Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sheehan v. Whitley

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Supreme Court, U.8.

rin Ss D

97-67 JUL 8 1997,

No. __o¢sict Of THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996

¢

JOHN ANTHONY SHEEHAN,

Petitioner,

versus

JOHN P. WHITLEY, WARDEN AND

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

Civil Appeal No. 96-30008

¢

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

Lewis O. UNGLEsBy

Unc.essy & Kocu

246 Napoleon Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

Telephone: (504) 387-0120

CHartes A. RIppte, III

Counsel of Record

Post Office Box 315

Marksville, Louisiana 71351

Telephone: (318) 253-4551

Attorneys for Petitioner,

John Sheehan

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Constitutional violations in this case are so basic, so

fundamental, so compelling, that it is astonishing that Peti-

tioner has to request discretionary review by this Court.

John Sheehan was convicted by a 10 to 2 vote — the

minimum necessary to convict — and the jury foreman hid the

fact that he is an active reserve deputy with the very Sheriff’s

Department that investigated the alleged offense, and that he

is the friend of the prosecution’s key police witness. The

foreman had even consulted an attorney about the effect of his

deputy status before reporting for jury duty.

The District Court found that the extreme and extraordin-

ary nature of the case required the application of the implied

bias doctrine.

The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits

have ruled that implied bias is a question of law beyond the

reach of the presumption of correctness whereas the Fifth

Circuit below reversed the District Court on the issue by

applying the presumption of correctness to the state court’s

ruling. The Fifth Circuit panel’s ruling has created a dan-

gerous split of authority among the various circuit courts of

appeals which threatens the interests of persons legitimately

deserving of habeas relief:

1. Is implied bias a question of law which falls

outside the presumption of correctness, enti-

tling petitioner to independent federal review?

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued

2. Does Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in

Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948-949

(1982), accurately reflect the applicable stan-

dard that in exceptional situations, like this one,

which require a finding of implied bias, that the

lower federal courts should not be deterred

from independent review by the presumption of

correctness?

3. Do the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments per-

mit an innocent man to be condemned to life in

prison based upon a conviction orchestrated by

a jury foreman who lied about critical facts

going to the heart of potential juror partiality to

get on the jury?

ian a AK RANI 4

jen dime etna: nna enn

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PARTIES

The parties appearing in the United States Court of

Appeal were, John Anthony Sheehan, plaintiff-appellee, rep-

resented by Lewis O. Unglesby and Aidan C. Reynolds of the

law offices of Unglesby & Koch, 246 Napoleon Street, Baton

Rouge, Louisiana 70802 and Charles A. Riddle, III, Post

Office Box 315, Marksville, Louisiana 71351; and John P.

Whitley, Warden of the Louisiana State Penitentiary and the

State of Louisiana, respondents-appellants, represented by

Richard P. Ieyoub, Attorney General; Eddie Knoll, District

Attorney, and David Lafarque, Assistant District Attorney, of

the Office of the District Attorney, Twelfth Judicial District.

In light of the Court of Appeal’s reversal of the District

Court’s judgment in his favor, John Sheehan now petitions

this Honorable Court for writ of certiorari to correct the split

of authority among the circuits and the patent legal error

made by the Court of Appeal below.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Questions Presented for Review.................se00- i

a re ee ee © Pte ee Poe eee ere ili

, ge Pe reer ry rer Tree eee iv

Te: GE I ou i v5 hs ka e's Fee ART vi

Citations to Opinions BelOw..............s0cc0860% 1

PTT eT ee eee eee TT ee 1

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved .... 2

IE Me ok i hacia sa nh ieneuweheenns 3

5 NE IIIS kao pc sdan ace de eweeaes 3

Re I os havin ch arau conn tacansens 3

III. Action of the District Court and Court of Appeals 13

Summary of the Argument ..........cccscseccceess 14

Reasons For Granting the Writ .................... 16

I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF

THE PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS TO

A QUESTION OF LAW IS IN CONFLICT WITH

SEVERAL DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS

OF APPEALS NECESSITATING CORRECTION

AND CLEAR GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT

PETC ee ee, ee eee Peet er ee 18

II. THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMEND-

MENTS DO NOT PERMIT AN INNOCENT

MAN TO BE CONDEMNED TO LIFE IN

PRISON BASED ON A CONVICTION

ORCHESTRATED AND INFECTED BY A PRE-

SUMPTIVELY BIASED JURY FOREMAN .... 21

Ce aa ul aeeeud sues be oreeer ae 30

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

PII ire soe anny gus ncsen gods cued as App. 1

1. Unpublished Decision of Court of Appeal, Fifth

Citomit, Miapoh 11, 1997. ois. ccs cacceseds. App. 1

2. Minute Entry Referring Petition to Magistrate, May

Fai + bed brent basin wean Gan eck eee App. 35

3. Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge,

SINT iG I gC bins hl Teds ok k. App. 36

4. Judgment of U.S. District Court, November 21,

ie PELEEELEEESUEE ESO TET OT i eT ee App. 60

5. Ruling of Court of Appeal On Suggestion For

Rehearing En Banc (Treated as a Petition for Panel

Rehearing), April 9, 1997................... App. 61

6. Local Rule 35 and Internal Operating Procedure for

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal — Treatment of

Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc As Petitions for

ae pee er ne App. 63

7. State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d 670 (La. App. 3rd Cir.

ds EE ee TOE Oe ee ae tte App. 64

8. State v. Sheehan, 519 So.2d 129, 3 (La.

Ws ete ab oe arctan teeters puch aeeee App. 80

9. State v. Sheehan, 533 So.2d 4, 1 (La. 1988)..App. 81

10. State v. Sheehan, 558 So.2d 758 (La. App. 3rd Cir.

SPU Heh Heddend eke kieecae bades ocak conga App. 82

11. State v. Sheehan, 566 So.2d 394, 2 (La.

POY FETS eas Cv oe VEN Behe buds bak tek App. 100

12. 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d) (pre-ADEPA

ie te cage, BEE ELITE App. 101

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASEs:

Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404 (1st Cir. 1992)........ 20

Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1991)..... 19

Crawford v. United States, 29 S.Ct. 260 (1909) ........ 24

Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1996),

cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1342 (1997).............. 18, 19

Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (per

| rr rrr ere rer 19

McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood,

104 S.Ct. 845, 849 (1984) .............000.. 13, 16, 20

Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982)....16, 17, 18, 19

Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835 (1965)........... 29

Thompson v. Koehane, 116 S.Ct. 457 (1997)........... 21

Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1990)....... 19, 20

Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 520, 532 (1927)...... 18

United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977).... 20

United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. at p. 50, No.

14692 g. (C.C. Va. 1807) ..cccccccccsccscvcsoees 18, 28

United States v. Bynum, 634 F.2d 768, 771 (4th Cir.

rm marr ae semen apc yr * i 5 rao Fe ae 23

United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2nd Cir.

TU dk ceccnsweesnenedigpanieswdssne ee sitenaees 28

United States v. Perkins, 748 F.2d 1519, 1533 (ilth

ek SED cv n'vnecécdedennceekenphaeeeekeeieaeess

United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (Sth Cir.

BE acoko-0ee ces esanbanens teEteeereae a 20, Bee

29

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

LoulIsIANA CAsEs:

State v. Mitchell, 475 So.2d 61 (La. App. 2nd Cir.

nad SUERTE ELECTR EET TTT EET C ET eT Terre eee 24

State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317, 1318 (La. 1980) .... 24

Unrrep States ConstItTuTION:

Sixth Amendment........................2--... 2, 13, 28

Fourteenth Amendment.................... 0.00 cccuee. 2

STATUTES:

Oe ey > I

28 U.S.C.A. 2254... 0c ccc cece ce ueues 13

BO WBA ZEIGE) ig cc ccc ccccccccccccccccevcccuccecs 2

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CITATIONS TO OPINIONS BELOW

The Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge for the

United States District Court, Western District, is unreported, Civil

Action No. 94-2249 (Appendix 2).

The Judgment of the United States District Court, Western

District, is unreported, Civil Action No. 94-2249. (Appendix 3).

The Opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit is

unreported, No. 96-30008. (Appendix 4).

The Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, reversing

petitioner’s conviction and sentence is reported at 515 So.2d 670

(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987). (Appendix 7).

The subsequent denial of the state’s application for certiorari

and/or review to the Louisiana Supreme Court is reported at 519

So.2d 129, 3 (La. 1988). (Appendix 8).

The Opinion of the Louisiana Supreme Court remanding the

case back to the district court for evidentiary hearing on the motion

for a new trial because of newly discovered evidence is reported at

533 So.2d 4, 1 (La. 1988). (Appendix 9).

The Opinion of the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, affirming

petitioner’s conviction and sentence is reported at 558 So.2d 758

(La. App. 3rd Cir. 1990). (Appendix 10).

The denial of petitioner’s application for writ of certiorari to

the Louisiana Supreme Court on the issues raised in petition for

writ of habeas corpus is reported at 566 So.2d 394, 2 (La. 1990).

(Appendix 11).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This federal action began with a petition for writ of habeas

corpus filed in the United States District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana. The Magistrate Judge and District Court

Judge concluded that John Sheehan’s 1988 conviction was uncon-

stitutional. The District Court entered judgment on November 27,

1995, granting Sheehan a conditional writ of habeas corpus from

his invalid 1988 conviction with an order for his release upon the

state’s failure to re-try him within sixty days of the entry of

judgment.

The State appealed and the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction

over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2253. On March 11, 1997,

2

the panel reversed the District Court. On April 9, 1997, the Court

of Appeal, treating his timely filed Suggestion for Rehearing En

Banc as a Petition for Panel Rehearing in accordance with the

Court’s local rules and IOPs governing rehearings, denied John

Sheehan’s request for rehearing. Accordingly, this Honorable Court

has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves egregious violations of the Sixth Amend-

ment, Constitution of the United States, which provides:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the

right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of

the State and district wherein the crime shall have been

committed, which district shall have been previously

ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and

cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the

witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for

obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-

tance of Counsel for his defense.

and the Fourteenth Amendment which provides in relevant part:

. . . [NJor shall the State deprive any person .of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of the law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.

This case also involves the misapplication of 28 U.S.C.A.

2254(d), as the provision read before the recent AEDPA amend-

ment. (See App.12) As well as, the misapplication of the presump-

tion of correctness now contained in § 2254(d), which provides in

pertinent part that a writ of habeas shall only issue where the

petitioner shows that the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or

involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-

lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court

of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea-

sonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-

dence presented in the State court proceeding.

SAA MERE Bia K A SNE

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I. Preliminary Statement.

John Sheehan is innocent. Nevertheless, he is serving a life

sentence in the Louisiana State Penitentiary without ever receiving

the fair trial promised to him by our Constitution. This is an

extraordinary and extreme case that cries out for the habeas relief

ordered by the District Court below. The constitutional violations

are so fundamental and egregious that the petition must be granted

to correct the split of authority in the circuits, and finally provide

clear guidance for the Courts of Appeals in future cases.

The Fifth Circuit panel’s reversal of the District Court’s

judgment has tured the standard of review governing the legal

question of implied juror bias on its head in favor of blind

adherence to the tortured rulings of the elected trial judge in the

small, country town of Marksville, Louisiana.

John was narrowly convicted for the accidental death of his

wife led by a foreman who lied to get on the jury. The foreman,

David Trimbur, was an active reserve police officer with the

Sheriff’s Office which investigated the alleged offense, and as it

turns out, the friend of the lead detective in the case, Detective

Venable. Trimbur even sought out the advice of a local attorney

concerning the possible effect of his deputy status before reporting

for jury duty.

The case was built almost solely upon the circumstantial bits

and pieces of the lead detective’s memory of the “crime scene”,

after he “lost” and/or “accidentally destroyed” critical Pieces of

evidence such as photos of the so-called “crime scene” and the

blouse John’s wife was wearing. Detective Venable’s credibility

and memory was the primary issue at trial. Had all of these items

of evidence not been lost or destroyed before trial, they could have

been used to tangibly refute the prosecution’s case.

Il. Factual Background.

On April 30, 1986, John Sheehan and his wife, Monica, and

their infant son, were visiting John’s grandparents in the tiny

Louisiana town of Dupont near Marksville. While his grandfather

was out crawfishing, John decided to help him by cleaning his

4

grandfather’s shotgun with oil and a rag. His wife left the den

briefly to put their infant son down for a nap. When she returned,

she seated herself, cross-legged, on the den floor facing John as he

continued to rub the oily cloth over the gun. Unknown to John; his

grandfather had left two shells in the gun which to John’s knowl-

edge and experience, he’d never done.

While John was wiping the gun down, John, his wife, and his

grandmother were visiting and talking about their family crawfish-

ing business, the gun accidently discharged striking his wife in the

upper left shoulder and chest.

John’s severely handicapped brother, Martin, who was sitting

right by Monica was unhurt. John’s grandmother, who was stand-

ing in the kitchen just off the den (the two rooms being separated

by a bar rather than a wall) sent John to find his grandfather and

telephoned for help. John’s wife died before help could arrive.

The coroner and Detective Venable on the case ruled the death

accidental, but because Sheehan had recently increased the life

insurance on his wife, Venable, urged on by Mrs. Sheehan’s family,

pursued his theory that Sheehan had purposely killed his wife for

the insurance proceeds.

In November of 1986, John Sheehan was tried for the death of

his wife in Marksville. The state’s circumstantial case developed,

sponsored, and recreated from memory by Venable resulted in

John’s narrow ten to two conviction, the minimum required for

conviction. The Louisiana Court of Appeals, however, reversed and

remanded in light of Detective Venable’s violation of Miranda.

State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d 670 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1987) (App.7). —

Given the extensive, sensational media coverage of his arrest,

trial, and conviction in this small community, Sheehan then filed a

Motion to Change Venue. The judge denied the motion. Sheehan

was retried in Marksville in April 1988, again before the same

judge. On April 30, 1988, he was convicted by a narrow ten to two

verdict.

After the trial, the defense learned that foreman Trimbur had

concealed the fact that he was an actively commissioned reserve

deputy with the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff’s Office. The defense also

learned that he was in fact a close personal friend and confidante of

the lead detective in the case, Detective Venable. During jury

bed

1 0 an 2h a ecb aL NEN roan ER,

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selection, Trimbur denied any telationship with the prosecuting

authorities and any close relationship with the state’s key witness.

The defense also discovered that members of the jury had learned

from news coverage that Sheehan had been tried and convicted

before, and they had discussed these facts before and during their

deliberations.

In light of the extraordinary manipulation of the jury selection

process and the jury’s exposure to the highly prejudicial extrinsic

information regarding his prior conviction, Sheehan filed a Motion

for New Trial.

At Sheehan’s trial, the trial court asked the following ques-

tions and received the following answers from Trimbur:

Q. Are you or any members of your family or close

friends employed by the District Attorney’s Office or by

the Sheriff's Office?

A. No sir.

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 918) (Emphasis supplied).

Q. Is there any personal, business, family, or health

reason that you know of why you could not serve as an

impartial juror in this case?

A. None that I know of.

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 919-20) (Emphasis supplied).

Q. Alright then Rev. Trimbur the district attorney of

Avoyelles Parish is Eddie Knoll. He just left here

for a few minutes. He’ll be back. The assistant

district attorney for this trial is David Lafargue.

The administrative assistant is Mr. Freeman Ford.

Do you know any of these people?

I know Eddie Knoll by name. But, I mean, I know

him, but not,

You know him as the district attorney?

Yes sir.

Have you ever had any dealings with him?

No sir.

rPOPrO >

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 917)

Additionally, Trimbur had led the Court and counsel to

believe that he was merely a passing acquaintance of Detective

Venable:

6

Q. Let me ask you some names and see if you know

these folks.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Detective Robert Venable with the Sheriff’s Office?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And how do you know Detective Venable?

A. I performed his wedding a year and a half ago.

Q. All right. And, did you have to — when I got

married, I met with the preacher in advance, and he

kind of counselled you and stuff, did you do any of

that, or did you just do the ceremony?

A. I just did the ceremony.

Q. All right. Do you know his wife?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was she a member of your congregation, or he?

A. She was. That was in Evergreen.

Q. All right have you had any contact with him since

that time?

A. I saw him yesterday for a few minutes in the hall,

and I asked him about his marriage.

Q. Other than that?

A. No sir. Not really.

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 930) (Emphasis supplied).

The first hearing on the Motion for New Trial was held on

June 28, 1988. (Tr., Vol. 7-8, pp. 1525-1653). Venable’s hearing

testimony revealed that he and his wife attended Trimbur’s small

congregation (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1533); that they saw each other

“numerous” times in 1986 (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1533-34); that Trimbur

would just “drop by” and visit with Venable in the Detective’s

Office at the Sheriff’s Office before the trial (Tr., Vol. 7, pp.

1535-36); that Venable’s wife also worked for the Sheriff’s Office,

and was commissioned with Trimbur (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1538); that

Venable had in fact assisted Trimbur in becoming an auxiliary

deputy by making a recommendation to the Sheriff on his behalf

(Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1539-40); that, in 1987, through January 1988,

Venable saw Trimbur at least once a month (Tr., Vol. 7, pp.

eee

Lc ine a RR,

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1540-41); Venable recalled seeing Trimbur at the Sheriff’s Office

before the trial, probably in his sheriff’s deputy uniform, and

remembered Trimbur being admitted through the locked back door

after knocking because he had “every reason to be around there”

and only police officers or employees of the District Attorney’s

office are allowed in this way (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1541-1542); that

Venable had visited in the Trimbur home at least half a dozen times

before the trial; further, he had coffee with the Trimburs at their

home two or three months before the hearing (just before

Sheehan’s trial) and he could just drop by to visit at any time (Tr.,

Vol. 7, p. 1543); Venable saw Trimbur at least three or four times

between January 1988 and April 1988 to discuss Venable’s marital

problems (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1545); and Venable was very comfortable

confiding in Trimbur as a friend and as a pastor (Tr., Vol. 7, p.

1546).

Sergeant Malcolm LaBorde, a veteran with the Avoyelles

Parish Sheriff’s Office, also testified at the hearing. He told the

court that he had personally been on patrol with Trimbur at least

five or six times in 1987 (Tr., Vol. 7, pp. 1549-50); that he had seen

Trimbur patrolling with many other deputies usually on the twelve

hour evening shift (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1550); that regular and auxiliary

deputies wore the same uniforms; you could not tell the difference

between the two (Tr., Vol. 7, p. 1550); Trimbur had ridden with

him to make arrests and to check out complaints (Tr., Vol. 8, p.

1551); Trimbur received officer training; he knew how to book

suspects, write reports, handcuff suspects, and he carries a gun on

patrol (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1551); Trimbur had to be qualified for fire

arms training by the Alexandria Police Department, and had to re-

qualify twice a year (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1552); Trimbur was required to

attend monthly training meetings at the Sheriff’s Office (Tr., Vol. 8,

p. 1553); and Trimbur was often at the Sheriff’s Office even if he

was not on duty (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1555).

Deputy LaBorde also testified that he had asked Trimbur how

he had managed to get on the Sheehan jury. He was curious

because people working at the Sheriff’s Office do not serve on

juries. Deputy LaBorde stated that Trimbur told him that “some-

body had asked him some questions, you know, if he was working

with [the Sheriff’s Office], and he said yes.” (Tr., Vol. 8, pp.

1555-56).

8

Gano Bergeron, a captain with the Sheriff’s Office, testified

that he was responsible for training and dispatching all auxiliary

deputies. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1598); that Trimbur was one of the more

concerned deputies and he worked more than the required mini-

mum 16 hours a month. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1599-1600). While he was

in charge of training, Trimbur and the others received training in

how to work car accidents, the law governing searches and sei-

zures, how to secure crime scenes, and “shoot, don’t shoot” firearm

safety. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1600).

At the hearing, Trimbur was forced to admit he was commis-

sioned as a reserve deputy in October of 1985 (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1562),

and that he kept his commission at home in a drawer; that he was

required to wear a sheriff’s deputy uniform and hat and the same

badge as regular sheriff’s deputies (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1557); that he

owned a gun which he only carried while on patrol, although when

asked during voir dire whether he “used guns” he said he did not

(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1558; Vol. 4, p. 932); that he attended monthly

training meetings at the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Office through-

out 1986, 1987, and 1988 (Tr., Vol. 8, pp. 1560-61); that he rode

around with various deputies on patrol, and while on patrol he and

his partners had arrested suspects, transported them to jail, and

interrogated them in jail (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1559); that he was required

to work at least eight hours every month in addition to his eight

hours of monthly training to maintain his deputy position (Tr., Vol.

8, pp. 1562-63); and he admitted that he had been called up for

duty during the Cuban inmate crisis at Oakdale, and was paid by

the Sheriff’s Office for guarding an inmate at Humana Hospital

(Tr., Vol. 8, pp. 1563, 1590-91). All of this occurred while John

Sheehan was a trustee in the tiny Avoyelles Parish Jail, where

Trimbur and Venable worked.

After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Thereafter,

Sheehan applied for writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court because

of newly discovered evidence that Trimbur had contacted an

attorney when he received his summons, seeking legal advice

regarding his minister exemption and questions about the possible

effect of his position with the Sheriff’s Office on his ability to

serve as a juror or to get out of service altogether.

a

De heen RAPES A AD: SN ak ld tt DMPO

Anak Ab om Mit PKA

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In November of 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court granted

writs and remanded the case to the trial court with an order for a

second evidentiary hearing. (App.9).

At the second hearing on the motion for new trial, Trimbur

admitted that as soon as he received his jury summons he sought

out the advice of a local attorney, Claire Sharpe, who attended his

church. (Tr. Supplement, p. 24-25). He said he called Ms. Sharpe

to see if he had to show up for jury duty since he had a minister

exemption, but claimed he did not remember asking if his service

as a deputy would prevent him from jury service. He testified that

he called her because of his “busyness . . . I just wanted to not

bother with it.” (Tr. Supplement, p. 25-26). Ms. Sharpe advised

him to call the judge. He said he did so, but he did not tell the

judge he was a deputy. (Tr. Supplement, pp. 26-27)

Claire Sharpe testified that Trimbur called her and asked her if

a minister was prohibited from serving on a jury:

And I told him that I felt like it’s not an automatic thing,

that he can be exempted if he wanted to be. And he said

— we talked a while and then [Trimbur] said something

about, what about being an auxiliary deputy? And, |

said, again, I think it’s basically the same thing . . . And

I said, well, if you’re extremely worried about it, you

can just tell them, when you’re asked questions ... I

explained to him that he would be asked many ques-

tions by the defense and by the prosecution, concern-

ing his relationships . . . I said, it’s difficult for you to

determine what’s important because you’re not an

attorney; and I said, you needn’t worry. If you’re

willing to serve, they’ll ask you those questions and

just answer them.

(Tr. Supplement, pp. 35-36) (Emphasis supplied).

Ms. Sharpe stated that on at least two occasions she distinctly

remembered Trimbur reflecting concern, interest, curiosity, and the

like over the possible effect of his deputy status. At one point, he

told her that it would probably be best for him to take his minister

exemption, but she urged him to serve, suggesting to him that he

would be a good juror. (Tr. Supplement, p. 36). She further testified

that she specifically advised Trimbur that the lawyers would know

10

what to ask and for him to just make sure he completely and

truthfully answered their questions. (Tr. Supplement, p. 37).

Ms. Sharpe testified that during her conversation with Trimbur

he had even voiced concern about the possibility of a mistrial or

multiple appeals if he decided to serve on the jury:

Q. Now, do you remember why that term, “mistrial” or

“appeal” came into the conversation? In what con-

text was that used?

A. Well, that would relate to what I just told Mr. Knoll

concerning his being a minister and a deputy, if, for

some reason, down the line, whether or not he’s

asked the question, that there would be repetitive

appeals and possibly the word “mistrial;” I really

don’t remember, but we did talk about something

like that.

Q. As regards to his status as a minister and deputy?

A. Yes.

(Tr. Supplement, p. 42).

At the prior hearing, Trimbur testified that “he was never

asked” whether or not he was a reserve deputy, but would have

admitted it, if specifically asked. (Exhibit A, Vol. 8, p. 1593). He

also said that he did not recall the trial judge asking him if he

worked for the Sheriff’s Office, but stated that he had not told the

judge that he was a deputy sheriff because he “felt” his involve-

ment with the Sheriff Office was minimal and of no consequence.

(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1573).

The following exchange occurred during Trimbur’s voir dire

testimony:

Q. Ok. Now, the other thing is, being in the city like

you have, I’m curious, have you had any kind of —

I don’t want to say outrage or up-roar, but conflict

about drinking in one of the neighboring towns,

and teenage drinking; and Mr. Rabalais is involved

in that. Are you — does that refresh your memory?

Have you been to any meetings that Mr. Rabalais

attended or you’ve attended, or Mr. Knoll’s

attended, on that issue?

A. Yes.

11

Tell me about that.

I went to see what was going to transpire in the

way of exchange of dialogue with the gentleman

representing out ABC Board Camp. Mr. Rabalais’

connection with that has no bearing on me, Ok? I

wouldn’t — I don’t portray myself with this word,

“outrage.” Ok?

Q. Well, I don’t know what the right word is, Ok? I’m

just looking for a word. . . . conflict...

A. I attended one meeting at the Concerned Parents

for Better Avoyelles, if that’s what you’re referring

to.

I don’t know.

Yes sir, that, I think, is what you’re referring to. Mr.

Rabalais was present at that meeting; I know that.

Ok, and what about Mr. Knoll?

Yes sir.

> ©

> ©

> ©

Ok, where is — what is your interest in that issue?

You know, I can follow up and you can answer all

the questions. And, does that come from just a

personal interest as an individual, or is that

4 through your representing the interest of your

; congregation, or of your religion or, you know,

whatever?

A. Through my church. . . . that was through per-

sonal interest as an individual.

(Tr., Vol. 4, pp. 928-29) (Emphasis supplied).

At the hearing, however, Trimbur corrected his voir dire

testimony. He stated that during the meeting at District Attorney

Eddie Knoll’s house approximately a month before Sheehan’s trial,

he “spoke up and said in that meeting . . . I said, I have a

commission, I am a deputy, I have a uniform, if you ever need

help in this parish, in this area, call me and I will see if I can

work out a way to be of assistance to you.” (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1572).

He did not ever mention this critical information during voir dire.

Trimbur testified that he did not think the fact that he assumed

a law enforcement role at this meeting was important. Trimbur

©

Sabie ND RR ins OE

12

testified that since the District Attorney prosecuting Sheehan knew

he was a deputy, and he assumed Sheehan’s counsel, Rodney

Rabalias and Tucker Melancon (now a sitting federal district court

judge), knew he was a deputy, he thought someone would bring it

up “if it was of any consequence”. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1573). This

testimony prompted the following colloquy between defense coun-

sel, Lewis Unglesby, and Trimbur:

Q. Now, Rev. Trimbur, were you confused about the

fact that I was interested in what happened, and

what you were doing at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. You were? Well, why did you not think to volun-

teer that you had taken on the role at that meeting

of a volunteer police officer who would help those

in the community concerned about the drinking of

under-aged children, and that you, yourself, are

willing to report that to the deputies or the District

Attorney, or whomever was the appropriate author-

ity. Why didn’t you tell me that?

A. I absolutely didn’t feel it had any consequence at

all, in this trial.

(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1574). He did, however, admit that the trial court

had told him and other potential jurors that there might be ques-

tions during voir dire that might not seem important or might even

seem silly, but each juror needed to answer those questions hon-

estly and completely to the best of his ability. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1575).

After the hearing, the trial court denied Sheehan’s motion

because in his mind there was an issue as to whether Trimbur was

technically “employed” by the Sheriff’s Office, since, although he

was paid for guarding inmates, he was “only” a reserve deputy.

While the judge admitted Trimbur’s answer during voir dire was

“arguably less than a full disclosure”, he excused Trimbur’s answer

because “he did not intentionally mislead anyone.” (Tr., Vol. 8, p.

1657). The judge further reasoned that the only way the defense

could show bias was to show, in the abstract, that law enforcement

personnel are prosecution oriented, since Trimbur claimed that he

had no prior knowledge of the case. (Tr., p. 1657). Further, the

judge found Trimbur had not “intentionally misled” the defense

about his friendship with Venable, stating the attorneys should have

13

asked more questions about it to unearth this information. (Tr., pp.

1661-2).

Following the second hearing on the motion, the trial court

again denied the motion. (Tr. Supplement, p. 43).

Itt. Action of the District Court and Court of Appeals.

Following the exhaustion of his state court remedies, John

Sheehan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254 on December 8, 1994. By memorandum order dated

February 1, 1995, the state was ordered to answer the petition and

submit the entire state court record with the court. On May 15,

1995, the District Court referred the petition to Magistrate Judge

Simon for his report and recommendation. (App.2).

After thorough briefing of the issues, the Magistrate Judge

issued his written recommendation that the writ of habeas corpus

be granted because John Sheehan’s Sixth Amendment right to a

fair trial before an impartial jury was violated. (App.3).

After an exhaustive review of the record, the Magistrate Judge

found that “Trimbur’s testimony was riddled with inconsisten-

cies.” (App.3, p.9). The Magistrate found proven evidence of

actual bias under McDonough Power Equipment, Inc. v. Green-

wood, 104 S.Ct. 845 (1984), as well as, implied bias:

The facts and circumstances of this case, taken as a

whole, show that Trimbur deliberately concealed his

employment with the Sheriff’s Office because he

wanted to be on the jury; in fact, he was the jury

foreman. Trimbur was asked to state his employment

with the Sheriff’s Office and did not do so because he

‘did not think it was important’. Trimbur did not take

his minister’s exemption because ‘he wanted to serve on

this jury’. Whether or not Trimbur believed his job as an

auxiliary deputy would not influence his judgment as a

juror, and through him, the other jurors, is irrelevant;

that was not his decision to make. See Scott, 854 F.2d at

699 (juror’s conscious censoring of the information that

his brother was a deputy sheriff created a strong infer-

ence that he wanted to serve on the jury and thought it

unlikely that the court or defense counsel would permit

him to do so).

14

While fully cognizant of the presumption of correctness, the

Magistrate further ruled:

However, in the instant case, the trial judge made no

finding as to whether the circumstances indicated that

Trimbur was biased; he only found that a deputy sheriff

was not disqualified from serving as a juror because he

could not be considered biased per se which is actually

an erroneous statement of the law. An inference of bias

was created by Trimbur’s conscious censoring of the

information that he was an auxiliary Deputy Sheriff

and that he was friends with Detective Venable; but, as

an active auxiliary deputy sheriff, he was considered to

be biased as a matter of law. (App.3, p.15)

On November 27, 1995, after a full review of the record, the

District Court entered judgment granting Sheehan a conditional

writ of habeas corpus. The state appealed claiming the District

Court erred in every respect. The Court of Appeal reversed, ruling

that “the lower courts failed to defer properly to the state court

findings of fact”. (App.1, p.2).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The fundamental issue raised by these proceedings is whether

any juror, who neglects, conceals, or fails to disclose the fact that

he is an actively commissioned, badge-wearing, gun carrying

reserve deputy sheriff with the very agency responsible for investi-

gating and charging petitioner and a friend of the lead detective,

can ever be considered a fair juror, despite his post-trial protesta-

tions of impartiality, and the trial judge’s blind acceptance of his

claimed freedom from bias. Particularly where, the objective,

undisputable evidence shows that he was so concerned about the

effect of his deputy status on the possibility of getting out of jury

service that he sought out the advice of a local attorney before he

ever walked through the courthouse doors and discovered that he

had the opportunity to participate in the most sensationalized

murder case in the history of his small, rural community.

It is petitioner’s contention that, given the proven, objective

reality presented by the evidentiary record, it is impossible as a

matter of law, for such a juror to be impartial, and that the trial

judge’s finding that the foreman sincerely believed he could be

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15

impartial despite these undisclosed relationships to the prosecuting

agency flies in the face of all logic, psychology, and human

experience.

This Court should finally and squarely address the question of

whether implied bias is a pure question of law or a mixed question

of law and fact beyond the reach of the presumption of correctness.

The Court should correct the resulting split of authority among the

circuits on this issue.

The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have

ruled that implied bias, as opposed to actual or admitted bias, is a

question of law beyond the reach of the presumption of correctness

whereas the Fifth Circuit below applied the presumption to this

purely legal issue, or at a minimum, this mixed question of law and

fact.

The lead detective was the state’s key police witness against

John Sheehan. He was a very important witness. He testified that

he took photos of the alleged crime scene, but that the film was

destroyed because he left the camera in the sun. The jury had to

test Venable’s credibility. Trimbur and Venable had coffee together

in Trimbur’s home some time just before the trial and discussed the

detective’s marital problems. Trimbur could not impartially judge

this case in light of his relationships and natural allegiances to the

Sheriff’s Department and the detective who had helped him get his

commission. Trimbur got the job because his friend, Venable,

recommended him to the Sheriff.

Trimbur had even called an attorney after receiving his jury

summons, seeking advice. His attorney testified they he had men-

tioned his relationship with the sheriff’s office and raised concerns

about the effect of this relationship upon his ability to sit on this

jury and the possibility of a mistrial or repeated appeals. His

attorney told him to tell the trial court and the attorneys involved if

he was extremely worried about it, and to just answer the questions

honestly and completely. He did not.

Trimbur wore the same uniform, badge, and hat as full time

deputies. He carried a gun on patrol and had to qualify and re-

qualify twice a year to carry his weapon although when asked in

voir dire if he “used guns” he said: “No.” At every turn, informa-

tion which could have lead to the discovery of his being a deputy

was suppressed.

16

Had Trimbur honestly answered the direct questions put to

him, the defense would have had a valid basis to challenge him

for cause under well settled Louisiana law. A reserve deputy

sheriff is too likely to be influenced as a juror by that associa-

tion and should be disqualified from jury service. Accordingly,

he was denied the right to a fair trial before an impartial jury

under McDonough, and regardless of whether the pre- or post-

AEDPA standard is employed, petitioner proved by clear and

convincing evidence that the state court findings on the issue

of actual bias were incorrect. Moreover, the District Court was

correct in granting John Sheehan the habeas relief required by

the United States Constitution under the implied bias doctrine.

The District Court’s resolution of this purely legal or mixed

question of law and fact is not subject to the presumption of

correctness.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

An accused’s right to be tried by an impartial jury of his

peers is one of the hallmarks of our constitutional heritage. The

Sixth Amendment commands that “[ijn all criminal prosecu-

tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 2.:d public

trial, by an impartial jury .. .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Every

member of any jury must be “capable and willing to decide the

case solely on the evidence before it. . . . ” Smith v. Phillips,

102 S.Ct. 940, 946 (1982). The voir dire process protects this

inviolate principle “by exposing possible biases, both known

and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.” McDonough

Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 104 S.Ct. 845, 849

(1984).

As the Court noted in McDonough:

Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on

voir dire may result in a juror’s being excused for

cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant chal-

lenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their

peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful

answers by prospective jurors if this process is to

serve its purpose is obvious.

McDonough, 104 S.Ct. at 849. This critically important process

of rooting out biased jurors is thwarted, however, when jurors

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17

fail to honestly and completely answer the questions put to

them during the voir dire examination.

The authority to accept jurors for service is vested by law

in the court and counsel. By withholding information, prospec-

tive jurors effectively usurp this critical decision-making

authority. When this occurs, the verdict is infected by bias and

constitutionally unreliable. The opportunity for prejudice to the

accused is obvious. Justice O’Connor aptly observed these

difficulties in Smith v. Phillips, 102 S.Ct. 940, 948 (1982):

Determining whether a juror is biased or has pre-

judged a case is difficult, partly because the juror

may be unaware of it. The problem may be com-

pounded when a charge of bias arises from a charge

of juror misconduct. . . . Whether or not the state

proceedings result in a finding of “no bias,” the

Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury should

not allow a verdict to stand under such circum-

stances [where bias is implied].

As the District Court properly held below, that is what pre-

cisely happened in this case.

Given the extreme facts of this case, it is impossible as a

matter of law, for such a jury foreman to be considered impar-

tial. The trial judge’s apologia for Trimbur’s inexcusable fail-

ure to fully and frankly answer direct questions flies in the face

of all logic, psychology, and human experience. Without ques-

tion, one biased juror destroys the integrity of any verdict.

Given the natural, and often subconscious, human propen-

sity for self-justification, it is difficult, at best, if not impossi-

ble to learn from a juror’s own testimony whether he was in

fact impartial. In the instant case, it would be virtually impos-

sible to expect that any juror, in Trimbur’s position, could

admit that his undisclosed law enforcement history had indeed

affected or influenced his verdict and behavior as foreman.

Nearly 200 years ago, Chief Justice Marshall, in words partic-

ularly appropriate to this case, stated that a person “may

declare that he feels no prejudice in the case; and yet the law

cautiously incapacitates him from serving on the jury because

it suspects prejudice, because in general persons in a similar

18

situation would feel prejudice.” United States v. Burr, 25 Fed.

Cas. at p. 50, No. 14692 g. (C.C. Va. 1807). Only cynics or

sophists could possibly declare — much less believe — that the

foreman in this case would not be subject to “a possible

temptation . . . not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true

between the state and the accused . . .” Tumey v. State of Ohio,

273 U.S. 520, 532 (1927). Undoubtedly, the extreme nature of

this case is precisely the kind Justice O’Connor had in mind in

Smith v. Phillips, supra.

I. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE

PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS TO A QUES-

TION OF LAW IS IN CONFLICT WITH SEVERAL

DECISIONS OF OTHER COURTS OF APPEALS

NECESSITATING CORRECTION AND CLEAR

GUIDANCE FROM THIS COURT.

The decision of the Fifth Circuit has created a dangerous

split of authority among various circuit courts of appeal

regarding the application of the presumption of correctness to

the legal question of implied or presumptive juror bias. The

Fifth Circuit below decided that the doctrine of implied bias is

a question of fact not law; and therefore, governed by the

presumption of correctness. In doing so, the court reversed the

District Court’s finding that John Sheehan was entitled to

independent federal review of his constitutional challenges.

The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have

ruled that implied bias is a question of law beyond the reach of

the presumption of correctness.

In Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 117 S.Ct. 1342 (1997), the Tenth Circuit ruled in a

state prisoner’s habeas case that whether implied bias exists in

a juror is a legal determination that turns on an objective

evaluation of the challenged juror’s background and relation to

the case being tried. Drawing on Justice O’Connor’s concur-

rence in Smith v. Phillips, supra, the court noted that such

extreme circumstances requiring a finding of implied bias

which might include a revelation that the juror is an employee

of the prosecuting agency like we have as in this case. The

court further noted:

19

Thus, juror bias may he found even though a juror

denies any partiality. A vinding of implied bias in the

face of a juror’s denials is not, however, tantamount

to a finding that the juror has lied. As Justice O’Con-

nor has observed, ‘[djetermining whether a juror is

biased or has prejudged the case is difficult, partly

because the juror may be unaware of it.’ Though a

juror might honestly believe she can be impartial,

she nevertheless may have ‘such a close connection

to the circumstances at hand that bias must be pre-

sumed’.

Gonzales, 99 F.3d at 987 (Citations omitted).

Likewise, in another state prisoner habeas case, the Tenth

Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that a woman con-

victed for the first degree murder of her spouse was entitled to

a new trial in light of a juror’s dishonest responses to voir dire

questioning regarding intra-family abuse. The court held that

whether a juror’s bias may be implied from circumstances is a

question of law. Any doubts regarding bias must be resolved

against the juror, and a juror’s dishonesty, of itself, was evi-

dence of juror’s bias. Burton v. Johnson, 948 F.2d 1150 (10th

Cir. 1991).

In another state prisoner habeas action, the Seventh Cir-

cuit in Hunley v. Godinez, 975 F.2d 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (per

curiam), the Seventh Circuit rejected the state’s contention that

the district court erroneously invoked the doctrine of implied

bias in order to evade the presumption of correctness. While

noting that this Court has held that actual bias is a question of

fact entitled to deference on review, this Court “ ‘has never

precluded the use of the conclusive presumption of bias’ in

‘extreme’ or ‘extraordinary cases,’ ” citing Justice O’Connor’s

concurring opinion in Smith. Hunley, 975 F.2d at 318. Accord-

ingly, the court succinctly held that whether a juror’s partiality

may be presumed from the circumstances is a question of law

beyond the reach of the presumption of correctness. Hunley,

975 F.2d at 318-319.

The Ninth Circuit in Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520 (9th

Cir. 1990), involved a claim of implied bias rejected by the

district court. The court clearly would not have been deterred

20

“personal connection” between the challenged juror and the

litigation as was presented in United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d

68 (9th Cir. 1977). The court concluded that the circumstances

did not warrant a presumption of bias:

Neither juror Smith herself nor a close relative had

been a rape victim or rapist. There was no personal

connection between Smith and the defendant, the

victim, or any other witness. Smith had no prejudi-

cial information about the defendant himself. This

situation differs significantly from that presented in

Allsup. In Allsup, the jurors in question worked for

the very bank which had been robbed . . . Not only

was there this employment relationship, but as bank

employees they had a well-founded, ‘reasonable

apprehension of violence’ by offenders such as the

defendant because ‘violence, or the threat of vio-

lence, is a frequent concomitant of the offense’ of

bank robbery . . . This combination added up to

presumed bias.

Tinsley, 895 F.2d at 529 (Emphasis supplied).

The First Circuit in Amirault v. Fair, 968 F.2d 1404 (lst

Cir. 1992), noted that state court findings on claims of actual

bias are presumed correct under 28 U.S.C.A. 2254(d). None-

theless, the court further noted

Although we read the majority vote in McDonough

Power Equipment v. Greenwood . . . to require a

further determination on the question of juror bias

even where a juror is found to have been honest, we

find that bias should not be implied here. As the

federal district court observed, the situation pre-

sented here of a juror found to have locked the

memory of an unrelated forty-year old rape does not

rise to the level of ‘exceptional’ or ‘extreme’ cir-

cumstances which may permit a finding of implied

bias.

Amirault, 968 F.2d at 1405-1496 (Citations omitted).

Although the full Court has yet to squarely decide the

issue and clear guidance is needed from the Court, the analysis

|

by the presumption of correctness had there been evidence of a

21

should be no less than that employed in Thompson v. Koehane,

116 S.Ct. 457 (1997). There, Justice Ginsburg, writing for a

solid majority, held that a state court decision as to whether a

suspect is “in custody” for purposes of Miranda is not entitled

to the statutory presumption of correctness, but is a mixed

question of law and fact warranting independent federal habeas

review. “What happened” issues of historical fact warrant the

presumption of correctness, but the “ultimate question” — Was

the foreman on John’s jury presumptively biased under the

totality of the circumstances? — falls outside of § 2254(d)’s

domain because of its “uniquely legal dimension” requiring the

court to apply an objective test to resolve “the ultimate

inquiry”. Thompson, 116 S.Ct. at 465. At a minimum, implied

juror bias must by necessity present a mixed question of law

and fact. Otherwise the doctrine would have little efficacy and

vitality in egregious situations like the one at bar.

Il. THE SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

DO NOT PERMIT AN INNOCENT MAN TO BE

CONDEMNED TO LIFE IN PRISON BASED ON A

CONVICTION ORCHESTRATED AND INFECTED

BY A PRESUMPTIVELY BIASED JURY FOREMAN.

The foreman of John Sheehan’s jury deliberately denied

the fact that he was a reserve criminal sheriff’s deputy. This

was critically important information because this office was

the very agency that investigated the death of John’s wife. He

also decided to consciously censor any information, like gun

use, which could have led the defense to the truth about his

connection with the investigating and prosecuting agencies

involved. Even though he was directly asked to reveal this sort

of information, he chose not to do so. Further compounding the

problem, when he was asked whether he knew a Detective

Venable, Trimbur’s answers led the court and the defense to

believe he was merely an acquaintance of Detective Venable.

In fact, he was the close personal friend, confidante, and

spiritual counsellor to Venable — the very detective who was

vigorously challenged at trial for his mishandling of critical

evidence and credibility problems. Once on the jury, a juror

22

who denied, concealed, and consciously censored critical infor-

mation about his relationship with both the Sheriff’s Office and

the state’s key police witness became its foreman and led the

jury to convict John Sheehan. This is presumptive bias in itself,

requiring habeas relief.

Even giving the foreman every benefit of the doubt, the

circumstances point so sharply to bias that even his own

denials of partiality must be discounted. United States v. Nell,

526 F.2d 1223, 1229 n. 8 (Sth Cir. 1976). He may to this day

sincerely believe that his undisclosed law enforcement rela-

tionships would not taint his judgment, but that is why Justice

O’Connor’s observations in Smith are so critical:

Determining whether a juror is biased or has pre-

judged a case is difficult, partly because the juror

may have an interest in concealing his own bias

and partly because the juror may be unaware of it.

Smith, 102 S.Ct. at 948.

In United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697 (Sth Cir. 1988), the

Fifth Circuit ruled that prospective jurors cannot be permitted

to censor material information during voir dire examination. In

Scott, the issue of juror bias arose when it was discovered that

the foreman of the jury failed to disclose the fact that his

brother was a deputy sheriff in the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s

Office. Scott moved for a new trial.

At the hearing, the foreman admitted his brother was a

deputy sheriff, but attempted to justify his actions by stating

that he had not furnished the information because he did not

think that it would affect his judgment in the case. Scott, 854

F.2d at 698. The trial court found that his failure to disclose

this relationship was “unreasonable”. Nevertheless, the trial

court excused his breach of faith because in the court’s opinion

the foreman “sincerely” believed that his brother’s position

would not affect his impartiality as a juror.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that “sincerity” is

not the proper constitutional test. There, the court held that the

constitution required a new trial due to implied bias: “The

dispute here, as the trial court and [the government] couched it,

is whether [the foreman] “failed to answer honestly. At bottom,

however, the issue is whether [the foreman] was biased

email

23

because of his relationship with his brother.” Scott, 854 F.2d at

699. Further, this Court pointed out:

The district court found that [the foreman] was “sin-

cere”. That is an insufficient basis for the court to

accept [the foreman] as a juror. A finding of “sin-

cerity” is not the same as a finding that the juror

was unbiased. A juror may not conceal material

facts disqualifying him simply because he sincerely

believes that he can be fair in spite of them.

Continuing, the Scott court recognized the tension, if not the

contradiction, inherent in the trial court’s findings. On the one

hand, the court found his failure to respond “unreasonable”,

and on the other, excusable given his “sincere” belief that he

could be an impartial juror. The court found that the foreman

“consciously censored” his relationship to law enforcement,

noting there was a strong inference that he wanted to serve on

the jury because he “believed it was his place, and not the

place of the court or defense counsel, to determine whether his

relations were a bar to jury service in this case.”

The court concluded its ruling, saying:

[The foreman] was hostile to what he correctly per-

ceived to be the interests of the defense and the

court. This in itself constitutes bias. As other cir-

cuits have recognized, “[c]Jertainly, when possible

non-objectivity is secreted and compounded by the

untruthfulness of a potential juror’s answer on voir

dire, the result is a deprivation of the defendant’s

right to a fail trial.”

Scott, 854 F.2d at 699-700, citing United States v. Perkins, 748

F.2d 1519, 1533 (11th Cir. 1984), quoting United States v.

Bynum, 634 F.2d 768, 771 (4th Cir. 1980).

Scott should have decided this case. The only real differ-

ence between Scott and the case at bar is that the jury foreman

in Scott hid the fact that his brother was a deputy sheriff. Here,

the jury foreman in John’s trial concealed not only the fact that

he was a deputy, but also that he was the social friend of the

prosecution’s star witness. One’s relationship to law enforce-

ment or persons in law enforcement are “challenge for cause”

questions; their implications for potential juror bias have been

Jo

recognized for centuries in Anglo-American jurisdictions. See

generally, Crawford v. United States, 29 S.Ct. 260 (1909).

The questions put to Trimbur demanded complete and

honest answers. The trial judge in his instructions had told

Trimbur that candor was required. He decided not to comply

with the rule of law. His “sincere” belief that he was not biased

is objectively unreasonable as the Magistrate and District

Court judges found.

Had Trimbur disclosed his relationships with the Sheriff's

Office and Detective Venable he would never have been

allowed to sit on this jury. Clear Louisiana jurisprudence at the

time of John’s trial supported challenging Trimbur for cause

had the defense known of his law enforcement relationships.

An active or reserve polic. officer at the time of trial is too

likely to be influenced as a juror by that association and should

be disqualified from the jury. In State v. Simmons, 390 So.2d

1317, 1318 (La. 1980), the Louisiana Supreme Court held:

7 . an actively employed criminal deputy sheriff is not a

competent criminal juror. Any jurisprudence to the contrary is

expressly overruled.” In State v. Mitchell, 475 So.2d 61 (La.

App. 2nd Cir. 1985), the court held:

[OJur review of the extensive Supreme Court juris-

prudence on the issue of jury service by one assoaci-

ated with law enforcement activities causes us to

determine that the trial court erred in failing to

sustain the challenges for cause by the defendants to

this juror. We conclude that our Supreme Court has

deemed that one serving in the capacity as an active

or reserve peace officer, such as a deputy sheriff or

police officer, is too likely to be influenced as a

juror by that association and should be disqualified

from jury service.

Mitchell, 475 So.2d at 65.

Trimbur’s inconsistent explanations of why he failed to

answer raise alarming questions about his actual bias and

personal motivations. His “explanations” are so riddled with

inconsistencies that it is difficult to ascertain what his actual

testimony is at times. The Magistrate Judge and District Court

agreed.

25

Trimbur admitted he attended a meeting of a civic group

called “Concerned Parents for a Better Avoyelles” at the Dis-

trict Attorney’s home just weeks before Sheehan’s trial. Trim-

bur stated that, at this meeting he “spoke up and said in that

meeting ... I said, I have a commission, I am a deputy, I

have a uniform, if you ever need help in this parish, in this

area, call me and I will see if I can work out a way to be of

assistance to you.” (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1572). He attempted to

justify his failure to disclose this information during jury

selection, saying he thought someone would bring it up “if it

was of any consequence”. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1573). Even if he

“sincerely” believed it was not important, and even if he

“sincerely” believed his law enforcement relationships would

not influence his judgment, and, through him, the other jurors,

his beliefs are irrelevant. It was not his decision to make. It

was the duty of counsel and the trial court to do so. As in Scott,

this creates a strong inference that he wanted to serve on the

jury and thought it unlikely that the court or defense counsel

would permit him to do so.

When pressed to explain this obvious omission he claimed

he was confused by the questions about the meeting and did

not think it was important:

Q. Now, Rev. Trimbur, were you confused about

the fact that I was interested in what happened,

and what you were doing at that meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. You were? Well, why did you not think to

volunteer that you had taken on the role at that

meeting of a volunteer police officer who

would help those in the community concerned

about the drinking of under-aged children, and

that you, yourself, are willing to report that to

the deputies or the District Attorney, or whom-

ever was the appropriate authority. Why didn’t

you tell me that?

A. I absolutely didn’t feel it had any consequence

at all, in this trial.

(Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1574). It just was not his job to decide if this

was important information.

26

Again and again inconsistencies arise. On June 28, 1988,

he said he just didn’t feel this information was important

enough to bring up. But we know that he called an attorney,

who testified that Trimbur was very concerned about the issue

of his deputy status. She said she told him that if he was

“extremely worried about it” he should just tell the court or the

attorneys. Why he chose to ignore her advice is unclear, but the

fact that he consciously did so and decided to hide this fact is

uncontroverted.

Other aspects of Trimbur’s attorney’s testimony are partic-

ularly alarming. Revealing Trimbur’s prescience, she said he

voiced real concern that his service might provoke a mistrial or

repetitive appeals. Why? This was on his mind before Trimbur

ever shows up at the courthouse, before he knows that he

would be a member of the jury venire for Sheehan’s highly

publicized trial. Is this not an admission of bias — to think he

might have caused a mistrial or repetitive appeals?

Trimbur testified that he wanted to avoid jury service

altogether — that he wanted to “get it off his calendar”, and did

not want to be bothered with it (Tr. Supplement, p. 25) He even

called the trial judge to see if he even had to show up at the

courthouse to claim his statutory exemption.

When asked during voir dire why he had not exercised his

exemption, he said: “Because I’m not just a member or servant

of my church; I’m a member of my community; and I feel

strongly an obligation in my community.” (Tr., Vol. 4, p. 925).

Contrast that with his testimony during the second hearing,

where he testified “I didn’t want to serve on the jury. I draw a

distinction between wanting to serve and being willing to

serve.” (Tr. Supplement, p. 28). Contrast that with his explana-

tion of why he had not claimed his exemption after he had gone

to the trouble of seeking legal advice regarding his status as a

minister and a deputy sheriff and his call to the judge to make

sure he had an exemption: “I saw no reason to claim it. I was

asking whether I would even have to bother coming in.” (Tr.,

Vol. 8, p. 26).

Trimbur came to court to exercise his automatic exemp-

tion, but ended up sitting through two long days of voir dire,

and a week long trial. What sparked his sudden interest? He

27

was the last juror chosen. He had heard the questions asked of

the other jurors over and over. He had plenty of time to reflect

upon his status and relationships, and to decide how he planned

to respond when his turn came up. Nonetheless, Trimbur testi-

fied that his only contact with Venable in a year and a half was

in the hall of the courthouse on the first day of jury service.

(Tr., Vol. 4, p. 930). Unless Venable was not telling the truth,

we know that this is not true. Venable testified that he had been

in Trimbur’s home several times and was probably there during

March and April 1988. (Tr., Vol. 8, p. 1545). The trial was held

the last week of April 1988.

Although Trimbur offered several inconsistent stories

about why he did not disclose he was a reserve deputy and

tried to minimize his role in his work for the Sheriff’s Office,

he never attempted to explain why he concealed the true nature

of his relationship with Detective Venable. This was critically

important information. The defense in this case was that the

shooting was accidental. The direct evidence indicated that it

was accidental, and the coroner initially ruled it accidental.

The case against John Sheehan was totally circumstantial,

and the state relied heavily on Venable’s testimony. Critical

elements of the so-called crime scene changed between the

moment of the incident and the time the coroner’s office

photographed the scene because Venable, the first officer to

arrive, failed to preserve the scene. He failed to seize the

shotgun shells out of the gun for fingerprint analysis which he

even conceded could have proven that John did not load the

gun and further prove his innocence! (Tr. pp. 1339-41). It was

Venable who testified from memory alone as to what he

remembered where, what “evidence” was found where, what

Sheehan allegedly told him, and as to what the physical evi-

dence involved because all of the photographs Venable took of

the scene were “lost” after he somehow allowed them to be

exposed to sunlight.

Other critical pieces of physical evidence like the shirt

John’s wife was wearing were also lost. The shirt could have

been aligned to the exit wounds to further corroborate John’s

statement of how this tragedy occurred and to disprove the

prosecution’s “pellet path” arguments.

28

John’s freedom or conviction rested almost solely on Ven-

able’s credibility; the jurors had to test his credibility. Only

impartial jurors could have done so. As the record so thor-

oughly demonstrates, given Trimbur’s undisclosed relation-

ships and natural allegiances, he was certainly not fit to do so.

As the District Court held, the trial court’s blanket acceptance

of Trimbur’s protestations of “sincerity” simply cannot be

accepted at face value. The trial court’s rulings are entitled to

no deference from any court. It would be asking far too much

of human nature to expect anyone in Trimbur’s position to

admit his undisclosed connections affected his verdict or

behavior. What person can be expected to admit that he had

violated his oath to tell the truth, his oath to be an impartial

juror and, in essence, admit he committed a crime, or at least, a

serious breach of faith? This is why Chief Justice Marshall

concluded so many years ago that:

[I]n determining whether a prospective juror should

be excluded on this ground [implied bias] his state-

ments upon voir dire are totally irrelevant; a person

‘may declare that he feels no prejudice in the case;

and yet the law cautiously excludes him from serving

on the jury because it suspects prejudice, because in

general persons in a similar situation would feel

prejudice,’ United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. at

50.”

United States v. Haynes, 398 F.2d 980, 984 (2nd Cir. 1968).

It is axiomatic that such jurors could hardly be expected to

afford a criminal defendant “the right to . . . trial, by an

impartial jury,” as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Other-

wise, if state court judges can hide behind the presumption of

correctness with a finding of “no bias” the constitutional guar-

antee of an impartial jury would truly become a hollow pledge.

The record makes Deputy Malcolm LaBorde’s testimony

all the more telling and alarming. Sergeant LaBorde testified

that he had asked Trimbur how he had managed to get on the

Sheehan jury. He was curious because people working at the

Sheriff’s Office do not serve on juries. Deputy LaBorde testi-

fied that Trimbur told him that “somebody had asked him

scniiaeesiiiiiiia imei

29

some questions, you know, if he was working with [the Sher-

iff’s Office], and he said yes.” (Tr., Vol. 8, pp. 1555-56).

We do not know the precise reasons why Trimbur chose to

conceal his relationships. Nor do we know what prompted the

dramatic change of heart in Trimbur’s willingness to serve on

this jury. But, given the human considerations at play here and

the applicable case law, we do know that John Sheehan did not

end up with a fair, unbiased, impartial juror.

As the Court noted in Swain v. Alabama, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835

(1965) (citations omitted):

The persistence of peremptories and their extensive

use demonstrate the long and widely held belief that

peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by

jury ... the challenge is “one of the most important

rights secured to the accused . . . The denial or

impairment of the right is reversible error without a

showing of prejudice . . . “For it is, as Blackstone

says, an arbitrary and capricious right; and it must be

exercised with full freedom, or it fails of its full

purpose.” The function of the challenge is not only

to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but

_ to assure the parties that the jurors before whom they

trust the case will decide on the basis of the evidence

placed before them, and not otherwise.

Trimbur would have never served on John’s jury had he

answered the questions put to him honestly. Petitioner would

have invariably exercised his remaining peremptory challenge

to remove Trimbur from the panel if this information had been

revealed.

The very purpose of voir dire was destroyed by Trimbur’s

actions. He ignored the trial court’s instructions to answer all

questions completely and truthfully. He ignored his attorney's

advice to answer all questions completely and truthfully. Trim-

bur “believed it was his place, and not the place of the court or

defense counsel to determine whether his relations were a bar

to jury service in this case.” Scott, 854 F.2d at 699. Trimbur

was hostile to what he correctly perceived to be the natural

concerns of the defense and the court.

30

As the court said in United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223,

1229 (Sth Cir. 1976): “The jury box is a holy place. To ensure

that those who enter are purged of prejudice, both challenges

for cause and the full complement of peremptory challenges

are crucial.” The Magistrate Judge and the District Court

properly ruled that Trimbur was presumptively biased. Trim-

bur, although a man of the cloth, was not fit to enter the holy

place and pass judgment upon John Sheehan.

CONCLUSION

The jury sitting in judgment of John Sheehan’s guilt or

innocence was infected by the presence of a presumptively

biased foreman. The evidentiary record speaks for itself. These

are fundamental constitutional violations going to the heart of

the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that all persons are entitled

to a fair trial before an impartial jury based solely on admissi-

ble evidence introduced at trial. This constitutional defect

warrants a new trial, and cries out for habeas relief. The

District Court properly granted the writ. John has already spent

over 10 years in prison without ever receiving a fair trial.

Accordingly, John Sheehan, prays that this Honorable

Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the

Court of Appeals’ reversal of the District Court’s order of

habeas relief.

Respectfully submitted,

Lewis O. UNGLEsBY

Unciessy & Kocu

246 Napoleon Street

Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70802

Telephone: (504) 387-0120

Facsimile: (504) 336-4355

Cuaries A. Rippie, III

Counsel of Record

P.O. Box 315

Marksville, Louisiana 71351

Telephone: (318) 253-4551

APPENDIX 1

App. 1

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-30008

JOHN ANTHONY SHEEHAN

Petitioner - Appellee

v.

JOHN P WHITLEY, Warden, Louisiana

State Penitentiary;

RICHARD P IEYOUB, Attorney General,

State of Louisiana

Respondents - Appellants

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

(94-CV-2249-A)

(Filed March 11, 1997)

Before JONES, DUHE, and EMILIO M. GARZA, Cir-

cuit Judges

EDITH H. JONES, Circuit Judge:*

Appellee John Anthony Sheehan was convicted of

second degree murder and sentenced to life imprison-

ment without benefit of parole for killing his wife,

Monica Jeansonne Sheehan in 1986. After his conviction

* Pursuant o [sic] Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule

47.5.4.

App. 2

was affirmed on direct and collateral review in the state

courts, Sheehan sought a writ of habeas corpus in federal

court. The district court referred the matter to a magis-

trate judge, who recommended granting the writ based

on Sheehan’s claims that he was denied a fair trial before

an impartial jury. The district court adopted the magis-

trate judge’s recommendation and ordered the state to

release Sheehan if he was not retried within sixty days.

Pending appeal, the order was stayed. We conclude that

the lower courts failed to defer properly to the state court

findings of fact. With that error corrected, there was no

basis for issuance of the writ. Accordingly, we reverse

and render judgment that relief be denied to appellee.

I. BACKGROUND

Monica Sheehan was killed in April 1986 when her

husband fired a 12-gauge pump shotgun into her chest.

Sheehan admitted that he was holding the shotgun when

it fired, but he contended at trial that he was merely

cleaning the gun and the shooting was accidental. Two

Louisiana juries disagreed, and appellee was twice found

guilty of second degree murder. The Louisiana appellate

court reversed Sheehan’s first conviction, finding that a

statement by appellee had been introduced against him in

violation of the constitution. State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d

670 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ den., 519 So.2d 129 (La.

1988,. Appellee’s second trial led to the confinement of

which he now complains.

At that trial, Michelle Bordelon testified that after an

argument in December 1984, Sheehan “told her that he

didn’t love her [Monica Sheehan], and didn’t know why

App. 3

he married her, and wish [sic] he would have never

married her.” Exhibit A, Trial Transcript (“Exh. A”) at

1178. Ms. Bordelon also testified that Sheehan abused

Monica, forcing her to visit the emergency room. Id. at

1176-79. Monica’s father testified that the marriage was

troubled and recounted a phone call from Monica in

which he overheard Sheehan threaten to kill her.? Id. at

1196. Monica’s mother also testified to marital difficulties

between Sheehan and Monica. Id. at 1209-11. Monica’s

step-father testified that Sheehan talked to him in July or

August of 1985 about marital difficulties, indicating that

he wanted out of the marriage.? Id. at 1220-21.

The state also introduced a $50,000 John Hancock

insurance policy on Monica’s life purchased on April 17,

1986, thirteen days before she died. The agent, Thomas

McCullom, testified that Sheehan already had a policy on

Monica’s life dating from 1984 in the amount of $25,000,

and the increase in insurance coverage ordered by

Sheehan was unsolicited. The John Hancock application

indicated that appellee did not contemplate acquiring any

other insurance on Monica’s life. Appellee made the pol-

icy effective immediately by delivering a military allot-

ment to Mr. McCullom.

1 “Anthony Sheehan was hollering over the phone that if

you tell your daddy anything about what’s going on over here,

I’m going to kill you; and if he comes down over here, I’m going

to fight with him and I’m going to kick him on his bad leg.” Id. at

1196.

2 “Well, I asked him [Anthony Sheehan] what their problem

was, and he told me that he just didn’t love her; that he thought

he did, but he didn’t. And that he would do anything that it took

to get her out of his life.” Id. at 1221.

App. 4

On April 23, just seven days before Monica’s death,

Sheehan initiated steps to secure an additional $75,000

insurance policy covering Monica’s life. The State Farm

representative, Phyllis Heser, testified that appellee

arrived at her office on April 24 without Monica, despite

Mrs. Hester’s admonition that Monica’s signature would

be necessary. Id. at 1057. Mrs. Hester sent the policy,

complete except for blanks requiring Monica’s signature,

home with Sheehan. When Sheehan returned the policy

early the next morning, the space contained Monica’s

purported signature.* Id. at 1059. To make the policy

effective immediately, Sheehan paid premiums for two

months in cash and returned to pick up the signed binder

that day, instead of accepting Mrs. Hester’s offer to mail

the binder once the agent had signed it. Id. at 1063-64.

The parties stipulated that the state’s handwriting expert

would testify that the signature purporting to be Mon-

ica’s on the State Farm policy application was actually

Sheehan's forgery. Id. at 1252.

When the shooting occurred, Monica was sitting on

the floor in front of her husband playing a game. He was

sitting in a chair and allegedly began to clean a 12 gauge

pump shotgun with an oily rag when the gun fired.

Monica was shot in the chest. The doctor who performed

the autopsy on Monica’s body testified that appellee’s

3 “Mr. Sheehan arrived at our office the next morning, on

the 25th, very early. Our office opens —- we work at 8:00, but we

don’t open to the public until 8:30. And he was sitting in the

parking lot when we unlocked the doors.” Exh. A at 1059.

App. 5

explanation that the shooting was accidental was incon-

sistent with Monica’s injuries and the trajectories of the

buckshot. Id. at 1108-1128.

Detective Robert Venable testified that three unspent

shotgun shells were found - two on the floor and one in

the chamber of the shot gun. Id. at 1325-26. A nurse who

arrived at the scene soon after the shooting testified that

two unspent shells and a spent shotgun shell were lying

on the floor near Monica’s body. Detective Venable did

not find a spent shell on the floor but found a spent shell

in the chamber of the shotgun.

The jury, by a 10-2 vote, found Sheehan guilty of

second degree murder. Appellee subsequently filed a

motion for new trial on the grounds that David Trimbur,

the jury foreman, had concealed his position as an auxil-

iary sheriff and his relationship with Detective Venable.

Appellee also alleged that members of the jury had

learned of his prior conviction on this charge. After an

evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion for

new trial. Appellee obtained a writ from the Louisiana

Supreme Court ordering the trial court to reopen the

hearing on the motion for new trial on the grounds that

appellee had newly discovered evidence. On remand, the

trial court heard the new evidence and again denied the

motion for new trial. This time, appeals were unsuccess-

ful. State v. Sheehan, 558 So.2d 758 (La. App.3d Cir. 1990).

Sheehan filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus,

alleging a denial of the right to trial by an impartial jury

because 1) Trimbur concealed information that would

have supported a challenge for cause and 2) the jurors

learned of appellee’s prior conviction for the same crime.

App. 6

The magistrate judge found that the state court applied

the wrong legal standard to appellee’s claim and thus

disregarded the state court’s findings of fact. The district

court concurred, leading to a conditional grant of the writ

and this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review.

The President signed the Antiterrorism and Effective

Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) on April 24, 1996.

Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). This circuit has

held that the AEDPA applies to appeals pending as of the

effective date of the act. Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751,

754 (5th Cir. 1996). AEDPA amended the substantive stan-

dards of review applicable to habeas cases.

In Drinkard, the panel determined that applying

§ 2254(d)(1) as amended by the AEDPA to pending cases

did not raise retroactivity problems since the amendment

is a “change in procedural rules” involving “federal stan-

dards of review of sate court decisions.” 97 F.3d at 766. A

habeas petitioner cannot demonstrate reliance on the

“former federal standards of habeas review in making

strategic, tactical, or other decisions during the state

court litigation.” Id. AEDPA has codified standards for

reviewing both the legal and factual determinations of

state courts pertinent to a habeas case. With respect to

any claim “that was adjudicated on the merits in state

court proceedings,” a writ shall not be granted unless the

petitioner shows that the state court adjudication

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to,

or involved an unreasonable application of,

App. 7

clearly established Federal law, as determined

by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an

unreasonable determination of the facts in light

of the evidence presented in the State court

proceeding.

AEDPA § 104, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis

added). AEDPA shields state court findings of fact from

reversal in federal court by a presumption of correctness,

which may be rebutted only by clear and convincing

evidence. AEDPA § 104, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

The following analysis will demonstrate that the

lower courts’ grant of relief did not satisfy these high

standards, but it will also show that, even under pre-

AEDPA standards, the lower courts failed to give the

appropriate deference to the state court findings. State

courts of competent jurisdiction, after a hearing on the

merits, made written factual findings supported by the

record as a whole. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) pre-AEDPA.

We must defer to the state court findings in the absence

of any proof that deference was unwarranted; the lower

federal courts’ mere disagreement with state court fact-

findings did not confer authority to disregard them.

B. Reverend Trimbur

The magistrate judge decided that Sheehan’s Sixth

Amendment right to a fair trial before an impartial jury

was violated because the jury foreman, Reverend David

Trimbur, concealed on voir dire that he was a reserve

deputy sheriff. This concealment allegedly created an

inference of bias which, according to the magistrate

App. 8

judge, would have supported a challenge for cause. The

alleged concealment also rendered Sheehan's counsel

unable to exercise their peremptory strikes intelligently.

The state argues that the magistrate judge failed to give

proper deference to the state court findings that Trimbur

was not biased. We agree with the state.

To demonstrate that he is entitled to a reversal, a

federal defendant who complains that a juror mistakenly

responded to a question on voir dire must first demon-

strate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material

question, and then further show that a correct response

would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for

cause. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464

U.S. 548, 555-56, 104 S.Ct. 845, 849-50 (1984). We will

assume, arguendo, that appellee must at least meet this

standard to justify relief in a federal habeas proceeding.

See Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 419 (5th Cir.) (“[Wle

assume, arguendo, that a McDonough theory of juror bias

would be sufficient to obtain federal habeas relief.”), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 116 S.Ct. 1417 (1995).

1. Voir dire.

Juror Trimbur was pastor of the Marksville Baptist

Church and an auxiliary deputy with the Avoyelles Par-

ish Sheriff’s office. During voir dire, Trimbur was asked:

Q: Are you or any members of your family, or

close friends, employed by the District

Attorney’s Office, or by the Sheriff’s Office?

A: No sir.

App. 9

* * *

Q: Is there any personal, business, family or

health reason, that you know of, why you

could not serve as an impartial juror in this

case?

A: None that I know of.

Exh. A at 918, 919-20. Trimbur was also asked about a

Concerned Parents for Better Avoyelles meeting that he

attended approximately five weeks prior to trial. Trimbur

indicated that he was there in his capacity as a minister

and for personal interest and made no mention of any

official role he might have played.*

4 The relevant examination of Trimbur by defense counsel

was:

Q. OK. Now,... I understand there’s some kind of

community - I don’t want to say outrage or up-

roar, but conflict about drinking in one of the

neighboring towns, and teenage drinking; and

Mr. Rabalais [one of the defense attorneys] is

involved in that. . . . Have you been to any

meetings that Mr. Rabalais’s attended or you've

attended or Mr. Knoll’s [the district attorney]

attended, on that issue?

Yes.

Tell me about that.

>O >

; I went to see what was going to transpire in the

j way of exchange of dialogue with the gentleman

| representing our ABC Board Camp. Mr.

: Rabalais’s connection with that has no bearing on

me, OK? I wouldn’t -I don’t portray myself with

this word, ‘outrage.’ OK?

App. 10

Later, Trimbur was asked about his knowledge of

people involved with the investigation or trial of the case.

Q. Well, I don’t know what the right word is, OK?

I’m just looking for a word .. . conflict...

A. Iattended one meeting at the Concerned Parents

for Better Avoyelles, if that’s what you’re

referring to.

I don’t know.

Yes sir, that, I think, is what you’re referring to.

Mr. Rabalais [one of the defendant’s lawyers]

was present at that meeting; I know that.

Q. OK, and what about Mr. Knoll [the district

attorney]?

A. Yes sir.

> O

* * *

Q. I’mnot from here, and I don’t know the history of

all this. But I understand that there are some

interest — I don’t — I won’t use a catch word, that

there’s some “interests” and there may be a

problem with teenage drinking and driving in

particular area[s] of the parish. Is that accurate?

A. That’s accurate.

cs * co

Q. OK, where is - what is your interest in that

issue? . . . And, does that come from just a

personal interest as an individual, or is that

through your representing the interest of your

congregation, or of your religion or, you know,

whatever?

A. Through my church .. . that was through

personal interest as an individual.

Q. OK. And, has the - is the District Attorney, does

he have anything to do with that issue, to your

knowledge?

App. 11

Examination by defense counsel relating to Detective

Robert Venable proceeded as follows:

Q. Let me ask you some names and see if you

know these folks.

A. Yes sir.

Q. Detective Robert Venable with the Sheriff's

Office?

A. Yes sir.

Q. And how do you know Detective Venable?

‘“

I performed his wedding a year and a half

ago.

% Q. Allright. And, did you have to - when I got

married, I met with he [sic] preacher in

advance, and he kind of counseled you and

stuff, did you do any of that, or did you just

do the ceremony?

A. I just did the ceremony.

Oo

All right. Did you know his wife?

Yes, I did.

>

A. I think as a corcerned parent, he was at the

meeting.

Q. OK. But not in an official - there’s no official

request to him, that you’re aware of, or none by

you, that...

A. None by me.

Q. Allright, and none that you’re aware of, that you

have any action upon?

A. Not that I know of.

Exh. A at 927-929.

App. 12

Q. Was she a member of your congregation, or

he?

>

She was. That was in Evergreen.

Q. All right, have you had any contact with

him since that time?

A. I saw him yesterday for a few minutes in

the hall, and I asked him about his mar-

riage.

Q. Other than that?

A. No sir. Not really.

Exh. A at 930.

2. Motion for new trial.

In considering Sheehan’s motion for new trial, the

Louisiana trial court held an evidentiary hearing during

which it heard the testimony of Detective Venable, Ser-

geant Malcolm LaBorde, Trimbur, and Captain Gano

Bergeron. The testimony focused on the extent of Trim-

bur’s participation as an auxiliary deputy, Trimbur’s rela-

tionship with Detective Venable, and Trimbur’s

explanation of his answers given in voir dire.

Trimbur’s service with the Sheriff’s Department.

Trimbur had been an auxiliary deputy since 1985. His

involvement appeared to peak in 1986, but tapered off in

1987 as his job at a new congregation required more of his

time. However, he still served as a deputy up to and after

the April 1988 trial. Auxiliary deputies are required to

spend 16 hours per month serving the department and

are not generally paid. However, Trimbur had been paid

App. 13

$38.53 in November 1987 for one day’s work guarding an

inmate at a local hospital. Trimbur had ridden in a patrol

car with regular deputies, wore a uniform identical to

that of a regular deputy, carried a badge, carried a gun,

had officer training, and sometimes visited the Sheriff's

office when he was not on duty. The Sheriff’s office is

adjacent to the jail, and Trimbur had counseled prisoners

and deputies on spiritual issues. Trimbur had also been

called to assist with a crisis relating to Cuban refugees at

the jail. Trimbur testified that he had not seen Sheehan at

the jail.

At the Concerned Parents for a Better Avoyelles

meeting five weeks before the trial, Trimbur had volun-

teered to the entire group that he was an auxiliary deputy

and would relay any concerns that individuals had to the

district attorney, sheriff or other appropriate authority.

Trimbur’s relationship with Detective Venable.

Detective Venable had at least some role in facilitating

Trimbur’s appointment as an auxiliary sheriff in 1985. In

1986, Trimbur was the pastor of the Evergreen Baptist

Church, which Detective Venable attended with his wife,

and Trimbur occasionally visited Detective Venable at the

Sheriff’s office. In 1987, Detective Venable saw Trimbur

about once a month, and he had also seen Trimbur at the

Sheriff’s office in 1988. Detective Venable testified that he

had been to Trimbur’s home approximately six times; the

most recent visit occurred several months before the

trial.5 Detective Venable had seen Trimbur about three or

5 Trimbur only recalled two visits when Venable

accompanied other parishioners to Trimbur’s home for coffee.

App. 14

four times between January 1988 and April 1988, the time

of the trial, and they had discussed the detective’s marital

problems. However, Trimbur was unaware as of the hear-

ing in June 1988 that Detective Venable had separated

from his wife in January 1988. Trimbur had not talked to

Detective Venable since the trial began.

Trimbur’s explanation of his voir dire testimony.

Trimbur stated that he did not reveal his commission as

an auxiliary deputy because no one directly asked him

about it and he did not consider himself to be

“employed” by the Sheriff’s office. Trimbur testified that

he considered the question about employment by the

sheriff’s office as a follow-up to the earlier instruction by

the court that “members of paid fire and police depart-

ments” are entitled to claim an exemption, and he did not

consider himself a paid policeman. Trimbur felt that his

involvement with the sheriff’s department was minimal,

and that he was looked upon as an unofficial chaplain

rather than an officer. He had forgotten about the one day

on which he supervised a hospitalized inmate and was

paid $38. Furthermore, Trimbur did not report in voir

dire that he had revealed his deputy status at the Con-

cerned Parents For a Better Avoyelles meeting because

the district attorney, Mr. Knoll, and two of the defense

lawyers, Mr. Rabalais and Mr. Melancon, were present

when he made the announcement.®

6 Trimbur’s extensive explanation was contained in the

following testimony:

Q. And please tell me where the meeting was, what

the meeting was about and what statement you

made.

App. 15

Sergeant LaBorde testified that he had asked Trimbur

how he had been selected for jury service, since, in his

> 0

The meeting was Concerned Parents For a Better

Avoyelies, is the name under which they were

meeting. It was the second meeting that they had,

the only meeting that they have had that I

attended. I was present, two men from the church

I serve was present and my wife was present. It

was at Mr. Knoll’s [the district attorney] home on

March 15th. I went in for the purpose of getting

information for my own curiosity about matters

related to problems of under-aged drinking in

our parish.

Finish your answer, please.

Well, I was at that meeting, and that’s when I

made a statement about being an auxiliary . . .

I'd like for you to tell us if you can, please, the

specifics, as you recall them, relating to what

caused ou to make that statement who you were

talking to, who was present, what was the

context of the statement, and what you said. I

want you to tell us about your actions, not

anyone else’s.

The meeting was called for the purpose of

hearing from board member or official of the

ABC Board of our State, as to ways that could be

explored so that the established laws about

under-aged drinking could be better enforced.

The gentleman from the ABC Board was there

and was telling us of his frustrations from

problems that he had in relation to manpower,

not being able to get out into the community, and

so forth. He made a statement that - something

to the effect — and I don’t remember the exact

words — something to the effect that if there were

people in the parishes that he could call upon for

App. 16

assistance, it would facilitate their being able to

follow up on complaints about business

establishments, selling intoxicating beverages to

under-aged youth. There was between 35 and 40

people at that meeting. I spoke up, there wasn’t a

lot of us talking; we were listening to Mr. . . . the

man who was - the ABC Board man. I spoke up

and said in that meeting, in the presence of these

people, and I know they heard me, I said, I havea

commission, I am a deputy, I have a uniform, if

you ever need help in this parish, in this area, call

me and I will see if I can work out a way to be of

assistance to you. And at that meeting, the

prosecuting attorney was there; he was hosting

the meeting, and so was both attorneys for the

defense present. Mr. Rabalais was sitting

immediately to my left, I was immediately to this

gentleman’s left, that was there; I was sitting on

the steps; he was standing; I remember distinctly

Mr. Rabalais, the attorney, and Mr. Melancon, the

attorney, being at that meeting. So, when I came

to court, having been called for jury selection, I

listened very carefully to Judge Brouillette’s

discourse to us about qualifications,

disqualifications, and exemptions. I heard him

very clearly say that a minister of religion could

claim an exemption. I heard him say very clearly

that a member of paid fire or police department

could be exempted. I did not, when the line

formed at his bench, come up and tell him I was a

minister of religion. I did not come up and tell

him I was an auxiliary deputy, in any capacity. I

felt that my involvement with the Department

was minimal; I thought that I was looked upon

more as a chaplain there, than I was as a

policeman. And so, I didn’t say anything about

App. 17

view, “if somebody’s working at the Sheriff’s Office, they

don’t serve on the jury.” Exh. A at 1555. Sergeant LaBorde

testified that Trimbur responded:

“somebody has asked him some questions, you know, if

he was working with them, and he said yes.” Id. at 1556.

State court findings. The state trial court denied the

new trial motion, crediting Trimbur’s explanation that he

associated the question about employment with the sher-

iff’s office with the exemption available for paid members

of police departments. The trial court found that Trim-

bur’s interpretation of the questioning was reasonable.

The court noted:

It may be argued that Trimbur’s answer to the

question was less than full disclosure, even if

technically correct. However, his testimony

makes it very clear that he did not intentionally

mislead anyone. He considered his service as a

volunteer auxiliary deputy to be such common

knowledge that it did not deserve special com-

ment in the voir dire questioning.

* * e

being a minister, either, until it came out in the

questioning, positively I knew, both, the

prosecuting attorney and both local defense

attorneys, heard me made [sic] that statement,

just five weeks before that I was an auxiliary.

And I felt if it was of any consequence, they

would bring it up. It wasn’t to me. And sol...

Q. Rev. Trimbur...

A. I know it’s a long answer, but I’m trying to

explain to you why I didn’t say anything.

Exh. A at 1571-73.

App. 18

The testimony of Rev. Trimbur depicts, in the

court’s opinion, a very civic-minded individual

who wanted to be a good citizen and to partici-

pate in civic activities. In voir dire by defen-

dant’s counsel, when asked why he did not avail

himself of his exemption as a minister, he

answered as follows:

Because I’m not just a member or servant of

my church; I’m a member of my commu-

nity; and I feel strongly an obligation to the

community.

Exh. A at 1657-58.

The trial court reasoned that since Trimbur had no

knowledge of or connections to the crime, the only way

to show he was biased and, consequently, disqualified

would be if law enforcement officers were disqualified

per se.? Reviewing the relevant Louisiana law, the trial

court held that a volunteer auxiliary deputy would not be

7 The court evaluated whether Trimbur’s activities

categorized him as a law enforcement officer:

The factors which show him to be in the law

enforcement community are that he had a uniform; he

occasionally went on patrol with paid deputies; he

. had a badge; and he had a firearm. The factors which

suggest that he was not truly a law officer are that he

never made an arrest; he never interrogated a

witness; he never used a firearm and never had

firearm training; and he never participated in any

investigation. While he did not have the title of

chaplain, he considered his position to be essentially

that. He counseled deputies; he counseled prisoners

in the jail; he conducted prayer services when a

deputy died in a plane crash.

Exh. A at 1657-58.

App. 19

automatically disqualified. See State v. Ballard, 337 So. 2d

481, 483 (La. 1976) (denial of challenge for cause against

unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff was not error; “We find

no prohibition against jury service by an unpaid volun-

teer [auxiliary policeman] who peripherally and occa-

sionally assisted in law enforcement.”).

In addition, the trial court found that the motion

should be denied because Sheehan had not established

that he and his counsel were unaware of Trimbur’s com-

mission. See State v. Baxter 357 So. 2d 271 (La. 1978)

(“ ... in order for a defendant to avail himself of the lack

of qualification of a juror, it must be made to appear that

the disqualification of the juror was not known to defen-

dant, or his counsel, when the juror was accepted by him

and could not then have been ascertained by due dili-

gence; and it must be made to appear that such diligence

was exercised by an examination of the juror, on his voir

dire, touching his qualifications, and that he answered

falsely.”). The trial court noted that only one of appellee’s

lawyers, Rodney Rabalais, testified that he was unaware

that Trimbur was an auxiliary deputy. Lewis Inglesby and

Tucker Melancon, appellee’s other two trial lawyers, did

not testify to a lack of knowledge. The trial court also

noted Trimbur’s testimony that he was sure that Rabalais

and Melancon knew Trimbur was a deputy. Further, as in

Baxter, the trial court found that “if it was error for

Trimbur to answer that he was not employed by the

sheriff’s office - and that is certainly not clearly estab-

lished - then it should be recognized that he was entirely

honest.” Exh. A at 1660.

As to Trimbur’s relationship with Detective Venable,

the trial court first noted that this relationship was not

App. 20

urged as a basis for a motion for new trial. The trial court

recounted the short voir dire examination of Trimbur

regarding Detective Venable, and concluded that defense

counsel was aware of the friendship and should have

probed it further. The court further found that “[tJhere is

nothing to suggest, in the court’s opinion, that Trimbur

intentionally misled or deceived defense counsel.” Exh. A

at 1662.

3. Remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court.

Before his appeal was heard by the intermediate

court of appeals, Sheehan obtained a writ from the Loui-

siana Supreme Court ordering the trial court to reopen

the hearing on the motion for new trial based on an

allegation of newly discovered evidence. At the reopened

hearing, appellee presented the testimony of Claire

Sharp, a local attorney and member of Trimbur’s congre-

gation, who testified that Trimbur had contacted her after

receiving a jury summons. Ms. Sharp testified that Trim-

bur asked for advice about the effect of his religious

profession as well as his auxiliary commission on his

ability to serve. Ms. Sharp told Trimbur to tell the court

and the attorneys about his positions, or to at least

answer the voir dire questions openly and honestly. Ms.

Sharp also testified that Trimbur told her that “I guess it

doesn’t matter; everybody knows I’m a minister and an

auxiliary deputy anyway,” and she responded “yes, I

suppose that’s true; this is a small town.” Exh. A. Supple-

ment at 40.

After hearing this new testimony as well as addi-

tional testimony from Trimbur, the trial court again

App. 21

denied the motion for new trial. The trial court con-

cluded:

There is certainly nothing ominous, as such,

about a prospective juror, calling an attorney,

prior to serving, to find out what it’s all about,

particularly in this case, a member of his congre-

gation. I would suppose it’s probably a common

occurrence, especially summoned for the first

time. Now, if the purpose of talking with an

attorney would be to conspire, to do anything

improper, then, of course, that would be most

significant. The record shows Rev. Trimbur’s

explanation for the call. It is totally consistent

with the testimony of Mrs. Sharp. I have no

difficulty accepting his explanation. And I cer-

tainly don’t feel that he was attempting to calcu-

late a way to mislead anybody in order to serve

on the jury. My findings in the reasons for

denial of the first motion for a new trial, that he

did not attempt to mislead anybody, is certainly

still my finding. There’s absolutely nothing to

suggest that there was any improper reason. In

fact, the evidence shows just the opposite.

Exh. A Supplement at 42-43.

4. Appeal to the Louisiana Court of Appeals.

In affirming the denial of the new trial motion, the

court of appeals opined at length:

We have examined this record closely and find

that there is nothing in it, nor in the nature of

Trimbur’s function with the sheriff’s office,

which would disqualify him from service on the

jury. It is apparent that he was a clergyman first,

and an auxiliary deputy second. His responses

App. 22

on voir dire were not misleading, and did not

conceal any information. His relationship to the

sheriff’s office, as well as his relationship with

Detective Venable, were not such as could be

expected to destroy the otherwise impartial atti-

tude of this juror. Trimbur was subjected to

intense interrogations in an effort to prove spec-

ific facts showing such a close connection to the

sheriff’s office and Detective Venable that bias

for the prosecution should be presumed. Trim-

bur’s consistent responses in the record reflect

his voir dire commitment to fairness and impar-

tiality. Nothing he said at the hearings sup-

ported a finding of bias, actual or implied. What

comes across most strongly in the record of all

three examinations - the voir dire, the new trial

hearing, and the remand hearing - is his rela-

tionship with the community and its citizens in

his capacity as a minister of religion. He neither

sought nor avoided jury duty. He answered

every question candidly and without rancor,

openness characterizing his every response.

Only by a strained manipulation of his words

can bias be wrung from his testimony. We agree

with the trial court.

Sheehan, 558 So.2d at 763-64.

5. Findings of the magistrate judge.

Contradicting the state court’s credibility evalua-

tions, the magistrate judge concluded that Trimbur

“deliberately concealed” his auxiliary deputy status and

friendship with Detective Venable during voir dire

because he did not think it was important and “because

he wanted to be on the jury.” The magistrate judge drew

App. 23

an inference of bias, citing United States v. Scott, 854 F.2d

697, 699 (5th Cir. 1988) (juror’s censoring of fact that

brother was a deputy sheriff created inference that he

wanted to serve on jury and thought he would not be

allowed to serve if he answered completely). The magis-

trate judge chided the trial court for having “no good

basis” to believe that Sheehan’s attorneys knew Trimbur

was an auxiliary deputy. The magistrate judge then con-

cluded that Sheehan satisfied the first prong of

McDonough - that a juror had falsely answered a material

question on voir dire.

The magistrate judge also decided that a challenge

for cause against Trimbur would have been granted

because he was an auxiliary deputy. “Louisiana jurispru-

dence is clear on that point,” he stated, citing State v.

Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317, 1318 (La. 1980) (“an actively

employed criminal deputy sheriff is not a competent

criminal juror”) and State v. Mitchell, 475 So.2d 61, 63-4

(La. App. 2d Cir. 1985) (active or reserve police officer is

too likely to be influenced as a juror and should be

disqualified).

After reciting the concept of deference to state court

findings. the magistrate judge concluded that the trial

court did not actually find that Trimbur was not biased.

And since the magistrate judge read Louisiana law as

automatically disqualifying auxiliary deputy sheriffs

- from jury service, he disagreed with the state courts’

application of state law.

App. 24

6. Analysis.

Whether analyzed under the old or new federal

habeas standards, the magistrate judge clearly erred in

failing to give appropriate deference to the findings of

the Louisiana courts.

The magistrate judge held that the trial court made

no express finding whether Trimbur was biased and that

Trimbur deliberately concealed information on voir dire,

supporting an inference of bias. Yet the trial court explic-

itly found that Trimbur did not “intentionally mislead

anyone,” that he “was entirely honest in his answer,” and

that “there is nothing to suggest . . . that Trimbur inten-

tionally misled or deceived defense counsel.” The trial

court so ruled after observing voir dire, the entire trial,

and two motions for new trial. The record amply sup-

ports the state trial court’s conclusions. The trial court

credited Trimbur’s explanation that he reasonably associ-

ated the question about employment with the sheriff’s

office with the exemption for paid policemen, an exemp-

tion he believed was not available to him. The trial court

found that Trimbur reasonably believed he was not

“employed” by the sheriff’s department in the common

usage of that term. Further, the trial court credited Trim-

bur’s testimony that he believed that all the attorneys

knew of his status as an auxiliary deputy, because he had

announced it in the attorneys’ presence just five weeks

before trial. Thus, even if an inference of bias can be

drawn from deliberate censoring during voir dire, the

trial court found, contrary to the magistrate judge, no

deliberate censoring on Trimbur’s part. The state court

made explicit findings, adequately supported by the

App. 25

record, that are contrary to the inferences drawn by the

magistrate judge. Deference was owed to the state court

fact findings, particularly because they were reached

after painstaking, meticulous efforts to uncover the rele-

vant facts. Under the AEDPA standard, Sheehan did not

prove by clear and convincing evidence that the state

court findings were incorrect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)

(as amended by AEDPA).

Moreover, the Louisiana court of appeals explicitly

found a lack of bias. Sheehan, 558 So.2d at 764 (“Nothing

he said at the Hearings supported the finding of bias,

actual or implied.”). Findings of state courts at all levels

must be given appropriate deference. Rushen v. Spain, 464

U.S. 114, 120, __ S.Ct. __, __ (1983) (per curiam). The

magistrate judged erred by not even addressing this find-

ing.

Also contrary to the magistrate judge’s conclusion,

the Louisiana courts correctly applied Louisiana law in

the issue of disqualifying auxiliary deputies. While the

magistrate judge quotes language from Simmons, 390

So.2d at 1318, and Mitchell, 475 So.2d at 62-63, that sup-

ports his interpretation of Louisiana law,® compelling

caselaw justifies a conclusion that someone in Trimbur’s

position would not be automatically disqualified from

jury service. The trial court cited the decision in Ballard,

in which the Louisiana Supreme court held that it was

8 However, Simmons involved a paid, full-time investigator

with the Sheriff’s department 390 So.2d at 1318, and Mitchell

involved an active reserve police officer, and although it is not

clear from the opinion, it appears that the officer was a paid

employee. Mitchell, 475 So.2d at 62-63.

App. 26

unnecessary to grant a challenge for cause against an

unpaid volunteer deputy sheriff. 337 So.2d at 43. But

perhaps most relevant is the decision of the court of

appeals in this very case, which the Louisiana Supreme

Court declined to reverse, holding that “there is nothing

in [the recor?], nor in the nature of Trimbur’s function

with the Sheriff’s office, which would disqualify him

from service on the jury.” Sheehan, 558 So.2d at 763.

Thus, the magistrate judge erred in disregarding the

state court findings in this case and in concluding that

Sheehan met the two prongs of McDonough. We must

defer to the state court findings that Trimbur did not

intentionally mislead the court or defense counsel, and

that even full information regarding Trimbur’s position

with the Sheriff’s department and his relationship with

Detective Venable would not support a challenge for

cause.®

Alternatively, the denial of the motion for. new trial

can be sustained on the independent state law ground

that Sheehan’s trial attorneys knew of Trimbur’s status as

an auxiliary deputy sheriff and failed to use reasonable

diligence to pursue further information about his rela-

tionship with the sheriff's department. The magistrate

judge erroneously concluded that the trial court “had no

good basis” for believing that the defense attorneys heard

Trimbur announce his auxiliary deputy status at a “noisy

public meeting” five weeks earlier, remembered it, and

9 Even if Louisiana law would have supported a challenge

for cause based on Trimbur’s auxiliary deputy status, Sheehan

has still not shown that he is constitutionally entitled to a

challenge for cause on that basis.

App. 27

“deliberately concealed the fact of Trimbur’s employment

as a deputy sheriff as a trial strategy.” First, the state trial

judge had ample basis: Trimbur testified that one of the

attorneys sat right next to him at the meeting, that he

made the announcement loudly, and that “no one else

was speaking at that time. I cannot conceive of everyone

in that room not having heard what I said.” The trial

judge was not required to believe Mr. Rabalais’ testimony

that he never heard Trimbur’s announcement. Second,

Trimbur’s wife worked for a company owned by Tucker

Melancon, one of appellee’s attorneys. Finally, the trial

judge never found that appellee’s attorneys deliberately

concealed their knowledge of Trimbur’s background as a

trial strategy. Louisiana law requires the defendant to

show that he and his lawyers had no knowledge of the

facts supporting disqualification and used reasonable dil-

igence to pursue these facts. The trial court found that

Sheehan had not met this burden, not that his attorneys

deliberately concealed the information as trial strategy.

The magistrate judge’s contrary conclusion is a clear

error. Sheehan’s challenge to Trimbur’s service on the

jury fails on this adequate and independent state law

ground as well.

C. Prejudicial extraneous information.

The magistrate judge also decided that Sheehan’s

right to a fair trial before an impartial jury was violated

because, before reaching the verdict, one or more jurors

learned of Sheehan’s prior trial and conviction for this

same crime. The state again objects that the magistrate

App. 28

judge failed properly to defer to the state-court findings

of fact and applied the wrong legal standard.

The Supreme Court’s cases in this area “cannot be

made to stand for the proposition that juror exposure to

information about a state defendant's prior convictions or

to news accounts of the crime with which he is charged

alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due pro-

cess.” Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031,

2036 (1975). In federal trials, exposure of the jury to

information about prior felony convictions is presumed

to be prejudicial, but this is a rule based on a federal

court’s inherent power to control its proceedings and is

not constitutionally required. Id. at 797, 95 S.Ct. at 2035

(rejecting the application of Marshall v. U.S., 360 U.S. 310

(1959) to a state prisoner’s claim on federal habeas

corpus). Instead, “we must turn . . . to any indications in

the totality of the circumstances that petitioner’s trial was

not fundamentally fair.” Id. at 799, 95 S.Ct. at 2036.

Although a juror may be presumed to be biased if

exposed to “inherently prejudicial facts about the defen-

dant” so that “the court deems it highly unlikely that the

juror can exercise independent judgment,” the “court will

not readily presume that a juror is biased solely on the

basis that he or she has been exposed to prejudicial

information about the defendant outside the courtroom.”

Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1379 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,

469 U.S. 1002 (1984). Thus, we must decide if “the actions

called into question were such as to reasonably result in

the possibility of prejudice.” Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891,

894 (5th Cir. 1979). Evaluation of a claim requires findings

relating to the impact of the extraneous information on

the verdict. Id. at 894.

App. 29

In considering appellee’s motion for new trial, the

trial court conducted a hearing’ at which Terri Taylor, a

juror who voted not guilty, testified that she was told of

the prior trial and conviction at church. Mrs. Taylor testi-

fied that although she did not tell any other jurors about

what she learned, she heard other jurors discuss appel-

lee’s previous trial and conviction. Mrs. Taylor also testi-

fied that David Gauthier, another juror, spoke about

appellee’s prior trial and conviction." Exh. A at 1639.

Mrs. Taylor also testified that another juror, Burnette

Bordelon, related to Mrs. Taylor that Mrs. Bordelon’s

husband read aloud a newspaper article about the trial at

breakfast. Id. at 1641. Mrs. Taylor did not indicate

whether the newspaper accounts discussed a prior trial.’

However, Mrs. Bordelon denied that she had read any

10 The trial court sustained the state’s objections to

testimony about juror misconduct under La. R.S. 15:470

(replaced by La. C. Art. 606), which allows testimony by jurors

as to misconduct by third persons but not as to juror

misconduct. However, the trial court allowed Sheehan to offer

testimony of juror misconduct as a proffer, recognizing that this

evidentiary rule must give way to a defendant’s constitutional

right to a fair trial. State v. Senigal, 393 So.2d 684 (La. 1981). The

trial court’s discussion of prejudice assumes that the proffered

evidence is admissible. Exh. A at 1665.

11 Mrs. Taylor testified that “ . . . it was in the jury room on

Saturday morning, and he had said he knew a friend of a friend,

or a relation somewhat to that nature, that had served on the

previous jury, and that he had considered that night calling and

speaking with him, but he had changed his mind; he decided

not to, because he didn’t want to be prejudiced.” Exh. A at 1639.

12 The trial court noted that it had monitored news

accounts of the trial and that none had mentioned the prior trial

or conviction while the trial was in progress.

. App. 30

article about the trial or that her husband had read aloud

any article about the trial. Id. at 1618.

Gwendolyn Small, an alternate juror, testified that

she overheard other jury members say that the defendant

had been tried before, but not that the defendant was

convicted. Exh. A at 1626. She could not remember who

said it or when. Trimbur also testified that he learned at

the end of the day on the last day of deliberations that

Sheehan had previously been tried, but not that he had

been previously convicted. Id. at 1586-87.

The trial court found that the only evidence that the

jury heard of appellee’s prior conviction came from the

testimony of Mrs. Taylor, who voted to acquit and thus

was not prejudiced, and who stated that she did not

discuss the prior convictions with other jurors. The trial

court also pointed to its instructions to the jury to con-

sider only the evidence introduced at trial, recognizing

that such an instruction could not cure all error but was a

factor in the overall consideration of prejudice. Further,

the trial court considered evidence that a previous jury

had convicted the defendant for the same conduct to be

less prejudicial than evidence suggesting a pattern of

conduct, such as that the defendant had been convicted

of similar conduct in the past.!> The trial court did not

believe that a defendant had an absolute constitutional

right to have a jury that had not heard of this prior

conviction and concluded that any extraneous influence

13 “There is no reason for a juror to believe that another jury

had more or better evidence than in the present case.” Exh. A at

1667.

App. 31

on the jury “was not prejudicial to the extent of requiring

a new trial.”

The magistrate judge decided that the trial court’s

ruling was based on an erroneous conclusion of law -

that juror knowledge of a prior conviction for the same

offense was not a per se constitutional violation — and

gave the trial court findings no deference. The magistrate

judge inferred that other jurors must have participated in

the discussions of appellee’s prior trial and conviction,

and thus inherently prejudicial extrinsic information was

considered by the jury. The magistrate judge relied pri-

marily on cases reviewing federal criminal convictions.

See, e.g., United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir.

1975) (post-conviction proceedings for federal prisoner);

United States v. Williams, 568 F.2d 464 (5th Cir. 1978)

(direct appeal of federal conviction).

The magistrate judge’s decision to disregard the state

court findings was erroneous. Juror exposure to extra-

neous information must be examined on case-by-case

basis to determine if there is a reasonable probability of

prejudice. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 797, 95 S.Ct. at 2035;

Durr, 589 F.2d at 894. Thus, the state court did not err in

considering all the circumstances in evaluating prejudice,

rather than concluding that the jury’s exposure to infor-

mation about appellee’s prior conviction was a per se

constitutional violation.

The state court found that the only evidence of extra-

neous influence on the jury’s deliberations was the infor-

mation passed on to Mrs. Taylor at church, that Mrs.

Taylor did not pass on the information to other jurors,

and that Mrs. Taylor voted to acquit. The trial court also

App. 32

specifically found that press coverage during the trial did

not reveal appellee’s prior trial and conviction. The trial

court considered that Trimbur and Ms. Small, the latter

an alternate juror, heard about Sheehan’s prior trial but

not his conviction. The only evidence that any juror other

than Mrs. Taylor learned of Sheehan’s prior conviction is

the testimony of Mrs. Taylor that David Gauthier spoke

about appellee’s prior trial and conviction. Based on this

evidence, the magistrate judge inferred that other jurors

must have participated in discussions of appellee’s prior

trial and conviction, and he then summarily concluded

that appellee’s right to a fair trial was violated. The

magistrate judge did not distinguish among jurors who

heard different information, stating that three jurors had

learned of appellee’s prior trial and conviction, when in

fact two jurors testified that they only learned of his trial.

The trial court heard firsthand the testimony of the

three jurors and was in a better position to judge the

subtleties of and appropriate inferences to be drawn from

their testimony. The trial court appropriately noted that

the only juror to testify that she had heard of appellee’s

prior conviction voted to acquit. See Durr, 589 F.2d at 894,

n. 4 (possibility that jury member alleged to have intro-

duced outside information voted to acquit is a factor in

deciding if there is a reasonable probability of prejudice).

In addition, the trial court appropriately weighed the

expected impact of the limiting instruction. After consid-

ering the evidence under all the circumstances, the trial

court found no possibility of prejudice, concluding:

The ultimate issue [in a motion for new trial]

therefore is whether an injustice has been done

to the defendant. Admitting that there may have

App. 33

been imperfection, this court can say without

reservation or hesitation that the evidence

clearly supports the jury’s verdict and that no

injustice was done to, this defendant. Accord-

ingly, he is not entitled to a new trial.

Exh. A at 1669. The court of appeals similarly concluded:

If this testimony of Mrs. Taylor is treated as

evidence of juror misconduct, it was inadmiss-

ible. If the testimony is treated as evidence of an

unauthorized communication resulting from

misconduct of a third person (at the church

meeting), and therefore admissible, it neverthe-

less offended no substantial rights of the defen-

dant, for two reasons: first, Mrs. Taylor testified

that she did not pass the information on and,

second, she voted for an acquittal.

Sheehen, 558 So.2d at 764.

Under the court’s supervisory power to control the

processes of its courts, this court has reversed a federal

conviction where jurors learned of the defendant's prior

conviction in the same matter. United States v. Williams,

568 F.2d 464, 470-71 (5th Cir. 1978) (“we are hard pressed

to think of anything more damning to an accused than

information that a jury had previously convicted him for

the crime charged”). However, the state court in this case,

who observed the entire trial, including the jurors’ testi-

mony in voir dire and at the evidentiary hearing, found

no prejudice. Mrs. Taylor’s vote to acquit provides at

least some credibility to the trial court’s analysis of the

relative prejudicial effect of knowledge of appellee’s prior

conviction. Sheehan has pointed to no decision establish-

ing his absolute constitutional right to a jury that is

ignorant of his prior conviction. The Williams decision

App. 34

itself acknowledges that it is following a federal criminal

rule, not a constitutional mandate, and that the deter-

mination of prejudice is a fact-specific inquiry. Id. at 469.

Furthermore, even in reviewing federal criminal convic-

tions, we give great deference to a trial court determina-

tion that there is no reasonable probability of prejudice.

See United States v. O'Keefe, 722 F.2d 1175, 1179 (5th Cir.

1983) (“appellate court should accord great weight to the

trial court’s finding that the [extrinsic] evidence in no

way interfered with any juror’s decision”).

We conclude that the lower courts erred awarding

habeas relief. The state courts found no reasonable proba-

bility of prejudice, and this conclusion as well as the

underlying factual-findings is fairly supported by the

record. Under the AEDPA standards, the state court deci-

sion was not contrary to or an unreasonable application

of federal law, and there is no basis for asserting that the

state factfindings should not be presumed correct.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the decision

of the district court and render judgment denying appel-

lee’s request for writ of habeas corpus.

REVERSED.

APPENDIX 2

App. 35

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JOHN ANTHONY CIVIL ACTION NO.

SHEEHAN 94-2249

-Vs- SECTION “P”

WARDEN, LSP (JUDGE LITTLE)

MINUTE ENTRY

(Filed May 15, 1995)

This habeas matter is referred to John F. Simon, U.S.

Magistrate, for his report and recommendation.

Alexandria, Louisiana

12 May 1995

COPY SENT

DATE 5-15-95 /s/ F. A. Little, Jr.

BY TWB F. A. LITTLE, JR.

nay UNITED STATES

TO: Riddle

Papale DISTRICT JUDGE

Illegible

Jfs w/File

esa

APPENDIX 3

App. 36

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ALEXANDRIA DIVISION

JOHN ANTHONY SHEEHAN, CIVIL ACTION

SECTION “P”

Petitioner NO. CV94-2249-A

VERSUS

Ww. EN, JUDGE LITTLE

geo WHITLEY, WARD MAGISTRATE

; JUDGE SIMON

Respondents

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF

MAGISTRATE JUDGE

(Filed Oct. 3, 1995)

This matter was referred to the undersigned Magis-

trate Judge for report and secommendation by order of

Judge F.A. Little, Jr. (Doc. Item 10). I will recommend that

petitioner’s pending petition for writ of habeas corpus be

granted.

Statement of Claim

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus

filed by petitioner John Anthony Sheehan (“Sheehan”) on

December 8, 1994. Sheehan is contesting the validity of

his 1988 second degree murder conviction by the Louisi-

ana 12th Judicial District Court in Avoyelles Parish, Loui-

siana, on the following grounds:

1. Petitioner was denied a fair trial before an

impartial jury because David Trimbur, the fore-

man of petitioner’s jury, was a reserve deputy

sheriff with the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's

App. 37

Department, which department investigated the

shooting of petitioner’s wife, and was also a

close personal friend and confidante of the

State’s key police witness, who incidentally was

the investigating detective in the matter.

2. Petitioner was denied a fair trial before an

impartial jury because extrinsic information,

specifically, petitioner’s prior trial and convic-

tion, tainted the jury’s deliberations.

3. Petitioner was denied a fair trial before an

impartial jury because the trial judge denied

him a change of venue; specifically, newspaper,

radio and television reports regarding his first

trial and conviction saturated the community

with prejudicial pretrial publicity.

Sheehan claims, respondent admits, and the record

reflects exhaustion of Sheehan's available state remedies

(See Exs. “B” and “F”).

Law and Analysis

Rule 8(a) Resolution

This court is able to receive the merits of this habeas

corpus petition without the necessity of an evidentiary

hearing because there is no genuine issue of material fact

that is relevant to the claims of the petitioner, and the

State court records provide the required and adequate

factual basis necessary to the resolution of the habeas

corpus petition. Passman v. Blackburn, 797 F.2d 1335, 1340

(Sth Cir. 1986), cert. den., 480 U.S. 948, 107 S.Ct. 1609, 94

L.Ed.2d 794 (1987); Easter v. Estelle, 609 F.2d 756, 761 (Sth

Cir. 1980); Habeas Corpus Rule 8(a).

App. 38

Ground No. 1 — Biased Jury Foreman

Sheehan contends he was denied his right to an

impartial jury because one of the potential jurors, David

Trimbur (“Trimbur”), who later became the jury foreman,

deliberately concealed his association with the Avoyelles

Parish Sheriff’s Office, where he served as an auxiliary

Deputy Sheriff, and also concealed his friendship with

Robert Venable, the detective with the Avoyelles Parish

Sheriff’s Office who led the investigation of Sheehan’s

case and testified as a prosecution witness at trial.

1. The Law

One touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of

fact - “a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely

on the evidence before it.” Voir dire examination serves to

protect that right by exposing possible biases, both

known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors.

Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir

dire may result in a juror’s being excused for cause; hints

of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may

assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges.

The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if

this process is to serve its purpose is obvious. McDonough

Power Equipment, Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104

S.Ct. 845, 849, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984).'

1 McDonough was a civil case, but the Fifth Circuit has

App. 39

In Pruett v. Thigpen, 665 F.Supp. 1254, 1266 (N.D.

_ Miss.), aff'd, 805 F.2d 1032 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. den., 481

U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 1964, 95 L.Ed.2d 535 (1987), a habeas

case raising the issue of a denied challenge for cause, the

district court stated that due process at a minimum

requires that a jury be capable and willing to decide the

issue solely on the evidence before it, and held that the

participation in jury deliberations of an admittedly biased

juror constitutes error of constitutional dimension recog-

nizable in a habeas proceeding. To prevail, a party must

first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a

material question on voir dire, and then further show that

a correct response would have provided a valid basis for

a challenge for cause. The motives for concealing infor-

mation may vary, but only those reasons that affect a

juror’s impartiality can truly be said to affect the fairness

of a trial. McDonough Power Equipment, Inc., 464 U.S. at

556, 104 S.Ct. at 850. Also, U.S. v. Buckhalter, 986 F.2d 875,

878-79 (Sth Cir. 1993), cert. den., __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct.

203, 126 L.Ed.2d 160 (1993); U.S. v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697, 698

(5th Cir. 1988). The remedy for allegations for juror par-

tiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the oppor-

tunity to prove actual bias, Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,

102 S.Ct. 940, 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (a habeas case). The

findings of the state court are presumptively correct

under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). Smith, 455 U.S. at 218, 102 S.Ct.

at 946.

The Fifth Circuit case of U.S. v. Scott, 854 F.2d 697,

698 (Sth Cir. 1988), is factually similar to the case at bar.

Although Scott involved a direct appeal rather than a

habeas petition, the principles enunciated in Scott are

applicable to this case. In Scott, the issue of juror bias

App. 40

arose when it was discovered after trial that Mr. Buras,

the jury foreman, had a brother who was a Jefferson

Parish Deputy Sheriff.-At a hearing on the defendant's

motion for a new trial, Buras acknowledged that his

brother was a deputy sheriff but stated that he had not

furnished the information in answer to the trial judge’s

question as to relatives in law enforcement because he

did not think that it would affect his judgment in the

case. The trial judge found that Buras’s failure to disclose

the relationship was “unreasonable” but, nevertheless,

also concluded that Buras “sincerely” believed that his

brother’s position would not affect his impartiality as a

juror. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that a new trial

was required due to implied juror bias, stating:

“There is no dispute that Buras would have

been challenged and excused for cause had he

revealed that his brother was a deputy sheriff in

the Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office. The dispute

here, as the trial judge and the United States

couched it, is whether Buras ‘failed to answer

honestly’. At bottom, however, the issue is

whether Buras was biased because of his rela-

tionship with his brother.

“The district court found that Buras was ‘sin-

cere’. That is an insufficient basis for the court

cerely believes that he can be fair in spite of

them... ” 854 F.2d at 698-99.

The Fifth Circuit reasoned that Buras had concealed the

fact that his brother was a deputy sheriff because he had

App. 41

wanted to be on the jury and knew he would be excused

if he admitted the relationship; the court found that bias

was implied by the circumstances. “When possible non-

objectivity is secreted and compounded by the

untruthfulness of a potential juror’s answer on voir dire,

the result is a deprivation of the defendant's right to a

fair trial.” Scott, 854 F.2d at 699-700, and cases cited

therein.

2. The Trial & Hearing

In the case at bar, the jury foreman, David Trimbur

(“Trimbur”), was a Baptist pastor and an auxiliary Dep-

uty Sheriff for the Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Department.

At voir dire, when asked about his occupation, Trimbur

replied only that he was a pastor (Ex. A;-Vol. 4, p. 9172),

and testified that he had never had any dealings with the

Avoyelles Parish District Attorney, Eddie Knoll (Ex. A,

Vol. 4, p. 917). Trimbur’s testimony, in pertinent part, was

as follows:

“Q. Are you or any members of your family, or

close friends, employed by the District Attor-

ney’s Office, or by the Sheriff’s Office?

“A. No sir.” (Ex. A, Vol. 4, p. 918).

“Q. Is there any personal, business, family or

health reason, that you know of, why you could

not serve as an impartial juror in this case?

2 The page numbers referred to are those written at the

bottom right hand corner of each page.

—s

App. 42

—

“A. None that I know of.” (Ex. A, Vol. 4, pp.

919-20).

* * *

“Q. Yes sir. Now, have you been involved in

some — well, let me ask you this, Reverend: The

Judge told you could claim your [minister’s]

exemption, and you chose not to. Id like to ask

you why not?

“A. Because I’m not just a member or servant

of my church; I’m a member of my community;

and I feel strongly an obligation in my commu-

nity.” (Ex. A, Vol. 4, p. 925).

* * »

“Q. OK. Now, the other thing is, being in the

city like you have, I’m curious, have you had

any kind of — I understand there’s some kind of

community — I don’t want to say outrage or up-

roar, but conflict about drinking in one of the

neighboring towns, and teenage drinking; and

Mr. Rabalais is involved in that. Are you — does

that refresh your memory? Have you been to

any meetings that Mr. Rabalais’s attended or

you've attended, or Mr. Knoll’s attended, on

that issue?

“A. Yes.

“Q. Tell me about that.

“A. I went to see what was going to transpire

in the way of exchange of dialogue with the

gentleman representing our ABC Board Camp.

Mr. Rabalais, connection with that has no bear-

ing on me, OK? I wouldn’t - I don’t portray

myself with this word, ‘outrage.’ OK? .. . I

attended one meeting at the Concerned Parents

App. 43

for Better Avoyelles, if that’s what you’re refer-

ring to. . . . Mr. Rabalais was present at the

meeting; I know that.

“Q. OK, and what about Mr. Knoll?

"A. Yea, 8...

“Q. OK, where is — what is your interest in that

issue? You know, I can follow up and you can

answer all the questions. And, does that come

from just a personal interest as an individual, or

is that through your representing the interest of

your congregation, or of your religion or, you

know, whatever?

“A. Through my church .. . that was through

personal interest as an individual.” (Ex. A, Vol.

4, pp. 927-29).

* * *

“Q. Let me ask you some names and see if you

know these folks.

“A. Yes sir.

“Q. Detective Robert Venable with the Sheriff's

Office?

“A. Yes sir.

“Q. And how do you know Detective Venable?

“A. I performed his wedding a year and a half

ago.

“Q. All right. And, did you have to - when I

got married, I met with the preacher in advance,

and he kind of counselled you and stuff, did

you do any of that, or did you just do the

ceremony?

App. 44

“A. I just did the ceremony.

“Q. All right. Do you know his wife?

“A. Yes, I did.

. Was she a member of your congregation,

or he?

“A. She was. That was in Evergreen.

“Q. All right, have you had any contact with

him since that time?

“A. I saw him yesterday for a few minutes in

the hall, and I asked him about his marriage.

“Q. Other than that?

“A. No sir. Not really.” (Ex. A, Vol. 4, p. 930).

After trial, it was discovered by both sides that Trim-

bur was a commissioned auxiliary Deputy Sheriff, who

had a uniform, a gun and a badge, who attended monthly

meetings, and who went on patrol and assisted the regu-

lar officers in carrying out their duties (Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp,

1557-62). Trimbur had been an active auxiliary Deputy

since 1985 and was so through the time of Sheehan’s trial

(Tr. pp. 1562-63). Sheehan filed a motion for a new trial

(Ex. A, Vol. 7, p. 1514-16) based in part on Trimbur’s

alleged bias. A contradictory hearing was held on June

28, 1988 (Ex. A, Vol. 7-8, pp. 1525-1653).

At the hearing, Detective Robert E. Venable, the lead

investigator in the Sheehan homicide, testified that Trim-

bur was the pastor of a church Venable had attended in

1986 with his wife (Ex. A, Vol. 7, pp. 1534-35); that Trim-

bur visited Venable at the Sheriff’s Office a few times in

1986 (pp. 1535-36); that Venable had assisted Trimbur in

App. 45

becoming an auxiliary deputy by making a recommenda-

tion to the Sheriff on his behalf (pp. 1539-40); that, in

1987, through January 1988, Venable saw Trimbur about

once a month (pp. 1540-41); Venable saw Trimbur at the

Sheriff’s Office in 1988 (p. 1541); Venable had visited in

_ the Trimbur home about half a dozen times, the last visit

about two to three months before the hearing, for coffee

(p. 1543); and Venable saw Trimbur three or four times

between January 1988 and April 1988 (the time of

Sheehan’s trial) to discuss Venable’s marital problems (p.

1545).

Sergeant Malcolm LaBorde, an Avoyelles Parish Sher-

iff’s Deputy, testified that he had ridden in a patrol car

with Trimbur in 1987 (Ex. A, Vol. 7, pp. 1549-50), that

regular deputies and auxiliary deputies wear identical

uniforms (p. 1550), that Trimbur carries a gun and has

had officer training (Ex. A, Vol. 8, p. 1551), and that

Trimbur sometimes visited the Sheriff’s Office even when

he was not working (p. 1555). LaBorde also testified that

he had asked Trimbur how he had been selected on the

Sheehan jury, since people working at the Sheriff’s Office

don’t usually serve on the jury (Tr. p. 1555). LaBorde

stated that Trimbur had said “somebody had asked him

some questions, if he was working with [the Sheriff’s

Office], and he said yes” (p. 1556).

Finally, Trimbur testified at the hearing; Trimbur’s

testimony was riddled with inconsistencies. Trimbur tes-

tified that he worked as an auxiliary deputy a lot in 1986

(Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp. 1564, 1566), much less in 1987 (only

about a dozen days) (p. 1566), some unspecified days in

the period from January 1988-March 1988 (less than a

App. 46

dozen) (pp. 1564, 1566), and in May, 1988 (p. 1564).°

Trimbur said that he had been paid $38.53 by the Sheriff's

Office in November 1987 for providing security for an

inmate at Humana Hospital (p. 1590-91). Trimbur stated

that he also counselled inmates on spiritual matters (p.

1567-68) and in 1988, before the Sheehan trial, he had

been requested by the Sheriff’s Office to evaluate an

inmate regarding the inmate’s proposed marriage, which

he had done (p. 1568). Trimbur stated that he did not

recall ever having seen Sheehan at the jail (p. 1568-69).

Trimbur also testified that Deputy Venable had vis-

ited Trimbur’s home, briefly, two times after June 1987,

including in early 1988, “to just drop by and say hello”

and that he had stopped to say hello to Venable at the

Sheriff’s Office (p. 1569). However, upon specific ques-

tioning, Trimbur admitted that he had talked with Ven-

able about spiritual matters and his marital problems, but

that he had not spoken with Venable during or since the

Sheehan trial (p. 1570). Trimbur further admitted that,

although he had stated during voir dire that the. only

contact he had with Detective Venable was when he

married him and when he asked him in the hall, just

before trial, how his marriage was going, he had actually

counselled Venable for his marital problems through 1988

and Venable had, in fact, visited Trimbur’s home before

(p. 1577).

Trimbur testified that he “was not employed by [the

Avoyelles Parish Sheriff's Office]” at the time he was

3 Sheehan’s trial, in which Trimbur served as the jury

foreman, began on April 25, 1988.

App. 47

selected to serve on the jury and that “he was never

asked” whether or not he was an auxiliary deputy (p.

1593). Trimbur also said he did not recall the trial judge

asking him if he had been employed by the Sheriff's

Office, but stated that he had not told the trial judge that

he was an auxiliary deputy sheriff in Avoyelles Parish

because he felt his involvement with the Sheriff’s Office

was minimal, that he was “looked upon more as a chap-

lain there, than I was as a policeman,” and he did not feel

it was necessary to tell the trial judge that he was an

auxiliary deputy (p. 1573). However, Trimbur stated that,

when he attended a meeting of Concerned Parents for a

Better Avoyelles on March 15, 1988, at Eddie Knoll’s

house, he told everyone there that he was an auxiliary

deputy sheriff and that he would assist them in any way

he could; Trimbur said there were a lot of people there,

including D.A. Eddie Knoll and two of Sheehan’s defense

attorneys, Mr. Rabalais and Mr. Melancon, and that,

although there were other people talking when he spoke,

he assumed that Knoll, Rabalais and Melancon had heard

him (pp. 1571-72). Trimbur stated that he did not think it

was necessary for him to tell the trial judge that he was

an auxiliary deputy because he assumed the D.A. and the

two defense attorneys knew he was one from hearing him

say so at the Concerned Parents meeting five weeks

before and they would bring it up themselves “if it was of

any consequence” (p. 1573). However, at the hearing, Mr.

Rabalais testified that he did not remember hearing Trim-

bur say he was an auxiliary deputy (p. 1604), and that he

was shocked when he discovered that after the trial (p.

1608). Mr. Knoll did not testify, and Mr. Melancon and

Mr. Unglesby (also a defense attorney) were not present

App. 48

at the hearing and, so, did not testify as to whether or not

they had heard Trimbur. |

Trimbur further testified at the hearing that, when

questioned by the defense during voir dire as to why he

was at that meeting, he did not say he had taken on the

role of a volunteer police officer while at the meeting

because he “didn’t feel it had any consequence at all, in

this trial” (p. 1574).

Finally, Captain Gano Bergeron, of the Avoyelles Par-

ish Sheriff’s Office, testified that he knew Trimbur from

the Sheriff’s Office (p. 1597), that Trimbur was one of the

more concerned auxiliary deputies (p. 1600), and that

Trimbur worked more than the required minimum 16

hours per month (p. 1599).

After the hearing on Sheehan’s motion for a new

trial, the trial judge denied Sheehan’s motion because

there was an issue as to whether Trimbur was actually

“employed” by the Sheriff’s Office, since he was only a

volunteer deputy (although he was paid $38.54 in 1987

for staying with a hospitalized prisoner) and because,

although Trimbur’s answer on voir dire was arguably

“less than a full disclosure”, Trimbur “did not inten-

tionally mislead anyone” (Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp. 1657). The

trial judge further reasoned that the only way the defense

could show bias on the part of Trimbur was to show, in

the abstract, that law enforcement personnel are prosecu-

tion oriented, since Trimbur had stated that he had no

prior knowledge about Sheehan’s case (p. 1657). The trial

judge concluded that the jurisprudence does not support

such a conclusion and found that Trimbur wanted to

participate in the trial because he was civic-minded (pp.

App. 49

1658-59). The trial judge also discussed the fact that Trim-

bur had testified that the three defense attorneys knew he

was a deputy sheriff because two of them, Mr. Rabalais

and Mr. Melancon (now Judge), were present at a meet-

ing, five weeks prior to trial, where Trimbur had admit-

ted it. The trial judge noted that only one of Trimbur’s

three trial attorneys was present at the new trial hearing

and that he was the only one who stated that he was

unaware that Trimbur was a volunteer deputy (p. 1660).

Finally, the trial judge found Trimbur had not inten-

tionally misled the defense attorneys about his friendship

with Venable, stating that the attorneys should have

asked more questions about it (pp. 1661-62).

3. Analysis

The first prong of Sheehan’s burden of proof is to

show that Trimbur lied during voir dire. The record of the

voir dire shows that Trimbur deliberately concealed his

connection with law enforcement, through denial of his

employment with the Sheriff’s Office,4 and deliberately

4 The trial judge’s strained interpretation of the term

“employed” does not support the State’s position; whether

“employed” encompasses volunteer workers or not, the fact

remains that Trimbur had actually been paid something by the

Sheriff’s Office before. Moreover, according to Webster’s Third

New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1986), p. 743, “employ”

means “something on which one is employed or with which he

is occupied; use, purpose; the state of being employed

especially for wages or a salary by someone or something; an

official public position.” This definition includes volunteer

work by implication, particularly volunteer work in a public

official position, such as an auxiliary deputy sheriff.

App. 50

concealed his friendship and contacts with a key prosecu-

tion witness in the case, Detective Venable, the lead

detective in the investigation of Sheehan.

The trial judge had no good basis for accepting Trim-

bur’s statement that Mr. Rabalais and Mr. Melancon were

paying attention to him, heard him announce that he was

an auxiliary deputy at a noisy public meeting five weeks

prior to trial, and remembered it, and from that, making

the inference that those two defense attorneys deliber-

ately concealed the fact of Trimbur’s employment as a

deputy sheriff as a trial strategy (Ex. A, Vol. 8, p. 1660). In

contrast, the trial judge failed to mention that D.A. Knoll

was also at that meeting and also did not recall Trimbur’s

statement that he is a Deputy Sheriff, and did not infer

that D.A. Knoll, likewise, deliberately concealed that fact.

The facts and circumstances of this case, taken as a

whole, show that Trimbur deliberately concealed his

employment with the Sheriff’s Office because he wanted

to be on the jury; in fact, he was the jury foreman.

Trimbur was asked to state his employment with the

Sheriff’s Office and did not do so because he “did not

think it was important”. Trimbur did not take his minis-

ter’s exemption because “he wanted to serve on this

jury”. Whether or not Trimbur believed his job as an

auxiliary deputy would not influence his judgment as a

juror, and, through him, the other jurors, is irrelevant;

that was not his decision to make. See Scott, 854 F.2d at

699 (juror’s conscious censoring of the information that

his brother was a deputy sheriff created a strong infer-

ence that he wanted to serve on the jury and thought it

unlikely that the court or defense counsel would permit

him to do so).

App. 52

Sheehan has also carried the second prong of his

burden or proof — that a challenge for cause on Trimbur,

due to the fact that he was an active auxiliary deputy

sheriff, would have been granted. Louisiana jurispru-

dence is clear on that point: “an actively employed crimi-

nal deputy sheriff is not a competent criminal juror.” State

v. Simmons, 390 So.2d 1317, 1318 (La. 1980). One serving

as an active or reserve police officer at the time of trial is

too likely to be influenced as a juror by that association

and should be disqualified from the jury. State v. Mitchell,

475 So.2d 61, 63-4 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985), and cases cited

therein. Also, Usner v. Strobach, 591 So.2d 713, 724 (La.

App. Ist Cir. 1991), writ den., 592 So.2d 1289 (La. 1992);

State v. White, 535 So.2d 929, 935 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988),

writ den., 537 So.2d 1161 (La. 1989). A challenge for cause

on Trimbur would have been granted due to the fact that

he was an active criminal auxiliary deputy sheriff.5

Finally, I note that, unlike Scott, this is a habeas pro-

ceeding, in which the factual findings of the state court

are entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C.

§2254. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545-47, 101 S.Ct. 764,

768-69, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). However, in the instant

case, the trial judge made no finding as to whether the

circumstances indicated that Trimbur was biased; he only

found that a deputy sheriff was not disqualified from

serving as a juror because he could not be considered

5 Trimbur (Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp. 1559-65) and Deputy Sheriff

Malcolm LaBorde (Ex. A, Vols. 7-8, pp. 1548-51) testified at the

hearing on the motion for new trial that Trimbur had assisted in

patrolling the streets, making arrests, investigating complaints,

| transporting people to jail, and making out offense reports, all

criminal law enforcement duties.

App. 52

biased per se, which is actually an erroneous statement of

the law. An inference of bias was created by Trimbur’s

conscious censoring of the information that he was an

auxiliary Deputy Sheriff and that he was friends with

Detective Venable; but, as an active auxiliary deputy

sheriff, he was considered to be biased as a matter of law.

Therefore, I will recommend that Sheehan’s petition

for writ of habeas corpus be granted on the ground that he

was denied his right to an impartial jury due to the

presence in his jury of a biased juror.

Ground No. 2 - Prior Trial & Conviction

Next, Sheehan contends he was denied his right to a

fair trial because extrinsic information relating to

Sheehan’s prior trial and conviction on the same charge,

which conviction was subsequently reversed and

vacated,® tainted the jury’s deliberations.

A defendant has the right to a trial by an impartial

jury and the right to be confronted with the witnesses

against him. The evidence developed against a defendant

shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom

where there is full judicial protection of the defendant’s

right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of coun-

sel. The rights of confrontation and cross-examination are

among the fundamental requirements of a constitu-

tionally fair trial. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct.

468, 470, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966). The government has the

6 State v. Sheehan, 515 So.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1987), writ den., 519

So.2d 129 (La. 1988).

App. 53

burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of evi-

dence produced in the courtroom and under circum-

stances assuring the accused all the safeguards of a fair

trial. U.S. v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 867-68 (5th Cir. 1975).

The defendant’s rights to a fair trial, confrontation, cross-

examination, and counsel are offended when prejudicial

extrinsic evidence before the jury comes from a third

party or from a juror. Howard, 506 F.2d at 868, and cases

cited therein.

However, it is not required that the jurors be totally

ignorant of the facts and issues involved in a case. The

mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt

or innocence of an accused, without more, is insufficient

to rebut the presumption that a prospective juror is

impartial if the juror can lay aside his or her impression

and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in

court. De La Rosa, 743 F.2d at 1379, quoting Irvin v. Dowd,

366 U.S. 717, 722-23, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751

(1961).

A juror is presumed to [sic] biased when he or she is

apprised of such inherently prejudicial facts about the

defendant that the court deems it highly unlikely that the

juror can exercise independent judgment, even if the

juror declares to the court that he or she will decide the

case solely on the evidence presented. De La Rosa v. State

of Texas, 743 F.2d 299, 1379 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. den., 470

U.S. 1065, 105 S.Ct. 1781, 84 L.Ed.2d 840 (1985); Willie v.

Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1379 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. den., 469

U.S. 1002, 105 S.Ct. 415, 83 L.Ed.2d 342 (1984). A juror’s

verdict must be based upon the evidence developed at

the trial. The scope of the discussion of the case among

the jurors during their deliberations does not include

RAL ES AE EUR DIETING DRG aE Sink SEI SERB ONS Sane ae RS

App. 54

communication from one juror to another of objective

extrinsic facts regarding the criminal defendant or his

alleged crimes. Howard, 506 F.2d at 867. In Howard, 506

F.2d at 867-68, the Fifth Circuit stated that, in the habeas

context, a defendant's right to a fair trial is violated when

prejudicial extrinsic evidence, a report by one of the

jurors that the defendant had been in trouble before, is

placed before the jury.”

This issue, also, was raised in Sheehan’s motion for a

new trial. At the hearing on his motion for new trial®,

7 In a similar context, with respect to media publicity, the

news of a defendant's prior criminal record disclosed to a jury is

considered “inherently prejudicial”. U.S. v. Gaffney, 676 F.Supp.

1544, 1551-52 (M.D. Fla. 1987), citing Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S.

794, 798, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2035, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975). In U.S. v.

Williams, 568 F.2d 464, (5th Cir. 1978), a case involving a direct

appeal, the court, focusing on the degree and pervasiveness of

the prejudicial influence, held that the exposure of two jurors to

information regarding the defendants’ convictions at the first

trial on the same charges resulted in an unfair second trial and

stated “we are hard pressed to think of anything more damning

to an accused than information that a jury had previously

convicted him for the crime charged.” Also, U.S. v. Bass, 10 F.3d

256, 260 (5th Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Aragon, 962 F.2d 439, 444 (Sth Cir.

1992) (“Thus, at a minimum, references to [the defendant’s]

prior convictions constituted inherently prejudicial

evidence. . . . It is innately prejudicial.”).

8 The testimony regarding the jurors’ discussions of

Sheehan’s previous trial and conviction was made only under

proffer because the trial judge was not sure if information

received from another juror constituted information from an

“extraneous source,” as stated in Sheehan’s motion for new trial

(Ex. A, Vol. 8, p. 1665). However, it is clear that, although

testimony regarding a juror’s mental process may not be

elicited, a juror may testify to any facts bearing upon the

App. 55

Trimbur testified that he did not know about the prior

conviction until the jury was deliberating on the final day

of trial (Ex. A, Vol. 8, p. 1586-87). Juror Kathy Small, the

alternate juror, testified that she heard someone mention,

in the jury room, that Sheehan had been tried before, but

did not say the outcome of the trial (Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp.

1626 & 1635); this occurred before the jury deliberations,

from which Small was excluded (p. 1634). Juror Terry

Taylor testified at the hearing that she found out during

the trial, from at least two conversations in the jury room,

and particularly from statements by Juror David

Gauthier, that Sheehan had been previously tried and

convicted on the same charges for which he was then

being tried (Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp. 1638-39). Taylor further

testified that Juror Brunette Bordelon had told her that

Bordelon’s husband had read a newspaper article about

the trial aloud to Bordelon during breakfast (P. 1641).

Bordelon denied that her husband had read the article

aloud to her or that she had read the article herself (Ex.

A, Vol. 8, p. 1618); she was not asked whether she had

heard any discussions concerning Sheehan’s prior trial

and conviction.

Since this is a habeas proceeding, the trial judge’s

factual findings are entitled to great deference, under 28

U.S.C. §2254. However, the trial judge held that, “assum-

ing the jurors learned about the prior trial and convic-

tion”, “[juror] ignorance of a prior conviction of the same

offense is not a constitutional right of a defendant” and

question of the existence of any extraneous influence, although

not as to how far that influence operated upon his mind. U.S. v.

Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 1975).

AGN Ng eg AEA AL BEY «

LL ALRE PERO RODE Mee pe tn sels

App. 56

that “it is speculative to assume that a juror would con-

sider a conviction of the same offense in a prior case as

evidence of guilt”, noting that he had specifically

instructed the jury to base its decision only on evidence

presented at the trial (Ex. A, Vol. 8, pp. 1667-68). Since the

trial judge’s holding is based on erroneous conclusions of

law, rather than factual findings, it is not entitled to

deference by this court.

Only four jurors testified at the hearing and only

three jurors were asked whether the jurors had discussed

Sheehan’s prior trial and conviction; of those three, all

answered affirmatively. One of those three indicated that

a fourth juror, David Gauthier, had also discussed the

prior trial. The inference to be drawn from the testimony

relating to the discussions in the jury room is that other

jurors, also, took part in or heard those conversations.

The facts of Sheehan’s prior trial and conviction are pre-

judicial extrinsic information that should not have been

considered by the jury. Compare, U.S. v. Howard, 506 F.2d

at 867.

Therefore, Sheehan’s right to a fair trial was clearly

violated and I will recommend that Sheehan be granted

habeas relief on this ground, also.

Ground No. 3 — Pretrial Publicity

Fi

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