Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Supreme Court brief1997
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Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
97.106 JUL 17 1997
RESice OF THE CLERK
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1996
MARY THOMAS and IVY THOMAS
Petitioners
VS.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
and
DONNA POWELL-THOMAS
Respondents
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Marvin Waldman,
Counsel of Record
Gary Diamond
Of Counsel
Waldman & Diamond, Chartered
2815 University Boulevard, West
Kensington, MD 20895
(301) 933-4500
Counsel for Petitioners
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Was the "strict compliance" standard under 5
U.S.C. Section 8705(a) misapplied by the District and
Circuit Courts, where the insured prepared a beneficiary
designation in his own hand in the presence of two (2)
attesting witnesses, and the form was later accepted by
the employing office prior to his death?
a Does the "signed . . . writing" element of
5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a) require a marking in the
signature box, as held by the District Court, or were
Petitioners, as intended beneficiaries, entitled to
demonstrate that the designation was valid because the
decedent printed his name, and completed the form in
every other respect?
il
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING
Petitioners, Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas a/k/a
Ivy Dotson were the Plaintiffs in the District Court and
Appellants in the Court of Appeals. Respondent
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company was a Defendant
in the District Court and Appellee in the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas was a
Plaintiff/Intervenor in the District Court and Appellee in
the Court of Appeals. Stewart Funeral Home, Inc. was
joined as a Plaintiff in the District Court. Stewart
Funeral Home, Inc. has not actively participated in the
proceedings.
a
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Questions Presented .................- i
Parties to the Proceedings ............... li
. SS ee eee ili
ee eee eee eee Vv
CE a 2
a eas sas 4 ao 8 2
Legal Provisions Involved in the Case ........ 2
MPD ge ee 3
| Reasons for Granting the Writ ............. 6
I. The Courts Below Misapplied
the "Strict Compliance" Standard
Under 5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a),
Since There is No Requirement
| That an Insured Mark the Signature
Box to Satisfy the "Signed. . .
Writing" Element of the Statute ...... 9
4
?
Siemens
iV
II. The Decision Below Conflicts With
the Decision of the United States
Court for the Middle District of
Florida in a Factually Similar
Case Resulting in Different Criteria
for Validating Beneficiary Designations
of Federal Employees and Retirees ... 13
Conclusion 16
ABB Sac eer 5
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Adams v. Macy, 314 F. Supp. 399
fe Per ee ee
Burleson v. Burleson, 277 A.2d 647
(D.C. App. 1971) ...............
Carna v. Bessemor Cement Co..,
558 F. Supp. 706
(Wr ee es SO a ee ee en
Ex Parte Cardoza, 109 A. 93
FF ere eee ee ee
Fair v. Moore, 397 A.2d 976
Rs BE ea 5 We aie eee Aas
In re Estate of Hall, 328 F.
Supp. 1305 (D.D.C. 1971).........
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Trainor,
754 P.2d 427 (Colo. App. 1988) .....
Plemens v. Diddle-Glaser, Inc.,
224 A.2d 464 (Md. 1966) .........
Reidy v. Almich, 418 P.2d 390
(Asm. App. T9G6) 2... ce ee ecw es
Ut oe 10
vi
Sears v. Austin, 292 F.2d 690
(Sai oe. BE) hv esis Cae eee eee Y
State v. Schell, 224 N.E.2d 49
(let. 1968) 60 08 00S hee eee 12
United States v. Wexler,
657 F. Supp. 966
1 Re. rer ee A 11-12
Ward v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65
(ae Cae. BSG e) ba bs ce a Oar eee 10
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
1 U.S.C. Section 1 (1994) .......... 6-7, 8, 11
5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a)
(ISM) . 5 shee oa Sree ae eee passim
28 U Section 1254(1)
(T9598) . wc wanes eave ewe eee 2
28 U.S.C. Section 1291 (1994) .............. 6
28 U.S.C. Sections 1331 and 1332
(T99O) . ke wesbeeeeee. eeeeee 4
28 U.S.C. Section 1335 (TFS) oc cece cw wees 5
:
5
:
Vii
3 C.F.R. Section 870.901
ER ee ee ee ea nk. 7, 11
5 C.F.R. Section 870.902
GEE? a ee ae es ote 7, ¥1
We a SG ee ck en ee cee 5
LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL
S. Rep. No. 1064, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1966),
reprinted in 2 U.S.C.C.A.N.
I ee ee Y
ORDERS FROM OTHER CASES
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Grant, et al.,
No. 96-136-Civ-Oc-10 |
(M.D. Fla. July 7, 1997) |
(Order Denying Summary |
Judgmemt) oo... eee. 7-8, 13, 14, 15 |
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1996
MARY THOMAS and IVY THOMAS
Petitioners
VS.
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
and
DONNA POWELL-THOMAS
Respondents
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Petitioners, Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas
respectfully request that a Writ of Certiorari issue to
review the judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia entered in this case
on February 24, 1997.
2
OPINIONS BELOW
The Judgment of the Court of Appeals (App. D
at Sa-6a) is reported at 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
[The foregoing citation is a table reference and is not an
opinion.] The Court of Appeals’ Orders denying the
Petition for Rehearing (App. A at la-2a) and Suggestion
for Rehearing In Banc (App. B at 3a) are not reported.
The Order of the District Court (App. F at 8a-10a) is
reported at 921 F. Supp. 810 (D.C. 1996).
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia was entered on
February 24, 1997. A Petition for Rehearing and a
Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc, filed on March 25,
1997, was denied on June 11, 1997. This Court’s
jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1254(1) (1994).
LEGAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE
1 U.S.C. Section 1 (1994).
5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a) (1994).
5 C.F.R. Sections 870.901-.902 (1995).
These provisions are set forth in the Petitioner’s
Appendix (App. G-J at 12a-16a).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Decedent Gerald C. Thomas, Jr., an employee of
the District of Columbia Lottery and Charitable Games
Control Board, participated in the Federal Employees
Group Life Insurance (FEGLI) Program, which is
administered by Respondent Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company (Metlife). He insured his life for One
Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Dollars 00/100
($197,000.00) under this program. On August 21,
1989, and April 7, 1993, Mr. Thomas namea his wife,
Respondent Donna Powell-Thomas, as the beneficiary of
death benefits under his policy.
In October 1993, Donna Powell-Thomas filed for
divorce against Gerald C. Thomas, Jr. in the Circuit
Court for Prince George’s County, Maryland. Mr. and
Mrs. Thomas were by that time living separate and
apart.
On October 13, 1993, the Decedent changed the
earlier beneficiary designation by naming his mother,
Mary Thomas, and his sister, Ivy Thomas, Petitioners
herein, as the only recipients of the FEGLI death
benefits. Mr. Thomas completed the document by
writing his name and address, and by checking the box
indicating "I have signed this form . . .". Two (2) co-
employees signed as attesting witnesses. However, he
made no marking within the signature box.
The employing office accepted and processed the
form, which was forwarded to the District of Columbia
4
Office of Payroll and Retirement for filing. After the
Office of Payroll and Retirement processed the form on
October 15, 1993, the duplicate copy was sent back to
Decedent’s employing office.
Gerald C. Thomas, Jr., died on February 2,
1994, before the divorce proceedings were concluded.
After his death, Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas claimed
the proceeds of the FEGLI policy at the invitation of the
Decedent’s employer. Donna Powell-Thomas also filed
a claim for the FEGLI proceeds based on the previous
Designation of Beneficiary forms. Only during the
claims process did any issue arise about an irregularity
in the Designation of Beneficiary completed by the
decedent on October 13, 1993. Metlife thereafter
denied all claims to the proceeds.
Petitioners, Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas, filed
this action against Metlife on August 31, 1994, in the
United States District Court for the District of
Columbia. Petitioners claimed entitlement to the
proceeds of the life insurance policy in the name of
Gerald Thomas, Jr. pursuant to the Designation of
Beneficiary form completed by him on October 13,
1993. Jurisdiction was asserted under 28 U.S.C.
Sections 1331 and 1332 (1994).
Respondent, Donna Powell-Thomas, filed a
Motion for Leave to Intervene and a Declaratory
Judgment. Respondent’s basis for the Motion was that
the Designation of Beneficiary form completed on
October 13, 1993 was invalid because the form lacked
5
a signature. She asserted the prior Designation of
Beneficiary forms completed on August 21, 1989, and
April 7, 1993, remained valid. Respondent’s Motion
for Leave to Intervene and to file a Declaratory
Judgment was granted.
Respondent, Metlife, deposited the policy
proceeds into the Registry of the District Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. Section 1335 and Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 67. Upon the Motion of Metlife.
Stewart Funeral Home was added as a party Plaintiff,
but has not otherwise participated in this case.
The Petitioners moved for Summary Judgment
and requested a hearing. Some thirteen (13) months
later, the District Court entered an Order denying
Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Request
for Hearing, and granting Respondent Donna Powell-
Thomas’ Motion for Declaratory Judgment (treated by
the Court as a Motion for Summary Judgment). No
hearing of any kind was ever conducted by the District
Court.
In its opinion, the District Court, relying on prior
case law requiring "strict compliance" with FEGLIA,
ruled that "the decedent’s acts of printing his name and
checking the box indicating that he had signed the form
are insufficient to constitute a signature as contemplated
by the statute". (App. F at 9a). Under the reasoning of
the District Court, since the form was not marked within
the signature box, Petitioners could not demonstrate a
valid change of beneficiary even considering the
)
Affidavits of the two (2) attesting witnesses.
The Petitioners, relying upon 28 U.S.C. Section
1291 (1994), appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia. They also filed a Motion to Stay
Judgment Pending Disposition of Appeal, which was
granted on January 31, 1996.
The Court of Appeals, despite Petitioners’ request
for a hearing, affirmed, without argument, the District
Court’s grant of Summary Judgment to Respondent
Donna Powell-Thomas. The panel determined an
opinion was not needed, and entered its per curiam
judgment on February 24, 1997. (App. D at Sa).
The Court of Appeals denied the Petitioners
Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc with Judge Garland
not participating. (App. B at 3a). The Petitioners’
Petition for Rehearing was also denied. However,
Judge Ginsburg of the original panel would have granted
the Petition for Rehearing. (App. A at la-2a).
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
This is a case of first impression with significant
impact on 2.5 million icderal government employees in
every branch of government and 1.5 million federal
retirees. At issue is the proper method for designating
beneficiaries of a Federal Government Life Insurance
Policy. Both courts below have failed to apply the
definition of a "signature" found in 1 U.S.C. Section 1
|
7
(1994), and have instead focused on strict compliance
with the Designation of Beneficiary form itself; a form
that the Courts acknowledge is not even required by the
Federal Employees Group Life Insurance Act
(FEGLIA). (App. D at Sa and App. F at 9a-10a). This
approach exalted form over substance in a manner
wholly inconsistent with the statute.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court
decision without oral argument, despite the record
showing that Petitioners’ Request for Hearing had been
denied in District Court. The District Court found as a
matter of law that where a standard form was used, the
insured was required to write his name in the signature
box. The Court of Appeals never addressed that
holding, but instead applied a "preponderance of the
evidence" standard in assessing Petitioners’ presentation
before the District Court. This affirmance implied that
Petitioners were afforded a trial in this matter.
However, no hearing of any type has been conducted at
the trial or appellate levels.
Additionally, this Court should grant certiorari
because of a different outcome in another Circuit on a
set of facts almost identical to this case. The United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(The Honorable William Terrell Hodges), on July 7,
. 1997, ruled that "strict compliance" did not require a
marking within the signature box. Furthermore, the
Court found that since the insured printed his name,
there were conflicting inferences on the question of
intent to be weighed by the trier of fact. It denied
8
summary judgment as to all parties. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Grant, et al., No. 96-136-Civ-Oc-10 (M.D.
Fla. July 7, 1997) (Order Denying Summary Judgment)
(App. K at 17a-26a). The approaches taken by the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case
were considered and specifically rejected by Judge
Hodges as "not persuasive . . ." (App. K at 22a).
No decisions listed under Title 1, Section 1 of the
United States Code Annotated indicate that this Court
has interpreted the signature definition of 1 U.S.C.
Section 1. Accordingly, this is an important question of
first impression of federal law that should be settled by
this Court under the facts and circumstances presented.
The millions of federal employees and retirees are
entitled to guidance and clarification of the procedures
utilized to carry out their intentions to change
beneficiaries as their life circumstances dictate. If
review is declined, the right of an insured to name a
beneficiary will be severely limited. That result would
clearly contradict the legislative intent of Section 8705(a)
of the FEGLIA statute. A decision which distorts the
law and underlying policy considerations should not
stand without this Court’s further review, especially
considering the summary proceedings below.
Ne rihanna AS sO AE RNY Bor al MPO RG WEN LS ae sk ft sith Og Ss SAI Tatts tees se Lee et sittin
9
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURTS BELOW MISAPPLIED THE
"STRICT COMPLIANCE" STANDARD UNDER 5
U.S.C. SECTION 8705(a), SINCE THERE IS NO
REQUIREMENT THAT AN INSURED MARK THE
SIGNATURE BOX TO SATISFY THE "SIGNED .. .
WRITING" ELEMENT OF THE STATUTE
The case sub judice concerns the proper method
for designating a beneficiary in accordance with 5
U.S.C. Section 8705(a). Congress amended the
FEGLIA statute in 1966 in reaction to a Ninth Circuit
decision validating a Designation of Beneficiary found
in a decedent’s Will. See Sears v. Austin, 292 F.2d 690
(9th Cir. 1961). Administrative uniformity would have
been lost in allowing an insured to change a beneficiary
by will or some other document without insisting on the
processing of the change by the appropriate agency.
Thus the amendment clarified the legislative intent that
the order of precedence set forth in the statute prevail
Over any extraneous document not received in the
employing office before an insured’s death. S. Rep.
No. 1064, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1996), reprinted in
2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2070, 2071. "Congress sought merely
to require official receipt of a designation and not to
further limit the right of an insured to name a
beneficiary". Fair v. Moore, 397 A.2d 976, 978 (D.C.
App. 1979).
The Courts below erred in holding the
Designation of Beneficiary invalid because the insured
10
made no mark in the signature box. The result is to
impose an impermissible restriction on the right to name
a beneficiary, such that the policy proceeds go to the
person whom the insured specifically wished to exclude.
Except for one explainable omission, the insured,
decedent Gerald C. Thomas, Jr., in all respects
completed the form in his own hand, and printed his
name after designating the Petitioners as beneficiaries.
This case does not involve an extraneous document, nor
is there anything in the text of the FEGLIA or its
legislative history to suggest that the signature must be
placed on a particular line or place on the Designation
of Beneficiary Form. A signature is valid without
regard to where it may appear on a document. E.g., Jn
Re Estate of Hall, 328 F. Supp. 1305, 1309 (D.D.C.
1971); Ex Parte Cardoza, 109 A. 93 (Md. 1919); Reidy
v. Almich, 418 P.2d 390 (Ariz. App. 1966).
Petitioners recognize that courts have consistently
required strict compliance with the FEGLIA statute.
See, e.g., Ward v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1993)
(writing not witnessed or received in the employing
office before the date of death), Adams v. Macy, 314 F.
Supp. 399 (D. Md. 1970) (witness to the writing was
also a beneficiary in direct violation of 5 U.S.C. Section
8705(a), and 5 C.F.R. 870.902(c)); Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co. v. Trainor, 754 P.2d 427 (Colo. App.
1988) (writing to change beneficiary did not specify
FEGLI policy). This rule was recognized in the District
of Columbia in Burleson v. Burleson, 277 A.2d 647,
648 (D.C. App. 1% 1) where the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals stated "[L]iteral compliance with the
1]
Statute is required when designating or changing
beneficiaries . . ."
However, the effect of the District Court’s ruling
and the Court of Appeals’ judgment is to require strict
compliance with the form itself. The strict compliance
standard was formulated to serve the statutory purpose,
rather than to create artificial hurdles for validating
beneficiary designations. See Fair v. Moore, 397 A.2d
976 (D.C. App. 1979). Petitioners seek no departure
from the "strict compliance" standard, and request no
waiver of the signature requirement. However, due
process necessitates that they have an opportunity to
demonstrate the decedent’s purpose and intent in
preparing the document.
By mandating that the Designation of Beneficiary
be "signed," Congress provided that the document be
authentic, and that the insured affirm a present intention
to be bound by its contents. Section 8705(a) and its
related regulations do not define the term "signed". See
5 C.F.R. Sections 870.901-.902 (1995). The trial court
failed to look anywhere but to the form itself for a
definition of the term "signed". 1 U.S.C. Section 1
provides general meanings for certain words used in
Acts of Congress not otherwise defined. "Signature" is
defined as "includ[ing] a mark when a person making
the same intended it as such". U.S.C. Section 1 (1994).
The Courts below failed to recognize that courts
have permitted signatures to take many shapes and
forms. E.g., United States v. Wexler, 657 F. Supp. 966
12
(E.D. Pa. 1987); Carna v. Bessemer Ement Co., 558 F.
Supp. 706 (W.D. Pa. 1983); State v. Schell, 224 N.E.
2d 49 (1967); Plemens v. Diddle-Glaser, Inc. , 224 A.2d
464 (1966). The opinions of the District and Circuit
Courts are devoid of any analysis of the words "signed"
or "signature," nor do they contain any discussion of
relevant case law interpreting these terms.
The Court of Appeals based its affirmance on the
ground Petitioners "failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the insured in this case signed the
contested form". (App. D at Sa). Yet, the Court failed
to articulate what further proof would be needed.
Viewed in its entirety, this transaction constituted a
complete expression of decedent’s compliance with the
statute, including a signing of the document. The
decedent completed the form in his own hand, checked
the box with the notation "I have signed this form in the
presence of two (2) witnesses who have signed below",
and his personnel office filed the form with the
appropriate office. The two (2) witnesses believed the
form had been signed, as evidenced by the Affidavits
submitted with Petitioner’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Request for Hearing in the District Court.
There can be no doubt of the decedent’s present
intention in preparing this form and printing his name.
Furthermore, the completed form was processed
by the employing office and the District of Columbia
Office of Payroll and Retirement. Neither office found
any defect in the Designation of Beneficiary form. The
decedent had no reason to believe the change in
13
beneficiary was not effective. A reasonable trier of fact
could conclude from this evidence that the decedent
intended his marks to constitute his signature.
The result urged by Petitioners falls within the
"strict compliance" standard enunciated by the courts.
This Court must not permit a distortion of that standard
to work an injustice in this case and to create further
uncertainty for the millions of affected federal
government employees and retirees.
Il. THE DECISION BELOW CONFLICTS WITH
THE DECISION OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT
OF FLORIDA IN A FACTUALLY SIMILAR CASE,
RESULTING IN DIFFERENT CRITERIA FOR
VALIDATING BENEFICIARY DESIGNATIONS OF
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES AND RETIREES
Review by this Court is further compelled by the
decision of the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida, in the case of Metropolitan
Life Insurance Company v. Grant, et al., Case Number
96-136-CIV-OC-10. (App. K at 17a). On July 7, 1997,
the Honorable William Terrell Hodges, United States
District Judge, issued an Order denying Motions for
Summary Judgment on the ground that the facts
surrounding the execution of the beneficiary form
permitted conflicting inferences that should be weighed
by the trier of fact. The facts of that case are
remarkably similar to the case sub judice, except that
14
unlike Mr. Thomas, the decedent in Grant failed to
check the box noting "I have signed this form in the
presence of two (2) witnesses who have signed below".
The Grant Court considered the decisions of the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in this case, and
observed as follows:
"While the Thomas approach is certainly
convenient and possesses _ superficial
appeal, it is not persuasive to me. To be
sure, FEGLIA requires strict compliance
with its beneficiary designation provisions
and deviations from those provisions will
render an attempted designation invalid.
(Internal citations omitted). However, this
is not a case in which a claimant requests
that partial compliance with the statute be
accepted, or that non-compliance be
excused. The statute does not define the
term "sign". The statute does not require
that a standard form be used and filled out
according to its terms in order to change a
beneficiary designation. In short, there is
no specific statutory requirement, with
which strict compliance could be required,
that Mr. Gayton ran afoul of in failing to
sign the designated signature line. The
issue in this case, therefore, is whether
Mr. Gayton signed the beneficiary
designation at all." (App. K at 22a).
15
The Grant Court, contrary to the District Court and
Court of Appeals in this case, stressed that the form
itself was not controlling nor was the insured’s usual
method of signing dispositive of the issue.
In Grant the Court did not grant Summary
Judgment because of the conflicting inferences created
from the underlying facts of the case. Therefore, the
parties will have their day in court. In contrast, the
decisions of the District Court and the Court of Appeals
in this case were delivered without the parties having the
opportunity for face to face discourse. Not only was the
Petitioners’ Request for Hearing at the District Court
level denied, but their opportunity to present argument
before the Court of Appeals was also denied. A
question of federal law affecting all federal employees
and retirees should not be decided without an
opportunity for an oral hearing to present a full
consideration of the facts and the law.
If this Court denies review, the right of Gerald C
Thomas, Jr. to contract for the payment of his life
insurance policy will have been frustrated, and affected
employees and retirees will be subject to different
standards for validating beneficiary designations.
16
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, a Writ of Certiorari
should be granted to review the decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
Respectfully submitted,
Marvin Waldman,
Counsel of Record
Gary Diamond,
Of Counsel
Waldman & Diamond, Chartered
2815 University Boulevard, West
Kensington, MD 20895
(301) 933-4500
Attorney for Petitioner
Date: July 17, 1997
APPENDIX
APPENDICES
CONTENT OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit denying Petition for
eee
APPENDIX B
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit denying Suggestion for
Rehearing In Banc, June 11, 1997 ..................
APPENDIX C
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granting Motion for Stay
of Mandate July 9, 1997 .................0...00000.
APPENDIX D
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, February 24, 1997 .....
APPENDIX E
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granting Motion to
Modify Record and Court’s own motion to dispose
of case without oral argument, February 10, 1997 ...
APPENDIX F
Order of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, January 22, 1996..............
Order of the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, amending Order of January 22,
Ge rr ee
APPENDIX G
5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a) (1994) ......................
APPENDIX H
BS Wrote UD © CIID oo ook nc ccc dccccccscvecccn
la
3a
4a
Sa
7a
8a
APPENDIX I
$ CER. Section S7O.SO01 (1995) ......cccccsccccccccces l4a
APPENDIX J
5 CPR. SOR Goes CH oo cccesegacccssesess l6a
APPENDIX K
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Grant et al., No. 96-136-
Civ-Oc-10B (M.D.FLA. July 7, 1997) (Order
Denying Summary Judgment) ...................... 17a
APPENDIX A
Gnited States Court of Appeals
FoR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 96-7021 September Term, 1996
94cv01908
Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas, a/k/a Ivy Dotson,
Appellants
Donna Powell-Thomas,
Appellee
V.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
and Stewart Funeral Home, Inc.,
Appellees
BEFORE: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Henderson, Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing, it is
ORDERED that the petition be denied. Appellants have failed
to demonstrate that rehearing is warranted. The court wishes to
clarify, however, that although it may appear from the judgment
filed February 24, 1997, that the court weighed the evidence and
decided the disputed issue, this court affirmed the judgment of the
district court because the evidence proffered in the summary
judgment pleadings failed to demonstrate the existence of sufficient
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude by a
preponderance that the insured in this case intended to sign the
contested form merely by printing his name in the informational
entries. Appellant would have had the burden at trial of
establishing that fact. See Rollins by Rollins v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., Inc., 912 F.2d 911, 915 (7th Cir. 1990) (person claiming
entitlement to proceeds of FEGLI policy bears burden of proving
the contested fact by a preponderance of the evidence). “[W]here
the nonmoving party shoulders the burden of proof at trial, the
movant’s burden is met by a sufficient showing ‘that there is an
2a
absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.’”
Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Willoughby, 863 F.2d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
Further, “[t]he [Supreme] Court has said that summary judgment
should be granted where the evidence is such that it would require a
directed verdict for the moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986) (internal quotations omitted). This
is such a case. The court thus determined that there are no
genuinely disputed issues of material fact.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /S/ ROBERT A. BONNER
Deputy Clerk
Circuit Judge Ginsburg would grant the petition for rehearing.
3a
APPENDIX B
Gnited States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 96-7021 September Term, 1996
94cv01908
Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas, a/k/a Ivy Dotson,
Appellants
Donna Powell-Thomas,
Appellee
¥.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
and Stewart Funeral Home, Inc.,
Appellees
BEFORE: Edwards, Chief Judge; Wald, Silberman, Williams,
Ginsburg, Sentelle, Henderson, Randolph, Rogers,
Tatel and Garland, Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants’ Suggestion for Rehearing In
Banc, and the absence of a request by any member of the court for a
vote, it is
ORDERED that the suggestion be denied.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /S/ ROBERT A. BONNER
Robert A. Bonner
Deputy Clerk
Circuit Judge Garland did not participate in this matter.
4a
APPENDIX C
Gnited States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 96-7021 September Term, 1996
94cv01908
Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas, a/k/a Ivy Dotson,
Appellants
Donna Powell-Thomas,
Appellee
¥.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
and Stewart Funeral Home, Inc.,
Appellees
BEFORE: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Henderson, Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of appellants’ motion for stay of mandate
and of the response thereto, it is
ORDERED that the motion is granted. The Clerk is directed to
withhold issuance of the court’s mandate through July 18, 1997.
No extension of this stay will be granted.
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT:
Mark J. Langer, Clerk
BY: /S/ ROBERT A. BONNER
Deputy Clerk
Sa
APPENDIX D
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 96-7021 September Term, 1996
94cv01908
Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas, a/k/a Ivy Dotson,
Appellants
Donna Powell-Thomas,
Appellee
V.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
and Stewart Funeral Home, Inc.,
Appellees
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
BEFORE: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Henderson, Circuit Judges
JUDGMENT
This appeal was considered on the record from the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia and on the briefs filed by
the parties. The court has determined that the issues presented
occasion no need for an opinion. See D.C. Cir. Rule 36(b). It is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the district court’s order filed
January 22, 1996, be affirmed. Assuming arguendo that an insured
under a Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance (“FEGLI”)
policy is not required, when using a standard designation of
beneficiary form, to use the space provided for the signature of the
insured, appellants nonetheless failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that the insured in this case signed the contested
form. Given that the insured signed his name by writing it in
cursive on three of four designation of beneficiary forms in
6a
evidence, including one which assigned to appellants any unpaid
compensation owed to the insured and which was executed at the
same time as the contested FEGLI form, the evidence as a whole
does not support concluding that Thomas intended his name as
printed in the informational entries on the contested form to
constitute his signature.
The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein
until seven days after disposition of any timely petition for
rehearing. See D.C. Cir. Rule 41.
Per Curiam
a ee ee ee en aes
7a
APPENDIX E
Gnited States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 96-7021 September Term, 1996
94cv01908
Mary Thomas and Ivy Thomas, a/k/a Ivy Dotson,
Appellants
Donna Powell-Thomas,
Appellee
V.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company
and Stewart Funeral Home, Inc.,
Appellees
BEFORE: Ginsburg, Sentelle, and Henderson, Circuit Judges
ORDER
Upon consideration of the motion to modify the record, the
opposition thereto, and the reply; and the briefs filed by the parties,
is it
ORDERED that the motion to modify the record be granted. It
is
FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that this
appeal be disposed of without oral argument on the basis of the
record and the presentations in the briefs. The court has determined
that oral argument will not assist the court in this case. See D.C.
Cir. Rule 34(j).
Per Curiam
8a
APPENDIX F
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARY THOMAS
and
IVY THOMAS,
Plaintiffs,
and
DONNA POWELL-THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
¥.
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE CoO.,
Defendant.
ORDER
Civil Action No. 94-1908
(HHG)
This case is currently before the Court on Plaintiff-Intervenor
Donna Powell-Thomas’s Motion for Declaratory Judgment! and
Plaintiffs Mary and Ivy Thomas’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Upon consideration of these motions, the oppositions thereto, the
replies, and the entire record in this case, the Court finds that
Plaintiff-Intervenor’s motion should be granted and Plaintiffs’
motion should be denied.
This case involves a dispute over who is the beneficiary of
decedent Gerald C. Thomas’s life insurance policy. On August 21,
1989, decedent executed a beneficiary designation form (“Form 1”)
1. The Court will treat this motion as a motion for summary judgment.
See Mobles v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 1995 WL 72825, *1 (D.D.C.
Nov. 29, 1995). Because the sole issue before the Court involves one of
statutory interpretation, see infra, the Court finds this case to be amenable
to disposition by summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
4
Pe eae ener
9a
naming his wife, Plaintiff-Intervenor Donna Powell-Thomas, as the
sole beneficiary of this Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance
(“FEGLI’) policy. On April 7, 1993, he executed another such
form (“Form 2”), again naming Powell-Thomas as the sole
beneficiary of his FEGLI policy. On October 13, 1993, decedent
completed yet another form (“Form 3”),? this time naming
Plaintiffs Mary and Ivy Thomas as the beneficiaries of 35% and
65%, respectively, of the policy. Decedent filled out Form 3 by
hand, printing his name, address, and date of execution. He also
checked a box preceding the statement “I have signed this form in
the presence of two witnesses who have signed below.” The form
was duly signed by two witnesses. However, the box marked
“Signature of Insured” was left blank.
The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (“FEGLIA”)
provides that a life insurance policy shall be paid “to the person or
persons surviving at the date of [the decedent’s] death, in the
following order of preference”:
First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the
employee in a signed and witnessed writing received before
death in the employing office . . . . For this purpose, a
designation, change or cancellation of beneficiary in a will of
other document not so executed and filed has no force or
effect.
5 U.S.C. § 8705(a). The sole issue for the Court to resolve in the
present case is whether the form was properly “signed” as required
by the statute.
The Court finds that the decedent’s acts of printing his name and
checking the box indicating that he had signed the form are
insufficient to constitute a signature as contemplated by the statute.
Courts have consistently held that FEGLIA requires strict
compliance with its provisions. E.g., Ward v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65,
67 (8th Cir. 1993); Adams v. Macy, 314 F. Supp. 399, 401 (D. Md.
1970); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 754 P.2d 427, 428
(Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Burleson v. Burleson, 277 A.2d 647, 648
(D.C. 1971). Although there is no requirement that a designation of
2. Although as noted infra the form does not bear decedent's signature,
it is undisputed that he completed this form.
10a
beneficiary be submitted on any particular form, here the decedent
used a standard form which clearly indicated the proper place to
affix his signature. The box was glaring left blank. Strictly
construing the statute, the Court finds no basis for concluding that
the form was “signed” based on his handwritten name on the line
designated as the area to “Print or type name” and a checkmark in a
box. Decedent had previously completed such forms in a proper
manner, and thus he clearly knew how to do so. Furthermore, in
several places, the form tells the policy holder that it must be
signed. Because it was not signed in this case, Form 3 is invalid.
Thus, according to the statute, Form 2 is still in full force and
effect, and decedent’s wife is the proper and sole beneficiary of the
policy.
Accordingly, it is, on this 22d day of January, 1996, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff-Intervenor Donna Powell-Thomas’s
Motion for Declaratory Judgment (treated as a Motion for
Summary Judgment) be and is hereby GRANTED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff-Intervenor Donna Powell-
Thomas be and is hereby GRANTED a declaratory judgment that
she is the sole beneficiary to the FEGLI policy of decedent Gerald
C. Thomas, Jr.; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Ivy and Mary Thomas’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Request for a Hearing be and is
hereby DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Joint Request for a Status
Conference be and is hereby DENIED; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of
Plaintiff-Intervenor Donna Powell-Thomas; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall
forthwith disburse the policy proceeds deposited into the registry of
this Court to Plaintiff-Intervenor Donna Powell-Thomas.
/S/ HAROLD H. GREENE
HAROLD H. GREENE
United States District Judge
Sa ON et Mtn heat os ae tn ctl Oe MMT Nam
lla
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARY THOMAS
and
IVY THOMAS,
Plaintiffs,
- | Civil Action No. 94-1908
DONNA POWELL-THOMAS, (HHG)
Plaintiff-Intervenor,
¥.
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE CO.,
Defendant.
ORDER
It is this 31st day of January, 1996, hereby
ORDERED that this Court’s order of January 22, 1996, in the
above-captioned case be and is hereby amended to include the
award of all interest accrued on the policy proceeds held in the
registry of this Court to Plaintiff-Intervenor Donna Powell-Thomas.
/Si/ HAROLD H. GREENE
HAROLD H. GREENE
United States District Judge
12a
APPENDIX G
5 U.S.C. Section 8705(a) (1994).
Section 8705. Death claims; order of precedence; escheat
(a) The amount of group life insurance and group accidental
death insurance in force on an employee at the date of his death
shall be paid, on the establishment of a valid claim, to the person or
persons surviving at the date of his death, in the following order of
precedence:
First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the
employee in a signed and witnessed writing received before death
in the employing office or, if insured because of receipt of annuity
or of benefits under subchapter I of chapter 81 of this title as
provided by section 8706(b) of this title, in the Office of Personnel
Management. For this purpose, a designation, change, or
cancellation of beneficiary in a will or other document not so
executed and filed has no force or effect.
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or
widower of the employee.
Third, if none of the above, to the child or children of the
employee and descendants of deceased children by representation.
Fourth, if none of the above, to the parents of the employee or
the survivor of them.
Fifth, if none of the above, to the duly appointed executor or
administrator of the estate of the employee.
Sixth, if none of the above, to the other next of kin of the
employee entitled under the laws of the domicile of the employee at
the date of his death.
13a
APPENDIX H
1 U.S.C. Section 1 (1994)
Section 1. Words denoting number, gender, and so forth
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise -
“signature” or “subscription” includes a mark when the person
making the same intended it as such;
l4a
APPENDIX I
5 C.F.R. Section 870.901 (1995).
Subpart I - Order of Precedence
and Designation of Beneficiary
Section 870.901 Order of precedence.
(a) Definitions. For the purpose of this part, the following terms
are defined as follows:
(1) Child means a legitimate child, an adopted child, or a
recognized natural child but does not include a stillborn child, a
stepchild , or a foster child. An individual who has attained the age
18 is considered to be an adult. However, if the age of majority in
the jurisdiction in which what individual is domiciled is set at a
lower age, he or she is considered to be an adult upon attaining the
age designated in that jurisdiction. An adopted child does not
inherit under the order of precedence specified in 5 U.S.C. 8705,
other than as a designated beneficiary, from his/her natural parents
but inherits from and through his or her adoptive parents.
However, a child who is adopted by the spouse of his or her natural
parent does inherit from that natural parent.
(2)(i) A recognized natural child, with respect to paternity, is
one for whom the father meets one of the following:
(A) Has acknowledged paternity in writing;
(B) Has been judicially ordered to provide support;
(C) Has, before his death, been judicially decreed to be the
father;
(D) Has been established as the father by a certified copy of the
public record of birth or church record of baptism if the insured was
the informant and so named himself as the father of the child; or
(E) Has established paternity on public records, such as school or
social welfare agencies, which show that with his knowledge the
insured was named as the father of the child.
(ii) Secondary evidence to support the alleged paternity, such as
evidence of eligibility as a recognized natural child under other
State or Federal programs or proof of inclusion of the child as a
lSa
recognized natural child on the insured’s income tax returns, may
also be considered in the determination process.
(3) Parent means the mother or father of a legitimate child or an
adopted child. The term parent includes the mother of a recognized
natural child and the father of recognized natural child but only if
the recognized natural child meets the definition provided in
paragraph (a)(2) of this section. An individual can not inherit from
a child who has been adopted by someone else. However, an
individual whose spouse adopted his or her child can inherit from
that child.
(4) Duly appointed representative of the insured’s estate means
an individual named in an order of a court having jurisdiction over
the estate of the insured which grants the individual the authority to
receive, or the right to possess, the property of the insured; and also
means, where the law of the domicile of the insured has provided
for the administration of estates through alternative procedures
which dispense with the need for a court order, an individual who
demonstrates that he or she is entitled to receive, or possess, the
property of the insured under the terms of those alternative
procedures.
(b) If an insured provided in a valid designation of beneficiary
that the proceeds of the insurance shall be payable to the insured’s
estate, or to the Executor, Administrator, or other representative of
the insured’s estate, or if the proceeds would otherwise be properly
payable to the duly appointed representative of the insured’s estate
under the order of precedence specified in 5 U.S.C. 8705(a),
payment of the proceeds to the duly appointed representative of the
insured’s estate will bar recovery by any other person.
l6a
APPENDIX J
5 C.F.R. Section 870.902 (1995)
Section 870.902 Designation of beneficiary.
(a) A designation of beneficiary shall be in writing, signed, and
witnessed by two people, and received in the employing office (or
in OPM, in the case of: (1) An annuitant or (2) a compensationer
whose basic life insurance is continued) before the death of the
insured.
(b) A change or cancellation of beneficiary in a last will or
testament, or in any other document not witnessed and filed as
required by this part, shall not have any force or effect.
(c) A witness to a designation of beneficiary is ineligible to
receive payment as a beneficiary.
(d) Any person, firm, corporation, or legal entity (except an
agency of the Federal or District of Columbia governments) may be
named as beneficiary.
(e) A change of beneficiary may be made at any time and without
the knowledge or consent of the previous beneficiary. This right
cannot be waived or restricted.
(f) A designation of beneficiary is automatically canceled 31
days after the employee stops being insured.
(g) If an insured person provides in a valid designation of
beneficiary that a designated beneficiary shall be entitled to the
proceeds of the insurance only if the beneficiary survives him/her
for a period of time (not more than 30 days) as specified by the
designator, no right to the insurance shall vest as to such
beneficiary during that period. In the event such beneficiary does
not survive the specified period, payment of the proceeds of the
insurance will be made as if the beneficiary had predeceased the
insured.
17a
APPENDIX K
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
OCALA DIVISION p
METROPOLITAN LIFE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
-VS-
BETTYE J. GRANT,
EDYEMAE LARKINS - CASE NO. 96-136-Civ-Oc-10B
GAYTON and ESTHER
MALONE (named in error
as ESTELLE GAYTON), as
parent and natural guardian
of JESSICA L. GAYTON,
Defendants.
ORDER DENYING MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND
TRANSFERRING CASE
Presently before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for
summary judgment. The issues have been thoroughly briefed and
the Court has heard oral argument.
The undisputed facts are these. At all material times until his
death, Mack Arthur Gayton was employed by the United States
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). As a federal
employee, Mr. Gayton was insured under a group life insurance
policy issued by the Plaintiff to the United States Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) pursuant to the Federal Employees
Group Life Insurance Act. 5 U.S.C. § 8701, et seq. Mr. Gayton
acquired both basic and additional coverage in a total amount of
$148,600.
~
18a
On June 27, 1988, Mr. Gayton used a standard form generated by
OPM to designate the beneficiaries of his life insurance policy.
Prepared by Mr. Gayton, in his own handwriting, the form specified
that the policy proceeds were to be paid to the Defendant Grant,
who was then Mr. Gayton’s fiancee, if she outlived him and, if not,
to June Shark, Mr. Gayton’s sister. The form was signed by two
witnesses. Mr. Gayton printed his name and address on the form
and signed it in a space designated for that purpose. The form was
received by INS on July 1, 1988.
On September 14, 1990, Mr. Gayton filled out a second standard
designation of beneficiary form. Like the first, this form was also
prepared in Mr. Gayton’s own handwriting and it listed his
daughter, Jessica Gayton, and his wife, the Defendant Edyemae
Gayton, as the beneficiaries of the policy, with each to take one-
half of the proceeds. This form was also signed by two witnesses
and Mr. Gayton had again printed his name and address on the
form. However, no marking was made in the space set aside for the
signature of the insured. Additionally, Mr. Gayton failed to check a
box next to the affirmation “I have signed this form in the presence
of the two witnesses who have signed below.” Despite these
deficiencies, the form was sent to INS where it was received on
October 12, 1990.
Mr. Gayton died on April 21, 1995. On April 25, Edyemae
Gayton filed with the Plaintiff a claim for death benefits under the
policy. The Plaintiff denied the claim reasoning that the second
designation of beneficiary form was ineffective because Mr.
Gayton failed to sign the form in the appropriate space. Ms.
Gayton subsequently retained counsel who advised the Plaintiff of
his intent to bring suit to recover Ms. Gayton’s share of the policy
proceeds pursuant to the second designation of beneficiary form. In
the interim, the Plaintiff contacted the Defendant Grant concerning
her potential entitlement to the insurance benefits. However, Ms.
Grant did not file a claim for benefits until more than one year had
elapsed after Mr. Gayton’s death.
On June 24, 1996, the Plaintiff filed its complaint for declaratory
judgment and interpleader (Doc. 1). The Plaintiff requested leave
to deposit the policy proceeds in the court registry; that the Court
enter a judgment declaring which of the claimants is entitled to the
19a
benefits of the policy; and, upon entry of such a judgment, that the
Plaintiff be discharged from any further liability arising out of any
conflicting claims to the proceeds of Mr. Gayton’s life insurance
policy. The litigation progressed in the usual course and all of the
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment asserting their
respective entitlements to the proceeds of the life insurance policy.
The entry of summary judgment is appropriate only when the
court is satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED.R.CIv.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court must
examine the pleadings, affidavits and other evidence in the record
“in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Samples on
Behalf of Samples v. Atlanta, 846 F.2d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 1988).
The moving party bears the initial burden of establishing the
nonexistence of a triable fact issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2458, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the movant is
successful on this score, the burden of production shifts to the non-
moving party who must then come forward with sufficient evidence
of each and every element that he or she must prove.” Rollins v.
TechSOUTH, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987). The non-
moving party may not simply rest on the pleadings, but must use
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other evidence
to demonstrate that a material fact issue remains to be tried.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
The Federal Employees’ Group Life Insurance Act (FEGLIA)
establishes an order of precedence for determining who is entitled
to the proceeds of a policy issued pursuant to the Act. As it
pertains to this case, the Act provides that the proceeds of a life
insurance policy shall be paid “to the person or persons surviving at
the date of [the insured’s] death, in the following order of
precedence:
First, to the beneficiary or beneficiaries designated by the
employee in a signed and witnessed writing received before
death in the employing office.... For this purpose, a
designation, change, or cancellation of beneficiary in a will or
other document not so executed and filed has no force or
effect.
20a
Second, if there is no designated beneficiary, to the widow or
widower of the employee.”
5 U.S.C. 8705(a) (1996) (emphasis added). See also 5 C.F.R.
§ 870.902 (1996). The Act also provides that if a person entitled to
precedence under the statute fails to file a claim for payment within
one year after the death of the insured, payment may be made as if
that potential claimant had predeceased the insured. 5 U.S.C.
§ 8705(b).
The motions for summary judgment raise three issues under
these statutory provisions; whether Mr. Gayton’s failure to sign the
form in the space provided for that purpose renders the second
designation of beneficiaries invalid; if so, whether Ms. Grant’s
failure to file a claim within the one year period precludes her
entitlement to the proceeds; and if not, whether the second
designation, although invalid, operated to revoke the earlier
document naming Ms. Grant as the beneficiary under the policy.
A. The Signed Writing Requirement
The Plaintiff and the Defendant Grant argue that Mr. Gayton’s
failure to sign the second beneficiary designation form in the space
provided, and his failure to check the box affirming that he signed
the form before two witnesses, renders the attempted substitution of
beneficiaries ineffective. Thus, they claim, the designation of Ms.
Grant as the beneficiary remains valid and she is, accordingly,
entitled to the the policy funds as a matter of law. The Defendants
Gayton and Malone counter this argument by pointing to the
following facts: Mr. Gayton printed his name on the form; Mr.
Gayton dated the form in a space marked “Date of Execution;” the
form was signed by two witnesses in a space marked “Witness to
Signature;” and Mr. Gayton sent the form to INS where it was
received four and one-half years prior to his death. Given these
circumstances, the Defendants Gayton and Malone maintain that
appearance of Mr. Gayton’s name in print is sufficient to make the
form a signed writing within the meaning of § 8705(a).
The statute does not require the use of a standard form to
designate a beneficiary. Neither does the statute, nor do the
regulations interpreting it, define the word “signed.” Further, it
appears that there is only one published decision concerning
2la
whether a failure to make any marking on the signature line of a
preprinted designation form renders the attempted designation
invalid as a matter of law. Thomas v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
921 F.Supp. 810 (D.C. 1996), affirmed, 111 F.3d 963 (D.C. Cir.
1997). In Thomas, the insured attempted to change the designation
of his life insurance beneficiaries using a standard form. The form
was filled out in the insured’s own handwriting and was subscribed
by two witnesses. The insured also check the box affirming that he
signed the form in the presence of the witnesses but failed to make
any markings on the signature line.
The court held that the absence of any marking in the space set
aside for the insured’s signature deprived the designation form of
any legal effect. /d. at 811. Reasoning that Congress intended
strict compliance with the beneficiary designation provisions of
FEGLIA, the Court concluded that where an insured fails to sign in
the space provided on a preprinted form, the insured can not be said
to have complied with the signed writing requirement of the
statute.' Jd. at 811. The court noted that its approach was
particularly appropriate in light of the fact that the insured had, on
two prior occasions, signed the standard form in the appropriate
space. /d. at 812. :
1. The principle that strict compliance with § 8705(a) is required may
be considered a reaction to the Ninth Circuit decision in Sears v. Austin,
292 F.2d 690 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 929, 82 S.Ct. 365,
7 L.Ed.2d 192 (1961), in which the court held that a life insurance
beneficiary designation in a holographic will was sufficient to entitle the
new beneficiary to the policy proceeds. Fearing that Sears, if followed,
would create severe complications in the administration of FEGLIA
policies, the Congress amended the statute to provide that beneficiary
designations not executed in the manner provided for by § 8705(a) are of
no force and effect. See Adams v. Macy, 314 F.Supp. 399, 400-01 (D.Md.
1970).
;
22a
While the Thomas approach is certainly convenient and
possesses superficial appeal, it is not persuasive to me.” To be sure,
FEGLIA requires strict compliance with its beneficiary designation
provisions and deviations from those provisions will render an
attempted designation invalid. E.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Sullivan, 96 F.3d 18, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, _. US.
—_, 117 S.Ct. 972, 136 L.Ed.2d 836 (1997) (beneficiary
designation executed by third party acting under power of attorney
held invalid); Ward v. Stratton, 988 F.2d 65, 67-68 (letter
purporting to change beneficiary designation ineffective where it
was not witnessed). However, this is not a case in which a claimant
requests that partial compliance with the statute be accepted, or that
noncompliance be excused. The statute does not define the term
“sign.” The statute does not require that a standard form be used
and filled out according to its terms in order to change a beneficiary
designation. In short, there is no specific statutory requirement,
with which strict compliance would be required, that Mr. Gayton
ran afoul of in failing to sign the designated signature line. The
issue in this case, therefore, is whether Mr. Gayton signed the
beneficiary designation at all.
The Court concludes that a writing is signed as required by
FEGLIA when the insured has made some marking on the
document which he intends as his signature. The understanding
comports with the rules of construction for the United States Code.
§ 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1985) (“In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress. . . ‘signature’. . . includes a mark when the person
making the same intended it as such”). In short, any mark intended
as a person’s signature becomes a signature. The fact—if it is a
fact—that the mark or writing differs in form or style from the
person’s usual method of signing his or her name is of no
2. Interestingly, in its unpublished opinion affirming the district
court’s entry of summary judgment, the Court of Appeals said: “Assuming
arguendo that an insured under a [FEGLI] policy is not required . . . to use
the space provided for the signature of the insured, appellants nonetheless
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the insured in this
case signed the contested form. .. [T]he evidence as a whole does not
support concluding that Thomas intended his name as printed . . . on the
contested form to constitute his signature.” Thomas v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 1997 WL 159428 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
23a
determinative legal consequence. Of course, such a difference
would be an item of evidence to be taken into account in deciding
whether the irregular mark or writing was intended as a valid
signature (and would usually give rise to a negative inference,
perhaps); but the irregularity alone is not conclusive of the issue.
Additionally, although the determination of whether the insured
intended a specific marking as his signature may be difficult to
make in some cases, it does provide a rule with which strict
compliance can be required, i.e., if no such marking exists, the
insured has failed to strictly comply with the terms of the statute
despite any evidence that the insured may have actually intended to
designate the beneficiary named in the writing.
It is hormbook law that questions concerning an individual’s
intent are intensely fact driven and rarely susceptible of disposition
by way of summary judgment. The Court is of the opinion that the
facts surrounding the execution of the second beneficiary
designation form permit conflicting inferences concerning the
markings made on the form—specifically Mr. Gayton’s printed
name—and Mr. Gayton’s intent in making them. As such, the
motions for summary judgment, as they relate to the question of
whether Mr. Gayton signed the form, should be denied.
B. Timely Filing of a Claim for Benefits
The Defendants Gayton and Malone argue that because the
Defendant Grant failed to file a claim for benefits under the policy
within one year of Mr. Gayton’s death, she is time barred from
asserting a claim in this action by operation of 5 U.S.C. § 8705(b).
That statute provides:
If, within 1 year after the death of the employee, no claim for
payment has been filed by a person entitled under the order of
precedence . . . payment may be made in the order of
precedence as if the person had predeceased the employee, and
__ payment bars recovery by any other person.
The argument is without merit and contrary to the unambiguous
language of the statute. The statute provides that payment may be
made to another claimant if a potential claimant entitled to
preference has not filed a claim for benefits within a year of the
insured’s death, not that such payment must be made. Further, the
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statute makes clear that it is not the passage of a year from the
insured’s death that bars recovery by a claimant; rather, it is the
payment of the proceeds to another claimant which does so.’ In
this case, although one year had elapsed from Mr. Gayton’s death
before the Defendant Grant filed her claim, the Plaintiff opted to
make no payments to either claimant and, instead, to seek a judicial
determination of the entitlement to the policy proceeds. Because no
payment has been made, Ms. Grant is not time barred from
pursuing her claim and Gayton and Malone’s motion for summary
judgment should be denied to this extent.
C. Cancellation of the First Designation
The Defendants Gayton and Malone next argue that, even if
ineffective to designate a new beneficiary, the second designation
does operate to cancel the first. The result of this claim, of course,
is that Ms. Gayton would take the proceeds as the next claimant in
the order of preference.
Again, however, the arugment is contrary to the clear statutory
language. 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a) provides that any writing purporting
to change a beneficiary designation under a life insurance policy
issued pursuant to FEGLIA that is not executed and filed as
required by the statute “has no force or effect.” 5 U.S.C. § 8705(a).
3. The authority cited by the Defendants Gayton and Malone is not to
the contrary. See Jacobs v. United States, 794 F.Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y.
1992); Brown v. Wharton, 756 F.Supp. 223 (E.D.Pa. 1990). Both of these
cases involved determinations that a claimanet was time barred from
asserting a claim after the insurer had paid the benefits to another claimant
and neither decision suggests that the statute would bar recovery absent
payment of the proceeds. Hughes v. Goodwin, 860 F.Supp. 272 (D.Md.
1994), addressed whether a federal employee had waived life insurance
coverage under FEGLIA and is, therefore, inapposite.
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The argument made by Gayton and Malone assumes that the second
form was not executed as required by the statute and, given that
assumption, the statute demands the conclusion that the second
designation form was without effect, either in terms of changing the
beneficiaries or in terms of cancelling the prior designation.* The
motion for summary judgment should be denied.
4. Gayton and Malone maintain that the regulations interpreting the
Statute require that a document changing or cancelling a beneficiary, as
opposed to designating one in the first instance, need only be “witnessed
and filed,” and not signed by the insured as required by the statute. 5
C.F.R. § 870.902(b). They do not dispute, nor could they, that under the
Statute, taken alone, a signed writing is necessary to cancel a previous
beneficiary designation. The argument that the regulation requires
something less than the statute merits no serious consideration. The
statute would nonetheless trump the regulation as the definitive expression
of the will of Congress.
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CONCLUSION
At the hearing conducted on the summary judgment motions on
May 20, 1997, the parties stipulated that, should the motions for
summary judgment be denied, the balance of conveniences weighed
heavily in favor of holding the trial of this case in the District of
New Jersey and that venue is proper there. Having concluded that
this case cannot be appropriately disposed of on the motions for
summary judgment, the case will be so transferred pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a).
Accordingly, upon due consideration,
(1) the Defendant Grant’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 16) is DENIED.
(2) The Defendants Gayton and Malone’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 28) is DENIED.
(3) This case is hereby TRANSFERRED, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1404(a), to the United states District Court for the
District of New Jersey. The Clerk is directed to take all steps
necessary to effectuate the transfer.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DONE and ORDERED in Jacksonville, Florida, this 7th day of
July, 1997.
/s/ W. Terrell Hodges
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copy to counsel of record
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