Petition for Writ of Certiorari — McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry

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Supremé Court, 0.3.

FILED

941 807 MAY | - 1995

No

" “OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

¢

McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE SITUATION,

MARY FISHER, and CHARLES YARBROUGH,

Petitioners,

WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,

Respondent.

¢

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

+

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

3

MICHAEL AXLINE

Counsel of Record for Petitioners

MARIANNE DUGAN

Western Environmental Law

Center

44 West Broadway, Suite 200

Eugene, Oregon 97401

Phone: (503) 485-2471

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Ninth Circuit erred in holding that sec-

tion 113(h) of the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42

U.S.C. section 9613(h), bars suits to enforce the Clean

Water Act and the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act at facilities engaged in remedial actions under

CERCLA.

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, petitioners

state that they are a not-for-profit organization and indi-

viduals and have no parent companies or subsidiaries.

ee wns

ST Ba ts

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ..... wk Ey

OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE Serer eee l

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS __ ore

STATUTE INVOLVED IN THE ME og ty Chet vs go: 2

SIATEMENT OF THE CASE...................__ 2

JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT CAPM onesie. is

cn Ua ae 6

EES RS SS ae ee ree Ss

l. THE NINTH, THIRD, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH

CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS ADDRESSING § 113(h)

OF CERCLA CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST, SEC-

OND, AND TENTH CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS

ADDRESSING § 113(h) OF CERCLA.........___ 9

li. THIS CASE INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE

OF FEDERAL LAW THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN

ADDRESSED, BUT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED,

gi oo tig sg Eee ees 14

A. CERCLA Was Not Intended to Preempt Other

Pollution Control Statutes................__ 16

1. The Ninth Circuit improperly ignored the

express savings provisions of CERCLA.... 18

2. The legislative history of CERCLA indicates

that Congress did not intend § 113(h) to

impliedly repeal the citizen suit provisions of

MR 20

B. EPA Recognizes that RCRA Enforcement Actions at

Sites Engaged in Remedial Action Under CERCLA

Are Not Precluded by § 113(h).........__ 24

iV

TABLE OF CONTENTS -—- Continued

Page

C. The Fact That Complying with RCRA and the

CWA Would Require the Expenditure of

Resources Does Not Make This Case ¢ Challenge

$0 CRP CUD FOR inns cca cienes Geena ew 27

D. The Fact That EPA and California Will Have

Additional Regulatory Authority at the Base If

Respondent Complies With RCRA and the CWA

Does Not Make This Case a Challenge to the

RN NE ove co's oe a hers pene een ceeee 29

CP ASUS ikaw nancies cscs te ce etea sera eurenens 30

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 87 S.

Cas Gee ee O60 a es ki bcd oe ee eee 16, 20

Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 112 S. Ct. 515, 116

Sade Ne LOPES bok doy Soe 6 ie AA a 20

Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution

Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert.

dented, ... US. ..., 113 3. Cth: 1907 11996)

i onse separ geen Sata eek enien: 3 @ 7,-9.2,

American Lung Ass‘n v. Kean, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS

15158, 26 ERC 1865, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,317

(D.N.J., Civ. No. 87-288, Nov. 19, 1987), aff'd, 871

Pi: BAP Bets WOE 5 wicca caenderekedaesy Maes

Barnes v. United States District Court, 800 F.2d 822

OPE Rae SRR a gichg tisk a Relecce al ook cheat eee

Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340,

Se: De AE. Qe CRO oe hes bs Cko eb s eee een Overs 14

Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.

i | ee ee he et ee er Err ee es 4, 7, 9, 12,

Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 673

¥. Ren. BOGS TD. Oh. SI asks s ckikn eee vn cdaws

County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of

Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S. Ct. 683

REM MED 6 Neb Sams Vane ben pee wae bene bie ee nes

Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 110 S. Ct.

er COs hee eee ee eee ore as Can

13

vi

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 101

BE Se Cs on. 0 6004 d0055os wee ee ele tedsentas 28

In re -eieetttected Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2nd Cir.

| ee Pree rere: re ec eye 7, 9, 10, 11

] V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1985) .... 22

King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215, 112 S. Ct.

Ds SEAS vere ere ee ee Per 21

Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102

ie Gk: TR Cs boas 0 cxns'kn ce ndbnnekeesvnakweks 17

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.

Cheney, 763 F. Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1989) .......... 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20

Envti. L. Rep. 20,870 (E.D. Cal. 1990) .............. 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20

Envtl. L. Rep. 20,877, 1990 WL 117920 (E.D. Cal.

i PERRET ESET es Cee Ce ee eek ULE PT OT ET PRE 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47

F.3d 325, 63 USLW 2543, 39 ERC 2089 (9th Cir.

SOE iti < 0b hoon no cae eR ea 1, 6, 7

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.

Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601, 25 ERC 1480, 17

Envtl. L. Rep. 20,344 (E.D. Cal. 1966).............. 1

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.

Weinberger, 707 F. Supp. 1182, 28 ERC 1282, 19

Envti. L.. Rep. 20,124 (E.D. Cal. 1968) .............. 1

enamel

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v.

Top Notch Metal Finishing Co., 1987 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 15163, 26 ERC 2012 (D.N.J., Civ. No.

eee 29

Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir.

PE Std bin bb hbase ike Chie 6 4dNS eos dane 8, 9, 11

Reynolds v. Lujan, Civ. No. 90-902, 1992 WL 39789

ee BO BD Ki cd hele cedsecnesbtadnceiuas +

Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 82 S. Ct. 787 (1962)...... 21

Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,

Pe Ms I SE 6rd 5-5 6 nis snes 0k www ft ee

United States v. Allegan Finishing Co., 696 F. Supp.

eee I SN BUND oo keds cond bie ob dess ous cs 28

United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D.N_J.

PC a0 55 04S nus ERUS KO4 WER Se wie RRR Ob kes cecal 28

United States v. Colorado, 22 ELR 20,008 (D. Colo.

1991), rev'd, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.

Gum, .... US... 1145S. Cu SAP C1998)... 5 2c 4

United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922

SPP Sohniv abcd 6 caGNNA bc4ewse dec eesees passim

United States v. Liviola, 605 F. Supp. 96 (N.D. Ohio

Pe aie b t o nck ki uawchesce en Ges en ak 28

United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961, 107 S. Ct. 457

St rk watches €6u cane oiek oie ioe een oo c: 22

United States v. T & S Brass and Bronze Works, Inc.,

681 F. Supp. 314 (D.S.C. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd

in part on other grounds, 865 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir.

ee EE EPO PL A le A 28

Vill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.

PRON ead nin 60 0.08:440 14 WEN Ob ee BE hee be 22

Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp. 887 (D. Minn.

i eT PerL Seer Ere eee Tere crore Ter mee Tre re 4

Wheaton Indus. v. EPA, 781 F.2d 354 (3d Cir. 1986) .... 22

Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 845 F. Supp. 705 (D.

SU Se i kc eb Rew hee eeces cei e ie rae eves 53, ba

pS ft oe oe Pare re ry Pers pete 6

Be Sc BE Sa cS eae oe bee 6

TO OE Bs Gs os oo kde ee 2

WUE Sie eee 15

SD Was Se Bh es ck enki keke eves ede ad eee 9, 15, 16

WiSE 6 es a 6, 15

CFSE DO 03 ae eee 14

CR RS 8 es Aa ae eee 15

Oe we. a a 8, 15, 16

OF Bo is nion teesoeencan 6, 15, 19

Ga Se Ds 6 Asbo hc de nco duced suweneck 19

TS I. 2 vo vk ccs eee 14

a2 USC. CMD ©. .6. 562s eck Se Oe ee 14

eRe a I os 36s oo 5 odok on oaks wa aw ee passim

~

WUsr 6A... ee 18

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

gtk Fae Df erg creer Terre rrr rrr 8, 15, 16, 18

OE UGA GPP ec cccisseccs bcd ce Aha We eee ET LET 24

Calif. Water Code, Div. 7, Ch. 4, Art. 4 § 13260(c).... 15

REGULATIONS

Ge Fs EE OEE A ope im 9. 4-06 00 bb 4 Kear he Oe 15

RuLes

I INS WON CU eres Vnkscsavedecnsneveaers 2

pera SAUNT Ce Pe a voce avai acvesscdedeseres ii

LEGISLATIVE History

132 Cong. Rec. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986,

IEE OE FH. TRO 6.5 vis sted vevdeue'e: 22, 23

132 Cong. Rec. $14814 (Oct. 3, 1986, comment of

BSE Ei rd 6 eda cu ibn aw ae cithan ee inl we 23

132 Cong. Rec. $14895, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (daily

Se a NG oa p90 a bs hve eds oes ee ews 23, 24

H.R. Rep. No. 253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 266

(1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. &

a I re 21, 23

Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal

Issues: Hearings on H.R. 2817 Before the Sub-

comm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Rela-

tions of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th

Cong., Ist Sess., House of Representatives 57

(1985) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, U:S.

Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dept. of — Land & Natu-

ee I I a eas 21

52 Fed.

54 Fed.

54 Fed.

55 Fed.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

OTHER AUTHORITIES

roe Bg errr: ere errr ee 3

ae ES eee ee err ee Ty 15, 25

et | re err er 25

eS EPP eR UCTS TET ee ree fs

ip ei eal desea eae al nee fotraatod

NR ERR fate ts Caen Pe RED Latte tne” Dye aids

OPINIONS DELIVERED IN THE CASE

The references to the official and unofficial reports of

opinions delivered in this case are as follows:

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,

655 F. Supp. 601, 25 ERC 1480, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,344

(E.D. Cal. 1986).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger,

707 F. Supp. 1182, 28 ERC 1282, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,124

(E.D. Cal. 1988).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 763 F.

Supp. 431 (E.D. Cal. 1989).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20

Envtl. L. Rep. 20,870 (E.D. Cal. 1990).

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Cheney, 20

Envtl. L. Rep. 20,877, 1990 WL 117920 (E.D. Cal. 1990).

All five opinions were appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

Ninth Circuit orders and opinions include:

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Aspin,

unpublished Order, 91-16467/91-16308 (9th Cir., Jul. 8,

1993), remanding.

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Aspin,

unpublished “Findings and Determination Re: Jurisdic-

tion” on remand, Civ. No. S-86-475-WBS (E.D. Calif., Oct.

28, 1993).

All vacated by:

McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d

325, 39 ERC 2089 (9th Cir. 1995).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS

The Ninth Circuit entered judgment in this case on

January 30, 1995. This Court has jurisdiction to review the

1

2

case by writ of certiorari pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

This case is appropriate for review on writ of certiorari

under Supreme Court Rule 10.1(a), because the Ninth

Circuit’s decision conflicts with decisions of the First,

Second, and Tenth Circuits on the same matter. This case

is also appropriate for review on writ of certiorari under

Supreme Court Rule 10.1(c), because the Ninth Circuit’s

decision addresses an important question of federal law

which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court.

STATUTE INVOLVED IN THE CASE

This case turns on the proper interpretation of

§ 113(h) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), which provides:

Timing of review

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction

under Federal law other than under section 1332

of Title 28 (relating to diversity of citizenship

jurisdiction) or under State law which is appli-

cable or relevant and appropriate under section

9621 of this title (relating to cleanup standards)

to review any challenges to removal or remedial

action selected under section 9604 of this title, or

to review any order issued under section 9606(a)

of this title, in any action except one of the

following: [listing five exceptions which are not

relevant in this case].

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Since the 1930’s, McClellan Air Force Base in Sacra-

mento, California, has served as an aircraft depot and

maintenance center for the Department of Defense.

Respondent has disposed of enormous quantities of toxic

and hazardous wastes by burying the wastes in unlined

earthen pits on the Base. Some of the wastes are now

ee ee, eee

3

leaching into the groundwater beneath the Base, and

discharging into surface waters that cross the Base. These

wastes include industrial solvents, caustic cleaners, heavy

metals, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), oils and lubri-

cants, contaminated jet fuel, low-level radioactive wastes,

electroplating chemicals and several volatile organic com-

pounds (VOCs). Petitioners live on the edge of the Base

and their domestic water supplies have been contami-

nated by toxic pollutants from the Base.

Petitioners alleged below that respondent violated

the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the

Clean Water Act (CWA), and California hazardous waste

and water laws by storing and discharging hazardous

waste at the Base without informing the Environmental _

Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Department

of Health Services of such discharges, and without

obtaining permits required by RCRA and the CWA.

Petitioners filed their complaint in 1986. At the time

the complaint was filed the Base was not on the CERCLA

National Priorities List (NPL) and no CERCLA removal or

remedial action had been selected.! Petitioners’ complaint

alleged only that respondent had violated RCRA and the

1 On July 27, 1987, more than a year after this case was

filed, EPA listed the Base on the NPL. 52 Fed. Reg. 27,620, 27,641

(1987). On May 2, 1990, more than four years after this case was

filed, EPA, respondent, and the state signed an Interagency

Agreement (IAG) for cleanup of some of the hazardous waste at

the Base. Under the IAG, respondent is primarily responsible

for the cleanup while EPA and the state “have important advi-

sory and oversight roles.” The document that describes how

cleanup will be accomplished at the Base is the Management

Action Plan (MAP), which was not formally adopted until July,

1993, after this case had already been appealed and submitted

for decision to the Ninth Circuit.

4

CWA, and sought relief only under those two statutes. At

no time have petitioners sought an injunction against

CERCLA remedial action at the Base. The district court for

the rnost part rejected petitioners’ RCRA and CWA claims,

and petitioners appealed to the Ninth Circuit.

On appeal respondent argued for the first time that

§ 113(h) of CERCLA barred the court from hearing peti-

tioners’ claims. Section 113(h) of CERCLA bars challenges

to EPA approved remedial actions prior to completion of

those actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h). Respondent argued

that although petitioners’ complaint did not refer to or

seek to enjoin respondent’s remedial actions, if peti-

tioners prevailed on their CWA and RCRA claims those

claims might “affect” respondent’s remedial actions and

petitioners’ claims therefore constituted a “challenge” to

respondent’s remedial actions within the meaning of

§ 113(h) of CERCLA.?

The case was argued on November 3, 1992. On July 8,

1993, the Ninth Circuit issued an order remanding the

case to the district court with instructions to decide in the

first instance whether § 113(h) precludes review of peti-

tioners’ RCRA and CWA claims.

After oral argument in the Ninth Circuit but before

remand, the Tenth Circuit held, in United States v.

2 Respondent raised this issue for the first time in its

response brief on appeal and at that time relied on four opinions

interpreting § 113(h): Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011,

1018-1024 (3d Cir. 1991); Werlein v. United States, 746 F. Supp.

887, 894 (D. Minn. 1990); United States v. State of Colorado, 22 ELR

20,008 (D. Colo. 1991), rev'd, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994); and Reynolds v. Lujan,

Civ. No. 90-902, 1992 WL 39789 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 1992).

en hth sR Bei es Sa

ok a Ca EK

Fans hes. 4 Bint

5

Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___

U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994), that § 113(h) of CERCLA

does not bar actions to enforce RCRA at facilities with

approved CERCLA remedial plans. The Eighth Circuit

then decided, in Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of

Pollution Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,

2 ge, 2, 3 S. Ce Tar ere, et 113(h) of

CERCLA does bar efforts to enforce environmental laws at

facilities with approved CERCLA remedial plans.

On October 28, 1993, the district court in this case

found that § 113(h) of CERCLA deprived the court of

jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ RCRA and CWA

claims, at least to the extent that those claims applied to

“inactive” waste sites at the Base.? The court found,

however, that § 113(h) did not deprive the court of juris-

diction over RCRA claims involving ongoing hazardous

waste storage and disposal operations at the Base. The

case then returned to the Ninth Circuit.

On January 30, 1995, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the

district court, holding that petitioners’ RCRA, CWA, and

state water quality law claims constitute “challenges” to

respondent’s CERCLA remedial actions. The court con-

cluded that ordering respondent to comply with the

3 On remand, respondent submitted two declarations from

Mario lerardi, Chief, Environmental Restoration Division of the

Environmental Management Directorate, McClellan Air Force

Base. Mr. Ierardi stated that compliance with the notification and

permitting requirements “would waste the time and resources”

of the Air Force. Second declaration of Ierardi at 3, 4, 7. Mr.

lerardi also hypothesized that if respondent complied with the

notification and permitting requirements of RCRA and the CWA,

EPA or the state might decide to deny a permit or halt CERCLA

cleanup operations, or order cleanup actions that conflict with

the CERCLA plan. Second declaration of lerardi at 4, 7, 8.

6

reporting and permitting requirements of RCRA and the

CWA would lead to “[t]he injection of new requirements

for dealing with the inactive sites that are now subject to

the CERCLA cleanup,” and the court was unable “to

fashion any remedy that would not interfere with

McClellan’s CERCLA groundwater extraction system.”

App. at 15, 17 (McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v.

Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 330-31 (9th Cir. 1995)).

JURISDICTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT

The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over

this matter pursuant to the citizens’ suit provisions of

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a), and the CWA, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365; under the federal question statute, 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331, and under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, providing supplemen-

tal jurisdiction over petitioners’ state law claims involv-

ing the “same case or controversy” as the federal claims.

INTRODUCTION

\

There is a disagreement among the various Circuits

of the United States Court of Appeals over whether

§ 113(h) of CERCLA bars enforcement of environmental!

laws at sites engaged in CERCLA remedial actions. This

Court has been asked on three prior occasions to review

this issue; one of these requests came from the Solicitor

General.4

4 See Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution

Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, US. __,

114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994); United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565

(10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994);

Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981

(1990).

7

The Ninth Circuit in the instant case, the Third Cir-

cuit in Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir.

1991), the Seventh Circuit in Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981 (1990), and the Eighth

Circuit in Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollu-

tion Control, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___

U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 1397 (1994), all held that § 113(h) of

CERCLA bars efforts to enforce environmental laws at

facilities with approved CERCLA remedial plans. See

App. at 15-18 (McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation, 47

F.3d at 330-31); Boarhead Corp., 923 F.2d at 1018-1024;

Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d at 1095; Arkansas Peace Center, 999

F.2d at 1217-18.°

In United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994),

however, the Tenth Circuit found that § 113(h) of

CERCLA does not bar the enforcement of RCRA at sites

engaged in remedial actions under CERCLA, and con-

cluded:

While CERCLA citizen suits cannot be brought

prior to the completion of a CERCLA remedial

action . . . RCRA citizen suits to enforce

[RCRA’s] provisions at a site in which a

CERCLA response action is underway can be

brought prior to the completion of the CERCLA

response action.

990 F.2d at 1577 (emphasis added). The First and Second

Circuits also have rejected arguments that § 113(h) of

CERCLA bars litigation that might affect a site engaged

in CERCLA remedial action. See In re Chateaugay Corp.,

5 In holding that petitioners’ claims were barred by

§ 113(h), the Ninth Circuit relied upon Arkansas Peace Center and

Boarhead.

8

944 F.2d 997, 1006 (2nd Cir. 1991) (in the context of a

challenge to a CERCLA-based property lien “CERCLA’s

prohibition of pre-enforcement review is simply inappli-

cable. The Court is not being called upon to ‘review any

challenges to removal or remedial action selected under

section 9604 of this title, or to review any order issued

under section 9606(a) of this title.’ ”); Reardon v. United

States, 947 F.2d 1509, 1513, 1515 (1st Cir. 1991) (hearing

constitutional challenge to EPA’s lien authority under

CERCLA would not impair underlying purposes of

§ 9613(h)).

In addition to the disagreement among the Circuits

over the proper interpretation of § 113(h) of CERCLA,

this case presents an important question of federal law

that has not previously been addressed by this Court. If

the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case is allowed to

stand, sites that are by definition some of the worst

hazardous waste facilities in the country will be immune

to enforcement of environmental laws once they adopt a

CERCLA cleanup plan. It is clear that Congress did not

intend such a result. Rather, Congress expected CERCLA,

RCRA, and other environmental statutes to work in con-

junction.® See 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (“nothing in CERCLA

shall affect or modify existing laws with respect to haz-

ardous substances”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (federal

agencies must comply with the substantive and pro-

cedural requirements of RCRA to the same extent as any

© EPA “has a number of options for harmonizing operation

of RCRA and CERCLA,” in order to avoid “duplicative orders

and overlaps.” App. at 201 (EPA memorandum of Lisa Fried-

man).

tae — i at Pee ee tied ’

9

other person); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (same, with respect to the

CWA).

ARGUMENT

I. THE NINTH, THIRD, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH

CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS ADDRESSING § 113(h) OF

CERCLA CONFLICT WITH THE FIRST, SECOND,

AND TENTH CIRCUITS’ OPINIONS ADDRESS-

ING § 113(h) OF CERCLA

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that § 113(h) of

CERCLA bars enforcement of RCRA and the CWA in this

case, and similar conclusions by the Third Circuit in

Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), the

Seventh Circuit in Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981, and the Eighth Circuit in

Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dept. of Pollution Control,

999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. __, 114

S. Ct. 1397 (1994), conflict with the Tenth Circuit’s conclu-

sion in United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994) that

§ 113(h) does not bar RCRA enforcement actions at

CERCLA remedial sites. The Ninth, Third, Seventh, and

Eighth Circuit opinions also conflict with the First Cir-

cuit’s opinion in Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509

(1st Cir. 1991) and the Second Circuit’s similar opinion in

In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997 (2nd Cir. 1991), both

holding that § 113(h) does not bar challenges to EPA liens

even if the challenges affect CERCLA remedial actions.

In United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir.

1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994), the

Tenth Circuit held that Colorado’s efforts to enforce a

final compliance order issued through the state’s EPA-

delegated RCRA authority against a hazardous waste site

10

involved in a CERCLA cleanup (the Rocky Mountain

Arsenal) was not a “challenge” to the cleanup within the

meaning of § 113(h). 990 F.2d at 1576. Noting that Con-

gress intended CERCLA to work in conjunction with

other environmental statutes, the Tenth Circuit concluded

that “to hold otherwise would require us . . . to find that

CERCLA implicitly repealed RCRA’s enforcement provi-

sions contrary to Congress’ expressed intention.” 990 F.2d

at 1575. Although the lawsuit at issue in Colorado was

presented by a state rather than by citizens, the Tenth

Circuit expressly stated that the government's interpreta-

tion of § 113(h) “is also inconsistent with RCRA’s citizen

suit provision.” 990 F.2d at 1577.7

The First and Second Circuits also rejected arguments

that § 113(h) bars all claims that could in some way affect

a CERCLA cleanup. In In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997

(2nd Cir. 1991), EPA argued that § 113(h) barred plain-

tiffs’ claim because if plaintiffs prevailed EPA “would be

forced to litigate in the bankruptcy proceedings to liqui-

date and fix any claims it might conceivably have against

[plaintiffs] for post-confirmation response costs” and

even trying to estimate the claims would “embroil the

parties and the bankruptcy court in disputes over the

” The court noted some citizen suits are explicitly barred by

§ 113(h) - CERCLA citizen suits and RCRA “imminent hazard”

Suits — but that the type of RCRA suit brought by petitioners in

the instant case are not barred by section 113(h). United States v.

Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577-78. The Ninth Circuit in the instant

case inexplicably failed even to mention United States v. Colo-

rado, despite the fact that the Colorado opinion directly supports

petitioners’ argument, was extensively briefed to the Ninth Cir-

cuit, in this case, and directly contradicts the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion.

11

wisdom and scope of possible remedies.” 944 F.2d at

1006.

The Second Circuit rejected this argument and held

that “CERCLA’s prohibition of pre-enforcement review is

simply inapplicable. The Court is not being called upon

to ‘review any challenges to removal or remedial action

selected under section 9604 of this title, or to review any

order issued under section 9606(a) of this title.’ ” Id.

In Reardon v. United States, 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir.

1991), the First Circuit rejected a similar argument. In

Reardon, landowners brought an action challenging a lien

filed against their property by the EPA pursuant to

CERCLA. Although the First Circuit held that some of the

claims were barred by § 113(h), it held that the plaintiffs’

constitutional due process claim was not barred. The

court held that § 113(h) civests federal courts of jurisdic-

tion only “over challenges to EPA’s administration of the

statute — claims that EPA did not ‘select[ ]’ the proper

‘removal or remedial action.’” 947 F.2d at 1514. The

plaintiffs’ due process claim was not barred by § 113(h)

because it did not challenge the way in which EPA

administers the statute and did not “concern the merits of

any particular removal or remedial action,” but rather

was a constitutional challenge to CERCLA itself. Id.*

8 See also Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 673 F.

Supp. 1043 (D. Kan. 1987) (suit challenging EPA’s CERCLA

procedures was not barred by § 113(h)); Yslava v. Hughes Aircraft

Co., 845 F. Supp. 705 (D. Ariz. 1993) (suit to recover medical

monitoring costs not barred by § 113(h)).

As the Yslava court recognized:

Even assuming medical monitoring programs

qualify as removal or remedial action, the jurisdic-

tional bar of § 9613(h) still does not preclude this

12

Despite these opinions from the First, Second, and

Tenth Circuits, the Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits,

like the Ninth Circuit, have adopted a broad interpreta-

tion of § 113(h) of CERCLA that precludes enforcement of

non-CERCLA laws at CERCLA remedial action sites. In

Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1991), the

owner of a CERCLA site sued under the National Historic

Preservation Act to halt the destruction of archaeological

artifacts through soil cleanup at his property. The Third

Circuit held that § 113(h) barred the claim, and that

Congress had balanced the importance of cleaning up

hazardous waste against the need to preserve archae-

ological artifacts and had tipped the balance in favor of

cleanup. 923 F.2d at 1013, 1018-19.

In Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.

denied, 498 U.S. 981, citizens sued EPA under the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) because EPA failed to

prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a

CERCLA cleanup. The Seventh Circuit held that the suit

was barred by § 113(h). 900 F.2d at 1095.

In Arkansas Peace Center, citizens attempted to enforce

RCRA provisions at a CERCLA site. Although the district

Court’s jurisdiction. . . . Plaintiffs’ state law medical

monitoring claims in no way challenge a response

action.

845 F. Supp. at 709. The Yslava court thus held that suits seeking

remedies unrelated to issues of liability for cleanup costs are not

challenges to ‘removal or remedial action’ and thus § 9613(h)

does not apply. The underlying structure and purpose of

CERCLA supports this conclusion. Given the purposes of

CERCLA, § 9613(h) only properly precludes jurisdiction in

actions where a potentially responsible party seeks to litigate

either the existence or extent of liability for response costs.

845 F. Supp. at 711.

13

court enjoined incineration of dioxin-laden wastes on the

site because it clearly violated EPA’s regulations, the

Eighth Circuit held that § 113(h) barred the suit and

overturned the injunction. 999 F.2d at 1215. The Eighth

Circuit attempted to distinguish United States v. Colorado

by asserting that “[t]he Tenth Circuit {in Colorado] limited

its holding to an action brought by a state.” Arkansas

Peace Center, 999 F.2d at 1218. But the Tenth Circuit in

Colorado made no distinction between state enforcement

and private enforcement. In fact, the Colorado court speci-

fically held: |

While CERCLA citizen suits cannot be brought

prior to the completion of a CERCLA remedial

action . . . RCRA citizen suits to enforce

[RCRA’s] provisions at a site in which a

CERCLA response action is underway can be

brought prior to the completion of the CERCLA

response action.

United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1577 (emphasis

added). The Eighth Circuit’s opinion also ignores the

Tenth Circuit’s explicit finding that “Congress clearly

intended that a CERCLA response action would not pro-

hibit a RCRA citizen enforcement suit. . . . Congress did

not intend a CERCLA response action to bar a RCRA

enforcement action or an equivalent action by a state.”

United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578 (emphasis

added).?

9 This case is, of course, a RCRA enforcement action and

thus falls squarely within the Colorado holding. The Tenth Cir-

cuit noted that “RCRA itself expressly prohibits imminent haz-

ard suits by citizens where the EPA is engaged in CERCLA

removal actions, . . . while not expressly so prohibiting citizen

enforcement suits.” United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578

(emphasis added).

14

When a party claims that a particular statute pre-

cludes judicial review, courts look to not only the stat-

ute’s express language, but also “the structure of the

statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and

the nature of the administrative action involved.” Block v.

Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104 S. Ct.

2450, 2453-54 (1984). The reasoning of the First, Second,

and Tenth Circuits properly interpret the scope of

§ 113(h) in light of the “structure of the statutory scheme,

its objectives, [and] its legislative history.” The opinions

of the Ninth, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits do not

attempt to reconcile their results with the structure and

objectives of CERCLA. Petitioners respectfully request

that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to resolve a

disagreement among the Circuits and to decide whether

the Ninth, Third, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits’ inter-

pretation of § 113(h) is correct, or whether the First,

Second, and Tenth Circuits’ interpretation of § 113(h) is

correct.

Il. THIS CASE INVOLVES AN IMPORTANT ISSUE

OF FEDERAL LAW THAT HAS NOT YET BEEN

ADDRESSED, BUT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED, BY

THIS COURT

CERCLA was adopted to address the worst hazard-

ous waste sites in the United States. See 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9605(a) (establishing “national contingency plan for

the removal of . . . hazardous substances”); 9604(a)(1)

(providing for hazardous waste removal and remedial

action consistent with the national contingency plan).

RCRA and the CWA also apply to activities at these sites.

See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (RCRA requires EPA to establish

15

performance standards applicable to owners and opera-

tors of hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal

sites); 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (prohibiting “the discharge of

any pollutant by any person” unless such discharge is

specifically permitted by a NPDES permit).’° RCRA, the

CWA, and California hazardous waste and water quality

laws all require notification and permitting when hazard-

ous substances are released into the environment. See,

e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6930(a); 40 C.F.R. § 270.13(h); Calif. Water

Code, Div. 7, Ch. 4, Art. 4 § 13260(c). Federal facilities are

subject to all requirements respecting the control and

abatement of hazardous waste or water pollution. 42

U.S.C. § 6961 (RCRA); 33 U.S.C. § 1323 (CWA).

The interrelationship between CERCLA, RCRA, the

CWA, and other environmental statutes has caused con-

siderable confusion in the lower courts, particularly with

respect to the effect of § 113(h) of CERCLA on the appli-

cation of RCRA and the CWA at hazardous waste sites

engaged in remedial actions. The Ninth Circuit’s opinion

in this case, for example, ignores the statutory citizen suit

language in RCRA and the CWA authorizing citizens

such as petitioners to prosecute cases such as this. 42

U.S.C. § 6972(a) (citizens’ suit provisions of RCRA); 33

U.S.C. § 1365 (citizens’ suit provisions of CWA). The

Ninth Circuit’s opinion also ignores the specific savings

provision in CERCLA stating that Congress did not

intend to repeal other laws regulating toxic waste. See 42

U.S.C. § 9652(d) (“nothing in CERCLA shall affect or

10 EPA has noted that “the great majority of Federal facility

sites that could be placed on the NPL have RCRA-regulated

hazardous waste management units within the Federal facility

property boundaries.” 54 Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,521 (1989).

16

modify existing laws with respect to hazardous sub-

stances.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (federal agencies must

comply with the substantive and procedural require-

ments of RCRA to the same extent as any other person);

33 U.S.C. § 1323 (same, with respect to CWA).

The only Circuit to address the relationship between

§ 302(d) of CERCLA (the savings clause), § 113(h) of

CERCLA, and the statutory authorization of citizen suits

in RCRA, concluded that Congress did not intend to

impliedly repeal the citizen suit provision of RCRA when

it adopted § 113(h) of CERCLA. See United States v. Colo-

rado, supra, 990 F.2d at 1575. The Ninth Circuit in this

case, and other Circuits that have addressed § 113(h),

simply failed to analyze the relationship between § 113(h)

of CERCLA, § 302(d) of CERCLA, and the citizen suit

provisions of other laws, such as RCRA and the CWA.

A. CERCLA Was Not Intended to Preempt Other

Pollution Control Statutes

Congress explicitly provided that CERCLA was not

intended to preempt other environmental laws. See

CERCLA § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d) (“nothing in

CERCLA shall affect or modify existing laws with respect

to hazardous substances”). The practical result of the

Ninth Circuit’s opinion, however, is to “affect or modify”

the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and the CWA by

making those provisions inapplicable at CERCLA sites

engaged in remedial action.

As this Court stated in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,

387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S. Ct. 1507, 1511 (1967), even in the

absence of a savings clause there is a presumption that

Congress does not intend to prohibit judicial review

“unless there is nersuasive reason to believe that such

17

was the purpose of Congress.” And as the Court has also

stated:

Whether and to what extent a particular statute

precludes judicial review is determined not only

from its express language, but also from the

structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives,

its legislative history, and the nature of the

administrative action involved.

Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345, 104

S. Ct. 2450, 2453-54 (1984)."

The plain language and legislative history of

CERCLA demonstrate that, far from intending that

§ 113(h) impliedly repeal the citizen enforcement provi-

sions of RCRA and the CWA, Congress intended to pre-

serve the citizen suit provisions of RCRA and the CWA.

Section 113(h) was intended only to limit challenges by

potentially responsible parties seeking to reduce their

financial liability by interfering with ongoing cleanup

efforts through litigation. The Ninth Circuits’ opinion

expanding § 113(h) beyond this limited purpose runs

11 Courts must give effect if possible to apparently compet-

ing statutes, “absent clearly expressed congressional intent[] to

the contrary.” County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of

Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 112 S. Ct. 683, 692 (1992)

(“Courts are not at liberty to pick and choose among congres-

sional enactments, and when two statutes are capable of co-

existence, it is [our] duty . . . absent clearly expressed congres-

sional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.”).

Even when a later enacted statute is not entirely harmonious

with an earlier one, courts are reluctant to find repeal by impli-

cation unless the text or legislative history of the later statute

shows that Congress intended to repeal the earlier statute and

simply failed to do so expressly. Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp.,

456 U.S. 461, 470, 102 S. Ct. 1883, 1892 (1982) (“an implied repeal

must ordinarily be evident from the language or operation of

the statute”).

18

afoul of the rule against implied repeal of statutory provi-

sion for judicial review.

1. The Ninth Circuit Improperly Ignored The

Express Savings Provisions of CERCLA

Congress explicitly preserved the application of other

statutes in § 302(d) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d).

Section 302(d) states:

Nothing in this chapter shall affect or modify in

any way the obligations or liabilities of any

person under other Federal or State law, includ-

ing common law, with respect to releases of

hazardous substances or other pollutants or

contaminants.

42 U.S.C. § 9652(d). Both RCRA and the CWA were in

existence when CERCLA was adopted, and plainly qual-

ify as federal law “with respect to releases of hazardous

substances or other pollutants or contaminants.”

Congress added an additional savings clause to

CERCLA to ensure that federal facilities such as the

respondent in this case do not evade RCRA respon-

sibilities. This clause states:

Nothing in this section shall affect or impair the

obligation of any department, agency, or instru-

mentality of the United States to comply with

any requirement of the Solid Waste Disposal Act

[RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.] (including cor-

rective action requirements).

42 U.S.C. § 9620(i).

The Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that CERCLA § 113(h)

precludes the enforcement of RCRA and the CWA due to

ongoing CERCLA removal and remedial activities would

eviscerate the explicit statements in §§ 302(d) and 120(i)

of CERCLA that RCRA, the CWA and other pollution

19

laws continue to apply at CERCLA sites, and particularly

~ at federal facility CERCLA sites.

That Congress did not intend to preclude citizen

enforcement actions at CERCLA sites engaged in reme-

dial actions is also demonstrated by the fact that Con-

gress did consider and explicitly limited RCRA’s reach at

CERCLA sites under circumstances not present in this

case. RCRA provides two separate citizen causes of

action. The first, “citizen enforcement suits,” allow any

person to sue any other person, “alleged to be in viola-

tion of any permit, standard, regulation, condition,

requirement, prohibition, or order” pursuant to RCRA. 42

U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A). The second, “imminent and sub-

stantial endangerment” suits, allow any person to sue

any other person to abate an “imminent and substantial

endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 6972(a)(1)(B).

Petitioners’ action is a citizen enforcement suit under

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A), and not an “imminent and

substantial endangerment suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 6972(a)(1)(B). Because Congress was concerned that

imminent and substantial endangerment suits would

involve courts in remedial actions under CERCLA, it

expressly provided in RCRA that imminent and substan-

tial endangerment actions are precluded at sites where

remedial or removal actions under CERCLA §§ 104 or 106

are proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B). If Congress had

intended to preclude RCRA citizen enforcement suits (as

opposed to imminent and substantial endangerment

suits) during a CERCLA remedial action, it would have

specifically said so in RCRA’s citizen enforcement provi-

sion. Instead, Congress carefully limited its preclusion to

the imminent endangerment section and left the citizen

20

enforcement provisions of RCRA available for enforce-

ment actions at sites engaged in CERCLA remediation.

See United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1578 (holding that

substantial endangerment suits are barred during

CERCLA cleanup, while enforcement suits such as the

instant suit are not).

If Congress had intended to preclude RCRA or CWA

citizen enforcement suits during a CERCLA remedial

action, the logical place to do so would have been the

citizen enforcement provisions of the RCRA and CWA.

Since the enactment of CERCLA in 1980, Congress has

had the opportunity to amend RCRA, the CWA, and

CERCLA and has chosen not to repeal the statutory pro-

visions for citizen enforcement of RCRA and the CWA.

2. The legislative history of CERCLA indi-

cates that Congress did not intend § 113(h)

to impliedly repeal the citizen suit provi-

sions of RCRA and the CWA

The Ninth Circuit refused to address the legislative

history of § 113(h), stating:

Because the statutory language is so clear, MESS

must Overcome a strong presumption that the

plain language of the statute expresses Con-

gress’ intent. See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129,

135-37, 112 S. Ct. 515, 520, 116 L.Ed.2d 496

(1991). For MESS’s purposes, the legislative his-

tory of Section 113(h) is, at best, unclear.

App. at 11 n.4 (47 F.3d at 329 n.4). But determining what

constitutes a “challenge” for purposes of § 113(h) requires

the court to look at the legislative history, particularly in

light of this Court’s admonition in Abbott Laboratories that

“only upon a showing of ‘clear and convincing evidence’

of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict

Neti see

ee ee Ee ie ee Ee

™ ee Tes ee

21

access to judicial review.” 387 U.S. at 141, 87 S. Ct. at 1511

(citing Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379-380, 82 S. Ct. 787,

794 (1962)).}2

Congress intended CERCLA’s first priority to be the

swift cleanup of hazardous waste sites. Determining

financial responsibility for cleanup was deliberately

given a lower priority than actually accomplishing the

cleanup. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d 1011, 1019

(3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress concluded that disputes about

who is responsible for a hazardous site... or . . . for its

costs should be dealt with after the site has been cleaned

up”).

Congress’ purpose in enacting § 113(h) was “to pre-

vent private responsible parties from filing dilatory,

interim lawsuits which have the effect of slowing down

or preventing the EPA’s cleanup activities.” H.R. Rep. No.

253(I), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2835, 2941 (section-by-

section analysis in Energy and Commerce Committee

Report). In fact, the proponents of § 113(h) of CERCLA

explicitly stated that § 113(h) was intended to codify the

case law which had interpreted CERCLA to bar pre-

enforcement review of claims by responsible parties. See

Superfund Reauthorization: Judicial and Legal Issues:

Hearings on H.R. 2817 Before the Subcomm. on Admin.

12 Even in cases that do not involve the potential preclusion

of judicial review, when courts engage in any statutory con-

struction they must look not only to the language of the statute

but also to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object

and policy. Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158, 110 S. Ct.

997, 1001 (1990); see also King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215,

112 S. Ct. 570. 574 (1991) (statute must be read as a whole

because “meaning, plain or not, depends on context”).

22

Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on

the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., House of Representa-

tives 57 (1985) (statement of F. Henry Habicht II, U.S.

Ass’t Att’y Gen., Dept. of Justice, Land & Natural

Resources Div.) (giving section-by-section explanation of

amendments and stating: “Our proposed amendment to

CERCLA [§ 113(h)] would simply codify these holdings

and ensure that court challenges would not delay

cleanups.”) See, Wagner Seed Co. v. Daggett, 800 F.2d 310,

315 (2d Cir. 1986) (CERCLA responsible party may not

bring pre-enforcement challenge); Wheaton Indus. v. EPA,

781 F.2d 354, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (same); United States v.

Outboard Marine Corp., 789 F.2d 497, 505-06 (7th Cir.), cert.

denied, 479 U.S. 961, 107 S. Ct. 457 (1986) (same); Barnes v.

United States District Court, 800 F.2d 822, 822 (9th Cir.

1986) (same); J.V. Peters & Co. v. EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 264-65

(6th Cir. 1985) (same).

There is absolutely no indication in the legislative

history of CERCLA that Congress intended § 113(h) to

preclude enforcement actions specifically authorized by

RCRA and the CWA. Congress did clearly state, however,

that it intended courts to distinguish “between

. . . lawsuits by potentially responsible parties involving

only monetary damages and legitimate citizens’ suits

complaining of irreparable injury that can be addressed

only if a claim is heard during or prior to response

action.” 132 Cong. Rec. S14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)

(comment of Sen. Stafford). See also 132 Cong. Rec. H9600

(daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (comment of Rep. Roe) (same).}3

13 The district court relied primarily upon a statement

made by Senator Thurmond during floor debate. App. at 183-85

(McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Aspin,

23

The fact that Congress envisioned citizen suits being filed

under CERCLA itself strongly suggests that Congress did

unpublished “Findings and Determination Re: Jurisdiction” on

remand, Civ. No. S-86-475-WBS (E.D. Calif., Oct. 28, 1993), at

15-16 (§ 113(h) “covers all issues that could be construed as a

challenge to the response”)). That statement, however, is much

broader in its reach than the plain wording of the statute and

than any of the statements made in Committee reports or by

other members of Congress.

The views expressed by Senators Stafford and Roe, that

§ 113(h) is aimed at lawsuits brought by potentially responsible

parties in order to delay CERCLA cleanup, were echoed repeat-

edly throughout the legislative history of the CERCLA amend-

ments. See 132 Cong. Rec. H9600 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986,

comment of Rep. Roe); 132 Cong. Rec. $14814, 14814 (Oct. 3,

1986, comment of Sen. Mitchell) (“The conferees agreed that

some preimplementation review would be provided so that

citizens would not be disadvantaged by having to wait until

cleanup was complete.”); H.R. Rep. No. 253(I), 99th Cong., 2d

Sess. 266 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.

News 2835, 2941; 132 Cong. Rec. $14898 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)

(citizens must be allowed to sue “before such plans are imple-

mented because otherwise the agency could proceed in blatant

violation of the law and waste millions of dollars of Superfund

money before a court had considered the illegality.”) (comment

of Sen. Stafford).

Senator Stafford, who chaired the Committee on Environ-

ment and Public Works during its extensive hearings on the

Superfund amendments, also coordinated the conference com-

mittee process and gave the section-by-section analysis in the

Conference Report to accompany H.R. 2005. 132 Cong. Rec.

S$14895, S14895, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). In Senator Chafee’s

words:

Our chairman [Sen. Stafford] worked long and

hard for this legislation. Despite innumerable obsta-

cles, he never gave up hope or slackened in his tire-

less efforts to achieve the goal of a new, improved

Superfund. For months and months, the conference

meetings went on and on. At each and every meeting

24

not intend CERCLA to preclude suits under other inde-

pendent statutes. See 42 U.S.C. § 9659.

Because potentially responsible parties can be made

financially whole by litigating after the completion of the

cleanup, Congress intended § 113 primarily to bar suits

by such parties seeking to interfere with cleanup activ-

ities in order to avoid or reduce future liability. Congress

did not, however, intend to bar enforcement actions

against ongoing violations of RCRA or the CWA until

after CERCLA cleanup is completed, which in this case

will not occur until some time in the 21st century, if ever.

In United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1575 (10th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994),

the Tenth Circuit found that Congress intended CERCLA

to work together with other statutes and that CERCLA

§ 113(h) does not impliedly repeal RCRA enforcement

provisions. This Court should grant a writ of certiorari to

reverse the Ninth Circuit’s opposite conclusion.

B. EPA Recognizes that RCRA Enforcement

Actions at Sites Engaged in Remedial Action

under CERCLA Are Not Precluded by § 113(h)

EPA has given considerable attention to the possi-

bility of overlap between RCRA and CERCLA and has

stated that such overlap was intended by Congress and

will not interfere with CERCLA response actions.

EPA recognizes that when it takes action under

CERCLA to address a facility that is also subject

- small private sessions or large public meetings — he

was there.

132 Cong. Rec. $14895, S14924, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).

Senator Stanford’s statements with request to § 113(h) plainly

should be given significant weight.

ee a a ee a ee ee ee

25

to RCRA authorities, there is some risk of over-

lap. . . . However, this potential overlap . . . is

the result of Congressional design, not site list-

ings. . . . The questions of which authority

should control, and of how to avoid potential

duplication or inconsistency, are . . . to be

resolved in light of the facts of the case and after

consultation between EPA and the concerned

State.

54 Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,522-23 (1989). See also 54 Fed. Reg.

41,000, 41,007 (1989) ("RCRA authorities may be used by

themselves or in conjunction with CERCLA removal and

enforcement authorities”); 55 Fed. Reg. 8,696 (1990) (EPA

“nas the discretion to use its authorities under CERCLA,

RCRA, or both to accomplish appropriate cleanup action

at a site, even where the site is listed on the NPL”).

Obviously, EPA does not view RCRA enforcement

actions as inherently incompatible with CERCLA cleanup

actions. To minimize any overlap between RCRA and

CERCLA, EPA has identified “a number of options for

harmonizing operation of the two authorities and avoid-

ing duplicative orders and overlaps.” App. at 201 (Fried-

man memo). EPA notes that “[s]uch conflict situations are

not a problem where EPA is responsible for carrying out

the requirements of both RCRA and CERCLA (since any

jurisdictional overlaps can be managed within EPA).” 54

Fed. Reg. 10,520, 10,522 (1989).

There will be no conflict between EPA issued RCRA

and CWA permits and ongoing cleanup activities at the

Base because “EPA is responsible for carrying out the

requirements of both RCRA and CERCLA [and]... any

jurisdictional overlaps can be managed within EPA[].” Id.

26

When the Department of Energy asked EPA: “Does

CERCLA section 121(e)(1) relieve DOE from the require-

ment to apply for [RCRA] post-closure permits at NPL

sites?” EPA answered: “No; CERCLA does not relieve

DOE from the requirement to obtain [RCRA] post-closure

permits for pre-existing, RCRA-regulated units at NPL

sites.” (App. at 199 (Friedman memo)), EPA noted that

§ 113(h) does not bar the enforcement of “RCRA orders or

permits that do not conflict with the CERCLA-selected

remedy.” App. at 200 (Friedman memo). “[I]t is clear,”

EPA concluded, “that the simple issuance of an FFA

[Interagency Agreement] . . . does not, without more, act

to preempt the effect of permits required under

RCRA .. . for non-CERCLA activities.” App. at 205

(Friedman memo).

The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in this case ignored the

extensive consideration given by EPA to the relationship

between RCRA permit requirements and CERCLA

cleanup activities. In particular, the Ninth Circuit took it

upon itself to determine that RCRA permitting require-

ments would detract from cleanup efforts at the Base,

despite the fact that such a determination is plainly the

province of EPA, not the courts. Under the Ninth Circuit’s

interpretation of § 113(h), every time a CERCLA removal

and remedial action begins at a new site, that site

becomes immunized from the permitting and enforce-

ment provisions of pollution prevention statutes such as

RCRA and the CWA. As even the Ninth Circuit acknowl-

edged, such immunization could last for decades, or

sometimes forever. See App. at 13 (47 F.3d at 329)

(because cleanup at the Base will last at least several

decades, “[w]e recognize that the application of Section

113(h) may in some cases delay judicial review for years,

27

if not permanently.”). This result is plainly inconsistent

with EPA’s views of the proper interaction of CERCLA

and RCRA.

C. The Fact That Complying with RCRA and the

CWA Would Require the Expenditure of

Resources Does Not Make This Case a Chal-

lenge to the Cleanup Plan

The Ninth Circuit apparently accepted respondent's

argument that the “additional study, documentation and

substantiation” that would be required to comply with

the notification and permitting requirements of RCRA

and the CWA “could delay the ongoing cleanup activities

while resources were redirected toward the application

effort.” See App. at 187 n.7 (Unpublished “Findings and

Determination Re: Jurisdiction,” Civ. No. S-86-475-WBS

(E.D. Calif., Oct. 28, 1993), at 19 n.7). The district court

found that such costs made this case a “challenge” to the

cleanup plan, and the Ninth Circuit, while not explicitly

basing its holding on the costs of compliance, stated:

The injection of new requirements for dealing

with the inactive sites that are now subject to

the CERCLA cleanup (or McClellan’s defense

against imposition of such requirements) would

clearly interfere with the cleanup.

It is true, as MESS argues, that every action

that increases the cost of a cleanup or diverts

resources or personnel from it does not thereby

become a “challenge” to the cleanup. The

enforcement of minimum wage requirements,

for example, might increase the cost of a

cleanup and even divert personnel from cleanup

duties without becoming a challenge to the

cleanup. MESS’s lawsuit, however, is far more

directly related to the goals of the cleanup itself

28

than is the hypothetical minimum wage action.

MESS, for all practical purposes, seeks to

improve on the CERCLA cleanup as embodied

in the Interagency Agreement. Its action quali-

fies as a “challenge” to the cleanup.

App. at 15 (47 F.3d at 330). The court’s acceptance of this

argument is puzzling. There is no principled way to draw

a line between spending resources to comply with envi-

ronmental laws and spending resources to do anything

else. Allowing a CERCLA site to argue that it cannot

comply with non-CERCLA environmental laws because

to do so would divert resources from a CERCLA cleanup

effort would exempt every CERCLA site from all non-

CERCLA laws.

The fact that compliance with RCRA may require

expending additional! resources is no defense to the law.

EPA’s Office of General Counsel (OGC) properly rejected

the “cost” argument when it was raised by the Depart-

ment of Energy. See App. at 199-200 (Friedman memo).

Hazardous waste operators are strictly liable for RCRA

violations. See United States v. Allegan Finishing Co., 696 F.

Supp. 275, 287 (W.D. Mich. 1988); United States v. Liviola,

605 F. Supp. 96, 100 (N.D. Ohio 1985). This is because

“[e]conomic loss to polluters is far outweighed by the

benefit to the community from enjoining of [polluting]

activities.” United States v. Ciampitti, 583 F. Supp. 483, 499

(D.N.J. 1984). See also EPA v. Nat'l Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449

U.S. 64, 101 S. Ct. 295, 304 (1980) (Clean Water Act

imposes “additional costs which must be borne or the

point source eliminated”); United States v. T & S Brass and

Bronze Works, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 314, 321 (D.S.C. 1988),

aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 865 F.2d 1261

(4th Cir. 1988) (“Compliance with the statutory deadline

was mandatory, even if the defendant[s’] only option was

29

to cease its business. . . . Congress had already deter-

mined that protection of the public health and the envi-

ronment was paramount”); American Lung Ass‘n v. Kean,

1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15158, *14-15, 26 ERC 1865, 18

Envtl. L. Rep. 20,317 (D.N.J., Civ. No. 87-288, Nov. 19,

1987), aff'd, 871 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1989) (“It is perhaps

understandable that intervenor-defendants wish to avoid

the costs of .. . compliance, but the law . . . will not allow

[them] to hide behind those costs”); Public Interest

Research Group of New Jersey, Inc. v. Top Notch Metal Finish-

ing Co., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15163, *14, 26 ERC 2012

(D.N.J., Civ. No. 87-3894, Nov. 6, 1987) (“[I]f to stay in

business Top Notch must expend a large sum of money to

come into immediate compliance with toxic substance

limitations, that is a balance Congress has struck in favor

of the environment”).

D. The Fact That EPA and California Will Have

Additional Regulatory Authority at the Base If

Respondent Complies With RCRA and the

CWA Does Not Make This Case a Challenge to

the Cleanup Plan

The Ninth Circuit also accepted respondent's argu-

ment that this case challenges the cleanup because noti-

fication and permitting under RCRA, the CWA, and state

water quality laws might lead to “[t]he injection of new

requirements for dealing with the inactive sites that are

now subject to the CERCLA cleanup (or McClellan’s

defense against imposition of such requirements).” App.

at 15 (47 F.3d at 330). Specifically, in regards to the

discharges to groundwater and surface water, the Ninth

Circuit held that requiring respondent to provide proper

notification to the state, EPA, and the public, and to

30

obtain a CWA discharge permit, might somehow interfere

with “the leaching process [which] is a necessary compo-

nent of the CERCLA plan’s groundwater extraction sys-

tem.” App. at 17 (47 F.3d at 330).

The Ninth Circuit assumed that if respondent gave

such notification, federal and state regulatory bodies

would order respondent to alter its cleanup activities in

ways that would interfere with the cleanup. But there is

no basis for assuming that EPA or the state of California

will order respondent to do something inconsistent with

its cleanup. Rather, as discussed, above EPA recognizes

the overlap of the statutes and has mechanisms to harmo-

nize. In fact, the Interagency Agreement (IAG) prepared

for the Base specifically recognizes that compliance with

the notification and permitting requirements of RCRA

and the CWA are required independent of the CERCLA

cleanup.

CONCLUSION

There is a significant conflict between the various

Circuits over the proper interpretation of § 113(h) of

CERCLA. The extent to which § 113(h) of CERCLA pre-

cludes enforcement of other environmental laws at sites

engaged in CERCLA remedial actions is an important

question of federal law that has not previously been

addressed by this Court. For these reasons, petitioners

respectfully request that the Court issue a writ of cer-

tiorari to the Ninth Circuit to review the Ninth Circuit's

opinion in this case.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL AXLINE

Counsel of Record for Petitioners

MarIANNE DUGAN

Dated this 1st day of May, 1995.

App. 1

FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

)

McCLet_tan EcoLoGicAL SEEPAGE )

SITUATION; Mary FisHeR; CHARLES __)

YARBROUGH, ) No. 91-16308

ee )

Plaintiffs-Appellants, D.C. No.

v. ) CV 86-00475-RAR

WitutaM J. Perry,* Secretary of )

the United States Department of )

Defense,

Defendant-Appellee. )

)

)

McCLettan ECOoLocicat SEEPAGE )

SITUATION; Mary FisHer; CHARLES )

YARBROUGH, ) No. 91-16467

Plaintiffs-Appellees, D.C. No.

V. ) CV 86-00475-RAR

WitttaM J. Perry,* Secretary of ) OPINION

the United States Department of )

Defense,

Defendant-Appellant. )

).

* William J. Perry is substituted for his predecessor, Les Aspin,

as Secretary of Defense. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1).

* William J. Perry is substituted for his predecessor, Les Aspin,

as Secretary of Defense. Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(1).

App. 2

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California

Raul A. Ramirez, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

August 9, 1994 - San Francisco, California

Filed January 30, 1995

Before: Betty B. Fletcher, Arthur L. Alarcon

and William C. Canby, Jr., Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Canby

SUMMARY

Environmental Law/Hazardous Waste/

Litigation and Procedure

The court of appeals vacated a judgment of the dis-

trict court and remanded. The court held that federal

courts lack jurisdiction over all contemporaneous chal-

lenges to hazardous waste cleanups undertaken pursuant

to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-

sation and Liability Act (CERCLA).

Since 1979, the Department of Defense (DOD) has

taken steps to remediate environmental damage caused

by toxic and hazardous waste pollution at McClellan Air

Force Base and its environs. The cleanup program is

governed by CERCLA and an interagency agreement

between the Air Force, the Environmental Protection

Agency and the State of California. The agreement’s Man-

agement Action Plan (MAP) incorporates the require-

ments of the Resource Conservation Recovery Act

(RCRA), the Clean Water Act (CWA) and California envi-

ronmental statutes.

App. 3

In 1986, McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation

(MESS) sued appellee Secretary of Defense, alleging that

McClellan’s past and present cleanup activities violated

RCRA, CWA and related California laws. Primarily, MESS

sought to compel McClellan’s compliance with RCRA’s

reporting and permitting requirements, require it to

obtain a CWA permit for leaching from its inactive waste

pits, and meet state notification requirements for contam-

inant discharge.

The district court found that MESS’s claims directed

at McClellan’s ongoing cleanup efforts were challenges to

CERCLA remedial and removal actions and therefore

barred by CERCLA section 113(h). With respect to current

and future waste disposal operations, the court con-

cluded that section 113(h) did not preclude MESS’s

claims.

Section 113(h) deprives federal courts of jurisdiction

to review “... any challenges to removal or remedial

action. .. . ” undertaken pursuant to CERCLA, except

citizen suits alleging that a cleanup action “taken” or

secured” under the statute “was” in violation of its provi-

sions.

On appeal, MESS contended that section 113(h) does

not apply to citizen suits or actions brought under non-

CERCLA statutes. MESS argued that waste storage and

disposal site operators like McClellan might try to avoid

RCRA liability by hiding under a CERCLA umbrella

unless challenges under non-CERCLA statutes were not

permitted.

[1] ON its face, section 113(h) precludes any con-

temporaneous challenge to a CERCLA cleanup, [2] not

App. 4

just those brought under other provisions of CERCLA. [3]

Nor does the prohibitory language of section 113(h) dis-

tinguish between plaintiffs. If it did not include citizen

suits, there would be little need for its exception for

citizen suits challenging past cleanup actions.

[4] Whatever theoretical potential there was for eva-

sion of RCRA in other cases, it did not exist in this one.

McClellan’s MAP incorporated the requirements of all

relevant hazardous waste legislation. [5] Although it was

true that MESS was unable to obtain immediate judicial

review of McClellan’s compliance with RCRA, CWA and

like statutory requirements during the course of the

cleanup, Congress determined that swift execution of

CERCLA cleanup plans outweighed this concern.

[6] The compliance with RCRA that MESS sought

[7] would constitute the kind of interference with the

cleanup plan that Congress sought to avoid or delay with

section 113(h). [8] To a greater degree, an injunction or

declaration requiring compliance with RCRA permitting

requirements would also interfere with the cleanup. [9]

Because MESS sought to improve on the cleanup embod-

ied in the Interagency Agreement, its action qualified as a

“challenge” to the cleanup.

[10] The leaching process was a necessary compo-

nent of the CERCLA plan’s groundwater extraction sys-

tem. Claims focusing on it could not be sustained until

the cleanup was completed. [11] The source of surface

water contaminants was not dispositive. The court's

inability to fashion a remedy that would not interfere

with McClellan’s cleanup action was, however.

App. 5

[12] The Interagency Agreement did not cover

McClellan’s active sites. Section 113 thus did not bar

MESS’s claims asserting RCRA noncompliance at them.

(13] It was unclear what claims remained relating to

active sites. [14] The district court was in the best position

to make that determination.

COUNSEL

Michael Axline, Western Natural Resource Law Clinic,

Eugene, Oregon, counsel for the plaintiffs-appellants-

appellees.

Ellen J. Durkee, United States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C., counsel for the defendant-appellee-

appellant.

OPINION

CANBY, Circuit Judge:

This is an action brought by McClellan Ecological

Seepage Situation (“MESS”) to require McClellan Air

Force Base to comply with various environmental laws.

The district court ruled against MESS and MESS

appealed. The Secretary of Defense cross-appealed on the

ground that MESS’s appeal was untimely - a contention

that we reject.!

1 The district court granted MESS’s motion to extend the

time for appeal on the ground of excusable neglect. The govern-

ment’s motion to dismiss the appeal was denied by a motions

panel of this court on the ground that the appeal time had not

App. 6

After hearing argument, we remanded the case to the

district court for certain findings regarding the jurisdic-

tion of the federal courts to entertain many of MESS’s

claims. The district court determined that most of MESS’s

claims, brought under the Resource Conservation Recov-

ery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (“RCRA”), the Clean

Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387, and several California

state environmental statutes, must be dismissed for lack

of jurisdiction. The findings indicate that the Department

of Defense is engaged in a cleanup at McClellan Air Force

Base, conducted pursuant to the Comprehensive Environ-

mental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of

1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (“CERCLA” §§ 101-175).2

and that the bulk of MESS’s claims constitute an imper-

missible challenge to that cleanup.

After again hearing argument, we accept the district

court's Findings and Determination with respect to all of

MESS’s claims relating to inactive waste storage sites

being cleaned up by McClellan pursuant to CERCLA. We

therefore vacate the original judgment, and instruct the

begun to run because the entry date of the final judgment did

not appear on the court docket. The government correctly states

that we may revisit the decision of the motions panel. See United

States v. Houser, 804 F.2d 565, 568-69 (9th Cir. 1986). We do sO,

but reject the government's cross-appeal because we conclude

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly

finding excusable neglect. See Pioneer Inv. Servs. v. Brunswick

Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 1496-98 (1993).

? As amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reau-

thorization Act of 1986, codified as amended at 42 US.

§§ 9601-9675.

App. 7

district court to dismiss those claims for lack of jurisdic-

tion. We agree with the district court that jurisdiction

exists over the remaining claims, which are all challenges

relating to active sites excluded by the CERCLA Plan. We

remand those claims for further consideration by the

district court.

BACKGROUND

Since the 1930’s, McClellan Air Force Base has served

as an aircraft depot and maintenance center for the Army,

and subsequently the Air Force. The repair and mainte-

nance of our military aircraft have always required the

use of toxic and hazardous materials which, after they

have served their purpose, become hazardous wastes

requiring disposal.* Until 1976, McClellan disposed of

large quantities of its wastes by burying them in earthen

pits on the Base. During the several preceding decades,

operations at McClellan generated a great deal of uncon-

tained hazardous waste, some of which leached into the

groundwater beneath the Base.

In 1979, McClellan began a groundwater monitoring

program as a first step in its cleanup of Base contamina-

tion. When Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, the

McClellan cleanup continued under the authority of the

Department of Defense’s Installation Restoration Pro-

gram, pursuant to CERCLA Section 104. In compliance

3 Some of the wastes generated at McClellan over the years

include industrial solvents, caustic cleaners, heavy metals, poly-

chlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), oils and lubricants, contaminated

jet fuel, low-level radioactive wastes, electroplating chemicals

and several volatile organic compounds (VOCs).

App. 8

with requirements of the Superfund Amendments and

Reauthorization Act of 1986, which amended CERCLA.

McClellan again modified its cleanup program to con-

form to a now-required Interagency Agreement between

the Air Force, the federal Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”) and the State of California. The Agree-

ment bound McClellan to incorporate all applicable legis-

lative requirements into its cleanup through a

Management Action Plan. McClellan’s cleanup effort has

proceeded under the authority of both CERCLA and the

Interagency Agreement since the Agreement’s effective

date of May 2, 1990.

A major component of McClellan’s CERCLA cleanup

plan is its groundwater extraction system. The system

allows contaminants to leach from the inactive waste pits

into the groundwater. The groundwater is then mechan-

ically extracted and treated. Through this “leach-extract-

treat” cycle, all contaminants are expected to be removed

from the inactive pits, and migration of contaminated

groundwater away from the Base to be prevented.

On April 23, 1986. MESS brought this action against

the Secretary of Defense, alleging that McClellan’s past

and present treatment, storage and disposal of hazardous

wastes violated RCRA, the Clean Water Act, the Califor-

nia Health and Safety Code, the California Water Code,

and the California Fish and Game Code. MESS sought

declaratory relief, civil penalties, and an injunction

against any further treatment, storage, discharge or dis-

posal of hazardous wastes at McClellan until all federal

and state hazardous waste requirements were met. The

district court, as we have said, denied MESS’s claims on

the merits.

App. 9

On appeal, the Secretary raised for the first time a

threshold jurisdictional issue, arguing that CERCLA Sec-

tion 113(h) denies federal courts the jurisdiction to enter-

tain MESS’s challenge to the ongoing CERCLA cleanup

action at McClellan. We remanded to the district court to

develop the record further with regard to the progress

and scope of CERCLA activities at McClellan, and to

determine whether MESS’s claims constituted a challenge

to the CERCLA cleanup, placing them beyond federal

court jurisdiction. The district court found that “a com-

prehensive cleanup effort is currently underway at

[McClellan],” and determined that each of MESS’s claims

for relief that were directed at sites now undergoing

cleanup activities constituted challenges to CERCLA

remedial and removal actions. The court thus concluded

that CERCLA Section 113(h) bars those challenges. With

respect to RCRA compliance for current and future waste

disposal operations at McClellan, the district court found

that Section 113 does not bar MESS’s claims.

MESS disputes the district court’s determination,

arguing first that Section 113 applies neither to citizen

suits nor to actions brought under non-CERCLA statutes.

MESS also contends that even if Section 113 does apply to

the present action, none of MESS’s claims constitute

“challenges” to the CERCLA cleanup effort at McClellan,

because MESS merely seeks compliance with existing

RCRA and Clean Water Act standards that McClellan is

already bound to follow. WE address each argument in

turn.

App. 10

ANALYSIS

I. Scope of CERCLA § 113(h)

[1] Section 113(h) of CERCLA provides:

(h) Timing of review

No Federal court shall have jurisdiction

under Federal law . . . or under State law .. . to

review any challenges to removal or remedial

action selected under section 9604 of this title, or

to review any order issued under section 9606(a)

of this title, in any action except one of the

following:

* ** + *

(4) an action under section 9659 of this

title (relating to citizen suits) alleging that the

removal or remedial action taken under section

9604 of this title or secured under section 9606 of

this title was in violation of any requirement of

this chapter. .

+ + + *

42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis supplied). On its face, then,

section 113(h) precludes contemporaneous challenges to

CERCLA cleanups. MESS interprets this section, how-

ever, to mean that federal courts are jurisdictionally

barred from reviewing only those challenges to CERCLA

cleanup actions brought under CERCLA provisions. In our

view, however, section 113(h) is not so limited.

[2] Section 113(h) is clear and unequivocal. It

amounts to a “blunt withdrawal of federal jurisdiction.”

North Shore Gas Co. v. E.P.A., 930 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir.

1991). Contrary to MESS’s position, the unqualified lan-

guage of the section precludes “any challenges” to

App. 11

CERCLA Section 104 cleanups, not just those brought

under other provisions of CERCLA. See Arkansas Peace

Ctr. v. Department of Pollution Control, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217

(8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1397 (1994) (holding

that section 113(h) bars a challenge based upon RCRA);

North Shore Gas, 930 F.2d at 1244 (same).

[3] MESS alternatively contends that Section 113(h)

withdraws federal jurisdiction only for challenges

brought by potentially responsible parties, and does not

affect actions brought under the citizen suit provisions of

environmental statutes. This argument is contradicted by

the plain words of the statute. The prohibitory language

of Section 113(h) does not distinguish between plaintiffs.

The statute divests federal courts of jurisdiction over “any

challenges” to removal or remedial actions under

CERCLA. If the prohibitory language did not include

citizen suits, there would have been little need for the

exception in subsection (h) for citizen suits challenging

past cleanup actions. MESS’s reliance on legislative his-

tory to show that congressional intent differs from the

statute’s plain wording is not persuasive.* We therefore

conclude that Section 113 withholds federal jurisdiction

to review any of MESS’s claims, including those made in

citizen suits and under non-CERCLA statutes, that are

found to constitute “challenges” to ongoing CERCLA

cleanup actions.

4 Because the statutory language is so clear, MESS must

overcome a strong presumption that the plain language of the

statute expresses Congress’ intent. See Ardestani v. INS, 112 S.Ct.

515, 520 (1991). For MESS’s purposes, the legislative history of

Section 113(h) is at best, unclear.

App. 12

MESS expresses concerns that waste storage and dis-

posal site operators like McClellan might try to avoid

RCRA liability by hiding under the protective umbrella of

a CERCLA cleanup plan. MESS and amici° argue that in

this situation, affected citizens would never have

recourse for the resulting RCRA violations, and pollution

would go unchecked.

[4] Whatever the theoretical potential for an evasion

of RCRA in other cases, it does not exist here. McClellan's

Management Action Plan incorporates the requirements

of all relevant hazardous waste legislation. See McClellan

Air Force Base Interagency Agreement §§ 1.2(e), 6.1, and

17 (signed July 21, 1989); Finding and Determination RE:

Jurisdiction, p. 11 (October 23, 1993). The parties to the

agreement clearly intended that McClellan be bound by

these requirements. The Management Action Plan is a

comprehensive scheme that takes into account all applica-

ble statutory requirements, including those of RCRA and

the Clean Water Act, and coordinates compliance with

each. McClellan therefore has, without question, an oblig-

ation to comply with substantive RCRA and Clean Water

Act requirements.

[5] It is true that MESS is now unable to obtain

immediate judicial review of McClelian’s compliance

with RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and similar statutory

requirements during the course of the cleanup program,

but this inability was Congress’s choice. Although judi-

cial review is an important element in the enforcement of

> Amici States of Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Indiana, IIli-

nois, Kansas, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas and

Utah filed a brief on behalf of MESS.

App. 13

laws such as RCRA and the Clean Water Act, Congress

has determined that the need for swift execution of

CERCLA cleanup plans outweighs this concern. Section

113(h) protects the execution of a CERCLA plan during its

pendency from lawsuits that might interfere with the expe-

ditious cleanup effort. This result furthers the policy

underlying CERCLA by allowing a quick response to

serious hazards. See Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, 923 F.2d

1011, 1018-19 (3d Cir. 1991). Congress concluded that the

need for such action was paramount, and that peripheral

disputes, including those over “what measures actually

are necessary to clean-up the site and remove the haz-

ard,” may not be brought while the cleanup is in process.

Id. at 1019.

We recognize that the application of Section 113(h)

may in some cases delay judicial review for years, if not

permanently,® and may result in irreparable harm to other

important interests. Whatever is likelihood, such a possi-

bility is for legislators, and not judges, to address. We

must presume that Congress has already balanced all

concerns and “concluded that the interest in removing

the hazard of toxic waste from Superfund sites” clearly

outweighs the risk of irreparable harm. Id. at 1023.

Having concluded that Section 113(h) would bar any

of MESS’s claims that challenge the CERCLA effort at

McClellan, we must now determine which, if any, of the

claims actually comprise “challenges” to the cleanup

within the meaning of the statute. Because the effects of

6 We do not here decide whether or to what extent the

district court can entertain MESS’s various claims after imple-

mentation of the CERCLA cleanup at McClellan is complete.

App. 14

each of MESS’s claims upon the cleanup are distinct, we

analyze them separately.

II. The “Inactive” Waste Pits and RCRA Compliance

[6] Although MESS’s complaint sought various

forms of injunctive relief, MESS now seeks primarily to

compel McClellan’s compliance with RCRA’s individual

reporting and permitting requirements, in addition to the

Interagency Agreement’s comprehensive requirements.”

MESS argues that, in seeking such relief, it does not

challenge the CERCLA cleanup plan.

[7] We agree with McClellan, however, that such

relief would constitute the kind of interference with the

cleanup plan that Congress sought to avoid or delay by

the enactment of Section 113(h). The Interagency Agree-

ment now integrates RCRA obligations into its own

reporting requirements. The parties to the Agreement

deemed those reporting requirements to be sufficient;

MESS clearly wants more. The additional reporting

requirements that MESS would have us impose would

second-guess the parties’ determination and thus inter-

fere with the remedial actions selected under CERCLA

Section 104.

[8] To an even greater degree, an injunction or dec-

laration requiring McClellan to comply with RCRA per-

mitting requirements would also interfere with the

7 42 U.S.C. § 6930 (RCRA § 1031) requires the operator of a

hazardous waste treatment, storage or disposal facility to file

specific reports: 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (RCRA § 1026) requires a

permit for any such facility.

App. 15

CERCLA cleanup. As McClellan points out, the entire

purpose of a permit requirement is to allow the regulat-

ing agency to impose requirements as a condition of the

permit. The injection of new requirements for dealing

with the inactive sites that are now subject to the

CERCLA cleanup (or McClellan’s defense against imposi-

tion of such requirements) would clearly interfere with

the cleanup.

[9] It is true, as MESS argues, that every action that

increases the cost of a cleanup or diverts resources or

personnel from it does not thereby become a “challenge”

to the cleanup. The enforcement of minimum wage

requirements, for example, might increase the cost of

cleanup and even divert personnel from cleanup duties

without becoming a challenge to the cleanup. MESS’s

lawsuit, however, is far more directly related to the goals

of the cleanup itself than is the hypothetical minimum

wage action. MESS, for all practical purposes, seeks to

improve on the CERCLA cleanup as embodied in the

Interagency Agreement. Its action qualifies as a “chal-

lenge” to the cleanup.

III. Inactive Waste Pits and Clean Water Act Compli-

ance

MESS alleges, and McClellan does not dispute, that

contaminants from the inactive pits continue to leach

downward into groundwater beneath the Base. This

leaching, according to MESS, constitutes a “point dis-

charge” of pollutants into “waters of the United States”

which, without an authorization permit, violates 33

U.S.C. § 1311 (Clean Water Act). MESS would require

App. 16

McClellan to procure a Clean Water Act permit authoriz-

ing all leaching from the inactive pits. The relief sought

would also compel McClellan’s compliance with individ-

ual state notification requirements for contaminant dis-

charge. Absent the permit and compliance. MESS would

prohibit any discharges.

[10] McClellan has amply demonstrated that the

leaching in question is closely connected to the CERCLA

action. The leaching process is a necessary component of

the CERCLA plan’s groundwater extraction system,

which was designed to prevent migration of contami-

nants away from McClellan. Any delay or interruption of

the process will slow the cleanup action, a result that

Congress sought to avoid in enacting Section 113(h). The

district court found that claims focusing on the ground-

water underlying the Base were “directed at an integral

part of the cleanup and, as such, may not be sustained

until cleanup is completed.” We agree with the district

court that MESS’s Clean Water Act and state water law

claims, as they pertain to leaching of contaminants, are

challenges to the continuing CERCLA response and are

consequently beyond federal jurisdiction.

A slightly different question exists with regard to

McClellan’s alleged discharges of pollutants into surface

waters. MESS asserts in its complaint that contaminants

from the inactive pits discharge laterally, through

perched groundwater, seeps and pipes, into the Magpie

Creek at points where it crosses the Base. McClellan

responds that because the sources of the alleged contami-

nants, the inactive pits, are subjects of the CERCLA

response action and its attendant Management Action

|

App. 17

Plan, the surface water contamination claims also should

be barred. We agree.

[11] The source of the alleged surface water contam-

inants is not dispositive of MESS’s claim. What is disposi-

tive, however, is the court’s inability to fashion any

remedy that would not interfere with McClellan’s

CERCLA groundwater extraction system. While the con-

taminants allegedly destined for Magpie Creek are mov-

ing laterally through the soil, unlike the downward-

leaching pollutants, it is impossible to require any Clean

Water Act compliance measure to remedy lateral contami-

nant discharges from the pits that would not actively

“challenge” CERCLA activities directed at remedying the

downward discharges. MESS’s claims pertaining to dis-

charge via seepage and pipes into Magpie Creek therefore

are excluded from federal court jurisdiction.

IV. McClellan’s Current Operations

[12] MESS also claims that “current operations” at

McClellan are not in compliance with RCRA permitting

requirements. We accept the district court’s determina-

tion that the Interagencv Agreement does not cover

McClellan’s active sites. Findings and Determination RE:

Jurisdiction, p. 26, Section 113 thus does not bar MESS’s

claims asserting RCRA noncompliance at those active

sites. Some dispute existed between the parties both in

briefing and at oral argument over what the term “cur-

rent operations” included. In order to clarify the limits of

our holding, we also adopt the district court’s character-

ization of “current operations” as those involving active

App. 18

waste treatment and storage sites not covered by the

Interagency Agreement.

[13] When the district court entered its original

judgment, it purported to determine all claims. Because

the jurisdictional bar of Section 113(h) of CERCLA had

not been asserted before the district court at that time, the

court did not differentiate in its opinions between those

sites that were subject to the CERCLA cleanup plan and

those “active” sites that were not. It is accordingly not

clear to us now just what claims remain relating to the

“active” sites not covered by the cleanup plan, and what

disposition, if any, the district court already may have

made of those claims.

[14] That determination is a difficult one no matter

who makes it. We conclude, however, that the district

court is in the best position to secure the active participa-

tion of the litigants in determining exactly what, if any-

thing, is left of this case. We therefore remand the matter

to the district court for determinations concerning: (1) the

extent of MESS’s claims not precluded by Section 113(h)

of CERCLA or otherwise abandoned; (2) the degree to

which the district court has already ruled on those claims;

and (3) any further determinations (with or without evi-

dentiary proceedings) that the district court deems

appropriate or necessary to dispose of this case and enter

a new final judgment.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly determined that CERCLA

Section 113(h) withholds federal jurisdiction to review

citizen suits and actions brought under other, non-

App. 19

CERCLA statutes that challenge ongoing CERCLA

cleanup actions. The court was also correct in finding that

all of MESS’s claims for relief connected with McClellan’s

inactive pits and sites were challenges to McClellan’s

CERCLA cleanup. Finally, we accept the district court's

determination that MESS’s claims against the active

waste storage sites are not barred by Section 113(h).

We vacate the original judgment of the district court

and remand this matter to the district court with instruc-

tions to dismiss MESS’s claims relating to the inactive

sites for lack of jurisdiction, and to conduct any further

proceedings the district court deems necessary or appro-

priate to resolve and enter final judgment regarding

MESS’s claims relating to active sites. Each party will

bear its own costs.

VACATED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUC-

TIONS.

App. 20

McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE SITUATION

(MESS), Mary Fisher, Charles and Sandy Yarbrough,

Plaintiffs,

V.

Caspar Willard WEINBERGER, Secretary of the United

States Department of Defense, Defendant.

No. CIV S-86-475-RAR.

United States District Court,

E.D. California.

Dec. 9, 1986.

Claim was brought against Secretary of Defense for

various types of relief from air force base’s alleged viola-

tion of certain provisions of Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act and Clean Water Act. Government move to

dismiss. The District Court, Ramirez, J., held that United

States had not waived sovereign immunity regarding

imposition of civil penalties against federal facilities

under either statute.

Motion granted.

Michael Axline, John E. Bonine, Western Natural

Resources Law Clinic, University of Oregon School of

Law, Eugene, Or., Victor Sher, San Francisco, Cal., Step-

hen L. Samuels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C.,

for plaintiffs.

F. Henry Habicht II, Asst. Atty. Gen., Stephen L.

Samuels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., Peter A.

Nowinski, U.S. Atty., Yoshinori H.T. Himel, Asst. U.S.

Atty., Sacramento, Cal., for defendant.

App. 21

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION

OF DEFENDANT TO DISMISS CLAIM

FOR CIVIL PENALTIES

RAMIREZ, District Judge.

This matter came on for hearing on November 3, 1986

on defendant’s motion to dismiss plaintiff's claim for

civil penalties. The Court rendered an oral ruling grant-

ing the motion to dismiss at the conclusion of that hear-

ing, and this opinion specifically incorporates by

reference the reasons articulated in that ruling.

This action was commenced on April 23, 1986 when a

group of citizens calling themselves McClellan Ecological

Seepage Situation (“MESS”) filed a complaint against

Caspar Willard Weinberger, Secretary of the United States

Department of Defense, alleging that McClellan Air Force

Base violated certain provisions of the Resource Conser-

vation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and the Clean Water

Act (“CWA”). In the complaint, MESS seeks declaratory

relief, injunctive relief, and the payment of civil penalties.

The present motion relates only to the request for civil

penalties.

This matter involves an issue of sovereign immunity.

It is axiomatic, of course, that the United States is sover-

eign. It cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued. Block

v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1819, 75

L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). There cannot be a waiver of sovereign

immunity unless the waiver is clear, concise, and

unequivocal. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan,

456 U.S. 728, 734, 102 S.Ct. 2118, 2122, 72 L.Ed.2d 520

(1982). When there is any doubt, waiver will not be

found. Waiver cannot be implied. It cannot be assumed. It

App. 22

cannot be based on speculation, surmise, or conjecture.

United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23

L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). Ambiguous language will not equate to

waiver. Any limitation on the United States’ consent to be

sued must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign

and may not be modified by implication. Ruckelshaus v.

Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-85, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3276-77,

77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983).

In this case, there are four potential areas for waiver

of sovereign immunity, two under RCRA and two under

the Clean Water Act. Turning first to RCRA, the relevant

provisions are the federal facilities provision set forth in

RCRA § 6001, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, and the citizen suit

provision in RCRA § 7002, 42 U.S.C. § 6972.

The RCRA federal facilities provision states in rele-

vant part that federal agencies shall be subject to and

comply with “all Federal, State, interstate, and local

requirements, both substantive and procedural (including

any requirement for permits or reporting or any provi-

sions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be

imposed by a court to enforce such relief).” The plain

face, common-sense reading of this provision convinces

this Court that there has not been a waiver of sovereign

immunity regarding the imposition of civil penalties

against federal facilities under RCRA. The plain face

reading of this legislation demonstrates that Congress

intended to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the

United States, insofar as process or sanctions is con-

cerned, only as required for the enforcement of injunctive

relief. As argued by the government in its moving papers,

this language infers, implies, and requires a preexisting

order of the Court to be enforced - no more, no less.

App. 23

The Court recognizes that this is an issue of first

impression. There are several cases that do not speci-

fically and succinctly apply to the facts but are neverthe-

less instructive, and therefore the Court will make brief

reference to them.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision in California v. Walters,

751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir.1984), is the only case to examine

RCRA § 6001 in the context of waiver of immunity for

criminal penalties. The Court, in finding no wavier, speci-

fically found that RCRA § 6001 plainly waives immunity

to sanctions but only as imposed to enforce injunctive

relief. What is significant is the Court’s statement that

“this only makes more conspicuous its failure to waive

immunity to criminal sanctions.” 751 F.2d at 978. While

Walters is not directly on point since it does not involve

civil penalties or a citizen suit, a waiver is a waiver

whether it be for criminal and/or civil penalties.

That leads to an even more instructive case, Meyer v.

United States Coast Guard, 644 F.Supp. 221 (E.D.N.C.1986),

wherein Judge Britt, again reviewing RCRA § 6001, found

that there has not been a clear and unambiguous waiver

on behalf of the United States regarding the imposition of

fines and/or other civil penalties. Meyer, unlike Walters,

dealt specifically with civil penalties as opposed to crimi-

nal penalties.

But whether or not Walters or Meyer is applicable, the

Court finds that RCRA § 6001 on its face does not provide

clearly and succinctly for a waiver of sovereign immunity

for civil penalties, and none will be implied.

App. 24

We turn then to MESS’ alternative argument that the

citizen suit provision, RCRA § 7002, provides the neces-

sary vehicle for waiver of sovereign immunity. Again, the

Court disagrees. While RCRA § 7002 specifically defines

“person” to include the United States for purposes of

administration of the statute and/or jurisdiction, the citi-

zen suit provision specifically refers to civil penalties

under subsections (a) and (g) of RCRA § 3008, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6928(a) and (g). A cursory review of subsections (a) and

(g), which are the federal enforcement provisions relating

to compliance orders and civil penalties, reveals that they

do not refer to the United States but to “persons.” The

Court must then take into consideration the general defi-

nition of “person” in RCRA § 1004(15), 42 U.S.C.

§ 6903(15), which seems to name everyone under the sun

save for the United States of America. The Court there-

fore adopts the reasonable interpretation set forth by the

government that indeed Congress did not intend, nor did

it legislate specifically, a waiver of sovereign immunity

for civil penalties under the citizen suit provision.

This Court cannot believe that if Congress wished to

waive immunity for civil penalties it could be so careful,

so all-knowing, so engaged in foresight and insight as to

define “person” to include the United States for purposes

of jurisdiction in the RCRA citizen suit provision, and yet

could forget, misappropriate, or be so negligent as to

decline to include the United States in its overall, all-

encompassing definition of “person” in RCRA § 1004(15),

which is applicable to compliance orders and civil penal-

ties. If I were to accept what has been espoused by

plaintiff in this case, we would have a unique and absurd

result whereby the Administrator of the Environmental

App. 25

Protection Agency would not be able to seek penalties

against the United States because the United States is not

a “person” within the meaning of RCRA § 3008(g), yet a

private citizen could seek and be awarded the imposition

of civil penalties under RCRA § 7002. If that is what

Congress intended, it certainly escapes this Court. It is

the opinion of this Court that that is not what Congress |

intended.

Rather than focusing my decision on intent per se, I

look to the face of the legislation and thereafter to the

legislative history, and I do not find the necessary clear

unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity for civil pen-

alties under RCRA.

We turn next to the Clean Water Act. And although

counsel have been very able in both their written and oral

argument, I take great exception to counsel for plaintiff

who indicates that here, at last, we have a clear enuncia-

tion of a waiver of sovereign immunity. If anything, the

mud gets muddier when we look to the Clean Water Act.

The federal facilities provision - CWA § 313(a), 33

U.S.C. § 1323(a) - is a compilation of ambiguity. The

sentence that is specifically at issue reads “the United

States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising

under Federal law,” if there be any, “or imposed by a

State or local court to enforce an order or the process of

such court.” The use of the word “or” as advocated by

counsel for plaintiff, or the substitution of “and” for “or”

as advocated by counsel for defendant, leads to very

interesting results. If in fact a state law has been pat-

terned “i” for and “t” for “t” on federal law, under a

“sur

1

disjunctive reading of the word “or” we would have a

App. 26

scenario where civil penalties could not be applied under

state and/or local court provisions, even under a state or

local ordinance that was an exact carbon copy duplicate

of the Clean Water Act, but could be imposed under the

provisions of the Clean Water Act itself. How Congress

envisioned that to be a vehicle to end the poilution which

this country is facing escapes this Court.

On the other hand, if we were to read the phrase in

the conjunctive so that “to enforce an order or process of

such court” applies both to federal law and to state or

local court law, the sentence in itself is an absurdity — it

makes no sense whatsoever. Under that reading, the

Court does not know what to do with the terminology

“such court” since the only court mentioned is state or

local court.

Either reading, then, appears to be an absurdity. Fur-

thermore, the remainder of CWA § 313 does not waive

sovereign immunity for civil penalties for the same rea-

sons discussed in relation to RCRA § 6001.

As rightfully argued by counsel for plaintiff, Con-

gress is not held to the standard of writing its statutes in

an all-knowing and all-encompassing manner. This pro-

ceeding is not a grammar or semantics course on how to

write a statute. Rather, the Court should look to the four

corners of the statute and obtain and apply the clear

meaning of the statute. Although the Court sympathizes

with the plaintiff, that is exactly what the Court is

attempting to do. But it is not possible to find a clear

meaning to CWA § 313. Since the statute is not clear on its

face, we must look to the legislative history.

App. 27

Here, of course, we have a problem because the

Clean Water Act’s legislative history is of no assistance. If

there is any assistance for plaintiff’s position, it comes

from the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642. The

question then is do we bootstrap the legislative history of

the Clean Water Act by reference to the Clean Air Act.

The Court does not believe that that is what Congress

envisions or the Supreme Court envisions when we are

called upon to make a waiver of sovereign immunity.

As indicated earlier, a waiver of sovereign immunity

must be clear and concise and unequivocal. It will not be

based upon ambiguities. There will not be a waiver

brought about by implication or by bootstrapping or by

borrowing. That does not mean that Congress has a duty

to write a waiver in a certain or specialized way. But it

must write with a clear hand, an unequivocal hand. And

the Court must assume that the learned members of

Congress, some of whom are learned members of various

bars, can say waiver of sovereign immunity for civil

penalties just as easily as any eighth grader writing the

same type of legislation. They have not done that.

Instead, they have inserted conjunctive and disjunctive

references that bring about absurd and contradictory

results. From this absurdity and contradiction, the Court

is asked to capture reason. It cannot.

Since the Court cannot capture reason from the writ-

ten word, I have to conclude that plaintiff has not met its

burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity.

Similarly, with respect to the citizen suit provision of

the Clean Water Act -- CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) -

for the very same reasons that the Court finds no waiver

App. 28

in the citizen suit provision of RCRA, there is no waiver

in the Clean Water Act. Again, there is a definition of

“person” that includes the United States in the jurisdic-

tional provision of CWA § 505(a). And again, CWA

§ 505(a) refers to another civil penalties provision, CWA

§ 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d). And again, there is an all-

encompassing introductory definition - CWA § 502(5), 33

U.S.C. § 1362(5) - which defines “person” as everybody

under the sun save for the United States.

This Court believes that although for twenty years

Congress has been attempting to raise some definite

reliance and response by federal facilities to get in line to

clean up their water, air, etcetera, it has been very slow

and cautious in its movements. Congress has finally got-

ten to the point where it has waived sovereign immunity

so as to force federal facilities to be brought into compli-

ance by way of injunctive relief only. It has not jumped

the magical line, however, and waived sovereign immu-

nity for purposes other than injunctive relief. Congress

could easily have stated that federal facilities would be

liable not only to injunctive relief but also to civil or

criminal penalties. It is easier written than said. It is not

written.

Defendant's motion to dismiss that portion of the

complaint praying for civil penalties both under RCRA

and the Clean Water Act is therefore granted.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

App. 29

McCLELLAN ECOLOGICAL SEEPAGE

SITUATION (MESS), Mary Fisher, Charles and

Sandy Yarbrough, Plaintiffs,

Vv.

Caspar Willard WEINBERGER, Secretary of the

United States Department of Defense, Defendant.

No. CIV S-86-475-RAR.

United States District Court,

E.D. California.

June 20, 1988.

Group of concerned citizens who lived near Air Force

base brought action against Secretary of Department of

Defense, alleging that base’s practices and procedures

with respect to industrial and domestic wastes violated

and threatened to violate various environmental laws. On

cross-motions for summary judgment, the District Court,

Ramirez, J., held that: (1) claim for injunctive relief from

use of treated waste-water in cooling towers was moot;

(2) court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act citizen suit pro-

vision over counts alleging violations of California solid

waste laws; (3) state statutory and regulatory provisions

referred to in other counts did not constitute “require-

ments” as that term was used in Clean Water Act waiver

of sovereign immunity provision, and court lacked juris-

diction over those counts under Act's citizen suit provi-

sion because provisions involved were not “effluent

standards or limitations”; and (4) court would follow

strict jurisdictional approach to notice provisions of envi-

ronmental statutes.

App. 30

Motions granted in part and denied in part.

Michael Axeline, Western Natural Resources Law

Clinic, Eugene, Or., for plaintiffs.

Steve Samuels, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Washington,

D.C., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RAMIREZ, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

On April 23, 1986, plaintiffs McClellan Ecological

Seepage Situation, Mary Fisher, and Charles and Sandy

Yarbrough (hereinafter “MESS”) brought this action seek-

ing declaratory and injunctive relief as well as civil penal-

ties against the Secretary of the Department of Defense

under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987; the Clean Water Act

(“CWA”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376; California hazardous

waste laws; and California water quality laws. The com-

plaint, which originally included twenty-three counts,

alleges violations of those statutes by McClellan Air Force

Base (“McClellan”) in Sacramento, California. On Decem-

ber 9, 1986, this Court granted the Government’s motion

to dismiss MESS’ request for civil penalties. McClellan

Ecologica! Seepage Situation v. Weinberger, 655 F.Supp. 601

(&.D.Cal.1986). Moreover, by stipulation and order,

Counts 1, 4(A), 7, and 19(C) of the complaint have been

dismissed without prejudice. (Orders dated August 4,

1987 and September 25, 1987.)

App. 31

On July 2, 1987, MESS filed a motion for partial

summary judgment with respect to Counts 2, 3, 4(B and

C), 6, 8, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 22, and 23 of its complaint.

On October 26, 1987, the Government filed a motion for

summary judgment, which relates to all counts of the

complaint except those previously dismissed by stipula-

tion and order. After full briefing of the cross-motions for

summary judgment, oral argument was held on February

8, 1988. At the conclusion of the argument, the Court

ruled from the bench on the cross-motions. This mem-

orandum opinion formalizes that bench ruling.

MESS is a group of concerned citizens who live near

McClellan Air Force Base. McClellan is a major aircraft

maintenance facility operated by the Department of

Defense. In its complaint, MESS alleges that McClellan’s

practices and procedures with respect to industrial and

domestic wastes have violated and threaten to violate

various environmental laws. Specifically, MESS alleges

that McClellan’s generation, treatment, and disposal of

wastes are in conflict with RCRA (Counts 2 through 5);

provisions of the California Health and Safety Code

(Counts 6 through 11 and 21); the Clean Water Act

(Counts 12 through 15, 22, and 23); provisions of the

California Water Code (Counts 16 through 19); and the

California Fish and Game Code (Count 20). Counts 2

through 11 are brought under the citizen suit provision of

RCRA, RCRA § 7002(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(A),

and Counts 12 through 23 are brought under the citizen

suit provision of the Clean Water Act, CWA § 505(a)(1), 33

U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).!

1 On April 1, 1988, the Court granted MESS’ motion for

leave to file an amended complaint. The amended complaint

App. 32

By agreement of counsel and the Court, proceedings

in this action were bifurcated. The present round of

motions for summary judgment involves purely legal

issues, undisputed facts, or facts the development of

which have not required extensive discovery. Any issues

not resolved in this round of motions will be subject to

additional discovery and a second round of motions for

summary judgment at a later date.

This opinion will address the remaining counts in

MESS’ complaint one-by-one. Each major section below

(RCRA and the Clean Water Act) will be preceded by a

brief overview of the relevant statutory provisions.

CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER RCRA

Subtitle C of RCRA creates a “cradle-to-grave” man-

agement system which is intended to ensure that hazard-

ous wastes are safely treated, stored, and disposed of

after November 19, 1980. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6934. Section

3005 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925, requires facilities that

treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste after Novem-

ber 19, 1980 to obtain a permit from EPA or from a state

authorized by EPA to administer its own hazardous

waste program. There are two parts to a permit applica-

tion — Part A and Part B. Part A requires general back-

ground information regarding the management of

hazardous wastes at a facility, while Part B requires a

much more extensive report. See 40 C.F.R. § 270.14.

adds a cause of action based upon the Administrative Procedure

Act. However, Counts 2 through 23 of the amended complaint

are identical to Counts 2 through 23 of the original complaint.

seri ioe eared

App. 33

Congress recognized that if every hazardous waste

management facility in existence on November 19, 1980

was immediately subject to the permit requirements of

RCRA, a bureaucratic nightmare would exist for the Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), the agency

charged with administering RCRA in coordination with

the states. Therefore, in order to provide for an ample

amount of time to set up the administrative machinery

necessary to accommodate all the requirements of RCRA,

Congress established a program of interim status for

facilities already in operation, such as McClellan. Under

this program, certain existing hazardous waste manage-

ment facilities are treated as having been issued a RCRA

permit until final administrative disposition of their per-

mit applications can be made. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C.

§ 6925(e).

,

In order to obtain this “interim status,” a hazardous

waste management facility must fulfill three conditions.

See RCRA § 3005(e)(1). First, the facility must have been

in existence on November 19, 1980 or on the effective

date of the statutory or regulatory changes which render

the facility subject to the permit requirement. Second,

where applicable, the owner or operator must have sub-

mitted preliminary notification to EPA stating the loca-

tion and general description of its hazardous waste

activity and listing the hazardous wastes involved in its

operation. Finally, the owner or operator must have

applied for a permit under RCRA § 3005. EPA has inter-

preted this third condition as requiring submission only

of Part A of the permit application; Part B is submitted

when EPA initiates the final permitting process for an

individual facility. 40 C.F.R. § 270.1(b). Facilities with

App. 34

interim status must comply with self-implementing tech-

nical standards that are analogous to but less stringent

than the standards for permitted facilities. See 40 C.F.R.

Part 270.1(b) and Part 265.

Congress was also concerned that the Federal gov-

ernment might not be able to administer the RCRA pro-

gram effectively in all states. Accordingly, Congress

enacted provisions which allow the various states to

receive full or partial authorization to administer their

own hazardous waste programs “in lieu of” the Federal

program. Specifically, section 3006 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6926, provides that any state wishing to administer and

enforce a hazardous waste program under RCRA may

apply to the EPA Administrator for authorization. If the

Administrator determines that the state program satisfies

specified standards, the state is authorized to administer

its program “in lieu of” ‘ie federal program. California

received partial interim authorization in 1981 and 1983

but that authorization expired on January 31, 1986. 51

Fed.Reg. 4128 (Jan. 31, 1986).

Congress also provided for a limited waiver of sover-

eign immunity in RCRA. Specifically, section 6001 of

RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, provides that facilities operated

by the federal government are subjected to all federal,

state, interstate, and local “requirements” respecting the

control and abatement of solid waste or hazardous waste

disposal. Moreover, section 7002(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 6972(a), authorizes any person to commence a civil

action against any other person, including the United

States, who is alleged to be in violation of an obligation

“which has become effective pursuant to” RCRA. How-

ever, such a citizen suit may be maintained only if the

App. 35

plaintiff has provided sixty days notice of its claims to the

alleged violator, the state, and EPA. RCRA § 7002(b)(1).

Waivers of sovereign immunity, of course, are not to

be liberally interpreted. As this Court previously stated

in dismissing MESS’ claim for civil penalties, the United

States cannot be sued unless it consents to be sued. Block

v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1819, 75

L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). There cannot be a waiver of sovereign

immunity unless the waiver is clear, concise, and

unequivocal. Army & Air Force Exchange Service v. Sheehan,

456 U.S. 728, 734, 102 S.Ct. 2118, 2122, 72 L.Ed.2d 520

(1982). When there is any doubt, waiver will not be

found. Waiver cannot be implied. It cannot be assumed. It

cannot be based on speculation, surmise, or conjecture.

United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4, 89 S.Ct. 1501, 1502, 23

L.Ed.2d 52 (1969). Ambiguous language will not equate to

waiver. Any limitation on the United States’ consent to be

sued must be strictly construed in favor of the sovereign

and may not be modified by implication. Ruckelshaus v.

Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 683-85, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 3276-77,

77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983).

Count 2 —- RCRA § 3005(a)

In Count 2 of the complaint, MESS alleges that

McClellan has violated section 3005(a) of RCRA. That

section prohibits the treatment, storage, or disposal of

hazardous wastes after the effective date of regulations

promulgated by EPA, except in accordance with a permit.

MESS asserts that McClellan “has been discharging, stor-

ing, and treating hazardous wastes without a permit to

do so since November 19, 1980, when the regulations

identifying the characteristics of hazardous wastes (40

App. 36

C.F.R. § 261.31) became effective.” Complaint { 45. Speci-

fically, MESS contends that McClellan’s Part A applica-

tion did not mention “storage of hazardous wastes in the

base cooling system and in unlined underground burial

pits” (MESS Memorandum at 21) and that McClellan

therefore lacks interim status with respect to those sites.

Cooling Towers

With respect to the cooling towers, McClellan states

that in the past it has used treated wastewater from the

base’s reclamation system in approximately one hundred

cooling towers that are used to cool buildings on the

base. The treated wastewater was circulated through the

cooling towers and then returned to the treatment facility.

However, that practice was discontinued in October 1985

with respect to most of the cooling towers and in March

1986 — one month prior to the filing of the present suit -

with respect to the remaining cooling towers. See Affi-

davit of Paul G. Brunner, attached to McClellan’s motion

for summary judgment, { 8. MESS does not dispute

McClellan’s assertion that it has not used any treated

wastewater in the cooling towers since March 1986.

McClellan’s termination of the use of treated waste-

water in the cooling towers makes Count 2 moot insofar

as it relates to the towers. The citizen suit provisions of

RCRA and the Clean Water Act are forward-looking; they

are intended to remedy present and future harmful

impacts, not conduct that has occurred entirely in the

past and cannot reasonably be expected to result in future

harm.

App. 37

The Supreme Court recently addressed the purposes

of the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act in

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 108

S.Ct. 376, 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987). For present purposes,

that provision is almost identical to the RCRA citizen suit

provision. Based upon the actual language of that provi-

sion as well as the definition of “citizen,” the Court

concluded that “the harm sought to be addressed by the

citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in the

past.” 108 S.Ct. at 382. In order for a district court to have

jurisdiction over a citizen suit claim, the Court con-

cluded, the underlying complaint must contain a good-

faith allegation that the conduct complained of is

continuing in nature.

Here, the conduct complained of - use of treated

wastewater in the cooling towers — was discontinued one

month prior to the filing of the complaint. Therefore, the

question might arise whether MESS’ allegation that the

conduct was continuing as of April 1986 was made in

good faith. I need not reach that issue, however, because

even where there is a good-faith allegation of a continu-

ing violation, the claim might be moot where that allega-

tion turns out to be in error. As the Supreme Court stated

in Gwaltney;

Longstanding principles of mootness .

prevent the maintenance of suit when ” ‘there is

no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be

repeated.’ ” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345

U.S. 629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303

(1953) (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of

America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (CA2 1945). In seeking

to have a case dismissed as moot, however, the

defendant’s burden “is a heavy one.” 345 U.S.,

App. 38

at 633, 73 S.Ct., at 897. The defendant must

demonstrate that it is “absolutely clear that the

allegedly wrongful behavior could not reason-

ably be expected to recur.” United States v. Phos-

phate Export Assn., Inc., 393 U.S. 199, 203, 89

S.Ct. 361, 364, 21 L.Ed.2d 344 (1968).

108 S.Ct. at 386 (emphasis added by Gwaltney Court).

The Court concludes that the Government here has

met the heavy burden of demonstrating mootness.

McClellan has provided evidence by means of the Brun-

ner affidavit - and MESS has not disputed that evidence -

that it has not used treated wastewater in the cooling

towers for nearly two years. There is simply no reason to

believe that McClellan has any intention of using treated

wastewater in the cooling towers any time in the future.

Accordingly, the Court grants the Government’s motion

for summary judgment on that part of Count 2 that seeks

injunctive relief with respect to the use of treated waste-

water in the cooling towers.

MESS has also requested declaratory relief on this

and all other issues. The Court is not prepared to rule at

this time on whether declaratory relief is appropriate

with respect to claims that are dismissed on mootness

grounds. Instead, the Court will ask that the parties brief

that issue in the context of the next round of dispositive

motions in this proceeding.

Waste Pits

MESS also alleges that McClellan is storing hazard-

ous wastes in unlined waste pits in violation of RCRA.

The crux of MESS’ contention is that McClellan’s Part A

App. 39

application did not mention certain unlined burial pits on

the base and therefore McClellan does not have interim

status with respect to those pits. The Government’s posi-

tion is that all the waste pits not identified in its Part A

have been inactive since at least November 19, 1980 and

ther “>re a RCRA permit is not required with respect to

those disposal sites.

RCRA is not a model of clarity in this respect. On the

one hand, certain provisions suggest that the permit

requirements are intended to apply only to the treatment,

storage, or disposal of hazardous wastes occurring after

November 19, 1980, the effective date of the RCRA imple-

menting regulations. Section 3005(a) of RCRA specifically

requires permits only for the management of hazardous

wastes “after such date” that EPA’s permit regulations

take effect. In addition, EPA’s regulations provide that

permits are required only during the “active life” of

hazardous waste management units. 40 C.F.R. § 270.1(c).

See also 45 Fed.Reg. 33,068 (May 19, 1980) (“The Agency’s

intent is not to regulate under Subtitle C portions of

facilities closed before the effective date of the regula-

tions”); 45 Fed.Reg. 12,747 (Feb. 26, 1980) (“RCRA Sub-

title C Regulations do not cover . . . abandoned sites”).

On the other hand, certain provisions suggest that

permit requirements may apply to the maintenance of an

inactive disposal site within an active facility. For exam-

ple, section 3004(u) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u), pro-

vides that prior to issuing a permit to a facility, EPA may

require corrective action with respect to certain releases

of hazardous waste from past waste disposal sites at that

facility. Similarly, section 3008(h), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(h),

App. 40

provides EPA with enforcement authority to require cor-

rective action with respect to releases of hazardous waste

into the environment from facilities with interim status.

Moreover, section 7003, 42 U.S.C. § 6973, authorizes EPA

to bring suit against anyone who has contributed to the

past handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or dis-

posal of waste that may present an imminent and sub-

stantial endangerment to health or the environment.

Having said all this, the narrow question presented

in Count 2 is whether McClellan was required to apply

for a RCRA permit with respect to the waste pits that

were not specifically identified in its Part A application.

The answer to this question might very well turn on

whether the waste pits were “active” after November 19,

1980. MESS contends that the pits were and continue to

be active after that date because McClellan is actively

“storing” hazardous wastes in the pits. The Government,

on the other hand, contends that the wastes placed in the

pits were intended for permanent disposal and that no

new wastes have been added to those pits since Novem-

ber 19, 1980. The Government states that the only activity

that has occurred at any of these sites relates to its Instal-

lation Restoration Program (“IRP”), which is designed to

mitigate any actual or threatened damage to the environ-

ment caused by its past disposal activities, and that activ-

ities undertaken pursuant to the IRP are exempt from

RCRA permit requirements. See section 121(a) of the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of

1986, adding new section 121(e) to the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act.

App. 41

In view of the parties’ disagreement as to whether

McClellan actively managed hazardous wastes in the

waste pits subsequent to November 19, 1980, the Court

determines that there is a triable issue of fact that can

benefit from further discovery. Accordingly, the cross-

motions for summary judgment on Count 2 are denied

insofar as that count relates to McClellan’s waste pits.

Count 3 —- RCRA § 3010(a)

Count 3 alleges that McClellan failed to give EPA

notice of its hazardous waste activities under section

3010(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6930(a). That section pro-

vides that within ninety days of the promulgation of

relevant regulations by EPA, persons engaged in hazard-

ous waste activity shall file “a notification stating the

location and general description of such activity and the

identified or listed hazardous wastes handled by such

person.” MESS contends that McClellan violated this

requirement because the notification filed by McClellan

on August 19, 1980 omitted any mention of the hazardous

wastes that are “stored” in the waste pits. The Govern-

ment responds that the notification requirement was

never intended as a means of locating inactive disposal

sites and that it fully complied with section 3010(a) in any

event.

Resolution of Count 3 might depend upon whether

McClellan was actively handling hazardous wastes in the

waste pits at the time that it filed its notification under

section 3010(a). Because the Court has already concluded

that that is a triable issue of fact, Count 3 should also

remain open for now. Accordingly, the cross-motions for

summary judgment on Count 3 are denied.

App. 42

Count 4 —- RCRA § 3005(e)

Count 4 alleges that McClellan is violating its interim

status by using treated wastewater from the industrial

waste treatment facility in the cooling system and by

misstating in its Part A application the hazardous wastes

to be treated, stored, or disposed of on the base.

Count 4 is principally a restatement of Count 2 and

the same ruling should apply. Accordingly, that part of

Count 4 that relates to the cooling towers is dismissed on

mootness grounds with respect to injunctive relief but not

declaratory relief, and the cross-motions for summary

judgment are denied insofar as count 4 relates to

McClellan’s waste pits.

Count 5 - 40 C.F.R. Part 265

Count 5 alleges several violations of the provisions of

40 C.F.R. Part 265. Part 265 sets forth minimum standards

for the management of hazardous waste during a facil-

ity’s interim status. 5ee 40 C.F.R. § 265.1.

MESS first asserts that McClellan has violated 40

C.F.R. § 265.15. Complaint { 48. Section 265.15(a) requires

owners of hazardous waste facilities to inspect their facil-

ities for malfunctions and deterioration, operator errors,

and discharges which may cause the release of hazardous

waste constituents to the environment or a threat to

human health. Section 265.15(c) requires owners to rem-

edy any deterioration or malfunction in order to avoid an

environmental or human health hazard.

MESS further alleges that McClellan is violating the

interim status standards for waste piles (40 C.F.R.

——

7

Alpe RE ia ac ONE ka hs RN MR a a RN lr SI a Mtns lil il iia ach salen

LS ek Ele len | eae. Oh

App. 43

§ 265.250) and land treatment 40 C.F.R. § 265.270). Speci-

fically, MESS asserts that McClellan is violating the provi-

sions of 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.250 and 265.270 “by storing

hazardous waste drums on permeable bases, storing

other hazardous wastes in unlined pits, and failing to

protect these sites by water run-on control systems or

water run-off management systems.” Complaint { 49.

Part 265 applies only to hazardous waste units that

are subject to RCRA’s interim status provisions. Thus, if a

RCRA permit is not required for a particular unit, then

that unit is not covered by Part 265. The Court will

therefore defer ruling on Count 5 insofar as it relates to

McClellan’s waste pits for the same reason that a ruling

on Count 2 has been deferred.

However, insofar as Count 5 relates to hazardous

waste drums, summary judgment in favor of the Govern-

ment is granted. The particular regulations cited by MESS

- 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.250 and 265.270 — do not apply to waste

drums. Rather, waste drums are covered by 40 C.F.R.

§ 265.170, which covers the use and management of con-

tainers. Section 265.170 does not in any way require a

water run-on/run-off management system. In any event,

it is undisputed that McClellan does have a management

system in place to prevent water run-on and run-off in its

staging areas. This system consists of secondary contain-

ment in the form of concrete berms, which prevent water

from entering and hazardous waste spills from exiting the

storage sites. McClellan also uses trailers with secondary

containment features at its hazardous waste temporary

staging areas. Brunner Affidavit { 5.

App. 44

Accordingly, the Government’s motion for summary

judgment on Count 5 is granted with respect to waste

drums and denied with respect to waste pits.

Counts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 —- California Solid Waste

Law

MESS alleges in Counts 6, 8, 9, and 10 of the com-

plaint that McClellan has violated various provisions of

California solid waste law. Specifically, Count 6 alleges

that McClellan has violated section 25201 of the Califor-

nia Health and Safety Code, which requires state permits

for the treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous

wastes. Count 8 alleges a violation of section 25154 of the

Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the handling,

storage, use, processing, or disposal of hazardous wastes

except as provided for under Chapter 6.5 of the Code or

regulations adopted by the state. Count 9 alleges a viola-

tion of section 25155 of the Health and Safety Code,

which prohibits the disposal of extremely hazardous

wastes without prior processing to remove harmful prop-

erties. Count 10 alleges a violation of section 25203 of the

Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the disposal of

hazardous waste at any unpermitted disposal site.

Count 11 alleges that McClellan is violating certain

discharge specifications in Order No. 78-99, issued by the

California Regional Water Quality Control Board on Sep-

tember 8, 1978.

The Government contends that each of these counts

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the

RCRA citizen suit provision. Specifically, the Government

argues that section 7002 of RCRA limits citizens suits to

alleged violations of “any permit, standard, regulation,

App. 45

condition, requirement, prohibition, or order which has

become effective pursuant to [RCRA].” (Emphasis

added.) According to the Government, the obligations

alleged to have been violated in Counts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11

are not effective pursuant to RCRA and therefore the

Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Court agrees.

A state statute could arguably have become effective

pursuant to RCRA if it is part of a state hazardous waste

program that has been authorized by EPA under section

3006 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926, to apply in lieu of the

federal hazardous waste program. Under section

3006(c)(1), EPA has the authority to grant interim authori-

zation to state programs that are “substantially equiva-

lent” to the federal program. Under section 3006(b), EPA

may grant final authorization to state hazardous waste

programs that: (1) are equivalent to the federal hazardous

waste program; (2) are consistent with the federal pro-

gram and other state programs that have received final

authorization; and (3) provide adequate enforcement.

Section 3006(c)(1) provides that a state’s interim authori-

zation automatically expires on January 31, 1986 and

authority to administer and enforce the entire RCRA

program reverts to the federal government on that date

unless the state has been granted final authorization.

California received partial interim authorization on

June 4, 1981. This authorization related to EPA’s regula-

tions in 40 C.F.R. Parts 260, 261, 262, 263, and 265, cover-

ing identification and listing of hazardous wastes,

standards applicable to generators, standards applicable

to transporters, and standards applicable to interim sta-

tus facilities. See 50 Fed.Reg. 5259 Feb. 7, 1985). On Janu-

ary 11, 1983, California received additional interim

App. 46

authorization under RCRA § 3006 limited to permitting

authority for the storage and treatment of hazardous

wastes in tanks and containers. This interim authoriza-

tion specifically did not include permitting authority with

respect to: (1) treatment of hazardous wastes in surface

impoundments, waste piles, land treatment facilities, or

incinerators; (2) storage of hazardous wastes in surface

impoundments or waste piles; or (3) disposal facilities. 50

Fed.Reg. 5259. On January 31, 1986, even this limited

authorization to administer the California hazardous

waste program in lieu of the federal program expired. See

51 Fed.Reg. 4128 (Jan. 31, 1986). No part of the California

hazardous waste program is presently authorized under

RCRA § 3006.

Because California’s interim authorization has

expired, that state’s hazardous waste laws are not even

arguably “effective pursuant to [RCRA].” RCRA

§ 7002(a)(1)(A). Indeed, California never had authoriza-

tion with respect to most of the provisions involved in

Counts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11. Under these circumstances, the

violations of state statutory provisions alleged by MESS

cannot be reviewed in the context of a citizen suit under

RCRA § 7002.2 Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction

2 MESS contends that the federal facility provision of

RCRA, section 6001, became effective pursuant to RCRA and

therefore the Court has jurisdiction under section 7002. Section

6001, however, is not itself a “permit, standard, regulation, con-

dition, requirement, prohibition, or order” as those terms are

used in section 7002; rather, section 6001 is a waiver of sover-

eign immunity with respect to certain substantive and pro-

cedural requirements that have independent existence outside

of section 6001. Indeed, Counts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 do not allege

App. 47

over Counts 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11 and those counts must

therefore be dismissed. It also follows that MESS’ motion

for summary judgment with respect to Counts 6, 8, and

10 must be denied.

In view of the above determination, it is not neces-

sary to address the Government’s alternative arguments

that the state law counts should be dismissed on other

grounds.

CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE

CLEAN WATER ACT

Section 301(A) of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(a), prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navi-

gable waters of the United States except pursuant to a

permit issued under section 402 of the Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342. The EPA Administrator is directed to establish

effluent limitations and standards of performance for

“point sources” of pollution. CWA §§ 304, 306, 307, 33

U.S.C. §§ 1314, 1316, 1317. Through the National Pollu-

tant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”), estab-

lished pursuant to section 402 of the CWA, these

standards and limitations, together with any applicable

limitations based on state law, are incorporated into indi-

vidual NPDES permits which regulate a particular per-

son’s discharges into waters of the United States.

violations of section 6001; rather, they allege violations of state

solid waste laws. It is these laws that must have become effec-

tive pursuant to RCRA for this Court to have jurisdiction under

section 7002.

App. 48

Under section 402(b) of the Clean Water Act, a state

may administer NPDES permit program upon approval

of EPA. California obtained such permitting authority on

May 14, 1973. 39 Fed.Reg. 26,061.

As with RCRA, the Clean Water Act provides for a

limited waiver of sovereign immunity. Specifically, sec-

tion 313(a) of the Act, 3 U.S.C. § 1323(a), waives the

sovereign immunity of federal facilities with respect to

“all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,

administrative authority, and process and sanctions

respecting the control and abatement of water pollution.”

Moreover, under section 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1),

any citizen may commence a civil action against any

person, including the United States, who is alleged to be

in violation of an effluent standard or limitation or an

order issued by EPA or a state with respect to such a

standard of limitation. The term “effluent standard or

limitation” includes NPDES permits issued under section

402, but does not include state standards that are not part

of a permit. CWA § 505(f). As is the case with citizen suits

under RCRA, a citizen suit under the Clean Water Act |

cannot be maintained unless the plaintiff has provided

sixty days notice of its claims to the alleged violator, the

State, and EPA.

As discussed earlier in the context of RCRA, waivers

of sovereign immunity are to be interpreted narrowly,

they are not to be implied, and they must be clear and

unambiguous.

Count 12 — NPDES Permit 78-232

McClellan’s discharges to waters of the United States

have been covered under a series of NPDES permits and

App. 49

state orders. A chronology of McClellan’s permits is set

forth in the Brunner Affidavit.

Count 12 of the complaint alleges that McClellan

violated the provisions of NPDES permit 78-232 every

day between July 1, 1981 and July 1, 1983 by discharging

waste to surface water drainage courses from outfall

pipes 001 and 002. In the memorandum in support of its

motion for summary judgment, MESS concedes that per-

mit 78-232 remained in effect only until September 24,

1982 and therefore alleges that violations occurred only

during the period July 1, 1981 to September 24, 1982.

MESS Memorandum at 5-6.

In its motion for summary judgment, the Govern-

ment offers two separate grounds for dismissing Count

12. First, the Government maintains that this Court lacks

jurisdiction under section 505 of the Clean Water Act -

the citizen suit provision - because Count 12 alleges

violation that occurred entirely in the past. Second, the

Government argues that Count 12 is moot because

McClellan no longer discharges waste to surface water

drainage courses from outfalls 001 and 002. This Court

agrees with both of the Government's contentions.

As previously discussed, the Supreme Court recently

held in Gwaltney that a district court has jurisdiction over

a claim under section 505 only if the complaint contains a

good-faith allegation that the purported violations are of

a continuous nature, i.e., that there is a reasonable likeli-

hood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the

future. Here, on its face, Count 12 alleges only past

violations. Count 12 does not allege that McClellan is

continuing to violate NPDES Permit 78-232; indeed, it

App. 50

could not since the permit expired by its own terms on

July 1, 1983. Accordingly, under Gwaltney, this Court

lacks jurisdiction with respect to Count 12.

Even if Count 12 did contain a good-faith allegation

of a continuing violation, the issue is now moot in view

of the uncontested evidence that McClellan now sends all

of its domestic and industrial wastewater directly to the

County waste treatment facility and no longer discharges

any such wastewater to surface waters. Brunner Affidavit

{ 19. As previously discussed, where “there is no reason-

able expectation that the wrong will be repeated,” 108

S.Ct. at 386, a claim should be dismissed as moot.

The Government’s motion for summary judgment

with respect to Count 12 is therefore granted and that

count is dismissed with respect to injunctive relief. As

was the case with Count 2, however, the Court is pres-

ently leaving open the possibility of granting declaratory

relief with respect to Count 12. MESS’ motion for sum-

mary judgment with respect to Count 12 is denied.

Count 13 -— Order No. 82-125

Count 13 alleges that McClellan violated Order No.

82-125 each and every day during the period May 1 to

October 31 in 1983, 1984, and 1985 by discharging domes-

tic wastewater to surface water or surface water drainage

courses.

Count 13 must be dismissed on the same grounds as

Count /2. First, Count 13 alleges past rather than continu-

ing violations and therefore this Court lacks jurisdiction

under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act.

Second because it is undisputed that McClellan no longer

App. 51

discharges domestic wastewater to surface waters, Count

13 is moot. Accordingly, the Government’s motion for

summary judgment on Count 13 is granted except with

respect to declaratory relief, and MESS’ motion for sum-

mary judgment on Count 13 is denied.

Count 14 —- CWA § 301 (Stormwater Discharges)

Count 14 of the complaint alleges that McClellan

discharges stormwater run-off into Magpie, Second, and

Arcade Creeks without an NPDES permit and is therefore

in violation of section 301 of the Clean Water Act. With-

out conceding any past violations, the Government

argues that Count 14 should be dismissed both because

McClellan’s present permit explicitly encompasses storm-

water discharges and because recent amendments to the

Clean Water Act make it clear that McClellan need not

presently apply for a permit for discharges consisting

entirely of stormwater. The Court agrees.

McClellan’s most recent NPDES permit was issued

on September 24, 1987. That permit expressly encom-

passes stormwater, both in its title and in its imposition of

monitoring and reporting requirements for discharges of

stormwater.

In addition EPA does not presently require permits

for discharges consisting entirely of stormwater. See 50

Fed.Reg. 35, 200-03 (Aug. 29, 1985); 53 Fed.Reg. 4157 (Feb.

12, 1988). Moreover, section 405 of the Water Quality Act

of 1987, Pub.L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 69 amended section

402 of the Clean Water Act and it is now evident that

permits for industrial discharges consisting entirely of

App. 52

stormwater might not be required until as late as Febru-

ary 4, 1993. MESS contends that this amendment nev-

ertheless requires McClellan to monitor its discharges of

stormwater. Even if this were true, that is exactly what

McClellan is doing pursuant to its current NPDES permit.

For these reasons, the Government's motion for sum-

mary judgment is granted with respect to Count 14 and

that count is dismissed except for the possibility of

declaratory relief. MESS’ motion for summary judgment

on Count 14 is denied.

“Count 15 - CWA § 301 (Discharges to Groundwater)

Count 15 alleges that McClellan is violating section

301 of the Clean Water Act by discharging hazardous

substances from its waste pits to groundwater beneath

the base without an NPDES permit.

Section 301(a) provides that in the absence of a per-

mit, “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall

be unlawful.” The term “discharge of a pollutant” is

defined in section 502(12) as “any addition of any pollu-

tant to navigable waters from any point source.” The

term “navigable waters,” in turn, is defined in section

502(7) as “waters of the United States, including the

territorial seas.” Accordingly, section 301(a) requires per-

mits for the addition of pollutants from point sources to

waters of the United States.

The Clean Water Act does not on its face indicate

whether groundwater constitutes “waters of the United

States.” Nevertheless, based upon the structure of the

Act, its legislative history, and the relevant case law, this

court concludes that Congress did not intend to require

App. 53

NPDES permits for discharges of pollutants to isolated

groundwater. On the other hand, permits might be

required for discharges to groundwater that has a direct

hydrological connection to surface waters that themselves

constitute “waters of the United States.”

The structure of the Clean Water Act indicates that

Congress did not intend groundwater and navigable

waters to be synonymous. For example, in section 102(a),

33 U.S.C. § 1252(a), Congress directed EPA to “prepare or

develop comprehensive programs for preventing, reduc-

ing. or eliminating the pollution of the navigable waters

and ground waters.” (Emphasis added.) Of course, if “navi-

gable waters” were the same as groundwater, it would

have been unnecessary to refer to “groundwaters” sep-

arately. See also CWA § 104(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(5);

CWA 106(e)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1256(e)(1).

The legislative history of the Clean Water Act also

demonstrates that Congress did not intend that dis-

charges to isolated groundwater be subject to permit

requirements. The report accompanying the Senate ver-

sion of the Clean Water Act stated:

Several bills pending before the Committee

provided authority to establish Federally

approved standards for groundwaters which

permeate rock, soil and other surface forma-

tions. Because the jurisdiction regarding

groundwaters is so complex and varied from

State to State, the Committee did not adopt this

recommendation.

S.Rep. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1971), U.S.Code

Cong. & Admin.News 1972, pp. 3668, 3739, reprinted in 2

App. 54

Congressional Research Service of the Library of Con-

gress, A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1491

(Comm.Print 1973) (hereinafter “Leg. Hist.”).

In addition, the House specifically rejected an

amendment introduced by Rep. Aspin that would have

brought groundwater within the permitting and enforce-

ment sections of the bill. 118 Cong.Rec. 10,669 (1972), 1

Leg.Hist. 597. In opposing this amendment, Rep. Clausen,

a sponsor of the House bill, stated:

Mr. Chairman, in the early deliberations

within the committee which resulted in the

introduction of H.R. 11896, a provision for

ground waters, similar to that suggested by the

gentleman from Wisconsin, was thoroughly

reviewed and it was determined by the commit-

tee that there was not sufficient information on

ground waters to justify the types of controls

that are required for navigable waters.

118 Cong.Rec. 10,667 (1972), 1 Leg.Hist. 590-91 (remarks

of Rep. Clausen). Thus, both the Senate and the House

specifically rejected attempts to require permits for dis-

charges to groundwater under the NPDES program.

EPA, the agency charged with administering the

NPDES program, has also taken the view that discharges

to groundwater are not prohibited by section 301(a).* In

3 An agency’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged

with administering is entitled to considerable deference. See

Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.Ct. 1102,

1107, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467

U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984).

:

7

)

:

App. 55

an opinion dated December 13, 1973, EPA’s Office of

General Counsel ruled that EPA did not have general

authority to regulate groundwater. Rather, according to

the opinion, EPA’s statutory authority to regulate dis-

charges into the ground was limited to discharges into

deep wells, and even then EPA could regulate only in

conjunction with the regulation of discharges to surface

waters.* Shortly after that opinion was issued, EPA pro-

mulgated regulations that reflected the General Counsel’s

interpretation. 38 Fed.Reg. 13,528 (May 22, 1973). See 40

C.F.R. § 125.26(a)(1) (1977). Subsequently, EPA eliminated

even this narrow authority to regulate discharges into

groundwater. 44 Fed.Reg. 32,854, 32,870 (June 7, 1979).

In addition to the structure of the Clean Water Act,

its legislative history, and EPA’s interpretation of its

scope, the pertinent case law also demonstrates that dis-

charges to isolated groundwater are not prohibited by

section 301(a). In a case directly on point, the western

district of Michigan dismissed a count in a citizen suit

that alleged that a federal facility had violated section

301(a) by discharging toxic chemicals into the ground

without an NPDES permit. Keliey v. United States, 618°

F.Supp. 1103 (W.D.Mich.1985). After analyzing the statu-

tory scheme and reviewing the relevant legislative his-

tory, the court held that “Congress did not intend the

Clean Water Act to extend federal regulatory and enforce-

ment authority over groundwater contamination.” Id. at

1107.

4 The General Counsel’s opinion is reproduced in full in

Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310, 1320-21 n. 21 (5th Cir.1977).

App. 56

In Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir.1977),

the Fifth Circuit, while expressing no opinion as to

whether EPA has jurisdiction over wastes that might

“‘migrate’ from groundwaters back into surface waters

that concededly are within its regulatory jurisdiction,” id.

at 1312 n. 1, held that EPA did not have the authority to

regulate discharges into deep wells as a condition to a

permit that regulated discharges into navigable waters.

Id. at 1329. See also United States v. GAF Corp., 389 F.Supp.

1379, 1383 (S.D.Tex.1975) (“The disposal of chemical

wastes into underground waters which have not been

alleged to flow into or otherwise affect surface waters

does not constitute a ‘discharge of a pollutant’ within the

meaning of § 1311(a) [CWA § 301(a)]”) (footnote omitted).

MESS places its principal reliance on the Supreme

Court’s decision in United States v. Riverside Bayview

Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 106 S.Ct. 455, 88 L.Ed.2d 419

(1985). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld an inter-

pretation by the Army Corps of Engineers that the Clean

Water Act authorizes the Corps to require landowners to

obtain permits before discharging fill material into wet-

lands adjacent to navigable bodies of water and their

tributaries. In doing so, the Court stated that:

the Act’s definition of “navigable waters” as

“the waters of the United States” makes it clear

that the term “navigable” as used in the Act is of

limited import. In adopting this definition of

“navigable waters,” Congress evidently

intended to repudiate limits that had been

placed on federal regulation by earlier water

pollution control statutes and to exercise its

powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate

at least some waters that would not be deemed

App. 57

“navigable” under the classical understanding

of that term.

Id., 106 S.Ct. at 462. Based upon this language in Riverside

Bayview, MESS asserts that the Clean Water Act plainly

requires permits for discharges to groundwater.

Riverside Bayview, although indicating that Congress

intended the term “navigable waters” to have broad

scope, does not resolve this case. First, Riverside Bayview

involved surface waters only; the site at issue was wet-

lands adjacent to bodies of water that were navigable in

the traditional sense, not isolated groundwater. There the

Corps had concluded that “wetlands adjacent to lakes,

rivers, streams and other bodies of water may function as

integral parts of the aquatic environment.” Id. at 463.

Isolated groundwater, obviously, serves no such function.

Moreover, in Riverside Bayview it was the reasonable-

ness of the Corps’ determination that the Clean Water Act

requires permits for the filling of wetlands that was

under review. In that context, the Court applied the well-

established doctrine that “[a]n agency’s construction of a

Statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to defer-

ence if it is reasonable and not in conflict with the

expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 461. Here, however,

MESS advances an interpretation of the Clean Water Act

that is directly contrary to the construction of that statute

by the Agency charged with enforcing the NPDES pro-

gram.°

° MESS contends that because Congress defined “point

source” to include wells, “Congess understood groundwater to

be regulated under the Act.” MESS Response at 32. But MESS is

App. 58

Whereas it is clear that Congress did not intend to

require permits for discharges to isolated groundwater, it

is also clear that Congress did mean to limit discharges of

pollutants that coulc' affect surface waters of the United

States. In Riverside Bayview, for instance, the Court noted

the importance of the Corps’ conclusion that. adjacent

wetlands “may affect the water quality of adjacent lakes,

rivers, and streams” by “serv[ing] to filter and purify

water draining into adjacent bodies of water .

and ... slow[ing] the flow of surface runoff into lakes,

rivers, and streams and thus prevent[ing] flooding and

erosion.” 106 S.Ct. at 463.

Other courts addressing the issue whether discharges

to something other than “waters of the United States” are

nonetheless covered by the NPDES program have also

taken note of the ultimate effect on surface waters. See

Quivira Mining Co. v. United States Environmental Protec-

tion Agency, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir.1985) (noting that

the discharges ultimately affected navigable-in-fact

streams); Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d at 1312 n. 1; United

States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.Supp. 1181, 1187

(D.Ariz.1975) (holding that “navigable waters” includes

“any waterway within the United States also including

confusing “point source” and “navigable waters.” Permits are

required for discharges from point sources, not to point sources.

Thus, the fact that a well is a point source has nothing to do with

whether a permit is required for a discharge to the well; it only

means that a discharge from the well, such as overflow into

surface waters, might require a permit. Moreover, groundwater

is not synonymous with wells. Thus, even if discharges to wells

did require permits, it does not follow that discharges to

groundwater would also require permits.

App. 59

normally dry arroyos through which water may flow,

where such water will ultimately end up in public waters

such as a river or stream, tributary to a river or stream,

lake, reservoir, bay, gulf, sea or ocean either within or

adiacent to the United States”); United States v. GAF Corp.,

389 F.Supp. 1379, 1383 (S.D.Tex.1975) (holding that per-

mits are not required for the “disposal of chemical wastes

into underground waters which have not been alleged to

flow into or otherwise affect surface waters”).

Taking all these factors into consideration, the Court

concludes that MESS should be given the opportunity to

engage in additional discovery to demonstrate a hydro-

logical connection between the groundwater that lies

below McClellan’s waste pits and surface waters that

themselves constitute “navigable waters.” Only if MESS

can show that discharges from the waste pits have an

effect on surface waters of the United States can it prevail

on Count 15. The mere fact that the groundwater might

ultimately be consumed or might be used for irrigation

purposes, as asserted by MESS, is not enough to bring the

alleged discharges within the parameters of the NPDES

program. Rather, MESS must establish that the ground-

water is naturally connected to surface waters that consti-

tute “navigable waters” under the Clean Water Act.

Because further discovery is necessary with respect

to Count 15, the cross-motions for summary judgment are

denied.

Counts 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21 — State Water Claims

Counts 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21 allege that McClellan

has violated various state statutory and regulatory provi-

sions.

App. 60

MESS alleges in Count 16 that McClellan has violated

section 13260 of the California Water Code. Section 13260

provides that “[A]ny person discharging waste . . . that

could affect the quality of the waters of the state” shall

file a report with the regional water quality board. MESS

contends that McClellan has violated this provision by

discharging toxic chemicals from unlined pits on the base

into the groundwater beneath the base without notifying

the regional water quality control board.

MESS alleges in Count 17 that McClellan violated

section 13264(a) of the California Water Code, which

requires the filing of reports prior to the initiation or

change of any discharge. MESS alleges that McClellan has

frequently changed the nature of its discharges and initi-

ated new discharges without filing the required reports.

In Count 19, MESS alleges a violation of section 13350

of the California Water Code, which requires compliance

with regional and state discharge regulations. Speci-

fically, MESS asserts that McClellan has not complied

with section 64403 of title 22 of the California Adminis-

trative Code - which purportedly requires water sup-

pliers to “protect the water resources” under their control

and to “assure” a supply of potable water to users — by

discharging hazardous substances to an aquifer under the

base from which base personnel receive their drinking

water. MESS further asserts that McClellan is not an

“approved waste management unit” and therefore has

violated section 2526 of title 23 of the California Adminis-

trative Code, which purportedly permits discharges of

waste to land only at such approved waste management

units.

App. 61

Count 20 alleges a violation of section 5650 of the

‘California Fish and Game Code. That provision prohibits

the discharge into state waters of “[a]ny petro-

leum .. . residuary product of petroleum, or car-

bonaceous material . . . [and] [a]ny refuse, liquid or solid,

from any . . . chemical works [and] [a]ny substance or

material deleterious to fish, plant life, or bird life.”

Count 21 alleges a violation of section 5411 of the

California Health and Safety Code, which prohibits the

discharge of waste in any manner that will result in

contamination, pollution, or nuisance.

The Government contends that the state statutory

and regulatory provisions referred to in Counts 16, 17,

19(A), and 21 do not constitute “requirements” as that

term is used in section 313 of the Clean Water Act, and

therefore there has been no waiver of sovereign immunity

with respect to these state provisions. The Government

further maintains that this Court lacks jurisdiction over

Counts 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21 under the citizen suit provi-

sion of the Clean Water Act because the state provisions

involved in those counts are not “effluent standards or

limitations” as defined in section 505 of the Act. The

Court agrees with both elements of the Government's

position.

Section 313

Section 313 waives sovereign immunity for “all Fed-

eral, State, interstate, and local requirements.” The term

“requirements” is not defined in the Clean Water Act;

however, there is substantial case law that has given

meaning to the term as used in section 313 and similar

App. 62

provisions of other environmental statutes. In short, these

cases have interpreted “requirements” to refer to objec-

tive and administratively pre-established water pollution

control standards; section 313 and vimilar provisions in

other stat..tes do not allow for the enforcement against

federal facilities of state laws that require an ad hoc estab-

lishment of standards of conduct by the judiciary.

When originally enacted in 1972, section 313 pro-

vided that federal facilities “shall comply with Federal,

State, interstate, and local requireme

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