Opposition Brief — Loon Mountain Recreation Corp. v. Dubois
Supreme Court brief1997
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No. 96-1539
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1996
¢
LOON MOUNTAIN RECREATION CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
VS.
ROLAND C. DUBOIS AND RESTORE:
THE NORTH WOODS,
Respondents
oummegt o-
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The First Circuit
+
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
— ¢
RotaNnp C. Dusots, Esa.
7401 Baltimore Avenue
Takoma Park, MD 20912
(301) 587-8266
Counsel Pro Se
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO, (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
LOD ROD eis ae A” RO pe c. ™
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Does the discharge of river water containing chemical
and biological pollutants to a pristine pond require a
permit-under the Clean Water Act?
2. Did the Forest Service violate NEPA by failing to
consider project alternatives and mitigation measures to
avoid degradation of a pristine pond, and by failing to
obtain public comment on the ski area development alter-
native selected in its Record of Decision?
LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
In addition to the parties set forth in the caption, the
parties to the proceedings include the United States
Department of Agriculture and the following officers
thereof who were sued in their official capacity: Daniel
Glickman, Secretary, U.S. Department of Agriculture;
Mike Domdeck, Chief, U.S. Forest Service; Robert Jacobs,
Regional Forester, Eastern Region, U.S. Forest Service;
and Donna Hepp, Forest Supervisor, White Mountain
National Forest, U.S. Forest Service.
ili
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
a oe oe Oh ee ne eno k Pee 8 a4 i
List of Parties to the Proceedings.................. ii
dL ue ced echiaeéxnanediseuues iii
EN ee IND ki r'e oda vo ene e ne UWA wees vod ead iv
Statutes and Regulations Involved ................. 1
IY We or i oes Soy cs sae sees anes 1
A. Statement of Facts.............. SP rere 1
mS UUROe OF PIGCRORMINE . oo. 56 ce cies. 6
Reasons for Denying the Writ ...................25 8
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE
THAT A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR
THE RETURN OF POLLUTANTS TO THE
SAME BODY OF WATER FROM WHICH
Ree WE Res UES soos sh dasavaunconen 8
Il. A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE
TRANSFER OF WATER AND POLLUTANTS
FROM ONE BODY OF WATER TO ANOTHER
Seee aren mates OOF WATER «3 00s cs cweees 9
Ill. THE FOREST SERVICE VIOLATED NEPA BY
FAILING TO CONSIDER REASONABLE PRO-
JECT ALTERNATIVES AND MITIGATION
MEASURES TO AVOID DEGRADATION OF
LOON POND, AND BY FAILING TO OBTAIN
PUBLIC COMMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT
PMY COR eg RS cB da 6° Se 12
(ES EROS LI a TE aS SRR ae ae RE ASTER pe 17
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases CITED:
Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th
ee) SR Ney ee Per ca ee tre ep Rein Orr 11
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).............. 2
Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800 F. Supp. 1113
CPL AI2S. 2 ROE, Sas he hes hiss eee See eae 10
Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d 1343 (2d Cir.
beg 2) ae a ag Ree pe ein Pat aE Ee eka eet ec ere 10, 12
Del-AWARE Unltd., Inc. v. Pennsylvania DER, 508
We me a, rey Sree yes Sein i pire 10
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862
Fee Te Seek Ry SON we xisccacascpelesseerens wan 9
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156
x1 Se eA Be rare renner garry OE Ser or re ea mip 9
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490
Liak. RE LAO os dp eked made Ue R ee ees Sees ee ee 15
U.S. v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992). ..........5. 11
West Virginia Coal Association v. Reilly, ERC (BNA)
1353, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9401 (4th Cir. 1991).... 11
STATUTES CITED:
A Le 6 Os a aa er a ecaw ne 1
SE SE Se SO ooo oe See a a ks 1
AE Ea cs cs hs rR 10
SS USEC A ee eh ine eansuo ec aia 9
Be Rie ee. Oe UG ae deangtcdh esa rebeeebbess 1
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Page
REGULATIONS CITED:
we <.B a Sb See ee bonds oh cet seeeeeee 1
OG (AR, B SRS oi ech ee eee 2
N.H. Code Admin. R. Env-Ws 432.03 ................ 1
N.H. Code Admin. R. Env-Ws 437.06 ................ 2
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED
Excerpts of the relevant statutes and regulations
appear in petitioner’s Appendices D and E.
*
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts.!
The White Mountain National Forest (“WMNEF”) is
managed by the United States Forest Service (“Forest
Service”) for a wide range of competing public uses,
including skiing. 16 U.S.C. § 497(b). The Forest Service
issues “special use” permits authorizing private entities
to provide recreational activities such as skiing on
national forest land. 36 C.F.R. §§ 251.50-.65. The Forest
Service must abide by federal environmental laws includ-
ing the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42
U.S.C. § 4332 et seq., and the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 33
U.S.C. § 1251 et seq., in issuing such permits.
Loon Pond is 65 feet deep and is located in the
WMQNF at an elevation of 2,400 feet. Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d
at 1277. It is unusual for its pristine nature. Id. Regula-
tions issued by the New Hampshire Department of Envi-
ronmental Services designate Loon Pond as a Class A
waterbody, protected by demanding water quality stan-
dards, see N.H. Code Admin. R. Env-Ws 432.03, and as an
1 This statement of facts is largely drawn from the opinion
of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit at Pet.
App. 3a-9a; 102 F.3d 1273, 1277-80.
Outstanding Resource Water, protected against any mea-
suravle long-term degradation, see id. 437.06; 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.12(a)(3); Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 112
(1992). It ranks in the upper 95th percentile of all lakes
and ponds in northern New England for low levels of
phosphorus, resulting in exceptionally high water clarity.
Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d at 1277. The Pond supports a rich
variety of life in its ecosystem, including aquatic organ-
isms not found elsewhere in New England. Id.; Court of
Appeals Joint Appendix (“J.A.”), vol. 1 at 514-15. Loon
Pond also constitutes a major source of drinking water
for the Town of Lincoln. Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d at 1277.
There is virtually no human activity on the land draining
into Loon Pond, except skiing at the nearby Loon Moun-
tain Ski Area. Id.
Petitioner Loon Mountain Recreation Corporation
(“Loon Corp.”) has operated the Loon Mountain Ski Area
since the 1960’s. Pet. App. 4a; 102 F.3d at 1278. Prior to
the permit revision that gave rise to this litigation, Loon
Corp. held a special use permit to operate on 785 acres of
WMNE land. Id. Although not specifically authorized by
the Forest Service to do so, Loon Corp. drew water for
snowmaking from Loon Pond, the East Branch of the
Pemigewasset River (“East Branch”), and Boyle Brook.
See id. Beginning in 1974, Loon Corp. was authorized by
the Town of Lincoln to remove the top 18 inches of water
from Loon Pond for use in snowmaking. Pet. App. 4a-5a;
102 F.3d at 1278. This agreement was amended in 1988 to
allow for authorization of further withdrawals on a case-
by-case basis. Pet. App. 5a; 102 F.3d at 1278. Combined
uses by Lincoln and Loon Corp. during the period cov-
ered by these agreements typically caused four-to six-foot
fluctuations in the level of Loon Pond. Id.
Loon Corp. has also used Loon Pond as a repository
for water and pollutants discharged from the snowmak-
ing system. Id. These discharges have included water
originating from the East Branch, Boyle Brook, and Loon
Pond. Id. Approximately 250,000 gallons of East Branch
water have been transferred to Loon Pond each year in
this manner. Id. Water taken from the East Branch and
discharged to Loon Pond contains bacteria, other aquatic
organisms such as Giardia lambia, phosphorus, turbidity
and heat. Id. Evidence was also introduced in district
court that oil and grease were present in the discharge
water, although their origin was disputed. Id.
In 1986, Loon Corp. applied to the Forest Service for
an amendment to its special use permit to allow ski area
expansion onto additional WMNF lands. Pet. App. 5a-6a;
102 F.3d at 1278. Pursuant to NEPA, the Forest Service
developed a Draft Environmental Impact Statement
(“EIS”), and a supplement to the Draft EIS. Responding to
criticism of the adequacy of those documents, the Forest
Service issued a Revised Draft EIS, which was published
for public comment. The Revised Draft EIS set forth five
alternatives to meet the perceived demand for additional
alpine skiing. Pet. App. 6a; 102 F.3d at 1278. All five
alternatives were located at the Loon Mountain site. Id.
Many individuals and groups, including respondent
Dubois, filed comments describing environmental prob-
lems with the alternative plans for ski area expansion.
One lengthy comment from the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency suggested that the Forest Service pro-
posed to “use Loon Pond like a cistern” instead of
treating it with the care it deserved as “one of the rare
high altitude ponds of its size in the White Mountains.”
Id.; J.A. vol. 2, Resp. to Pub. Com. on RDEIS at A-78.
Other commenters suggested that Loon Corp. be required
to build artificial water storage ponds to replace Loon
Pond as a source of water for snowmaking and as a
disposal site for pollutants from the snowmaking system.
Pet. App. 6a; 102 F.3d at 1278.
During the EIS process, Ron Buso, a hydrologist for
the WMNF, expressed concern that the proposed draw-
down of Loon Pond by twenty feet was likely to have
severe environmental impacts. Pet. App. 6a-7a; 102 F.3d
at 1279. He explained that natural snowmelt in New
Hampshire is extremely acidic and that a substantial
amount of acidic snowmelt would remain in Loon Pond
as a result of the drawdown, making the Pond two to
three times more acidic than it would otherwise be. Pet.
App. 7a; 102 F.3d at 1279. According to Mr. Buso and a
number of scientists whose affidavits were submitted to
the district court, this increase in the Pond’s acidity
would change the chemistry of the Pond, cause toxic
metals to be released from the sediment, and kill natu-
rally occurring organisms. Id.
Without addressing the issues raised by Mr. Buso or
in the comments suggesting artificial storage ponds, the
Forest Service prepared a Final EIS. Id. The Final EIS
added a sixth alternative, also on the Loon Mountain site,
which the Forest Service identified as its preferred alter-
native. Id. The new alternative provided for expansion of
Loon Corp.’s permit area by 581 acres, for the construc-
tion of one new lift and upgrading of several others, and
for the construction of approximately 70 acres of new ski
trails. Id. These changes were designed to increase the
number of skiers accommodated at the area from 5,800
skiers per day to 9,000. Id. Under Alternative 6, Loon
Corp. would more than double the amount of water used
for snowmaking, from 67 million gallons per year to 138
million gallons. Id. Most of the additional water would be
drawn from Loon Pond. Id. Loon Corp. would be autho-
rized to draw the Pond down for snowmaking by fifteen
feet, compared to the current eighteen inches. Id. The
Forest service assumed that the Town of Lincoln would
need up to an additional five feet of Pond water, making
a total of twenty feet that the Pond was expected to be
drawn down each year. Pet. App. 7a-8a; 102 F.3d at 1279.
This draw down would remove approximately 63% of the
Pond’s water. Pet. App. 8a; 102 F.3d at 1279. In March
1993, the Forest Service published a Record of Decision
(“ROD”) adopting Alternative 6. Id.
As a mitigation measure for the adverse environmen-
tal impacts on Loon Pond, the Forest Service required
Loon Corp. to pump water from the East Branch to Loon
Pond in December and May of each year if the Pond was
not otherwise full at those times. Id. These transfers of
river water to Loon Pond would be in addition to
increased discharges to the Pond resulting from the
planned expanded snowmaking operations. In its Final
EIS, the Forest Service recognized that the East Branch is
a relatively unprotected Class B waterway under New
Hampshire law, and that transfer of East Branch water to
Loon Pond would introduce pollutants irito the Pond. Id.
Accordingly, it specified that this transfer of East Branch
water could not occur if it exceeded certain levels of
turbidity, bacteria, or oil and grease. Id. Neither the Final
EIS nor the ROD set any limits, however, on the level of
non-bacterial organisms such as Giardia lambia or on
pollutants such as phosphorus and heat that may be
present in the transferred water. Id. Nor did the Final EIS
indicate an alternative means of refilling Loon Pond -
with clean water — if conditions were such that the trans-
fer of East Branch water would exceed the specified
levels of pollutants. Id.
B. Course of Proceedings.
Administrative appeals of the ROD were filed by the
National Audubon Society, Sierra Club, RESTORE: The
North Woods, Lincoln Coalition of Concerned Citizens,
Preserve Appalachian Wilderness, Pemigewasset River
Council, and Roland C. Dubois. These appeals were
denied. See J.A. vol. 1 at 201, 493-94.
Thereafter, respondent Roland C. Dubois (“Dubois”)
filed a complaint challenging the Forest Service action in
the United States District Court for the District of Colum-
bia. Docket Entry (“DOC”) 1. The matter was transferred
to the District of New Hampshire. Id Dubois then
amended his complaint to include a claim that the Forest
Service violated the CWA by allowing the unpermitted
discharge of pollutants from the East Branch to Loon
Pond during snowmaking activities. DOC 8. Both
RESTORE: The North Woods (“RESTORE”) and Loon
Corp. intervened. DOC 9, 13, 19, 19-1. Dubois then again
amended his complaint to include Loon Corp. as a defen-
dant also responsible for violating the CWA by transfer-
ring East Branch water to Loon Pond without a CWA
permit. DOC 52.
Dubois filed motions for a Temporary Restraining
Order and a Preliminary Injunction in district court, DOC
12, which were denied. DOC 41, 53. Thereafter, Dubois,
RESTORE and the Forest Service each filed motions for
summary judgment, DOC 31, 33, 46, 47, 502, 54, 56, 57,
while Loon Corp. filed a motion to dismiss. DOC 26. The
District Court granted the Forest Service motion, and
denied all others. Pet. App. 102a.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit partially reversed the District Court’s deci-
sion, ruling that a CWA permit is needed to transfer
water and pollutants from the East Branch to Loon Pond,
that the Forest Service arbitrarily failed to consider rea-
sonable alternatives to the use of Loon Pond for snow-
making, and that the Forest Service failed to provide an
opportunity for public comment on the approved ski area
expansion alternative. Pet. App. 1a-59a.
The Forest Service and Loon Corp. filed motions for
rehearing, and Dubois filed a conditional motion for
rehearing. On February 13, 1997, the Court of Appeals
granted in part the Forest Service’s motion (by incor-
porating into its opinion certain technical amendments
not relevant here), denied Loon Corp.’s motion, and did
not address Dubois’ motion. Pet. App. 60a-61a.
¢
REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE
THAT A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE
RETURN OF POLLUTANTS TO THE SAME BODY
OF WATER FROM WHICH THEY WERE
REMOVED.
Petitioner Loon Corp. would have this Court review
a matter specifically not decided by the Court of Appeals:
whether the return of water and associated pollutants to
the same waterbody from which they were removed
requires a CWA permit even if nothing is added to the
water in the interim. Pet. at 9-13. The Court of Appeals
explicitly states in its opinion that its holding on CWA
permit issues is limited to situations where water and
associated pollutants are transferred from one water body
to another. The Court wrote:
We hold that the Pemigewasset River and Loon
Pond are two distinct “waters of the United
States,” and that the proposed transfer of water
from one to the other constitutes an “addition.”
Where, as is undisputed here, the discharge is
through a point source and the intake water
contains pollutants, [a CWA] NPDES permit is
required. The Forest Service’s determination to
the contrary was arbitrary and capricious and
not in accordance with law. [citations omitted]
Pet. App. 53a; 102 F.3d at 1299. Thus, the Court’s holding
does not address the issue of the return of water and
associated pollutants to the same waterbody from which
they were withdrawn. Indeed, the Court distinguished
this case from others involving such activity:
The Forest Service is simply wrong to analogize
the present situation to a dam that merely accu-
mulates the same water, see National Wildlife
Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (D.C. Cir.
1982), or a pump storage facility that stores
water from one source in a different place, see
National Wildlife Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co.,
862 F.2d 580, 589-90 (6th Cir. 1988), as distin-
guished from moving different water from one flow-
ing water body into another stationary, colder body.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, this case does not present the question which
petitioner asks the Court to review.
II. A CWA PERMIT IS REQUIRED FOR THE TRANS-
FER OF WATER AND POLLUTANTS FROM ONE
BODY OF WATER TO ANOTHER DISTINCT
BODY OF WATER.
Loon Corp. argues that the CWA’s prohibition on the
unpermitted discharge of pollutants through a point
source, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a), does not apply when the
pollutants in question are transferred from one body of
water to another wholly distinct waterbody. Pet. at 13-16.
Loon Corp.'s approach would, for example, allow the
unregulated transfer of water and associated pollutants
from waters bearing heavy loads of industrial pollutants
into pristine waters that have been protected from direct
10
industrial discharges because of their exceptional ecologi-
cal significance or importance as municipal water sup-
plies. This cannot be reconciled with the CWA’s goals of
“restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a), and would render useless the billions of dollars
that have been invested nationwide in attaining water-
body-specific water quality standards through the control
of point source pollution.
Two courts other than the First Circuit have speci-
fically addressed whether the transfer through pipes of
water and associated pollutants from one waterbody to a
distinct water body requires a CWA permit. Both courts
reached the same result as the First Circuit - a CWA
permit is required. Dague v. City of Burlington, 935 F.2d
1343 (2d Cir. 1991) (permit needed for operation of a
culvert allowing water and pollutants from a pond to
enter a hydrologically distinct wetland); Del-AWARE
Unltd., Inc. v. Pennsylvania DER, 508 A.2d 348 (Pa. 1986)
(permit needed for movement through a pipe of water
and pollutants from the Delaware River to a high-eleva-
tion creek).
Petitioner’s reference to Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800
F. Supp. 1113 (W.D.N.Y. 1992), is not persuasive. Pet. at
14. Bettis addressed the diversion of an entire stream to
another location where no other body of water existed. Id.
at 1119. The Court held that a CWA permit was not
required for such activity, specifically noting that “there
is no indication that any pollutants were discharged
either into the stream or from the stream into another body of
water.” Id. (Emphasis added.)
11
Equally strained is petitioner’s reliance on Appala-
chian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1976),
which has been overturned by the Fourth Circuit. In
Appalachian Power the Court held that pollutants which
were present in a facility’s intake water could not thereaf-
ter be subject to limitations in a CWA permit when
returned to a water of the United States, because the
industrial facility did not itself “add” the pollutants to
the water body. Id. at 1377. The Fourth Circuit has now
abandoned this reasoning. In West Virginia Coal Associa-
tion v. Reilly, ERC (BNA) 1353, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 9401
(4th Cir. 1991), the Fourth Circuit upheld a district court
determination that holding ponds associated with coal
mining operations are “waters of the United States”
under the CWA, and that permits are required to autho-
rize the discharge of pollutants from such ponds into
other waters of the United States. Id. at LEXIS *4, *13.
Similarly, in U.S. v. Law, 979 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1992), the
Fourth Circuit held that pollutants released from a point
source into a water of the United States must be regulated
by a CWA permit, even if the pollutants originated off the
property of the discharger. Id. at 979. Thus, Appalachian
Power is no longer controlling even in the Fourth Circuit.
This is not simply respondent’s view — the United States
Environmental Protection Agency has reached the same
conclusion and has stated that it follows the approach
reflected in subsequent Fourth Circuit decisions. J.A. vol.
1 at 278.
There is no split in the Circuits on the need for a
CWA permit when pollutants are transferred from a
water of the United States to a distinct water body. It
12
follows that petitioner’s statements regarding discrep-
ancy in treatment of ski areas in different locations in the
country are demonstrably wrong. Petitioner’s specific
example, that ski areas in New York and Vermont are
subject to different treatmeni than those in New Hamp-
shire, Maine and Massachusetts, Pet. at 15, is particularly
difficult to comprehend in light of petitioner’s own recog--
nition, Pet. at 14, that the Second Circuit reached the
same conclusion in Dague as the First Circuit did in this
case.?
Ill. THE FOREST SERVICE VIOLATED NEPA BY
FAILING TO CONSIDER REASONABLE PRO-
JECT ALTERNATIVES AND MITIGATION MEA-
SURES TO AVOID DEGRADATION OF LOON
POND, AND BY FAILING TO OBTAIN PUBLIC
COMMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT ALTER-
NATIVE SELECTED.
The issues raised by petitioner regarding the ade-
quacy of the Forest Service EIS are highly fact-specific
and, because petitioner’s motion for stay of the Court of
Appeals mandate was denied, likely to be rendered moot
2 Loon Corp. mischaracterizes the facts as well as the law. It
claims that it does not use water withdrawn from the East
Branch before it is discharged to Loon Pond. Pet. at 7. However,
the record demonstrates, and the Court of Appeals specifically
noted, that Loon Corp. uses East Branch water before it is
discharged to Loon Pond to pressurize its snowmaking system
and to keep its pipes from freezing. Pet. App. 5a n.3. Loon Corp.
also alleges that it does not add any materials to the East Branch
water that passes through its pipes and is discharged to Loon
Pond. Pet. App. at 7. Evidence in the record suggests otherwise.
See Pet. App. 47a n.29; 102 F.3d at 1296; J.A. vol. 1 at 256, 337.
13
through issuance of a revised Forest Service EIS before
this Court would have an opportunity to address thern.
Moreover, petitioner has identified no fundamental legal
question underlying these challenges that would warrant
this Court’s consideration. ~
Although Loon Corp. itself describes water use and
discharge issues as “critical” to the Loon Mountain
expansion project, Pet. at 22, it argues that studying feas-
ible alternatives to the use of Loon Pond as the principle
source of water for snowmaking can only be criticized as
a failure to study “mitigation” as opposed to a failure to
study reasonable alternatives.3 Pet. at 17-18. This is non-
sense. An alternative with less environmental impacts
than other alternatives is not automatically converted
into a mitigation measure for the other alternatives, as
Loon Corp. argues. Rather, where a fundamental mod-
ification is identified for a critical project element, it
clearly represents an “alternative” to the proposed action.
The record demonstrates that the Forest Service has
required the construction of even larger snowmaking
ponds at other ski areas than would be required to elimi-
nate the use of Loon Pond for snowmaking purposes at
the Loon Mountain Ski Area. Pet. App. 28a-29a; 102 F.3d
at 1288. Public commenters, including respondent
Dubois, specifically requested that the Forest Service con-
sider construction of artificial ponds at the Loon Moun-
tain site. Pet. App. 27a-28a, 32a-35a; 102 F.3d at 1288,
* Loon Corp. is procedurally foreclosed from making this
argument now, since neither it nor the Forest Service asserted it
in any of the proceedings below.
14
1290-91. Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly deter-
mined that the alternative should have been studied in
the Final EIS.
Loon Corp. also claims that the Forest Service was
under no obligation to study mitigation measures to pro-
tect Loon Pond because allowing the annual removal of
63% of the water in Loon Pond, and its replenishment
with acidic snowmelt and low-quality river water, would
cause no impact whatsoever to the Pond. Pet. at 17-19.
This argument is not only counter-intuitive, but is also
thoroughly contradicted by expert opinion in the admin-
istrative record. The United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency stated in comments on the Revised Draft EIS
that the proposal would “use Loon Pond like a cistern”
instead of treating it with the care it deserves because “it
is acknowledged to be one of the rare high altitude ponds
of its size in the White Mountains.” Pet. App. 6a; 102 F.3d
at 1278; J.A. vol. 2, Resp. to Pub. Com. on RDEIS at A-78.
Again in its comments on the Final EIS the Environmental
Protection Agency stated that it “objects to the proposed
drawdown of the pond,” in part because “the likelihood
of frequent substantial drawdowns and the proposed
refilling of Loon Pond with significant quantities of water
from the East Branch subjects the Pond to threats,
acknowledged in the EIS, from non-point sources of pol-
lution.” J.A. vol. 1 at 194-95. These concerns of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency were substantiated by the
Forest Service’s own hydrologist, Ron Buso, who warned
that the planned use of Loon Pond was likely to greatly
increase its acidity. Pet. App. 7a; 102 F.3d at 1279. The
record clearly reflects, and the Court of Appeals correctly
determined, that the planned use of Loon Pond would
15
likely cause severe environmental impacts. The Forest
Service was obliged under NEPA to study all reasonable
mitigation measures for these impacts, including the con-
struction and use of artificial water storage ponds to
minimize or eliminate the use of Loon Pond for snow-
making purposes. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens
Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351-52 (1989).
In view of NEPA’s public participation requirements,
the Court of Appeals also correctly ruled that the Forest
Service must prepare a Supplemental EIS. Pet. App.
36a-39a; 102 F.3d at 1291-93. The Revised Draft EIS that
the Forest Service released for public comment set forth
five development alternatives, differing by location of
trails, amount and location of water to be used for snow-
making, mitigation measures, and size and location of
facilities associated with skiing. The location and size of
ski trails is one of the critical components of the project,
since the trails take up by far most of the land needed for
the development and, therefore, are a major determinant
of its aesthetic and environmental impacts. (E.g., through
wetland fills and destruction of critical wildlife habitat.)
The Forest Service did not uitimately select one of the
five alternatives described in the Revised Draft EIS, but
instead authorized construction of a new Alternative 6
that was first described in the Final EIS. Virtually all of
the trails in Alternative 6 are in substantially different
locations than those of any of the five alternatives set
forth in the Revised Draft EIS. Pet. App. 38a; 102 F.3d at
1292-93.
One particularly different aspect of Alternative 6
from other alternatives is the crowding of many new
16
trails within the area of the WMNF historically autho-
rized for Loon Corp.’s use. Id. In the Revised Draft EIS
the Forest Service had indicated that crowding more
trails in this area was not feasible. Pet. App. 39a; 102 F.3d
at 1293; J.A. vol. 1 at 145-46. Thus, Loon Corp.’s argument
that Alternative 6 “was within the range of alternatives
the public could have reasonably anticipated [the agency]
to be considering,” Pet. at 23-24, is clearly meritless.
Loon Corp. also seriously misstates the facts when it
claims that “on the critical issues of water-withdrawal
and discharge . .. Alternative 6 presented no new issues.”
Pet. at 20, 22. First, as the Court of Appeals noted, Alter-
native 6 envisioned more-water use for snowmaking than
any of the other alternatives. Pet. App. 39a; 102 F.3d at
1293. The Environmental Protection Agency, among
others, expressed surprise and dismay at the amount of
water required for snowmaking under Alternative 6. J.A.
vol. 1 at 193.
In addition, Alternative 6 is the only alternative that
envisions substantial expansion of the ski area onto South
Mountain but does not provide for the construction of a
one-acre snowmaking pond to mitigate water with-
drawals from Loon Pond and to receive the wastewater
discharges from the snowmaking system. J.A. vol. 1 at
167-68 (alt. 2), 174 (alt. 3), 179-80 (alt. 4); J.A. vol. 2, ROD
at 17 (alt. 6). Thus, on both water withdrawal and dis-
charge issues, Alternative 6 is substantially different from
the alternatives made available for public comment. The
Court of Appeals correctly determined that a Supplemen-
tal EIS should have been prepared.
S
17
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition for Writ
of Certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Rotanp C. Dusotrs
7401 Baltimore Avenue
Takoma Park, Maryland 20912
(301) 587-8266
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