Appendix A — Bustamante v. United States

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App. 1

UNITED STATES of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

Albert G. BUSTAMANTE,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 93-8705.

United States Court of Appeals,

Fifth Circuit

Feb. 13, 1995.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

En Banc Denied April 5, 1995.

Former United States Representative was convicted

in the United States District Court for the Western Dis-

trict of Texas, Edward C. Prado, J., of violating Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and

he appealed. The Court of Appeals, W. Eugene Davis,

Circuit Judge, held that evidence supported conviction.

Affirmed.

Nancy Barohn, Bernard Campion, San Antonio, TX,

for appellant.

Michael A. Attanasio, Trial Atty., Crim. Div., Jackie

M. Bennett, Jr., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, DC, for

appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court For the

Western District of Texas.

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE and STEWART, Circuit

Judges.

App. 2

W. EUGENE DAVIS, Circuit Judge:

Bustamante appeals his conviction and sentence on

two counts of a ten count indictment charging RICO and

related offenses. We affirm.

I.

Albert G. Bustamante was elected to the United

States House of Representatives in November 1984 and

served until his defeat in 1992. In 1993, a federal grand

jury returned a ten-count indictment against Bustamante,

accusing him of using his public office for personal

enrichment.

Count One alleged that Bustamante conducted the

affairs of an enterprise, his congressional office, through

a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of the Rack-

eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) stat-

ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The alleged pattern of

racketeering activity consisted of nine predicate acts:

accepting a bribe in violation of former 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)

(now § 201(b)) and accepting eight illegal gratuities in

violation of current 18 U.S.C. § 201(c) and its predecessor,

18 U.S.C. § 201(g). Count Two charged Bustamante with

conspiring to violate the RICO statute. In Counts Three

through Ten, the same eight acts of accepting illegal

gratuities were charged as individual violations of the

gratuity statutes.

After a two-week trial, the jury found Bustamante

guilty of Counts One and Four and acquitted him of the

other charges. To support the RICO conviction, the jury

found that Bustamante had committed Predicate Act One

App. 3

(accepting the bribe) and Predicate Act Three (accepting

the same illegal gratuity charged in Count Four).

Using the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the

district court sentenced Bustamante to concurrent terms

of incarceration of 42 months on Count One and 23

months on Count Four, and concurrent terms of super-

vised release of two years on Count One and one year on

Count Four. Bustamante was also ordered to pay total

fines of $55,000 and a $100 special assessment.

Bustamante challenges his convictions and sentence

on numerous grounds which we consider below.

Il. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Bustamante contends that the government failed to

produce sufficient evidence to support his conviction on

either the bribery charge (Predicate Act One) or the ille-

gal gratuity charge (Predicate Act Three/Count Four). As

Bustamante correctly points out, his RICO conviction is

based on only two predicate acts, the minimum number

required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 18

U.S.C. § 1961(5). If the evidence is insufficient to support

the jury’s finding that Bustamante committed either pred-

icate act, his RICO conviction must be overturned.

This Court will uphold a conviction as long as a

rational trier of fact could have found that the evidence

established the elements of the crime beyond a reason-

able doubt. United States v. Pofahl, 996 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 266, 126 L.Ed.2d

218 (1993). The jury is free to choose among reasonable

constructs of the evidence, which need not exclude every

App..4

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. United States v. Mas-

eratti, 1 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, __ US.

__, 114 S.Ct. 1096, 127 L.Ed.2d 409 (1994). We view all

inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable

to the jury verdict. United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980,

1001 (5th Cir.1987). With these ground rules in mind, we

turn to the particular facts and proof of each predicate

act.

A. The Bribe

As Predicate Act One, the indictment alleged that in

February 1986, Bustamante accepted a $35,000 bribe in

exchange for using his official influence on behalf of

Falcon Food Services and Management, Inc. (Falcon

Foods). Since 1983, Falcon Foods had held the food ser-

vice contract for Lackland Air Force Base (Lackland) in

San Antonio, Texas. This contract was set to expire in

1986, when the Air Force planned to conduct a competi-

tive bidding process to award a new multi-million dollar

contract. Hoping to win the renewed contract, Falcon

Foods enlisted Bustamante’s aid.

In late 1985, Bustamante invited Brigadier General

Richard Gillis to lunch at a private club in San Antonio.

At that time, General Gillis was in charge of the San

Antonio Contracting Center, which handled all procure-

ment for military bases in the region, including Lackland.

At trial, General Gillis testified that he believed he would

be having lunch only with Bustamante and did not expect

to discuss the Lackland contract.

When General Gillis arrived at the club, Bustamante

introduced him to Douglas Jaffe, Jr., owner of Falcon

App. 5

Foods, Evaristo “Eddie” Garcia, president of Falcon

Foods, and Morris Jaffe, Douglas Jaffe’s father. During

lunch, Douglas Jaffe (Jaffe) persistently tried to persuade

General Gillis that Falcon Foods was doing a good job at

Lackland and should have its contract renewed. Prohib-

ited by regulations from discussing a contract that was

open to bidding, General Gillis became increasingly

uncomfortable with Jaffe’s lobbying effort. When his

repeated attempts to change the subject were unsuccess-

ful, General Gillis left the club.

In January of 1986, a $223,000 promissory note bear-

ing Bustamante and his wife’s signatures came due. By

mid-February, the Bustamantes had paid (or made

arrangements to pay) all but $35,000 of the amount owed.

On February 15, although he had not yet received the

remaining $35,000 from any source, Bustamante wrote a

check that completely satisfied the promissory note.

Three days later, Bustamante received a check for

$35,000 from Garcia, which he deposited into his bank

account. This check bore the handwritten notation “sale

of note.” This notation allegedly referred to a $35,000

second lien note that Bustamante held on a former home.

Bustamante claimed that he sold this second lien note to

Garcia to raise the money to pay off the balance of the

$223,000 promissory note. However, no other written

documentation of the alleged sale was produced as trial.

Additionally, though it had a face value of $35,000, in

February 1986 the second lien note’s present value was

only $22,000.

At the time he wrote the check to Bustamante, Garcia

only had $493.42 in his checking account; within a few

App. 6

days, Garcia’s account had overdrawn by more than

$34,000. Douglas Jaffe wrote Garcia a $35,000 check from

Jaffe’s personal account, which Garcia deposited on Feb-

ruary 24.

At some point in February, Bustamante also applied

for a $35,000 loan from San Antonio Savings Association

(SASA). On February 25, SASA approved the loan. Busta-

mante took no prompt action on the loan.

On March 4, Bustamante placed a telephone call to

Isodoro Leos, the officer assigned to handle the Lackland

contract, and left a message complaining about the fact

that the Air Force had delayed bidding on the Lackland

contract. Returning the call, Leos informed Bustamante’s

secretary that the Congressman should make his future

inquiries in writing.!

The next day, Bustamante closed on the SASA loan

and executed a $35,000 promissory note. Bustamante

secured the loan with the same second lien note he

claimed to have sold to Garcia weeks earlier. On March

14, SASA issued a $35,000 cashier’s check to Bustamante,

representing the principal of the loan. The back of the

check showed that Bustamante endorsed both his and his

wife’s names. The check also bore a typewritten notation

stating “Deposit Only to the HSB Construction Inc.

Account” and listing an account number. HSB Construc-

tion belonged to Douglas Jaffe. Unlike most of Jaffe’s

1 The government argued that this event made Bustamante

realize that his illicit advocacy might be exposed, causing him to

take action to cover up the money he had received.

App. 7

companies, however, HSB Construction was not a subsid-

iary of Jaffe’s corporate umbrella, the Jaffe Group, Inc.

On March 18, the Air Force opened the sealed bids

for the Lackland Contract. Falcon Foods had submitted

the highest of seven bids. Following standard procedure,

the Air Force began to work its way up from the bottom

of the list, looking for the lowest bidder that was also

“responsive and responsible,” factors having to do with

the contractor’s ability to carry through on its promised

performance. After disqualifying the two lowest bidders,

the Air Force found itself running out of time to hire a

new contractor before the existing Falcon Foods contract

expired on April 30.

To ease the time crunch, on April 17 the Air Force

attempted to exercise its contractual option to tempo-

rarily extend its existing contract. Unfortunately for the

Air Force, the notification deadline had expired two days

earlier. No longer bound by the contract, Falcon Foods

responded with a counter-offer that was $150,000 more

per month than it had previously charged. The Air Force

rejected the counter-offer. Afraid that it would not find a

qualified bidder by April 30, the Air Force decided to

place the new contract through a faster minority set-aside

program operated by the Small Business Administration.

In this manner, the Air Force awarded the Lackland con-

tract to Aleman Food Service (Aleman Foods). Aleman

Foods had been the fourth lowest bidder.

On April 24, the day of the award to Aleman, Leos

received a call from Bustamante, who insisted that Leos

explain why the original bidding process had been scut-

tled. Dissatisfied with Leos, Bustamante next berated

App. 8

Leos’ boss, the deputy director for contracting. Still

unplacated, Bustamante telephoned General Gillis and

expressed his anger that Falcon Foods had not been

awarded the Lackland contract. Bustamante threatened

General Gillis that he had “better turn this around” or

Bustamante would end his career. On April 25, Busta-

mante wrote to the General Accounting Office demand-

ing an explanation of the award to Aleman Foods. At

approximately the same time, another disgruntled bidder

obtained a restraining order that prohibited Aleman

Foods from serving food until all protests to the award

were resolved. Left with no food service contractor, the

Air Force fed its troops prepackaged meals from its war

reserve stock from May 1 to July 31, when Aleman Foods

was finally allowed to begin meal service.

To find bribery, the jury is required to find that a

public official accepted a thing of value in return for

being influenced in the performance of an official act.

United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480-81 (5th Cir.), cert.

denied, 439 U.S. 870, 99 S.Ct. 200, 58 L.Ed.2d 182 (1978).

Bustamante first contends that the government pro-

duced insufficient evidence for the jury to decide that his

actions on behalf of Falcon Foods were “official acts.”

This contention is spurious. Without question, Busta-

mante took action in his official capacity as a congress-

man on a “matter” (the award of a government food

service contract) which was “then pending.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 201(a)(3).

Bustamante next argues that the jury could not legit-

imately find that the $35,000 payment from Garcia was a

quid pro quo for any assistance he gave to Falcon Foods.

App. 9

First, Bustamante maintains that he provided an entirely

innocent explanation for the $35,000 that he received

from and returned to Garcia. Bustamante testified that he

was on his way to SASA to borrow the $35,000 he needed

to pay off his promissory note when he told Garcia, a

long time friend, about the planned loan. Garcia offered

to buy Bustamante’s second lien note instead. Bustamante

accepted, not knowing that Garcia did not have enough

money to make the purchase himself. Bustamante bought

back the second lien note, however, because his wife did

not approve of the sale. Bustamante had already used

Garcia’s $35,000 to pay off his own promissory note, so he

went to SASA for a loan after all, to get the money to

reimburse Garcia. Bustamante asserts that he did not

know that the money for the purchase really came from

Jaffe, nor that the money he repaid to Garcia ended up in

Jaffe’s account. However, Bustamante’s explanation is the

type of alternative hypothesis of innocence that the jury

need not exclude when reaching a guilty verdict. Mas-

eratti, 1 F.3d at 337.

Bustamante also argues that the evidence does not

persuasively support the government's cover-up theory -

that Leos’ instruction to communicate in writing spurred

Bustamante to incur the SASA loan for the purpose of

hiding the $35,000 payment. However, disregarding the

government’s cover-up theory, the evidence was more

than sufficient for the jury to find that Bustamante

accepted a bribe in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(b). Busta-

mante received a large amount of money from the princi-

pals of Falcon Foods at a time when Falcon Foods needed

Bustamante’s assistance and when Bustamante needed

the funds. Neither Bustamante nor Garcia documented

App. 10

the “sale” of the second lien note in any standard manner.

Garcia, a successful businessman, supposedly purchased

this second lien note at a price $13,000 higher than its

present value. Though Garcia appeared to make this pur-

chase, it was Jaffe who actually supplied the money.

Additionally, Bustamante telephoned a brigadier general

and threatened to end his career if the Lackland contract

was not re-awarded to Falcon Foods. Given these facts,

the jury’s guilty verdict must stand. See United States v.

Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 683-84 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499

U.S. 904, 111 S.Ct. 1102, 113 L.Ed.2d 213 (1991).

B. The Illegal Gratuity

As Predicate Act Three and Count Four, the indict-

ment alleged that Bustamante accepted an illegal gratuity.

Unopposed in the 1984 general election, Bustamante’s

seat in Congress was a foregone conclusion once he won

the primary election. In the period between the primary

and general elections, Bustamante was invited to partici-

pate in a fledgling company called San Antonio Video

Corporation (SAVC). SAVC had been organized by Oliver

S. Heard and R. Lawrence Macon, both local attorneys

and friends of Bustamante. Heard and Macon formed

SAVC to compete for the Federal Communications Com-

mission (FCC) license for a commercial television station.

On November 29, 1984, a few weeks after the general

election, SAVC filed its licensing application with the

FCC. Although the application listed Bustamante as own-

ing 18.5 percent of SAVC, he had not actually contributed

any money at that time.

App. 11

To purchase his share of SAVC, Bustamante was

expected to make an initial pro rata contribution of

approximately $15,000. This would entitle Bustamante to

16 percent of the non-voting stock; Heard, Macon, and

Heard’s law firm also owned portions of the non-voting

stock. SAVC also issued voting stock which was owned

by three minority women.?

In the event the SAVC was fortunate enough to win

the FCC license, Bustamante was expected to make a

second contribution of $650,000 toward the roughly $5

million start-up cost. Like several of the other investors,

Bustamante did not have the financial strength to contrib-

ute such a substantial sum. Heard and Macon planned to

borrow the start-up cost using the FCC license as collat-

eral, then lend this money to the other investors, includ-

ing Bustamante. Macon testified at trial that, if push came

to shove, he would not have forced Bustamante to repay

this loan.

Bustamante did not even have the initial $15,000 on

hand. To make his up-front stock purchase, Bustamante

applied for a $20,000 loan from Groos Bank in San Ant-

onio in April 1985 (the Groos Bank loan). According to an

internal bank document entitled “Loan Application” the

loan was needed to “[i]nvest in a new television broad-

casting company” and was “made as a result of a specific

request on the part of Oliver S. Heard, Jr., Guarantor.”

The Loan Application included Heard’s financial state-

ment, his net worth and annual income. Just three days

* The fact that SAVC would be controlled by minority

women entitled it toa “comparative preference” during the FCC

licensing process.

App. 12

earlier, Groos Bank had granted the Bustamantes another

$20,000 loan, for personal purposes, which was also

“based on the specific request and financial strength of

guarantor Oliver S. Heard, Jr.”

As part of the FCC’s licensing procedure, SAVC and

its rivals litigated their claims before an administrative

law judge (ALJ). In May 1985, as part of this process,

Bustamante testified about his initial stock purchase as

well as the potential $650,000 future payment. Busta-

mante testified that he had taken out the Groos Bank loan

to make his initial stock purchase in the fall of 1984.

Bustamante denied that Heard had guaranteed this loan.

The FCC litigation extended over a number of years.

During this time, three installments on Bustamante’s

Groos Bank loan became due in April 1986, 1987, and

1988. Bustamante missed all three of these payments. On

April 20, 1988, Groos Bank allowed Bustamante to renew

the loan by relying on Heard’s original guaranty. At the

same time, Bustamante took out another loan to cover the

accumulated interest on the original Groos Bank loan;

this loan was also covered by the Heard guaranty. In July

1988, Bustamante combined both of these loans into a

single $20,140.69 obligation. Like each of the previous

loans, this consolidation loan relied on Heard’s guaranty.

Bustamante made two of the monthly installment pay-

ments on this loan.

In October 1988, the FCC litigation finally ended.

SAVC was not awarded the FCC license, but did get

$175,000 in settlement from the company that did receive

the license. On October 27, 1988, three days after SAVC

received the settlement, Heard issued Bustamante a check

App. 13

for $19,467.53, the exact amount that Bustamante still

owed to Groos Bank. Bustamante immediately repaid the

consolidated Groos Bank loan in full.

SAVC’s other investors did not receive such priority

treatment. On October 31, 1988, Macon wrote a letter to

Heard stating that before the shareholders would receive

refunds of their pro rata contributions, the settlement

money would be used to pay off SAVC’s outstanding

bills. This included loans that Heard and Macon had

made to SAVC during its lengthy effort to obtain the FCC

license. The record does not reflect whether the other

SAVC shareholders ever received their share of the settle-

ment proceeds.

To find a public official guilty of accepting an illegal

gratuity, a jury must find that the “official accepted,

because of his position, a thing of value ‘otherwise than

as provided by law for the proper discharge of official

duty.’ ” Evans, 572 F.2d at 480. Generally, no proof of a

quid pro quo is required; it is sufficient for the govern-

ment to show that the defendant was given the gratuity

simply because he held public office. Id. at 479; United

States v. Secord, 726 F.Supp. 845, 847 (D.D.C.1989) (suffi-

cient for government to show that gratuity was given

“simply because of [a person's] official position, in appre-

ciation for their relationship, or in anticipation of its

continuation”). In addition, the jury need not find that

the official accepted the gratuity with the intent to be

influenced. The jury must only conclude that the evi-

dence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the

official accepted unauthorized compensation. Evans, 572

F.2d at 480.

App. 14

Bustamante’s challenges to his illegal gratuity convic-

tion rely on his interpretation of the charge against him.

According to Bustamante, the indictment alleges only

that he accepted two specific things of value: Heard’s

Groos Bank loan guaranty for the initial loan to purchase

SAVC stock and the promise of future loans in the

amount of $650,000, both at no risk to himself. Busta-

mante argues that his conviction for accepting these two

things of value is invalid because the government failed

to prove (1) that he knew of Heard’s loan guaranty and

(2) that the Groos Bank loan was actually risk-free.

Bustamante views the charge too narrowly. Busta-

mante was not merely accused of accepting these particu-

lar guarantees and promises, but of allowing Macon and

Heard to shoulder the responsibility for his SAVC invest-

ment from start in 1984 to finish in 1988. Bustamante is

correct that the indictment alleges that he accepted “Loan

Guarantees ($20,000) and Promises of Loans ($650,000)”,

and “a loan guarantee for the purchase of stock and the

promise of future loans for additional investment in

[SAVC], all at no personal risk. ” However, the

indictment also describes the broader investment scheme

of which these loans were a part. For example, the indict-

ment alleges “{[Bustamante] was invited by SAVC’s con-

trollers to participate in SAVC at no personal risk to

himself.” The government’s counsel, without objection

from Bustamante, succinctly explained its theory to the

jury in closing argument: “[t]he crime is a carry, a carry of

Albert Bustamante in this transaction.”%

3 Bustamante does not argue that this characterization or

the proof at trial were fatally at variance with the indictment. In

App. 15

Viewed in this light, the proper question is whether

Bustamante knew that Heard and Macon were giving him

a risk-free investment in SAVC. We are convinced that the

above evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to find

that Bustamante rested firmly on Heard and Macon’s

shoulders for the SAVC investment. In addition, the

Groos Bank officer who handled Bustamante’s loans,

Neyland Allen, testified that he knew of only one

instance in Groos Bank history in which the bank had

purposefully kept a guarantor secret from the borrower.

Given Bustamante’s long friendship with Heard and the

context of this entire transaction, the fact that Allen could

not specifically remember informing Bustamante of

Heard’s guaranty is not fatal. Bustamante also emphas-

izes that he himself testified that he did not know of the

guaranty. However, the jury was free to reject this testi-

mony. United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1202 (5th

Cir.1982).

Likewise, Bustamante’s argument that the govern-

ment failed to prove that the Groos Bank loan was risk-

free misses the mark. The government was required to

prove what it alleged — a risk-free investment carry, not a

risk-free loan. Heard and Macon gave Bustamante the

precise amount needed to repay his investment loan,

which exceeded the amount he actually invested, at a

time when they were not repaying other investors. This

fact alone strongly supports the jury’s conclusion that

Bustamante’s SAVC investment was risk-free.

fact, in another section of his own brief, Bustamante argues that

Count Four described a “single, continuing gratuity violation”

that ended in 1988.

App. 16

Leaving no stone unturned, Bustamante also suggests

that the government was required to prove that the gratu-

ity was given in exchange for an official act. As we noted

above, this is not the government’s burden.

The jury was also entitled to conclude that Busta-

mante received the SAVC gratuity because of his status as

a congressman. Bustamante was invited to invest after his

seat in Congress was assured. He brought no broadcast-

ing experience to SAVC. Because he owned non-voting

stock, his Hispanic ethnicity did not contribute to the

minority preference. His inclusion certainly added no

financial strength to the venture. The government pro-

duced evidence that Heard’s firm called on Bustamante

to assist them in his official capacity, demonstrating that

Heard had reason to appreciate his relationship with the

Congressman and anticipate its continuation. Consider-

ing these circumstances, the jury was entitled to find that

Heard and Macon sustained Bustamante throughout his

SAVC investment because he was a member of the United

States Congress.

C. The Pattern of Racketeering Activity

Bustamante argues next that, even if the evidence

establishes both predicate racketeering acts, the govern-

ment did not prove a pattern of activity within the mean-

ing of the RICO statute. To establish a pattern of

racketeering activity, the government must show a series

of at least two related predicate acts that constitute a

threat of continuing racketeering activity. Tel-Phonic Ser-

vices, Inc. v. TBS Intern., Inc., 975 F.2d 1134, 1139-40 (5th

Cir.1992) (citing H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell, 492 U.S. 229,

App. 17

109 S.Ct. 2893, 106 L.Ed.2d 195 (1989)). At the time of his

trial, Bustamante was no longer in office. Thus, to satisfy

the continuity requirement, the government had to estab-

lish “a closed period of repeated conduct,” which it could

do by showing “a series of related predicates extending

over a substantial period of time.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at

241, 242, 109 S.Ct. at 2901, 2901.

Bustamante concedes that Predicate Acts One and

Three are related but argues that they are not sufficiently

continuous. Again, Bustamante’s argument depends pri-

marily on his constricted interpretation of the acts com-

prising his acceptance of the SAVC gratuity. Bustamante

argues that the gratuity offense was completed in 1985,

when he accepted the loan guaranty and the promise of

future loans. He contends that when the gratuity is added

to the 1986 Falcon Foods bribe, his racketeering activity

occurred over a short, isolated period of approximately

eleven months. On this basis he maintains that the evi-

dence was insufficient to permit the jury to find either

that his racketeering acts covered a substantial period of

time or posed a threat of ongoing activity.

Bustamante’s argument is belied by the record. As

discussed above, the record reveals that Bustamante did

more than accept the loan guaranty and promise of future

loans in 1985 — he continued to allow Heard and Macon

to carry him. This gratuity did not end until Bustamante

accepted the 1988 loan repayment. Bustamante’s rack-

eteering acts therefore continued for a period of nearly

four years. This time period is substantial. See United

States v. Pellulo, 964 F.2d 193, 209 (3d Cir.1992); Metro-

media v. Fugazy, 983 F.2d 350, 369 (2d Cir.1992), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993).

App. 18

In addition, the jury was entitled to conclude that Busta-

mante’s actions amounted to a threat of continuing crimi-

nal activity. Indeed, the gratuity itself threatened to

continue as long as the SAVC investment continued; had

SAVC obtained the FCC license, Heard and Macon proba-

bly would have sustained Bustamante’s investment for a

much longer period of time. Bustamante makes much of

the fact that the jury found him not guilty of the other

seven alleged racketeering acts. However, these acquittals

are not inconsistent with the jury’s conclusion that Busta-

mante’s criminal behavior threatened to continue, at least

during the closed-end four year period of activity. See

United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir.1993) (by

their nature, crimes such as bribery suggest the threat of

long term activity).

Ill. Statute of Limitations

Bustamante argues that his prosecution for the SAVC

gratuity is barred by the five year statute of limitations in

18 U.S.C. § 3282.4 He contends that the limitations period

started to run when he first accepted the gratuity in 1985

and that it expired in 1990 long before his 1993 indict-

ment.

Bustamante relies on United States v. Hare, 618 F.2d

1085 (4th Cir.1980), in which the defendant accepted an

4 At trial, Bustamante first raised this defense in a post-

verdict motion for acquittal. Because we find that the gratuity

charge is not barred by the statute of limitations, we decline to

address whether, under the circumstances of this case, Busta-

mante’s failure to raise this issue earlier amounts to waiver.

App. 19

illegal gratuity in the form of a loan with favorable inter-

est and payment provisions. Hare accepted the loan in

1970 and made periodic payments on the loan until 1975.

Because Hare was not indicted until 1979, he argued that

the five year limitations period had expired. The court

agreed, holding that the gratuity was complete when

Hare received the loan and that the statute of limitations

could not be extended simply because Hare continued to

benefit from the favorable terms every time he made a

payment. The court based its decision on Toussie v. United

States, 397 U.S. 112, 90 S.Ct. 858, 25 L.Ed.2d 156 (1970),

which held that the doctrine of continuing offenses

should be applied sparingly, to avoid undermining the

congressional policy of repose.

Hare is distinguishable from Bustamante’s case. The

Hare Court itself limited its holding to the specific facts

alleged in Hare’s indictment, which asserted that Hare

committed one act of accepting a gratuity in 1970. Hare,

618 F.2d at 1087. In contrast, Bustamante’s indictment

charges that his acts of accepting the SAVC gratuity

extended over a period of years. As we explained in the

previous section, Bustamante is not accused of commit-

ting a crime that has continuing effects after its comple-

tion. Rather he was charged with accepting illegal

gratuities over an extended period of time. Unlike Hare,

Bustamante was therefore charged with continuing crimi-

nal behavior. Accordingly, we find that Bustamante’s

acceptance of the SAVC gratuity occurred within the five

App. 20

year limitations period.> See United States v. Morales, 11

F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir.1993).

IV. Defense Witness Immunity

Bustamante argues next that the district court erred

by not granting immunity to a trial witness, Eddie Garcia,

pursuant to a grand jury immunity order. In September

1992, the government subpoenaed Garcia to testify before

the grand jury investigating Bustamante. The government

applied for and received an order compelling Garcia to

testify under a grant of immunity. Both the application

and order were captioned “IN RE GRAND JURY PRO-

CEEDINGS” and given the cause number “SA92CR270.”

Under this order, Garcia testified before the grand jury

twice.

In February 1993, the indictment against Bustamante

was returned, creating cause number “SA93CRO039.” Gar-

cia was subpoenaed by the government to testify at Bust-

amante’s trial. When he received his trial subpoena,

Garcia’s attorney wrote a letter to the government stating

that, if called at trial, Garcia would invoke the fifth

amendment and refuse to testify because “it is our belief

the [former immunity order] does not extend to any

testimony, other than grand jury testimony, requested of

After receiving no response, Garcia

47

him in this case.

5 This holding precludes Bustamante’s argument that the

district court should not have sentenced Bustamante under the

United States Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Devine, 934

F.2d 1325, 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 929, 112 S.Ct. 349,

116 L.Ed.2d 288 (1991) (guidelines apply to offense initiated but

not completed before October 31, 1987).

App. 21

filed a motion with the trial court requesting a protective

order immunizing his trial testimony and stating that the

former immunity order “did not specifically require or

compel [Garcia] to testify in [SA93CR039].”

Although the government never called Garcia as a

witness during the trial, Bustamante did. When Busta-

mante was ready to call Garcia to testify, Bustamante’s

attorney informed the trial court that Garcia wished to

speak with the court. Garcia told the court that he wanted

to testify but that “I’d like to have .. . immunity ... I

think it’s only fair for me to have immunity.” When the

court asked if Garcia would be receiving immunity, the

government responded that Garcia had been given immu-

nity before the grand jury but that he would not be

granted immunity for his testimony at trial. The govern-

ment explained that it believed that Garcia had perjured

himself in his grand jury testimony.

Garcia’s attorney then appeared in court to explain

that, despite his earlier statements, he believed that the

language of the immunity order granted Garcia immunity

throughout the grand jury proceedings and the trial. Gar-

cia’s attorney explained that at the time he had written

the letter and motion, he did not possess a copy of the

immunity order and had only seen it briefly, immediately

before Garcia’s grand jury appearance. After listening to

both Garcia’s attorney and the government, the trial court

ruled that the immunity order only applied to Garcia’s

testimony before the grand jury. Believing that Garcia

would not testify without immunity, Bustamante did not

om

~ call him as a witness.

App. 22

Bustamante now argues that the district court incor-

rectly interpreted Garcia’s immunity order. Bustamante cites

several decisions holding that the court must interpret an

immunity agreement generously to protect the witness’s fifth

amendment right against self-incrimination. However, these

decisions describe the rights of the party to the immunity

agreement, not the rights of a third party. Garcia’s personal

rights under the agreement cannot form the foundation for

Bustamante’s own claim on this issue.®

Neither party cites, nor can we find, any case

describing a defendant's right to assert error based on a

trial court’s interpretation of another person’s immunity

order. Our review of the existing case law makes clear

that a defendant’s rights are only implicated by a third

party’s immunity status when that status intrudes on the

defendant’s due process protections. In United States v.

Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 259-61 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

846, 103 S.Ct. 102, 74 L.Ed.2d 92 (1982), we held that the

sixth amendment compulsory process right does not

enable a defendant to “demand that the government

shield a witness from the consequences of his own testi-

mony.” It is also settled that, unless the government has

abused its immunity power, a defendant has no due

process right to have the trial court immunize defense

witnesses. United States v. Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 374 (5th

6 Neither Bustamante nor the government frames this as an

issue of standing. It is sufficient for us to note that Bustamante

has provided no reason why he should escape the general rule

that a litigant cannot base her own claim on the legal rights and

interests of a third party. United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 1225,

1229 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 926, 111 S.Ct. 2038, 114

L.Ed.2d 122 (1991).

App. 23

Cir.1992), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 3004, 125

L.Ed.2d 696 (1993); United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616,

638-41 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2300,

73 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1982). In addition, a defendant cannot

prevent the government from revoking a prior grant of

immunity when the government has a good faith belief

that the witness testified falsely. United States v. Taylor,

728 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.1984). These decisions illuminate the

underlying principle that a defendant only has grounds

to complain about the treatment of a witness’s immunity

when the government is using its immunity privilege to

unfairly skew the facts presented to the jury, thereby

breaching the defendant’s right to due process of law.

Accordingly, we evaluate Bustamante’s claims under this

standard.

Bustamante maintains that the government’s inter-

pretation of Garcia’s immunity order is unfair because it

is inconsistent with the manner in which the government

treated another witness. Bustamante contends that the

government informed the trial court that this witness’s

immunity order, identical to Garcia’s, extended to testi-

mony at trial. However, we do not read the government’s

statements in this way; in fact, it appears that the govern-

ment was asking the court to extend the former order to

apply to the trial.”

? The actual interchange was:

GOVT: In March of 1992, Jerry Hoyack called before

the grand jury and was given a grant of immuni-

ty ... and we would like your Honor to essentially, for

counsel’s purposes, sort of refresh your order com-

pelling his testimony.

COURT: Okay. Does the same order, is the Govern-

ment saying that the same order of immunity that

App. 24

Bustamante also points out that the government

never charged Garcia with perjury. However, this fact is

not sufficient to allow this Court to infer that the govern-

ment was concealing Garcia’s truthful testimony because

it would have helped Bustamante. See Taylor, 728 F.2d at

936. In fact, the record reveals that before the government

was aware that Bustamante wanted to call Garcia as a

witness, the government had disclosed Garcia as an unin-

dicted co-conspirator. This detail supports the govern-

ment’s statement to the trial court that it declined to

further immunize Garcia because he had “outstanding

criminal liability.”

In sum, nothing in the record causes us to believe

that the government was acting in bad faith by advocat-

ing its limited interpretation of Garcia’s immunity. The

record also does not in any way suggest that the trial

court itself violated Bustamante’s due process rights in

making its ruling on Garcia’s immunity. Accordingly, we

conclude that Bustamante’s due process rights were not

implicated by the trial court’s decision that the immunity

order was limited to testimony before the grand jury.

Bustamante also argues that, even if the trial court

correctly interpreted Garcia’s immunity order, the court

should have ordered immunity to stem the government’s

misbehavior. See, e.g., Follin, 979 F.2d at 374. As discussed

took place before the grand jury, the Government

intends to follow in trial, as well?

GOVT: Precisely.

COURT: So immunity is still being granted to the

witness.

GOVT: Precisely.

App. 25

above, the record does not support this argument. More

importantly, Bustamante did not ask the trial court to

grant immunity on any ground other than the existing

immunity agreement. Bustamante makes no attempt to

establish that the trial court was obligated to order immu-

nity on its own initiative and we decline to bear this

burden for him. See Taylor, 728 F.2d at 934 n. 3.

V. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Bustamante argues next that government counsel

made numerous improper comments which caused the

jury to be prejudiced against him. He contends that these

instances of misconduct so permeated the trial that this

Court should reverse his convictions.

A. Opening statement

Bustamante complains that, during its opening state-

ment, the government maligned the defendants and cer-

tain witnesses, misstated evidence, attempted to establish

Bustamante’s guilty by association, and suggested that

certain witnesses might lie. However, because Busta-

mante made no objection to any of these statements we

will review only for plain error. United States v. Andrews,

22 F.3d 1328, 1341 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, __. U.S. __, 115

S.Ct. 346, 130 L.Ed.2d 302 (1994); United States v. Bermea,

30 F.3d 1539, 1564 (5th Cir.1994). To meet this standard,

Bustamante must prove:

(1) an error;

(2) that is obvious or “so conspicuous that

‘the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in

countenancing [it], even absent the defendant’s

App. 26

timely assistance in detecting [it],’” United

States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 163-64 (5th

Cir.1994) (en banc) (quoting United States v.

Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d

816 (1982)); and

(3) that affected the defendant’s substantial

rights, usually by affecting the outcome of the

proceeding, id. (citing United States v. Olano, __

U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).

In addition, we will correct a plain error affecting

substantial rights only if it “ ‘seriously affect[ed] the fair-

ness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceed-

ings.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157,

56 S.Ct. 391, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)). See also United States v.

Rodriguez, 15 F.3d 408, 414-15 (5th Cir.1994).

We have carefully reviewed the above statements of

which Bustamante complains. Even if the district court

abused its discretion in allowing them, which we doubt,

such error certainly did not rise to the level of plain error.

B. Improper closing argument

Bustamante argues that, during its closing argument,

the government improperly suggested that Jaffe, Garcia

and Heard were guilty of criminal conduct and called

attention to Bustamante’s decision not to call them as

witnesses. However, as the government points out, Busta-

mante’s own counsel had already repeatedly highlighted

the fact that the government did not call these witnesses.

The district court overruled Bustamante’s objection to

this argument. The district court did not err in permitting

ee

Ate dae eed

App. 27

the government to respond to Bustamante’s own argu-

ment suggesting that the jury draw unfavorable infer-

ences from the government’s failure to call these

witnesses.

C. Improper cross-examination of Bustamante

Bustamante first complains that the government sug-

gested that he had received other uncharged illegal gratu-

ities by asking him twice “You've never gotten anything

from Doug Jaffe?” At trial, Bustamante’s attorney objec-

ted on the ground that the government was trying to

introduce evidence of extraneous bad acts prohibited by

Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(b). The government

responded that these inquiries were directly relevant to

the Falcon bribe, in addition to being fair impeachment

questions. The district court apparently agreed, but lim-

ited the government's questioning to Jaffe’s involvement

in the $35,000 payment Bustamante received from Garcia.

Bustamante now argues that the question itself was

improper because it implied Bustamante had received

other gratuities from Jaffe. We disagree. The record leads

us to conclude that a reasonable jury would interpret this

question as referring to the gratuity with which Busta-

mante had been charged, a matter which the government

was entitled to explore.

Bustamante next complains that the government

twice asked questions intimating that Bustamante had

done other improper things in his past, then stated in the

jury’s presence that it had outside evidence to support

these questions. Bustamante contends that the govern-

ment thus gave unsworn testimony about his prior bad

App. 28

acts. However, the record reveals that the government

made these statements after Bustamante’s attorney sug-

gested in front of the jury that the government asked

these questions in bad faith. In this context, the govern-

ment’s statements were not improper. In any event, these

statements certainly do not amount to plain error, which

is the applicable standard given that Bustamante never

objected to them.

Bustamante also complains about two series of ques-

tions the government asked regarding two other specific

instances of uncharged prior conduct: Bustamante’s fail-

ure to report or pay taxes on certain income, and Busta-

mante’s solicitation of an unrelated bribe in 1987. At trial,

Bustamante objected that the government was introduc-

ing FRE 404(b) evidence without first disclosing it to the

defense as required by a pretrial order. The government

correctly responded that, because it was using this evi-

dence to impeach Bustamante’s credibility, FRE 404(b)

did not apply. United States v. Tomblin, 42 F.3d 263, 282-83

(5th Cir.1994). The district court allowed both lines of

questioning. Bustamante now contends that these ques-

tions were highly prejudicial.

Bustamante’s argument places the cart before the

horse. We assess the prejudicial quality of these questions

only if we conclude that they were improper. United

States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 501 (5th Cir.1990), cert.

denied, 499 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 1388, 113 L.Ed.2d 445

(1991). They were not. FRE 608(b) allows the government

to inquire into specific instances of conduct relevant to

Bustamante’s character for truthfulness. Both the failure

to report income and the solicitation of bribes are rele-

vant to the issue of honesty. E.g., Tomblin, 42 F.3d at

Sr wigan a

App. 29

282-83. The record reveals that, prior to embarking on

each series of questions, the government informed the

district court of the factual support for its inquiries, thus

establishing a good faith basis for its questions. We con-

clude that the district court did not err in permitting

these questions.

Lastly, Bustamante asserts that the government com-

mented on his assertion of his fifth amendment rights

before the grand jury. At the start of his direct examina-

tion, Bustamante stated “I’ve been waiting a long time for

this day to come.” On cross-examination, the government

asked “You were given an opportunity to come in and tell

the government your version [of the facts], weren’t you?”

and “I sent your attorney a letter inviting you to come in

to the grand jury and tell your story under oath, at that

time, didn’t I?” The district court sustained Bustamante’s

objections to both questions.

On appeal, the government argues that these questions

were properly designed to impeach Bustamante’s earlier

testimony. We disagree. The rule is well established that a

witness generally may not be cross-examined about her

choice to invoke the fifth amendment privilege in grand jury

proceedings. United States v. Robichaux, 995 F.2d 565, 568 (Sth

Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S.Ct. 322, 126 L.Ed.2d

268 (1993). We need not consider the relationship between

this rule and the government’s right to impeach a wit-

ness, because in Bustamante’s case the government was

not fairly impeaching his earlier statement. Bustamante’s

general introductory remark that he had been waiting a

long time for his trial date to arrive cannot be interpreted

as a complaint that he had never before had a chance to

App. 30

speak to the government or the grand jury. The govern-

ment’s remarks were thus improper.

This, however, is not the end of the inquiry. We will

only find reversible error if the government’s improper

comments cast serious doubt on the jury’s verdict. United

States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 234 (5th Cir.1990), cert.

denied, 500 U.S. 934, 111 S.Ct. 2057, 114 L.Ed.2d 462

(1991). In making this evaluation, we consider (1) the

likelihood and degree that the jury was prejudiced by the

remarks; (2) the effectiveness of any cautionary instruc-

tions given by the court; and (3) the strength of the

legitimate evidence of the defendant’s guilt. Id.; Andrews,

22 F.3d at 1341. In assessing prejudice, we consider sev-

eral factors, including whether defense counsel objected

to the improper remark, asked the court for a curative

instruction or moved for a mistrial on the ground of the

misconduct. United States v. Wright-Barker, 784 F.2d 161,

175 (5th Cir.1986). We consider the error in the overall

context in which it occurred. See Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1564.

For a number of reasons, we conclude that these

statements do not cast the jury’s verdict into serious

doubt. First, they were brief and the court sustained

Bustamante’s objections. Second, the court instructed the

jury to disregard any questions or answers that it ruled

improper. Third, counsel did not move for a mistrial or a

curative instruction. Finally, the government’s proof of

guilt was strong. In the context of this three-week trial we

are satisfied that these brief remarks did not prejudice

Bustamante’s substantial rights.®

8 Bustamante identifies several other questions as

improper. First, he complains that, in its cross-examination of

App. 31

VI. Brady Review

Bustamante asks this court to review the transcripts

of the grand jury proceedings for exculpatory evidence

that the government should have disclosed. Before trial,

the district court reviewed these transcripts in camera and

concluded that they contained no Brady evidence. With-

out arguing that the district court erred, Bustamante asks

this Court to conduct its own review of the transcripts.

However, we decline to scour the grand jury record with-

out some showing either that the district court failed to

identify Brady material or that the government failed to

disclose it. Jones v. Butler, 864 F.2d 348, 356 (5th Cir.1988),

cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1075, 109 S.Ct. 2090, 104 L.Ed.2d 653

(1989) (after district court holds in camera hearing, we

will ordinarily not go beyond court's finding that records

contain no Brady material). See also United States v. Regis-

ter, 496 F.2d 1072, 1081 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.

1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 819 (1975).

Laurence Macon, the government asked questions designed to

inform the jury of evidence that the trial court had previously

excluded. Second, he complains that, during Rebecca Busta-

mante’s cross-examination, the government insinuated that

Bustamante had used his official influence to advance Mrs.

Bustamante’s career. Lastly, he complains that the government

attempted to elicit testimony about Bustamante’s bad character

from another defense witness. At trial, Bustamante’s attorney

objected to each of these remarks and the court sustained each

objection. Counsel asked for neither curative instruction nor a

mistrial. We are not persuaded that these isolated questions

prejudiced Bustamante’s substantial rights.

VII. Sentencing

Bustamante argues that the sentence for his RICO

conviction was impermissibly enhanced by double count-

ing. The district court determined Bustamante’s base

offense level of 19 from the RICO sentencing guideline,

U.S.S.G. § 2E1.1, then increased that level by two for

Bustamante’s abuse of a position of public trust, under

§ 3B1.3. Bustamante argues that, because his congres-

sional office was already used to satisfy the RICO enter-

prise element, the district court could not also properly

enhance his sentence for abusing that office. This argu-

ment is meritless.

We agree with the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in

United States v. Ford, 21 F.3d 759 (7th Cir.1994). In Ford,

the court held:

The crime of racketeering, [unlike simple bribery],

does not in all cases entail an abuse of trust, so that

the minimum base offense level of 19 already

established for all RICO offenses does not already

incorporate that element. Instead, the Sentencing

Commission has determined that all RICO offenses

merit a minimum offense level of 19, and those

RICO offenses that entail an abuse of trust must,

under the logic of the Guidelines, be distinguished

on the basis of that additional element by receiving

the two-level enhancement.

Id. at 766. See also United States v. Butt, 955 F.2d 77, 89 (1st

Cir.1992).? The district court did not err in arriving at its

sentence.

9 The RICO sentencing guideline allows a sentencing court

to derive the base offense level either form the RICO guideline

or by using the offense level from the underlying racketeering

acts. In Bustamante’s case, the district court used the base

App. 33

VIII.

For the reasons stated above, Bustamante’s convic-

tion and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

offense level specified by the RICO sentencing guideline. We do

not address whether our decision would be different had the

court taken the base offense level from the underlying bribery

and gratuity offenses, §§ 2C1.1 and 2C1.2, which do not allow

the abuse of public trust enhancement.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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