Opposition Brief — Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc.

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No. 96-1629

pete«

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United Bintes

October Term, 1996

HARVEY S. PEELER

Petitioner,

_ a

SPARTAN RADIOCASTING, INC.

AND ALLAN RAY TEDDER

Respondents.

On Petition For a Writ Of Certiorari

To The South Carolina Supreme Court

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

BRUCE W. SANFORD

Counsel of Record

HENRY S. HOBERMAN

DAVID S. WACHEN

MICHAEL J. LORENGER

Baker & Hostetler LLP

1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 861-1500

Counsel for Respondents

WILLIAM U. GUNN

PERRY D. BOULIER

Holcombe, Bomar, Gunn & Bradford, P.A.

P.O. Box 1897

Spartanburg, SC 29304

(864) 585-4273

Of Counsel

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court should review the dismissal by the

Supreme Court of South Carolina of a libel action brought

by a public official when that court, after careful independent

review, found that the public official had failed to present

clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.

il

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

Petitioner Harvey S. Peeler was the plaintiff in the

Court of Common Pleas of Spartanburg County, where this

case was initiated. Peeler was the respondent in the appeal

to the Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Respondent Spartan Radiocasting, Inc. , defendant and

appellant below, owns and operates WSPA-TV in

Spartanburg, South Carolina. It is a South Carolina

corporation with its principal place of business in

Spartanburg County, South Carolina.

Respondent Allan Ray Tedder, defendant and

appellant below, was a reporter at WSPA-TV during the

events at issue.

RULE 29.6 LISTING

Respondent Spartan Radiocasting, Inc. has no parent

companies or publicly held, nonwholly-owned subsidiaries.

ill

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

FS seb Bo py) rr i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS .......... il

SUNDER ek yo ike Wee 9 se a il

Bis OPE Ps PAD i Ke i ee we es Vv

wares Gr SPI CAGE ke ee l

A. NE oda ga G 6: 6 oa ek ee a 2

B. ME a ac 8b ew eS 6

_ it We NI oo tion ak sk Se ee 9

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 11

I. RATHER THAN PRESENT A

COMPELLING REASON TO

GRANT CERTIORARI,

PETITIONER MANUFACTURES A

PHANTOM OPINION OF THE

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH

CAROLINA THAT IS AT ODDS.

WITH THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF

SHE REAL OPINION .......-%:; 1]

1V

Table of Contents Continued

Page

II. THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH

CAROLINA PROPERLY FOUND

THAT PETITIONER FAILED TO

PROVE BY CLEAR AND

CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT

RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH

ACTUAL MALICE

A. The August 29 Report ...... 15

B. The September 1 Report ..... 18

CONCLUSION

Vv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Page

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct.

RU CRUE oe es ere ae eee 13

Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union,

SG 23S. Se. ies OEE 16

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323

Eee ase e dea s o R se 14

Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,

SOs Si. Seer Cee sa ss hs Seas 14, 16

Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496

SUES an 5-0 oO 8 ee ks RC 8, 19, 20

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254

‘4. Be rarerereerar gree ree crs ms Sars ca 14, 19

Peeler v. Spartan Radiocasting, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 282

a6 See. 5 ek ea ke ees Ae passim

Perez v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.,

520 N.E.2d 198 (Ohio), cert. denied,

SEB SES. See Cee 6 ch Reh ews 17, 19

Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc. , 925 F.2d 703

(4th Cir.), cert. denied,

Se Sh GE UE 6 a Sakediee sees 14, 17

Vi

Table of Authorities Continued

Cases

Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779

RGR An SO Bik ope ete e wee viet

Silvester v. American Broadcasting Cos.,

650 F. Supp. 766 (S.D. Fla. 1986),

aff'd, 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir. 1988)

St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) .

Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987) ...

Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 1041 (1984) .....

In re UPI, 106 Bankr. 323 (D.D.C. 1989)...

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925)

Rules

Nc Ws OP is ae ee Sa eceleca kala

No. 96-1629

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996.

HARVEY S. PEELER

Petitioner,

Vv.

SPARTAN RADIOCASTING, INC.

AND ALLAN RAY TEDDER

Respondents.

On Petition For a Writ Of Certiorari

To The South Carolina Supreme Court

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This Petition challenges the unremarkable

application by South Carolina’s highest court of this Court’s

well-settled constitutional profections in a public official

libel action. In reversing the judgment of the trial court, the

Supreme Court of South Carolina held that Petitioner failed

to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondents

acted with actual malice in broadcasting allegedly false and

defamatory statements about him.

Rather than offer a compelling reason for this Court

to grant his Petition, as required by Supreme Court Rule 10,

Petitioner ignores the plain language of the lower court’s

opinion and contends that the court below “‘made a de novo

review of falsity, [and erroneously] applied a clear and

convincing evidence standard to the issue of falsity... .’

,’

2

Pet. at 13. The majority of Petitioner’s Argument section is

devoted to this proposition.

In fact, in a 7-page per curiam decision, the Supreme

Court of South Carolina explicitly states no less than four

times that it was steering clear of falsity and, instead, was

conducting a de novo review of the record to determine

whether Petitioner had proved actual malice by clear and

convincing evidence. See, e.g., Peeler v. Spartan

Radiocasting, Inc., 478 S.E.2d 282, 284 (S.C. 1996) (per

curiam) ("[W]e are required to conduct an independent de

novo review of the record only on the issue of actual

malice.") (emphasis added). The court went on to

recognize, correctly, that the record in this case contains

nothing that even approaches clear and convincing evidence

of actual malice. But this Court need look no further than

the four corners of the decision below to dispatch the

Petition.

A. The Facts

This lawsuit arises from two news reports broadcast

by Respondent Spartan Radiocasting’s television station,

WSPA-TV in Spartanburg, South Carolina, concerning the

acrimonious 1988 campaign for the District 14 seat in the

South Carolina Senate.

When it appeared that Petitioner Harvey S. Peeler

would be reelected in an unopposed election, former

Cherokee County Councilman J.R. Stroupe decided to mount

a late petition drive to put his name on the ballot as a

challenger to Peeler. On August 29, 1988, three days before

the September 1 petition deadline, several local newspapers

reported that there were questions about the authenticity of

some of the signatures on Stroupe’s petition, resulting in an

—_—— >

3

investigation by the State Law Enforcement Division

("SLED"). (R. at 142-45, 505S.)' On that same day, WSPA

assigned Respondent Allan Ray Tedder, a WSPA reporter

for nearly ten years, to cover the story for that evening’s

newscast. (R. at 142-43, 242, 328.) Tedder contacted the

South Carolina Election Commission, the Cherokee County

Election Office, and SLED, which confirmed its

investigation. (R. at 144-45.) He also spoke with Stroupe

on three separate occasions -- first over the telephone,

second in person but off-camera, and finally on-camera; he

also interviewed Stroupe supporters. (R. at 169-71, 231-32.)

According to Tedder, during his in-person, off-camera

conversation with Stroupe, Stroupe said he believed either

Peeler or his supporters had caused the forgeries to occur.

(R. 151, 171.) Stroupe’s supporters echoed the same

sentiment, with two supporters also opining that Peeler was

involved. (R. at 151, 170-71, 228, 231-32.) Tedder also

contacted Peeler, who denied any involvement. (R. at 328-

29.)

Tedder prepared a one-minute summary for that

evening’s six o’clock news. (R. at 332-33.) The report

followed a typical television news format for day-to-day

campaign coverage: (1) issue; (2) accusation; (3) denial; and

(4) "stand-up" closing by reporter. Tedder reported the

following:

Ray Tedder: These SLED agents are poring over

petitions that have been filed by J.R. Stroupe, a

former Cherokee County Councilman who wants to

run for the State Senate. The State Election

Commission says that twenty people have signed

' “R." refers to the Record On Appeal submitted to the Supreme

Court of South Carolina.

4

affidavits saying that they didn’t sign the petitions;

that someone forged their signatures. These agents

are trying to find out if there are more. At Stroupe’s

Service Station near Thickety Mountain, supporters

are claiming it’s just dirty politics.

J.R. Stroupe: Everything was fine until I asked to

see them.

Tedder: Stroupe says he has hundreds of people

working for him trying to get enough signatures to

get him on the ballot in November, opposite

incumbent State Senator Harvey Peeler. He says he

doesn’t know who might have forged the signatures,

but he claims Peeler or his supporters engineered this

problem. Peeler says that’s nonsense.

Harvey Peeler: The first I heard about it, Ray, was

yesterday afternoon. It took me totally by surprise.

Tedder: For election officials, finding out who did

it is not as important as finding out how many

signatures are valid. They have to certify the petition

by September the first. In Gaffney, Ray Tedder,

TV-7, Eyewitness News.

Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 283. Three days later, on September

1, Tedder prepared a one-minute follow-up report about the

failure of Stroupe’s petition drive. It again followed the

familiar campaign coverage format, and contained reactions

from the public:

Tedder: According to South Carolina Election

Officials, twenty people claim their names were

forged on these petitions. That helped keep J.R.

Stroupe twenty-seven away from having enough to

get on the ballot opposite incumbent State Senator

Harvey Peeler. These SLED agents sorting the

petitions are continuing to investigate hoping to find

5

out who committed the crime. J.R. Stroupe is

conducting his own investigation. Stroupe wan*: tc

prove he had nothing to do with the forgeries, and

the supporters who gathered at his service station

believe someone in the Peeler camp set Stroupe up.

Peeler says he had nothing to do with it. But Peeler

will be hard pressed to convince a lot of people.

They believe it’s just Cherokee County politics as

usual.

John Gimball: It wouldn’t surprise me. I mean,

there’s so much things that go on that people won’t

say nothing about. —

Arthur Hall: My opinion is that Harvey’s got

something to do with it.

Tedder: Stroupe says he’s not decided whether to

wage a write-in campaign, but his supporters say they

will carry on one with or without his active

participation. In Cherokee County, Ray Tedder, TV-

7, Eyewitness News.

Id. at 283-84. Although Peeler did not contact Respondents

following the airing of the August 29 report, in which he

was quoted (R. at 333-34), he visited WSPA on September

2 to complain that he was not contacted for comment prior

to the September 1 report. (R. at 334-44, 346, 348.) He

did not, however, complain that any of the statements in

either broadcast was false. (R. at 369-73.) When the news

director at the time, Harvey Cox, offered to broadcast a

follow-up report to allow Peeler another opportunity to

respond, Peeler declined the offer. (R. at 275.)

Senator Peeler was reelected to the South Carolina

Senate in November 1988. (R. at 360-61.)

B. The Lawsuit

For nearly two years after Senator Peeler’s reelection,

WSPA heard nothing further about the broadcasts from

Peeler. On August 8, 1990, he filed a Complaint alleging

that he had been defamed by the two broadcasts, but failed

to identify the specific statements alleged to be false and

defamatory. On June 5, 1992, Respondents moved for

summary judgment on the grounds that neither broadcast

contained any false statement, and that even if there had

been a false statement, there was no evidence that it had

been made with actual malice. The trial court denied the

motion with little explanation.

On June 15, 1992, a five-day trial began. Peeler

introduced the videotape of the two reports. As to the

August 29 report, Tedder testified that Stroupe had told him

during their off-camera conversation that he believed Peeler

or his supporters had committed the forgeries. (R. at 151,

171.) Because Peeler neglected to call Stroupe as a witness,

Peeler was unable to offer any affirmative evidence that

Stroupe had not made the accusation against Peeler.’

? Thus, Petitioner misrepresents the evidence when he claims that

"the evidence presented at trial showed that Stroupe never made the

accusation and that Tedder knew this." (Pet. at 2.) Indeed, later in the

Petition he concedes that Tedder testified at trial that the accusation

occurred off-camera, and that Haynes Mullinax, who was “present at the

grocery store when Tedder talked with Stroupe,” was not privy to that

conversation, having “observed the on-camera interview" only. (Pet. at

3 (emphasis added).) In addition, Petitioner neglects to mention that, at

one time, he sued Stroupe for libel based solely on the statement that he

now claims Stroupe never made. (R. at 517-29.) In support of his

motion for summary judgment in that case, Petitioner stated in a sworn

affidavit that Stroupe had in fact accused him of forgery. (R. at 530

2(b).)

7

With regard to the September | broadcast, which

was taped by WSPA and voluntarily provided to Petitioner

by WSPA at the September 2 meeting, (R. at 112, 349-50),

Petitioner insisted that the report on the videotape was not

the one that actually aired. The "real" broadcast, he told the

jury, was worse because the station’s tape did not include the

anchor’s "lead-in." (R. at 247-48, 349.) To support his

contention that the "real" broadcast was worse than the one

before the jury, Peeler offered hearsay testimony that his

mother told him that the September 1 newscast contained a

still picture of him in addition to Tedder’s report. (R. at

334-35.) Since he had not seen the news that evening,

Peeler was unable to confirm his mother’s recollection. (R.

at 334-35.)

Peeler then suggested to the jury that Tedder and

WSPA had destroyed the supposed "worse" videotape.

Peeler brought back former news director Harvey Cox, who

had since been terminated by WSPA. (R. at 267, 275.)

Cox testified that an air-check tape’ of the September |

newscast could not be located. He speculated that the air-

check might have been erased, but did not explain how he

eliminated the equally plausible possibility that the

September 1 newscast had never been recorded. (R. at 249-

50.) However, he did testify that “he did not mean to

suggest that he thought that Tedder had [erased it.]" (R. at

268.)

At the close of Peeler’s case, Respondents moved for

a directed verdict, arguing that Peeler had not met his

> Many television stations make a real-time tape of their programs

as they are broadcast, called an “air-check.". There is no legal

requirement that television stations make or retain "air-check" tapes, and

such tapes often are unavailable or of poor quality. (R. at 271.)

8

burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a

false and defamatory statement had been made with actual

malice. (R. at 387-91, 393-401.) The motion was denied.

(R. at 408-09.) Convinced that Peeler had not come close

to meeting the weighty constitutional burdens facing a public

official libel plaintiff, Respondents chose not to offer any

testimony. (R. at 410.)

The trial court’s instructions to the jury were long

and complex. The trial judge gave the jury two different

definitions of "actual malice." First he instructed the jury

that “actual malice" means knowingly or recklessly

publishing false statements.* Later in his instructions, he

told the jury that actual malice means conduct that is

"willful, wanton, or reckless or a conscious indifference or

a reckless disregard of the rights of others." (R. at 421,

430.)

Not surprisingly, after approximately two hours of

deliberations, the jury was baffled. It asked the court for

"(t]he definitions such as defamatory, preponderance, words

like that that were called out in here," and a copy of the

written charge. (R. at 459-60.) Instead of providing one,

the judge read the entire charge again, including the

instructions on presumed damages and both definitions of

actual malice. (R. at 459-74.) Respondents’ counsel

requested that the jury be provided with a written copy of

the definition of actual malice as it relates to liability. The

trial court rejected the request. (R. at 475.)

* The trial judge failed to abide by this Court’s admonition that "[i}n

place of the term actual malice, it is better practice that jury instructions

refer to publication of a statement with knowledge of falsity or reckless

disregard as to truth or falsity." Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501

U.S. 496, 511 (1991).

9

The same day, the jury returned a verdict for Peeler

and awarded $50,000 in actual damages and $625,000 in

punitive damages. (R. at 476-77.) Respondents promptly

moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial,

a new trial nisi as to both actual and punitive damages, and

an independent review of the punitive damage verdict. (R.

at 477-79.)

On December 22, 1992, the trial court denied all of

Respondents’ post-trial motions with no explanation other

than the conclusory statement that there was "sufficient

evidence" to support the jury’s verdict. (R. at 6.) The trial

court also reviewed the punitive damage verdict and held that

it was "proper." (R. at 14-15.)

hes The Appeal

On January 13, 1993, Respondents appealed to the

Supreme Court of South Carolina. After full briefing by the

parties, the court heard argument on November 16, 1994.

Thirteen months later -- on December 19, 1995 -- the court

informed the parties that Justice Toal, a member of the panel

who had heard argument, had decided to recuse herself.

Justice Toal’s husband, an attorney in private practice, had

been retained by Petitioner’s counsel to handle his domestic

relations situation shortly after the court heard oral argument

in this case. See Motion for Reargument and Memorandum

in Support, filed Jan. 31, 1996. This served as the basis for

Justice Toal’s recusal.

Respondents moved for reargument, which was

granted. A judge from the South Carolina Court of Appeals

sat in Justice Toal’s place at the second argument. The

reconstituted panel heard argument on April 16, 1996.

10

On November 18, 1996, the court reversed the jury’s

verdict for Petitioner, finding after conducting de novo

review that Petitioner had failed to prove actual malice by

clear and convincing evidence. Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 285.

As to the August 29 report, the court found that,

At best, Tedder may have practiced sloppy

journalism by referring to Peeler rather than only his

supporters, however, there is no evidence in the

record that he did so with actual malice.

Id. As to the September | follow-up report, the court said,

The testimony of [Hall and Gimball] does not clearly

show that Tedder deliberately misrepresented his

interviews with them. Tedder’s comment prior to

airing these quotes may have been ambiguous ["a lot

of people . . . believe it’s just Cherokee County

politics as usual."], but without additional evidence,

we hold this does not amount to clear and convincing

evidence of actual malice.

Id. In announcing its decision, the court explicitly rejected

Respondents’ argument that it was required to conduct an

independent review of the record to determine whether

Petitioner had proven falsity by clear and convincing

evidence. Instead, the court accepted Petitioner’s argument

that it was "required to conduct an independent de novo

review of the record only on the issue of actual malice." Jd.

at 284 (emphasis added). On January 13, 1997, the Supreme

Court of South Carolina denied Petitioner’s request for a

rehearing. This Petition followed.

11

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. RATHER THAN PRESENT A COMPELLING

REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI,

PETITIONER MANUFACTURES A PHANTOM

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF

SOUTH CAROLINA THAT IS AT CDDS WITH

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE REAL

OPINION.

Petitioner asks this Court to re-do the careful, de

novo work of South Carolina’s highest court in assessing

evidence of actual malice in an ordinary public official libel

case. Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 284. Petitioner does not

quarrel with the existing constitutional standard. He does

not dispute that he is a public official, that he bears the

constitutional burden of proving actual malice, that he must

prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, that

the Supreme Court of South Carolina properly defined the

term actual malice, or that the court was required to conduct

an independent review of the record on actual malice. Nor

does he advocate a departure from, or even an extension of,

these established principles.

Instead, he puts words in the mouths of South

Carolina’s Justices, asserting that they conducted a de novo

review of the evidence of falsity, not actual malice, and

erroneously applied the clear and convincing standard to

their phantom falsity analysis. The Justices said, and did, no

such thing. Petitioner ignores at least 4 unambiguous

statements by the court:

12

* We agree our scope of review on the issue of

actual malice is a de novo review to

determine if there is clear and convincing

evidence. However, we do not agree this is

the proper scope of review on the issue of

falsity. Id. at 284 (emphasis added).

e [W]e are required to conduct an independent

de novo review of the record only on the issue

of actual malice. Jd. (emphasis added).

e At oral argument, appellants in essence stated

if we declined to adopt a de novo review on

the evidence of falsity, [which the court has

cone,] the focus of this appeal should be on

whether there is clear and convincing evidence

of actual malice. Id. at 284 n.5 (emphasis

added).

® Pursuant to a de novo review of the record,

we hold there is not clear and convincing

evidence to support a finding of actual

malice. Jd. at 285.

This Court simply does not disregard the plain

language of lower court decisions, or re-plow fields that

have already been tilled by a State’s highest court. See

Texas v. Mead, 465 U.S. 1041, 1043 (1984) ("We do not

grant a certiorari to review evidence and discuss specific

facts") (quoting United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220,

227 (1925)); Sup. Ct. R. 10 ("A petition . . . is rarely

granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual

findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule of

law."). Petitioner’s plea for relief amounts to nothing more

than an argument that the lower court did not mean what it

13

actually said, and that it misapplied a properly stated rule of

law.° These are hardly the “compelling" reasons for

certiorari contemplated by Rule 10.

Il. THE SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH

CAROLINA PROPERLY FOUND THAT

PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR

AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT

RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH ACTUAL

MALICE.

Spirited accusations of political chicanery, trenchant

barbs between candidates, finger pointing, lawsuits -- this,

unfortunately, is the familiar face of politics and

electioneering in America today. The District 14 race for

State Senate in South Carolina had it all, and reporter Ray

Tedder did his best to report on the accusations, the ensuing

investigation by a state agency, and the predictable denials

from both camps. This is not the stuff of actual malice.

The decades-old actual malice rule was virtually

tailor-made to protect news reporting about hard-fought,

° After erroneously arguing that the Supreme Court of South

Carolina conducted a review of falsity, not actual malice, Petitioner

suggests that the court should not have used the clear and convincing

standard in its falsity analysis. Even if the court had conducted a review

of falsity, which it did not, and had applied the higher evidentiary

standard for that review, which it did not, such a decision would fall

within the court’s discretion and this Court’s First Amendment

jurisprudence. This Court has set the minimum standards required to

satisfy the Constitution; "[S]tate courts are absolutely free to interpret

state constitutional provisions to accord greater protection to individual

rights than do similar provisions of the United States Constitution.”

Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 115 S. Ct. 1185, 1190 (1995).

le

14

emotionally-charged local elections like this one. The actual

malice yardstick in part reflects the recognition that the press

must be free to cover even the most raucous political

campaigns and activities without fear of liability for mere

negligence. See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. Vv.

Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 687 (1989); New York Times

Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). As the Fourth

Circuit recently observed:

In the hurly burly of political and scientific

debate, some false (or arguably false)

allegations fly. The press, however, in

covering these debates, cannot be made to

warrant that every allegation that it

[publishes] is true. If this burden were

imposed through the law of defamation, news

organizations would become ever more

officious referees in the ring of robust debate,

and the free exchange of views would be

diminished to the public detriment.

Reuber v. Food Chem. News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 717 (4th

Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1212 (1991).

To recover for libel, therefore, a public official has

the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that

any allegedly defamatory statements about him were

published with knowledge that the statements were false or

with "a *high degree of awareness of . . . [their] probable

falsity.’" St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)

(citation omitted); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418

U.S. 323, 334 n.6 (1974) (reckless disregard is "equated

. . . With subjective awareness of probable falsity"); New

York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 279-80.

15

After full briefing, two oral arguments, and a de novo

review of the complete record, the Supreme Court of South

Carolina found that a public official embroiled in a tough re-

election campaign had failed to meet his heavy burden of

proving actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.

The record fully supports the court’s determination.

A. The August 29 Report

In his August 29 report, reporter Ray Tedder

described some of the developments in the heated District 14

State Senate race to the viewers of Cherokee County. In a

one-minute report, he conveyed the allegations of campaign

fraud, the pending investigation by the state agency charged

with overseeing the election, and the positions of both

candidates on the allegations. See In re UPI, 106 Bankr.

323, 330 (D.D.C. 1989) (publishing accused’s denial

eliminates risk publisher will be viewed as endorsing

reported charge). He paraphrased a private, off-camera

conversation he had with J.R. Stroupe, in which Stroupe told

Tedder that he believed that Peeler or his supporters had

"caused these forgeries to occur." (R. at 151, 169-71.)

Petitioner does not dispute that Stroupe and his

supporters accused Peeler’s supporters of having “engineered

this problem." Pet. at 4. The only issue he raised at trial,

and again on this appeal, was whether Stroupe also accused

Peeler himself. Petitioner even concedes that four local

newspapers had previously reported that "Stroupe had

accused Peeler’s supporters of involvement in the forgeries."

Pet. at 5.

At trial, Petitioner did not produce any direct

evidence that Tedder had deliberately misreported Stroupe’s

accusation. Tedder testified that Stroupe had told him

16

shortly before broadcast that he suspected that Peeler or his

supporters were behind the forgeries. (R. at 170-71.)

Remarkably, Petitioner did not call Stroupe as a witness to

refute Tedder’s recollection that Stroupe had told Tedder that

he believed Peeler was involved. In fact, Petitioner offered

no evidence that anyone at WSPA questioned whether

Stroupe had made the charge. And Tedder testified that,

even after four years, he still believed that the broadcasts

were fair and accurate reports of what Stroupe told him.°

(R. at 151, 167.)

Petitioner’s only evidence that purported to show

actual malice was second-hand testimony about Stroupe’s

bias and state of mind (not Tedder’s) at the time of the

interview, and allegations that Tedder somehow "staged" the

on-camera appearance. Alone or collectively, these

allegations do not come close to proving actual malice by

clear and convincing evidence.’

° Petitioner calls into question Tedder’s credibility in an attempt to

bolster his sagging actual malice argument. But, questioning Tedder’s

credibility is not tantamount to providing affirmative evidence of actual

malice. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984)

("discredited testimony is not considered a sufficient basis for drawing

a contrary conclusion"); Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 793

n.10(D.D.C. 1990) (questioning plausibility of defendant’s testimony is

not sufficient for fulfilling “affirmative duty" to prove actual malice).

Moreover, Petitioner distorts the record in saying that Tedder, at his

deposition, could only remember Stroupe accusing Peeler’s supporters.

(Pet. at 3-4.) In fact, Tedder remembered Stroupe saying “what we said

in the story." (R. at 154.)

” Petitioner also urges that Respondents’ supposed motive to "scoop"

the competition is evidence of actual malice. (Pet. at 22.) This Court

has rejected a similar theory. See Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 667.

17

Stroupe’s bias or state of mind is irrelevant to the

publisher’s subjective belief that the accusation was made.

See Reuber, 925 F.2d at 715 ("[a]ctual malice cannot be

proven simply because a source of information might also

have provided the information to further the source’s self-

interest"). Likewise, Petitioner’s assertion that Stroupe’s on-

camera appearance was "staged," simply because Stroupe

donned a clean shirt and sunglasses for the broadcast, is, at

best, irrelevant hyperbole. Petitioner did not even establish

at trial that Tedder had orchestrated Stroupe’s appearance.

(R. at 181, 229-30.) Even if Petitioner had proven that

Tedder provided a shirt and sunglasses to Stroupe, these

actions would be inconsequential. Taking reasonable steps

to improve the quality of a broadcast is "essentially neutral,"

and certainly far afield of the clear and convincing evidence

required to prove actual malice. See, e.g., Perez v. Scripps-

Howard Broadcasting Co., 520 N.E.2d 198, 204 (Ohio)

(rehearsal of questions does not affect actual malice

determination), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988); Silvester

v. American Broadcasting Cos., 650 F. Supp. 766, 779

(S.D. Fla. 1986) (allowing witnesses who support reporter’s

"thesis" to rehearse and retape without giving same

Opportunity to others does not “rise to the level of

constitutional malice"), aff'd, 839 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.

1988).

Based on this record, the Supreme Court of South

Carolina reached the unsurprising conclusion that evidence

about the state of mind of someone other than the publisher,

coupled with the unproven allegation that a reporter took

steps to make his broadcast look better, is not clear and

convincing proof of actual malice.

18

B. The September 1 Report

In his follow-up report of September 1, Tedder again

included comments from both camps, as well as “sound-

bites" from two citizens -- Gimball and Hall -- supporting

the unremarkable conclusion that some members of the

public viewed the petition controversy as "Cherokee County

politics as usual." Petitioner claims that Tedder acted with

actual malice because he edited the interviews with Gimball

and Hall and, Petitioner claims, took portions of the

interviews “out of context."

The record does not support Petitioner’s claims.

Tedder testified that he asked Gimball and Hall open-ended

questions. (R. at 192-93.) He also stated that he understood

Hall to say that Peeler might have had something to do with

the forgeries or the investigation. (R. at 186-87, 196-97.)

Although Hall testified that he had not intended to refer to

the forgeries, he admitted that Tedder could have asked

about them. (R. at 239-40.) The broadcast itself is at best

ambiguous as to whether Hall’s statement refers to the

investigation or forgeries. Gimball testified that his principal

gripe was that his sound-bite "was just one little segment of

what we had discussed." (R. at 129.) He did, however,

acknowledge that at the time he was interviewed, there were

people who would have thought that Peeler or his associates

were involved in the controversy. (R. at 136-37.)

Petitioner apparently quibbles with Tedder’s editing

decisions, suggesting that the broadcast should have

contained more of the Gimball and Hall interviews. This

argument ignores the realities and constraints of television

news, and also threatens the time-honored tradition of

leaving editing decisions to those in newsrooms, not

courtrooms. See Tavoulareas v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 796

19

(D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Courts “do not sit ’as some kind of

journalism review seminar offering our observations on

contemporary journalism and journalists.’") (citation

omitted), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). As one court

explained, "In any broadcast, there will be a selection made

as to what is newsworthy. The relevant question is whether

that selection is made with a view toward dissemination of

false information." Perez, 520 N.E.2d at 204 (citations

omitted). Here, the record contains ample evidence that

only two factors were considered when the broadcast was

edited: clarity and length of time. (R. at 168, 201.) There

is no evidence that Tedder edited the Gimball and Hall

interviews with anything but good faith, let alone "with a

view toward dissemination of false information," Perez, 520

N.E.2d at 204, or with the intent to quote Gimball and Hall

out of context.*

This Court’s decision in Masson v. New Yorker

Magazine, 501 U.S. 496 (1991), prominently featured in the

Petition, is not to the contrary. In Masson, the petitioner,

seeking reversal of the lower court’s grant of summary

judgment, pointed to evidence in the record of wholesale and

* The "missing" air-check tape and the testimony of a fired news

director add nothing of constitutional significance to the Petition.

Petitioner claims that Respondents intentionally erased the air-check to

hide unfavorable evidence, but he failed to prove at trial that the tape was

deliberately erased. See Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 285 (Petitioner failed to

prove erasure was not routine, negating possibility of actual malice).

Even the former news director, Harvey Cox, fired by the station before

trial, did not believe that Tedder had erased the air-check. (R. at 268-

69.) Similarly, Cox’s “expert" opinion that Gimbal] and Hall’s

comments may have been taken out of context, based entirely on his

impressions of what Hall and Gimball said at trial, (R. at 255), does not

address state of mind at the time of the broadcast. See New York Times

Co., 376 U.S. at 287.

20

deliberate fabrication of quotations that the petitioner

brought to the attention of the respondent-magazine’s fact-

checker prior to publication. Jd. at 500. This Court found

that the evidence in the record, taken in the light most

favorable to the petitioner, raised a genuine issue of material

fact as to actual malice and falsity, precluding summary

judgment. Jd. at 521. In making this determination, the

Court held

that a deliberate alteration of the words uttered by a

plaintiff does not equate with knowledge of

falsity . . . unless the alteration results in a material

change in the meaning conveyed by the statement.

Id. at 517 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

Here, unlike Masson, there is no evidence of

fabrication or alteration, no evidence of deliberate

fabrication or alteration, no evidence of pre-publication

knowledge of falsity, and no evidence of any “material

change in meaning" of the broadcast resulting from Tedder’s

editing decisions. Jd. As the Supreme Court of South

Carolina correctly recognized, the testimony in this case

"does not clearly show that Tedder deliberately

misrepresented his interviews with [Gimball and Hall],"

Peeler, 478 S.E.2d at 285 (emphasis added), and therefore

does not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence

that Tedder edited the September | broadcast with actual

malice.

Aeron ocinenan

——— mn

21

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny the

Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Bruce W. Sanford

Counsel of Record

Henry S. Hoberman

David S. Wachen

Michael J. Lorenger

Baker & Hostetler LLP

1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 861-1500

Counsel for Respondents

William U. Gunn

Perry D. Boulier

Holcombe, Bomar, Gunn & Bradford, P.A.

P.O. Box 1897

Spartanburg, SC 29304

(864) 585-4273

Of Counsel

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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