Reply Brief — Kidd v. United States
Supreme Court brief1995
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
(9
—
Supreme Court, y. S.
No. 94-2117 FILED
SEP 25 1995
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE conicikcesseiies
i. +
=
October Term, 1994
DEL KIDD; JUDY KIDD, Petitioners,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
~~
Ss
DEL AND JUDY KIDD
1303 Darlene Way #406B
Boulder City, NV 89005
Phone: (702) 293-3680
PETITIONERS PRO SE
Date: September 25, 1995
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ARGUMENTS
I. The district court did not rule on the merits of
Kidd’s constitutional claims. The court’s
discussion of those claims was clearly meant only
to determine jurisdiction and cannot be construed
as a ruling on the merits.................. l
II. Collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply
here because the MSPB refused jurisdiction of all
of Kidd’s constitutional claims and ignored his
private First Amendment claims. ........... <a
IIT. The CSRA remedy does not provide adequate
Afuicie ll protection. .................. 3
I oe oe ce eae te 7
ar yet eee a Se ee A-|
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp. 169 F.2d 254
Ba ERR ee a I
Cutts v. Lowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir 1982) ..... 6
Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988)...... 6
Stewart v. U.S., 199 F.2d 517 (7th Cir 1952) .......... l
STATUTES:
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978
Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat, llll ........... Throughout
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989
Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat 16 ............. 3, 4,5
5 U.S.C. § 1206 (a)(I);(c)(D{A);(c)(A)-(B). ......... 5, 6
ARTICLE:
Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of
a Constitutiona: Cause of Action:
Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101:1251 at 1263-65 ....... 6
ARGUMENTS
I. The district court did not rule on the merits of
Kidd’s constitutional claims. The court’s
discussion of those claims was clearly meant only
to determine jurisdiction and cannot be construed
as a ruling on the merits.
Kidd’s constitutional claims were dismissed in district
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' It is elementary
that jurisdiction is the threshold issue in every case in federal
court. If a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, it
is without power to adjudicate and the only action it can take is
to order dismissal of the complaint. Stewart v. U.S., 199 F.2d
517 (7th Cir., 1952.) Furthermore, it is the duty of the district
court to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction before proceeding to
hear and decide any case on its merits. Battaglia v. Gen. Motors
Corp. 169 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1948).
Clearly, the district court could not have ruled on the
merits of Kidd’s constitutional claims because it did not accept
jurisdiction to do so. All statements in the Government’s Brief in
Opposition declaring that the court found Kidd’s constitutional
claims lacked merit should, therefore, be disregarded.
The court’s discussion of Kidd’s constitutional claims
cannot be construed as a ruling on the merits. The court
discussed the claims only to determine jurisdiction:
' The district court assumed that all of Kidd’s claims
involving freedom of speech and assembly and some related to
due process were linked to his whistleblower claims which were
appealable only to the Merit System Protection Board. (MSPB)
The court held, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction of those
claims. Pet. App. A-25-26. Likewise, the district court held and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to provide
injunctive relief with regard to the issues of privacy, equal
protection, and due process. Pet. App. A-6.
l
‘RN iii
- In discussing Kidd’s privacy claim, the court reviewed
“some sort of constitutional violation related to privacy."? Pet.
App.. A-23. It then dismissed the claim, not because it lacked
merit, but because review by the court "would open the back door
to judicial review to perhaps an overwhelming number of CSRA
claims." Pet. App. A-24.
- In discussing Kidd’s equal protection claims, the court
held that because the CSRA "implicates no suspect class, the
court’s review is limited to determining whether the statute’s
scheme is rationally related to a legitimate government propose."
Pet. App. A-25. Kidd’s equal protection claim was dismissed not
because it lacked merit but because of the "need to avoid the
escalating costs and overcrowding in the federal court system."
Pet. App. A-25.
- In discussing Kidd’s claims related to speech, assembly,
and due process, the court incorrectly assumed that all such
claims would have been within the jurisdiction of the MSPB and
that they would have been presented and adjudicated there. These
claims, too, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction not lack of
merit. Pet. App. A-25-26.
With regard to Kidd’s claims that the government’s actions
had deprived him of procedural due process, the court noted that
all such "irregularities" had been brought before the OSC, which
found no constitutional violation. The court then assumed
jurisdiction to determine only the limited issue of whether the
OSC had discharged its statutory duty to investigate. Pet. App.
A-26.
In its Brief in Opposition, the Government argues that the
instant case is "not an appropriate vehicle" to decide the question
presented because "petitioner’s constitutional claims are plainly
without substance." Opp. Brief p. 10. The Government then
bases that argument on the false assertion that the district court
found the claims to lack merit. Since the district court could not
? If the pro se Complaint reviewed by the court was
incomplete or unclear as to evidence of specific claims, the
Compiaint can be amended to fully define the allegations.
2
Pet Dole Cates
and did not rule on the merits of Kidd’s constitutional Claims, the
Government’s argument should be dismissed as spurious.
II. Collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply here
because the MSPB refused jurisdiction of all of Kidd’s
constitutional claims and ignored his private First
Amendment claims.
In its Brief in Opposition, the Government argues that the
“Petitioner’s First Amendment claim is . .. in essence a reprise
of his claim that his Supervisors retaliated against him for
whistleblowing. That claim was presented to and rejected by the
MSPB ..." Opp. Brief, Pp. 10. And further, “When an
administrative agency is acting in a judicial Capacity and resolves
disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have
had an adequate Opportunity to litigate, the courts have not
hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." Citings
omitted. Opp. Brief, p. 11.
The MSPB carefully limited its jurisdiction to exclude all
of Kidd’s claims that the agency’s actions violated his
constitutional rights.
After accepting jurisdiction of Kidd’s 14-day suspension
under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), the MSPB
excluded from review all issues dealing with or stemming from
Kidd's having been placed on administrative leave, detailed out of
his Yuma position, and transferred to Nevada, because those
personnel actions occurred prior to July 9, 1989, the effective
date of the WPA. Reply App. A-1 , and A-3°. With regard to
Kidd’s constitutional claims, the MSPB found that “appellant’s
claim that his constitutional rights have been abridged, in and of
itself, is insufficient to bring this matter within the Board’s
jurisdiction... (The board does not have plenary jurisdiction. )"
Reply App. A-8. And with regard to Kidd’s claims of prohibited
personnel practices, the MSPB found that "... aS with the
appellant’s constitutional claim, the allegation that the agency has
> The MSPB’s Decision issued in this case is attached to
this Reply Brief and referenced herein as Reply App.
3
ert ae ee ee) es ell hn ee tr >, ;
eS oe 43 RN cane FER a be A aN A eR SW kip ts otc
ae
Py eel
at REGIE What Ny
CNT eae: deer SS
BRAS ac) aiid ths ames AR gi wih ale Oe Bor
Rk Se
Mao SR Aare ae Cle dine
committed a prohibited personnel practice is insufficient to bring
this matter within Board jurisdiction." Reply App. A-9. Citings
omitted. Nowhere does the MSPB Decision address or in any
way adjudicate the issues of equal protection, due process,
privacy or assembly.
With regard to Kidd’s First Amendment claims, the MSPB
distinguished between disclosures made in the public interest and
protected under the WPA and those made solely in a private
interest and not protected. Reply App. A-7. The distinction is
especially significant in this case in that the MSPB Decision
addresses only the issue presented by the agency and
conspicuously ignores the disclosures that Kidd claimed evidenced
whistleblowing.* Kidd’s disclosures concerning allegations of
agency wrongdoing in violation of his constitutional rights are all
of a private nature and are, arguably, not protected under the
WPA.
The Decision also ignores that fact that Kidd was
suspended, in part, for having hosted a meeting in his home with
a member of Congressman Morris Udall’ staff and 14 fellow
employees during which Kidd disclosed the agency’s wrongdoing
in his case and the others disclosed mismanagement and abuse of
authority at the Yuma Project Office. Again, Kidd’s disclosures
* The reord showed that Kidd claimed his disclosures to the
Secretary of the Interior and to two Congressmen -- that the
agency had flagrantly violated the regulations governing his
administrative leave, detail, and transfer and had violated the
grievance regulations in his case -- constituted whistleblowing.
These disclosures were contained in a six-page attachment to
Kidd’s September 11, 1989 letter to the Secretary with copies to
the Congressmen. The letter was a contributing factor in Kidd’s
14-day suspension. The same disclosures were made by Kidd to
Congressman Morris Udal’s staff person at a meeting hosted by
the Kidds and attended by 14 fellow employees. The fact that
Kidd hosted the meeting and made the disclosures was also a
contributing factor in his 14-day suspension. The Government,
on the other hand, claimed that the whistleblowing issue involved
statements related to a fire at Kidd’s home.
4
-
of abuse of authority and violation of regulation involved his
private interests that the MSPB defined as unprotected by the
WPA.
Since Kidd’s private interest disclosures were not
protected by the WPA and his First Amendment claim with
: respect to those disclosures was not adjudicated or in any way
discussed by the MSPB, collateral estoppel and res judicata should
not apply in the instant case.
IIT. The CSRA remedy does not provide adequate Article II]
protection.
It would seem undisputed that the CSRA provides no
judicial remedy for a federal employee’s job-related individual
constitutional claims. The Government’s Statement of the relevant
question concedes the point: "Thus, the question in this case ...
is whether an elaborate remedial System that has been constructed
step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy
considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new
judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue." Citings
omitted. [Emphasis added. ] Opp. Brief, p. 8.
It would also seem undisputed that, insofar as the WPA
applies to disclosures of public interest, it does not contravene
Article III.
However, neither the CSRA nor the WPA protects the
federal employee’s private constitutional rights on the job. As
noted by the district court, under the CSRA Kidd’s only recourse
for violations of his constitutional rights was to report them to the
OSC as prohibited personnel practices and ask for an
investigation. Pet. App. A-22. But,
“the right to petition the OSC is a constitutionally
inadequate remedy because its protections are wholly
discretionary. The statute directs the Special Counsel to
“receive any allegations of a prohibited personnel practice
and ... investigate the allegation to the extent necessary to
determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, exists,
or is to be taken. 5 U.S.C. §1206(a)(I). If the special
Counsel concludes that such reasonable grounds exist, it
is directed to report that conclusion to the MSPB, the
agency involved, and the Office of Personnel
Management. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (c)(I)(A). Any further
action is wholly discretionary: the Special Counsel need
not submit recommendations concerning corrective action
to the MSPB, and the MSPB need not order corrective
action. 5 U.S.C.§1206 (c)}{A)-(B). Thus an employee
who alleges constitutional violations surrenders control of
his claim to the Office of Special Counsel that has vast
discretion not to prosecute his action. By law, all he can
do is force the OSC to investigate and consider his case;
he cannot even challenge the OSC’s disposition of his
claim or seek judicial review to determine whether it was
arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial
evidence. Because this procedure does not guarantee
relief for unconstitutional actions, even those taken in
violation of “clearly established" constitutional law, the
CSRA remedy is constitutionally inadequate. °
Individual constitutional rights are not public rights nor is
their adjudication discretionary. So, unless federal employees
have now become the new Dred Scotts, Kidd’s constitutional
claims must be heard in federal court.
> Judicial review of the OSC’s decision whether to pursue
a case is limited at most, to insuring compliance with the statutory
requirement that the OSC perform an adequate inquiry on which
to base its disposition of the employee’s petition." Cuts v.
Lowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140. (D.C. Cir. 1982) Although Custs
concerned OSC inquiries into charges of violations of statutes and
not of the Constitution, subsequent courts have assumed that the
limitations on judicial review hold in constitutional cases as well.
See e.g. Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223.
6 Bi D . I Fl ‘ S P | . f
ituti ion: Harvard Law Review, Vol.
101:1251 at 1263-65. Applicable citings included.
6
—
CONCLUSION
The arguments presented in the Government’s Brief in
Opposition do not defeat those presented in the Petition. The
petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
Del and Judy Kidd
Petitioners, pro se
APPENDIX
inte .
A
~~
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD
DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE
DEL A. KIDD, )
Appellant, )
) DOCKET NUMBER
v. ) DE122191W0210
)
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR )
Agency. ) DATE: JUL3 1991
)
Jerre Dixon, Esquire, Dixon & Snow, Denver, Colorado,
for the appellant.
Bob Moeller, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the
agency.
BEFORE
Steven L. Chaffin
Administrative Judge
INITIAL DECISION
INTRODUCTION
The appellant seeks Board review of his 14-day
suspension, effective July 16, 1990. See Appeal Record, Tabs 1
and 4-41. The appellant asserts Board jurisdiction over the matter
appealed by claiming the protection of the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989.
The appellant was given the opportunity to present
evidence and argument on the issue of whether he was a
whistleblower under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). And, because of
allegations made by the appellant, a hearing was held on June 26,
1991. The appeal record closed upon the completion of the
hearing.
ee
For the reasons stated below, I find that the appellant is
not a whistleblower and I DISMISS the appeal of his 14-day
suspension.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Factual Background
Most of the facts of this case are undisputed. See Appeal
Record, Tab 21 (Stipulated Facts). The appellant served in the
position of Environmental Specialist, GS-12, in the Lower
Colorado Division of the Bureau of Reclamation. On July 16,
1990, the appellant was suspended for 14 days for repeatedly
accusing his former supervisor -- Ray Pritchett -- of setting fire
to the appellant’s home on August 26, 1989, and for writing a
letter to prospective witnesses on April 13, 1990.
‘ These accusations, as set forth in the notice of proposed
) removal, first occurred on the night of the fire, August 26, 1989.
See Appeal Record, Tab 4-4M. Then, on the next Monday
———
i morning, August 28, the appellant and his wife secured
‘ injunctions against Pritchett and David Gudgel -- the appellant’s
: second line supervisor -- in the Yuma, Arizona Municipal Court.'
i These injunctions indicated that Pritchett and Gudgel were to stop
‘ all acts of intimidation, threats, bodily harm, or acts causing
‘ property damage. See Appeal Record, Tab 5-4AA. The
: injunction also noted the fire at the appellant’s house and stated
A a belief that Pritchett was capable of such arson.
; Then, on September 11, 1989, the appellant wrote a letter
‘| to Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the Interior. See Appeal Record,
Tab 5-4Y. In that letter, the appellant indicates that he suspected
Pritchett and Gudgel of starting the fire at his house on August
26, 1989.
To, Oy pe Bl |
<
aba allies
ee eh et iad
ee, Se Lee, we
eS ah aac
These injunctions were obtained ex parte and without a
hearing. Thus, I do not consider the granting of the injunctions
by the Yuma Municipal Court to be probative evidence that the
allegations contained therein in support of the injunction were
true.
Fore eee Ege
ak De at ata
A-2
In March of 1990, the appellant sought a renewal of the
injunction against Pritchett and Gudgel. In seeking this renewal,
the appellant raised the same accusations against the two
individuals.
Finally, the notice of proposed suspension cites an April
13, 1990, letter the appellant wrote to 30 prospective witnesses
for a grievance hearing.” That letter, noting the withdrawal of the
grievance, suggests that the witnesses might also be subject to
harassment by Pritchett and Gudgel. See Appeal Record, Tab 4-
4Q.
Other, less germane facts, are also undisputed. The
appellant had difficulty working under Pritchett’s supervision for
several years. During this period, reprimands were issued.
grievances filed, and hearings held. This series of events
presumably ended in July of 1989, when the appellant was
reassigned from the agency’s Yuma, Arizona office to the
agency's Boulder City, Nevada Office.’ This reassignment
occurred approximately three weeks before the fire at the
appellant’s Yuma residence.
In 1990, the appellant sought review of his Suspension by
the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). However, on January 2,
1991, the OSC notified the appellant that it would take no further
action on his complaint. The appellant was informed of his right
to seek corrective action from the Board, and did so on March 7,
1991.
> The parties are in agreement that the letter was
erroneously dated March 13, 1990, and should have been dated
April 13, 1990.
It is undisputed that all of the "personnel actions" leading
up to the appellant’s reassignment, including the reassignment
itself, were effected or proposed prior to July 9, 1989, the
effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Act. Thus, they
are not subject to review here under that Act. See Herring V.
Department of the Treasury, 44 M.S.P.R. 673, 675 ( 1990), aff'd
918 F.2d 186 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table); Marshall vy. Department
of Veterans Affairs, 44 M.S.P.R. 28, 31-33 (1990).
A -3
x
es
a
a:
.
e
Og
%
Applicable law
In order to establish a claim of retaliation for
whistleblowing, an employee must show that he made a protected
disclosure and the disclosure was a “contributing factor" in the
agency’s decision to effect the personnel action. See 5 U.S.C.
§1221(e)(1); Christopher v. Defense Logistics Agency, 44
M.S.P.R. 264, 271 (1990); Gergick v. General Services
Administration, 43 M.S.P.R. 651, 569 {sic] (1990). Here, there
can be no disagreement that the appellant’s disclosures were a
contributing factor in his 14-day suspension: the suspension action
was specifically taken for those disclosures.* Thus, the issue
before me is whether the appellant’s disclosures as set forth in the
notice of proposed suspension were “protected” disclosures under
the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.
Analysis
The agency’s suspension action can be divided into two
parts. The first part relies on the appellant’s repeated accusations
of arson against Pritchett and Gudgel. Specifically, these
accusations occurred on August 26, 1989 -- the night of the fire -
- to police and fire officials; on the Monday following the fire in
the request for a court injunction; in the September 11, 1989
letter to Secretary Manuel Lujan; and in March 1990, when the
appellant sought to renew the injunctions against Pritchett and
Gudgel.
The second part of the agency’s suspension action involves
the appellant’s letter dated April 13, to prospective witnesses.
The issuance of this letter raises different issues and will be
discussed later.
* The appellant cites earlier protected disclosures with
regard to his several grievances with the agency. However, the
appellant presented no evidence to show that these earlier
disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to
suspend him for 14 days. Moreover, it is not clear that the
disclosures made are of the type which can be considered
protected.
A-4
The central issue with regard to these accusations of arson
against Pritchett and Gudgel is whether they constituted a
violation of the law and weather the appellant reasonably believed
he was reporting such a violation. See 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8).
The test for such “reasonable belief" is not the subjective belief
of the appellant/discloser. Rather, it is whether a “reasonable
person in the appellant’s position would believe that the matter
reported was protected. See Special Counsel v. Hoban, 24
M.S.P.R. 154, 160 1984).°
Thus, the instant case must be examined not from the
appellant’s perspective, but from the perspective of a reasonable
person, confronted with the appellant’s circumstances and the
evidence available to the appellant. And, based on the evidence
presented, I find that a reasonable person could not have
"reasonably believed" the accusations made.
To support his accusations, the appellant first alludes to a
conversation he had with several fellow employees some 18
months before the fire. See Hearing Tape (the appellant’s
testimony). During this conversation, which involved Pritchett’s
alleged harassment, one of the fellow employees stated that
Pritchett would stop at nothing, even burning a residence, to
harass employees. See Id.
This statement, according to the appellant, formed the
basis for his belief that Pritchett had committed arson. Yet, this
fellow employee apparently did not provide any factual basis to
support his supposition; it was apparently nothing more than an
unsubstantiated opinion.
Moreover, as noted, while the appellant and Pritchett had
been having difficulties in the workplace, no evidence has been
produced to show that these difficulties ever occurred outside the
workplace. That is, even assuming arguendo that Pritchett
harassed the appellant, and I do not make this assumption, the
appellant has presented no evidence to show that Pritchett had
> | note that this case was issued prior to the Whistleblower
Protection Act of 1989. However, the language of the statute
requiring that the employee “reasonable [sic] believe" his
disclosure is unchanged by the Act.
A-5
our Berart Ne hy ay
ay metre Cree nos a
ever said or done anything to suggest that he was capable of such
activities outside the mantle of work supervision.
The appellant next justifies his accusations by asserting
that he was only cooperating with law enforcement officials. That
is, the appellant claims that on the night of the fire, both the Fire
Marshal and the investigating police officer suggested that the fire
was arson and asked for the names of suspects. Thus, the
appellant was only complying with these law enforcement officials
by providing his supervisors’ names.
However, while the appellant testified that he was asked
to provide such information, he has submitted no evidence to
show that the Fire Marshall or the Police Officer ever asked for
such information on the night of the fire.®
In fact, the final police report indicates that the fire was
due to “unknown" causes.’ See Appeal Record, Tab 5-4AB.
And, the report of the investigating police officer suggests that the
appellant first raised the specter of arson, and that the appellant
and his wife suggested that Pritchett and Gudgel might be
involved. See ID.
More importantly, I note that the available evidence
provided at least one alternative to arson and should have
suggested caution to the appellant in making his accusations.
First, the appellant had recently been reassigned from Yuma,
Arizona, to Boulder City, Nevada. Thus, the appellant was no
longer living in his former Yuma residence -- his daughter was--
and the evidence shows that Pritchett was not even aware of the
® I note that the parties stipulated that the Fire Marshall
found that the fire was arson. However, I am unable to find any
evidence of this in the appeal record. Nor was I able to find any
record of the appellant’s conversation with the Fire Marshall on
the night of the fire.
7 During his testimony, the appellant indicated that insofar
as the fire was arson, he had become the prime suspect because
of certain discrepancies in his story and that he was deemed to
have failed a lie detector test on the matter. See Hearing Tape
(the appellant’s testimony.)
A - 6
appellant’s presence in Yuma on the night of the fire. See Id.
Further, on the day of the fire, the appellant’s son-in-law
had cleaned the storage room where the fire started. See Id; see
also Hearing Tape (testimony of Judy Kidd). This cleaning
involved the stacking of paint and other combustible materials.
While these chemicals were ultimately found not to be the cause
of the fire, the possibility of such an occurrence was extant at the
time of the fire.
I am also disturbed by the fact that on the Monday after
the fire, and then some two weeks later when he wrote to
Secretary Lujan, the appellant repeated his charge of arson
without any apparent attempt to check with the police or fire
department to ascertain the development of evidence. In fact, the
appellant stated that he had been unable to secure a copy of the
police report and did not see one until provided by the agency in
its adverse action file. See Hearing Tape (the appellant and Judy
Kidd's testimony). I note, however, that the agency was able to
obtain a report of investigation without any apparent difficulty.
Having reviewed the appeal file and specifically the
appellant's testimony at the hearing, I find not one scintilla of
credible, probative evidence available either now or at the time f
the fire, which would suggest that Pritchett and/or Gudgel were
involved in the fire at the appellant’s home. Thus, | find that a
reasonable person could not have reasonably believed that
Pritchett and Gudgel had started the fire at the appellant’s home.
As suggested by the agency in its closing argument, the
appellant's statements appear to be unfounded suspicions rather
than a reasonable belief.
Accordingly, I conclude that the appellant’s accusations
against Pritchett and Gudgel in this regard are not “protected
disclosures" within the coverage of the Whistleblower Protection
Act. And, because of this conclusion, I make no finding on
whether the appellant’s accusations were in the public interest -
those types of disclosures Congress intended to protect through
the Act -- or solely in his private interest. See Berube v. General
Services Administration, 30 M.S.P.R. 581, 596 (1986) vacated on
other grounds, 820 F2d 396 (Fed. Cir, 1987).
The appellant also argues that his communication letter to
Secretary Lujan must be accorded protection "on its face" as Ist
A-7
r
a
7
1
4
4
‘a
a
Amendment free speech and a disclosure of a violation of the law.
However, as found above, the appellant’s accusations of arson are
not "protected disclosures." and, the appellant’s claim that his
constitutional rights have been abridged, in and of itself, is
insufficient to bring this matter within the Board’s jurisdiction.
See Saunders v. Merit System Protection Board, 757 F.2d 1288,
1290 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the Board does not have plenary
jurisdiction).
The final basis for the 14-day suspension is the appellant's
letter to approximately 30 fellow employees who were to appear
as witnesses at this grievance hearing. See Appeal record, Tab
4-4Q. In that grievance the appellant was attempting to show that
he was being harassed. However, on the second day of the
hearing, before calling many of the requested witness [sic] to
testify, the appellant withdrew the claim of harassment.’ See
Appeal Record, Tab 5-4R (Vol 3 of the grievance transcript, pg.
130). Yet, he still wrote to these individuals to outline his
continuing plans and to warn the employees of potential
harassment.
Having reviewed this letter, I do not believe it contains a
protected disclosure. See Appeal Record, Tab 4-4Q. Rather, the
appellant is complaining of the agency’s alleged harassment
toward him rather than any disclosure of specific mismanagement.
Nothing the appellant disclosed in this letter effectuated the
purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See Berube, 30 M.S.P.R. at
596. That is, any disclosures made involved only the furtherance
of the appellant’s case, not the public interest. Thus, | find that
they were not protected disclosures. See Williams v. Department
of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 553-54 (1991); Oliver v.
Department of health and Human Services, 34 M.S.P.R. 465, 472
(1987), aff'd 847 F.2d 842 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Table)..
8 The parties stipulated to this matter but essentially agreed
to disagree. My reading of the hearing transcript convinces me
that the agency’s position -- the appellant withdrew the claim of
harassment -- is the correct one. See Appeal Record, Tabs 5-4R
and 21.
A-8
Moreover, insofar as the appellant claims that the agency
is retaliating against him under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) -- reprisal
for having written this letter in connection with his grievance, I
disagree. The credible evidence of record shows that at the time
the appellant wrote these letters he had withdrawn his grievance.
Moreover, as with the appellant’s constitutional claim, the
allegation that the agency has committed a prohibited personnel
practice is insufficient to bring this matter within Board
jurisdiction. See Hunter v. Department of the Army, 40 M.S.P.R.
449, 451 (1989).
Finally, | note that the appellant alleges that the agency’s
actions against him constitute age discrimination. While it is not
clear that the appellant is specifically raising this argument with
regard to his 14-day suspension, I would simply note that the
Board lacks jurisdiction over such an allegation in the absence of
an appealable matter. See Perlmutter v. Department of the Air
Force, 41 M.S.P.R. 38, 39 (1989). Thus, because the Board
does not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s 14-day suspension,
or any of the other personnel actions taken against the appellant,
it cannot consider this allegation of discrimination.
Summary and conclusion
In sum, I find that the appellant is not entitled to the
protection of the Whistleblower Protection Act because the
disclosures he made -- accusations of arson against his supervisors
and the letter he issued to prospective witness -- are not protected
by the Whistleblower Protection Act. That is, the appellant could
not have “reasonably believed" the accusations of arson, and the
letter he wrote to prospective witnesses was in his personal
interest, not the public interest.
Further, the appellant’s 14-day suspension, standing alone,
is NOt an agency personnel action over which the Board had
jurisdiction. See 5 U,S. C. § 7512(2); Gosa v. United States
Postal Service, 43 M.S.P.R. 11, 13 (1989). The appellant’s
Suspension was reviewed only because of his allegation that the
personnel action was in retaliation for his whistleblowing activity.
However, having found that the appellant is not a whistleblower,
the appeal must be deemed as outside the Board’s subject matter
jurisdiction.
A-9
DECISI
The appeal is DISMISSED.
FOR THE BOARD:
A - 10
N
Steven L. Chaffin
Administrative Judge
rae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.