Reply Brief — Laguna Gatuna, Inc. v. Browner
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] Supreme Court, U.S.
| eS Ee
(4) JAN 4. 1996
No. 95-465 CLERK
—__—_ os
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1995
4
LAGUNA GATUNA, INC., A New Mexico Corporation, —
Petitioner,
V.
CAROL M. BROWNER, Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, JANE N. SAGINAW,
Regional Administrator, Region VI of the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,
Respondents.
¢
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
¢
REPLY TO OPPOSITION
,
vv
Topp Stusss WELcH*
*Counsel of Record
WILLIAM Perry PENDLEY
MownraIn States LEGAL FOUNDATION
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300
Denver, Colorado 80264
(303) 861-0244
Attorneys for Petitioner
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PPE Sich cs 6S OLN es Cd a Wah Chet ce. 8 1
I. DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT THIS COURT
SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI GIVEN THE
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE IN
WHICH ALL ACCESS TO THE COURTS HAS
SES PRIA 6b wnt hc perce steievopess's 1
Il. DEFENDANTS’ ASSERTION THAT THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S
CEASE AND DESIST ORDER IMPOSES NO
PENALTY OR SANCTION AND DOES NOTH-
ING TO ALTER THE LEGAL POSITION OF
PETITIONER IS SIMPLY UNTRUE............ 2
III. DEFENDANTS REFER THIS COURT TO THE
WRONG LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ONE
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR...... 5
IV. DEFENDANTS’ ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE
THIS COURT THAT THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS
THE SAME AS THE CLEAN WATER ACT
| SPER RPC rear ee er Pete Fh Co eee 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136
(IO? os cide heed Be ee eee 5
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)... 062... ssccscees 4
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972)..... 7
Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455
a Ba) ee rete iT aes ee ak aig et eer ee 7
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)............. 8
Thunder Basin Coal Company v. Reich, 510 U.S.
ee Gt By sak PR ne ha ieee 1
United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1992)..... 7
STATUTES
SS UG. BUSI): 5 iit gets ieee ) a
Te CAs MRED s code ac vndyv neces scence abao bate 3
SS AF A Kin nd Rc hes bene eens ere eel 3
So Uh BEAU 650 ds chest ete hdenee «iene eee 3
OTHER AUTHORITIES
19 Environmental Law Reporter 35181 ............... 3
Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster
Provisions: The Delineation Procedures,
Options, and Alternatives for the American
Farmer, 73 Neb.L.Ret. 163 (1904). ..6 oc dctcccccces 7
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
General Permit and Reporting Requirements
from Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations,
NS os ae ls a eee 6
National Research Council, Wetlands: Characteris-
tics and Boundaries (1995)......................... 7
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANTS ADMIT THAT THIS COURT
SHOULD GRANT CERTIORARI GIVEN THE
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS IN THIS CASE IN
WHICH ALL ACCESS TO THE COURTS HAS
BEEN FORECLOSED.
Defendants admit that “[t]he absence of judicial
review may offend due process in extreme cases where
‘the practical effect of coercive penalties is to foreclose all
access to the courts.’ ”! This case is the very case of which
Defendants write. This is that “extreme case[] where the
practical effect of coercive penalties is to foreclose all
access to the courts.”
Petitioner was given a cease and desist order by
Defendants. The violation of that order - and according
to the courts below a violation of the order is the only
manner in which Petitioner can obtain judicial review of
the order — would subject Petitioner to a $25,000 a day
fine and jail time.? Petitioner cannot afford to expose
itself to such coercive penalties to obtain judicial review.
As a result, Petitioner’s access to the courts has been
foreclosed.
Defendants cannot have it both ways. Defendants
cannot assert, as a philosophical matter, that “[t]he
absence of judicial review may offend due process in
extreme cases where ‘the practical effect of coercive pen-
alties is to foreclose all access to the courts,’” but then
1 Respondents’ Brief at 15, citing Thunder Basin Coal Com-
pany v. Reich, 510 U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 771, 782 (1994).
2 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(1).
when confronted with just such a case, pretend that it
does not exist. Applying the standard embraced by
Defendants, this Court should grant certiorari.
Il. DEFENDANTS’ ASSERTION THAT THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY’S CEASE
AND DESIST ORDER IMPOSES NO PENALTY OR
SANCTION AND DOES NOTHING TO ALTER
THE LEGAL POSITION OF PETITIONER IS SIM-
PLY UNTRUE.
Defendants’ assertion that the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency’s (EPA) issuance of a cease and desist order
against Petitioner carries with it no sanctions and does
nothing to change Petitioner’s legal position is not only
untrue, but is an audacious and arrogant misrepresenta-
tion of the facts below and the situation in which Peti-
tioner finds itself.?
On January 19, 1989, the EPA and the United States
Army Corps of Engineers entered into a “Memorandum
of Agreement [MOA] Between the Department of the
Army and the Environmental Protection Agency Con-
cerning the Determination of the Geographic Jurisdiction
of the Section 404 program and the Application of the
3 [T]he compliance order is not self enforcing. It
imposes no penalty or other sanction. The issuance of
such a compliance order does nothing to alter the
legal position of the alleged violator. . . . In effect, the
compliance order merely apprises the alleged violator
of the agency’s pre-enforcement position. Its issuance
is by no means a final administrative determination
that a violation has occurred.
Respondents’ Brief at 13-14.
Exemptions Under Section 404 (f) of the Clean Water
Act.”* The MOA specifically states: “[c]ase-specific deter-
minations made pursuant to the terms of this [MOA] will
be binding on the Government and [will] represent the
Government's position in any subsequent Federal action
or litigation regarding the case.”5 Thus, contrary to
Defendants’ assertion, a determination by the EPA that an
area constitutes “waters of the United States,” such as the
one made regarding Petitioner’s land, is final agency
action.
Not only does issuance of a compliance order that an
area is “waters of the United States” constitute final
agency action, it “alter[s]” in a very significant way “the
legal position of” Petitioner. If Petitioner had violated the
cease and desist order issued by EPA, then Petitioner
would have been subject to civil penalties of up to
$25,000 per day, criminal penalties of up to $25,000 per
day plus one year in prison, as well as administrative
penalties of $125,000 per violation.® In addition, since any
violation by Petitioner, in order to gain access to court,
would have been “knowing,” the penalty would have
increased to $50,000 per day and up to three years in jail.”
In other words, “the penalties for disobedience are by
fines so enormous and imprisonment so severe as to
intimidate [Petitioner] and its officers from resorting to
* Reprinted in 19 Env. L. Rep. 35181.
5 Id.
6 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(1), (d) & (g).
7 33 U.S.C. §1319(c)(2). This represents double the fine and
a three fold increase in jail time.
the courts.”8 Is Petitioner's fear of such monstrous penal-
ties a reasonable one? The answer is: “Yes!” When asked
by the Court of Appeals what penalties Defendants
would seek should Petitioner violate the cease and desist
order to obtain judicial review, Dvfendants’ attorney
responded: “We would seek the maximum.”
Under the cease and desist order issued by EPA,
Petitioner is faced with “an abandonment of the right” to
judicial relief “rather than face the conditions upon which
[the right to judicial review] is offered or may be
obtained.”'"° When Defendants assert otherwise they
attempt to mislead this Court.
8 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 147 (1908). The assessment of
penalties for a violation of a compliance order is not only a
possibility, but is a probability. See the excellent discussion of
this issue by Amici at pages 9-12 of their brief: not only is the
penalty increased, but also the probability of prosecution is
significantly increased if a compliance order is violated (“EPA
seeks cooperation and voluntary compliance . . . . Violations
after receipt of notice also help establish the knowledge element of
environmental crimes”) Id. at 11 (Emphasis added); (EPA “places
a high priority on enforcement of unpermitted discharges”) Id.
at 10 (Emphasis added); “EPA may require companies to restore
wetlands following a determination, thus a person
... faces . . . costly restoration requirements if he chooses to
challenge EPA’s assertion of jurisdiction by violating the com-
pliance order” Id. at 10-11; and “violation of a compliance order
will also typically result in increased civil or criminal penalties.”
Id. at 12.
9° A similar statement was made by EPA officials to Peti-
tioner during the meeting in the spring of 1991. Petitioner
requested that EPA issue a de minimis fine so Petitioner could
challenge EPA’s jurisdiction. EPA refused to issue a de minimis
fine and told Petitioner if the cease and desist order was vio-
lated EPA would seek the maximum penalties allowed by law.
10 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 147.
5
Ill. DEFENDANTS REFER THIS COURT TO THE
WRONG LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ONE
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
While admitting that in determining whether a par-
ticular statute precludes judicial review the proper refer-
ence is to the statute itself,!1 Defendants draw the
attention of this Court, not to the legislative history of the
Clean Water Act (CWA), that is the statute in question
here, but to the Clean Air Act (CAA) - an act that has no
application to the case at bar.!2 The question before this
Court, given the importance of the right of judicial review
and the seriousness of its denial,!5 is whether Congress
intended to deny that right in its adoption of the CWA.
Defendants’ attempt to analogize tu the CAA is without
merit and should be ignored.
IV. DEFENDANTS’ ATTEMPT TO CONVINCE THIS
COURT THAT THE CLEAN AIR ACT IS THE
SAME AS THE CLEAN WATER ACT FAILS.
Defendants attempt to persuade this Court that the
legislative history of the CAA, which precludes judicial
11 “Whether a particular statute (here, the CWA) ‘is
intended to preclude initial judicial review is determined from
the statute's language. ...’ ” Respondents’ Brief at 8. (Emphasis
added.)
12 Respondents’ Brief at 11.
13 The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable
should not suffice to support an implication of exclu-
sion as to others. The right to review is too important to
be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of
legislative intent.
-Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
(Emphasis added.) ;
review, is the same as the legislative history of the CWA,
which is silent regarding judicial review. Yet the enforce-
ment regimes of the two acts could not be more different
and thus any attempt to analogize between the two must
be resisted.
The CAA contains express and published standards
against which conduct is measured. The amount of emis-
sions permitted under the CAA is clear, as is what consti-
tutes a violation of the CAA. As pointed out by Amici, the
CAA has exact emission standards that are to be applied
consistently.1* Under the CAA, when emissions exceed a
certain level, a violation of the law has occurred. A per-
son charged with a violation will know that a violation
has occurred.!5 However, with regard to the so-called
“waters of the United States” provision of the CWA, there
are no published standards. Instead, the decision as to
what constitutes “waters of the United States,” that is,
what, for example, is a “wetland,” is established on a
case-by-case basis.
Defendants admit that they undertake determina-
tions regarding “waters of the United States” “on a case-
by-case basis, generally in the context of enforcement
actions.”1© These case-by-case determinations are made
against a standard that is clearly subjective, and that may
or may not be applied: “[these factors] are neither exclu-
sive nor regulatory; they are simply examples of the sort
14 Brief of Amici at 13.
15 Id.
16 Preamble to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimina-
tion System General Permit and Reporting Requirements from
Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations, 58 Fed. Reg. 7620.
of factors EPA will probably apply in making individual
determinat ‘s.”!7 The result of this “absence of a uni-
form federal methodology” results “in inconsistent wet-
lands determinations for similar areas.”18 As Amici
declare, “[{t]h[e] dispute over the appropriate manual for
use in wetlands determinations involves more than mere
procedural! flip-flopping. Which manual is used to iden-
tify and delineate wetlands can make a great difference in
the amount of land considered to be wetlands.”!9 Most
importantly, for constitutional due process to be assured,
a federal statute must provide a person with a clear
standard against which his or her conduct can be mea-
sured.29 Contrary to the assertion by Defendants, the
17 Id. (Emphasis added.)
18 United States v. Ellen, 961 F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 1992).
19 Brief of Amici at 14, n. 12, citing National Research Coun-
cil, Wetlands: Characteristics and Boundaries (1995) at 77-78 and
Justin Lamunyon, Wetlands and the Swampbuster Provisions: The
Delineation Procedures, Options, and Alternatives for the American
Farmer, 73 Neb.L.Rev. 163, 173-174.
20 It is a basic principle of due process that an enact-
ment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined. . .. we insist that laws give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to
know what is prohibited, so that he may act accord-
ingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not pro-
viding fair warning. . . . if arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws
must provide explicit standards for those who apply
them. A vague law impermissibly delegates basic pol-
icy matters. ...
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 107 (1972). This Court
has applied this standard to civil matters. See Hoffman Estates v.
Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). The civil stan-
dard is described as “less strict” because “the regulated
CWA fails to provide that constitutionally required stan-
dard. While the CWA may not be void for vagueness on
its face, if Defendants are correct that no judicial review
is allowed in the face of a determination that private
property is “waters of the United States,” then the CWA
is unconstitutional as applied. Defendants’ attempt to
analogize to the CAA to save the CWA from its constitu-
tional infirmity are nonavailing.
*
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Opposition must be found wanting, not
only for its failure to provide this Court with the relevant
legislative history, but for its failure to set forth accu-
rately the legal impact of the cease and desist order
issued by the EPA. While admitting that “[t]he absence of
judicial review may offend due process in exw 2me cases
enterprise may have the ability to clarify the meaning of the
regulation by its own inquiry, or by resort to an administrative
process.” Id. Petitioner was denied either opportunity in the
case at bar. Petitioner asked EPA if the sinkhole was “waters of
the United States” and EPA said it was not. App. at 13. EPA then
changed its position and declared the sinkhole “waters of the
United States.” App. at 13-14. This does nothing to “clarify the
meaning of the regulation.” It adds confusion. The reason this
case is before this Court is because there is no administrative
process that provides the necessary “meaningful review.” There
is no due process. The decision of the Tenth Circuit is in conflict
with the holding of this Court since the decision below “encour-
age[s] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. . . . [and]
allows [regulators] to pursue their personal predilections” con-
trary to the decisions of this Court. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 358 (1983).
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where ‘the practical effect of coercive penalties is to fore-
close all access to the courts,’” Defendants attempt to
pretend that this case is not one of those “extreme cases.”
Yet, despite Defendants’ obfuscation and misrepresenta-
tions, it clearly is. Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully Submitted,
Topp Stusss WELCcH*
*Counsel of Record
WILLIAM Perry PENDLEY
MounrtTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION
1660 Lincoln Street, Suite 2300
Denver, Colorado 80264
(303) 861-0244
DATED: January 3, 1996
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