Opposition Brief — Loon Mountain Recreation Corp. v. Dubois

Supreme Court brief1997

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No. 96-1539

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996

¢

LOON MOUNTAIN RECREATION CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

VS.

ROLAND C. DUBOIS AND RESTORE:

THE NORTH WOODS,

Respondents

oummegt o-

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The First Circuit

+

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

— ¢

RotaNnp C. Dusots, Esa.

7401 Baltimore Avenue

Takoma Park, MD 20912

(301) 587-8266

Counsel Pro Se

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO, (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Does the discharge of river water containing chemical

and biological pollutants to a pristine pond require a

permit-under the Clean Water Act?

2. Did the Forest Service violate NEPA by failing to

consider project alternatives and mitigation measures to

avoid degradation of a pristine pond, and by failing to

obtain public comment on the ski area development alter-

native selected in its Record of Decision?

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS

In addition to the parties set forth in the caption, the

parties to the proceedings include the United States

Department of Agriculture and the following officers

thereof who were sued in their official capacity: Daniel

Glickman, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture;

Mike Domdeck, Chief, U.S. Forest Service; Robert Jacobs,

Regional Forester, Eastern Region, U.S. Forest Service;

and Donna Hepp, Forest Supervisor, White Mountain

National Forest, U.S. Forest Service.

ili

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

a oe oe Oh ee ne eno k Pee 8 a4 i

List of Parties to the Proceedings.................. ii

dL ue ced echiaeéxnanediseuues iii

EN ee IND ki r'e oda vo ene e ne UWA wees vod ead iv

Statutes and Regulations Involved ................. 1

IY We or i oes Soy cs sae sees anes 1

A. Statement of Facts.............. SP rere 1

mS UUROe OF PIGCRORMINE . oo. 56 ce cies. 6

Reasons for Denying the Writ ...................25 8

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE

THAT A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR

THE RETURN OF POLLUTANTS TO THE

SAME BODY OF WATER FROM WHICH

Ree WE Res UES soos sh dasavaunconen 8

Il. A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE

TRANSFER OF WATER AND POLLUTANTS

FROM ONE BODY OF WATER TO ANOTHER

Seee aren mates OOF WATER «3 00s cs cweees 9

Ill. THE FOREST SERVICE VIOLATED NEPA BY

FAILING TO CONSIDER REASONABLE PRO-

JECT ALTERNATIVES AND MITIGATION

MEASURES TO AVOID DEGRADATION OF

LOON POND, AND BY FAILING TO OBTAIN

PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT

PMY COR eg RS cB da 6° Se 12

(ES EROS LI a TE aS SRR ae ae RE ASTER pe 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases CITED:

Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th

ee) SR Ney ee Per ca ee tre ep Rein Orr 11

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).............. 2

Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800 F. Supp. 1113

CPL AI2S. 2 ROE, Sas he hes hiss eee See eae 10

Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir.

beg 2) ae a ag Ree pe ein Pat aE Ee eka eet ec ere 10, 12

Del-AWARE Unltd., Inc. v. Pennsylvania DER, 508

We me a, rey Sree yes Sein i pire 10

National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862

Fee Te Seek Ry SON we xisccacascpelesseerens wan 9

National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156

x1 Se eA Be rare renner garry OE Ser or re ea mip 9

Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490

Liak. RE LAO os dp eked made Ue R ee ees Sees ee ee 15

U.S. v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992). ..........5. 11

West Virginia Coal Association v. Reilly, ERC (BNA)

1353, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9401 (4th Cir. 1991).... 11

STATUTES CITED:

A Le 6 Os a aa er a ecaw ne 1

SE SE Se SO ooo oe See a a ks 1

AE Ea cs cs hs rR 10

SS USEC A ee eh ine eansuo ec aia 9

Be Rie ee. Oe UG ae deangtcdh esa rebeeebbess 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

REGULATIONS CITED:

we <.B a Sb See ee bonds oh cet seeeeeee 1

OG (AR, B SRS oi ech ee eee 2

N.H. Code Admin. R. Env-Ws 432.03 ................ 1

N.H. Code Admin. R. Env-Ws 437.06 ................ 2

STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

Excerpts of the relevant statutes and regulations

appear in petitioner’s Appendices D and E.

*

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of Facts.!

The White Mountain National Forest (“WMNEF”) is

managed by the United States Forest Service (“Forest

Service”) for a wide range of competing public uses,

including skiing. 16 U.S.C. § 497(b). The Forest Service

issues “special use” permits authorizing private entities

to provide recreational activities such as skiing on

national forest land. 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50-.65. The Forest

Service must abide by federal environmental laws includ-

ing the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42

U.S.C. § 4332 et seq., and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33

U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., in issuing such permits.

Loon Pond is 65 feet deep and is located in the

WMQNF at an elevation of 2,400 feet. Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d

at 1277. It is unusual for its pristine nature. Id. Regula-

tions issued by the New Hampshire Department of Envi-

ronmental Services designate Loon Pond as a Class A

waterbody, protected by demanding water quality stan-

dards, see N.H. Code Admin. R. Env-Ws 432.03, and as an

1 This statement of facts is largely drawn from the opinion

of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at Pet.

App. 3a-9a; 102 F.3d 1273, 1277-80.

Outstanding Resource Water, protected against any mea-

suravle long-term degradation, see id. 437.06; 40 C.F.R.

§ 131.12(a)(3); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112

(1992). It ranks in the upper 95th percentile of all lakes

and ponds in northern New England for low levels of

phosphorus, resulting in exceptionally high water clarity.

Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d at 1277. The Pond supports a rich

variety of life in its ecosystem, including aquatic organ-

isms not found elsewhere in New England. Id.; Court of

Appeals Joint Appendix (“J.A.”), vol. 1 at 514-15. Loon

Pond also constitutes a major source of drinking water

for the Town of Lincoln. Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d at 1277.

There is virtually no human activity on the land draining

into Loon Pond, except skiing at the nearby Loon Moun-

tain Ski Area. Id.

Petitioner Loon Mountain Recreation Corporation

(“Loon Corp.”) has operated the Loon Mountain Ski Area

since the 1960’s. Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d at 1278. Prior to

the permit revision that gave rise to this litigation, Loon

Corp. held a special use permit to operate on 785 acres of

WMNE land. Id. Although not specifically authorized by

the Forest Service to do so, Loon Corp. drew water for

snowmaking from Loon Pond, the East Branch of the

Pemigewasset River (“East Branch”), and Boyle Brook.

See id. Beginning in 1974, Loon Corp. was authorized by

the Town of Lincoln to remove the top 18 inches of water

from Loon Pond for use in snowmaking. Pet. App. 4a-5a;

102 F.3d at 1278. This agreement was amended in 1988 to

allow for authorization of further withdrawals on a case-

by-case basis. Pet. App. 5a; 102 F.3d at 1278. Combined

uses by Lincoln and Loon Corp. during the period cov-

ered by these agreements typically caused four-to six-foot

fluctuations in the level of Loon Pond. Id.

Loon Corp. has also used Loon Pond as a repository

for water and pollutants discharged from the snowmak-

ing system. Id. These discharges have included water

originating from the East Branch, Boyle Brook, and Loon

Pond. Id. Approximately 250,000 gallons of East Branch

water have been transferred to Loon Pond each year in

this manner. Id. Water taken from the East Branch and

discharged to Loon Pond contains bacteria, other aquatic

organisms such as Giardia lambia, phosphorus, turbidity

and heat. Id. Evidence was also introduced in district

court that oil and grease were present in the discharge

water, although their origin was disputed. Id.

In 1986, Loon Corp. applied to the Forest Service for

an amendment to its special use permit to allow ski area

expansion onto additional WMNF lands. Pet. App. 5a-6a;

102 F.3d at 1278. Pursuant to NEPA, the Forest Service

developed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement

(“EIS”), and a supplement to the Draft EIS. Responding to

criticism of the adequacy of those documents, the Forest

Service issued a Revised Draft EIS, which was published

for public comment. The Revised Draft EIS set forth five

alternatives to meet the perceived demand for additional

alpine skiing. Pet. App. 6a; 102 F.3d at 1278. All five

alternatives were located at the Loon Mountain site. Id.

Many individuals and groups, including respondent

Dubois, filed comments describing environmental prob-

lems with the alternative plans for ski area expansion.

One lengthy comment from the U.S. Environmental Pro-

tection Agency suggested that the Forest Service pro-

posed to “use Loon Pond like a cistern” instead of

treating it with the care it deserved as “one of the rare

high altitude ponds of its size in the White Mountains.”

Id.; J.A. vol. 2, Resp. to Pub. Com. on RDEIS at A-78.

Other commenters suggested that Loon Corp. be required

to build artificial water storage ponds to replace Loon

Pond as a source of water for snowmaking and as a

disposal site for pollutants from the snowmaking system.

Pet. App. 6a; 102 F.3d at 1278.

During the EIS process, Ron Buso, a hydrologist for

the WMNF, expressed concern that the proposed draw-

down of Loon Pond by twenty feet was likely to have

severe environmental impacts. Pet. App. 6a-7a; 102 F.3d

at 1279. He explained that natural snowmelt in New

Hampshire is extremely acidic and that a substantial

amount of acidic snowmelt would remain in Loon Pond

as a result of the drawdown, making the Pond two to

three times more acidic than it would otherwise be. Pet.

App. 7a; 102 F.3d at 1279. According to Mr. Buso and a

number of scientists whose affidavits were submitted to

the district court, this increase in the Pond’s acidity

would change the chemistry of the Pond, cause toxic

metals to be released from the sediment, and kill natu-

rally occurring organisms. Id.

Without addressing the issues raised by Mr. Buso or

in the comments suggesting artificial storage ponds, the

Forest Service prepared a Final EIS. Id. The Final EIS

added a sixth alternative, also on the Loon Mountain site,

which the Forest Service identified as its preferred alter-

native. Id. The new alternative provided for expansion of

Loon Corp.’s permit area by 581 acres, for the construc-

tion of one new lift and upgrading of several others, and

for the construction of approximately 70 acres of new ski

trails. Id. These changes were designed to increase the

number of skiers accommodated at the area from 5,800

skiers per day to 9,000. Id. Under Alternative 6, Loon

Corp. would more than double the amount of water used

for snowmaking, from 67 million gallons per year to 138

million gallons. Id. Most of the additional water would be

drawn from Loon Pond. Id. Loon Corp. would be autho-

rized to draw the Pond down for snowmaking by fifteen

feet, compared to the current eighteen inches. Id. The

Forest service assumed that the Town of Lincoln would

need up to an additional five feet of Pond water, making

a total of twenty feet that the Pond was expected to be

drawn down each year. Pet. App. 7a-8a; 102 F.3d at 1279.

This draw down would remove approximately 63% of the

Pond’s water. Pet. App. 8a; 102 F.3d at 1279. In March

1993, the Forest Service published a Record of Decision

(“ROD”) adopting Alternative 6. Id.

As a mitigation measure for the adverse environmen-

tal impacts on Loon Pond, the Forest Service required

Loon Corp. to pump water from the East Branch to Loon

Pond in December and May of each year if the Pond was

not otherwise full at those times. Id. These transfers of

river water to Loon Pond would be in addition to

increased discharges to the Pond resulting from the

planned expanded snowmaking operations. In its Final

EIS, the Forest Service recognized that the East Branch is

a relatively unprotected Class B waterway under New

Hampshire law, and that transfer of East Branch water to

Loon Pond would introduce pollutants irito the Pond. Id.

Accordingly, it specified that this transfer of East Branch

water could not occur if it exceeded certain levels of

turbidity, bacteria, or oil and grease. Id. Neither the Final

EIS nor the ROD set any limits, however, on the level of

non-bacterial organisms such as Giardia lambia or on

pollutants such as phosphorus and heat that may be

present in the transferred water. Id. Nor did the Final EIS

indicate an alternative means of refilling Loon Pond -

with clean water — if conditions were such that the trans-

fer of East Branch water would exceed the specified

levels of pollutants. Id.

B. Course of Proceedings.

Administrative appeals of the ROD were filed by the

National Audubon Society, Sierra Club, RESTORE: The

North Woods, Lincoln Coalition of Concerned Citizens,

Preserve Appalachian Wilderness, Pemigewasset River

Council, and Roland C. Dubois. These appeals were

denied. See J.A. vol. 1 at 201, 493-94.

Thereafter, respondent Roland C. Dubois (“Dubois”)

filed a complaint challenging the Forest Service action in

the United States District Court for the District of Colum-

bia. Docket Entry (“DOC”) 1. The matter was transferred

to the District of New Hampshire. Id Dubois then

amended his complaint to include a claim that the Forest

Service violated the CWA by allowing the unpermitted

discharge of pollutants from the East Branch to Loon

Pond during snowmaking activities. DOC 8. Both

RESTORE: The North Woods (“RESTORE”) and Loon

Corp. intervened. DOC 9, 13, 19, 19-1. Dubois then again

amended his complaint to include Loon Corp. as a defen-

dant also responsible for violating the CWA by transfer-

ring East Branch water to Loon Pond without a CWA

permit. DOC 52.

Dubois filed motions for a Temporary Restraining

Order and a Preliminary Injunction in district court, DOC

12, which were denied. DOC 41, 53. Thereafter, Dubois,

RESTORE and the Forest Service each filed motions for

summary judgment, DOC 31, 33, 46, 47, 502, 54, 56, 57,

while Loon Corp. filed a motion to dismiss. DOC 26. The

District Court granted the Forest Service motion, and

denied all others. Pet. App. 102a.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit partially reversed the District Court’s deci-

sion, ruling that a CWA permit is needed to transfer

water and pollutants from the East Branch to Loon Pond,

that the Forest Service arbitrarily failed to consider rea-

sonable alternatives to the use of Loon Pond for snow-

making, and that the Forest Service failed to provide an

opportunity for public comment on the approved ski area

expansion alternative. Pet. App. 1a-59a.

The Forest Service and Loon Corp. filed motions for

rehearing, and Dubois filed a conditional motion for

rehearing. On February 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals

granted in part the Forest Service’s motion (by incor-

porating into its opinion certain technical amendments

not relevant here), denied Loon Corp.’s motion, and did

not address Dubois’ motion. Pet. App. 60a-61a.

¢

REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE

THAT A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE

RETURN OF POLLUTANTS TO THE SAME BODY

OF WATER FROM WHICH THEY WERE

REMOVED.

Petitioner Loon Corp. would have this Court review

a matter specifically not decided by the Court of Appeals:

whether the return of water and associated pollutants to

the same waterbody from which they were removed

requires a CWA permit even if nothing is added to the

water in the interim. Pet. at 9-13. The Court of Appeals

explicitly states in its opinion that its holding on CWA

permit issues is limited to situations where water and

associated pollutants are transferred from one water body

to another. The Court wrote:

We hold that the Pemigewasset River and Loon

Pond are two distinct “waters of the United

States,” and that the proposed transfer of water

from one to the other constitutes an “addition.”

Where, as is undisputed here, the discharge is

through a point source and the intake water

contains pollutants, [a CWA] NPDES permit is

required. The Forest Service’s determination to

the contrary was arbitrary and capricious and

not in accordance with law. [citations omitted]

Pet. App. 53a; 102 F.3d at 1299. Thus, the Court’s holding

does not address the issue of the return of water and

associated pollutants to the same waterbody from which

they were withdrawn. Indeed, the Court distinguished

this case from others involving such activity:

The Forest Service is simply wrong to analogize

the present situation to a dam that merely accu-

mulates the same water, see National Wildlife

Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir.

1982), or a pump storage facility that stores

water from one source in a different place, see

National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co.,

862 F.2d 580, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1988), as distin-

guished from moving different water from one flow-

ing water body into another stationary, colder body.

Id. (Emphasis added.)

Thus, this case does not present the question which

petitioner asks the Court to review.

II. A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE TRANS-

FER OF WATER AND POLLUTANTS FROM ONE

BODY OF WATER TO ANOTHER DISTINCT

BODY OF WATER.

Loon Corp. argues that the CWA’s prohibition on the

unpermitted discharge of pollutants through a point

source, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), does not apply when the

pollutants in question are transferred from one body of

water to another wholly distinct waterbody. Pet. at 13-16.

Loon Corp.'s approach would, for example, allow the

unregulated transfer of water and associated pollutants

from waters bearing heavy loads of industrial pollutants

into pristine waters that have been protected from direct

10

industrial discharges because of their exceptional ecologi-

cal significance or importance as municipal water sup-

plies. This cannot be reconciled with the CWA’s goals of

“restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical and

biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a), and would render useless the billions of dollars

that have been invested nationwide in attaining water-

body-specific water quality standards through the control

of point source pollution.

Two courts other than the First Circuit have speci-

fically addressed whether the transfer through pipes of

water and associated pollutants from one waterbody to a

distinct water body requires a CWA permit. Both courts

reached the same result as the First Circuit - a CWA

permit is required. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d

1343 (2d Cir. 1991) (permit needed for operation of a

culvert allowing water and pollutants from a pond to

enter a hydrologically distinct wetland); Del-AWARE

Unltd., Inc. v. Pennsylvania DER, 508 A.2d 348 (Pa. 1986)

(permit needed for movement through a pipe of water

and pollutants from the Delaware River to a high-eleva-

tion creek).

Petitioner’s reference to Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800

F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), is not persuasive. Pet. at

14. Bettis addressed the diversion of an entire stream to

another location where no other body of water existed. Id.

at 1119. The Court held that a CWA permit was not

required for such activity, specifically noting that “there

is no indication that any pollutants were discharged

either into the stream or from the stream into another body of

water.” Id. (Emphasis added.)

11

Equally strained is petitioner’s reliance on Appala-

chian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976),

which has been overturned by the Fourth Circuit. In

Appalachian Power the Court held that pollutants which

were present in a facility’s intake water could not thereaf-

ter be subject to limitations in a CWA permit when

returned to a water of the United States, because the

industrial facility did not itself “add” the pollutants to

the water body. Id. at 1377. The Fourth Circuit has now

abandoned this reasoning. In West Virginia Coal Associa-

tion v. Reilly, ERC (BNA) 1353, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9401

(4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit upheld a district court

determination that holding ponds associated with coal

mining operations are “waters of the United States”

under the CWA, and that permits are required to autho-

rize the discharge of pollutants from such ponds into

other waters of the United States. Id. at LEXIS *4, *13.

Similarly, in U.S. v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992), the

Fourth Circuit held that pollutants released from a point

source into a water of the United States must be regulated

by a CWA permit, even if the pollutants originated off the

property of the discharger. Id. at 979. Thus, Appalachian

Power is no longer controlling even in the Fourth Circuit.

This is not simply respondent’s view — the United States

Environmental Protection Agency has reached the same

conclusion and has stated that it follows the approach

reflected in subsequent Fourth Circuit decisions. J.A. vol.

1 at 278.

There is no split in the Circuits on the need for a

CWA permit when pollutants are transferred from a

water of the United States to a distinct water body. It

12

follows that petitioner’s statements regarding discrep-

ancy in treatment of ski areas in different locations in the

country are demonstrably wrong. Petitioner’s specific

example, that ski areas in New York and Vermont are

subject to different treatmeni than those in New Hamp-

shire, Maine and Massachusetts, Pet. at 15, is particularly

difficult to comprehend in light of petitioner’s own recog--

nition, Pet. at 14, that the Second Circuit reached the

same conclusion in Dague as the First Circuit did in this

case.?

Ill. THE FOREST SERVICE VIOLATED NEPA BY

FAILING TO CONSIDER REASONABLE PRO-

JECT ALTERNATIVES AND MITIGATION MEA-

SURES TO AVOID DEGRADATION OF LOON

POND, AND BY FAILING TO OBTAIN PUBLIC

COMMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT ALTER-

NATIVE SELECTED.

The issues raised by petitioner regarding the ade-

quacy of the Forest Service EIS are highly fact-specific

and, because petitioner’s motion for stay of the Court of

Appeals mandate was denied, likely to be rendered moot

2 Loon Corp. mischaracterizes the facts as well as the law. It

claims that it does not use water withdrawn from the East

Branch before it is discharged to Loon Pond. Pet. at 7. However,

the record demonstrates, and the Court of Appeals specifically

noted, that Loon Corp. uses East Branch water before it is

discharged to Loon Pond to pressurize its snowmaking system

and to keep its pipes from freezing. Pet. App. 5a n.3. Loon Corp.

also alleges that it does not add any materials to the East Branch

water that passes through its pipes and is discharged to Loon

Pond. Pet. App. at 7. Evidence in the record suggests otherwise.

See Pet. App. 47a n.29; 102 F.3d at 1296; J.A. vol. 1 at 256, 337.

13

through issuance of a revised Forest Service EIS before

this Court would have an opportunity to address thern.

Moreover, petitioner has identified no fundamental legal

question underlying these challenges that would warrant

this Court’s consideration. ~

Although Loon Corp. itself describes water use and

discharge issues as “critical” to the Loon Mountain

expansion project, Pet. at 22, it argues that studying feas-

ible alternatives to the use of Loon Pond as the principle

source of water for snowmaking can only be criticized as

a failure to study “mitigation” as opposed to a failure to

study reasonable alternatives.3 Pet. at 17-18. This is non-

sense. An alternative with less environmental impacts

than other alternatives is not automatically converted

into a mitigation measure for the other alternatives, as

Loon Corp. argues. Rather, where a fundamental mod-

ification is identified for a critical project element, it

clearly represents an “alternative” to the proposed action.

The record demonstrates that the Forest Service has

required the construction of even larger snowmaking

ponds at other ski areas than would be required to elimi-

nate the use of Loon Pond for snowmaking purposes at

the Loon Mountain Ski Area. Pet. App. 28a-29a; 102 F.3d

at 1288. Public commenters, including respondent

Dubois, specifically requested that the Forest Service con-

sider construction of artificial ponds at the Loon Moun-

tain site. Pet. App. 27a-28a, 32a-35a; 102 F.3d at 1288,

* Loon Corp. is procedurally foreclosed from making this

argument now, since neither it nor the Forest Service asserted it

in any of the proceedings below.

14

1290-91. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly deter-

mined that the alternative should have been studied in

the Final EIS.

Loon Corp. also claims that the Forest Service was

under no obligation to study mitigation measures to pro-

tect Loon Pond because allowing the annual removal of

63% of the water in Loon Pond, and its replenishment

with acidic snowmelt and low-quality river water, would

cause no impact whatsoever to the Pond. Pet. at 17-19.

This argument is not only counter-intuitive, but is also

thoroughly contradicted by expert opinion in the admin-

istrative record. The United States Environmental Protec-

tion Agency stated in comments on the Revised Draft EIS

that the proposal would “use Loon Pond like a cistern”

instead of treating it with the care it deserves because “it

is acknowledged to be one of the rare high altitude ponds

of its size in the White Mountains.” Pet. App. 6a; 102 F.3d

at 1278; J.A. vol. 2, Resp. to Pub. Com. on RDEIS at A-78.

Again in its comments on the Final EIS the Environmental

Protection Agency stated that it “objects to the proposed

drawdown of the pond,” in part because “the likelihood

of frequent substantial drawdowns and the proposed

refilling of Loon Pond with significant quantities of water

from the East Branch subjects the Pond to threats,

acknowledged in the EIS, from non-point sources of pol-

lution.” J.A. vol. 1 at 194-95. These concerns of the Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency were substantiated by the

Forest Service’s own hydrologist, Ron Buso, who warned

that the planned use of Loon Pond was likely to greatly

increase its acidity. Pet. App. 7a; 102 F.3d at 1279. The

record clearly reflects, and the Court of Appeals correctly

determined, that the planned use of Loon Pond would

15

likely cause severe environmental impacts. The Forest

Service was obliged under NEPA to study all reasonable

mitigation measures for these impacts, including the con-

struction and use of artificial water storage ponds to

minimize or eliminate the use of Loon Pond for snow-

making purposes. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens

Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989).

In view of NEPA’s public participation requirements,

the Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the Forest

Service must prepare a Supplemental EIS. Pet. App.

36a-39a; 102 F.3d at 1291-93. The Revised Draft EIS that

the Forest Service released for public comment set forth

five development alternatives, differing by location of

trails, amount and location of water to be used for snow-

making, mitigation measures, and size and location of

facilities associated with skiing. The location and size of

ski trails is one of the critical components of the project,

since the trails take up by far most of the land needed for

the development and, therefore, are a major determinant

of its aesthetic and environmental impacts. (E.g., through

wetland fills and destruction of critical wildlife habitat.)

The Forest Service did not uitimately select one of the

five alternatives described in the Revised Draft EIS, but

instead authorized construction of a new Alternative 6

that was first described in the Final EIS. Virtually all of

the trails in Alternative 6 are in substantially different

locations than those of any of the five alternatives set

forth in the Revised Draft EIS. Pet. App. 38a; 102 F.3d at

1292-93.

One particularly different aspect of Alternative 6

from other alternatives is the crowding of many new

16

trails within the area of the WMNF historically autho-

rized for Loon Corp.’s use. Id. In the Revised Draft EIS

the Forest Service had indicated that crowding more

trails in this area was not feasible. Pet. App. 39a; 102 F.3d

at 1293; J.A. vol. 1 at 145-46. Thus, Loon Corp.’s argument

that Alternative 6 “was within the range of alternatives

the public could have reasonably anticipated [the agency]

to be considering,” Pet. at 23-24, is clearly meritless.

Loon Corp. also seriously misstates the facts when it

claims that “on the critical issues of water-withdrawal

and discharge . .. Alternative 6 presented no new issues.”

Pet. at 20, 22. First, as the Court of Appeals noted, Alter-

native 6 envisioned more-water use for snowmaking than

any of the other alternatives. Pet. App. 39a; 102 F.3d at

1293. The Environmental Protection Agency, among

others, expressed surprise and dismay at the amount of

water required for snowmaking under Alternative 6. J.A.

vol. 1 at 193.

In addition, Alternative 6 is the only alternative that

envisions substantial expansion of the ski area onto South

Mountain but does not provide for the construction of a

one-acre snowmaking pond to mitigate water with-

drawals from Loon Pond and to receive the wastewater

discharges from the snowmaking system. J.A. vol. 1 at

167-68 (alt. 2), 174 (alt. 3), 179-80 (alt. 4); J.A. vol. 2, ROD

at 17 (alt. 6). Thus, on both water withdrawal and dis-

charge issues, Alternative 6 is substantially different from

the alternatives made available for public comment. The

Court of Appeals correctly determined that a Supplemen-

tal EIS should have been prepared.

S

17

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Rotanp C. Dusotrs

7401 Baltimore Avenue

Takoma Park, Maryland 20912

(301) 587-8266

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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