Opposition Brief — Ball v. Gasho

Supreme Court brief1995

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

—-

Suarem Court, U.S.

Sia ED

po Pwete

No. 94-1777

In the :

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

WILLIAM L. BALL; ROGER MANNHALTER:

JOHN J. HOWE, JR.,

Petitioners,

v.

JOHN R. GASHO, SR.; SHARON L. GASHO,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Christine R. Taradash

Maria Crimi Speth*

Beus, Gilbert & Morrill, P.L.L.C.

3200 North Central Avenue

1000 Great American Tower

Phoenix, AZ 85012-2417

Counsel for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Consistent with this Court’s decisions in Harlaw v.

Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800 (1982), and Anderson v. Creighton,

483 U.S. 635 (1987), the Ninth Circuit determined that the

Customs Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity

because, based on clearly established law, no reasonable

Customs agent could have believed that there was probable

cause to arrest John and Sharon Gasho. Thus, this case

presents the following questions:

1. Whether Petitioners’ argument that the Ninth Circuit

did not apply an objective standard of reasonableness to

determine the qualified immunity issue is frivolous.

2. Whether Petitioners’ argument that the Ninth Circuit

did not apply clearly established principles of constitutional

law to defeat Petitioners’ qualified immunity defense is

frivolous.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

eu yy eB) rere a i

TARE GP ALTE cc beck cenwseuwes iv

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS

DEVEINED wnowcaveecetateke uta 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........ccese- 3

A. See ee in ve bv kA Oe ee 3

B. District Court Proceedings ....... ee: 9

CG. Fee Gee Se ks obs a we bee eee 10

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ........ 12

I. PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT THE NINTH

CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH

RULINGS OF THIS COURT IS FRIVOLOUS .. 12

A. The Ninth Circuit Properly Applied an Objective

Standard to Determine the Qualified Immunity

WR ac cctadnbusdseee bane 12

B. The Ninth Circuit Clearly and Expressly Articu-

lated the Specific Constitutional Right at Issue

and Properly Held that Based on Clearly

Established Law the Officers Were Not Entitled

to Qualified Immunity ............... 15

iil

Il. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WAS FILED SOLEY TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS

LONG ENOUGH TO BAR THE BIVENS

GEE SRE Soho eee w es ces Hester 22

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635

EE a Bou ae eee a a ihe 12, 15, 19, 20

Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents,

ee ee: Ge OE es os 0 es re we 9

Duran v. City of Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372

I St ho oa 0 eee ee wee 18

Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991) .......... 17

Gasho v. United States, 39 F.2d 1420

RI ge hos otha is oe. a ae passim

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S. 800 (1982) ..... 4. 33

Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) ............ 18

Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224(1991) .......... 20

United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343

URE ig Ur Ae A er 17, 18

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Se ais a te a ea eae a

th Be” Sl CS 9, 15, 18, 19, 21

OR Re OS | er er rr a ae ee 9

ee eT

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Continued)

STATUTES Page

ee Se 5 a 4 OR oe OA ee 8,9

ea EE 4 6 6 Oe CK Ra eee 10

Oe an EE 4 Oe ek eee eee 2, 10, 20

- Gk io 0 ee eee eee re 2, 9, 20

ee ee Oe 8S eb 4 ee dea 9

ee ees EE bck beeen es 2, 9, 10, 22

og Fe | ear are Ur a 6

REGULATIONS AND RULES

Rule 41(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure ... 23

Rule 12(b)(6), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ..... 9

Rule 42.2, Rules of the Supreme Court of

Re ee rar as ie ee ee ee 25

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1994

WILLIAM L. BALL; ROGER MANNHALTER;

JOHN J. HOWE, JR.,

Petitioners,

v.

JOHN R. GASHO, SR.; SHARON L. GASHO,

Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT:

Respondents John R. Gasho, Sr. and Sharon L. Gasho

respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari submitted by Petitioners William L. Ball, Roger

Mannhalter, and John J. Howe, Jr.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

In addition to the constitutional and statutory provisions

cited by Petitioners, Respondents refer this Court to the

Statutory provisions cited below.

Title 18, Section 2233, of the United States Code

provides:

Rescue of seized property.

Whoever forcibly rescues, dispossesses, or attempts

to rescue or dispossess any property, articles, or

objects after the same shall have been taken,

detained, or seized by any officer or other person

under the authority of any revenue law of the United

States, or by any person authorized to make searches

and seizures, shall be fined under this title or

imprisoned not more than two years, or both.

Title 28, Section 2676, of the United States Code

provides:

Judgment as bar.

The judgment in an action under section 1346(b) of

this title shall constitute a complete bar to any action

by the claimant, by reason of the same subject

Matter, against the employee of the government

whose act or omission gave rise to the claim.

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual Statement.

John and Sharon Gasho own an aircraft restoration

company in Tucson, Arizona. On June 24, 1988, the Gashos

flew a McDonnell Douglas DC-3 aircraft from Tucson to the

Scottsdale Municipal Airport in order to meet with John

Zarcone, a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

inspector.' The Gashos were selling the aircraft to

Millardair, Ltd., a Canadian corporation, and needed to

terminate the United States registration of the aircraft before

export.

At the airport, Zarcone issued the Gashos several docu-

ments, including a Special Flight Authorization allowing the

aircraft to be flown to the United States-Canada border with

Canadian registry markings. The Special Flight Author-

ization stated that Canada would not issue a valid Canadian

registration until the aircraft actually entered into Canada.

Millardair had applied to Canadian authorities for a Canadian

registration and had been assigned a Canadian number:

however, official registration was contingent upon the

aircraft's entry into Canada.

The Gashos with the assistance of Zarcone removed the

U.S. registration markings and affixed the Canadian

' There is absolutely no evidence that John and Sharon Gasho have

ever participated in smuggling contraband across the United States-

Mexico border. In fact, the Customs Service concluded after their

investigation of the Gashos that they are honest, law abiding citizens who

are “as clean as a whistle."

4

markings to the aircraft. The Gashos then returned to their

room at a nearby hotel in Scottsdale, Arizona. It was the

Gashos’ intention to return to Tucson the following day to

await issuance of a provisional certificate of registration and

flight permit before exporting the aircraft to Canada.

Later that day, an air traffic controller at the airport

noticed that the registration markings on the aircraft had been

changed after its arrival. He alerted William Gately, the

Customs agent in charge. Based solely on the report of the

air traffic controller and without any further investigation,

Gately, Special Agent William Ball and others decided that

"the aircraft would not be permitted to depart, and should be

seized because of registration irregularities." Gately dis-

patched Special Agents Ball and Roger Mannhalter to investi-

gate.

2 Gately claims that he telephoned a friend, Corporal Karol

Waversfeld of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Vancouver. Gately

claims Waversfeld told him the registration markings were invalid prior

to seizure of the aircraft. Waversfeld gave a different account in a

deposition. He testified that Lorraine Gray of the Canadian Transport

Ministry in Toronto told him thai an application for Canadian registry

was pending and that the numbers could not be used in Canada until the

application was approved. Waversfeld testified that he relayed this

information to Gately or his representative. There is also a dispute

regarding when the information was relayed to Gately. Petitioners claim

that Gately knew the information before the seizure of the aircraft.

Waversfeld, however, testified that he could not have called Gray on the

afternoon of June 24, 1988, because there is a four hour time difference

between Vancouver and Toronto and therefore Gray would not have been

at her office when Waversfeld received the call from Gately in the

afternoon of June 24, 1988.

5

The Customs Agents learned from officials at the

Scottsdale Airport that the Gashos were staying at a local

hotel. The Customs Agents easily located the Gashos at the

hotel. When the Agents confronted the Gashos at their hotel

room, John Gasho explained the ownership history of the

aircraft, that he obtained the Canadian registry markings

from the aircraft’s owner, Millardair, and that the FAA

inspector John Zarcone had assisted in changing the regis-

tration markings. He explained that the FAA issued several

documents, including a special authorization permit, which

was inside the aircraft, allowing the aircraft to be flown to

Canada. After hearing John Gasho’s explanation, Customs

Service Pilot Will Willbanks, who was also present at the

hotel, informed Agents Ball and Mannhalter that the proce-

dure described by John Gasho for changing registration

markings before export was consistent with the customary

FAA procedures for exporting an aircraft to Canada. Never-

theless, Agent Ball advised John Gasho of his Miranda

rights. The Gashos then summoned their daughter, Pamela

Vining, a Phoenix attorney, for legal counsel.

At this point, the Agents, the Gashos and Vining went to

Scottsdale airfield. At the airport, the Gashos showed the

Customs Agents the documents issued by the FAA, including

the Special Flight Authorization allowing them to fly the

aircraft with Canadian markings. The Special Flight Author-

ization signed by Zarcone expressly provided that the aircraft

could display the foreign (Canadian) registration markings

for the purpose of flying the plane to the Canadian border

and that "the aircraft . . . had a current and valid standard

airworthiness certificate . . . but will not be issued a current

6

and valid Canadian airworthiness certificate until after its

entry into Canada.”

While the documentation expressly provided that the

aircraft was authorized by the FAA to fly with the Canadian

markings within the United States, the Agents decided that

the documents did not establish the validity of the Canadian

markings. The Agents placed a lock on the aircraft's

propeller, claiming they had probable cause to seize the

aircraft for the "knowing[ ] and willful[ |" display of "false

or misleading” markings, in vioiation of 49 U.S.C. § 1472.

After seizing the aircraft, the Customs Agents gave

Sharon Gasho permission to enter the aircraft to remove

personal belongings and the aircraft's radio. The Customs

Agents did not tell her that anv items inside the aircraft were

seized. Among the items she removed were the aircraft’s

logbooks. Sharon Gasho then exited the aircraft, carrying

the items in a plastic bag. At that time, John Gasho and the

Customs Agents were standing on the tarmac near the air-

craft. In the presence of the Customs Agents, John Gasho

called out to his wife in a loud, clear voice and asked her

whether she removed the logbooks. She replied, "Yes, |

did." Sharon Gasho then placed the plastic grocery bag

containing the logbooks and other personal belongings into

Vining’s automobile. Neither Agent Ball nor Agent

Mannhalter made any effort, either physical or verbal, to

stop Sharon Gasho from removing the logbooks and placing

them in the vehicle. In a deposition, Agent Ball was cross-

examined as follows:

Q. Did you stop her at that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you say anything to her at that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you protest in any way?

A. No.

Q. All right. What happened next?

A. Shortly thereafter we went inside the aviation center.

The subject of the logbooks was not raised until after the

parties entered the Scottsdale Aviation Center to make photo-

copies of the FAA documents. Ball and the other Agents

then told the Gashos that the seizure of the aircraft included

the logbooks and demanded that the Gashos return them.°

When Agent Ball threatened to search the vehicle, the

Gashos called the local police to prevent a breach of the

peace. The Agents warned the Gashos that they would be

arrested if they refused to turn over the logbooks.

3Customs Service Pilot Willbanks, who was present during the entire

play of events at the Scottsdale Airport on June 24, 1988, told Agent

Mannhalter, prior to the handcuffing of the Gashos, that the logbooks

were not a "big issue.” In fact, according to Customs Service policy,

normally logbooks are never seized with an aircraft and are not necessary

to the operation of an aircraft. Willbanks testified that the logbooks are

only important when the aircraft is put in service. However, when the

Customs Service seizes an aircraft, the logbooks are not important

because the aircraft is not put in service, but, rather, is put in a storage

facility pending forfeiture proceedings.

8

At Vining’s request, the Agents allowed Vining to meet

with the Gashos in a glass-enclosed office at the avaiation

center, where the Gashos were visible to the Customs

Agents. Immediately prior to the Gashos’ confere..ce with

Vining, Agent Ball telephoned his supervisor John Howe to

advise him of the situation. Mr. Howe ordered Agent Ball

to arrest the Gashos for theft from Customs’ custody and told

Ball that if he did not effect the arrest, he (Howe) would

come down and do it himself.

During the conference with Vining, the Gashos reached

the decision to give the logbooks to the Customs Agents.

Just as Vining was opening the office door to inform the

Agents of this decision, the Agents pushed open the door and

handcuffed the Gashos. Vining retrieved the logbooks from

her car and gave them to the Customs Agents. Although the

Gashos acquiesced in relinquishing the logbooks, the

Customs Agents handcuffed John and Sharon Gasho, unneces-

sarily paraded them through the lobby of the aviation center,

and loaded them into a squad car which transported them to

the Madison Street jail.

The Gashos were booked for violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 549, which forbids unlawful removal of property from

Customs custody. During booking, an Assistant United

States Attorney told Agent Mannhalter that his office would

not prosecute the Gashos. Nevertheless, Agent Mannhalter’s

supervisor, John Howe, ordered Mannhalter to continue the

booking process and to tell the Gashos that charges would be

filed. In October 1989, sixteen months after the arrests, the

United States Attorney formally declined to prosecute the

Gashos.

we Festina ti te aan a aa

)

B. District Court Proceedings.

The Gashos filed suit against the United States under the

FTCA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680, seeking damages

for false arrest and false imprisonment, intentional infliction

of emotional distress, and abuse of process.‘ The district

court granted summary judgment in favor of the government

on the false arrest and imprisonment claims and the inten-

tional infliction of emotional distress claim. By subsequent

order, the district court dismissed the abuse of process claim

for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6).

Prior to entry of judgment on the FTCA claims, the

Gashos filed suit under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal

Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against Agents Ball

and Mannhalter, and Howe, the Agents’ supervisor. The

Gashos claimed that the Agents arrested them without

probable cause, violating their Fourth and Fifth Amendment

rights.

The defendants moved to dismiss the Bivens claims

pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and also moved for

summary judgment, arguing that because of the judgment

entered in the FTCA action, 28 U.S.C. § 2676 operates as

a complete bar to the Bivens action and, alternatively, that

the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The

“The Gashos also filed a claim against Northrop Worldwide Aircraft

Services, Inc. ("Northrop") for damage incurred to the aircraft while in

Customs’ custody. The Gashos settled the claim with Northrop.

10

district court dismissed the claims, concluding that they were

barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2676.

C. Ninth Circuit Decision.

The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals in the FTCA

action and the Bivens action. In addressing the false arrest

claims in the FTCA action, the Ninth Circuit held that there

was no probable cause for the arrests of the Gashos under 18

U.S.C. §§ 2232 or 2233 because no agent could have

reasonably believed that the Gashos intended to steal the

logbooks from Customs’ custody or that the Gashos intended

to prevent seizure of the logbooks.* Gasho v. United States,

39 F.3d 1420, 1427-1432 (9th Cir. 1994) (Petitioners’ Brief

at pp. 7a-18a). The Ninth Circuit reasoned that no probable

Cause existed because the Agents gave the Gashos no notice

that they intended to seize the logbooks and there was no

evidence that the Gashos knew the removal of the logbooks

was forbidden. /d. The Ninth Circuit further determined

that the Gashos’ mere passive refusal to consent to a

warrantless search did not provide probable cause to arrest

the Gashos under §§ 2232 or 2233. /d.

With respect to the Bivens claims, the Ninth Circuit held

that since the judgment was reversed on the false arrest

claims in the FTCA action, the Bivens claims based on the

Gashos’ wrongful arrests were not barred by operation of 28

U.S.C. § 2676. Id. at 1437-38 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 29a-

° Although the Gashos were arrested under 18 U.S.C. § 549, the

United States conceded that no probable cause for the arrests existed

under § 549.

ANS

BR IY INN 8 Btls aah MIN TS ti ie a AN ET Hk

11

30a). Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Respondents

could pursue both their FTCA and Bivens claims on remand.

Id.

After finding that the Bivens claims for wrongful arrest

were not barred, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the Agents’

qualified immunity claim and found that based on clearly

established principles of constitutional law, no reasonable

agent could have believed that the Gashos’ arrests were

lawful. Jd. at 1438-39 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 31a-32a).

The Ninth Circuit employed a two-step analysis. First, the

plaintiff must show that a clearly establish constitutional right

exists. Second, the defendant must show that based on well

settled law, he could have believed he was not violating that

constitutional right. Jd.

Under the first step of the analysis, the Ninth Circuit

found that the Gashos had a clearly established constitutional

right to refuse consent to a warrantless seizure. Jd. The

Ninth Circuit then found that based on an objective review

of the information known to the Agents at the time of the

arrests, not on their subjective motives for the arrests, no

reasonable agent could have believed that the arrests were

lawful. Jd. The Ninth Circuit determined that the officers

should have known the arrests were unlawful because there

was no evidence the Gashos had the specific intent to prevent

Customs’ seizure of the logbooks or to steal them from

Customs’ custody. /d. The Agents had no facts to support

a belief that the Gashos knew that the logbooks were an

appurtenance to the aircraft and they should have known, in

light of the clearly established law, that the Gashos’ passive

refusal to turn over the logbooks was privileged conduct

12

which could not serve as a basis for finding criminal intent.

Id,

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

The questions of qualified immunity on which review is

sought involve no conflict with any decision of the Court.

Petitioners’ arguments to the contrary are frivolous and

imposed solely for the purpose of delaying any action on the

Bivens claims on remand to the district court. The decision

below properly applied the rulings of this Court on qualified

immunity. Consistent with Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 475 U.S.

800 (1982), the Ninth Circuit held that no reasonable officer

could have believed the arrests of the Gashos were lawful.

The Ninth Circuit’s decision is also consistent with this

Court’s ruling in Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635

(1987).

I, PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENT THAT THE NINTH

CIRCUIT’S DECISION IS INCONSISTENT WITH

RULINGS OF THIS COURT IS FRIVOLOUS.

A. The Ninth Circuit Properly Applied an Objective

Standard to Determine the Qualified Immunity

Issue.

Petitioners contend that the Ninth Circuit improperly

applied a subjective test to determine the issue of qualified

immunity. In making the argument, Petitioners completely

ignore the analysis of the Ninth Circuit on the qualified

immunity issue. Not only did the Ninth Circuit not apply a

subjective test, the court thoroughly analyzed the reasonable-

13

ness of the Agents’ conduct objectively in light of clearly

established law.°

In its decision, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that the

Gashos presented evidence that Agent Howe told another

Customs official that the Gashos were arrested because their

refusal to turn over the logbooks "made [the Agents] mad."

Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1438 (Petitioners’ Brief at p. 31a).

Petitioners point to this single sentence in the Ninth Circuit’s

Opinion to support their argument that the Ninth Circuit

applied a subjective test. Petitioners have taken this sentence

out of context and ignore the remainder of the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion wherein the court thoroughly analyzed the

Agents’ conduct in accordance with an objective standard.

Respondents argued before the Ninth Circuit that they

were arrested in retaliation for refusing to turn over the

logbooks. /d. As evidence of the Agents’ retaliation, the

Gashos cited to Agent Howe’s comment that the Gashos

"made [the Agents] mad." /d. The Ninth Circuit referred

to Howe’s comment to explain the Gashos’ argument that

they were arrested solely for refusing consent to a

* Petitioners erroneously argue that an officer’s subjective intent is

irrelevant to determining whether the officer is entitled to qualified

immunity. In fact, in Harlow, this Court did not hold that an officer's

intent is irrelevant, but rather the Court held that allegations of an

officer’s malice is not sufficient to subject that officer to liability unless

it is shown that the officer knew or should have known that his conduct

violated clearly established law. Harlow, 475 U.S. at 817-818. This

point, however, is irrelevant because the Ninth Circuit in this case

applied an objective test to determine that the agents could not have

believed that the arrests of the Gashos were lawful in light of clearly

established law.

14

warrantless search and refusing to turn over the logbooks.

The Ninth Circuit did not rely on Howe’s comment or the

Agents’ subjective retaliatory motives in concluding that the

Agents were not entitled to the qualified immunity defense.

In analyzing the qualified immunity defense, the Ninth

Circuit examined the facts known to the Agents at the time

of the Gashos’ arrests, not their subjective motives. The

Ninth Circuit found that no reasonable Customs agent could

have believed the arrests were lawful because there was no

evidence that the Gashos had the specific intent to steal the

logbooks from Customs’ custody or to frustrate or prevent

their seizure. Jd. at 1438-1439. (Petitioner's Brief at pp.

31la-32a). The Agents allowed Sharon Gasho to enter the

aircraft specifically for the purpose of removing objects from

inside. The Agents never gave her notice that she could not

take the logbooks or that the logbooks had been seized. The

Ninth Circuit determined that absent such warning, the

Agents had no reason to believe that the Gashos knew the

logbooks were an appurtenance to the aircraft, that the

logbooks had been seized or that their removal was

forbidden. Further, the Ninth Circuit determined that the

Gashos’ mere passive refusal to consent to a warrantless

search and immediately turn over the logbooks was not

grounds for finding criminal intent.

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis is based solely on what the

Agents knew and observed prior to and at the time of the

arrests and what a reasonable agent should have done under

the circumstances. Nothing in their analysis suggests that the

Ninth Circuit reached its conclusion that the Agents were not

15

entitled to a qualified immunity defense because it believed

the Agents were angry with the Gashos.

B. The Ninth Circuit Clearly and Expressly Articu-

lated the Specific Constitutional Right at Issue and

Properly Held that Based on Clearly Established

Law the Officers Were Not Entitled to Qualified

Immunity.

There is no question that the Ninth Circuit’s finding that

the Agents were not entitled to qualified immunity was a

decision well grounded in this Court’s rulings. The Ninth

Circuit recognized that Respondents had a duty to show that

the constitutional right at issue was clearly established.’

Contrary to the Petitioner’s assertion, the Ninth Circuit

analyzed the specific principles of constitutional rights at

issue in holding that the Respondents satisfied that duty.

The Ninth Circuit first stated generally that the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from arrests without probable

cause is clearly established and specifically held that "it is

clearly established that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights

are violated if the sole basis for his arrest is his challenge to

the officer’s authority absent a warrant." Gasho, 39 F.3d at

’ The Petitioners attempt to confuse this issue by directing attention

to whether the law was clearly established that the seizure of a vehicle

did not include the contents of the vehicle. Whether the seizure includes

its contents is not the issue. Under this Court’s analysis in Anderson, the

issue was whether the constitutional right asserted by the Gashos was

clearly established and whether a reasonable Customs agent could have

believed that Sharon Gasho knew the logbooks were seized with the

aircraft.

16

1439 (Petitioner’s Brief at p. 32a). The Ninth Circuit

recognized that the heart of the issue was whether the

Customs Agents should have known that probable cause was

obviously lacking when the reason for the arrest was the

arrestee’s verbal challenge of the Agents’ authority to effect

a seizure Or arrest.

Defendants, with an apparent recognition that their

argument that the Ninth Circuit applied only general constitu-

tional standards was contrary to the text of the opinion on its

face, then argue that the Ninth Circuit, in assessing what is

clearly established law relied on irrelevant and inapplicable

law.

In both its discussion on probable cause and qualified

immunity, the Ninth Circuit cited ample authority demonstra-

ting that the law was well settled on this point. The Petition-

ers make a weak assertion that such law was not clearly

established at the time of the arrest because the cases holding

that passive refusal of a search or seizure is a clearly estab-

lished constitutional right are not factually identical to the

situation the Customs Agents were presented with. It is

important to stress that the Customs Agents had no statutory

authority for the arrests. The very wording of the statutes

cited by the Petitioners as justification for the arrests

precludes application of those statutes to the conduct of the

Gashos. That alone gave the Agents knowledge that there

was a lack of probable cause for the arrests and thus the

arrests violated the constitutional rights of the Gashos.

Additionally, the passive refusal to turn over property for

a warrantless seizure, had previously been held by the courts

lial clans

17

to be an improper reason for arrest. In fact, in 1978, the

Ninth Circuit held exactly that: "The passive refusal to

consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which

cannot be considered as evidence of criminal wrongdoing."

United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir.

1978).

Petitioners argue that the Ninth Circuit was wrong in

holding that this law was clearly established because the

Prescott case was not factually similar enough. Prescott

arose out of a passive refusal to allow a warrantless search

at an apartment, while here the arrests occurred as a result

of the passive refusal to allow a warrantless search of a car

and warrantless seizure of the logbooks which were in that

car. The Ninth Circuit expressly stated that while there is a

lower expectation of privacy when searches involve auto-

mobiles rather than houses, “the citizen nevertheless retains

the right to refuse consent to a warrantless search of the bag

containing his personal effects, even if consent is given to

search the vehicle." 39 F.3d at 1432 (Petitioners’ Brief at

pp. 17a-18a) (citing Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252

(1991)). The holding in Prescott was squarely on point.

The Petitioners here argued that the refusal to return the

logbooks was evidence of Sharon Gasho’s specific intent to

prevent the seizure when she moved the logbooks. The

defendants in Prescott argued that the plaintiff's passive

refusal to allow entry into her apartment for a search was

evidence of the plaintiff's intent to harbor a criminal. The

court held in Prescott that such passive, privileged conduct

could not be offered as evidence of intent because it would

place an unfair and impermissible burden on the assertion of

a constitutional right. Prescott 581 F.2d at 1350-51.

18

The Ninth Circuit’s ruling that the constitutional right to

passively refuse a warrantless search or seizure was well

established is also based on this Court’s holding in Houston

v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987). Hill’s holding was on

point and constituted clearly established law upon which the

customs officers should have based their actions. This

Court’s statement in Hill that "the freedom of individuals

verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby

risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which

we distinguish a free nation from a police state” should

certainly serve as a guideline for law enforcement officers.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit cited Duran v. City of

Douglas, 904 F.2d 1372, 1378 (9th Cir. 1990) as additional

support of its holding*. Gasho, 39 F.3d at 1437

(Petitioners’ Brief at p. 31a). The Duran Court followed this

Court’s holding in Hill and held that no reasonable officer

could have believed there was probable cause to stop the

vehicle of an individual merely because the individual had

challenged his authority by verbally insulting and making

obscene gestures at the officer as his car passed the officer’s.

The focus in Duran was not, as Petitioners argue, the First

Amendment right to free speech, but rather was the Fourth

Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and

seizure.

Petitioners argue that a reasonable law enforcement

officer who was fully aware of Hill, Duran and Prescott

*The Defendants point out that Duran was decided after the Gashos’

arrest. Duran, however, did not establish new law, but merely

recognized already clearly established rights.

19

would not know that the arrests violated the constitutional

rights of the Gashos. That argument is outrageous. The

holdings and pronouncements of the courts in those cases are

precisely on point and leave no question that the arrest for a

passive refusal to allow entry into a vehicle and/or turn over

property for seizure violated a clearly established

constitutional right. That Customs agents who make

decisions every day regarding people’s personal liberty and

freedom and who are empowered to deprive a person of that

liberty and freedom would not be cognizant of that law is a

frightening thought for law abiding citizens such as the

Gashos. If these officers were to be immune from liability

for their wrongful arrests merely because a case factually

identical had not yet been published, law enforcement

officials would have unfettered power to act unreasonably in

all but the most common scenarios.

Having held that it is clearly established that a person’s

Fourth Amendment rights are violated if the sole basis for

his arrest is his challenge to the officer’s authority absent a

warrant, the Ninth Circuit turned to the second step of its

inquiry. Relying on this Court’s analysis in Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987), the Court considered

whether a reasonable Customs agent could have believed that

the arrests of the Gashos were lawful in light of clearly

established law and the information the arresting agents

possessed. 39 F.3d at 1439 (Petitioners’ Brief at p. 32a).

The Ninth Circuit recognized that its holding that probable

cause was lacking for the arrests was not determinative

because under the qualified immunity doctrine the agents

would be immune if they mistakenly believed there was

20

probable cause to arrest the Gashos if they could have

reasonably believed that their actions were lawful. Jd.’

The Ninth Circuit held that the Agents failed to

demonstrate that a reasonable Customs agent could have

believed that the Gashos’ arrests were lawful. /d. The

Ninth Circuit carefully analyzed both grounds which the

Agents cited as justification for the arrests--the removal of

the logbooks and the refusal to turn the logbooks over upon

demand. /d. As discussed by the Ninth Circuit in its

analysis of the probable cause issue and in the qualified

immunity discussion, there was no probable cause to arrest

the Gashos under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2232 or 2233, the statutes

cited by Petitioners for the arrests. Jd. at 1427-1432

(Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 7a-18a).

18 U.S.C. § 2233 prohibits forcible rescue of property

which has been seized. The Ninth Circuit recognized that

ample case law as well as the language of the statute itself

made clear that the offense required: (1) knowledge that the

property was seized; (2) knowledge that removal was unlaw-

ful; (3) forcible and willful removal of the property from the

dominion and control of the government; and (4) specific

intent to frustrate the seizure. 18 U.S.C. § 2232 prohibits

physical interference with a search. It is concerned with the

destruction or removal of property before it is seized and

requires a specific intent to prevent a seizure.

® Petitioners’ attempt to discredit the Ninth Circuit by reference to

this Court’s reversal of the Ninth Circuit in Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S.

224 (1991), is unwarranted. The Ninth Circuit in the case at bar

followed the Hunter decision and used the identical test set forth in

Anderson and quoted in Hunter.

21

Sharon Gasho was given permission to enter the plane

and remove her belongings, the logbooks were in no way

secured by Customs, the Gashos were not advised that the

logbooks were seized, and the agents did not attempt to

prevent Sharon Gasho from moving the logbooks from the

airplane to her attorney’s car even though they were aware

she did so. Based on these undisputed facts, the Ninth

Circuit found that there were no grounds to support a belief

that the Gashos had the specific intent required by the

Statutes. 39 F.3d. at 1439 (Petitioners’ Brief at p. 32a).

Alternatively, if the Gashos were arrested for their refusal to

return the logbooks upon demand, a reasonable officer would

have known their conduct was privileged and could not serve

as a basis for finding intent.'°

The Ninth Circuit held that the passive refusal to hand

Over property cannot be grounds for inferring criminal intent

because the Fourth Amendment gives citizens the right to

refuse to consent to warrantless searches and seizures. /d.

at 1427-1432 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 7a-18a). Later, in

discussing this same issue in the context of qualified

immunity, the court pointed out that this proposition is a

matter of clearly established constitutional law. /d. at 1438-

1439 (Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 3la-32a). "It is Clearly

established that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are

violated if the sole basis for his arrest is his challenge to the

Officer’s authority absent a warrant.” Jd. at 1439

(Petitioners’ Brief at p. 32a).

'° The Gashos’ refusal was based upon the advice of their attorney

at the time.

22

Petitioners’ argument that the Ninth Circuit applied only

general and irrelevant principles of constitutional law is

frivolous. The Ninth circuit applied the analysis established

by this Court. The constitutional right to passively refuse

consent to a warrantless search is obviously neither general

nor irrelevant.

Il. THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WAS FILED SOLEY TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS

LONG ENOUGH TO BAR THE B/VENS CLAIMS.

Petitioners filed their Petition for Writ of Certiorari not

because they believed that this matter was worthy of review

by this Honorable Court, or with even a remote expectation

that it would be granted. Rather, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari was one step in a clever but unsuccesful plan by

Petitioners to delay proceedings on remand to the district

court until judgment was entered in the FTCA action so they

could then invoke the judgment bar of 28 U.S.C. § 2676.

A major issue in the appeal to the Ninth Circuit was the

application of 28 U.S.C. § 2676. In its opinion, the Ninth

Circuit determined that if a judgment was entered in the

FTCA action, whether in favor of or against the United

States on the FTCA claims, § 2676 would act as a complete

bar to the Gashos’ Bivens claims. 39 F.3d at 1437-1438

(Petitioners’ Brief at pp. 27a-30a). The Ninth Circuit ruled

that, "because we have reversed the district court’s summary

judgment on the FTCA claim involving the arrest, a prior

‘judgment’ no longer bars the subsequent Bivens claim on the

arrest. Thus, the Gashos are permitted to pursue either the

Bivens claim or FTCA claim, or both claims. If they pursue

23

both remedies in separate actions, they may secure judgments

on both claims only if the Bivens judgment is entered first."

39 F.3d at 1438.

Following remand, the Gashos elected to pursue both the

FTCA and Bivens claims and sought and obtained an order

of the district court consolidating the Bivens and FTCA

claims for discovery and a contemporaneous trial. The

district court’s decision to consolidate the actions prevents

the Petitioners from intentionally delaying trial of the Bivens

action until after trial and judgment in the FTCA action.

Unable to do so in the district court, Petitioners attempted to

delay the Bivens action in the appellate courts.

A stay of proceedings pending petition for writ of

certiorari is normally requested before the mandate issues.

Had Petitioners, however, sought a stay of the action before

January 11, 1995 (the date the mandate was issued), they

would have had only until February of 1995 to petition for

writ of certiorari.’

A Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed in February would

likely have been decided before the end of this court’s

October 1994 term in June. The district court has indicated

that at the June scheduling conference it will set both actions

for trial. Thus, if Petitioners had timely requested a stay of

the Bivens claims, there probably would not have been a long

'' The United States has not joined in this Petition and the agents

request review of only the Bivens claim.

'? Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(b) provides that a stay is

only in effect for 30 days unless the petition for writ of certiorari is filed.

24

enough delay for the FTCA action to result in a judgment in

the interim. Instead, Petitioners did not request a stay before

the mandate was issued but rather waited four months after

the mandate was filed to request a recall of the mandate and

a stay. The Petitioners then sought a 60-day extension of

time for filing the Petition, which, if granted, would have

resulted in the Petition being filed on May 26, 1995, and the

responsive brief being due at the end of June, guaranteeing

that the Petition would not have been decided until the

October 1995 term, after the trial on the FTCA action.”

It did not matter to Petitioners’ plan that the Petition

would be denied. Had the Ninth Circuit granted a stay, the

Petitioners would have succeeded in barring the Bivens claim

even though the Petition was denied. The only way the

Petitioners could request a stay from the Ninth Circuit was to

file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which they did without

regard to the merits of the Petition.

‘Petitioners were unsuccessful. First, this court only granted a 30-day

extension for filing the Petition, and on May 15, 1995, after their

Petition was filed, the Ninth Circuit denied their request to recall the

mandate and stay the Bivens portion of the action pending a decision from

this court.

25

CONCLUSION

There was no error in the Court of Appeals’ decision and

further review by this Court is not warranted. Respondents

respectfully request that the Court deny the Petition for Writ

of Certiorari and award Respondents just damages and

double costs pursuant to Rule 42.2, Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States, for responding to the Petition.

Respectfully submitted,

Christine R. Taradash

Maria Crimi Speth*

Beus, Gilbert & Morrill, P.L.L.C.

3200 North Central Avenue

1000 Great American Tower

Phoenix, AZ 85012-2417

Attorneys for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

Dated: Phoenix, Arizona, May 30, 1995.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.