primary responsability was the safety of

Hundreds of Peoples Flying on those Aircraft

and the Airwhortiness and safety of those Aircraft

‘A Very Sensitive Position’

ENDURFD UNDER HEAVY Hostile work environment

conditions

EXTREMATELY DANGEROUS !!!S!!!8!!8!!!r!@rrrr!

SUPPICIENTLY SEVERE !!!2!22222828rrrerg:

HIGHLY PERVASIVE !!2!9!2!8!828errrrgrrgggsy

MOST CRIMINAL was American Airlines

Employees behavior Turns me

"The safety of Passengers was in Danger"

"The Aircraft Airworthtines was in Danger”

"the safety of the Aircraft was in Danger"

American Airlines Employees including Crew Chiefs and Supervisors

Worked Hard to Damaged my Credibility as a Knowledgeable Mechanic

but in the process the safety of the Airplane and People's Lives

were on my Hands, Not on the Hands of the Pilot who Flew that

airplane, but in the hands of the mechanic, who repaired,Trouble-

shooted,Inspected Service and Repaired that Particular airplane

during Overnight Maintenance.

-<--— That person was ME!

Title VII comes into play before the harrassing Conduct

Leads to a nervous breakdown. Conduct was so severe and Pervasive

that it created a work environment abusive that OFFENDS

Title VII BROAD RULE of Workplace equality.

12

Based on Evidence that we all had to live with .,in TWA 800,

The Valuejet trajedy in the Florida's Everglades, The American

Airlines Destruction of fly 965 December 20,1995 near Cali-

Colombia.,and thousands of close calls that never makes the

six o'clock news, Suffered by all the airlines of the World

" --NO EXCEPTIONS-- The FAA, Congress and the Supreme Court

need to MANDATE For the safety of the United States Airline

Aviation safety , to Issue an Order That who ever harrass,

discriminates,mistreates and Threats Aircraft Maintenance

Technicians , shall be Punish as any other Vicious Criminal

and be charge with a Criminal Indictment.

IIl. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S DECISION DO NOT CONFLICT

WITH ANY OTHER DECISIONS OF ANY OTHER COURT OF

APPEALS WERE THE SAFETY OF THE FLYING PUBLIC

IS IN DANGER,UNTIL LAWS ARE CHANGE TO BETTER

Protect AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS FROM

ANY SOURCE THAT CAN ENDANGER THE AIRCRAFT :

INCLUDING VICIOUS HUMANS

WHO ARE RACISTS

Respondent Tired of been mistreated at work and worry about the

safety of the Aircraft Complained for the third time to his im-

mediate Supervisor in September 10, 1991 and Threaten to call

the "PBI" or Port Authority Police To Investigate that my work

was been Sabotaged While I answer Daily Pranks in the Hangar's

Public Address System. My Ex-Supervisor Has Never Denied I made

Such Threats while Employed as an Aircraft Mechanic there.

Three (3) Months Later I was Fired for Life.

only because I was Doing my job properly by FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION MANDATES, AND STANDARDS.

So I got Punish for Believing in safety and Integrity., That is

Probably why The safety of Airtavel is in so much decline today.

Let it be a Pact for the /Record in this Supreme Court

that Respondent -Appellant ,Respondent Charged American Airlines

13

with Racketeering and Conspiracy to defraud Under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")

I CHARGED see Second Circuit's Brief That Defendants secretly

conspired to deprive me of my Constitutionally Protected

rights in their ~---Hostile work environment

---In Investigating and Failed to Prosecute

offenders

---Was defamed in a way that will interfere

with future Job Possibilities.

---their activities was Criminal ,Danger,Life

Threatening for the safe of the aircraft

and the public Flying on them.

("RICO") ---for all the Illegal activities carry on at Kennedy |

International Airport New York by ORGANIZED

Crime Known for Years, even by the common Citizen |

---American Airlines Cocaine Trafficking Worlwide

---Alterations on Aircraft LOG BOOKS : , A Clear

Federal Aviation Administration Violations

OF THE UNITED STATES OF NORTH AMERICA.

Plaintiff contends that his Complaint and motion papers

demostrate genuine issues of material fact warranting a trial

on the merits of two/1981 Claims: Criales 1981 Workplace

Harrassment with Hostile work environment based upon National

Origin and Wrongful Discharge from Employment based upon

National Origin Because the Disparate impact Due to Race that

May " Stand alone as a ground for relief”

When the work place is permeated with Discriminatory

Intimidation,ridicule, and insult 477. U.S. at 65 that is

*"Sufficiently Severe or Pervasive

to alter the conditions of the

victim's employment and create an

abusive working environment," at 67

TITLE VII IS VIOLATED!

Edward Cerasia II Attorney on Record Here Has Failed to

provide Plaintiff Criales with Valuable Documents requested

On a Discovery Request rule 26 on 93-CV-5340 dated back to June 28,

1994 ,Three Years Later On June 23, 1997 was Resubmitted

When the Second Circuit Remanded to the Easthern District Court

the Decision Reversed and Vacated.

I Charge that American

Continues Manipulating the Law and that such action has to

14

* Has to Stop , They are Provided and Ordered by Civil Procedures

and Rules by rule 26 and 34 to provide the Discovery requested

for three Years Now.

As for the Race Issue That I claimed in My Original EEOC

Timely Complaint was Titled Wrong by the EEOC . I Claimed

National Origin Based On Racial Hate for been of Hispanic

ancestry. On Nazir Kahn .v. Pepsi cola Bottling group

526.F Supp.1268,27 fair Empl.Prac cas (BNA) 770;28 Empl.Prac

(CCH) P 32,499 No. 81C1998 was a Highly Favorable Decision Against

Seyfarth,Shaw,Pairweather & Geraldson, New York city Dec 2, 1981

This case represented by the same law Firm that American Airlines

maintains in this action,

The Defendant moves to dismissed the

Title VII Claim account of race only because Plaintiff EEOC

Charge , did not allege discrimination on account of race.

Khan will not be penalized because the EEOC Misplaced his

= Title VII Charge.

Note how Defendant's Seyfarth,Shaw, Fairwheather

& Geraldson Motion to Dismiss is DENIED in all respects.

I Support the Post-November 1991 Conduct to the

unfair, Illegal Arbitration on March 12, 1992 Until still

Today . Please Most see Respondent Appendix E THAT

Contrary to Amrican Airlines Arguments in their Petition for

Writ of Certiorari is Lying When they Claimed that I only

attacked the Arbitration Board's Non-neutrality It is a lie,

it is not True. Please see the Memorandum of Law Provided

to the District Court Easthern District of New York June 4.Here

in Appendix "E" Were it Clearly States.

IV. "THE ARBITRATION DECISION THAT I WAS SUBJECTED

BY AMERICAN AIRLINES TO TERMINATE MY EMPLOYMENT

MOST BE OVERTURN ON GROUNDS THAT IT WARRANT A

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT IN DISTRICT COURT

NOW REAFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT ON 95-9170

bee This Document in Appendix "E" Clearly Demostrates American

Tactics of Dishonesty by Misrepresenting Facts.

}

On Appeal at the second Circuit Please Notice that Honorable

Judge Miner Concurs in Part and Dissents in Part by Separate

Opinion Nevertheless.,ALL THREE CIRCUIT JUDGES UNANIMOUSLY

agreed that the New York State Violations by American Airlines

are actionables and were REVIVED as Judge Miner Put it

\

in his own words

"Criales May bring his State Claims in

State Court if he chooses to do so.”

ON Appeal Respondent Criales Attacked time after time |

The Arbitration Decision, See Plaintiff Brief Pages 44,45

|

MY STORY WAS THE SAME AT THE ARBITRATION

AS IT IS HERE NOW ; ALSO SEE

MEMORANDUM OF LAW TO THE E.D.N.Y.

HERE ON APPENDIX "E”" 95-CV-1709

The Judicial review of Arbitation awards CHAPTER XXV

IV. BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW

UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

Robert A Gorman

* Professor of law *

University of Pennsylvania

American Casebook Series,Hornbook Series and

Legal Texts Nutshell Series of West Publishing

Company st Paul, Minnesota 55165

Section 1 Backgroud: General Standard of Judicial review

An arbitrator is confined to interpretation and

application of the Collective bargaining agree-

ment; He does not sit to dispense his own brand

of Industrial Justice. When the arbitrator's

words manifest an infidelity to his obligation,

Courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement

of the award.

Section 2 Lack of Arbitral Jurisdiction

In short, it is the task of the Court in an ac-

tion to confirm or to set aside an arbitrator's

award to determine wheter the arbitrator has re-

solve the grievance by considering the proper

sources, the contract and those circunstances out

of which cames the "Common Law of the Shop"

16

Section 5 Violation of Law or Public Policy

On occasions, a Court will Vacate and award

because of Unfair and Prejudicial exclusion

or admission of evidence. Plaintiff Respondent

Demanded that other Mechanics Expence Reports

be also Investigated--not so-- Criales was the

Only one nationwide. Singled out...Only as a

Pretextual excuse to terminate My Employment

They been out for Months. My Supervisor was

Tired of My Complaints , Only made in effords

TO Stop the Daily Constand Harrasement against

me, and YES, YES, YES I Risked Complaining for

The Safety Sensitive Maintenance Tasks Performed,

To Protect My Work and the Safety of the Airplane

That I was Assigned to work on. SAFETY FIRST.

A Court will also Vacate an arbitral award

which requires conduct in Violation of State Law,

Which are the Third and Fourth Causes of Ac-

tion Included in all Complaints In District

Court and the Second Circuit and=now the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

the parties agreement BUT on Extrinsic

Statutory Policy exceeds his Powers and

render his award subject to Judicial attack.

& The Arbitrator who base his decision not on

The Supreme Court Rules[**69) and [**2387] Id.at 3371-3372.nll

and [**22] [**13] yag vioLaTeD at THE EASTERN DISTRICT

OF NEW YORK SINCE 1993.

I did not get Such Treatment and or Protection on Either

93-CV-5340 or 95-CV-1709 E.D.N.Y¥. Brooklyn, New York.

The mistake I made While Employed at American Airlines

Hangar 10 JFK Int'l Airport on How to charge for Dry

Cleaning Incurred IT IS SO MICROSCOPIC Compare to the

Huge Violations that I was Victimized for 13 months

Including been subjected to Threats NOT TO COMPLAINT

by my own Supervisor.

17

I Have been Accuse by American Airlines Inc ,an AMR CORP.

of been a thief, Because of the Dry Cleaning receipts

SUT. oc cseeccces As clearly explained in the District Court

and the Court of Appeals Briefs and papers.,Including rule

26 and 34 Discovery Request is one Huge Fact that most not

be here be Ignored:

*** AMERICAN AIRLINES INC. NEVER PAY ME

FOR TWO WEEKS VACATION PAY ACRUED

DURING THE 13 MONTHS OF SERVICE TO

THEM AS A FAA AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE

TECHNICIAN. Including the -interest***

I Lost my job for a tiny mistake for the first time,

WHAT SHALL IT BE American Airlines Punishment be for

Theirs????2?2??

Because before they terminate my Employment for a First

time Error they have Several Options of Disciplinary po-

licies that Many other American Employees experienced, Who

today still work for the Airline, Including All the Individuals

Who Inflicted Permanent Damaged and who Discriminated me for

Months. the options given to other Non Hispanics at "American"

are ----Oral/Written Warnings

----Demotions

----Suspension and return to work

Criales was Never Given any of this Options.

BIAS AND PREJUDICE 100%

RACiSTS AND VICIOUS 100%

Plaintiff,Apellant,Respondent Criales Never Had a Day

in Court at the Eastern District of New York,Federal Court

against Hundreds of Violations Suffered at the Hands of

American Airlines Inc.

18

As to be regarded as atrocious

and utterly intolerable in

A CIVILIZED SOCIETY

CONCLUSION

I HAVE NOT INCLUDE THE MERITS OF THE CASE HERE, IF I DO THAT

THIS OPPOSITION BRIEF WILL BE HUNDREDS OF PAGES LONG, AMERICAN

AIRLINES KNOWS WHAT I AM SAYING IS TRUE BEEN THE PRIMARY

REAZONS FOR FIGHTING TO STAY AWAY FROM A TRIAL BY JURY, THEY

DO NOT WANT THE WORLD TO KNOW WHO THE REALLY ARE.

Please, I Respecfully request that the Decision of the

Court of Appeals be AFFIRMED for Justice and the true, by

Denying Petitioner's Petition for Writ.

The Second Circuit Issue a Mandate May 13,1997 and Remmanded

The Case to the District Court E.D.N.Y.

A Discovery Stage is Under way and all Discovery was Extended

to January 8, 1998. Although still today American has Failed

to Provide any Discovery Requested that by Federal Civil

Procedures they have to provide. A TRIAL BY JURY MOST BE

___PRESERVED___

Please, I further Respecfully request that the Supreme Court

Issue an Order to have this action Reassign by Lot

at the Unites States District Court Eastern District of New York

based on most Court of Appeals Rules, Example Rule 36 7th Circuit

on Reassigment of Remmanded Cases , Orders ,that whenever a

case tried in a District Court is remanded by this Court for

a new trial it shall be Reassigned by the District Court for

Trial before a Judge Other than the Judge who heard the prior

Trial, This rule shall apply on remand.

19

The Fact of the matter is Plaintiff, Respondent Already

Requested Orally and Later In Writting to Request Honorable

Judge I Leo Glasser to "Recuse” Himself and to Have this

case Reassigned by Lot But Honorable Glasser refused on

a Memorandum and Order Signed by Him July 1, 1997.

The Problem with that is this.,

Honorable Glasser Dismissed Not l. But 2. Federal

Lawsuits. He Never Took any Jurisdiction to Any New York

State Claims and Yet Removed From State Court an Action

Entered since January 15,1997. Removed to the E.D.N.Y. Why?

Supreme Court State Of New York County of Queens Judge LEVINE

was Already Assigned to the 1072/97 Action. Right now the

Complaint id DEAD in the District Court, Were I Requestedd

American Airlines and Edward Cerasia II Esq. To “SHOW CAUSE”

Of the Infamous Slanderous Lies Of Displaying a Semi Automatic

a Firegun at a Busy New York American Airlines Terminal. |

THEY FAILED TO SHOW CAUSED and Warned me He will not

Considered any other Requests ,because I Most follow the

Proper procedures, and that is fine .,The Problem with that

is that Has Prevented Plaintiff the Chance to Prove I was

Defamed and I am Still been Prevented from Working=

JUSTICE PLEASE, I HAVE A LARGE FAMILY TO SUPPORT

A WIFE AND FOUR CHILDREN AGES 11/2, 6,8,10, THEY

ARE NO BABIES ANY MORE AND DO NOT UNDERSTAND WHY

I AM BEEN ACCUSE OF CARRYING A GUN THEY NEVER SAW

AND WHY DADDY WHO'S AN Airplane Mechanic IS NOT

WORKING AND OR PREVENTED FROM WORKING In an Era

Were Aircraft Mechanic are in so Much Demand Now than ever

Before . Printed and Let It be for the Record that Mauricio

Criales SAFETY RECORD IN AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE IS IMPRESIVE

ONE OF A KIND-CLEAN- With a Training Record Full of Safety

AWARDS. Thanks to God I Never Been Injury on the Job, I Never

-) Been off Work For any Injury Suffered in the Job-,Thanks to GOD.

As for all the Bad things Poeple Talked About Colombians |

I can Tell you all,That the entire CRIALES FPAMILY IS THE BEST

EVER LEFT COLOMBIA. We all are Honest and Hard Working.,

Decent and Educated People.

a a aa ari it

20

I WILL SEEK JUSTICE I WILL NOT ALLOW PEOPLE TO

INSULT ME AND PAMILY. WHEN THEY SLANDERED MOMS

NAME ON THE WALLSAND BATROOMS AND LACKER ROOMS

OF AMERICAN AIRLINES., HANGAR 10 at JFK AIRPORT.

IN NEW YORK. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

a ST

| on mole, B-II-47

Respectfully submitted,

MAURICIO CRIALES

UNITED STATES CITIZEN

37-57 61 st lst Floor

WOODSIDE, New York 11377

Beeper (917) 419-1272

Respondent ,Apellant,Plaintiff

may God Bless the United States of

America

APPENDIX = *

INITED STATES COURT OF APPE’’S

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE

40 FOLEY SQUARE

ee NEW YORK 10007

GEORGE LANGE lil

CLERK

At a Stated Term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second

Circuit, held at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, in the City of

New York, on the 21st day of January, one thousand nine hundred and

ninety-seven.

PRESENT: HON. Roger J. Miner

HON. Joseph M. McLaughlin

HON. Pierre N. Leval

Circuit Judges

Docket No: 95-9170

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from United States District Court for the Eastern District

of New York.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from

the Eastern District of New York and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the judgment of said district court

be and it hereby is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded

to the said district court for further proceedings in accordance

with the opinion of this court.

For the Court

GEORGE LANGE III, Clerk

y,

Administrative Attorney

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE

40 FOLEY SQUARE

NEW YORK 10007

B....: LANGE Il!

CLERK

NOTICE

Local Rule effective July 1, 1992

0.40 Petitions for Rehearing

Each petition for rehearing shall include a copy of the opinion or

summary order to which the petition relates.

If a petition for rehearing be found to be wholly without merit,

vexatious and for delay, the court may tax a sum not exceeding $250

against petitioner in favor of his adversary, to be collected with

the costs in the case.

July 1, 1992

rehrg_frm

WNe

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

fe. i386 qj 4 snenne August Term, 1995

fee epee

(Argued: April 19, 1996 Decided: ya ae — )

Docket No. 95-9170 a:

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Vv.

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: Miner, McLaughlin, and Leval, uit J es.

Pro se plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the United

States District Court for the Eastern District of New York

(Glasser, J.) dismissing his discrimination complaint primarily

on res judicata grounds.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded.

Judge Miner concurs in part and dissents in part by separate

opinion.

MAURICIO CRIALES, Pro Se, Woodside,

N.Y., for Plaintiff-Appellant.

EDWARD CERASIA II, New York, N.Y.,

(Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &

Geraldson, New York, N.Y., Of

Counsel), for Defendant-Appellee.

LEVAL, Circuit Judge:

Mauricio Criales, appearing pro se, appeals from a judgment

of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

New York (I. Leo Glasser, Senior Judge), dismissing his

complaint. The complaint alleges in part that Criales's employer

American Airlines, Inc. ("AA"), discriminated against him by

reason of his Hispanic origin in viclation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e

et _ seq. (codifying Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).

The district court dismissed the complaint for a number of

reasons including that the Title VII claims were barred by res

judicata because of the Jrevious dismissal of similar claims. In

the unusual circumstances of this case, we conclude that the

Title VII claims were not barred by res judicata.

We therefore reverse that portion of the judgment which

dismissed Criales's Title VII claims on res judicata grounds.

ac °

This case has a rather complex procedural history, which we

explain here in some detail because it is crucial to our

decision.

Criales is an American citizen who was born in the Republic

of Colombia and is Hispanic. In November 1990, he was hired by

AA to work as an airline mechanic at John F. Kennedy

International Airport. The complaint alleges that his co-workers

harassed and ridiculed him because of his Latino origin, and that

AA officials condoned this harassment.

On December 7, 1991, AA suspended Criales while it

investigated an allegation that he had filed a false expense

report relating to his attendance at a training course in

Chicago. Criales maintains that, at the hearing on his alleged

misconduct, he tried unsuccessfully to assert his allegations of

discriminatory harassment. Criales was terminated on December

20, 1991. On March 12, 1992, he and his union contested the

termination before an arbitration panel, which upheld the

dismissal.

Without the aid of counsel, Criales filed two administrative

charges against AA alleging discrimination because of his

national origin. The first charge, dated February 5, 1992, was

filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")

within the time allowed by Title VII. The EEOC transferred this

charge for processing to the New York State Division of Human

Rights ("NYSDHR"). After a number of months with no reaponee,

Criales filed a second similar charge, dated December 3, 1992,

this time with the New York City Commission on Human Rights

("NYCCHR"); it was transferred for processing to the EEOC. The

second charge was not filed within the time allowed by Title VII.

These two charges each alleged discrimination on the basis of

national origin, and were based substantially on the same

allegedly discriminatory conduct. Compare Brief of Appellant,

Exhibit B, with id., Exhibit C. The EEOC dismissed the December

1992 charge because it was not timely filed, and issued a right-

to-sue notice in connection with that charge on October 26, 1993.

On November 18, 1993, after receiving the right-to-sue

notice based on the untimely December 1992 charge (but before

receiving a right-to-sue notice on his timely charge), Criales

filed a pro se complaint in the district court. Criales then

retained counsel and amended his complaint in several respects,

adding claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and pendent state law

Claims of defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress. AA moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state

a claim. The district court granted the motion, ruling that

Criales's Title VII claims must be dismissed because the

underlying administrative charge (the one filed in December 1992)

was not timely filed. Criales v. American Airlines, Inc., 93

Civ. 5340 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 1994) ("Criales I"). The other

Claims were dismissed for various reasons that are not of

Significance to this opinion. On December 1, 1994, Criales, no

longer represented by counsel, filed a pro _se notice of appeal |

with this court.

Meanwhile, his first charge was making its way through the

administrative process. As noted above, this timely charge had

been referred by the EEOC for initial processing to the NYSDHR.

On August 29, 1994, recognizing that Criales's complaint stemming

from the second charge was being litigated in district court, the

NYSDHR dismissed the timely charge for "administrative

convenience" on the rationale that the litigation of the second

charge in the district court would resolve all the issues raised

in the first charge. On January 31, 1995, while his appeal was

pending, Criales received a right-to-sue notice on the timely

charge.

Apparently seeking to inform this court that he could now

proceed on the timely charge, Criales attempted to append his

right-to-sue notice on the timely charge to his appellate brief.

AA moved to strike the right-to-sue notice from Criales's brief

on the grounds that it had not been in the record below. Criales

then moved to withdraw his appeal without prejudice so that he

could, as he put it in his motion papers, "seék judicial remedy

in the Eastern District of New York on the basis of a newly

issued, timely 'Right to Sue' letter by the EEOC." AA opposed

the motion, and it was denied by this court on May 26, 1995, in

an order stating that Criales would be permitted to withdraw his

appeal with prejudice. On August 8, 1995, this court granted

Criales's pro se motion to withdraw his appeal with prejudice.'

Criales (represented again by counsel) then filed a new

complaint in the district court based on the new right-to-sue

notice granted on the first, timely charge. AA moved to dismiss

the complaint. The district court granted the motion, ruling

that Criales's claims of discrimination under Title VII were

barred by res judicata. Criales v. American Airlines, Inc., 95

Civ. 1709, 1995 WL 669900 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 1995) ("Criales II").

The other federal claims were dismissed on various grounds, and

‘Although Criales filed this motion pro _ se, he indicated at

oral argument that he did so after receiving informal advice from

his former attorney.

1 the state claims were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, by

2 reason of the absence of a valid federal claim to which they

3 could be appended.

4 This appeal followed.

5 II. Discussion

6 The primary question raised by this appeal is as follows:

7 Where a plaintiff filed two administrative charges alleging

8 illegal discrimination under Title VII -- one timely, the other

9 untimely -- and instituted suit upon the agency's delivery of a

10 right-to-sue notice on the untimely charge, which suit was then

11 dismissed by reason of the untimeliness of that charge, does that

D. dismissal operate as an adjudication on the merits, barring the

13 plaintiff from proceeding upon the timely charge? The district

14 court believed it did. We disagree.

15 The prerequisites for a suit under Title VII include a

16 timely filed administrative charge and timely institution of the

17 suit after receipt of a right-to-sue notice. See 42 U.S.C. §

18 2000e-5(e) (1) (timely charge) & (f) (1) (right-to-sue notice) ;

19 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47, 94 S. Ct. 1011,

20 10319 (1974): McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798,

21 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1822 (1973). Criales complied with both

22 requirements. The only reason for the dismissal was that he had

23 previously filed a suit, based on an untimely administrative

> charge, which suit was dismissed because of the untimeliness of

25 the charge. Although the district court viewed the problem as

eo one of untimeliness, it is more appropriately seen as one of

2 prematurity. Had Criales waited to file his suit until receipt

3 of the right-to-sue notice on the timely charge, there would have

4 been no defect. The superfluous untimely administrative charge

$ would have been irrelevant to Criales's right to proceed on his

6 timely charge. His problem was that he filed the initial

7 complaint without waiting for the issuance of the right-to-sue

8 notice based on his timely charge.

9 Like any other dismissal for failure to exhaust

10 administrative remedies, a dismissal of a TitYe VII action by

11 reason of a plaintiff's failure to wait for a right-to-sue notice

12 is not a bar to instituting the suit after the notice is

13 delivered. See, e.g., Johnson v. Nyack Hosp., 86 F.3d 8, 10 (2d

~ Cir. 1996) (noting district court's dismissal without prejudice

15 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see also Twitty

16 v. Smith, 614 F.2d 325, 335 n.16 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissal for

17 failure to exhaust state remedies is without prejudice). There

18 is no reason why the result should be different here merely

19 because plaintiff had filed a second administrative charge that

20 was superfluous and untimely.

21 The district court believed the bar to suit was mandated by

22 the terms of Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

23 which provides

24 Unless the court in its order for dismissal

25 otherwise specifies, ... any dismissal

26 - « «, Other than a dismissal for lack of

27 jurisdiction, [or for other specified reasons

8 not here pertinent) operates as an adjudication

e on the merits.

The district court noted that courts have found the

administrative time limits of Title VII to be subject to

equitable tolling and estoppel and have thus considered them to

be "not jurisdictional." Criales II, 1995 WL 669900, at *6. The

court thus concluded that the dismissal for untimeliness of the

charge was not within the "lack of jurisdiction" exception of

Rule 41(b), and that it operated as an adjudication on the

merits.

The teachings of the Supreme Court in Costello v. United

States, 365 U.S. 265, 81 S. Ct. 534 (1961), r@quire a different

analysis and result. The Court there considered whether a

district court's dismissal of a denaturalization action, because

of the government's failure to file an affidavit of good cause,

barred the government from filing a new complaint with the proper

affidavit. The district court had not designated the dismissal

as jurisdictional, nor had it stated whether the dismissal was

with or without prejudice. 365 U.S. at 268, 81 S.Ct. at 536.

The Court ruled that, despite the district court's silence on the

question, the dismissal was jurisdictional within the meaning

intended by Rule 41(b), and thus without prejudice. 365 U.S. at

285; 81S. Ct. at 544. The Court noted that the term "lack of

jurisdiction" as used in Rule 41(b) was a term of art, 365 U.S.

at 287, 81 S. Ct. at 546, encompassing failure to comply with

statutory prerequisites, 365 U.S. at 285, 81 S.Ct. at 545.

Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan referred to the exception

in Rule 41(b) for certain enumerated dismissals that are without

re) @ ..

10

11

12

prejudice, and explained:

We regard the exception as encompassing those

dismissals which are based on a plaintiff's

failure to comply with a precondition

requisite to the Court's going forward to

determine the merits of his substantive

clain.

365 U.S. at 285, 81 S.Ct. at 545. The origins of this exception,

according to Justice Brennan, were in the common law rule that

"dismissal on a ground not going to the merits was not ordinarily

a bar to a subsequent action on the same claim." Id. Justice

Brennan noted that this principle had been applied at common law

in many cases involving motions to dismiss by a defendant, and

that Rule 41(b) did not alter this rule. He quoted Hughes v.

United States, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 232, 237 (1866), accordingly:

"If the first suit was dismissed for defect of pleadings, or

parties, or a misconception of the form of proceeding, or the

want of jurisdiction, or was disposed of on any ground which did

not go to the merits of the action, the judgment rendered will

prove no bar to another suit." 365 U.S. at 286, 81 S.Ct. at 545.

Shortly thereafter, we interpreted Costello to mean that

the preclusive effect afforded dismissals by

Rule 41(b) was intended to apply only to

those situations in which a defendant must

incur the inconvenience of preparing to meet

the merits of the plaintiff's claims because

there is no initial bar to the court's

reaching the merits as there would be, for

illustrative purposes, if there were a defect

in pleadings or parties.

Nasser v. Isthmian Lines, 331 F.2d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 1964); see

also Saylor v. Lindsley, 391 F.2d 965, 967, 969 (2d Cir. 1968)

(in light of Costello, dismissal of derivative suit for failure

9

to post bond, despite being labeled "with prejudice," did not bar

subsequent suit by another stockholder because defendants were

not required to prepare defense and court did not reach merits of

plaintiff's substantive claim); Papilsky v. Berndt, 466 F.2d 251,

256-57 (2d Cir.) (similar), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1077, 93 S.Ct.

689 (1972); 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2373, at 405 (1995) ("[{C]jourts

have recognized that Rule 41(b) does not apply in situations in

which a case is dismissed because of some initial bar to reaching

the merits of the plaintiff's claims ... ."f; 18 Charles A.

Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, Jurisdiction §

4437, at 347 (1981) ("In ordinary circumstances a second action

on the same claim is not precluded by dismissal of a first action

for prematurity or failure to satisfy a precondition to suit.").

Like the government's failure to file an affidavit of good

cause in Costello, Criales's filing of a complaint based on an

untimely underlying administrative charge, where he also had

filed a timely charge upon which he had not yet received his

right-to-sue notice, "simply constituted non-fulfillment of a

prerequisite to the initiation of the proceedings." Weston

Funding Corp. v. Lafavette Towers, Inc., 550 F.2d 710, 713 (2d

Cir. 1977) (interpreting Costello). AA had not been "put to the

necessity of preparing a defense." Costello, 365 U.S. at 287, 81

S. Ct. at 546. Plaintiff had not yet fulfilled a statutory

prerequisite to suit, but remained capable of fulfilling it. His

suit was premature.

10

The district court's initial characterization of the first

dismissal as being due to Criales's failure to satisfy a

“statutory prerequisite[]" was entirely correct. Criales I, slip

op. at 7, 8. The court described the dismissal in similar terms

when it dismissed the Title VII claims in Criales's second

complaint on res judicata grounds, stating that the first

dismissal had been “predicated on a lack of a statutory

prerequisite... .'" Crjiales JI, 1995 WL 669900, at *6. The

court went on, however, to conclude that a dismissal predicated

on lack of a statutory prerequisite was not bdsed on a "lack of

jurisdiction." Id.

In light of Costello, Nasser, and similar decisions, the

district court was drawing a distinction where one should not

have been drawn. cCriales simply had failed to comply "with a

precondition requisite to the Court's going forward to determine

the merits of his substantive claim." Costello, 365 U.S. at 285,

81S. Ct. at 545. Because he remained capable of complying with

that precondition by instituting his suit after receipt of the

right-to-sue notice on the timely charge, the dismissal of the

first complaint should not have been found to operate as an

adjudication upon the merits and as a bar to the subsequent

complaint filed after the precondition had been satisfied. It

was a dismissal "for lack of jurisdiction" within the special

meaning of that term in Rule 41(b), as explained in Costello.

See Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hosp., 614 F.2d 520, 524 (5th

Cir. 1980) ("Because a dismissal for failure to meet a condition

11

1 for filing suit does not operate as an adjudication upon the

D: merits, it cannot bar a subsequent suit between the

3 parties.") (internal quotations omitted).

4 We recognize that the district court's dismissal of

5 Criales's complaint arising from his untimely charge was styled

6 as a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6)

7 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that dismissals

8 under Rule 12(b)(6) are generally considered judgments on the

9 merits, unless the court specifies otherwise. See Federated

10 Dep't Stores, Inc., v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3, 101 S.Ct.

11 2424, 2428 n.3 (1981).

12 Nonetheless, we would not permit the choice of labels to

13 distort substance, especially where the consequence would be so

14 drastic as to deprive a party of the opportunity to be heard.

D. Regardless whether characterized as a failure to plead the

16 necessary elements of his cause of action, or as failure to

17 comply with all the statutory prerequisites, the reason for the

18 first dismissal was that plaintiff had not waited until receipt

19 of the right-to-sue notice on his timely administrative charce.

20 To consider it an adjudication on the merits of his

21 discrimination complaint is a distortion.

22 Furthermore, some authorities hold that a Rule 12(b) (6)

23 dismissal "will not bar a second action if new facts have come

24 into existence or have been alleged for the first time and it was

25 the absence of these facts that made the first complaint

26 defective." 9 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal

p |

12

Practice and Procedure, Civil 2d § 2373, at 408 (1995) (citing

cases). Here, the pertinent new fact was that Criales's second

complaint was based on the EEOC's delivery of a right-to-sue

notice upon Criales's timely charge.

The district court also noted that Criales had procedural

means at his disposal either to compel the issuance of a right-

to-sue notice on his timely complaint prior to the dismissal of

his first action, or to convince the court to stay, rather than

dismiss, the first action while awaiting the issuance of the

right-to-sue notice on the timely charge. These observations

were all true but, in our view, irrelevant to whether the

dismissal of the initial action should have been considered an

adjudication on the merits.* If anything, by stressing the

simple procedural devices by which Criales might have avoided the

drastic ruling, the district court's observations underscore the

inappropriateness of denying him the opportunity to have his

claim adjudicated- Cf. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455

U.S. 385, 397, 102 S. Ct. 1127, 1134 (1982) ("a technical reading

(of Title VII] would be 'particularly inappropriate in a

statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,

initiate the process'") (quoting Love v. Pullman Caq., 404 U.S.

522, 527, 92 S. Ct. 616, 619 (1972)).

2No contrary inference may be drawn from this court's denial

of Criales's motion to withdraw his first appeal without prejudice.

The prejudice in question related to the appeal of the first

action. There was no suggestion that Criales's voluntary dismissal

of the appeal should bar him from proceeding to file suit upon his

timely charge, which is what he had told this court he intended to

do.

13

i We noted in Fay v. South Colonie Central School District,

e 802 F.2d 21, 29 (2d Cir. 1986), that "{ijn properly seeking to

3 deny a litigant two 'days in court’, courts must be careful not

4 to deprive him of one." (quotation marks and citation omitted).

5 Because plaintiff never had a day in court on his Title VII

6 Claims, and because his initial suit was dismissed by reason of a

7 curable defect -- his failure to satisfy a statutory prerequisite

8 -- we reverse the part of the judgment which held that res

21 unless it is a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction (as well as other

22 specified exclusions). As explained above, Costello makes clear

23 that a dismissal in these circumstances (for failure to comply with

24 a statutory prerequisite to suit) operates as a dismissal for "lack

25 of jurisdiction." Unlike the dismissal in Samuels, such a

26 dismissal was not on the merits. Indeed, the judge did not say the

27 dismissal was with prejudice. After the involuntary dismissal of

28 his first action by reason of his failure to comply with the

29 statutory prerequisite, Criales was free to file his second

30 complaint without preclusion.

9 judicata barred those claims.?

10 sSamuels_v. Northern Telecom Inc., 942 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.

11 1991), does not require a different result. In that case, the

12 plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his first action "with prejudice"

13 and his stipulation to this effect was so ordered by the court.

14 Under Rule 41(a) such a dismissal so ordered with prejudice acts as

15 an adjudication on the merits.

e In contrast, the dismissal of Criales's complaint did not

7 arise under Rule 41(a); rather, it was an jnvoluntary dismissal

18 under Rule 41(b), imposed because of Criales's failure to wait for

19 the right to sue letter on his first administrative complaint. By

20 the terms of Rule 41(b), an involuntary dismissal is on the merits

i

'

31 The dismissal “with prejudice" of Criales's appeal in his

32 first action did not convert the prior dismissal of that action

33 from one for lack of jurisdiction to one on the merits. The

34 judgment of the district court remained what it was -- a dismissal

35 for lack of jurisdiction without preclusive effect. It could not

36 be changed by the taking or dropping of an appeal. Thus, when

37 Criales voluntarily dismissed his appea] from the first action with

38 prejudice, that terminated the first action. It did not transform

39 the dismissal from one for lack of jurisdiction to one on the |

40 merits. |

e 14

1 We find no error in the district court's dismissal of the

remaining federal claims. As to the pendent state claims,

3 however, the district court dismissed these for lack of subject

4 matter jurisdiction because there was no federal claim to which

5 they could be appended. Our direction that Title VII claims be

6 reinstituted nullifies the rationale for that ruling. The

7 dismissal of the state claims is therefore also vacated.

8 III. Conclusion

9 The portions of the judgment dismissing plaintiff's Title

10 VII claims on grounds of res judicata and dismissing pendent

11 state claims are vacated. The dismissal of the remaining federal

12 Claims is affirmed. The action is remanded for further

@ proceedings.

Criales v. Americ: Airlines, Inc., 95-9170

MINER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

Because I agree with the district court that Criales’ Title

VII claims are barred by res judicata, I respectfully dissent

from so much of the majority opinion as vacates the judgment

dismissing the Title VII claims and pendent state claims. I

concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it dismisses

the remaining federal claims.

The prior action brought by Criales was dismissed as to the

Title VII claims for untimely filing of his second employment

discrimination complaint with the EEOC. The majority opinion

acknowledges that the dismissal of the Title VII portion of the

complaint in that action was grounded in Criales’ failure to

state a Title VII claim, Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and that such

a dismissal generally is considered a judgment on the merits.

See Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 399 n.3

(1981).

My colleagues nevertheless see the dismissal of the prior

action as being for lack of jurisdiction within the intendment of

Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) and therefore without prejudice to the

bringing of a new action based upon the earlier timely filing

with the EEOC. This analysis is predicated in the main upon the

decision of the Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, 365

U.S. 265 (1961). In that case, the Court held that dismissal for

the government’s failure to file a statutorily required affidavit

of good cause in a denaturalization action was for lack of

jurisdiction under 41(b) and therefore without prejudice. There,

the district court had not classified the dismissal as

without prejudice or for lack of jurisdiction.

Aside from the fact that the district court in the opinion

giving rise to this appeal makes it clear that the dismissal of

the previous action was not intended to have a jurisdictional

basis, precedent compels us to arrive at the same result. The

Supreme Court could not have been more clear on this subject:

We hold that filing a timely charge of

discrimination with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional

prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a

requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is

subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.

es Vv. Wo j ines ., 455 U.S. 365, 393 (1982).

Whatever may have been the rule in Costello, it cannot be applied

in a Title VII action involving untimely filing with the EEOC.

It is because the "statutory requirement is analogous to a

statute of limitations," Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80

F.3d 708, 712 (2d Cir. 1996), that dismissal for failure to

comply with the requirement is a judgment on the merits. See PRC

arris c. v. Boei Co., 700 F.2d 894, 896-97 n.2 (2d Cir.

1983) (holding that a dismissal on statute of limitations grounds

is an adjudication on the merits for purposes of res judicata).

Although the result envisioned by the foregoing is most

unfortunate, it could have been avoided. Criales could have

moved for a stay in the prior action in the district court

pending receipt of the right-to-sue letter that resulted from the

timely filing of his first administrative complaint. See Woods

v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 972 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir. 1992). In the

alternative, Criales could have requested the district court to

12

13

dismiss the prior action without prejudice to renewal upon

receipt of the timely right-to-sue letter. Although Criales has

conducted the bulk of this litigation as a pro se litigant, he

did appear by counsel at various stages of the first action.

Whether the fault is that of counsel or Criales himself, the

failure to have considered these alternatives leaves Criales in

his present bind.

Because the district court properly dismissed Criales’

federal claims, it did not abuse its discretion in declining to

exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims. See Carnegie-

Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Criales may

bring his state claims in state court if he chooses to do so.

APPENDIX

A

NITED STATES COURT OF ArPES’ ~ Sl 121709

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 95-cvel. 0%

UNITED STATES COURT HOUSE Glasser, DJ

40 FOLEY SQUARE

newvens “MANDATE

GEORGE LANGE iil

CLERK

At a Stated Term of she United States Court of Appeals for <=ne Secona

Circuit, heid at the United States Courthcuse, Foley Square, in the City <<

New Yorx, on the zlst day cf January, one thousand nine hunared anda

ninety-seven.

PRESENT: HON. Roger J. Miner

HON. Josepn M. McLaughlin

HON. Pierre N. Levai —..

Circuit cudges

Docket Ho: 95-9170

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Plaintiff-Lppeilant,

%

V eo

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.,

Appeal from United Stetes

or New YOrX.

ct Court for the Eastern District

This cause came cn to be heard on the transcript of record from

the Eastern District of New Yerk and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ORDERED,

ADJUDGED. and DECREED that the judoment of said district court

be and it hereby is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remandea

to the said district court fer further proceedings in accordance

with the opinion cf this ccurt.

For the Court

GEORGE LANGE III, Clerk

4A

By,: '

CI “7 yr

Beth J. Meador

Administrative Attorney

5 AACR SALLIE BE ES RES DOBLE LRT

ISSUED AS SNORE + en £3 97 Nee

71980

a United States Court of Appeals ORIGINAL,

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT Each motion must be eccompenied by

eS 5 8 supporting effidevt (Local Rule 27(s))

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Plaintiff-Appellantr, 95-9170

Docke! Number

- against - ; NOTICE OF MOTION

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., ee ee sate 1798 of movin

Defendant~Appellee. ~~~ for Stay of Mandate

Use short title

as BPR3O499F ty

MOTION BY: (Name, adaress ond tel. no. of law fem and of SS ae G COUNSEL: (Name, address and tel. no. of law

attorney in cnarge of case) " _" wg Sirm and of attorney in charge of case)

Edward Cerasia II, Esq. es ee ee

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Gerakdsan ~ — hey auricio Criales, Pro Se

900 Third Avenue = 37-57 6lst Street —

New York, New York 10022-4728 Woodside, New York 11377

Has consent of opposing counsel:

A. been sought? ——- F No EMERGENCY MOTIONS, MOTIONS FOR STAYS &

B. been obtained? — Yes ¥ No INJUNCTIONS PENDING APPEAL

Has service been effected? & Yes — No Has request for relief been made below? > ¥0S ~ NO

Is Orai argument desired? a wee 4 No (See F.R.A.P. Rule 8)

(Substantive motions only) Would expedited appeal eliminate need

Requested return date for this motion? — . No

(See Second Circuit Rule 27/b)) If No. explain why not:

Has argument date of appeal been set:

A. by scheduling order? E Yes — No

a B. by firm date of argument notice? x Yes = Oo Will the parties agree to maintain the

C. If Yes. enter date: April 19, 1996 status quo until the motion is heard? — Yes — No

Judge or agency whose order 1s being appeaiec

-_

I. Leo Glasser

Brief statement of the relief requested:

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 41(b), defendant-appellee American Airlines, Inc. seeks a

90-day stay of the issuance of mandate pending petition for writ of certiorari to the

United States Supreme Court.

Complete Page 2 of this Form

By: (Signature of attorney) Appearing for: (Name of party) Appellant or Petitioner:

C Plainiff Defendant

Carvivy, t_ Appellee or Respondent:

American Airlines, Inc, (= Plaintiff {Defendant

Signed nate must be printed beneath Date

Edward Cerasia II _April 30, 1997

ORDER

Kindly leave this space blank

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion be and it hereby is a denied |

( 7-2 Maer Asserts J

= © OOP OP man, |

DA.

> , ee ee Eng

9 —_— ..

ee Some C i Oe

EMPLOYMENT Dis

| i |

{| FEB 19 197 {1

Vol. 8, No. 7

February 12, 1997

The Bureau of National Angi¢

_—s.— 4

cy-making body. In consensus vote, ABA House of Delegates

also endorses due process standards for mediation and arbitra-

tion of statutory employment disputes. (Page 213)

EMPLOYEE/INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR STATUS is

element in Age Discrimination in Employment Act case that

must be proven by plaintiff and decided by jury, Eleventh

Circuit rules. (Page 197)

NO DAMAGES FOR SEX HARASSMENT ARE AVAILABLE

for conduct that predates November 1991 effective date of Civil

qi Act of 1991, Eighth Circuit holds, as it vacates jury

wards for two female former workers at steel plant and orders

new trial. (Page 198)

FIRM’S LIST OF 18 WORKERS’ NAMES WITH AGES who

might be retained in event of layoffs did not create liability.

under ADEA, even though most younger workers on list ulti-

mately kept their jobs while most of older people did not,

Seventh Circuit rules. (Page 198)

CONSTRUCTION FIRM THAT WAS LOW-BIDDER on two

public sewer projects in New York but was denied contracts

awarded to minority business enterprises can sue city under

federal civil rights law even though sewer projects were nearly

completed when suit was filed, Second Circuit rules. (Page 199)

MANDATORY EEO TRAINING FOR EMPLOYEES is part

of plan agreed to by Massachusetts Bay Transportation Author-

ity and 25 unions in effort to address workplace discrimination

that was being invesfigated by state attorney general. New EEO

plan preempts union contracts in most cases. (Page 203)

MORBIDLY OBESE PRODUCTION MANAGER for New

York-based trade publication fails to convince federal judge

that her condition warrants protection under Americans with

Disabilities Act, but court allows her claim to proceed under

eo broadly worded state human rights law. (Page 201)

HISPANIC AIRLINE MECHANIC, whose first national origin

discrimination suit was dismissed because it was based on

untimely administrative charge, is not barred from bringing

second suit based on prior, timely charge, divided Second Circuit

rules.

(Page 209)

Copyright © 1997 by The Bureau of National

HU

SS YD ST; ——rJ

et ee

ee ae 2

ANALYSIS & PERSPECTIVE

Taxation: Because rules regard-

ing tax treatment of employment

recoveries have changed radically

over short period of time, confu-

sion exists about which rules apply

depending on when recovery was

received. San Francisco tax attor-

ney Robert Wood illustrates how

date of settlement or payment can

be critical and provides flowchart

for determining whether recovery

may or may not be excludabie

from income taxes. (Page 215)

ALSO IN THE NEWS

EEOC: Ciinton administration's

fiscal 1998 budget request of $246

million for Equal Employment Op-

portunity Commission would keep

agency operating at about same

current spending level. (Page 194)

Sex Harassment: California jury

convicts woman of falsifying elec-

tronic-mail message in order to get

$100,000 settlement in case involv-

ing Oracle Corp.'s chief executive

Officer. (Page 208)

Affirmative Action: Shoney's

Inc. may omit from its 1997 proxy

materials shareholder proposal

seeking report on company’s affir-

mative action policies and pro-

grams because it deals with com-

pany's ordinary business,

Securities and Exchange Commis-

sion advises. (Page 196)

Sex Harassment: Two cases rais-

ing issue of employer's liability for

alleged sex harassment by

In one case, court vacates panel

liable under 1964 Civil Rights

despite lack of notice. (Page 212)

LITIGATION

(Vol. 8) 209

the grievance/arbitration procedure was “permis-

sive” rather than mandatory.

Judge Doumar ordered the dispute to be sent to

arbitration. He relied on the Fourth Circuit’s 1996

opinion in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Con-

tainer Inc. (6 EDR 364, 386, 3/20/96; 70 FEP Cases

272), which was recently left standing by the U.S.

Supreme Court (7 EDR 607, 11/13/96).

The appeals court in Austin dismissed an ADA

claim on the grounds that it must go to arbitration

under a collective bargaining agreement. In Bright's

case, Doumar similarly rejected the argument that

the arbitration procedure is permissive rather than

mandatory. Contract language that the union “may”

submit a case to arbitration “is to give an aggrieved

party the choice between arbitration and abandon-

ment of his claim,” not a choice between arbitration

and litigation, the court said.

With access to the courts “neither affordable nor

expeditious, we should view arbitration not with suspi-

cion but with relief,” Doumar added. “Arbitration and

other alternative methods of dispute resolution pro-

vide for ordinary citizens and businesses what our

court system no longer produces with any regularity:

affordable, speedy justice.”

Agreement Does Not Cover Title Vil

In a separate opinion, however, Doumar rejected

Alamo Rent-A-Car’s argument that a former employ-

ee who resigned because of alleged sex harassment

must submit to arbitration.

The nonunion company requires workers to sign a

“Personal Alamo Family Member Pact,” or “Fam-

pact.” The document, prepared by Alamo but written

in the voice of the employee, includes an arbitration

clause that states: “If I claim that Alamo has violated

this FamPact, I agree that the dispute will be submit-

ted to and resolved through binding arbitration... .”

The company argued that the contract required

parties to submit all employment disputes to arbitra-

tion but plaintiff Percilla Rudolph contended that the

clause only referred to breaches of “Fampact” and

not to violations of statutory law.

Although “Fampact” stated that employees were

guaranteed “the right to be free from harassment”

and “the right to be free from discrimination,” the

court noted that there was no further mention of

statutory rights under Title VII of the 1964 Civil

Rights Act or other federal laws.

“{Tjhe presumption in favor of arbitration is not a

mindless mantra repeated merely for the sake of

consistency,” Doumar wrote, and in this case, the

terms of Fampact did not apply to Rudolph’s statutory

‘{Bjecause Fampact neither required arbitration of

any employment tes nor specifically bound

Alamo to comply with Title VII and other statutes, the

court simply cannot overcome the elementary and

ultimate o tion: nowhere does Fampact memori-

alize an agreement to arbitrate the statutory claims

that Rudolph asserts before this court,” he wrote.

2-12-97

National Origin Discrimination

COURT HOLDS DISMISSAL OF FIRST CASE

NO BAR TO SUIT BASED ON TIMELY CHARGE

A Hispanic airline mechanic, whose first national

origin discrimination suit was dismissed because it

was based on an untimely administrative charge, is

not barred from bringing a second suit based on a

prior, timely charge, a divided U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit has ruled (Criales v. Ameri-

can Airlines Inc., CA 2, No. 95-9170, 1/27/97).

In a case with “a rather complex procedural histo-

ry,” the court said that plaintiff Mauricio Criales’ first

suit against American Airlines Inc. was “premature”

and should not be given preclusive effect. The appeals

court reversed a lower court’s dismissal of Criales’

claims under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

Writing for the majority, Judge Pierre N. Leval said

that because Criales “remained capable of complying

with [the statutory prerequisites] by instituting suit

after receipt of the right-to-sue notice on the timely

charge, the dismissal of the first complaint should not

have been found to operate as an adjudication upon

the merits and as a bar to the subsequent complaint

filed after the precondition had been satisfied.”

Two Charges Followed Separate Paths

Criales is a native of Colombia and U.S. citizen who

worked for American as a mechanic at John F. Kenne-

dy International rt. He alleged that his co-work-

ers harassed and ridiculed him because of his Latino

origin and that the airline condoned the conduct.

In December 1991, American suspended Criales

pending investigation of a charge that he filed a false

expense report for an out-of-town training course. He

was fired two weeks later and filed a union grievance,

but an arbitration 1 upheld the dismissal.

Criales filed his discrimination charge with the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Feb-

ruary 1992 within the time allowed by Title VII, and it

was transferred for processing to the New York State

Division of Human ts. Because he did not hear

that anything was happening with the first charge, he

filed a second in December 1992, this time

with the New York City Commission on Human

Rights. The second charge was transferred to EEOC,

which dismissed it as untimely and issued a right-to-

sue notice in October 1993.

In November 1993, Criales filed suit pro se under

Title VII and, after retaining an attorney, added

claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 USC

1981) and state common law. Meanwhile, in August

1994, NYSDHR dismissed his first charge on the

ground that the same issues were being litigated in

In November 1994, the U.S. District Court for the

Eastern District of New York dismissed the Title VII

claim because the underlying ove yep ene charge

was untimely. During the pendency of Criales’ pro se

appeal, he received a right-to-sue letter on the first,

timely charge and attempted to withdraw his appeal

without prejudice and go back to the district court.

210 (Vol. 8)

BNA’s EMF._ ¢MENT DISCRIMINATION REPORT

The Second Circuit denied the motion but allowed him

withdraw the appeal with prejudice.

After again obtaining counsel, Criales filed a second

suit based on his original, timely charge. The district

court granted American's motion to dismiss the Title

VII claims as barred by res judicata, and Criales

appealed a second time.

First Suit Was ‘Premature’

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides that a dismissal is with prejudice unless a

court specifies otherwise, but an exception exists for

dismissals due to “lack of jurisdiction.” The district

court found that the first dismissal did not fall within

the Rule 41(b) exception because Title VII time limits

are subject to equitable tolling and are therefore not

jurisdictional.

The district court’s only reason for disrnissal of the

first suit was the untimeliness of the charge but the

problem “is more appropriately seen as one of prema-

turity,” Leval wrote. Criales’ “problem was that he

filed the initial complaint without waiting for the

issuance of the right-to-sue notice based on his timely

charge.”

Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is no

bar to a later suit once the administrative process has

been completed, Leval said. “There is no reason why

the result should be different here merely because

ales] had filed a second administrative charge that

superfluous and untimely,” he found.

In Costello v. U.S., 81 S.Ct. 534 (1961), the US.

Supreme Court found that “lack of jurisdiction” was a

term of art that encompassed failure to comply with

statutory prerequisites, according to Leval. Rule

41(b)’s exception was based on the common law rule

that “dismissal on a ground not going to the merits

was not ordinarily a bar to a subsequent action on the

same claim,” Leval found.

The Second Circuit decided in several cases follow-

ing Costello that Rule 41(b)’s preclusive effect applied

only to cases dismissed after the defendant incurred

the inconvenience of deaeien to meet the merits of

the claims, Leval sai

Criales’ filing of a complaint based on an untimely

charge and his failure to wait for a right-to-sue notice

on his timely charge simply constituted nonfulfillment

of a prerequisite to determination of the merits of his

to the necasslty of prepering a Gafense, the court said

to the ty 0. a defense,

i wes 2 Gemlseal for lack ef juriediation Within the

meaning of Rule 41(b).

The a court also revived Criales’

Criales was not represented by an attorney on

appeal.

Edward Cerasia of Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather &

Geraldson in New York represented American.

Federal Procedure

CA 8 FINDS MAGISTRATE LACKED JURISDICTION

TO CONDUCT TRIAL WITHOUT PARTIES’ CONSENT

A federal magistrate judge lacked jurisdiction to

conduct a jury trial on age and sex discrimination

claims when the parties did not consent to the refer-

ral, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

has ruled (Reiter v. Honeywell Inc., CA 8, Nos. 95-

2859 and 95-2884, 1/16/97).

A judge in the US. District Court for the District of

Minnesota referred plaintiff George Reiter’s discrimi-

nation and tort claims against Honeywell Inc. to a

magistrate judge. The parties neither consented nor

objected before a jury trial was conducted, which

resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. The judge adopt-

ed the magistrate’s recommendations, which rejected

some of jury’s findings and reduced the verdict

from $765,000 to $261,281. Both sides appealed.

Although the district judge cited 28 USC 636(b\2)

and Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

as authority for the referral, the Eighth Circuit said

that the requirements for neither rule were satisfied

since the parties did not consent and the judge did not

make the requisite findings. Without reaching the

merits of the case, the appeals court dismissed the

appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case

to the district court.

Writing for the appeals court, Judge C. Arlen Beam

commented that court’s holding “is in no way

meant to condone defendants’ actions.” He noted that

the defendants “only complained of the referral after

the jury rendered a hefty verdict against them.” “This

‘wait and see’ procedure is contrary to judicial effi-

ciency,” he wrote.

Consent Not Sought For Referral

|

f

Ht

ll

—____~—_—_—_—~_~—~_—_—_____

APPENDIX "* B

DePlenvec (3 (95

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

E EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

SCARS EREESSEEEKAOKE De REMEO ROE SS Oe X

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Plaintiff, i

95-CV-1709 (ILG)

-against-

AMERICAN AIRLINES,

Defendant.

CESK e Desens eon eeUesssnneneneoenen aban xX

INTRODUCTION

Mauricio Criales ("Criales"), the Plaintiff herein, submits

this memorandum of law in response and opposition to defendant

American Airlines, Inc.’s ("American") motion to dismiss the

First and Second Causes of Action (Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act, as amended, and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981) in the complaint on

: principles of res judicata, and the Third and Fourth Causes of

Action (defamation and intentional infliction of emotional

distress) derivatively, through a lack of supplemental

jurisdiction over these state law claims. American alternatively

seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (1) or (6), or

dismissal of post-November 21, 1991 harassment claims pursuant to

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. For the reasons enunciated below, Criales

opposes dismissal in entirety,’ and seeks to move this matter

forward so that it may finally be heard on its merits.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Criales worked for American for over a year as a commercial

airplane mechanic before he was pretextually fired for expense

report improprieties which totalled at most $120.00. Known to the

company was the fact that other white, non-Hispanic employees of

the defendant engaged in misconduct that damaged aircraft,

jeopardized the safety of American’s passengers, and compromised

the very integrity of the company to its shareholders. After the

defendants employees’ one year reign of discriminatory terror

failed to force Criales to quit his job at American, he was

actively induced into filing inaccurate expense reports by the

company’s employees. The company subsequently singled Criales

out, and after it’s investigation terminated him for dishonesty

in filling out his expense reports, which in the aggregate were

Still $221.00 less than the total American had afforded him.

After his discharge, and an arbitration hearing conducted

without counsel, Criales immediately filed one charge of

discrimination based upon national origin against the defendant

with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

("EEOC). This charge was filed on February 5, 1992, 45 days

after Criales’ December 21, 1991 termination, and challenged

Criales’ termination after countless episodes of harassment by

the defendant’s employees and managers (EEOC Charge No. 160-92-

1069). This charge was later referred to the New York State

Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") for initial processing._

Yet, somehow, this timely filed charge had not been

responded to by December 3, 1992, approximately 250 days after

Criales had filed it pro se. After Criales’ attempts to obtain

any information as to the status of his initial EEOC complaint

had failed, Criales went pro se to the New York City Commission

on Human Rights ("NYCCHR") and filed a second complaint. The

second complaint was then referred to the EEOC (Charge No. 160-

93-0816). This complaint then became the only complaint which the

EEOC had received from a New York agency for action thus far.

Accordingly, although this second complaint to the NYCCHR was

dismissed by the EEOC as untimely, and the initial complaint

referred to the NYSDHR by the EEOC was actually timely, a right

to sue notice was issued by the EEOC on the second complaint

(Charge No. 160-93-0816). The first complaint was ultimately

dismissed, as Criales had already sought judicial relief in this

Court.

After obtaining what he believed to be a valid Right-to-Sue

notice from the EEOC, and still pro se, Criales filed a complaint

in this Court, Criales v. American Airlines, Inc., 93-CV-5340

(ILG), ("Criales I") alleging Title VII violations. At the

commencement of Criales I, Criales did not have a right to sue

letter based upon his timely filed February 5, 1992 charge. The

defendant argues that Mr. Criales pro se should have realized

that he could have requested a right-to-sue letter under 42

U.S.C. 2000e-5(f£) (1).

After the filing of his initial Complaint, Criales sought

and obtained counsel, and on July 29, 1994 an Amended Complaint

was filed. The Amended Complaint alleged Title VII and 42 U.S.C.

1981 violations, based on Criales’ Colombian national origin, and

State law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of

emotional distress ("IIED").

Shortly thereafter, on September 1, 1994, the defendant

moved pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6) for dismissal of

Criales’ entire complaint. On November 14, 1994, in a written

memorandum, this Court dismissed Criales’ Title VII claims as

untimely, his Section 1981 claims as not encompassing national

Origin, and his state law claims for lack of jurisdiction in

light of dismissal of all federal causes of action. On November

21, 1994 judgement was entered in the District Court.

On December 1, 1994 Criales filed a pro se Notice of Appeal.

Criales and the defendant submitted their briefs, and prepared

for argument. On January 31, 1995, during the pendency of

Criales’ appeal, Criales personally returned to the EEOC and

finally managed to obtain a right to sue letter on his timely

filed, February 5, 1992 complaint. This right-to-sue letter was

appended to Criales’ brief. In response to Criales’ presenting

this right-to-sue letter to the Second Circuit, the defendant

moved to strike materials not contained in the lower court

record.

On April 25, 1995 Criales moved to withdraw his appeal

without prejudice, as he had already instituted a second suit

through counsel in district court. On May 3, 1995 the defendant

responded to Criales, seeking dismissal with prejudice and costs

to the defendant. The Second Circuit denied American’s request

for costs, but allowed Criales to withdraw his appeal with

prejudice. Criales, acting pro se, withdrew his appeal, and

American’s motion to strike materials not in the lower court

record was denied as moot, thereby terminating all outstanding

aspects of Criales’ appeal.

On April 28, 1995, Criales instituted the instant case,

Criales II, based on the January 31, 1995 right-to-sue notice and

his February 5, 1991 EEOC charge (Compl.,Ex. A). Criales II

alleges conduct similar to that alleged in Criales I, principally

violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. 1981, and supplemental

state law claims for defamation and IIED. Several key

distinctions may be drawn between Criales I and Criales II,

however.

—

First, each proceeding was predicated on a right to sue

letter from a different charge. Criales I was instituted with an

untimely right-to-sue notice based on Criales’ December 3, 1992

complaint to the NYCCHR, whereas Criales II was instituted on a

timely right-to-sue letter stemming from Criales’ initial

complaint to the EEOC on February 5, 1992. Secondly, Criales I

alleged national origin as the basis for recovery under Section

1981, whereas Criales II contains the significantly different

allegation of racial discrimination as a basis for recovery under

Section 1981. Third, Criales II alleges specific incidents of

disparate impact of the defendant’s employee regulations, whereas

Criales I does not.

The defendant, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 8(c), has

raised the affirmative defense of res judicata as to Criales II, |

arguing that Criales II meets its three prerequisites for

dismissal: first, American notes that the parties to both

actions are identical -- which fact is not in dispute; second,

the defendant argues that Criales I was adjudicated on its

merits. Criales, on the other hand, argues that Criales I was

dismissed as to its Title VII allegations for failure to meet the

condition precedent of obtaining a valid right-to-sue letter

before commencing suit in federal court. Not one of the

substantive issues raised by Criales was ever "adjudicated on its

merits." Third, the defendant urges that both the Title VII and

Section 1981 actions in Criales II are based on identical causes

of action as those in Criales I. The defendant argues that, as

Criales failed to assert the present Title VII and 1981 claims in

Criales I, that he is forever barred from litigating the merits

of these claims in Criales II.’ American is thus seeking to use

the doctrine of res judicata, a rule of judicial economy, to

avoid its having to defend itself on the merits as to the

substantive issues raised by Criales Il.

The defendant also proffers an additional seven alternative

bases for dismissing Criales II (Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,

pp. 5-6). Each point raised by the defendant is meritless with

respect to Criales II, and will be examined in turn after the

1 Criales concedes that, if this Court should dismiss the

federal causes of action against the defendant, that it has no

supplemental jurisdictional basis for proceeding on the state law

Claims which Criales raises in his Third and Fourth Causes of

Action. Dunton v. County of Suffolk, 729 F.2d 903, 910-911 (2a

Cir. 1984). ~

4 backdrop against which these allegations are to be viewed has

been set.

ACKGR

A. The Parties

Criales is an American Citizen, Hispanic in descent and of

Colombian national origin (Compl., para. 5). Criales worked for

the defendant American as a union-represented aircraft mechanic

from November 10, 1990 to December 20, 1991 at John F. Kennedy

International Airport ("JFK"), in Jamaica, New York (Id., para.

6). After a year of enduring a racially discriminatory hostile

work environment, Criales was fired pretextually for $120.00 in

expense account improprieties (Id., para. 48-51).

a The defendant American is an air carrier, pursuant to the

Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. Section 151 et seg. American

operates a portion of its airline business at JFK (Compl., para.

4).

B. Th ri I

The First Cause of Action raised by Criales is that of

employment discrimination by the defendant American due to

Criales’ Hispanic, or Latin, ancestry or race (Compl., paras. 1,

7, 11, 12, 15, 19, 24, 32, 61). The Second Cause of Action

devolves around Criales’ wrongful discharge by the defendant, and

the disparate impact of its employee regulations upon him.

4 Criales was discriminated against, and wrongfully terminated by

Ee a rr Ee a ONE

the defendant due to his race (Compl., paras. 38-69) .*

Criales also asks the Court to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over his Third and Fourth Causes of Action, the

state law claims of defamation based upon libel and slander per

se, (Compl., paras. 71-79), and IIED (Compl., paras. 81-83).

1. The Workplace Harassment

In the First Cause of Action

From the second day of his employment, up until the last

mocking comment on the public address system on December 20, 1991

when Criales cleaned his personal effects out of his locker and

was terminated formally, Criales was pervasively, severely, and

degradingly harassed due to his Hispanic race.’ (Compl., paras.

7-29).

a. bh re-Nov xr

Admitted, Criales was only employed at defendant American

for one month after November 21, 1991, thirteen days of which

were spent on paid suspension pending final investigation of his

expense account improprieties. The pre-November 21, 1991 conduct

was constant, demeaning, and designed to drive Criales either

crazy or out of the defendant’s employ (Compl., paras. 11-34).

2 Obviously, Causes of Action One and Two implicate the

Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("CRA of 1991"), 42 U.S.C. 1981 and all

subsections of the statute.

> Hispanic, Latin, and Race are all terms which are used

interchangeably throughout this memorandum, and which are not

mere "national origin."

It included the writing of epithets, public address pranks,

amplified insults, and personal confrontations. (Id.).

b. The post-November 21, 1991 conduct

Criales raises four specific allegations of post-November

21, 1991 abusive, discriminatory conduct. (Compl., paras. 16, 33,

34, 35). In an effort to render these allegations de minimis,

the defendant points to Criales’ deposition testimony, which was

given while he was pro se, without counsel, and under the

complete control of the defendant’s attorneys, in which he stated

that after September he had been subjected to no more incidents |

of harassment. Clearly, Criales’ deposition testimony is of

little value under the one-sided circumstances in which it was

taken. Criales was easily duped into confusion by American, and

he often did not understand the questions posed to him. Should

Criales be afforded the opportunity to put on his case, testimony

will substantiate his allegations of a continuing course of

discriminatory conduct up until December 20, 1991* through the

* The defendant attempts to question the integrity of

counsel in drafting the complaint in Criales II, with the

rhetorical question: "one wonders how paragraphs 16 and 33 of the

Complaint can allege that Criales was harassed at work up to

‘December 20, 1991’, when Criales’ last day of work at American

was December 7, 1991." (Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, page 10,

fn. 6). This bit of factual omission on the part of the

defendant is indicative of its trend in minimizing or ignoring

Criales’ allegations: what is earth shattering to Criales is

"Minuscule" to American. The fact remains that, when Criales was

formally terminated by American on December 20, 1991, he returned

to retrieve his possessions from American’s JFK location, and he

was publicly mocked again on the public address system by the

same person whom management already knew had been terrorizing

him.

testimony of the defendant’s own employees.

Y Discrimin Di r bh n £ Action

The Second Cause of Action stems from the circumstances of

Criales’ dismissal by the defendant. From September 20, 1991 to

October 18, 1991, Criales, as well as two other American

mechanics who worked with Criales, attended a special avionics

training course at O’Hare International Airport in Chicago,

Illinois. (Id., para. 44) Criales was given a $1,000.00 spending

allowance for the entire month. Of this $1,000.00, Criales spent

only $729.00 (Id., para. 46), yet somehow he was singled out for

investigation into his dry cleaning expenditures.

Criales had received oral instructions on the filling out of

his expense reports. He still, however, did include in his

itemized expenditures dry cleaning charges which he falsely

claimed to have incurred in Chicago, when the charges were

actually incurred in New York. (Id., para. 48). Criales included

these expenses because he had never filled out expense reports

before, and he was told that he could safely itemize dry cleaning

expenditures by the two employees of American who had accompanied

him to Chicago.

Upon Criales’ cebu, despite having spent only 73% of the

money allotted to him by American for an entire month, Criales

was singled out and investigated for expense account violations.

(Id., para. 49.) Criales was temporarily suspended by the

defendant on December 7, 1991, pending the outcome of its

10

investigation. Two weeks later, Criales was terminated in his

€ employment, American having held that he violated company rules

16 and 34 (Id.. para. 51.) After Criales’ union contested his

termination at Arbitration, on March 12, 1992, Criales was found

terminated for just cause pursuant to his employment contract.

Criales was not represented by counsel at this proceeding, but a

union representative did speak on his behalf, noting:

The compan, has agreed to in the letter of stipulation

and raised questions of harassment on the job, of being

a foreigner in this country....being made a fool of on

the PA system, having his mother’s name slandered,

things written on walls, hiss time card punched in and

out; what he perceives as a set up... (emphasis added)

(Ex. 2, Discharge Hearing, dated March 12, 1992, p. 219).

Clearly, Criales’ "story" was the same at his arbitration as it

is now. He has always maintained that he was discriminated

€ against, and that he had been set up for termination by the

defendant and its employees.

3. State Law Claims in the Third

and Fourth Causes of Action

In his Third Cause of Action, Criales states that he was

defamed upon termination by the defendant’s issuance of a "no-

comment letter," which had the effect of preventing him from

obtaining employment of any sort for over two years in an

industry where he had previously never had difficulty obtaining a

job. (Compl., para. 72).

In his Fourth Cause of Action, Criales alleges IIED, in that

he was conspired against by the defendant, its employees and

€ :

managers, who engaged in a continuing course of extreme and

malicious conduct, which degraded, humiliated, and scarred Mr.

Criales.

Cc. Criales’ February 5, 1992 EEOC Charge and

Criales’ initial, pro se February 5, 1992 charge (Charge No.

160-92-1069) with the EEOC alleged discrimination based on

national origin. The EEOC referred this charge to the NYSDHR for

initial processing, and at the time of Criales I, a right to sue

letter based upon this timely filed charge had not yet been

issued by the EEOC. Criales, still pro se, went forward in

Criales I, predicated solely upon the EEOC’s erroneous granting

of an untimely right to sue letter on Criales’ second, December

3, 1992 complaint to the NYCCHR.°*

After this Court granted American’s motion to dismiss in

Criales I, on January 31, 1995, Criales obtained a right-to-sue

letter on the February 5, 1992 timely complaint from the EEOC for

use in his appeal. Criales, pro se in the Second Circuit, then

was moved against by the defendant, who sought to strike the

timely EEOC right-to-sue letter from the appellate record.

Criales sought to withdraw without prejudice, American moved for

prejudice and costs. The Second Circuit then allowed Criales to

withdraw his appeal with prejudice, which he did. The present

* On August 29, 1994, Criales’ timely complaint of February

5, 1992 was dismissed by the NYSDHR, as he had already instituted

suit in federal court in Criales I.

12

action is based upon the timely right-to-sue letter, which

e Criales as a matter of law was entitled to, and which was a clear

by product of the timely filed February 5, 1992 charge known to

both the defendant and the Court during the disposition of

Criales I.

ARGUMENT

1

CRIALES’ TITLE VII AND 42 U.S.C. 1981 CLAIMS

IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION

ARE NOT PRECLUDED BY RES JUDICATA

A. Criales’ Title VII claims in the First and

Second Causes of Action are not Barred by Res Judicata _

Criales I was commenced in November, 1993. The Title VII

7 claims in Criales I were predicated solely on the untimely issued

right-to-sue letter of October 26, 1993, which relate back to his

untimely filed December 3, 1992 complaint with the NYCCHR.

Although Criales attempted to obtain a valid right to sue notice

during the pendency of Criales I, the EEOC failed to provide a-

timely right-to-sue notice before this Court’s dismissal of that

action. Although Criales II implicates similar issues under

Title VII, Criales’ previous inability to obtain a right-to-sue

notice constituted nothing more that failure to meet a condition

precedent to being heard upon the merits in Criales I. As this

infirmity in Criales I barred Criales from reaching the merits of

his case, the First and Second Causes of Action in Criales II

may not be dismissed as res judicata, per Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

4 13

eS Se ee NST ee F

Noting Woods v. Dunlop Tire Co., 972 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1992),

cert. denied, 113 §.Ct. 977 (1993), and its rule that: "A

judgement on the merits in one suit is res judicata in another

where the parties and the subject matter are the same," Id. at

38-39, Criales maintains that Criales I was not adjudicated on

its merits. Rather, Criales I was dismissed for failure to meet

a statutory prerequisite (Memorandum ai.d Order, p. 6). Arguing

that the EEOC had actually failed in its obligation to give

Criales a right-to-sue notice on his timely filed complaint,

Criales alleged that his situation was ripe for equitable

modification under Hladki v. Jeffrey’s Consol Ltd., 652 F. Supp.

388, 392 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). The Court rejected this argument,

holding the Criales was not entitled to any equitable

modification of Title VII’s statutory prerequisites regarding his

failure to receive a right-to-sue notice. None of Criales’

substantive issues were ever raised.

In it’s motion to dismiss, counsel for the defendant

American indicates that:

It is well settled law that the filing of a charge with

the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a private

civil action under Title VII...(emphasis added) (Id.,

Pp. 26)

See also, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47

(1974); Mc Donnell Douglass Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798

(1973) (a complainant’s right to bring suit under the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 is not confined to charges as to which the

EEOC has made a reasonable-cause finding). Under Fed. R. Civ. P.

Rule 41(b), a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction does not

14

constitute an adjudication on the merits:

Unless the Court in its Order for dismissal otherwise

specifies, a dismissal under this subsection and any

dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a

dismissal for lack of jurisdiction...operates as an

adjudication upon the merits (emphasis added).

Criales failed to satisfy what this Court characterized as a

"Statutory prerequisite" in Criales I. Given the unique facts

Surrounding this litigation, failure to meet a "statutory

prerequisite" is arguably identical to failure to meet a

jurisdictional prerequisite under Rule 41(b). There was no

adjudication on the merits in Criales I whatsoever. The only

issue ever addressed by the Court as to Criales’ Title VII claims

was whether an equitable basis for waiving the right-to-sue

notice requirement was present. Criales’ subsequent obtaining of

a right-to-sue letter clearly contravenes this Court’s earlier

decision as to the merits of Criales’ argument regarding his

ability to maintain Criales I. Criales pro se then managed to

dismiss his appeal with prejudice, still never having presented

his timely right-to-sue letter as a basis for overturning this

Court’s earlier holding. Accordingly, given Criales I and II’s

unique procedural history, Criales should not be precluded on res

judicata grounds from bringing all Title VII allegations

contained in Criales II, such that they may be finally and fully

adjudicated upon their merits.

B. Criales’ Section 1981 Claims In the First and

Second Causes of Action are not Barred by Res Judicata

Criales II further alleges 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 claims,

15

which are also not dismissable under the doctrine of res

judicata.

As discussed at length above, the three prerequisites for

application of res judicata to Criales II have not been met.

Although the parties are identical, the factual occurrences

Surrounding Criales’ allegations in Criales II are substantially

different. Here, an entirely different set of issues is presented

to the Court. Rather than alleging the specific, pointed,

national origin discrimination of Criales I, Criales alleges

conduct which, if proven, does not encompass national origin

discrimination. This conduct is actionable under Section 1981,

and rules of judicial economy such as res judicata must yield to

Criales’ right to present the merits of his case. Also, in light

of Criales I’s termination without adjudication on its merits,

Criales should be allowed to go forward with his Section 1981

claims, in conjunction with the Title VII claims which he raises

above.

It.

THIS COURT DOES NOT LACK JURISDICTION OVER CRIALES’

TITLE VII "RACE" DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

IN THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION oo _

It is not so-well settled a principle that a pro se filing

of a complaint with the EEOC precludes a plaintiff from seeking

judicial relief for claims outside of the "four corners" of the

original EEOC complaint. In fact, within the Eastern District of

New York, at least one judge has held against the defendant’s

+ 16

e present counsel that:

the scope of a complaint in a Title VII suit is not

limited solely by the charge [contained in the EEOC

complaint] but by the ‘scope of the EEOC investigation

which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the

charge of discrimination.’"

Kahn v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Group, 526 F. Supp. 1268

(E.D.N.Y. 1981), quoting Silver v. Mohasco Corp., 602 F.2d 1083,

1090 (2d Cir. 1979), xyev’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 807, 100 S.

Ct. 2486 (1980). See also, Yates v. Philip Morris Co., 690 F.

Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("under the law of this circuit,

courts should take a flexible approach in interpreting Title VII |

complaints so as to consider any claim of discrimination

reasonable related to the allegations in the complaint filed with

the EEOC"); Av Vv mi ij j , 614 F.

a Supp. 1397, 1402 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("the Second Circuit has

embraced a flexible approach in interpreting Title VII complaints

filed with the EEOC"). Therefore, to the extent that Criales’

Claims before this Court of employment discrimination, disparate

impact. and harassment due to race could have been reasonable

outgrowths of the EEOC’s investigation of his admittedly limited

pro se EEOC complaint based upon national origin, these claims

must be maintained and adjudicated on their merits in the instant

case.

III. |

CRIALES’ TITLE VII HARASSMENT CLAIMS IN THE |

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION ARE JUSTICIABLE _ |

Even in light of this Court’s jurisdiction to hear Criales’ |

a Title VII harassment claim, the defendant argues that: (a) with |

17

EO ee

respect to American’s pre-November 21, 1990 discriminatory

misconduct, Criales is entitled to no relief, and; (b) that

Criales’ post-November 21, 1990 discriminatory harassment was so

de minimis as to not be actionable.‘

The defendant then proffers a bifurcated approach to dealing

with pre-November 21, 1990 and post-November 21, 1990 conduct.’

American proposes that all of the discriminatory conduct which

Criales experienced pre-November 21, 1990 should be excluded from

any analysis as to the extent of Criales’ discriminatory

treatment post-November 21, 1990, and that the post-November 21,

1990 conduct must be viewed separately, in a vacuum.

The defendant’s argument in adopting this strict bifurcation

approach is that: (1) pre-November 21, 1991 conduct is not

properly to be taken into account in meting out compensatory or

punitive damages for post-November 21, 1991 damages under the

Civil Rights Act ("CRA") of 1991, and (2) if Criales was not

subject to "sufficiently severe or pervasive"*® discrimination

* The defendant also cites Criales’ deposition testimony as

a pro se plaintiff, without counsel, that he was not

discriminated against post-November 21, 1990 as a basis for

dismissal. However, as earlier noted, Criales’ deposition under

such one-sided and uneven circumstances has little evidentiary

value. A reading of the entire transcript is enlightening as,

when viewed in totality, it clearly demonstrates that Criales was

manipulated extensively during his questioning by American.

7 November 21, 1990 is a critical line of demarcation, in

that it is the date that the damages provisions of the Civil

Rights Act of 1991 took effect, entitling a plaintiff to, inter

alia, compensatory and punitive damages. Prior to this time,

equitable remedies alone were available to plaintiffs.

* See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 367, 370

(1994). To satisfy the "pervasive" requirement under Harris, the

18

post-November 21, 1990, then none of the conduct he alleges post-

e November 21, 1990 is actionable.

Criales is not attempting to bootstrap pre-November 21, 1991

conduct to that which occurred later, in an attempt to recover

punitive and compensatory damages for this earlier conduct per

the CRA of 1991. Criales concedes that his pre-November 21, 1991

discrimination allegations, if successful, warrant only equitable

relief -- principally in the form of back pay and associated lost

benefits.

Criales does argue, however, that the pre-CRA of 1991

conduct must be taken into account as to the state that this

continued discrimination left Criales in on November 21, 1990.

The post-CRA Criales may be analogized to a tort victim with an

eggshell skull. It is a clearly settled principle that one

3 "takes their victim as they find them," regardless of their

feebleness at the time of the tort. Criales, after being put

through a solid year of abusive discrimination by the defendant,

entered into the post-CRA of 1991 period of his employment with

American, short as it was, in a considerably more fragile state

than he had when he commenced his employment with American in

November, 1990.

"incidents must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently

continuous and concerted." Carrero v, New York City Housing

Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 581 (2d Cir. 1989). In this respect, the

pre-CRA of 1991 conduct is directly relevant to proof of

concerted, continued conduct. Even though these pre-CRA of 1991

events may not warrant compensatory or punitive damages, they

Clearly have evidentiary value in substantiating the

pervasiveness of Criales’ post-CRA of 1991 claims.

a 19

|

Therefore, what American callously characterized as four

non-pervasive acts of post-CRA discrimination by American and its

employees, actually carried the weight of the world with them.

It was these ultimate acts by the defendant which culminated a

year’s worth of psychological abuse. As such, without any

attempt to retroactively apply the CRA of 1991, Criales’

treatment during the two weeks that he was actively on the job

site at American, and the two weeks thereafter that he was on

temporary suspension, constituted among the greatest harms which

he suffered. We concede that damages for the pre-CRA of 1991

conduct is limited to equitable relief. However, bifurcation and

viewing in a vacuum is not consistent with "taking your victim as

you find them" and would only undercut the true impact which the

four alleged post-CRA acts had on Criales. Accordingly, Criales

maintains his demand for punitive and compensatory damages for

the post-November 21, 1991 conduct of the defendant.

Iv.

CRIALES’ SECTION 1981 CLAIMS, TO THE EXTENT THAT

THEY ARE OUTSIDE OF THE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS ARE

STILL ACTIONABLE UNDER PRINCIPLES OF EQUITABLE TOLLING

The defendant argues that, even though Criales may overcome

the res judicata doctrine in bringing Criales II’s Section 1981

claims, that the three year statue of limitations applicable to

these claims has passed and that therefore -riales must be barred

from litigating these issues. Admittedly, over three years have

passed since these claims accrued. However, statutes of

limitation are: "subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable

20

é tolling." Zipes v. Trans-World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398

(1982). Given Criales’ continued attempts to bring this case to

a trial on its merits, and its unique procedural history, we

respectfully urge that sufficient grounds for equitable

modification exist with regard to Criales’ present Section 1981

claims, and that they therefore be subject to equitable tolling

of the statute of limitations.

V.

CRIALES’ STATE LAW CLAIMS MAY BE WITHIN THE PURVIEW

OF THIS COURT’ S SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

|

Should this Court maintain any aspect of Criales’ First and

Second, federal, Causes of Action, the Third and the Fourth state

law based Causes of action are properly within this Court’s

a supplemental jurisdiction. Criales concedes that, should

defendant’s motion be granted as to Causes of Action One and Two,

there is no jurisdictional basis for the state law claims before

this Court. Accordingly, maintenance of Criales’ Third and

Fourth Causes of Action is predicated entirely upon this Court’s

decision with respect to dismissal of its federal bases for

jurisdiction.

vi.

CRIALES’ STATE LAW CLAIMS, IF WITHIN THE COURT’S

SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION, ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO

Statutes of limitation are subject to equitable modification

"7 when appropriate. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.

21

485. Should this Court allow Criales to reach the merits of his

federal Causes of Action, in light of Criales’ attempts to

adjudicate his complaints since they accrued and the tortured

procedural history of this litigation, we respectfully urge that

equitable tolling of his state claims is proper. Given the short

New York State one year statute of limitations applicable to

intentional torts, and the longer-term nature of bringing Title

VII actions, further reason to allow Criales to litigate all of

his claims exists. To not equitably toll the statute of

limitations regarding Criales’ state law claims under the

circumstances of this case would serve only to bar future

litigants from seeking a streamlined remedy in federal court for

wide ranging abuses that stemmed from the same, or related,

factual occurrences, but which were not capable of adjudication

in the federal forum until after the shorter state statute had

run.

vit.

CRIALES’ STATE LAW CAUSES OF ACTION BOTH STATE

CLAIMS UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED _

A. THE DEFAMATION CLAIM

American urges that its no-comment letter was: (1) not

alleged to be published to a third party, (2) protected under a

qualified immunity, even if it was purposefully inaccurate, and

(3) was an omission rather than a false or defamatory statement

of fact (Motion to Dismiss, pp. 47-49.) Criales retorts that

22

this letter was: (1) clearly "published" to third parties, in

e that each employer whom he interviewed with would receive it in

the course of investigating his credentials for employment; (2)

that these employers understood the meaning of a "no-comment"

letter, and also the importance of employers writing letters that

say absolutely nothing as a means of avoiding defamation actions

as Criales has raised herein; (3) that the purported silence of

the letter indicates to prospective employees that an individual

is unhireable due to, literally, unspeakable conduct at a

previous place of employment, and (4) that American’s qualified

immunity is not unlimited, and is actionable when, as here,

Criales has alleged from the onset that his employer’s conduct

has been effectuated with ill will and malicious intent.

2 Clearly, Criales has proffered a sufficient basis to survive

dismissal on the Third Cause of Action for defamation, and to

move this matter forward to the discovery stage.

B. THE ILED CLAIM

The defendant argues that, even if Criales’ IIED claim is

‘not time-barred, that it is not sufficiently "extreme and

outrageous" as a matter of law and thus should be dismissed

(Motion to Dismiss, p. 49). In support of its argument, the

defendant cites dismissal of IIED claims where (1) an employer

allowed crude and sexually derisive statements to occur in the

workplace, Shea v. Cornell Univ., 192 A.D.2d 857, 596 N.Y.S. 502,

Z ‘

ee

504 (3d Dep’t 1993), and (2) a plaintiff was subjected to the

religious slurs of "Kike" and "Hebe", Leibowitz v. Bank Leumi

Trust Co. of New York, 152 A.D.2d 169, 548 N.Y.S.2d 513, 521 (2d

Dep’t 1989).

Criales’ IIED claim is far more pervasive than those present

in either Shea or Liebowitz. The basis for his IIED claim is

stronger than those relied on by the defendant, the conduct which

Criales has sufferred was sufficiently pervasive and severe to

have had a lasting impact on him up until today, and is

regardless an issue properly preserved for the trier of fact.

Proof of Criales’ allegations should be presented at trial,

after he has presented his witnesses and evidence, and then this

motion may be re-instituted by the defendant.

For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss presently before the

court, though, all allegations contained in the complaint must be

viewed as true, and all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff must be drawn. Ortiz. v. Cornetta, 867 F. 2d 146, 149

(2d Cir. 1989). Furthermore, a complaint must not be dismissed

"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no

set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to

relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Under this

standard for dismissal, Criales has clearly stated a claim for

IIED, and therefore dismissal for failure to state a claim is

improper.

24

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the

defendant’s motion to dismiss in entirety, schedule this matter

for discovery and trial on its merits, and grant unto the

Plaintiff any such other and further relief which it may deem

just and proper.

Dated: New York, New York

September 13, 1995

Respectfully submitted,

CANTON & JASPER, ESQS.

By

Joseph A Bondy (JB-6887)

276 Fifth Avenue

New York, New York 10001

(212) 629-6489

Attorneys for the plaintiff

Mauricio Criales

ro

i Pi. |

te a he TE Di le rT

»™

/ APPENDIX "C*

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

at al

MAURICIO CRIALES,

Plaintiff,

-against- MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

97 CV 526

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

EDWARD CERASIA II, and

THOMAS MATTINA,

Defendants.

GLASSER, United States District Judge:

; From Naxember 1990 until December 1991, plaintiff Mauricio Criales worked for

defendant American Airlines as a commercial aircraft maintenance technician. Complaint ¢ 6.

On January 15 1997, Mr. Criales brought this action, pro s¢, in the New York State Supreme

Court of Queens County alleging that defendants American Airlines, Edward Cerasia I] and

Thomas Mattina defamed him, intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon him, conspired to

defraud him, subjected him to malicious prosecution, and violated his rights under the First and

Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. On January 31 1997, defendants American Airlines

and Edward Cerasia II filed a petition to remove this action to federal court pursuant to28 U.S.C. —

§ 144]. Mr. Criales now moves for a remand arguing that this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear

this case. For the reasons that follow, Mr. Criales’ motion is denied.

The statutory provisions relevant to this motion are 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367 and 1441.

Section 144] provides, in part:

(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a

ii

claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be

removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties.

(c) Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the jurisdiction

conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more otherwise non-

removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district

court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand al! matters in

which State law predominates.

Section 1331 provides that “[t}he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions

arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Section 1367 provides, in

part

(a) . . . in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the

district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are sb related

to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of fre same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

As is clear from the language of section 1441, an action may be removed to federal court

if it might have been brought in federal court originally. Box Tree So. Lid. v. Bitterman, 873 F.

Supp. 833, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Calhoon v. Bonnabel, 560 F. Supp. 101, 104 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

Hence, a case raising a federal question may be removed from state to federal court. 28 U.S.C. §

1331; Box Tree So. Lid. 873 F. Supp. at 837. Likewise, a case raising both federal question

claims and state law claims may be removed from state to federal court if the claims are related

to the same case or controversy and therefore subject to the federal court's supplemental

jurisdiction. 18 U.S.C. § 1367; Costantini v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 859 F. Supp. 89, 90

(S.D.N.Y. 1994).

To determine whether 2 case raises a federal question, the court examines the face of the

complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed. Westmoreland Hospital Ass'n v. Blue

Cross of Western Pennsylvania. 605 F.2d 119, 123 (10th Cir. 1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1077

2

(1980). If the adjudication of any claim requires the application of the law of the Constitution,

treaties or laws of the United States, the case raises a federal question. Box Tree So.. Ltd., 873 F.

Supp. at 837.

Accordingly, because the complaint in this case alleges Constitutional violations,

complaint §§ 46-50, this Court has jurisdiction over this action and the plaintiff's motion for

remand is denied.

SOORDERED. _

" “4

Dated: February ZL: 1997

a klyn, New York

asisn

I. Leo Glasser, U. S. D. J.

A copy of the foregoing Memorandum and Order was this day sent to:

Mr. Mauricio Criales

37-57 61 Street

Woodside, N.Y.

11377

Douglass B. Maynard

Joyce J. Sun

Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather

& Geraldson

900 Third Avenue

New York, N.Y.

10022-5728

APPENDIX" D*"*

FILED

, IN CLERKS OFFICE

UNITED STATES .STRICT COURT . US. f- va-ent ED, NY:

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

HK WR26 ST %&

ne ae

MAURICIO CRIALES. — mrs 1 SS Te

piainiteel GV 9” 14 (ILG-aSC)

nF

AMERICAN AIRLINES INC.,EDWARD COMPLAINT

CERASIA II Esq.,THOMAS MATTINA.

FRANK GRILLO. US CUSTOMS and

RODNEY DAVIS,FBI Agent JFK Airport

Defendants.

CHR = ve

PRELIMINARY STATEMENTS j 7 a ee:

This is an action for Gamages caused by the Defendants

G PLAINTIFF DEMANDS

pyr BY JURY _

» = eda “4 AN

SSSSSE64 £28 ES we me oe mo ee

Malicious prosecution based on Defamation.Intentional Infliction

of Emotional Distress; Conspiracy to Defraud; Constitutional Violatior

of the First (1). and 14th Constitutional Ammendments Priviledges

= of the United States of America.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

- Jurisdiction and venue are explicitly conferred upon

this Court by 28 U.S.C.A Section 1631 71404. ; 28 U.S.C.A. Sec.1332

Muitipiicity of parties; 28 U.S.c.A. 1331 constitutional laws end

treaties; “Federal question” Jurisdiction ,are made by,e.g.,28 U.S.C.A

Sections 1337,1339 and 1343; 42 U.S.c.A. Sect 1983.; 28 U.S.C.A.

Sections 1346-2674-2680; Becaused this Complaint was Removed by

the defendants and approved by honorable I. Leo Glasser , on

His MEMORANDUM AND ORDER Signed February 12,1997 to take full

Jurisdiction of the entire complaint Removed out from the SUPREME

a COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF QUEENS Index No.001072/97

on January 15,1997 to the UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT E.D.N.Y.

on January 31,1997. Respecfully Request that all the Jurisdictionals

B 1C6— summers with nouce. blank coun © 1993 Juuvs Bi umeena. inc.

J 1 ise rresacts| peronal or subsutuied service 12 pi nope 4-94 PUBLISYER. NYC 150:3

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK —— O01072 97

COUNTY OF QUEENS Date purchased

MAURICIO CRIALES Plaintiff(s) designate(s) QUEENS

County as the place of trial.

The basis of the venue is

based on the county in

Plaintiff(s) which the premises are situated.

— ummons

AMERICAN AIRLINES. ,ED CERASIA II,Esq.SEYFARTH, SHAW, with Notice

PAIRWEATHER, and GERALDSON. , Esty.

THOMAS MATTINA US CUSTOMS JPK AIRPORT AREA DIRECTOR Plaintiff(s) reside(s) at

RECE!VED

Defendant(s) County of

JAW i & 1897

To the above named Defendant(s) COUNTY CLERK

a Bou are hereby summoned to answer the complaint in this action and toterve scopy ig

your answer, or, if the complaint is not served with this summons. to serve a notice of appearance. on the Plaintiff's

Attomey(s) within (20) Gays after the service of this summons, exclusive of the day of service (or within 30

days after the service is complete if this summons is not personally delivered to you within the State of New

York): and in case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief

demanded in the complaint.

MAURICIO CRIALES

Dated. WOODSIDE, NEK YORK Attorney(s) for Plainuff , pro se

, sameasy 15,1997

Defendant's address: Office and Post Office Address

AMERICAN AIRLINES,La Guardia Airport

ED CERASIA II,Esq. 900Third Avenue New York,NY 10022

THOMAS MATTINA, JFK Airport US CUSTOMS Jamaica NY 11430

Notice: The nature of this action is

Based on Defamation on slander per se,Intentional infliction of Emctional distress,

Conspiracy to Gefraud,MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, Constitutional Violation of the

Pirst (1), and 14th Constitutional Ammendments priviledges of the United States.

37-57 61Street

WOODSIDE, NEW YORK 11377

(917)419-1272

The relief sought is to show a conspiracy to defraud is in progress and none of

the Gefendant,s can Genie me the right to work on my profession of 15 years

: as a licensed and qualify Aircraft Maintenance Thecnician.

Punity Damages .LIABLE for trying to destroy my reputation and responsible

for the suffering. Embarassment and Humiliation caused by AMERICAN AIRLINES.

failure to appear, judgment will be taken against you by default for the sum of $ 1' 997.000,00

eee January 1997 and the costs of this action.

© SD deem rte & _-_ a BECO he We gv Oe tvts.

State of Arw Bork, sup. £ court

SUPREME courT Court, County of ouEENS Index No. 001072/97

eo RECEIVED

MAURICIO CRIALES

FEB O06 1997

QUEERS COON ty

against

AMERICAN AIRLINES.,ED CERASIA II Esq,SEYFARTH

SHAW,FAIRWETHER AND GERALDSON Esqs.

THOMAS MATTINA US CUSTOMS JFK AIRPORT AREA DIREQTOR

Affidavit of Personal! Service

Defendant(s)

State of Mew Pork,

an:

County of QUEENS ;

TERESA QUISBERT and LUIS FERNANDO ARBOLEDA being duly sworn,

deposes and says that deponent is not a party to the action or proceeding, is over 18 years of age and re-

sides at 41-07 53 Street Woodside New York 11377

That on the 5th day of February 19 97 at all the defendants

last known address

deponent served the annexed NOTICE OF MOTION, SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT,RJI request

in this action, on SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT. ON Pebruary 5,1997

, Names above corporation, the defendant therein named, by delivering a true copy thereof to

personally,the Reoguest for Oral Argument on February 26, 1997

_ of said corporation: deponent knew the said corporation so served to be the corporation mentioned and

described as defendant thereinandknew of the charges against them »served January 15,

to be the February 26 at 9:30 A-thereof.

Sworn to before me, this

4 day of = A 197 7

hus [ a A crccheds °

Pesaro anrhe

sugnature

Teresa, Quisbect

APPENDIX "“E "

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

x

MAURICIO CRIALES, AT JUN -4 A 10

poe CLERK

Plaintiff, ws DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT

OF NEW YORK

~-against- 95-CV-1709 (ILG)

AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC.

Defendant.

x

PLAINTIFF MAURICIO CRIALES

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER SUPPORT THE TITLE VII

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT REAFFIRMED BY THE

COURT OF APPEALS for THE SECOND CIRCUIT ON

95-9170 -

THE ARBITRATION DECISION THAT I WAS SUBJECTED BY AMERICAN AIRLINES; INC

ON MARCH 12, 1992 "MOST BE OVERTURN ON GROUNDS THAT WARRANTS A

RACIAL DISCRIMINATION LAWSUIT IN DISTRICT COURT "

i. MARVIN HILL JR Alleged "neutral" arbitrator is far from

neutral he is Chairman AMERICAN AIRLINES —TWU New York area board of

adjustment.

2. Who FAILED to interpretate and applicate the collective

bargaining agreement. ;

3. HE SAT to dispense his own brand of industrial Justice.

4. HE FAILED to provide plaintiff Criales with any opportunity

to call to testify all Supervisors or Crew Chiefs Whom he had Complaint

of harrasement and Discrimination. . |

5. The Arbitrator did not resolve the Grievance by considering

the proper sources, the Contract and those circunstances out which came

the "Common law of the shop"

6. Documents were requested since January 21, 1992 but BILL GARY

Labor Relations Manager at la Guardia Airport "OBJECTED"

HIS EXACT WORDS jMr Criales I wont give you Anything......

You are a THIEF... You Stole from US AND hanged the telephone down.

7 The Distri. Court most Vacate the Arbitr. n award because

of Unfair and Prejudicial Exclusion or Admission of Evidence. I request

other Expense accounts Investigated. No ones Training Class Expense

receipts were ever Investigated.

Criales was Clearly Single-Out

8. a Court will also vacate an arbitral award which requires

conduct in Violation of State Law. In UAW .v. W.M.chase Co (E.D:Mich. 19¢6)

10. In Criales Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 95-9170

all three judges in the Pannel Agreed that all State Claims entered on

the District Court Complaint 95-CV-1709 are actionable and can be claim

Giving the District Court Eastern District the Jurisdiction for

State Claims, which are

ke Intentional Infliction of Emotional distress

2. Defamation and slander per se.

3 When the Arbitrators award and Words manifest an infedelity to

this obligation Courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the

award.

12. Courts had Vacated the arbitrator's award holding that once the

arbitrator had found cause for discipline ,He had no authority to

consider How Just was the discipline actually imposed by the Employer.

13. I Claimed the Discharge was Too Severe Punishment specially

when I was Never Reprimand for any wrong doing before., Like so many

other employees of American Airlines Who after having Violated American

Airlines Rules of Conduct And Rules of Safety, They were giving the

Chance to stay. and still today are American Airlines Employees

who after been reprimand,Suspended or even Fired were taken back by

Management....NO ONE HAD TO GO AS FAR AS COMPLAINING IN DISTRICT COURT

AS I HAD NO CHOICE TO DO SO:.......2200-

14.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

Section 5

“VIOLATION OF LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY"

The arbitrator who bases his decision

not on the parties agreement but on

extrinsic statutory policy exceeds his

Powers and renders his award subject to

Judicial attack.

Arbitration Awards

ae Marvin Hill JR

Section 5 of JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

“VIOLATION OF LAW OR PUBLIC POLICY"

The arbitrator who bases his decision

not on the parties agreement but on

extrinsic statutory policy exceeds his

Powers and renders his award subject to

Judicial attack.

Supreme Court.

United Steelworkers -v-

Enterprise wheel and car Corp.

(US 1960)

A Court will also vacate an arbitral award

which requires conduct in violation of

State Law. UAW -v- W. M. Chace Co

(E.D Mich. 1966)

Dated: Woodside, Queens New York

June 1 ,1997

Respectfully submitted,

UA

MAURICIO CRIALES

37-57 61 Street

Woodside, New York |

(917) 419-1272

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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