Appendix — Ellington v. Superior Court of California

Supreme Court brief1995

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Second Appellate District, Division Four, No. Bo73682

$043368

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

IN BANK

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON Et Al. Petitioners

LOS ANGELES COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT. Respondent

ROBERT BARBER STULL Et Al. Rea! Parties In Interest

Petition for review DENIED

Chief Justice

2a

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON et al. No. B073682

Petitioners. (Super.Ct.

No. KC009085)

( Gregory C. O'Brien,

V. Jr., Judge)

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondents:

ROBERT BARBER STULL et al.

Real Parties in Interest

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING from a judgment of the Superior

Court of Los Angeles County. Being treated as writ of mandate. Denied.

Joy Elaine Ellington and Azariah Michael Ellington. in pro

per.. for Petitioners.

No appearance for Respondent.

Law Offices of Charles Crismier III, Michael E. Maning.

Bakken and Koester, Richard P_ Delatorre. Hawkins, Schnable, Lindahl

& Beck and Patrick T. Barrera for Real Parties in Interest

2al

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs appeal from the trial court's order denying

their motion to amend their complaint adding defendants and

causes of action. Ultimately plaintiffs settled their case against

the original defendant and filed a request for dismissal of the

entire action. An order of dismissal was was entered by the

court on February 16, 1994. Although plaintiffs appeal from a

nonappealable order, was shall treat the appeal as a petition for

writ of mandate and decide the case

(Califormia Dental Assn. v. California Dental Hygienists’ Assn.

(1990) 222 Cal App.3d 49 )

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Joy Ellington wa injured in an automobile

accident with defendant Robert Stull on January 13, 1992. She

and her husband, Plaintiff Azanah Ellington, engaged in

negotiations with defendant Stull's insurance carrier,

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co

Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing in propna

persona a Judicial Council form personal injury complaint on

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March 23, 1992, against the driver of the other vehicle, Robert

Stull and his insurance carrer, Nationwide Mutual Insurance

Co. The complaint contained four causes of action against

both Stull and Nationwide for property damage, personal

injury, "infliction of emotional distress" and loss of

consortium. Plaintiffs alleged that Stull was negligent and

caused the collision, which resulted in Joy Ellington suffering

personal injuries and the Nationwide inflicted emotional

distress by contending Joy Ellington was contributorily

negligent

Defendants demurred to the complaint on May 18.

1992. The parties engaged in correspondence about the

pleadings. As a result of these negotiations, plaintiffs and

defendants stipulated that plaintiff would file and amended

complaint, naming as defendants Stull and Does | through 10,

deleting Nationwide Mutual Insurance as defendant, and

Clarifying that their infliction of emotional distress cause of

action was for negligent infliction of emotional distress

Defendant Stull demurred to the amended complaint. The

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jemurrer was set for hearing on July 16, 1992. The record

contains an undated stipulation signed by the Ellingtons and

John Walker. attorney for Stull. with respect to the filing of an

amended complaint. which defendant Stull would answer

A"Second Amended Complaint", dated July 5, 1992, was filed

and served by mail on Defendant Stull's attorney on August to

plaintiffs’ second-amended complaint, which contains a

general denial and eight affirmative defenses.

Thereafter the parties apparently engaged in

settlement negotiations and discovery. On December 17, 1992.

plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a third amended

complaint, which was set for hearing on January 11, 1993

The proposed third amended complaint added as parties the

lawyer who represented defendant Stull. John Walker: the

lawyer who represented defendant Stull, John Walker. the

lawyer who represented Stull as cross-complainant. Michael

Manning (although the record contains no cross-complaint)

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.. plus Does | through 3

Plaintiffs added a fourth cause of action for intentional

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infliction of emotional distress and a fifth cause of action for

perjury. Plaintiffs’ three children are added as plaintiffs in the

second cause of action for loss of consortium and the third

cause of action for negligent infliction for emotional distress.

Finally, the prayer seeks punitive aamages. The reasons stated

in plaintiffs’ declaration supporting the motion were that

defendant Stull, his insurance company, and his lawyers all

participated in a scheme to have defendant Stull commit

perjury in order to defeat plaintiffs’ claims

Defendant Stull, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,

and attorney John Walker together filed an “opposition” to

plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file an amended complaint,

contending. inter alia. there 1s no cause of action for perjury.

that plaintiffs previously agreed not to allege intentional

infliction of emotional distress. and that neither Nationwide

nor Walker had anything to do with the collision or any

claims arising therefrom

There are two filings opposing the plaintiffs’ motion

for leave to amend -- one filed on behalf of "Defendant Robert

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Stull", by Bakken and Koester, and another on behalf of

"Defendant and cross-complainant" Robert Barber Stull filed

by Michael Manning, a proposed defendant in the third

amended complaint. of the law offices of Charles Crismier III

Plaintiffs filed a reply to the “oppositions”. The trial court

denied the motion to file a third amended complaint at the

hearing held on January 11, 1993. From the order denying

their motion, plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal on February

4, 1993

The case was arbitrated, plaintiffs requested trial de

novo; the case was set for trial on September 29. 1993 and for

mandatory settlement conference on September 15, 1993. At

that settlement conference, plaintiffs agreed to accept

defendant Stull's $50,000 insurance policy limits plus

additional amount for property damage. Subsequently. they

raised questions about the loss of consortium claim and

whether it would afford additional insurance policy proceeds:

the tnal court brought the matter before it for further hearing

on October 15, 1993. at which time plaintiffs settled their

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personal injury claims against Stull for $50.000 plus $5,000 for

property damage. They preserved their claims against the

additional defendants proposed to be added in their third

amended complaint. the subject of this mandate petition. |/

DISCUSSION

The test for determining if the trial court correctly

decided the motion to amend the complaint is whether abuse of

discretion is shown. The trial court's ruling will be disturbed

only upon a showing of a "‘clear case of abuse" [of discretion]

and a “miscarriage of justice." (Denham v. Supenor Coun

(1970) 2 Cal. 3d557, 566: California Casualty Gen. Ins. Co. v

Superior Court (1985) 173 Cal. App 3d 274, 279.)

1. On October 15, 1993, plaintiffs signed a request for

dismissal of the entire action with prejudice. The request for dismissal

wa ordered entered in the record on February 16, 1994. At oral

argument. plaintiffs asserted they intended to dismiss defendant Stull

only. having reserved their rights to proceed against the other proposed

defendants both at the mandatory settlement conference and in the

release document they signed. Plaintiffs also asserted the dismissal

request form was prepared by defendant Stull's attorneys. While we are

mindful of the fact that the trial court may have no further subject matter

or personal jurisdiction over the parties once the voluntary dismissal 1s

filed. (Harris v. Billings (1993) 16 Cal App4th 1396, 1405). plaintiffs

filed and perfected their “appeal” with this court prior to

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dismissal. Thus. this court has jurisdiction to decide the matter

Abuse of discretion will not be found unless the trial court

“exceeds the bounds of reason. all of the circumstances before

it being considered." (Denham v Supenor Court. supra, 2

Cal.3d at p. 566.)

We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in denying plaintiffs’ motion to file their third amended

complaint

With respect to the proposed addition of defendant

Stull's insurance carrier, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. it

has long been the rule in California that the injured plaintiff

Cannot join the insured tortfeasor's insurance carrier in the

same action. (See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Superior Court

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 880, 891-892, overruled on other grounds in

Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46

Cal.3d 287, Spencer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins Co (1957)

152 Cal App.2d 797.) The essence of the emotional distress

claim arises out of the conduct of the defense of plaintiffs’

lawsuit. Even a separate action may not be brought against the

tortfeasor's insurance carner on these facts. (See

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Moradi-Shalal v_ Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies (1988) 46

Cal.3d 287.)

Plaintiffs also sought to add their children as plaintiffs

seeking loss of consortium. This cause of action is available

only to spouses. (Elden v Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal 3d 441.

446.) The children were not present at the scene of the

accident. Since they had no contemporaneous awareness of

any harm which their mother suffered. neither may they allege

a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress

(Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal 3d 644 )

Finally. plaintiffs sought to add a cause of action for

“perjury” against the insurance carrier and defendant Stull's

attorneys. John Walker and Michael Manning. This claim is

based on plaintiffs’ contention that the insurance company.

defendant Stull, and his lawyers conspired to have him he

about the facts of the collision in response to discovery

propounded by plaintiffs Even if perjury were a recognized

civil cause of action (it is a crime under Penal Code. § 118).

the conduct plainuffs allege 1s absolutely privileged pursuant

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to Civil Code section 47 (b). (Silberg v. Anderson (1990) 50

Cal 3d 205, 211-212, 218.) Thus plaintiffs may not sue the

insurance carrier or defendant Stull's lawyers. either in this case

or in a separate action, for the conduct alleged in the proposed

cause of action for perjury

DISPOSITION

The petition for writ of mandate is denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

NEWMAN, J.*

We concur

VOGEL (CS), Acting P. J

HASTINGS. J

* Assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council

3a

COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOR THE SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION: 4

Azanah Ellington

18470 Bellefont Drive

Azusa, CA. 91702

RE: Ellington. Joy E

VS

Stull, Robet B

2 Civil BO73682

Los Angeles NO. KC009085

* * REMITTITUR NOTICE * *

Notice is hereby given that the Remittitur has been issued this

date and that the opinion, decision or order entered in the above entitled

cause on 10/17/94 is now final

* * Petition Summarily Denied By Opinion * *

Respondent To Recover Costs

JOSEPH A. LANE, Clerk

By: R. Mayfarth

Deputy Clerk

da

RICHARD P DELATORRE BAR NO 110563

BAKKEN AND KOESTER

701 North Haven Avenue, Suite 230-A

Ontario, CA 91764-4903

Telephone (714) 466-6977

Attorneys for Defendant.

ROBERT BARBER STULL

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES. EAST DISTRICT

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON AND CASE NO-KC009085

AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON

Plaintiffs. Notice of Ruling

vs

ROBERT BARBER STULL and

Does | through 10. Inclusive.

Defendants

TO ALL PARTIES AND TO THEIR ATTORNEYS

OF RECORD

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to

File a Third Amended Complaint came before the Honorable Judge

Gregory O'Brien in Department G of the East District. county of Los

Angeles Superior Court at 8:30 a.m. on Monday. January 11, 1493

Plaintiffs Motion was denied

Dated January 14. 1993 BAKKEN AND KOESTER

RICHARD P DELATORRE

Sa

1 SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

2 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

3 DEPARTMENT G HON. GREGORY C. O'BRIEN JUDGI

4

5 JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON, ET. Al

6 PLAINTIFF

7 VS NO. KC009085

® ROBERT BARBER STULL, ET. AI

9 DEFENDANT

10

1] REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OI

12 ‘OURT PROCEEDINGS

13 MONDAY, JANUARY 11, 1993

14 APPEARANCES

15 FOR THE PLAINTIFI AZARIAH AND JOY ELLINGTON

IN PROPRIA PERSONA

16 18470 BELLEFONT DRIVE

AZUSA, CALIF. 91702

17 FOR THE DEFENDANT BAKKEN & KOESTER

ATTORNEY AT LAW

18 BY: MR._RICHARD P. DELATORRI

701 N. HAVEN AVE., STE. 230-A

19 ONTARIO, CALIF. 97164

2) FOR THE CROSS-DEFENDANT

ELLINGTON HILL, GENSON, EVEN, CRANDALI

21 & WADE

ATTORNEYS AT LAW

22 BY: MR. MARC W. HAWKINS

3401 CENTRELAKE DRIVE, #650

23 ONTARIO, CALIF. 91764

24 FOR THE DEFENDANT CHARLES CRISMIER III

AND CROSS-DEFENDANT ATTORNEY AT LAW

25 BY: MR. MICHAEL MANNING

424. N. LAKE AVE., SUITE 304

26 PASADENA, CALIF. 91101

27 REPORTER LYNN A. BARBSCH., C.S.R. 2457

OFFICIAL REPORTER

Sal

4

i MR. ELLINGTON: MR. - | DON'T MEAN TO BE TEDIOUS.

2 YOUR HONOR, IF YOU JUST BEAR WITH ME FOR A MOMENT,

IF WITHIN

3 A DEPOSITION UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY —

4 THE COURT: UH-HUH

| s MR. ELLINGTON: AND THEIR ATTITUDE, THE

EVIDENCE HAS

6 BEFORE THE INDIVIDUALS AND THEY CHOOSE TO -

7 THE COURT: MR. ELLINGTON, IF YOU FEEI

SOMEBODY IS

8 LYING IN THE COURSE OF A DEPOSITION, AND THE CASE

RESOLVES

9 ITSELF BEFORE TRIAL AND YOU REALLY THINK THE

DISTRICT

10 ATTORNEY WOULD BE INTERESTED IN DOING SOMETHING

ABOUT THAT,

11 YOU MAY TALK TO THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

12 FRANKLY ITS MY EXPERIENCE THAT YOURE

13 PROBABLY NOT GOING TO GET VERY FAR WITH THAT,

BUT I'M NOT

14 GOING TO - I'M NOT GOING TO MAKE A PROSECUTORIAL

DECISION,

1S THAT'S NOT MY FUNCTION

16 IF YOU THINK THEY'RE TELLING A LIE, AND THEY

7 TELL IT AGAIN ON THE WITNESS STAND, YOU CAN POINT

OUT TO THE

18 JURY, "LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY. THESE

PEOPLE ARE

19 LYING.” OBVIOUSLY BUT YOU DON'T FILE AND

AMENDED COMPLAINT

20 SAYING, "LLAR, LIAR, PANTS ON FIRE." OKAY? YOU JUST

DON'T

21 DO THAT

22 OKAY. MR. AND MRS. ELLINGTON, I'M GOING TO

23 DENY YOUR MOTION TO FILE YOUR AMENDED COMPLAINT

AND COUNSEL,

24 WHO'S GOING TO GIVE NOTICE? MR. DELATORRE?

25 MR. MANNING: I'D BEEN HAPPY TO

26 THE COURT: MR. MANNING

27 MR. DELATORRE: I'LL GIVE NOTICE REGARDING THE

28 REQUEST FOR FEES, YOUR HONOR

Nm

6a

2nd Civil No. BO73682

Superior Court No. KC 009085

(Hon. Gregory C. O'Brien, Judge)

IMMEDIATE STAY REQUESTED

TRIAL DATE: SEPTEMBER 29, 1993

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON CIVIL NO. B073682

AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs

ROBERT BARBER STULL and

Does | through 10 inclusive,

Defendants and Respondents

APPELLANTS’ OPENING BRIEt

On Appeal from the Judgment of the Superior Court of

Califorma, Los Angeles County

JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON

AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON

18470 Bellefont Drive

Azusa, California 91702

(818) 339-8348

Appellants

IN PROPRIA PERSONA

a

aA

INDEX

Page No

eatmanestt OF Cane. .......c<.ccccecoecocss.-. ral aes haa ]

CCE Uc ae ]

I a vintstanicaciicsacin crasbaisutorsaeioac cae . 22

Point! THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED DISCRETION. -7

WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFFS

TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO JOIN MINOR

CHILDREN AS CO-PLAINTIFFS TO THE

INSTANT ACTION

Point I! THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE DISCRETION ...7 -9

WHEN IT DID NOT ALLOW PLAINTIFF TO

AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO JOIN OTHER

DEFENDANTS WHO MAY BE LIABLE TO

PLAINTIFFS

Point IIi TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION..9 - 11

WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO

AMEND BASED ON COMPLAINT'S FAILURE

TO STATE FACTS SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE

A CAUSE OF ACTION

Point IV. TRIAL COURT ABUSED JUDICIAL...... 11 - 13

DISCRETION WHEN DENYING PLAINTIFFS’

MOTION TO AMEND, BASED ON INEXCUSABLE

DELAY AND PREJUDICE TO THE OPPOSING

PARTY

Point V TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN..13 - 16

DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAVE STATED MERITORIOUS

CAUSES OF ACTION

Point VI. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION... 17 - 20

BY NOT ALLOWING PLAINTIFFS TO

AMEND THEIR COMPLAINT TO STATE A

CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL

INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Pomt VI] TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION... 20 - 23

WHEN IT DENIED PLAINTIFFS’ AMENDED

COMPLAINT FOR THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERJURY

od

oo

6a2

INDEX

(continued)

Page No

Point VIII. TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION.. 24 - 35

IN DENYING PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO

AMEND, INDICATING THAT THERE IS

NO CIVIL REMEDY FOR CRIMINAL

ACTIVITY AND IF SO PLAINTIFFS MUST

WAIT UNTIL TRIAL TO SEEK SUCH

REMEDY

Rc diiicttinni ks ee BisicasR needs a

7a

] TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 California Statues: Page No

3 Code of Civil Procedure, section 378... Chicane

4 Code of Civil Procedure, section $76... Briel Mel

5 Code of Civil Procedure, section 379... 9

6 Business & Professional Code, section a iataicchannasetiingseccs a

7 Penal Code, section 9 oo..........cccccsscccsssssssssssscsssssessessossssses... 27

8 Penal Code, section 118.0000... cccccecccccssscecseseeeeeeeeeec. 28

9 Cases:

10 Estate of Hunter, 194 Cal. App.2d 849, 865.

1] BFR, SIG once cnsseiessetevceccenc. Cidsailemboapinn paca 7

12 California Cas. Gen. Ins. Co. (1985) 173 Cal App. 3d 274,

130-218 Cal. Rptr. 817.0000. sososananannansnesessscssceccees 9,11,25

14 Avedissian v. Manukian (1983) 14] Cal. App.3d 379, 383.

15 PING MDT ev tiistinec meine 12

16 Higgins v. Van R. Dental Prod., Inc. (1981) 123 Cal.

17 App.3d 558, 176 Cal.Rptr. 704, 708... 13, 22

18 Binning, Inc. v. Safeco Ins. Co (1977) 74 Cal. App.3d

19 617, 141 Cal. Rpt. $47,548.00 ieee Re

20 Murphy v Allstate Ins. Co., 17 Cal.3d 937. 941.

21-132 Cal. Rptr. 424... isitiendenedidiaices ieee ae

22 Roberts v. Ball, Hunt. Hart, Brown & Baerwitz. 57 Cal

23 App.3d 104, 109, 128 Cal.Rptr. 901, 905.0000. 16

24 Dector's Co. Ins. Services v. Superior Court (1990)

25 225 Cal. App.3d 1284, 275 Cal.Rptr. 674 iiehnetion ee

26 Weiner v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. (1991) 9] Daily

27 ae daca sO EAS te 18

tw

Tal

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

(CONT.)

Cervantez v. J.C. Penny Co. (1979) 24 Cal. 3d $79,

593 ’ 18

Wolfrich Corp. v. United Services Auto Ass'n (1983)

149 Cal. App.3d 1211, 197 Cal. Rptr. 392 19

Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979) 24 Cal 3d 773.

777, 784, 187 Cal. Rptr 392 19

Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1972) 7 Cal. 3d 616. 681.

102 Cal _Rptr. 815 , 19

Black v. Sullivan, 48 Cal. App 3d 566-567,

122 Cal. Rptr. 119. 20

Burke v. Compania Meticana De Aviacion (1970) 433

F.2d 1031, 1033, 1034 21

Wyndotte v. Transportation Co. v. United States (1967)

389 U.S. 191. 88 S.Ct 379, 19 L.Ed 2d 407 21

J.1. Case Co. v. Borak (1964) 377 US 426.848.

1555, 12 L.Ed.2d 423 21

Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby (1916) 241 US. 33

36 S. Ct. 482. 60 L.Ed 874 2)

Maclsaac v. Pozzo, 26 Cal. 2d 809. 161 P 24449. 22

Herrera v. Lisnmek (| 984) 158 Cal App 3d 255,

204 Cal. Rptr. $$3, $56 22. 23

Klopstock v. Superior Court (1941) 17 Cal 2d 13

19 20, 108 P.2d 906 22

Nw

wa

7a2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(CONT.)

Cases Page No

Densy v. Wilder (1956) 46 Cal.2d 715, 75].

299 P.2d 257. Beis , 22

Wells v. Lloyd IV (1936) 6 Cal.2d 70, 88

56 P.2d $17....... 23

Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 C.2d 481,

275 P.2d 15. i ndtv 23

Kreutzer v. San Diego County (1984) 153 Cal App.3d

62, 100 Cal. Rptr. 322 23

Peterson v. Peterson (1946) 74 Cal. Anp.2d 312.

168 P.2d 358 26

Crouser v. Boice (1942) 51 Cal. App.2d 198

124 P 2d 358 26

Merlino v. West Coast Macaroni Mfg. Co. (1949)

90 Cal. App.2d 106, 202 P.2d 748 26

Hicks v. Sanders (1940) 40 Cal. App.2d 211,

104 P.2d 549... 26

Bundy v. Maginess (1888) 76 C. 532, 18 P._ 773 27

Wilson v. Middleton (1852) 2.C. 54 a7

Fenelon v. Superior Court (1990) 223 Cal App.3d 1476,

273 Cal. Rptr. 367, 368-371 27,2

Laczko v. Jules Meyers, Inc. (1969) 276 Cal App.2d

293, 80 Cal Rptr. 798, 799 29

Hudson v. Craft, 33 Cal.2d 654. 660

204 P.2d 1.7 AL.R.2d 696 29

Ta3

l Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 651,

Nm

320 P.2d 16, 64 AL.R.2d 1358000000000... ss 29

3 Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Ass'n. 275 AC.A. 188.

4 I 29 |

5 Mc Ivor v. Mercer-Fraser Co., 76 Cal App.2d 247.

6 253 - 254, 172 P.2d 758. , snelhiconl a 29

7 Agnew v. Parks (1959) 172 Cal. App.2d 756,

8 343 P.2d 118...... mae siete 29, 31

) Taylor v. Bidwell, 65 Cal 489.4 P. 491... 30

10 Mox Incorporated v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675,

1] $e 6 ayen 30

12 Smith v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal App.3d 491

13 eS: — =

14 Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co. (1931)

15 282 U.S. $64. $1 S.Ct 251 aiiiahon oie 33

16 Gilbert v. Kennedy (1871) 22 Mich 117, 130 33

17 Buckaloo v. Johnson (1975) 14 Cal. 3d 815, 822 - 823.

18 122 Cal Rptr. 745, 537 P.2d 865 34

19 Lowell v. Mother's Cake & Cookie Co. (1978)

20 79 Cal. App.3d 13, 17, 144 Cal Rptr. 664 34

21 Asia Investment Co. v. Borowski (1982)

22-133 Cal. App.3d 832, 840 - 841, 184 Cal. Rp. 42 34

23 Worldwide Commerce, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp. (1978)

24 84 Cal. App.3d 803, 811, 149 Cal. Rp 42 34

25 Howard v. Superior Court (1992) 2 C A 4th 745, 3

26 Cal. Rptr 2d 575, 577 36

8a

1 JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON

AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON

2 18470 Bellefont Drive

Azusa, California 91702

3 Telephone (213) 339-8348

4 IN PRO PER

8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

9 JOY ELAINE ELLINGTON, and CASE NO: KC 009085

AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON NOTICE OF MOTION

10 Plaintiffs, FOR LEAVE TO FILE

AMENDED COMPLAINT:

ll vs. DECLARATION AND

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

12 IN SUPPORT

ROBERT BARBER STULL, and DATE: JANUARY 11, 1993

13 Does | through 10, inclusive TIME: 8:30 a.m

DEPT: G

14 ___ Defendants. - TRIAL DATE: NONE

15 TO EACH PARTY AND ATTORNEY OF RECORD IN THIS

ACTION

16 PLEASE TAKE NOTICE THAT on January 11, 1993. at 8:30 am.

17 or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, Plaintiffs JOY ELAINE

18 ELLINGTON and AZARIAH MICHAEL ELLINGTON will move this

19 court in Department "G" thereof. at the above entitle Court, located

20 at 400 East Civic Center Plaza. Pomona, California,

21 for an order permitting Plaintiffs to file an amended

22 complaint, which is attached hereto and a copy of which is

23 served herewith

24

F

8al

| This motion will be made upon the ground that it is in

2 furtherance of justice to allow the filang of such amended

} complaint. and will be based upon this notice, the attached

4 pomts and authorities. and the attached declaration of

S Azanah M. Ellington

6 Dated December 17. 1992

Azanah M. Ellington

& In Pro Per

l

6

~

1¢

8a2

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING MOTION

| The court may, in furtherance of justice. and on

such terms as may be proper. allow a party to amend any

pleading or PROCEEDING. THE court may likewise. in its

discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon

such terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or

proceeding in other particulars..." (CCP section 473)

2. It is judicial policy to resolve all disputes

between the parties on their merits, and to allow amendment

of the pleadings to put all such disputes at issue at the

tume of trial

"While a motion to permit an amendment to a pleading

to be filed is one addressed to the discretion of the

court. JUS 4 tate case in which a court will be

dusiilied in refusing a party leave to amend his

pleadings so that he may properly present his case___ If

the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of

the motion will not prejudice the Opposing party. it is

error to refuse permission to amend and where the

refusal also results in a party being deprived of the

right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a

meritorious defense, it 1s not only error. but an abuse

of discretion "

8a3

"Trial courts are vested with the discretion to

2 allow amendments to pleadings in furtherance of

3 justice..... That trial courts are to liberally permit such

4 amendments at any stage of the proceeding, has been

5 established policy in this state.... resting on the fundamental

6 policy that cases should be decided on their merits."

7 {Hi Ss ior C Vickers) (1981) 118 CA3d 486. 173

8 Cal Ror 418)

9 4. Where change in law subsequent to filing original

10 complaint demonstrates possibility of recovery on new legal

11 theory, but same general set of facts, courts should permit

12 amendment of complaint to set forth such theory.

13 [Marasco v, Wadsworth (1978) 21 C3d. 82.146 Cal. Rptr 8431)

14

15

Page 10 of Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Supreme Court Rule 10.1 (c)

1. A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of

right, but of judicial discretion A petition for a writ of

certiorari will be granted only when there are special and

important reasons therefor The following, while neither

controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate

the character of reasons that will be considered:

(c) When a state court or a United States court of

appeals has decided an important question of federal law

which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or

has decided a federal question in a way that conflicts with

applicable decisions of this Court

Private individual may be subject to liability under § 1983 if he

or she willfully collaborated with official state actor in

deprivation of federal right, while state actor may be subject

to liability for action physically undertaken by private actors in

violation of plaintiff's liberty or property rights if state actor

directed or aided and abetted the violation Duares v. City of

N.Y., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 985 F3d 94

Mere recourse to state or local court procedures does not, by

itself, amount to “joint activity" with state that would be

sufficient to subject private party to liability under § 1983:

"joint activity" theory requires, at minimum, some overt and

significant state participation in challenged action Hoai v. Vo,

CADC 1991, 935 F 2d 308

10a

Private parties who corruptibly conspire with state officials to

maliciously prosecute an individual act under color of state

law and can be sued by the individual under federal civil rights

Statute, plaintiff attempting to prove such a conspiracy must

show that the parties reached an understanding to deny

plaintiff his or her rights, the conspiratorial acts must impinge

upon the federal right, and the plaintiff must prove an

actionable wrong to support the conspiracyN.A.A.C.P. v.

Hunt, C A 11 (Ala ) 1990, 891 F 2d 1555

As the language itself makes clear, the central purpose of §

1983 is to "give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional

rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his

position” Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 172 5 L Ed 2d 492. 8]

S Ct 473 (1961) The United States Constitution among other

things, places substantial limitations upon state action, and the

cause of action provided in 42 USC § 1983 [42 USCS §

1983] is fundamentally one for "misuse of power, possessed

by virtue of state law and made possible only because the

wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law" United

States v Classic, 313 US 299, 326, 85 L Ed 1368. 61 S Ct

1031 (1941) It is manifest then that all state officials as a

class cannot be immune absolutely from damage suits under

42 USC § 1983 [42 USCS § 1983] and that to extend

absolute immunity to any group of state officials is to negate

pro tanto the very remedy which it appears Congress sought

to create Scheuer v Rhodes, 416 US 232, 243. 40 L Ed 2d

90,

Ila

94S Ct 1683 (1974) Thus, as there is no language in 42

USC § 1983 [42 USCS § 1983] extending any immunity to

any state officials, the Court has not extended absolute

immunity to such officials in the absence of the most

convincing showing that the immunity is necessaryimbler v.

Pachtman 424 US 409, 47 L Ed 2d 128, at 145.96 S Ct

984

In considering a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of

the complaint must be taken as true and all reasonable

inferences must be indulged in favor of the plaintiffA/itchel/

v. King, 537 F2d 385 (10th Cir 1976), Dewell v. Lawson, 489

F2d 877 (10th Cir 1974) A complaint should not be

dismissed unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff

can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief Conley v. Gibson, 355 US 41. 45-46. 78

S.Ct 99, 101-102, 2 L Ed2d 80 (1957) The question is not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he is

entitled to offer evidence to support his claimScheuer v.

Rhodes, 416 U.S 232, 236, 94S Ct 1683, 1686, 40 LEd2d

90 (1974) Steele v. Stephan, 633 F Supp 950

Thus, we concluded that it is "not unfair to hold liable the

official who knows or should know he is acting outside the

law," and that “insisting on awareness of clearly established

constitutional limits will not unduly interfere with the exercise

of official judgment " Butz v. Economou, 438 U S 478. 98 §

Ct 2894, at 2911, 57 LEd 2d 895 (917M).S. v. Stanley

483 US 669, at 697, 107 SCt 3054, at 3071, 97 LEd 2d

550

12a

We therefore hold that government officials performing

discretionary function generally are shielded from liability for

civil damage insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. S@eocunier vy.

Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 565 98 §.Ct. 855, 861, 55 LEd2d

24 (1978); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S., at 322, 95 S.Ct , at

1001. Harlow v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 800, 817, 102 S.Ct

2727, 2738, 73 L._Ed2d 396.

Allegation that defendants knowingly and willfully conspired

and agreed among themselves to interfere with plaintiff's

privacy and committed acts in controversy in furtherance of

conspiracy, resulting in damages set forth in incorporated

causes of action, was sufficient to state a cause of action for

conspiracy to interfere with the contractual relationships and

to invade privacy H & M Associates v. City of El Centro

(1980) 167 Cal Rptr. 392, 09 C._A 3d 399

Federal and State Constitutions guarantee that no state shall

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law In re Marilyn H. (1993) 19 Cal Rptr.2d 544,

5 Cal 4th 295, 851 P. 2d 826

l3a

Not all speech is protected by First Amendment, as speech,

fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit are unprotected by First

Amendment State v. Monastero 1988, 424 N W.2d 837,

228 Neb. 818, appeal dismissed 109 S Ct. 358, 488 US. 936,

102 L_ Ed2d 349

In general, speech mixed with conduct may be more

significantly regulated than pure speecWarina v. U.S.

D.C. App.1993, 622 A 2d 50

Where individual violates otherwise valid criminal statute,

First Amendment does not act as shield to preclude

prosecution of that individual simply because his criminal

conduct involves speecHJU.S. v. Riggs N D Ill 1990, 743

F Supp. 556

Fact that speech of newspaper and reporter may have been

constitutionally privileged under First Amendment did not

automatically protect them from private action for intentional

infliction of emotional distress based on publication of

article Upchurch v. New York Times Co.S C_ 1993, 431

S.E.2d 558

Rule which provided that it is professional misconduct for

lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to

administration of justice is not vague, so as to have chilling

effect on First Amendment rights Matter of Anderson, 1990.

795 P.2d 64, 247 Kan 208, certiorari denied 111 S Ct 985,

498 US 1095, 112 L Ed 2d 1069

l4a

Speech which ts critical of court or judge is protected by First

Amendment unless it presents clear and present danger that it

will influence court's decision in pending caseColeman v.

Caddo Parish School Bd, La App 2 Cir 1994, 635 So 2d

1238

"Actual malice," in defamation context, does not mean "ill

will," but means knowledge that statement was false, or

doubts about its truth couple with reckless disregard of

whether it was false Underwager v. Salter C A. 7 (Wis)

1994, 22 V.3d 730

Where information is from a source known to be hostile to

subject against whom material is to be used, failure to

investigate truth of allegations solely received from such

source may support finding that publication has been made in

wanton and reckless disregard of veracity. Fisher v. Larsen

(1982) 78 L_Ed2d 335, 464 US. 959, 138 C A 3d 627, 188

Cal Rptr 216

Privilege for publications or broadcasts made in_ judicial

proceeding applies only to communicative acts and does not

privilege tortious courses of conduct. West's Ann

Cal Civ Code 47(b)(2Kupiec v. American Intern.

Adjustment Co. (1991), 235 Cal App. 3d 1329 | Cal Rptr 2d

37)

15a

"Privilege" for statements made in course of judicial

proceeding did not preclude court from making evidentiary

use of statements made during negotiation sessions in prior

lawsuit in determining whether defendant in abuse of process

action acted for improper "ulterior" purpose Oren Royal

Oaks Venture v. Greenberg, Bernhard, Weiss & Karms,

Inc. (1986) 42 C.3d 1157, 232 Cal. Rptr. 567.

"In all such instances the unsuccessful party is really

prevented, by the fraudulent contrivance of his adversary,

from having a trial; but when he has a trial he must be

prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. He

knows that a false claim or defense can be supported in no

other way; that the very object of the trial is, if possible, to

ascertain the truth from the conflict of evidence, and ihat

necessarily the truth or falsity of the testimony must be

determined in deciding the issue. The trial is his opportunity

for making the truth appear...Kachig vy. Boothe22

Cal. App.3d 626, 634, 99 Cal Rptr. 393,397

Privilege for publications or broadcasts made in judicial

proceedings applies to any communication (1) made in judicial

Or quasi-judicial proceeding, (2) by litigants or other

participants authorized by law, in or out of court, (3) to

achieve objects of litigation, and (4) has some connection or

logical relation to action. West's Ann Cal Civ. Code Kupiec v.

American Intern. Adjustment Co.235 Cal App.3d 1329,

Cai Rptr.2d 371

16a

We conclude that Williams and Heninger correctly held that

an injured claimant has a right of recovery underRoyal Globe

only upon proof that the insured was actually liable to the

third party claimant. If the insured is not liable for the

claimant's injury, the claimant has no right to damages from

the insured, and the claimant cannot be permitted to recover

for “unfair conduct" by the insurer in refusing to settle and

underlying unmeritorious claim. Moradi-Shala v. Fireman's

Fund Ins. 46 Cal 3d 287,308,250 Cal Rptr. 116, 129, 758

P 2d 58

"To deny the injured party the right to recover any actual

damages in such cases, because they are of a nature which

cannot be thus certainly measured, would be to enable parties

to profit by, and speculate upon, their own wrongs, encourage

violence and invite depredation. Such is not and cannot be the

law..." Parchment Co. v. Paterson P. Paper Co. (1931) 282

US. at p 564, 51 S.Ct. at p251, citindsilbert v. Kennedy

(1871) 22 Mich. 117, 130

Attorneys would not be provided especially broad application

of this section rendering privileged publication or broadcast

made in judicial proceeding, the litigation privilege, to avoid

conflict of interest that might result if attorney were forced to

defend against invasion of privacy or illegal conduct claim as

codefendant with clients, so as to immunize attorney from

liability for alleged misconduct in aiding and abetting violation

of Privacy Act [Penal Code Section 630 et seq.]. Kimmel v.

Goland (1990) 51 Cal 3d 202, 793 P.2d 524, 271

Cal Rptr 191

17a

Title 28 § 1257. State courts; certiorari

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where the

validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in

question or where the validity of a statute of any State is

drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the

Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States, or where

any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or

claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or

any commission held or authority exercised under, the United

States

The profession of the law possesses extraordinary powers

Lawyers can make the arrogant humble and the weak strong

In control of the course of litigation and armed with the

knowledge of right and wrong, they are most able to abjure

illegal or tortious conduct, it is their duty to do so. As

occupants of a high public trust and officers of the court, they

are expected to conform their behavior in legal affairs to a

higher standard of rectitude and spirit of obedience than those

who are willing to endure the dust of transgression.

Guided by oath, duty and obligation, the lawyer's path avoids

the vices from which the virtuous abstain. Thus, it ill suits the

profession to seek immunity for injuries inflicted while

engaged in legal warfare under the protective tarpaulin of the

privilege for "judicial proceedings Kimmel v. Goland

(1990) 51 Cal.3d 204, 213,271 Cal Rptr 191, 198

-?

18a

Finally, in immunizing participants from liability for torts

arising from communications made during judicial

proceedings, the law places upon litigants the burden of

exposing during trial the bias of witnesses and the falsity of

evidence, thereby enhancing the finality of judgments and

avoiding an unending roundelay of litigation, an evil far worse

than an occasional unfair result. Silberg v. Anderson (1990)

50 Cal.3d. 205, 214: 266 Cal. Rptr. 638, 643

As indicated above, a reviewing court, should not disturb the

exercise of a trial court's discretion unless it appears that there

has been a miscarriage of justice. This, in Loomis v. Loomis,

181 Cal App2d 345, 348-349 [4-6], 5 Cal Rptr 550, 552

[2-4], it was said: “it is fairly deducible from the cases that one

of the essential attributes of abuse of discretion is that it must

clearly appear to effect injustice Discretion is abused

whenever, in its exercise, the court exceeds the bounds of

reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.

The burden is on the party complaining to establish an abuse

of discretion, and unless there has been a miscarriage of justice

a reviewing court will not substitute its opinion and thereby

divest the trial court of its discretionary power." (See also City

of Los Angles v. Superior Court, 271 Cal.App. 292, 294 [1],

76 Cal. Rptr. 256, Ordway v. Arata, 150 Cal.App2d 71, 78

309 P.2d 919, Estate of Hart, 119 Cal App2d 310, 318 [12],

259 P.2d 703 )Denham v. Superior Court of Los Angeles

County, 2 Cal. 3d 557, 568, 86 Cal Rptr 65, 71, 468 P.2d 193

19a

If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the

motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to

refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results

in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious

cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error

but an abuse of discretion. Cal.CasGen. Ins. v. Superior

Court 173 Cal App.3d 274, 279, 218 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819

Although it would have been preferable for plaintiff to have

specified the basis for amendment in addition to stating the

relief requested on motion to amend complaint, the error was

not a ground for denying the motion to ameRdtya v.

Maryatt Industries, N_D Cal.1993, 829 F.Supp. 1169

Leave to amend pleading should be freely granted to correct

or clarify insufficient statement of court's jurisdictional basis

over suit. Jacobi v. Blocker. ED. Va.1994, 153 F.R.D. 84

Fact that plaintiff pleads improper legal theory in complaint

does not preclude recovery under proper theory and selection

of improper remedy in demand is not fatal if claim indicates

that pleader is entitled to some other relief, sufficiency of

pleading 1s tested by statement of claim, and demand for

judgment is not considered part of clddimuccio v.

D'Ambra, M _D Fla.1991, 779 F Supp. 1318

Short and plain statement of claim showing that pleader is

entitled to relief, need not be factually detailed, but it must

give defendant fair notice of what plaintiff's claim is and

grounds upon which it restGallardo v. Board of County

Com'rs, Kearny County Kan. DKan 1994, 857 F Supp

783

20a

Despite statutory language indicating "reasonableness"

standard, statutory sanctions for vexatious filings are not

awarded unless attorney acted recklessly or in bad faith;

however, unlike sanctions under Rule 11, pleading does not

have to be entirely frivolous for statutory sanctions to attach,

so long as finding of bad faith or recklessness is madeln re

Keegan Management Co., Securities Litigation

N.D Cal.1994, 154 F R.D. 237

Fraud in the factum is such fraud in procurement of the

execution of an instrument as results in the signer's being

ignorant of the nature of the instrument he is signing The

theoretical basis of the defense of fraud in the factum is the

absence of a meeting of the minds, the mutual assent

necessary to the creation of a binding contract. If the signer

of a contract misapprehends the terms of a document, then he

has not, in fact, assented to its true terms. Signatures to

written releases obtained by fraud in the factum render such

releases void. Such a fraud or misrepresentation may be

deemed to have induced a party's signing of a release if it

substantially contributes to his decision to manifest his

consent. A release of a claim of personal injuries may be

rendered void on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation

regarding the nature of the claim covered by the release so

long as the releasor's failure to learn the nature of the terms

was not attributable to his own negligence. Where a release

was obtained by fraud in the factum, the failure of a releasor

to read the contracts does not prevent courts from declaring

such contracts void. Frusetta v. Hauben(1990, 2nd Dist)

217 CA3d 551, 266 Cal Rptr. 62

2la

Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is

given in evidence by one party, the whole on the same subject

may be inquired into by an adverse party; when a letter is read,

the answer may be given, and when a detached act,

deciaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any

other act, declaration, conversation, or writing which is

necessary to make it understood may also be given in

evidence. Evidence Code Section 356.

In negligence action, statement by police officer that witness

to automobile accident had told him that first driver had gone

by fast was admissible as part of conversation that had already

been admitted regarding second driver's ability to go through

intersection. Carson v. Facilities Development Co.

(1984) 36 C. 3d 830, 206 Cal Rptr 136

Further testimony of insured regarding remainder of

conversation between insured and insurance representative

was admissible as having some bearing upon, or connection

with, admission of part of conversation in evidence and as

prior consistent statements. Sprague v. Equifax Inc. (App. 2

Dist. 1985) 166 C.A.3d1012,213 Cal.Rptr. 69.

Conviction for perjury requires that accused have specific

intent to make false statement under penalty of perjury,

statement must be known by accused to be false at time it was

made and must be willfully made. West's Ann. Cal. Penal

Code Section 118 - People v. Story(1985 2 Dist) 168

C.A.3d 849, 216 Cal Rptr. 158.

22a

Police officer who would deliberately lie in affidavit in support

of issuance of search warrant to mislead magistrate would be

subject to prosecution for perjury, and any officer who would

willfully procure another officer to commit such perjury

would be guilty of subornation of perjury. West's Ann. Cal.

Penal Code Sections 118, 119, 127. -People v. Truer(1985

5 Dist) 168 C.A. 3d 437, 214 Cal. Rptr. 869

In perjury prosecutions, material false statement is one which

is relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration 8

U.S.C.A. Section 1621. - U.S. v. Clark (1990 Cal.) 918 F.2d

843.

Defect, if any, in complaint charging that first driver on certain

date a certain place drove tractor and trailer combination on

highway in speed in excess of 50 miles per hour in violation of

certain section of Vehicle Code was entirely procedural in

nature and was effectively waived for all purposes in absence

of objection, and therefore information charging that first

truck driver and second truck driver concocted story designed

to clear first truck driver of speeding charge, and that second

truck driver gave false testimony preventing conviction of first

truck driver sufficiently state perjury, subornation of perjury,

and conspiracy to obstruct justice West's Ann. Vehicle

Code, Sections 15, 22406, 40300, 40503. - Brown v.

Superior Court (1965) 234 C.A 2d 628, 44 Cal. Rptr. 519

The root requirement of the Due Process Clause is that an

individual be give an opportunity for a hearing before he is

deprived of any significant protected interest, hearing required

before termination of employment. Zinermon v. Burch 494

US. 126; 110 S Ct. 984.

23a

Due Process clause of Fourteenth Amendment protects an

individual's rights of access to civil courts, and deprivation if

this right is actionable undGSection 1983, Woodard v.

Mennella, (EDNY 1994) 861 F Supp 192

The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of

force, and it is one of the highest and most essential privileges

of citizenship, and must be allowed by each state to the

citizens of all other states to the precise extent that it Is

allowed to its own citizens Chambers v. Baltimore, etc. R.

Co., (Ohio 1907) 28 S.Ct. 34, 207 US 142, 52 L.Ed. 143.

A § 1983 conspiracy claim may arise when a private actor

conspires with a state actor to deprive a person of a

constitutional right under color of state law. Dixon v. City

of Lawton, Oki, C A 10 (Okl.) 1990, 898 F.2d. 1443

Justice, indeed, must satisfy the appearance of justice, and this

stringent rule may sometimes bar trial even by judges who

have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh

the scales of justice equally between contending parties

Concrete Pipe & Prod. v. Const. Laborers Pen. Tr. (1993)

113 S.Ct. 2254, 2277

Since the causes of action in the amended complaint were

different legal theories arising from the same basic facts, the

alleged improper treatment of plaintiffs foot, the trial court

erred in refusing to allow the complaint to be amended

Herrera v. Superior Court (1984) 158 Cal App.3d._ 255; 204

Cal Rptr 553, 556

24a

Allegations in state court defendant's pro se complaint, that

state trial judge had acted out of spite or annoyance in

refusing to sign journal entry to permit defendant to appeal,

was sufficient to state claim under § 1983 for violation of

defendant's due process rights. Olson v. Hart, C_A.10 (Kan)

1992, 965 F2d. 940.

Purpose of rule depriving trial court of jurisdiction pending

appeal in civil actions is to protect jurisdiction of appellate

court, the rule prevents trial court from rendering the appeal

futile by changing the judgment into something different;

accordingly, whether a matter is embraced in or affected by a

judgment within the meaning of this section providing that the

perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court

upon the judgment or order or upon the matters embraced

therein or affected thereby, depends on whether postjudgment

proceedings on the matter would have any effect on the

effectiveness of the appeal. In re Marriage of Horowitz

(App. | Dist. 1984) 159 C_.A.3d 377,205 Cal. Rptr. 880

I perceive no substantial countervailing reason why at the

certiorari stage this federal policy should not be applied to

state cases presenting arguably substantial federal questions

American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. et al. v.

American Broadcasting - Paramount Theatres, Inc. (1966)

873.Ct. I

The Anglo-American system of law is based not upon

transcendental revelation but upon the conscience of society

ascertained as best it may be by a tribunal disciplined for the

task and evironed by the best safeguards for disinterestedness

and detachment. Bartkus v. Illinois,359 US 121, 79 S.Ct

676

-25a-

Some of the apparent confusion over the meaning of "sham"

may stem from our use of the word "genuine" to denote the

opposite of "sham". The word "genuine" has both objective

and subjective connotations. On one hand, "genuine" means

“actually having the reputed or apparent qualities or

character." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 948

(1986). "Genuine" in this sense governs Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 56, under which a "genuine issue" is one "that

properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because [it]

may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party." On the

other hand, "genuine" also means " sincerely and honestly felt

or experienced." Webster's Dictionary,supra, at 948. To be

sham, therefore, litigation must fail to be "genuine" in both

senses of the word.6

6. In surveying the "forms of illegal and reprehensible practice which

may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may result in

antitrust violations," we have noted that "unethical conduct in the Setting of

the adjudicatory process often results in sanctions" and that "[mjisrepresent-

ations, condoned in the political arena, are not immunized when used in the

adjudicatory process." California Motor Transport, 404 US., at $12-513,

92 S.Ct, at 613. We need not decide here whether and, and if so, to what

extent Noerr permits the imposition of antitrust liability for a litigant's fraud

or other misrepresentations. Cf Fed Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(3) (allowing a federal

court to "relieve a party ... from a final judgment" for "fraud ..., musrepresentation, or

other misconduct of an adverse party"); Walker

Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 US.

172, 176-177, 86 S.Ct. 347, 349-350, 15 LEd 2d 247 (1965); id., at 179-

180, 86 s.Ct., at 351-352 (Harlan, J., concurring)

Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures

Ind., Inc. (1993) 113 §.Ct. 1920, 1928-1929.

Mislabeling cause of action is immaterial, if facts that justify

imposition of liability on defendant are alleged and proved

Gagne v. Bertran (1954) 43 C.2d. 481, 275 P.2d. 15

26a

Nature and character of a pleading are to determined from its

allegations, regardless of what they may be called, and the

subject matter of the action and issues involved are

determined from the facts alleged than from the title of the

pleading. Kreutzer v. San Diego County (1984) 153 CA 3d

62, 100 Cal Rptr. 322

However, not all speech is protected by the first amendment.

The U.S. Supreme court stated, in Konigsberg v. California

State Bar, 366 US. 36, 49, 81 S.Ct. 997, 1006, 6 L.Ed. 2d

105 (1961):

At the outset we reject the view that

freedom of speech and association ... as

protected by the First and Fourteenth

Amendments, are "absolutes," not only in the

undoubted sense that where the constitutional

protection exists it must prevail, but also in the

sense that the scope of that protection must be

gathered solely from at literal reading of the

First Amendment.

The Konigsburg Court noted at 49-50 n. 10, 81 S.Ct. at 1006

n. 10.

That view [freedom of speech is

absolute], which of course cannot be reconciled

with the law relating to libel, slander,

misrepresentation, obscenity, perjury, false

advertising, solicitation of crime, complicity by

encouragement, conspiracy, and the like, is said to

be compelled by the fact that the commands of the

First Amendment are stated in

unqualified terms: "Congress shall make no

law ... abridging the freedom of speech..."

Consequently, as speech, fraud,

misrepresentation, and deceit are unprotected by the first

amendment. State v. Monastero (Neb. 1988) 424 N.W 2d

837, 843

California Civil Code Secti 7

and

lifornia Civil ion 47, amend

as of January 1, 1995

Re: The Malice Element

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty

(b) In any (1) legislative or (2) judicial

proceeding, or (3) in any other official proceeding authorized

by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other

proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to

Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title | of Part

3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows

(2) This subdivision does not make privileged any

communication made in furtherance of an act of intentional

destruction or alteration of physical evidence undertaken for

the purpose of depriving a party to litigation of the use of that

evidence, whether or not the content of the communication is

the subject of a subsequent publication or broadcast which is

privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph,

"physical evidence" means evidence specified in Section 250

of the Evidence Code or evidence that is property of any type

specified in Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(3) A goer lis gna is not a 20

li V1

scat al ceeds aaiaies ahh dinnia the te aes

of possession of real property. as authorized or required by

law

-27a I-

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a

person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or

(2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person

interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the

motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who 1s

requested by the person interested to give the information

(d) By a fair and true report in a public journal, of

(1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official

proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof, or

(5) or a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a

public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been

issued

(e) By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings

of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a

lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication

of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 47, AMENDED

JANUARY 1, 1995.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. It is the intent of the Legislature in

amending Section 47 of the Civil Code to overturn the

decision inCalifornia Dredging Company v. Insurance

Company of North America, 18 Cal. App. 4th 572.

Section 2. Section 47 of the Civil Code is amended

to read

47 A privileged publication or broadcast is one

made

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty

-27a 2-

(b) — In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial

proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by

law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding

authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2

(commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:

(2) This subdivision does not make privileged any

communication made in furtherance of an act of intentional

destruction or alteration of physical evidence undertaken for

the purpose of depriving a party to litigation of the use of that

evidence, whether or not the content of the communication is

the subject of a subsequent publication or broadcast which is

privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph,

"physical evidence" means evidence specified in Section 250

of the Evidence Code or evidence that is property of any type

specified in Section 2031 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3) This subdivision does not make privileged any

communication made in a judicial proceeding knowingly

concealing to existence of an insurance policy or policies.

(4) A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged

publication unless it identifies an action previously filed with a

court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right

of possession of real property, as authorized or required by

law

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a

person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or

(2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person

interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the

motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is

requested by the person interested to give the information.

-27a 3-

(d) By a fair and true report in a public journal, of

(1) a judicial, (2) legislative, or (3) other public official

proceeding, or (4) of anything said in the course thereof. or

(5) or a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a

public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been

issued.

(e) By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings

of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a

lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication

of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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