Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sundwall v. Connecticut

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

(\) 961490 mar 17 1997

= iS;

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1996

ASTRID A. SUNDWALL,

Petitioner

V

&-

STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

SECOND CIRCUIT

1229 Winsted Rad.

Torrington, CT.

(860) 496-1252

1.) Whether the application of various

doctrines and laws pertaining to the relation

of state and federal courts has placed an

unjustified and unprecedented limitation on

the available of the federal forum to review

state laws and procedures that violate the

Constitution and federal law.

2.} Whether Plaintiff's complaint should

have been dismissed based on chance words in

the complaint without complying with the re-

quirements of 28 USC {{1738.

3.) What authority does the federal

court have to abstain from issuing relief,

particularly when there is a specific federal

statute defining when injunctions are allowed

and when they are prohibited.

4.) To what extent should the Code of

Judicial conduct come into play when "the pu-

rity of the judicial process" is the thing at

stake.

5.) Whether the claim that Defendant/

Respondent's Mechanics lien statues and

procedures are unlawful should have been

dismissed.

6.) Whether claims against defendants

who are in no way involved in the act of

judging should have been dismissed.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO PROCEEDINGS

IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT

In the District Court for Connecticut at

Bridgeport, the Plaintiff was Appellant

Astrid A. Sundwall. The Defendants were State

Of Connecticut; Judicial Department; Governor

Aaron Ment in his Official Capacity; Edward

Johnson in his official] Capacity; Donald B.

Caldwell in his Official Capacity; Daniel

Horwitch in his official Capacity; and

Marshall K. Berger in his official Capacity.

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

QUESTIONS PRESENTED. ....cccccccccser i

Mame ee PO Ee weak se 6 46 be Kibo ee Oe eee a3

Re WE PEO A Les bch knees nb esees iv

OPINIONS OF THE COURTS BELOW.......... 1

SENS S EEN Wav OES 6 6d ww we 6 dn ¥.0 038 2 2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

EMOVEDEUNS LNVULVED. ceccccccctccces 2-3

Same meene Se TH CASE: cocks ce svceeseva 4

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT......... 7

I. THE APPELLATE COURT HAS UPHELD THE

DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION ON IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS OF PARITY, COMITY, RES JUDICATA,

AND DOCTRINES SIMILAR THERETO WHICH CONFLICT

WITH FEDERAL LAW AS WELL AS VARIOUS RULINGS

OF THIS COURT REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE

FEDERAL COURTS IN RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAI.

II. THE APPELLATE COURT HAS ENTERED A RULING

THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS HAVE

ALREADY BEEN DECIDED. HOWEVER, THE CASES

CITED DO NOT APPLY TO THE ISSUES IN

PLAINTIFFS COMPLAINT. UNLESS THIS COURT

REVERSES THE DECISION OF THE LOWER FEDERAL

COURTS, THERE WILL BE NO OTHER FORUM IN WHICH

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY AND LAWFULNESS OF THE

STATE'S LIEN STATUTES AND DEBT ENFORCEMENT

PROCEDURES CAN BE CHALLENGED........... 9

APPENDIX A.

Opinion of the District Court........ A-1.

APPENDIX B.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals, 2nd

eA. wees wh Ok ee Wks 8 6 66 WS Oh % 606 048K B-1.

APPENDIX C.

Constitutional provisions, federal and

BEGce Scecuces TNVOLVOGs . 6k sks cc ce wceks C-1.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman

BEOS., 968 068. SIL (2988 oe eee 8

Conn. v Doehr, 501 US 1; 115 L. Ea. 20 13 111

SCvlt. 2200 43998 7. ui ee Oe |

Dennis v. Higgins, 111 St. Ct. 865

(SOFT sisi sie sees beads dae Oe US Cie ee 9

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 PLeeChivakwhenns 9

Kiner-Wood v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,

403 F.2d 437 (5th VenOUsts Leer sa cae 7

Mitchum v. Foster, 407 Wate es Ghose Lele es eo: 7

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. SOF (FOGL IOS 7

(NOPSI) New Orleans Public Service Inc. v.

Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350

(LITO oe ES aa PEs Cee os ee wee DE PO 9

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Coc, 263 USS. 413;

(LCS Fe Se BS ie Bake Fei WOLEL IE TE ee 6.7

Roundhouse Construction Corp. v Masons Sup-

plies Co.,; 168 Conn. 373 (1975), vacated 423

U.S. 809, aff'd 170 Conn. 155; (3976), cert.

Genied 429 0.8. €69. 55 dic ee 4

Sundwall v. General Building Supply, Petition

Os BOWES s a snes ae eho dedci en Oo ee 1,9

Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp... 433 U.3.:-623

(LRT hv he sb4 owe pakke we Rar eens ee eee, 8

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (AMTAT & ia oh 6,7

iv.

OFFICIAL OPINIONS IN THE CASE BELOW

The judgment and opinion of the District

Court for the District of Connecticut at

Bridgeport is reproduced in Appendix A of

this Petition. The ruling was in response to

Defendant/ Respondent's Motion to Dismiss.

A timely notice of appeal was filed by

Plaintiff/Petitioner to the United States

Court of Appeals. That court denied

Plaintiff/Petitioner's appeal on December 19,

1996. The ruling is reproduced in Appendix B.

Because Plaintiff/Petitioner learned of

the ruling from the Second Circuit by phone a

few days before she was to leave for People's

Republic of China, she filed a motion

requesting an extension of time to after she

returned to review the decision and file a

Request to Reconsider. The Request to

Reconsider is currently pending. Since there

may be a question of whether Plaintiff's

Motion to Reconsider was timely, this

Petition is being filed at this time so as

not to lose appeal rights to this Court.

Plaintiff has already exhausted the

path for appellate review of the state courts

decision on the constitutionality of

Connecticut's Mechanic's Lien and Lis

Pendants laws. (Ref, Sundwall v General

Building Supply Petition for Certiorar;i

No, 93-450) - Cert. denied.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 USC-1254. This petition is

filed within ninety days of the ruling of the

United States Court of Appeals Second

Circuit.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, FEDERAL

AND STATE STATUTE INVOLVED

This case involves the following

constitutional and Statutory provisions.

All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and Subject to the

jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the

United States and the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any

law which shall abridge the Privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States;

nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty or property, without due

Process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

laws.

Article One, Section 10 of Connecticut

Constitution.

All courts shall be open, and every person,

for an injury done to him in his person,

Property or reputation, shall have remedy by

due course of law and right and justice

administered without Sale, denial or delay.

28 USC {{ 1331. Federal Question.

The district courts shal] have original

jurisdiction of all Civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of

the United States.

Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

15 USC 1692g. {{809 (b).

"(b) If the consumer notifies the debt

collector in writing within the thirty-day

period ....the debt collector shall cease

collection of the debt, or any disputed

portion thereof..."

28 USC 2283. Stay of State court proceedings.

A court of the United States may not grant

an injunction to stay proceedings in a State

court except as expressly authorized by Act

of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its

jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its

judgments.

Conn. Gen. Stat. {{49-33 through CGS 49-39.

Mechanics Lien; (Please refer to Appendix C

for pertinent portions of the text of this

Statute.)

28 USC {{ 1738. Full Faith and Credit Act.

(Please refer to Appendix C for pertinent

portions of the text of this statute.)

42 USC {{ 1983. Civil Rights Act. (Please

refer to Appendix C for pertinent portions of

the text of this statute.)

NNER ae

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case has its Origin in the actions

of the Connecticut State Legislature who

disagreed with the final decision of the

State's highest court that portions of

Connecticut's ex Parte Mechanics Liens were

unconstitutional and re-instituted provisions

of the law that the court had ruled un-

constitutional. (Roundhouse) This case also

concerns a conflict between Connecticut's

debt enforcement procedures and the require-

ments of the Federal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act. Finally, this case seeks

judicial reform of Defendant/Respondent's

practices and procedures that violate the Due

Process clause of the United States

Constitution.

In spite of Deehr, ex parte attachment

schemes are growing like mushrooms throughout

Connecticut's statutes and procedures. They

are enacted ostensibly to secure a debt

although the debt is not yet substantiated.

With Mechanics Liens, enforcement of the debt

Claim is handled through the State's

foreclosure procedures.

There is no way to enforce the

requirement to notify the property owner that

a lien has been filed. This means the

property owner may not learn about a lien

until they go to sell the property or

refinance. A bond is not required to

compensate the property owner in the event of

an unjust "taking". Because of enormous case

backlogs in state court and statutory

Provisions that places an extra ordinary

burden on the property owner to dispute the

alleged debt with a preponderance of the

evidence, a timely and meaningful post

attachment hearing is not possible.

Antiquated and conflicting state discovery

Procedures exist. State Judges are either

unaware of controlling federal debt

9 et a amen

collection law or refuse to enforce it.

Intentional abuses of the lien statute and

foreclosure process occurs quite frequently.

Abuses of the Rules of the Court are common.

Thus, the resolution of a disputed debt can

and often does take years while the property

continues to be adversely affected by the

lien.

The Defendant's debt enforcement

procedures are at extreme variance with

Federal law. What occurs is that the lien

holder can begin foreclosure on the lien that

secures the disputed debt without first

obtaining a judgment. If the debt is verified

at trial, the practice is to elect the remedy

of foreclosure after which the property can

be reclaimed, but only if the owner also pays

the lawyers foreclosure fee. The only

recourse for the property owner to avoid a

lengthy and costly trial and permanent loss

of their credit is to pay the unsubstantiated

debt.

More importantly, however, the foreclo-

Sure court in Connecticut has become a forum

for lawyers and judges to obtain valuable

property at substantially less then its

worth. This activity has been largely

unregulated and consequently, fraud has crept

into the process thereby placing the property

Owner in Connecticut at additional risk of

unlawful deprivation of a substantial

property right.

The lawsuit in state court is a civil

matter between private parties. No legitimate

state interest is present. Furthermore, all

that remains in state court is the underlying

fact disputes involved in the contract and

debt collection which have been stayed in

State court due to one of the parties to the

State action having filed for bankruptcy

protection.

Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Federal

District Court after her attempts in state

court to obtain a favorable decision on the

unconstitutionality of Connecticut's

Mechanic's Lien and Lis Pendens statues

failed. Before doing so, however, Plaintiff

duly exhausted all her State and federal

appeal rights.

The federal lawsuit suit seeks a .

declaratory judgment and an injunction. It

sets forth claims under 42 usc {{1983; the

Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,

15 USC {{ 1692; the First and Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution;

and violations of State Constitution. Count

two and three are new Claims that have never

been heard in any pending or former state

case.

Defendant/Respondent filed a Motion to

Dismiss the federal law Suit before discovery

could be had. It claimed that issues of

comity and parity applied and that Plaintiff

was also improperly appealing a state court

decision to the District Court. Rather then

complying with 28 usc {{1738 and the Anti

Injunction Act, it did hot cite and certify

the “ruling” that was allegedly being

appealed from and instead used chance words

in the Plaintiff's complaint - words that in

fact are needed in Order to overcome Younger

and similar doctrines. The District Court

accepted the argument and dismissed the

appeal. In so doing, the District Court has

foreclosed any further Opportunity to obtain

federal review of Defendant/Respondent's

unlawful and unconstitutional state laws and

Procedures. It has also extended the scope of

~Rooker" beyond what this court intended.

The District Court issued the ruling

that is set forth in Appendix A. On Appeal,

the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rendered

the ruling that is set forth in Appendix B.

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. THE APPELLATE COURT HAS UPHELD THE

DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION ON IMPORTANT

QUESTIONS OF PARITY, COMITY, RES JUDICATA,

AND DOCTRINES SIMILAR THERETO WHICH CONFLICT

WITH FEDERAL LAW AS WELL AS VARIOUS RULINGS

OF THIS COURT REGARDING THE ROLE OF THE

FEDERAL COURTS IN RESOLVING CONSTITUTIONAL

AND FEDERAL LAW CLAIMS.

The lower federal courts appear to have

perceived a problem with the scope of its

authority to review the decision of a state

court based on this courts holding in Rooker.

Some form of review is needed, however, if

the federal court is to be asked to give full

faith and credit to an alleged ruling by a

State court. (Ref. provisions of 28 USC 2283

and 28 USC 1738, also Younger)

The manner in which the district court

appears to have resolved the problem was to

not inquire into the alleged state court

ruling or examine the record below on the

basis that to do so would be an impermissible

appeal. Instead of assuming that all

allegations within the complaint to be true,

it examined chance words in Plaintiff/

Appellant's complaint (words that it turns

Out were needed to over come this courts

findings in Younger, etc.,) and, without

allowing any discovery what so ever, claimed

that Plaintiff/ Appellant's motive was

Suspect and that in fact she was just

improperly appealing a state court decision.

Monroe, Mitchum, and similar decisions

by this court have made it clear that Section

{{1983 was intended to provide a remedy in

Situations when there was not full and fair

opportunity to litigate federal claims, and,

that the state court proceedings should not

be able to frustrate the role of the federal

7

eee cereal

judiciary in interposing the federal court

between the states and the people in guarding

peoples federal rights.

The purpose of the Federal Fair Debt

Collection Practices Act is to stop abusive

debt collection practices. Implicit in this

wording is the right to stop actions that

violate the law. Even a single instance of a

state court enforcing a disputed debt would

violate the Federal Fair Debt Collection

Practices Act. (Yendo, Amalgamated)

As has been pointed out numerous times

by various respected authorities on these

various doctrines, “there is a real risk that

questions of parity, and similar doctrines

may be a pretext for funneling federal

constitutional decision making into state

courts precisely because they are less likely

to be receptive to vigorous enforcement of

federal constitutional doctrines". (Neuborne,

The Myth of Parity, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1105

(1977); Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered:

Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36

UCLA, L. Rev. 233, (1988); Fallon, of

Justiciability, Remedies and Public Law

Litigation", Notes on the Jurisprudence of

Lyons, 59 NYUL Rev. 1 (1984)).

yhile the issue of federal and state

jurisdiction is important, the rules should

be firm and as predictable as possible

"because it is undesirable for federal courts

to be able to manipulate these doctrines to

avoid cases or to make decisions about the

merits of disputes under the guise of these

kind of doctrines", especially on the limited

chance that a review of their activities can

be had by this Court. (Nichol, Rethinking

Standing, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 68 (1984);

Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the “Passive

Virtue: - A comment on Principle and

Expediency in Judicial Reviews, 64 Columbia

L. Rev. 1 (1964))

8

Problems in not applying federal law ir

dealing with allegations of res judicata

issues involving alleged state court

decisions are humerous. They include: (1) An

Opportunity to misrepresent the facts. (2) An

Opportunity to misrepresent the rulings. (3)

Encouraging the entry of rulings in state

court that would intentionally block federal]

review. (4) An Opportunity to hide

inculpating evidence. (5) The motives of the

court become unprincipled because they depend

entirely on how a court chooses to

characterize Plaintiffs injuries and

complaint. (6) Access to the federal district

court to adjudicate constitutional and

federal claims becomes arbitrary. Moreover,

the combination and/or application of these

Various theories and doctrines has left

Plaintiff/Appellant without the choice of

forum of federal] court to address the State's

unconstitutional and unlawful laws and

Procedures. (Dennis, Fx Parte Young, NOPST)

The Plaintiff/Appellant has already

exhausted the state appellate path to review

a State court's determination of federal law

and constitutional Claims as to the

Connecticut Mechanics Lien and Lis Pendens

Statute. (Sundwal] y General Building Supply,

Petition No. 93-450) - Cert. denied.

Extra ordinary circumstances are present

in this case due to the state courts

continuing to enforce provisions of state law

that its own Supreme Court have declared are

unconstitutional. Moreover, the

unconstitutional activities of state

officials is the thing alleged in the federal

complaint due to the largely unregulated

trading in real estate by judges and lawyers

in the foreclosure court. Lawyers who have

knowledge of problems in the foreclosure

court will not take on these cases in state

court because of fear that they will never be

able to practice law in the courts in

Connecticut again. There is also no way of

knowing when the court has compromised its

ability to act. Therefore, the only recourse

at this point to deal with state

unconstitutional law claims is for the

federal court to determine the

constitutionality of state laws and

procedures, otherwise Plaintiff and others

will never be heard and the constitutional

abuses will continue. {Kinner-Wood)

More incidents have come to light since

the Second Circuit heard this appeal which

further strengthens the argument for federal

intervention. What occurred is that it

subsequently came to the attention of

Piaintiff/Appellant through a newspaper

article that a clerk of the court had

admitted to having taken substantial “loans”

from lawyers. There are claims that she told

at least one lawyer she could affect how his

cases were handled. This activity has a

direct bearing on Plaintiff's federal claims

because the individual involved had access to

Plaintiff's case file when many of the bogus

entries referenced in the federal lawsuit

occurred. Those entries were paving the way

for a fraudulent strict foreclosure without

ever proving the alleged debt. This activity

10

was hidden, however, by the extra ordinary

steps taken by Defendant/Respondent to avoid

discovery and the requirements of the Full

Faith and Credit Statute by using chance

words in Plaintiffs complaint instead.

SUMMARY :

Connecticut's numerous ex parte lien

Statutes are well known to this Court. (Ref,

Conn. v. Doehr). Enough time elapsed in the

State case to demonstrate that the State's

post attachment judicial procedures for

Mechanics Liens are extremely deficient in

providing adequate post attachment due pro-

cess.

What has occurred Subsequent to the

appeal in 1993 demonstrates conclusively

that the State lacks incentive to deal with

serious problems in the courts although the

Situation in Connecticut Clearly infringes on

citizens First Amendment and Due Process

rights. For these reasons, federal courts

Should not leave the crucial and

constitutional and federal law issues toa

State court, subject only to the relatively

remote chance of review by this Court.

4

Re ectfully /supmitted,

J) 4 c4al Wasa

Ms. As rid A. uldwail

pro se Plaintiff/Appellan

1229 Winsted Rd., #106

Torrington, Ct. 06790

860-496-1252

11

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

ASTRID A. SUNDWALL

V. STATE OF CONN. ET AL No. 3:95CV2458 (AHN)

RULING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Plaintiff pro se Astrid Sundwall

("Sundwall") brings this action pursuant to

42 USC {{1983 (1988) against the State of

Connecticut, the Judicial Department of the

State of Connecticut, Governor John G.

Rowland, The Honorable Ellen A. Peters, Chief

Justice of the Supreme Court of the State of

Connecticut, The Honorable Aaron Ment, Chief

Court Administrator, The Honorable Marshall

K. Berger, Jr., Daniel Horwitch, Statewide

Bar Counsel to the Connecticut Statewide

Grievance Committee, Donald B.Caldwell,

Executive Director of the Judicial Review

Council, and Edward Johnson, Executive

Director of the Connecticut Bar Association.

The individual defendants are named in their

official capacities. She seeks declaratory

and injunctive relief.

The defendants move to dismiss the

complaint pursuant to Rules 12 (b) (1) and 12

(b) (6), Fed. R. Civ. P. For the reasons that

follow, the motions to dismiss (doc. ##8, ag

27) at GRANTED and the complaint is DISMISSED

in its entirety.

DISCUSSION

Sundwall is a disgruntled state court

litigant, apparently vexed by adverse rulings

in a foreclosure proceeding in state court.

A-1

ERieensncre scarcer nn er creer eer Nene am

Her three-count Revised Complaint (doc. #33)

contains a series of broad, conclusory

accusations about alleged flaws in the

Connecticut civil legal system, in particular

its debt collection and enforcement laws, and

provides a laundry list of perceived wrongs,

Claimed abuses of court rules and procedures,

and purported attorney and judicial

misconduct. Stripped to its essentials,

however, Sundwall's request for declaratory

and injunctive relief is an attack on the

validity of the judgment of the state trial

court in the foreclosure proceeding in which

Sundwall was a party. It is well settled,

however, that "a plaintiff may not seek a

reversal of a state court judgment simply by

casting (her) complaint in the form of a

Civil rights action." Hagerty v. Succession

of Clement, 749 F, 20 217, 220 (Sth Cir, .

19784, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 968 (1985),

A federal district court does not have

the authority to review the final judgments

of a state court in a judicial proceeding.

See Rooker v,. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S,

413, (1923). In Rooker, the plaintiff sought

to reverse an unfavorable state court

decision by filing a complaint in federal

district court alleging that the state court

decision rested on unconstitutional state

Statute. In affirming the district court's

ruling that it lacked subject matter

jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claim, the

Supreme Court stated that "no court of the

United States other than this Court could

entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify

the judgment for errors of that character.

Bo: Peet aT eS

A-2

i

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|

Sixty years later, in

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 482 (1983), the Court reaffirmed

that federal district courts do not have

jurisdiction “over Challenges to state-court

decisions in particular Cases arising out of

judicial Proceedings even if those challenges

allege that the state court's action was

unconstitutional." id, at 486. The court

restated that such review may be had only in

the United States Supreme Court. see_id.: see

also 28 U.S.C, {{1257(a) 1998.

Pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

federal courts have declined to exercise

jurisdiction over constitutional claims

brought pursuant to section 1983 that

collateral attack a state court judgment if

those section 1983 claims are "inextricably

intertwined" with the state court judgment.

see, @.g.. Ritter vy. Ross. 29225. 28 750.

laasr4s A]th Cir. 1993}. cert. denied 114 S,.

Ct. 694 (1994). See also Feldman, 460 U.S. at

482-83 n. 16 ("If the constitutional clams

presented to the United States district court

are inextricably intertwined with the state

court's denial in a judicial proceeding of a

particular plaintiff's application for

admission to the state bar, then the district

court is in essence being called up to review

the stet-court decision.") Although one

exception exists to the -Fe] D

doctrine, that exception does not apply here.

see Ritter, 992 F. 2g at 753: Brooks-Jones y,

Hones, 916 F. Supp. 280, 281 (S.D,N.Y. 1996).

Whether a federal claim is “inextricably

intertwined" with a State court judgment

Often is a “difficult distinction to draw"

A-3

iii

and varies with the circumstances of a

particular case. See Ritter, 992 F. 21d at

124 (quoting Razatos v. Colorado Supreme

Court, 746 F. 2d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984),

cert. denied, 47] U.S. 1016, (1985)).

In Ritter v. Ross, the Seventh circuit

addressed an issue similar to the present

one. In Ritter, the plaintiffs alleged that a

proceeding in rem to foreclose tax liens

against the plaintiffs' property violated due

process. In dismissing the section 1983

action the court held that the district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the

plaintiff's section 1983 action under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. It concluded that

the subject of the plaintiffs' section 1983

action was the state court foreclosure

proceedings and that their section 1983 claim :

was “inextricably intertwined" with the

merits of that proceeding.

The Ritter court's conclusion applies

here. Sundwall's claims are "inextricably

intertwined" with the merits of the state

court decision in the foreclosure proceeding.

Indeed, the state court foreclosure

proceedings are the subject of this action.

(See Revised Compl. at 11-38, 40-47.) 4

Although Sundwall generally attacks the ‘

constitutionality of the state mechanics lien

and foreclosure statutes, she primarily

Challenges the state court's refusal to

remove an entry of default, its acceptance of

"bogus" appraisals of the property's value,

its refusal to discharge or reduce the amount

of the lien, its failure to provide timely

notice of its ruling, and its failure to

issue a written ruling of its decision as

well as the motives and tactics of the

persons and entities involved in the

foreclosure proceedings.

A-4

Sundwall professes that she does not

seek to relitigate the State-court debt

collection Proceedings in this action. (See

Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp'n Defs. Mot. Dismiss 6

(doc #25).) Her complaint and memorandum of

law suggest otherwise, however. Indeed, she

argues that if she was “required to wait a

final judgment on the debt collection claim

below," any ruling from this Court would be

too late to remedy the harm done to her as a

result of the "unconstitutional and unlawful

Procedures that are here under attack." (id.

at 6-7)

Like the Plaintiffs in Ritter, Sundwal]

essentially is Seeking federal] district court

appellate review of a State court's decision

in a judicial Proceeding. Because such a

review may be had only in the United Stets

Supreme Court, this court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction Over this action.

Sundwall's course Of appeal from an adverse

to this district court. Her complaint

therefore is DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 12

(b) (1).

Because the court has dismissed

Sundwall's section 1983 claims, the court

declines to exercise supplemental]

jurisdiction over her state law Clams. See

United Mine Workers v. Gobbs. Ifa0.S, 716.

126 (1966),

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the motions

to dismiss (docs. *¢ 8, 21, 27) are GRANTED

and the complaint is DISMISSED in its

entirety. SO ORDERED this 23rd day of April,

1996 at Bridgeport, Connecticut.

Alan H. Nevas, United States District Judge

A-5

CONCLUSION

g reasons, the motions to dismiss [docs. ##

D and the complaint is DISMISSED in its

23rd day of April, 1996 at Bridgeport,

Alan H. Nevas

United States District Judge

BEST AVAILABLE COPY” iam

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Sundwall v. Connecticut Docket No. 96-7762

APPEARING FOR APPELLEE: Andrew Turret,

(Edward Johnson, Bai, Pollock &

Executive Director, Coyne, P.C.

Connecticut Bar Assoc.) Bridgeport, CT.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the District of Connecticut (Alan

H. Nevas, Judge)

This cause came to be heard on the

transcript of record from the United States

District Court for the District of

Connecticut and WaS argued by appellant pro

se and by counsel for appellee..

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, IT IS HEREBY

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the order

of the District Court be and it hereby is

AFFIRMED.

Astrid Sundwall, Pro se, appeals from a

judgment of the United States District court

for the District Of Connecticut (Nevas, J,)

which dismissed her compliant for lack of

Subject matter jurisdiction. Sundwal]l brought

a Civil rights action against the State of

Connecticut; Governor John G. Rowland; The

Honorable Ellen A. Peters, Chief Justice of

the Supreme Court of the State of

Connecticut; the Judicial Department of the

State of Connecticut; The Honorable Aaron

Ment, Chief Court Administrator; The

Honorable Marshal K. Berger, Jr.; Daniel B,

Horwitch, Statewide Bar Counsel to the

Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee;

Edward Johnson, executive Director of the

Connecticut Bar Association; and Donald B,

B-l

sialic

Caldwell, Executive Director of the Judicial

Review Council. The suit stems from a

foreclosure action against Sundwall in state

court. Sundwall sought declaratory and

injunctive relief.

The district court properly dismissed

counts two and three of the amended complaint

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

pursuant to Rooker v,. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462

11983). Under the so-called "Rooker-Feldman

| doctrine," a federal court does not have the

authority to review the final judgment of a

state court in a judicial proceeding. Any

decision concerning the second and third

counts would require a federal court to

review the decision made by the state court,

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however,

does not apply to count one of Sundwall's

amended complaint because that count,

liberally construed, brings a general

constitutional challenge to Connecticut's lis

pendens and mechanic's lien statutes. See

Feldman,., 460 U. S. at 486-87. Therefore,

because state and federal courts have

determined that these statutes are

constitutional, see N tj

vy. Piccioine, 802 F. Supp, 692, 698 (D.Conn,

1992) (finding Connecticut's iis pendens

Statute provides requisite due process and is

constitutional); Red Rooster Constr. Co, y,

River Assoc, , 620 A.2d 118, 123-124 (Conn,

1992) (Refusing to find Connecticut's

mechanics lien statue unconstitutional); Papa .

v. Greenwich Green, Inc., 416, A, 2d 1996,

B-2

wht Hae

han TE EA ASH RGAE Wises eS aaa iS

wary HSE

REECE ete

1199 (Conn, 1979) (discussing changes to

Connecticut's mechanic's lien laws to remedy

prior constitution deficiencies, including

providing owner with notice of lien);

Wallingford Staffordshire Commons Ass'n. v

Staffordshire Assoc,, 615 A, 2d 188, 1965

(Conn. Super, Ct. 1992) (finding

Connecticut's lis pendens statute provides

due process and is constitutional), we affirm

the district court's dismissal of count one

on the alternative ground that it fails to

State a claim upon which relief may be

granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b) (6).

Finally, to the extent Sundwall's

amended complaint alleges state law claims

arising out of her claims concerning the

Connecticut Constitution, the district court

properly declined to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers Local

6 Pension Fund, 81 F. 3d 1182, 111878, (2nd

fob Oro BE

Accordingly, we AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF

THE DISTRICT COURT.

WILFRED FEINBERG, U.S.C.J.

FRANK X. ALTIMARI, U.S.C.J.

FRED I. PARKER, U.S.C.J.

lay be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).

Finally, to the extent Sundwall’s amended complaint

y

J

State law claims arising cut of her claims concerning the

cut Constitution, the district court properly declined t:c

Supplemental jurisdiction. See Nowak v. Ironworkers

‘Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996).

;

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

eee a w Aa,

WILFRED/ FEINBERG, U.S.C. J}

Were

f

FRANK X. ALTIMARI,“U.S.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

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APPENDIX C

Pertinent text of statutes.

Conn. Gen. Stat. {{49-33. Mechanics

lien. Rights of subcontractors. (a) If any

person has a claim for more than ten dollars

for materials furnished or services rendered

in the construction...of any Dbuilding...the

building, with the land on which it Stands or

the lot ...is subject to the Payment of the

claim.

(h) Any mechanics lien may be foreclosed

in the same manner s a mortgage.

Conn. Gen. Stat. {{49-34. Certificate of

lien to be recorded and notice given to

owner. A mechanics lien is not valid, unless

the person performing the services or

furnishing the materials, (1) within ninety

days after he has ceased to do So, lodges

with the town clerk of the town in which the

building, lot or plot of land is situated a

certificate in writing, which shall be

recorded by the town clerk with deeds of

land,...and(2) within the same time, or prior

to the lodging of the certificate but no

later than thirty days after lodging the

certificate, serves a true and attested Copy

of the certificate upon the owner of the

building, lot or plot of land in the same

manner as is provided for the service of the

notice in section 49-35.

C=]

Conn. Gen. Stat. {{49-35b. Burden of

proof at hearing. Authority of court. (a)

Upon the hearing held on the application or

motion set forth in section 49-35a, the

lienor shall first be required to establish

that there is probable cause to sustain the

validity of his lien. Any person entitled to

notice under section 49-35a may appear, to be

heard and prove by clear and convincing

evidence that the validity of the lien should

not be sustained or the amount of the lien

Claimed is excessive and should be reduced.

(b) Upon consider of the facts before

it, the court or judge may: (1) Deny the

application or motion if probable cause to

Sustain the validity of the lien is

established; or (2) order the lien discharged

if (a) probable cause to sustain its validity

is not established, or (b) by clear and

convincing evidence its invalidity is

established; or (3) reduce the amount f the

lien if the amount is found to be excessive

by clear and convincing evidence; or (4)

order the lien discharged or reduce the

amount of the lien conditioned upon the

posting of a bond, with surety, in a sum

deemed sufficient by the judge to indemnify

the lienor for any damage which may occur by

the discharge or the reduction of amount.

amc a ee tr eae arom

1s RAS EGA ati asi, aac

ee

Conn .Gen.Stat. {{49-35c. Appeal.

(a) any order entered as provided in

Subsection (b) of section 49-35b shall be

deemed a final judgment for the purpose of

appeal.

(b) No appeal may be taken from the

Order except within seven days thereof.

Conn. Gen. Sta. {{49-39. Time

limitation of mechanic's lien. Action to

foreclose is Privileged. A mechanics lien

Shall not continue in force for a longer

period than one year after the lien has been

perfected, unless the Party claiming the lien

commences an action to foreclose it, by

complaint Cross-complaint or counter-claim,

and records a notice Of lis pendens in

evidence thereof on the land records of the

town in which the lien is recorded within one

year from the date of the lien was recorded

Or within sixty days of any final disposition

Of an appeal taken in accordance with section

49-35c, whichever is later....An action to

foreclose a mechanics lien shal] be

Privileged in respect to assignment for

trial;

28 USC {{ 1738 State and Territory

Statues and Judicial Proceedings; full faith

and credit.

The records and judgment Proceedings of

any court of any such State...or copies

thereof, shall be Provided or admitted in

other courts within the United States...by

the attestation of the clerk and seal of the

court annexed, if a seal exists, together

with a certificate Of a judge of the court

that the said attestation is in Proper form.

Such Acts, records and judicial Proceedings

Or copies thereof, so authenticated, shal}

C~3

have the same full faith and credit in every

court within the United States and its

territories...as they have by law or usage in

the courts of such State...from which they

are taken. (June 25, 1948.)

42 USC {{1983 Civil Action for

Deprivation of Rights.

Every person who, under color of any

Statute,...of any state...subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United

States...to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress.