Reply Brief — Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner

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] Supreme Court, U.S.

| eS Ee

(4) JAN 4. 1996

No. 95-465 CLERK

—__—_ os

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

4

LAGUNA GATUNA, INC., A New Mexico Corporation, —

Petitioner,

V.

CAROL M. BROWNER, Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency, JANE N. SAGINAW,

Regional Administrator, Region VI of the Environmental

Protection Agency, and the ENVIRONMENTAL

PROTECTION AGENCY,

Respondents.

¢

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Tenth Circuit

¢

REPLY TO OPPOSITION

,

vv

Topp Stusss WELcH*

*Counsel of Record

WILLIAM Perry PENDLEY

MownraIn States LEGAL FOUNDATION

1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300

Denver, Colorado 80264

(303) 861-0244

Attorneys for Petitioner

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PPE Sich cs 6S OLN es Cd a Wah Chet ce. 8 1

I. DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT THIS COURT

SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI GIVEN THE

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE IN

WHICH ALL ACCESS TO THE COURTS HAS

SES PRIA 6b wnt hc perce steievopess's 1

Il. DEFENDANTS’ ASSERTION THAT THE ENVI-

RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S

CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IMPOSES NO

PENALTY OR SANCTION AND DOES NOTH-

ING TO ALTER THE LEGAL POSITION OF

PETITIONER IS SIMPLY UNTRUE............ 2

III. DEFENDANTS REFER THIS COURT TO THE

WRONG LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ONE

INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR...... 5

IV. DEFENDANTS’ ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE

THIS COURT THAT THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS

THE SAME AS THE CLEAN WATER ACT

| SPER RPC rear ee er Pete Fh Co eee 5

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136

(IO? os cide heed Be ee eee 5

Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)... 062... ssccscees 4

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)..... 7

Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455

a Ba) ee rete iT aes ee ak aig et eer ee 7

Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)............. 8

Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Reich, 510 U.S.

ee Gt By sak PR ne ha ieee 1

United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992)..... 7

STATUTES

SS UG. BUSI): 5 iit gets ieee ) a

Te CAs MRED s code ac vndyv neces scence abao bate 3

SS AF A Kin nd Rc hes bene eens ere eel 3

So Uh BEAU 650 ds chest ete hdenee «iene eee 3

OTHER AUTHORITIES

19 Environmental Law Reporter 35181 ............... 3

Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster

Provisions: The Delineation Procedures,

Options, and Alternatives for the American

Farmer, 73 Neb.L.Ret. 163 (1904). ..6 oc dctcccccces 7

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

General Permit and Reporting Requirements

from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,

NS os ae ls a eee 6

National Research Council, Wetlands: Characteris-

tics and Boundaries (1995)......................... 7

ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT THIS COURT

SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI GIVEN THE

DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE IN

WHICH ALL ACCESS TO THE COURTS HAS

BEEN FORECLOSED.

Defendants admit that “[t]he absence of judicial

review may offend due process in extreme cases where

‘the practical effect of coercive penalties is to foreclose all

access to the courts.’ ”! This case is the very case of which

Defendants write. This is that “extreme case[] where the

practical effect of coercive penalties is to foreclose all

access to the courts.”

Petitioner was given a cease and desist order by

Defendants. The violation of that order - and according

to the courts below a violation of the order is the only

manner in which Petitioner can obtain judicial review of

the order — would subject Petitioner to a $25,000 a day

fine and jail time.? Petitioner cannot afford to expose

itself to such coercive penalties to obtain judicial review.

As a result, Petitioner’s access to the courts has been

foreclosed.

Defendants cannot have it both ways. Defendants

cannot assert, as a philosophical matter, that “[t]he

absence of judicial review may offend due process in

extreme cases where ‘the practical effect of coercive pen-

alties is to foreclose all access to the courts,’” but then

1 Respondents’ Brief at 15, citing Thunder Basin Coal Com-

pany v. Reich, 510 U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 771, 782 (1994).

2 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(1).

when confronted with just such a case, pretend that it

does not exist. Applying the standard embraced by

Defendants, this Court should grant certiorari.

Il. DEFENDANTS’ ASSERTION THAT THE ENVI-

RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S CEASE

AND DESIST ORDER IMPOSES NO PENALTY OR

SANCTION AND DOES NOTHING TO ALTER

THE LEGAL POSITION OF PETITIONER IS SIM-

PLY UNTRUE.

Defendants’ assertion that the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency’s (EPA) issuance of a cease and desist order

against Petitioner carries with it no sanctions and does

nothing to change Petitioner’s legal position is not only

untrue, but is an audacious and arrogant misrepresenta-

tion of the facts below and the situation in which Peti-

tioner finds itself.?

On January 19, 1989, the EPA and the United States

Army Corps of Engineers entered into a “Memorandum

of Agreement [MOA] Between the Department of the

Army and the Environmental Protection Agency Con-

cerning the Determination of the Geographic Jurisdiction

of the Section 404 program and the Application of the

3 [T]he compliance order is not self enforcing. It

imposes no penalty or other sanction. The issuance of

such a compliance order does nothing to alter the

legal position of the alleged violator. . . . In effect, the

compliance order merely apprises the alleged violator

of the agency’s pre-enforcement position. Its issuance

is by no means a final administrative determination

that a violation has occurred.

Respondents’ Brief at 13-14.

Exemptions Under Section 404 (f) of the Clean Water

Act.”* The MOA specifically states: “[c]ase-specific deter-

minations made pursuant to the terms of this [MOA] will

be binding on the Government and [will] represent the

Government's position in any subsequent Federal action

or litigation regarding the case.”5 Thus, contrary to

Defendants’ assertion, a determination by the EPA that an

area constitutes “waters of the United States,” such as the

one made regarding Petitioner’s land, is final agency

action.

Not only does issuance of a compliance order that an

area is “waters of the United States” constitute final

agency action, it “alter[s]” in a very significant way “the

legal position of” Petitioner. If Petitioner had violated the

cease and desist order issued by EPA, then Petitioner

would have been subject to civil penalties of up to

$25,000 per day, criminal penalties of up to $25,000 per

day plus one year in prison, as well as administrative

penalties of $125,000 per violation.® In addition, since any

violation by Petitioner, in order to gain access to court,

would have been “knowing,” the penalty would have

increased to $50,000 per day and up to three years in jail.”

In other words, “the penalties for disobedience are by

fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to

intimidate [Petitioner] and its officers from resorting to

* Reprinted in 19 Env. L. Rep. 35181.

5 Id.

6 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(1), (d) & (g).

7 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(2). This represents double the fine and

a three fold increase in jail time.

the courts.”8 Is Petitioner's fear of such monstrous penal-

ties a reasonable one? The answer is: “Yes!” When asked

by the Court of Appeals what penalties Defendants

would seek should Petitioner violate the cease and desist

order to obtain judicial review, Dvfendants’ attorney

responded: “We would seek the maximum.”

Under the cease and desist order issued by EPA,

Petitioner is faced with “an abandonment of the right” to

judicial relief “rather than face the conditions upon which

[the right to judicial review] is offered or may be

obtained.”'"° When Defendants assert otherwise they

attempt to mislead this Court.

8 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908). The assessment of

penalties for a violation of a compliance order is not only a

possibility, but is a probability. See the excellent discussion of

this issue by Amici at pages 9-12 of their brief: not only is the

penalty increased, but also the probability of prosecution is

significantly increased if a compliance order is violated (“EPA

seeks cooperation and voluntary compliance . . . . Violations

after receipt of notice also help establish the knowledge element of

environmental crimes”) Id. at 11 (Emphasis added); (EPA “places

a high priority on enforcement of unpermitted discharges”) Id.

at 10 (Emphasis added); “EPA may require companies to restore

wetlands following a determination, thus a person

... faces . . . costly restoration requirements if he chooses to

challenge EPA’s assertion of jurisdiction by violating the com-

pliance order” Id. at 10-11; and “violation of a compliance order

will also typically result in increased civil or criminal penalties.”

Id. at 12.

9° A similar statement was made by EPA officials to Peti-

tioner during the meeting in the spring of 1991. Petitioner

requested that EPA issue a de minimis fine so Petitioner could

challenge EPA’s jurisdiction. EPA refused to issue a de minimis

fine and told Petitioner if the cease and desist order was vio-

lated EPA would seek the maximum penalties allowed by law.

10 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 147.

5

Ill. DEFENDANTS REFER THIS COURT TO THE

WRONG LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ONE

INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

While admitting that in determining whether a par-

ticular statute precludes judicial review the proper refer-

ence is to the statute itself,!1 Defendants draw the

attention of this Court, not to the legislative history of the

Clean Water Act (CWA), that is the statute in question

here, but to the Clean Air Act (CAA) - an act that has no

application to the case at bar.!2 The question before this

Court, given the importance of the right of judicial review

and the seriousness of its denial,!5 is whether Congress

intended to deny that right in its adoption of the CWA.

Defendants’ attempt to analogize tu the CAA is without

merit and should be ignored.

IV. DEFENDANTS’ ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THIS

COURT THAT THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS THE

SAME AS THE CLEAN WATER ACT FAILS.

Defendants attempt to persuade this Court that the

legislative history of the CAA, which precludes judicial

11 “Whether a particular statute (here, the CWA) ‘is

intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from

the statute's language. ...’ ” Respondents’ Brief at 8. (Emphasis

added.)

12 Respondents’ Brief at 11.

13 The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable

should not suffice to support an implication of exclu-

sion as to others. The right to review is too important to

be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of

legislative intent.

-Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).

(Emphasis added.) ;

review, is the same as the legislative history of the CWA,

which is silent regarding judicial review. Yet the enforce-

ment regimes of the two acts could not be more different

and thus any attempt to analogize between the two must

be resisted.

The CAA contains express and published standards

against which conduct is measured. The amount of emis-

sions permitted under the CAA is clear, as is what consti-

tutes a violation of the CAA. As pointed out by Amici, the

CAA has exact emission standards that are to be applied

consistently.1* Under the CAA, when emissions exceed a

certain level, a violation of the law has occurred. A per-

son charged with a violation will know that a violation

has occurred.!5 However, with regard to the so-called

“waters of the United States” provision of the CWA, there

are no published standards. Instead, the decision as to

what constitutes “waters of the United States,” that is,

what, for example, is a “wetland,” is established on a

case-by-case basis.

Defendants admit that they undertake determina-

tions regarding “waters of the United States” “on a case-

by-case basis, generally in the context of enforcement

actions.”1© These case-by-case determinations are made

against a standard that is clearly subjective, and that may

or may not be applied: “[these factors] are neither exclu-

sive nor regulatory; they are simply examples of the sort

14 Brief of Amici at 13.

15 Id.

16 Preamble to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-

tion System General Permit and Reporting Requirements from

Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 7620.

of factors EPA will probably apply in making individual

determinat ‘s.”!7 The result of this “absence of a uni-

form federal methodology” results “in inconsistent wet-

lands determinations for similar areas.”18 As Amici

declare, “[{t]h[e] dispute over the appropriate manual for

use in wetlands determinations involves more than mere

procedural! flip-flopping. Which manual is used to iden-

tify and delineate wetlands can make a great difference in

the amount of land considered to be wetlands.”!9 Most

importantly, for constitutional due process to be assured,

a federal statute must provide a person with a clear

standard against which his or her conduct can be mea-

sured.29 Contrary to the assertion by Defendants, the

17 Id. (Emphasis added.)

18 United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 1992).

19 Brief of Amici at 14, n. 12, citing National Research Coun-

cil, Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries (1995) at 77-78 and

Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster Provisions: The

Delineation Procedures, Options, and Alternatives for the American

Farmer, 73 Neb.L.Rev. 163, 173-174.

20 It is a basic principle of due process that an enact-

ment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not

clearly defined. . .. we insist that laws give the person

of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

know what is prohibited, so that he may act accord-

ingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not pro-

viding fair warning. . . . if arbitrary and

discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws

must provide explicit standards for those who apply

them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic pol-

icy matters. ...

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972). This Court

has applied this standard to civil matters. See Hoffman Estates v.

Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). The civil stan-

dard is described as “less strict” because “the regulated

CWA fails to provide that constitutionally required stan-

dard. While the CWA may not be void for vagueness on

its face, if Defendants are correct that no judicial review

is allowed in the face of a determination that private

property is “waters of the United States,” then the CWA

is unconstitutional as applied. Defendants’ attempt to

analogize to the CAA to save the CWA from its constitu-

tional infirmity are nonavailing.

*

CONCLUSION

Defendants’ Opposition must be found wanting, not

only for its failure to provide this Court with the relevant

legislative history, but for its failure to set forth accu-

rately the legal impact of the cease and desist order

issued by the EPA. While admitting that “[t]he absence of

judicial review may offend due process in exw 2me cases

enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the

regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative

process.” Id. Petitioner was denied either opportunity in the

case at bar. Petitioner asked EPA if the sinkhole was “waters of

the United States” and EPA said it was not. App. at 13. EPA then

changed its position and declared the sinkhole “waters of the

United States.” App. at 13-14. This does nothing to “clarify the

meaning of the regulation.” It adds confusion. The reason this

case is before this Court is because there is no administrative

process that provides the necessary “meaningful review.” There

is no due process. The decision of the Tenth Circuit is in conflict

with the holding of this Court since the decision below “encour-

age[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [and]

allows [regulators] to pursue their personal predilections” con-

trary to the decisions of this Court. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.

352, 358 (1983).

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where ‘the practical effect of coercive penalties is to fore-

close all access to the courts,’” Defendants attempt to

pretend that this case is not one of those “extreme cases.”

Yet, despite Defendants’ obfuscation and misrepresenta-

tions, it clearly is. Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully Submitted,

Topp Stusss WELCcH*

*Counsel of Record

WILLIAM Perry PENDLEY

MounrtTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION

1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300

Denver, Colorado 80264

(303) 861-0244

DATED: January 3, 1996

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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