Appendix — Sanders v. Los Angeles Unified School District

Supreme Oourt, Us.

®iTED

941835 may 8 1995

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

NO.

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

COLUMBUS SANDERS,

Petitioner,

Ve

UNITED TEACHERS-LOS ANGELES,

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED SCHOOL

DISTRICT,

Respondents

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

APPENDIX

Columbus Sanders

In Pro Per

P. 0. Box 4040

Sunland, California 91041

(818) 897-8841

)

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Order of the Unites States

District Court of the

Central District of

California, Cases Nos.

CV90-2703KN, CV 91-0172KN,

CV 92-2352KN

(February 1,1993) ...-ccccesseces la

Order and Opinion of the

United States District Court

of the Central

District of California,

Cases No. CV 92-2352KN

(March 16, 1993) ..csecccccccaves 58a

Order and opinion of the

United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

Cases Nos. 93-55397, 93-55569

(November 21, 1994) .....ceceeees 62a

Order and Opinion of the

United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,

Cases Nos. 93-55397, 93-55569

(February 7, 1995)... eeeeeees 73a

ic

be-

be

Determination and Opinion

of the United States

Government Equal

Employment Opportunity

Commission Charge No.:

340901317

(September 28, 1990) ..ccceccecss 76a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NTERED

~ 4

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BY DEPUTY

FILED FEB 1 1993

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BY DEPUTY

COLUMBUS SANDERS,

)

)

Plaintiff, ) CV 90-2703

) KN

Vv. )

)

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED )

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.)

)

Defendants. )

)

COLUMBUS SANDERS, )

)

Plaintiff, ) CV 91-0172

) KN

v. )

)

UNITED TEACHERS - )THIS

LOS ANGELES, et al., ) CONSTITUTES

2a

LOS ANGELES, et al., ) NOTICE OF

) ENTRY AS

Defendants. ) REQUIRED BY

) FPCP, RULE

COLUMBUS SANDERS, ) T7(d).

)

Plaintiff, ) CV 92-2352

) KN (Ex)

Vv. )

)

LOS ANGELES BOARD OF ) ORDER Re

EDUCATION, et al. ) Motion for

) Summary

Defendants. ) Judgment

The Court, having received and

considered plaintiff Columbus

Sanders' Motion for summary

judgment, and defendants' Los

Angeles Unified School

District/United Teachers-Los

Angeles Cross Motions for summary

3A

judgment, and the papers filed in

support thereof and in ws#pposition

thereto, GRANTS defendant's motion

and DENIES plaintiff's motion.

I. FACTS

Plaintiff Columbus Sanders

(herein-after "Sanders" ) started

working for the Los Angeles Unified

School District (Hereinafter

"LAUSD" ) in 1968. Since that

time, he has been represented by

the United Teachers-Los Angeles

(Hereinafter "UTLA") (Sanders Depo.

©. 1351-134) «

During the 1987-1988 school

year, Sanders taught at the Liggett

4

Elementary School in the San

Fernando Valley. On February 11,

1988 Sanders was temporarily

transferred from Liggett to an

assignment in the District's Region

F office as a result of a

disruptive incident with a parent

(hereinafter “the incident").

(Decl. of Tony Rivas, LAUSD Exh. F,

S. Aes

After the incident, Sanders

con-sulted Gary Campbell, a full-

time member of the UTLA, and Doris

Rangel, the Chapter Chair of the

UTLA at Liggett. On February 22,

1988 Campbell filed a grievance on

behalf of Sanders concerning the

transfer (Sanders Depo. p. 134,

UTLA Exh. B p. 32). On March ll,

1988, the LAUSD returned Sanders to

his former position at Liggett, and

Campbell withdrew the grievance in

a letter to the LAUSD dated March

14, 1988 (Sanders Depo. 136-137,

UTLA Exh. B p. 33).

Following his reassignment in

March, Sanders wrote to District

officials and School Board members

alleging that Ed Krojansky and Tony

Rivas (his principal and regional

Super-intendent, respectively)

were racists (Decl. of Ed Krojansky

and Tony Rivas, LAUSD Exhibits E

6A

and F., During this period

(Spring, 1988 semester), Sanders

waS absent from his classroom at

Liggett for 69 school days because

of illness. (Sanders Exhibit BA,

p.4).

In late Spring 1988, Tony

Rivas requested a review of

Sanders’ assignment at Liggett

school by LAUSD’ s school

operations office. According to

Rivas, the review was

motivated by three factors:

concer about the continued

working relationship between

Sanders and Krojansky, Sanders’

admitted unhappiness with the

la

assignment at Liggett school,

and Sanders’ high rate of

absenteeism in the Spring 1988

semester (Decl. of Tony Rivas, LAUSD Exh.

Pe).

On September 13, 1988, Sanders

was notified by LAUSD adminis-

trative consultant, Edward Sams,

that he was being transferred

fran Liggett to Broadus

Elementary School in Pacoima

(Sanders Depo.p. 139) . Sams

explained that the transfer Broadus

elementary school, which was

closer to Samders’ hare, was

not penal in nature and would

not result. in any reduction in

8a

salary or employee benefits

(Decl. of Ed Sams, LAUSD Exh. C pgs. 7-8).

Subsequently, Sanders spoke to

Campbell and Rangel of the

UTLA about’. the transfer, and on

September 16, 1988, Campbell filed

a grievance on Sanders’ behalf

(Sanders Depo. p. 145; UTIA Exh. B pp.

ao)

In accordance with the

collective bargaining and UTLA, a

Step I grievance conference’ was

held at the District office of

9a

Ed Sams on April 18, 1989.’ (Sanders

. UTLA’s grievance procedure

involves two levels before a

grievance is submitted to

arbitration. Step I involves the

filing of a formal grievance.

Within five days of presentation

of the grievance in writing to the

immediate administrator, a meeting

is held between the grievant and

the immediate administrator to

discuss the grievance. Within

five days, the immediate

supervisor is required to reply to

the grievance. After the grievant

receives the reply, Step I is

concluded.

If the grievance is not

resolved at Step I, the grievant

may within five days after the

conclusion of Step I, present the

grievance to the appropriate

superintendent, division or

designee. After the administrator

responds in writing, the receipt

of the response by the grievant

terminates Step HII. If the

grievance is not resolved at Step

+e UTLA may, but it is not

Ta

10a

Depo. 151). Sanders was represented at

that meeting by UTLA’s Campbell. (Sanders

Depo. 153).

The LAUSD’s response to the Step I

meeting was unfavorable to Sanders. (UTIA

Exh. B, p. 39). Consequently, Campbell

sent LAUSD a letter indicating that

sanders wished to move the grievance to

Step II. (Sanders Depo. 162; UTLA Exh. B,

p. 40). Sanders was not present at the

Step II meeting due to illness, but

Campbell represented him on behalf of

UTLA. (Sanders

Collective Bargaining Agreement;

Sanders Exh. A, p. 1241).

lla

Depo. 169). Sanders’ grievance was again

denied by LAUSD after the Step II meeting.

(Sanders Depo. 170).

In a letter to Sanders dated November

3, 1989, UTLA’s Grievance Review Cammittee

Chair, Jim Weber, explained that after

reviewing the language of the collective

bargaining agreement, UTLA had decided not

to pursue Sanders’ grievance to

arbitration. (Sanders Depo. 174; UTIA Exh.

B, p. 41). The letter also stated that

Sanders could appeal this decision to the

UTLA Grievance Review Cammittee. Sanders

appealed the decision. (Sanders depo.

178).

In denying the appeal for

arbitration, the Grievance Review

12a

Cammittee explained to Sanders that the

plain language of the collective

bargaining agreement specifically

prohibited review of charges of racial

discrimination.* Consequently, on June 21,

1990, Sanders received a letter fran UTIA

re-iterating that the union would not be

pursuing his grievance to arbitration.

(UTLA Exh. B, p. 42).

. Article vV, Sect. 1.1 of the

1986-1988 Collective Bargaining

Agreement between UTLA and LAUSD

provides that: “Also exluded from

this grievance procedure are those

matters so indicated elsewhere in

this agreement. Claimed

violations of Article VII _ (Non-

Discrimination) are handled under

appropriate statutory and/or

judicial procedures (where

available) rather than under this

grievance procedure. (Emphasis

Added}.

13a

After receiving the June 21 letter,

Sanders filed a complaint against the UTIA

with the Federal Equal Employment

Opportunity Cammission (hereinafter EEOC)

on August 6th, 1990. (Sanders Exh. A, p.

1222). After reviewing the case, the EEOC

determined that the facts did not support

a finding that UTIA had discriminated

against Sanders. Specifically, the EEOC

concluded that “(t]he facts did not show

that, but for his race, Charging party

would have been treated differently.”

(UTLA Exh. B, p. 43).

Thereafter, Sanders filed suit

against UTILA and LAUSD in Federal District

Court, alleding violations of Title VII,

42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986, as well

l4a

42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986, as well

as intentional infliction of emotional

distress. Currently, both Sanders and

IAUSD & UTIA have filed motions for

summary judgment.

II. DISCUSSION

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, summary § judgment is

appropriate only if there is “no geniune

issue as to any material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

The Ninth Circuit has elaborated that:

The very object of summary judgment

is to separate real and geniune

issues fran those that are formal

or pretended, so that only the

fommer may subject the

moving party to the burden of

trial citation amitted]. Here we are

l5a

convinoed that the issues of fact

created by [the non-moving party] are

not issues which this Court could

reasonably characterize as geniune;

rather, they are sham issues which

should not subject the [moving party]

to the burden of the trial.

Radobenko v. Automated Equipment

Corp., 520 F. 2d 540, 544 (9th Cir

1975).

In the present case,

defendants LAUSD and UTLA have

presented overwhelming and

uncontroverted evidence to rebut

allegations of racial

discrimination and intentional

infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff Sanders, on the other

hand, has only presented. self-

serving and speculative assertions

to support his accusations; he has

not demonstrated that geniune

issues of material fact remain to

be resolved or that he is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.

ait. 42 U.8.C. SECTS. 1981-SECTS.

1986 ACTIONS

A. LAUSD

Eleventh Amendment

Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-

Sects. 1986 claims against the LAUSD are

barred pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment

of the United States Constitution as

enunciated in Belanger v. Madera Unified

sonol Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (Sth Cir.

lia

1992). Belanger involved an action against

a Califomia public. school. district

alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. Sect.

1983. The Belanger court held that

California school districts are agencies

of the state and are thus protected by

Eleventh Amendment immunity.

Despite its straight-forward

language, the exact boundaries of the

Eleventh Amendment are far fran clear. In

attempting to discern the limits of the

Amendment, the Supreme Court traditionally

looks toward whether the substance of the

relief sought is prospective or retro-

spective in nature. As was explained in

Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985),

18a

“{rjemedies designed to end a

continuing violation of federal law are

necessary to vindicate the federal

interest in assuring the supremacy of that

law. But the compensatory or deterrence

interests are insufficient to overcame the

dictates of the Eleventh Amendment.”

Here, Sanders seeks campensatory and

punitive damages for LAUSD’s alleged

violations of 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects.

1986. Clearly, these claims are barred

pursuant to the dictates of the Eleventh

Amendment .

Sanders also seeks “equitable relief”

and back pay. Regarding the latter, it is

hard to understand how Sanders could have

a claim for backpay when he was merely

til

19a

transferred fram Liggett to Broadus

elementary schools (with full pay and

benefits) instead of fired.

Sanders claim for “equitable relief,”

however, merits more discussion.

Specifically, Sanders alleges that LAUSD

discriminated against him and continues to

do so against other Afro-Americans.?

We note that Sanders is no

longer employed by LAUSD, and he

is not seeking re-instatement.

Indeed, the gravamen of Sanders’

complaint is that LAUSD

discriminated against him in the

past. Accordingly, Sanders cannot

claim that he is seeking

injunctive relief against LAUSD,

thus permitting him to make an

end-run around the Eleventh

Amendment limitation.

We also note that Sanders does

not have proper standing to file a

Claim against LAUSD on behalf of

those Afro-Americans who he

ee

20a

Therefore, he seeks “equitable relief” by

the court to bring an end to what he

perceives as present violations of 42

U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986 by the

LAUSD.

However, in Edelman v. Jordan, 415

U.S. 651, 668 (1974), the Court suggested

that it is appropriate to look to the

Substance rather than to the form of the

relief sought. Here, Sanders’ claims for

back pay and equitable relief appear to

serve merely as a pretext for an otherwise

Straight-forward claim of damages against

LAUSD. Consequently, Sanders’ claims for

“equitable relief” and back pay also are

alleges are still discriminated

against.

2la

properly barred pursuant to the Eleventh

Amendment .

B. UTLA

Sanders alleges that UTLA

violated 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981 by

refusing to process his grievance

to arbitration. Although Sanders’

claim appears timely, it nonetheless

fails on the merits.

Statute of Limitations

Sanders’ 42. U.S.C. Sect. 1981 claim

against UTIA is timely-filed under the

applicable statute of limitations.

Specifically, CA code of Civ. Pro. Sect.

340(3) states that the statute of

limitations applicable to a cause of

action arising under 42 U.S.C. Sects.

22a

1981-Sects. 1986 is one year after the

date of accrual. Del Persio v. Thornsley,

877 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying

Sect. 340(3) to a Sect. 1983 claim).

Here the date of accrual for Sanders’

cause of action against UTLA was 6/6/90

(the day Sanders was notified of UTIA’s

refusal to process his grievance to

arbitration). In order for Sanders’ 42

U.S.C. Sect. 1981 claim to be considered

timely, he must have filed it by 6/6/91.

in fact, Sanders’ claims were filed with

the EEOC on 8/6/90, well-within the

applicable limitations period.

23a

Therefore, Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981

action is considered timely.‘

Tne Merits of Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect.

1981 Action

* Although we do not reach the

issue of the limitations period

due to our dismissal of Sanders’

claims based on the Eleventh

Amendment, we note that Sanders’

42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986

claims against LAUSD would also be

time-barred.

Specifically, the date of

accrual for Sanders’ cause of

action against LAUSD would be

9/13/88 (the day Sanders’ was

notified of his transfer).

Consequently, in order for

Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-

Sects. 1986 claims to be

considered timely, he must Nave

filed them by 9/13/89. in fact,

Sanders’ claims were filed with

the EEOC on 8/6/90, eleven months

after the applicable statute of

limitations.

24a

Sanders alleges that UTLA violated 42

U.S.C. Sect. 1981 by refusing to process

his grievance to arbitration. By making a

42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981 claim against a

union, Sanders in fact alleges a violation

of the union’s duty of fair representation

to its members.” Courts have held that the

> On the Federal tier, “the duty

of fair representation is a

judicially established rule

imposed n labor organizations

because of their Status as

exclusive bargaining repre-

Sentative for all of the employees

in a given bargaining unit.”

Peterson _v. Kennedy, 771 F. 2d

1244, 1253 (9th Cir. 1985). A

union breaches its duty of fair

representation to its members when

its conduct is “arbitrary,

discriminatory, or in bad faith.”.

Vaca vs.Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190

(1976).

In California, the duty of

fair representation is Statutorily

|

— a

—— —_—-

25a

plaintiff must prove three elements in

order to establish a prima facie claim of

discrimination against a union:

(1) that the company committed a

violation of the collective

bargaining agreement with

respect to the plaintiffs;

(2) that to go unrepaired,

thus breaching its own duty of

fair representation; and

(3)that there was same indication

that the Union’ s actions

were motivated by racial animus.

Bugg _v. Int’l Union of Allied Industrial

Workers of America, 674 F.2d 595, 598 n.5

(7th Cir. 1982) (summarizing Hines v.

Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554

(1976); Veca_v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171

imposed on labor unions

representing public sector

employee. Cal. Gov. Code, Sect.

3544.9 (Educational Employment

Relations Act).

ee

26a

(1967); and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).

Bugg Analysis

Applying the three-pronged' test

enunciated in Bugg to the present case, it

is clear that Sanders’ allegations fail to

assert a prima facie claim of

discrimination against UTLA.

First, Sanders offers no evidence

that UTILA committed a violation of the

collective bargaining agreement by

refusing to process his grievance to

arbitration. Instead, he alleges only

broad assertions of racial discrimination

in violation of Article VII of the

27a

UTLA/LAUSD collective bargaining

agreement .°

Second, Sanders cannot prove that

UTLA breached its own duty of fair

representation. No evidence exists

demonstrating that UTIA acted toward

sanders in an “arbitrary, discriminatory,

or...bad faith” manner. Vaca, 386 U.S.

171, 190 (1966). Instead, existing

' A typical example of Sanders’

“proof” of racial discrimination

is contained in his Declaration in

Support of Summary Judgment #18.

Specifically, Sanders refers to

language contained in Mr. Sams

9/26/88 transfer letter (“We also

want to state that this transfer

is in no way a punitive measure”)

to prove that “the idea of being

punitive was in [plaintiff’s]

mind... or could be understood to

be punitive by all persons.

28a

evidence indicates that UTLA went out of

its way to accammodate Sanders’ grievance.’

Finally, Sanders offers no evidence

indicating that UTLA’s failure to process

his grievance to arbitration was motivated

by racial animus. Rather, the apparent

reason why UTIA refused to arbitrate

sanders grievance was based upon explicit

language in the collective bargaining

agreement which prohibited resolution of

claims based on racial discrimination.®

: As explained in the FACTS

section, UTLA acted in full

accordance with the collective

bargaining agreement when

processing Sanders’ grievance.

Specifically, Sanders was granted

Step I & II review meeting, as

well as a chance to appeal the

Step II decision.

lis aaeneaeeiiaiiiiaii ial

29a

A Union’s Duty to Process Grievances

The gravamen of Sanders’ camplaint is

that UTLA refused to pursue his grievance

to arbitration. However, it is well

established that a union is umder no

Obligation to take a all cases to

arbitration. Indeed, the Supreme Court

has stated that “(w]e do not agree that an

individual employee has an absolute right

to have his grievance taken to arbitration

regardless of the provisions of the

applicable bargaining agreement.” Vaca,

386 U.S. 171, 191 (1966). Therefore,

While Sanders may disagree with UTIA’s

decision not to pursue his case to

See: Article V, Sect. 1.1 of

the UTLA/ LAUSD collective

a

.

i

30a

arbitration, UTLA may legitimately refuse

to do so in accordance with the language

of the collective bargaining agreement.

UTLA’s decision not to take Sander’s

grievance to arbitration should stand even

if they erred in reaching the

determination. The court in Peterson v.

Kennedy, 771 F.2d 1244, 1253, 1254 (9th

Cir. 1985) held that “negligent conduct on

the part of a union does not constitute a

breach of the umnion’s duty of fair

representation” and that “{a] union’s

repres-entation of its members ‘need not

be error free’ .” Therefore, absent a

showing that racial animus was linked to

bargaining agreement.

|

3la

UTLA’s refusal to process his grievance,

Sanders’ discrimination claim fails.

Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.

To support his claim that UTIA acted

in a racially discriminatory manner by

refusing to process his grievance, Sanders

relies solely on Goodman v. Lukens Steel

Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1986). The holding of

Goodman, however, is clearly

distinguishable fram the present

Situation.

In Goodman, plaintiff union members

brought suit against their union,

asserting racial discrimination claims

under 42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981. It was

established that the union systematically

refused to assert instances of racial

lea iii

32a

discrimination as grievances, in spite of

language in the oollective bargaining

agreement that would allo ffor§ such

Claims. The Supreme Court held that “a

collective-bargaining agent could

not...follow a policy of refusing to file

Qrievable racial discrimination claims

however strong they might be and however

Sure the agent was that the employer was

discriminating against blacks...on the

ground that the employer looks with

disfavor on and resents such grievances.”

Id., at 668-669. The facts of the present

case make it readily distinguishable fran

Goodman. Specifically, Article V, Sect.

1.1’s express prohibition of pursuing

33a

grievances based on Article VII® differs

dramatically with the collective

bargaining agreement found in Goodman,

which allowed grievances to arbitration,

the claim would have ultimately been

dismissed as outside the jurisdiction of

. Article VII (Non-

Discrimination): Sect. taf

Pursuant to applicable Federal and

State laws, the District and UTLA

agree not to discriminate against

any employee based upon race,

color, creed, national origin,

sex, age, marital Status,

handicap, or political or UTLA

affiliation, and to have - due

regard for employee’s privacy

(including sexual orientation) and

constitutional rights as citizens.

34a

the UTIA.” Consequently, | Sanders’

reliance upon Goodman is illfounded.

IV TITLE VII ACTION (42 U.S.C. SECT. 200E)

A. LAUSD

Sanders argues that conduct by

LAUSD officials Ed Krojansky and

Tony: Rivas, which resulted in his

transfer from Liggett to Broadus

Elementary school, violated the

non-discrimination provisions of

Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e et

seq. The reasoning articulated in

section B.I. (Eleventh Amendment

bars Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-

9 ~—so Gee: Article V, Sect. 1.1 of

the UTLA/ LAUSD collective

bargaining agreement.

a Lt

35a

sects. 1986 actions against LAUSD) is

just as applicable here. Therefore

Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e actions

against LAUSD are barred pursuant to the

Eleventh Amendment.

II. UTLA

Sanders alleges that UTLA

discriminated against him in

violation of 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e

et seq. by refusing to process his

grievance to arbitration. Here

again, while Sanders’ action appears

timely, it nonetheless fails on the

merits.

Statute of Limitations

As a pre-requisite to pursuing a

Title VII action in Federal Court, a

36a

party must file a Title VII charge

with the EEOC within 180 days (300 on

certain occasions) after the

occurrence of the alleged unlawful

employment practice pursuant to 42

U.S.C. Sect. 2000e-5(e). See Mohasco

Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S 807, 100

S.Ct. 2486, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980);

EEOC v. Commercial Office Products

Co., $86 U.S. id?; i88 &.Ct. 1666,

100 L.Ed.2d 96 (1988); Zipes v. Trans

World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385,

Aue SCE. Liki, Th & ee OO OSM

(1982).

In Delaware State College v.

Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498,

66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the Supreme

a a

37a

Court stated that the minitation

period for actions arising under

Title VII begins to run at the

occurrence of the alleged

discrimination. See also Chardon v.

Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981) (per

Curiam opinion).

In his declaration in support of

summary Judgment #13e, Sanders

appropriately argues that the

relevant date of accrual for his 42

U.S.C. Sect. 2000e action was June 6,

1990, the date which the UTLA

informed him that it would not pursue

his grievance to arbitration.

Because 6/6/90 is the date of UTLA’s

alleged discrimination against Sanders, it

38a

properly becomes the date of accrual under

the Ricks~ analysis. Consequently,

Sanders’ filed his EEOC complaint well

within Sect. 2000e-5(e)’s prescribed

limitations period to preserve his Title

VII action.”

" Although we do not reach the

issue of the limitations period as

to LAUSD due to our dismissal of

Sanders’ action based on the

Eleventh Amendment, we note that

Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e et

seq. claim against LAUSD would

also be time barred.

Specifically, Sanders became

aware of the alleged

discriminatory decision to

transfer him on September 13,

1988. Inorder to preserve a Title

VII action in accordance with 42

U.S.C. Sect. 2000e-5(e), Sanders

would had to have filed an EEOC

charge prior to July 15, 1989. In

fact, Sanders filed a complaint

with the EEOC on August 6, 1990,

approximately thirteen months

Vj Da i AT Wesabe, «

, ‘

39a

The Merits of Sanders’ 42 U.S.C. Sect.

2000e et seq. Action

Because Sanders’ 42 J.5.C.

Sect. 2000e claim is timely filed, it

is necessary to consider the merits

to his claim. Specifically, Sanders

alleges that the UTLA discriminated

against him by refusing to process

his grievance to arbitration. In

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), the

Supreme Court held that Title VII

discrimination claims based on

after the applicable limitations

period.

Additionally, Sanders’ EEOC

complaint named only UTLA (not

LAUSD) as defendants.

40a

Opposition to an unlawful employment

practice must be assessed according

to a three-stage procedure.

Specifically, these steps are:

(1)The plaintiff has the burden

of proving a prima facie case

of discrimination based on

Opposition to an uniawful

employment practice.

(2) If plaintiff succeeds in

proving the prima facie case,

the burden shifts to the

defendant to articulate some

legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason for the adverse

employment action.

(3) If the defendant carries its

burden of articulating a proper

reason, the plaintiff has an

Opportunity to prove by

preponderance of the evidence

that the stated reason was not

the defendant’s true reason for

acting, but a pretext for

discrimination.

(1)Prima Facie Case

Ree thine mao arenes CURE: aie erat

4la

Plaintiff establishes a prima

facie case of discrimination based

on opposition to an unlawful

employment action if he shows three

elements:

(1)He has expressed in

statutorily protected

expression;

(2)He has suffered an adverse

employment action; and

(3)There is a causal link

between the protected

expression and the

adverse action.

A Fe op £ Crown Zellerbach

Corp.,/20 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir.

1983) quoting Payne v. McLemore’s

Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654 F.2d

1130, 1136 (5th Cir. 1981).

Here, it is conceded that

Sanders’ grievance about LAUSD’s alleged

42a

Here, it is conceded that

Sanders’ grievance about LAUSD’s alleged

campaign of discrimination against him is

a statutorily protected expression.

Furthemnore, it is conceded that /he

suffered an adverse employment action as a

result of UTILA’s failure to process his

grievance to arbitration. However,

Sanders cannot prove that a causal link

exists between the protected expression

and the adverse action. Specifically,

Sanders has not shown that the reason why

UTIA did not process his grievance to

arbitration was due to UTIA’s desire to

retaliate against Sanders for filing the

grievance against the LAUSD.

Consequently, Sanders’ prima facie claim

43a

of discrimination based on an unlawful

employment practice fails.

(2)Reasonableness of the Opposition

Even if Sanders were able to

establish a _- prima facie case of

discrimination based on unlawful

employment practice, UTIA can meet its

burden of showing a _ legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason why it chose not to

process Sanders’ grievance. Specifically,

UTLA can point to Article V, Sect. 1.1 of

the LWWASD/UTIA' oollective bargaining

agreement, which expressly prohibits

pursuit of grievances based upon racial

discrimination. Consequently, UTILA can

legitimately argue that the sole reason it

chose not to pursue Samder’s grievance to

44a

arbitration was due to the explicit

language in the collective bargaining

agreement.

(3)True Intent Behind Defendant’s Actions

Assuming that Sanders established a

prima facie case, and that UTIA meets its

burden of articulating a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action, Sanders must show by a

preponderance of the evidence that UTIA’s

stated reason for its action was merely a

pretext for discrimination.

Here, Sanders did not allege a single

fact to substantiate his beliefs that

UTLA’s decision not to take his grievance

to arbitration was based on racial animus.

45a

Indeed, all existing evidence proves

otherwise -- UTIA did everything that it

possibly could on Samders’ behalf.”

Therefore, Sanders fails to carry his

burden.

(4)Result

In light of Sanders’ failure to

establish a _ prima facie case of

discrimination based on opposition to an

unlawful employment practice, UTLA’ s

successful effort to articulate a

2 In short, UTLA filed the

grievance on behalf of Sanders

against LAUSD as well as

represented him through the Steps

I & II of the grievance procedure

established by the collective

bargaining agreement.

For a comprehensive summary of

UTLA’s actions on behalf of

Sanders, see the FACTS section.

46a

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for

its adverse action, and Sanders’ inability

to prove that UTILA’s action was merely a

pretext for discrimination, Sanders’ Title

VII/42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e et seq. action

against UTIA fails.

V.__ INTENTIONAL ~INFLICTION CE EMWOTIQAL

DISTRESS

A. LAUSD

Sanders alleges that the

inappopriate conduct of LUASD

officials Ed Krojansky and Tony

Rivas was motivated by racial

animus. Sanders also claims that

this conduct caused him emotional

distress. Here again, the

47a

reasoning discussed in section B.I.

(Eleventh Amendment bars Sanders’

42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986

actions against LAUSD) is applicable.

Therefore, Sanders’ IIED action is

barred pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.

B. UTLA

Sanders claims’ that racial

discrimination motivated UTLA’sS

failure to fully process his

grievance. Sanders further alleges

that this conduct caused him

emotional distress. The general rule

in California is that conduct arising

from a normal part of the employment

relationship (including IIED claims

against an employer) is barred by the

48a

against an employer) is barred by the

exclusivity provisions of the

Workers’ Campensation Act. Livitsanos v.

Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th “44, #267

Cal.Rptr. 808, 828 P.2d 1195 (1992): Cole

V. Fair Qaks Fire Protection Dist., 43

Cal. 3d 148, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d

743 (1987). See also CA Lab. Code, Sects.

3600, 3601.

In livitsanos, plaintiff employee

sued defendant employer alleging

defamation and negligent and intentional

infliction of emotional distress. The

Camplaint arose fram an alleged campaign

of harassment conducted by the employer

resulting in the wrongful termination of

the employee. In assessing plaintiff's

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emotional injury claims, the Court held

that emotional distress claims against an

employer are pre-empted by the exclusivity

provisions of the Workers’ Campensation

Act., notwithstanding the absence of any

campensable physical disability.

Similarly in Cole, plaintiff brought

an action against his employer for IIED.

The camplaint arose fram an alleged

campaign of harassment oonducted by the

employer which included unjustified

institution of disciplinary proceedings

against plaintiff, procuring plaintiff’s

temporary demotion, and attempting to

force plaintiff’s retirement. In

affirming the appellate court, the

California Supreme Court held that an

50a

employee cannot maintain a civil cause of

action for IIED against an employer when

the employee’s claim is based on conduct

normally occurring within the workplace.

Sanders’ kien appears substantially

similar to those IIED claims found to ke

pre-empted in Livitsanos and Cole.

However, Sanders, might assert (although

in this case he has not) that the alleged

discriminatory grievance procedures

utilized by UTIA falls outside the scope

of his nommal employment duties. While

potentially colorable, Sanders’ ITED

r ing the UTIA’s grievance procedures

are problematic for two reasons. First,

Sanders offers no proof of actual

discrimination by the UTIA; he merely

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speculates that racial discrimination

motivated the decision not to proceed to

arbitration with his grievance.

Second, it is reasonable to consider

that Sanders’ filing of a grievance with

UTLA is regarded as common workplace

conduct. eee as such, Sanders IIED

Claim would statutorily be excluded

pursuant to the exclusivity provision of

the Worker’s Campensation Act.%

‘3 Although we do not reach the

issue of IIED due to our dismissal

of Sanders’ action based on the

Eleventh Amendment, we note that

Sanders’ IIED claim against LAUSD,

like his claim against UTLA, would

be barred.

Specifically, Sanders’ IIED

Claim could partially arise from

the alleged racist conduct of his

principal and regional

Superintendent, Ed Krojansky and

52a

E. CONCUUSICN

Despite the voluminous amount of

paper submitted by Sanders in support of

his motion of summary judgrent, he

presents no hard evidence showing that

either UTIA or LAUSD discriminated against

him. Instead, most of Sanders’ pleadings

principal and regional

Superintendent, Ed Krojansky and

Tony Rivas, respectively. Assuming

that a teacher regularly deals

with dis/her principal and is kept

informed of district matters by

his/her regional superintendent,

then Krojansky’s and Rivas’

conduct would be considered

normally occurring in the

workplace. Consequently, the rule

established in Livitsanos and Cole

(i.e. claims of IIED against an

employer arising from conduct

inherent within the workplace are

barred under the exclusivity

provision of the Workers’

Compensation Act) is applicable.

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53a

contain either: (1) documentation of

relevant dates, events, amd encounters

with various administrative agencies; (2)

speculative amd oonclusory allegations

about the discriminatory practices of UTIA

and LAUSD. While Sanders’ category #1

documentations were helpful in obtaining a

picture of what actually happened in the

case, they offered absolutely no hard

proof to substantiate his allegations of

racism.

All of Sander’s actions against LAUSD

(42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-Sects. 1986, 42

U.S.C. Sect. 2000e, amd IIED) are barred

due to the District’s Eleventh Amendment

immunity. However, even if the Court were

to assume that LAUSD does not qualify for

a iii

94a

to assume that LAUSD does not qualify for

Eleventh Amendment Immunity, Sanders’

racial discrimination claims against the

District fail because they are time-

barred, and his IIED claim fails because

workers’ campensation is his exclusive

remedy .

Sanders’ allegations against UTIA (42

U.S.C. Sect. 1981, 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e,

ITED) must also fail. Specifically, the

evidence dramatically shows that UTIA,

instead of refusing to help Sanders based

on his race, bent-over-backward to help

him process his grievance. Indeed, even

Sanders repeatedly praised UTILA’s efforts

on his behalf. (Sanders Depo. 138, 184-

186; UTLA Exh. 3). Were it not for the

§

Ake ile Atk hak ehralton, “

55a

express prohibition of processing

grievances based on discrimination, this

Court has little doubt that UTIA would

have sent Sanders’ case to arbitration (if

for no other reason than to settle the

matter).

Ssander’s IIED claim against UTIA

fails for the same reasons as it does

against LAUSD (i.e. Workers’ Camnpensation

is the exclusive remedy for IIED claims

occurring in the workplace).

Defendants’’ LAUSD and UTIA motions

for summary judgment are therefore

GRANTED.

Related Case

Sanders has filed a related case, CV

92-2352 KN, in which he seeks declaratory

56a

relief to the effect that the UTIA’s

written policy of not pursuing Title VII

claims to arbitration is wunlawful.

Although the question raised my be an

interesting one, it is not clear that

Sanders has standing to raise it.

However, it is unclear whether Sanders

intends to pursue this related case. The

last paper filed by Sanders is dated

August 25, 1992. No papers have been

filed by the named defendants, yet

plaintiff has not moved for entry of

Default. Plaintiff is therefore ordered

to show cause (within fourteen days of the

date of this order) why CV 92-2352 should

not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.

Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 41(b).

57a

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: February 1, 1993

s\David V. Kenyon

DAVID V. KENYON

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

58a

FILED

March 10, 1993

U.S. DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA

BY DEPUTY

ENTERED

CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT

MAR 16, 1993

CENTRAL DISTRICT

OF CALIFORNIA

BY DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

COLUMBUS SANDERS,

Plaintiff, 92-23552

(Ex)

)

)

)

)

) CV

) KN

)

)ORDER Re:

)Dismissal for

)Failure to

LOS ANGELES BOARD )Prosecute.

OF EDUCATION, et al. )

)

THIS

CONSTITUTES

)NOTICE OF

)ENTRY AS

)REQUIRED BY

FRCP, RULE

77 (qd)

Defendants.

The Court, having received and

considered Plaintiff’s Motion to

Show Cause why CV 92-2352 KN (Ex)

should not be dismissed for failure

to prosecute, and the papers filed in

Support thereof, hereby DISMISSES

Plaintiff’s action.

Sanders argues that he has standing

to pursue his action for declaratory

relief’ based upon his continuing

. In CV 92-2352, Sanders seeks

declaratory relief to the effect

that the UTLA’s written policy of

60a

employment with LAUSD.* However, Sanders

does not appear to be interested in

pursuing the instant action.

Specifically, Sanders states “the court

may choose {to} close the case and allow

the Department of Justice to do whatever

it likes concerning the case.” see,

Sanders’ Response to 2/1/93 Order, p. 2.

Given that Sanders presents no compelling

evidence or argument in support of his

Claim for declaratory relief, the Court

that the UTLA’s written policy of

nor pursuing Title VII claims to

arbitration is unlawful.

2

Due to the confusing and

unorganized nature of the papers

previously submitted by Sanders,

the Court erred in stating that he

was no longer employed by LAUSD.

See, 2/1/93 Order, p.7,n.3).

3

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sees no reason why it should ignore

sanders’ instruction. Accordingly, CV No.

92-2352 is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: March 10, 1993

S\ David V. Kenyon

DAVID V. KENYON

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

Pe ey

62a

FILED

Nov 21, 1994

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COLUMBUS SANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 93-55397

. BO. C¥=

0-02703-DVK

VS.

oO ©

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED

SCHOOL DISTRICT; ED

SAMS; TONY RIVAS,

Supervisor; UNITED

TEACHERS LOS ANGELES,

Defendants-Appellees.

COLUMBUS SANDERS, No. 93-55569

Plaintiff-Appellant, O.0. 8. C¥-

92-02352 KN

vs. CENTRAL

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

CALIFORNIA

63a

LOS ANGELES BOARD OF )MEMORANDUM’

EDUCATION, LOS ANGELES)

UNIFIED SCHOOL )

DISTRICT; DR. TONY )

RIVAS; DR. ED SAMS;

UNITED TEACHERS LOS )

ANGELES GRIEVANCE

RESOLUTION COMMITTEE; )

UNITED TEACHERS LOS

ANGELES BOARD OF )

)

DIRECTORS,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the Decision of the

United States District Court for

the Central District of California,

David V. Kenyon, District Judge,

Presiding

Submitted August 4, 1994**

*

This disposition is not

appropriate for publication and

may not be cited to or by the

courts of this circuit except as

provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-

ae

64a

Pasadena, California

Before: D.W. NELSON AND NOONAN,

Circuit Judges, and KING,

District Judge.

In this consolidated appeal,

Columbus Sanders challenges pro se

the district court’s grant of

summary judgment in favor of the Los

Angeles Unified School District

(“LAUSD”), United Teachers Los Angeles

(“UTLA”), and others (No. 93-55397), and

**

The panel unanimously finds

this case suitable for decision

without oral argument. Fed. R.

App. P. 34(a) and Ninth Circuit

Rule 34-4.

ty Honorable Samuel P. King,

Senior United States District

Judge for the District of Hawaii,

sitting by designation.

65a

dismissal of his action against the Los

Angeles Board of Education and others (No.

93-55569) . The actions arise out of

Sanders’ employment with LAUSD as an

elementary school teacher, and involve

alleged violations of Title VII, 42 U.S.C.

Sect. 2000e, and 42 U.S.C. Sects. 1981-

1986, as well as claims of intentional

infliction of emotional distress. We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sect.

/

1291, review de novo the grant of summary

4 a

judgment, Matter of McLinn, 739 F.2d 1395

(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc), review for

abuse of discretion the dismissal for

failure to prosecute, Link v. Wabash R.R.

Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962), and affim.

66a

The district court granted summary

judgment in favor of LAUSD in No. 93-55397

because all of Sanders’ claims against

LAUSD are barred by the Eleventh Amendment

to the United States Constitution.

We recognized in Belanger v. Madera

Unified School Dist., 963 F.2d 248 (9th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1280

(U.S. Feb 22, 1993), that a California

school district is oonsidered a_ state

agency for purposes of the Eleventh

Amendment . Thus, LAUSD cannot be sued

absent a waiver of its immunity. None is

alleged here. The district court thus

properly dismissed all claims against

LAUSD which seek retrospective relief.

67a

Sanders also seeks “equitable

relief”. Apparently he believes that

discrimination by LAUSD is ongoing and

wants the court to bring an end to that

discrimination. The district court called

this claim “merely...a pretext for an

otherwise straight-forward claim of

damages against LAUSD.” (Citing Edelman

Vv. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)).

Finding no error in the district court’s

Characterization of Sanders’ claim for

“equitable relief”, we affirm the court’s

dismissal of all claims against LAUSD in

No. 93-55397.

II.

The district court dismissed Sanders’

42 U.S.C. Sect. 1981 action against UTIA

68a

on the grounds that Sanders failed to make

out a prima facie claim of discrimination

against the Union.

Bugg v. International Union of Allied

Indus. Workers of America, 674 F.2d 595

(7th Cir.), appeal dismissed, cert.

denied, 459 U.S. 805 (1982), set out a

three-pronged test for establishing a

prima facie claim of discrimination

against a union:

(1) that the campany committed a

violation of the collective

bargaining agreement with respect

to the plaintiff; (2) that the

Union permitted that breach to go

unrepaired, thus breaching its own

duty of fair representation; and

(3) that there was same indication

that the Union’s actions were

motivated by racial animus.

69a

Id. at 598 n.5 Under this test, Sanders’

claim against UTIA must fail because he

did not show that UTIA’s refusal to

process his grievance was due to racial

animus. Rather, UTLA refused to process

the nen ‘ because the explicit

language of the collective bargaining

agreement prohibited resolution of claims

based on racial discrimination.

Sanders’ Title VII claim against UTIA

fails for the same reason. A prima facie

case for Title VII discrimination requires

a showing that:

(1) He has engaged in Statutorily

protected expression;

(2) He has suffered an adverse

employment action; and

(3) There is a causal link between

the protected expression and the

adverse action.

10a

E.E.0.C. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 720

F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir, 1983). The

district court found that Sanders’ was

able to make out the first two elements.

Sanders failed on the third element,

however, because “he has not shown that

the reason why UTIA did not process his

grievance to arbitration was due to UTIA’s

desire to retaliate against Sanders for

filing the grievance against the LAUSD.”

We agree that Sanders failed on his proof

as to the third element, not because he

failed to show UTIA had a desire to

retaliate against him, but rather because

Sanders failed to show that similarly

situated non-minority employees would have

7la

received arbitration. In other words,

Sanders’ adverse emplyment action was not

the result of discrimination; it was the

result of adherence by UTIA to the tenmns

of the collective bargaining agreement.

Finally, Sanders claim of

intentionial infliction of motional

distress against UTIA must also fail.

Once again, Sanders offered no proof of

actual discrimination by UTIA. We

therefore affirm the district ocourt’s

dismissal of all claims against UTIA.

Iii.

In No. 93-55569 the district court

ordered Sanders to show cause why the case

should not be dismissed for failure to

prosecute. Sanders responded that “the

72a

prosecute. Sanders responded that “the

court may choose [to] close the case and

allow the Department of Justice to do

whatever it likes concerning the case.”

That is what the court did. We find

no abuse of discretion and therefore

affirm the dismissal for failure to

prosecute.

For the foregoing reasons,’ the

decisions of the district court are

AFFIRVED.

73a

FILED

FEB - 7, 1995

CATHY A. CATTERSON, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

UNITED STATED COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

COLUMBUS SANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v,

LOS ANGELES UNIFIED

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

COUMBUS SANDERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

LOS ANGELES BOARD OF

EDUCATION, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

et ee ee ee ee

No. 93-55397

D.C. No. CV-

90-02703=KN:

No. 93-55569

D.C. No. CV-

92-02352-KN

ORDER

74a

Before: D.W. NELSON and NOONAN, Circuit

Judges, KING, District Judge

The members of the panel that

decided this case voted unanimously

to deny the petition for rehearing

and to reject the suggestion for

rehearing en banc.

The full court has been

advised of the suggestion for

rehearing en banc and no active

judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter en

banc. (Fed.R. App. P. 35.).

Honorable Samuel P. King,

Senior United States District

Judge for the District of Hawaii,

sitting by designation.

75a

The petition for rehearing is

denied and the - suggestion for

rehearing en banc rejected.

76a

UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT EQUAL

EMPLOYMENT

OPPORTUNITY

COMMISSION

3660 WILSHIRE

_ BLVD.,

5TH FLOOR

LOS ANGELES,

CALIFORNIA

90010

1-800-USA-EEOC

(213) 251-7278

TDD# (213) 251-7384

Charge No.: 340901317

COLUMBUS SANDERS Charging Party

Post Office Box 4040

Sunland, CA 91041

United Teachers of Respondent

Los Angeles

2511 West 3rd Street

Los Angeles, CA 90057

DETERMINATION

Under the authority vested in me by

the Commission, I issue the

77a

following determination as to the

merits of the subject charge filed

under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended.

All requirements for coverage have

been met. Charging Party alleged

that he was discriminated against

in violation of Title VII in that

he was denied Union representation

regarding a grievance filed in

September of 1988, because of his

race, Black.

Examination of the evidence

indicates that Charging Party filed

a grievance with Respondent’s Union

against the employer alleging race

discrimination. The Collective

78a

Bargaining Agreement does not contain

procedures for grieving

discrimination of any type covered by

Title VII. Specifically, the CBA

states that “claimed violations of

Article VII (non-Discrimination) are to be

handled under appropirate statutory and/or

judicial procedures (where available)

rather than under this grievance

procedure.”

It is undisputed that Respondent’ s

Union failed to process Charging

Party’s grievance upon determining that

the claims were of race dicrimination.

The facts did not show that, but for his

race, Charging party would have been

treated differently.

79a

Based on this analysis I have determined

that the evidence obtained during the

investigation does not’ establish a

violation ot the statute.

This determination does not conclude the

processing of this’ charge. If the

charging party wishes to have this

determination reviewed, he must submit a

signed letter to the Determinations Review

Program which clearly sets forth the

reasons for requesting the review and

which lists the Charge Number” and

Respondent’s name. Charging Party must

also attach a copy of this Determination

to her letter.

DETERMINATION

80a

Charge No.: 340901317

Page 2 of 2

These documents must be personally

delivered or mailed (postmarked) on or

before Oct 12, 1990 to the Determinations

Review Program, Office of Program

Operations, EEOC, 1801 L Street, N.W.,

Washington, D.C. 20507. It is recommended

that sane proof of mailing, such as 4a

certified mail receipt, be secured.

If the Charging Party submits a request by

the date shown above, the Cammission will

review the determination. Upon campletion

of the review, the Charging Party and

Respondent will te issued a final

determination which will contain the

8la

results of the review and what further

action, if any, the Cammission may take.

The final determination will also give

notice, as appropriate, of the Charging

Party’s right to sue.

If the Charging Party does not request a

review of this deterination by Jan ll,

1991, this determination will became final

the following day, the processing of this

charge will be complete, and the charge

will be dismissed. (This letter will ke

the only notice of dismissal and the only

notice of the Charging Party’s right to

sue by the Canmmission. FOLLOWING

DISMISSAL, THE CHARGING PARTY MAY QULY

PURSUE THIS MATIER FURTHER FILING SUIT

82a

AGAINST THE RESPONDENT(S) NAMED IN TE

CHARGE IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT WITHIN 90

DAYS OF THE EFFECTIVE DATE Cf DISMISSAL.

Therefore, in the event a request for

review is not made, if a suit is not filed

by Jan 11, 1991, the Charging Party’s

right to sue will ft lost. The

Cammission’s regulations governing no

cause determinations are printed in Title

29, Code of Federal Regulations, Section

1601.19.

On Behalf of the

Cammission:

9/28/90 s\Dorothy J. Porter

Date Dorothy J. Porter,

Director

Los Angeles

District Office

Encl:Information Sheet on Filing

Suit in Federal District Court