Reply Brief — Kidd v. United States

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Supreme Court, y. S.

No. 94-2117 FILED

SEP 25 1995

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE conicikcesseiies

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October Term, 1994

DEL KIDD; JUDY KIDD, Petitioners,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS

~~

Ss

DEL AND JUDY KIDD

1303 Darlene Way #406B

Boulder City, NV 89005

Phone: (702) 293-3680

PETITIONERS PRO SE

Date: September 25, 1995

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ARGUMENTS

I. The district court did not rule on the merits of

Kidd’s constitutional claims. The court’s

discussion of those claims was clearly meant only

to determine jurisdiction and cannot be construed

as a ruling on the merits.................. l

II. Collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply

here because the MSPB refused jurisdiction of all

of Kidd’s constitutional claims and ignored his

private First Amendment claims. ........... <a

IIT. The CSRA remedy does not provide adequate

Afuicie ll protection. .................. 3

I oe oe ce eae te 7

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Battaglia v. Gen. Motors Corp. 169 F.2d 254

Ba ERR ee a I

Cutts v. Lowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140 (D.C. Cir 1982) ..... 6

Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1988)...... 6

Stewart v. U.S., 199 F.2d 517 (7th Cir 1952) .......... l

STATUTES:

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978

Pub. L. 95-454, 92 Stat, llll ........... Throughout

Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989

Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat 16 ............. 3, 4,5

5 U.S.C. § 1206 (a)(I);(c)(D{A);(c)(A)-(B). ......... 5, 6

ARTICLE:

Bivens Doctrine in Flux: Statutory Preclusion of

a Constitutiona: Cause of Action:

Harvard Law Review, Vol. 101:1251 at 1263-65 ....... 6

ARGUMENTS

I. The district court did not rule on the merits of

Kidd’s constitutional claims. The court’s

discussion of those claims was clearly meant only

to determine jurisdiction and cannot be construed

as a ruling on the merits.

Kidd’s constitutional claims were dismissed in district

court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.' It is elementary

that jurisdiction is the threshold issue in every case in federal

court. If a court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter, it

is without power to adjudicate and the only action it can take is

to order dismissal of the complaint. Stewart v. U.S., 199 F.2d

517 (7th Cir., 1952.) Furthermore, it is the duty of the district

court to ascertain whether it has jurisdiction before proceeding to

hear and decide any case on its merits. Battaglia v. Gen. Motors

Corp. 169 F.2d 254 (2nd Cir. 1948).

Clearly, the district court could not have ruled on the

merits of Kidd’s constitutional claims because it did not accept

jurisdiction to do so. All statements in the Government’s Brief in

Opposition declaring that the court found Kidd’s constitutional

claims lacked merit should, therefore, be disregarded.

The court’s discussion of Kidd’s constitutional claims

cannot be construed as a ruling on the merits. The court

discussed the claims only to determine jurisdiction:

' The district court assumed that all of Kidd’s claims

involving freedom of speech and assembly and some related to

due process were linked to his whistleblower claims which were

appealable only to the Merit System Protection Board. (MSPB)

The court held, therefore, that it lacked jurisdiction of those

claims. Pet. App. A-25-26. Likewise, the district court held and

the Ninth Circuit affirmed that it lacked jurisdiction to provide

injunctive relief with regard to the issues of privacy, equal

protection, and due process. Pet. App. A-6.

l

‘RN iii

- In discussing Kidd’s privacy claim, the court reviewed

“some sort of constitutional violation related to privacy."? Pet.

App.. A-23. It then dismissed the claim, not because it lacked

merit, but because review by the court "would open the back door

to judicial review to perhaps an overwhelming number of CSRA

claims." Pet. App. A-24.

- In discussing Kidd’s equal protection claims, the court

held that because the CSRA "implicates no suspect class, the

court’s review is limited to determining whether the statute’s

scheme is rationally related to a legitimate government propose."

Pet. App. A-25. Kidd’s equal protection claim was dismissed not

because it lacked merit but because of the "need to avoid the

escalating costs and overcrowding in the federal court system."

Pet. App. A-25.

- In discussing Kidd’s claims related to speech, assembly,

and due process, the court incorrectly assumed that all such

claims would have been within the jurisdiction of the MSPB and

that they would have been presented and adjudicated there. These

claims, too, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction not lack of

merit. Pet. App. A-25-26.

With regard to Kidd’s claims that the government’s actions

had deprived him of procedural due process, the court noted that

all such "irregularities" had been brought before the OSC, which

found no constitutional violation. The court then assumed

jurisdiction to determine only the limited issue of whether the

OSC had discharged its statutory duty to investigate. Pet. App.

A-26.

In its Brief in Opposition, the Government argues that the

instant case is "not an appropriate vehicle" to decide the question

presented because "petitioner’s constitutional claims are plainly

without substance." Opp. Brief p. 10. The Government then

bases that argument on the false assertion that the district court

found the claims to lack merit. Since the district court could not

? If the pro se Complaint reviewed by the court was

incomplete or unclear as to evidence of specific claims, the

Compiaint can be amended to fully define the allegations.

2

Pet Dole Cates

and did not rule on the merits of Kidd’s constitutional Claims, the

Government’s argument should be dismissed as spurious.

II. Collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply here

because the MSPB refused jurisdiction of all of Kidd’s

constitutional claims and ignored his private First

Amendment claims.

In its Brief in Opposition, the Government argues that the

“Petitioner’s First Amendment claim is . .. in essence a reprise

of his claim that his Supervisors retaliated against him for

whistleblowing. That claim was presented to and rejected by the

MSPB ..." Opp. Brief, Pp. 10. And further, “When an

administrative agency is acting in a judicial Capacity and resolves

disputed issues of fact properly before it which the parties have

had an adequate Opportunity to litigate, the courts have not

hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose." Citings

omitted. Opp. Brief, p. 11.

The MSPB carefully limited its jurisdiction to exclude all

of Kidd’s claims that the agency’s actions violated his

constitutional rights.

After accepting jurisdiction of Kidd’s 14-day suspension

under the Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), the MSPB

excluded from review all issues dealing with or stemming from

Kidd's having been placed on administrative leave, detailed out of

his Yuma position, and transferred to Nevada, because those

personnel actions occurred prior to July 9, 1989, the effective

date of the WPA. Reply App. A-1 , and A-3°. With regard to

Kidd’s constitutional claims, the MSPB found that “appellant’s

claim that his constitutional rights have been abridged, in and of

itself, is insufficient to bring this matter within the Board’s

jurisdiction... (The board does not have plenary jurisdiction. )"

Reply App. A-8. And with regard to Kidd’s claims of prohibited

personnel practices, the MSPB found that "... aS with the

appellant’s constitutional claim, the allegation that the agency has

> The MSPB’s Decision issued in this case is attached to

this Reply Brief and referenced herein as Reply App.

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committed a prohibited personnel practice is insufficient to bring

this matter within Board jurisdiction." Reply App. A-9. Citings

omitted. Nowhere does the MSPB Decision address or in any

way adjudicate the issues of equal protection, due process,

privacy or assembly.

With regard to Kidd’s First Amendment claims, the MSPB

distinguished between disclosures made in the public interest and

protected under the WPA and those made solely in a private

interest and not protected. Reply App. A-7. The distinction is

especially significant in this case in that the MSPB Decision

addresses only the issue presented by the agency and

conspicuously ignores the disclosures that Kidd claimed evidenced

whistleblowing.* Kidd’s disclosures concerning allegations of

agency wrongdoing in violation of his constitutional rights are all

of a private nature and are, arguably, not protected under the

WPA.

The Decision also ignores that fact that Kidd was

suspended, in part, for having hosted a meeting in his home with

a member of Congressman Morris Udall’ staff and 14 fellow

employees during which Kidd disclosed the agency’s wrongdoing

in his case and the others disclosed mismanagement and abuse of

authority at the Yuma Project Office. Again, Kidd’s disclosures

* The reord showed that Kidd claimed his disclosures to the

Secretary of the Interior and to two Congressmen -- that the

agency had flagrantly violated the regulations governing his

administrative leave, detail, and transfer and had violated the

grievance regulations in his case -- constituted whistleblowing.

These disclosures were contained in a six-page attachment to

Kidd’s September 11, 1989 letter to the Secretary with copies to

the Congressmen. The letter was a contributing factor in Kidd’s

14-day suspension. The same disclosures were made by Kidd to

Congressman Morris Udal’s staff person at a meeting hosted by

the Kidds and attended by 14 fellow employees. The fact that

Kidd hosted the meeting and made the disclosures was also a

contributing factor in his 14-day suspension. The Government,

on the other hand, claimed that the whistleblowing issue involved

statements related to a fire at Kidd’s home.

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of abuse of authority and violation of regulation involved his

private interests that the MSPB defined as unprotected by the

WPA.

Since Kidd’s private interest disclosures were not

protected by the WPA and his First Amendment claim with

: respect to those disclosures was not adjudicated or in any way

discussed by the MSPB, collateral estoppel and res judicata should

not apply in the instant case.

IIT. The CSRA remedy does not provide adequate Article II]

protection.

It would seem undisputed that the CSRA provides no

judicial remedy for a federal employee’s job-related individual

constitutional claims. The Government’s Statement of the relevant

question concedes the point: "Thus, the question in this case ...

is whether an elaborate remedial System that has been constructed

step by step, with careful attention to conflicting policy

considerations, should be augmented by the creation of a new

judicial remedy for the constitutional violation at issue." Citings

omitted. [Emphasis added. ] Opp. Brief, p. 8.

It would also seem undisputed that, insofar as the WPA

applies to disclosures of public interest, it does not contravene

Article III.

However, neither the CSRA nor the WPA protects the

federal employee’s private constitutional rights on the job. As

noted by the district court, under the CSRA Kidd’s only recourse

for violations of his constitutional rights was to report them to the

OSC as prohibited personnel practices and ask for an

investigation. Pet. App. A-22. But,

“the right to petition the OSC is a constitutionally

inadequate remedy because its protections are wholly

discretionary. The statute directs the Special Counsel to

“receive any allegations of a prohibited personnel practice

and ... investigate the allegation to the extent necessary to

determine whether there are reasonable grounds to believe

that a prohibited personnel practice has occurred, exists,

or is to be taken. 5 U.S.C. §1206(a)(I). If the special

Counsel concludes that such reasonable grounds exist, it

is directed to report that conclusion to the MSPB, the

agency involved, and the Office of Personnel

Management. 5 U.S.C. § 1206 (c)(I)(A). Any further

action is wholly discretionary: the Special Counsel need

not submit recommendations concerning corrective action

to the MSPB, and the MSPB need not order corrective

action. 5 U.S.C.§1206 (c)}{A)-(B). Thus an employee

who alleges constitutional violations surrenders control of

his claim to the Office of Special Counsel that has vast

discretion not to prosecute his action. By law, all he can

do is force the OSC to investigate and consider his case;

he cannot even challenge the OSC’s disposition of his

claim or seek judicial review to determine whether it was

arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial

evidence. Because this procedure does not guarantee

relief for unconstitutional actions, even those taken in

violation of “clearly established" constitutional law, the

CSRA remedy is constitutionally inadequate. °

Individual constitutional rights are not public rights nor is

their adjudication discretionary. So, unless federal employees

have now become the new Dred Scotts, Kidd’s constitutional

claims must be heard in federal court.

> Judicial review of the OSC’s decision whether to pursue

a case is limited at most, to insuring compliance with the statutory

requirement that the OSC perform an adequate inquiry on which

to base its disposition of the employee’s petition." Cuts v.

Lowler, 692 F.2d 138, 140. (D.C. Cir. 1982) Although Custs

concerned OSC inquiries into charges of violations of statutes and

not of the Constitution, subsequent courts have assumed that the

limitations on judicial review hold in constitutional cases as well.

See e.g. Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d 223.

6 Bi D . I Fl ‘ S P | . f

ituti ion: Harvard Law Review, Vol.

101:1251 at 1263-65. Applicable citings included.

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CONCLUSION

The arguments presented in the Government’s Brief in

Opposition do not defeat those presented in the Petition. The

petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted.

Del and Judy Kidd

Petitioners, pro se

APPENDIX

inte .

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEM PROTECTION BOARD

DENVER REGIONAL OFFICE

DEL A. KIDD, )

Appellant, )

) DOCKET NUMBER

v. ) DE122191W0210

)

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR )

Agency. ) DATE: JUL3 1991

)

Jerre Dixon, Esquire, Dixon & Snow, Denver, Colorado,

for the appellant.

Bob Moeller, Esquire, Phoenix, Arizona, for the

agency.

BEFORE

Steven L. Chaffin

Administrative Judge

INITIAL DECISION

INTRODUCTION

The appellant seeks Board review of his 14-day

suspension, effective July 16, 1990. See Appeal Record, Tabs 1

and 4-41. The appellant asserts Board jurisdiction over the matter

appealed by claiming the protection of the Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1989.

The appellant was given the opportunity to present

evidence and argument on the issue of whether he was a

whistleblower under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). And, because of

allegations made by the appellant, a hearing was held on June 26,

1991. The appeal record closed upon the completion of the

hearing.

ee

For the reasons stated below, I find that the appellant is

not a whistleblower and I DISMISS the appeal of his 14-day

suspension.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Factual Background

Most of the facts of this case are undisputed. See Appeal

Record, Tab 21 (Stipulated Facts). The appellant served in the

position of Environmental Specialist, GS-12, in the Lower

Colorado Division of the Bureau of Reclamation. On July 16,

1990, the appellant was suspended for 14 days for repeatedly

accusing his former supervisor -- Ray Pritchett -- of setting fire

to the appellant’s home on August 26, 1989, and for writing a

letter to prospective witnesses on April 13, 1990.

‘ These accusations, as set forth in the notice of proposed

) removal, first occurred on the night of the fire, August 26, 1989.

See Appeal Record, Tab 4-4M. Then, on the next Monday

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i morning, August 28, the appellant and his wife secured

‘ injunctions against Pritchett and David Gudgel -- the appellant’s

: second line supervisor -- in the Yuma, Arizona Municipal Court.'

i These injunctions indicated that Pritchett and Gudgel were to stop

‘ all acts of intimidation, threats, bodily harm, or acts causing

‘ property damage. See Appeal Record, Tab 5-4AA. The

: injunction also noted the fire at the appellant’s house and stated

A a belief that Pritchett was capable of such arson.

; Then, on September 11, 1989, the appellant wrote a letter

‘| to Manuel Lujan, Secretary of the Interior. See Appeal Record,

Tab 5-4Y. In that letter, the appellant indicates that he suspected

Pritchett and Gudgel of starting the fire at his house on August

26, 1989.

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These injunctions were obtained ex parte and without a

hearing. Thus, I do not consider the granting of the injunctions

by the Yuma Municipal Court to be probative evidence that the

allegations contained therein in support of the injunction were

true.

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A-2

In March of 1990, the appellant sought a renewal of the

injunction against Pritchett and Gudgel. In seeking this renewal,

the appellant raised the same accusations against the two

individuals.

Finally, the notice of proposed suspension cites an April

13, 1990, letter the appellant wrote to 30 prospective witnesses

for a grievance hearing.” That letter, noting the withdrawal of the

grievance, suggests that the witnesses might also be subject to

harassment by Pritchett and Gudgel. See Appeal Record, Tab 4-

4Q.

Other, less germane facts, are also undisputed. The

appellant had difficulty working under Pritchett’s supervision for

several years. During this period, reprimands were issued.

grievances filed, and hearings held. This series of events

presumably ended in July of 1989, when the appellant was

reassigned from the agency’s Yuma, Arizona office to the

agency's Boulder City, Nevada Office.’ This reassignment

occurred approximately three weeks before the fire at the

appellant’s Yuma residence.

In 1990, the appellant sought review of his Suspension by

the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). However, on January 2,

1991, the OSC notified the appellant that it would take no further

action on his complaint. The appellant was informed of his right

to seek corrective action from the Board, and did so on March 7,

1991.

> The parties are in agreement that the letter was

erroneously dated March 13, 1990, and should have been dated

April 13, 1990.

It is undisputed that all of the "personnel actions" leading

up to the appellant’s reassignment, including the reassignment

itself, were effected or proposed prior to July 9, 1989, the

effective date of the Whistleblower Protection Act. Thus, they

are not subject to review here under that Act. See Herring V.

Department of the Treasury, 44 M.S.P.R. 673, 675 ( 1990), aff'd

918 F.2d 186 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (Table); Marshall vy. Department

of Veterans Affairs, 44 M.S.P.R. 28, 31-33 (1990).

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Applicable law

In order to establish a claim of retaliation for

whistleblowing, an employee must show that he made a protected

disclosure and the disclosure was a “contributing factor" in the

agency’s decision to effect the personnel action. See 5 U.S.C.

§1221(e)(1); Christopher v. Defense Logistics Agency, 44

M.S.P.R. 264, 271 (1990); Gergick v. General Services

Administration, 43 M.S.P.R. 651, 569 {sic] (1990). Here, there

can be no disagreement that the appellant’s disclosures were a

contributing factor in his 14-day suspension: the suspension action

was specifically taken for those disclosures.* Thus, the issue

before me is whether the appellant’s disclosures as set forth in the

notice of proposed suspension were “protected” disclosures under

the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.

Analysis

The agency’s suspension action can be divided into two

parts. The first part relies on the appellant’s repeated accusations

of arson against Pritchett and Gudgel. Specifically, these

accusations occurred on August 26, 1989 -- the night of the fire -

- to police and fire officials; on the Monday following the fire in

the request for a court injunction; in the September 11, 1989

letter to Secretary Manuel Lujan; and in March 1990, when the

appellant sought to renew the injunctions against Pritchett and

Gudgel.

The second part of the agency’s suspension action involves

the appellant’s letter dated April 13, to prospective witnesses.

The issuance of this letter raises different issues and will be

discussed later.

* The appellant cites earlier protected disclosures with

regard to his several grievances with the agency. However, the

appellant presented no evidence to show that these earlier

disclosures were a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to

suspend him for 14 days. Moreover, it is not clear that the

disclosures made are of the type which can be considered

protected.

A-4

The central issue with regard to these accusations of arson

against Pritchett and Gudgel is whether they constituted a

violation of the law and weather the appellant reasonably believed

he was reporting such a violation. See 5 U.S.C. §2302(b)(8).

The test for such “reasonable belief" is not the subjective belief

of the appellant/discloser. Rather, it is whether a “reasonable

person in the appellant’s position would believe that the matter

reported was protected. See Special Counsel v. Hoban, 24

M.S.P.R. 154, 160 1984).°

Thus, the instant case must be examined not from the

appellant’s perspective, but from the perspective of a reasonable

person, confronted with the appellant’s circumstances and the

evidence available to the appellant. And, based on the evidence

presented, I find that a reasonable person could not have

"reasonably believed" the accusations made.

To support his accusations, the appellant first alludes to a

conversation he had with several fellow employees some 18

months before the fire. See Hearing Tape (the appellant’s

testimony). During this conversation, which involved Pritchett’s

alleged harassment, one of the fellow employees stated that

Pritchett would stop at nothing, even burning a residence, to

harass employees. See Id.

This statement, according to the appellant, formed the

basis for his belief that Pritchett had committed arson. Yet, this

fellow employee apparently did not provide any factual basis to

support his supposition; it was apparently nothing more than an

unsubstantiated opinion.

Moreover, as noted, while the appellant and Pritchett had

been having difficulties in the workplace, no evidence has been

produced to show that these difficulties ever occurred outside the

workplace. That is, even assuming arguendo that Pritchett

harassed the appellant, and I do not make this assumption, the

appellant has presented no evidence to show that Pritchett had

> | note that this case was issued prior to the Whistleblower

Protection Act of 1989. However, the language of the statute

requiring that the employee “reasonable [sic] believe" his

disclosure is unchanged by the Act.

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ever said or done anything to suggest that he was capable of such

activities outside the mantle of work supervision.

The appellant next justifies his accusations by asserting

that he was only cooperating with law enforcement officials. That

is, the appellant claims that on the night of the fire, both the Fire

Marshal and the investigating police officer suggested that the fire

was arson and asked for the names of suspects. Thus, the

appellant was only complying with these law enforcement officials

by providing his supervisors’ names.

However, while the appellant testified that he was asked

to provide such information, he has submitted no evidence to

show that the Fire Marshall or the Police Officer ever asked for

such information on the night of the fire.®

In fact, the final police report indicates that the fire was

due to “unknown" causes.’ See Appeal Record, Tab 5-4AB.

And, the report of the investigating police officer suggests that the

appellant first raised the specter of arson, and that the appellant

and his wife suggested that Pritchett and Gudgel might be

involved. See ID.

More importantly, I note that the available evidence

provided at least one alternative to arson and should have

suggested caution to the appellant in making his accusations.

First, the appellant had recently been reassigned from Yuma,

Arizona, to Boulder City, Nevada. Thus, the appellant was no

longer living in his former Yuma residence -- his daughter was--

and the evidence shows that Pritchett was not even aware of the

® I note that the parties stipulated that the Fire Marshall

found that the fire was arson. However, I am unable to find any

evidence of this in the appeal record. Nor was I able to find any

record of the appellant’s conversation with the Fire Marshall on

the night of the fire.

7 During his testimony, the appellant indicated that insofar

as the fire was arson, he had become the prime suspect because

of certain discrepancies in his story and that he was deemed to

have failed a lie detector test on the matter. See Hearing Tape

(the appellant’s testimony.)

A - 6

appellant’s presence in Yuma on the night of the fire. See Id.

Further, on the day of the fire, the appellant’s son-in-law

had cleaned the storage room where the fire started. See Id; see

also Hearing Tape (testimony of Judy Kidd). This cleaning

involved the stacking of paint and other combustible materials.

While these chemicals were ultimately found not to be the cause

of the fire, the possibility of such an occurrence was extant at the

time of the fire.

I am also disturbed by the fact that on the Monday after

the fire, and then some two weeks later when he wrote to

Secretary Lujan, the appellant repeated his charge of arson

without any apparent attempt to check with the police or fire

department to ascertain the development of evidence. In fact, the

appellant stated that he had been unable to secure a copy of the

police report and did not see one until provided by the agency in

its adverse action file. See Hearing Tape (the appellant and Judy

Kidd's testimony). I note, however, that the agency was able to

obtain a report of investigation without any apparent difficulty.

Having reviewed the appeal file and specifically the

appellant's testimony at the hearing, I find not one scintilla of

credible, probative evidence available either now or at the time f

the fire, which would suggest that Pritchett and/or Gudgel were

involved in the fire at the appellant’s home. Thus, | find that a

reasonable person could not have reasonably believed that

Pritchett and Gudgel had started the fire at the appellant’s home.

As suggested by the agency in its closing argument, the

appellant's statements appear to be unfounded suspicions rather

than a reasonable belief.

Accordingly, I conclude that the appellant’s accusations

against Pritchett and Gudgel in this regard are not “protected

disclosures" within the coverage of the Whistleblower Protection

Act. And, because of this conclusion, I make no finding on

whether the appellant’s accusations were in the public interest -

those types of disclosures Congress intended to protect through

the Act -- or solely in his private interest. See Berube v. General

Services Administration, 30 M.S.P.R. 581, 596 (1986) vacated on

other grounds, 820 F2d 396 (Fed. Cir, 1987).

The appellant also argues that his communication letter to

Secretary Lujan must be accorded protection "on its face" as Ist

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Amendment free speech and a disclosure of a violation of the law.

However, as found above, the appellant’s accusations of arson are

not "protected disclosures." and, the appellant’s claim that his

constitutional rights have been abridged, in and of itself, is

insufficient to bring this matter within the Board’s jurisdiction.

See Saunders v. Merit System Protection Board, 757 F.2d 1288,

1290 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (the Board does not have plenary

jurisdiction).

The final basis for the 14-day suspension is the appellant's

letter to approximately 30 fellow employees who were to appear

as witnesses at this grievance hearing. See Appeal record, Tab

4-4Q. In that grievance the appellant was attempting to show that

he was being harassed. However, on the second day of the

hearing, before calling many of the requested witness [sic] to

testify, the appellant withdrew the claim of harassment.’ See

Appeal Record, Tab 5-4R (Vol 3 of the grievance transcript, pg.

130). Yet, he still wrote to these individuals to outline his

continuing plans and to warn the employees of potential

harassment.

Having reviewed this letter, I do not believe it contains a

protected disclosure. See Appeal Record, Tab 4-4Q. Rather, the

appellant is complaining of the agency’s alleged harassment

toward him rather than any disclosure of specific mismanagement.

Nothing the appellant disclosed in this letter effectuated the

purposes of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See Berube, 30 M.S.P.R. at

596. That is, any disclosures made involved only the furtherance

of the appellant’s case, not the public interest. Thus, | find that

they were not protected disclosures. See Williams v. Department

of Defense, 46 M.S.P.R. 549, 553-54 (1991); Oliver v.

Department of health and Human Services, 34 M.S.P.R. 465, 472

(1987), aff'd 847 F.2d 842 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Table)..

8 The parties stipulated to this matter but essentially agreed

to disagree. My reading of the hearing transcript convinces me

that the agency’s position -- the appellant withdrew the claim of

harassment -- is the correct one. See Appeal Record, Tabs 5-4R

and 21.

A-8

Moreover, insofar as the appellant claims that the agency

is retaliating against him under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9) -- reprisal

for having written this letter in connection with his grievance, I

disagree. The credible evidence of record shows that at the time

the appellant wrote these letters he had withdrawn his grievance.

Moreover, as with the appellant’s constitutional claim, the

allegation that the agency has committed a prohibited personnel

practice is insufficient to bring this matter within Board

jurisdiction. See Hunter v. Department of the Army, 40 M.S.P.R.

449, 451 (1989).

Finally, | note that the appellant alleges that the agency’s

actions against him constitute age discrimination. While it is not

clear that the appellant is specifically raising this argument with

regard to his 14-day suspension, I would simply note that the

Board lacks jurisdiction over such an allegation in the absence of

an appealable matter. See Perlmutter v. Department of the Air

Force, 41 M.S.P.R. 38, 39 (1989). Thus, because the Board

does not have jurisdiction over the appellant’s 14-day suspension,

or any of the other personnel actions taken against the appellant,

it cannot consider this allegation of discrimination.

Summary and conclusion

In sum, I find that the appellant is not entitled to the

protection of the Whistleblower Protection Act because the

disclosures he made -- accusations of arson against his supervisors

and the letter he issued to prospective witness -- are not protected

by the Whistleblower Protection Act. That is, the appellant could

not have “reasonably believed" the accusations of arson, and the

letter he wrote to prospective witnesses was in his personal

interest, not the public interest.

Further, the appellant’s 14-day suspension, standing alone,

is NOt an agency personnel action over which the Board had

jurisdiction. See 5 U,S. C. § 7512(2); Gosa v. United States

Postal Service, 43 M.S.P.R. 11, 13 (1989). The appellant’s

Suspension was reviewed only because of his allegation that the

personnel action was in retaliation for his whistleblowing activity.

However, having found that the appellant is not a whistleblower,

the appeal must be deemed as outside the Board’s subject matter

jurisdiction.

A-9

DECISI

The appeal is DISMISSED.

FOR THE BOARD:

A - 10

N

Steven L. Chaffin

Administrative Judge

rae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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