Appendix — Todd v. Florida
Supreme Court brief1995
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A Supreme Court, vu.
‘oy FILED
941736 app o + 1995
No. __QFFICE OF THE Cieox
In The
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1994
JASON TODD AND JOSEPH HUGH HUTCHINSON, Petitioners,
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
Florida First District Court of Appeal
APPENDIX TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
John G. Crabtree
Counsel of Record
Of Counsel: Messer, Vickers,
Nancy A. Daniel Caparello, Madsen,
Doug Brinkmeyer Goldman & Metz, P.A.
301 South Monroe Street P.O. Box 1876
Leon County Courthouse Tallahassee, Florida 32302
Tallahassee, FL 32301 (904) 222-0720
Counsel for Petitioners
October 1994
AMIS RIOR 88 BS aes lek Lire
TABLE OF CONTENTS
APPENDIX A
Opinion of the District Court of Appeal .............. la
APPENDIX B
Opinion and Order of the Circuit Court Denying
ee. Gas 12a
Sentencing Order of the Circuit Court .............. l4a
I res ss hy Deas l6a
sudgmom (Hutchinson) ... 1... cc ce 19a
Oueer of Probation (Tedd)... wc cee 22a
Order of Probation (Hutchinson).................. 27a
Orders of the Circuit Court .................. 32a-40a
Orders of the District Court of Appeal ........... 41la-66a
Order of the Florida Supreme Court Denying Petition for
Discretionary Review (Todd) .................... 67a
Order of the Florida Supreme Court Denying Petition for
Discretionary Review (Hutchinson) ................. 69a
APPENDIX C
Order of District Court of Appeal Denying
SE eg on ok ew wd 0s Va ck oa 71a
iia
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
APPENDIX D
Chapter 38, §1005-5-3.2(a),
Illinois Statutes (1989)
Staff Summary and Analysis of
House Bills 235 and 351, Florida
House of Representatives
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT,
STATE OF FLORIDA
JASON TODD, NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME
EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION
Appellant, FOR REHEARING AND
DISPOSITION THEREOF IF
FILED.
v. CASE NO. 92-4116
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee,
and
JOSEPH HUGH HUTCHINSON,
Appellant,
v. CASE NO. 92-4136
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
Opinion filed August 22, 1994.
An appeal from the Circuit Court for Columbia County.
L. Arthur Lawrence, Jr., Judge.
la
John G. Crabtree of Messer, Vickers, Caparello, Madsen,
Lewis, Goldman & Metz, P.A., Tallahassee, for Appellants.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney
General, Tallahassee; Michael J. Neimand, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of the Attorney General, Department of Legal
Affairs, Miami, for Appellee.
Amici Curiae: Mitchell Horwich, Coral Gables; Marc D.
Stern and Lois C. Waldman, American Jewish Congress, New
York; Thomas A. Horkan, Jr., Florida Catholic Conference,
Tallahassee.
MINER, J.
In these two cases, which have been consolidated for the
purposes of briefing, oral argument and opinion, the appellants
challenge, on constitutional grounds, section 806.13(2), Florida
Statutes (1991), which makes it a felony to deface a church,
synagogue, mosque or other place of worship or its religious
contents. Additionally, appellant Todd, a minor at the time of
sentencing, contends that the trial court, contrary to section
39.059(7), Florida Statutes (1991), failed to make written
findings of fact or state in writing the reasons for its decision
to impose adult sanctions against him. Finding no merit in
such argument, we affirm on that point without further
discussion. As to the constitutional challenges to section
806.13(2), which are issues of first impression in Florida, we
conclude that the statute does not violate any constitutional
command and therefore affirm.
The facts in these two cases are without dispute.
Appellants were charged with three counts of criminal mischief
each in violation of section 806.13(2), which makes it a third-
degree felony to willfully and maliciously cause between $200
and $1,000 damage to a place of worship or its religious
2a
& tne Diab tot ela soar
contents. Specifically, appellants were accused of spray
painting three churches in Columbia County with anti-religious
symbols and words. Appellants filed motions to dismiss,
asserting state and federal equal protection and religion
establishment challenges to the statute. Those motions were
denied, and appellants subsequently pled no contest to the
charges, reserving their rights to appeal the denial of the
motions to dismiss. They were convicted and sentenced to
serve 48 hours in jail followed by five years of probation and
to perform 150 hours of community service for each count,
with the probationary sentences to be served consecutively.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court is obligated to honor the strong presumption
in favor of the constitutionality of statutes. All doubt will be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute, and an act
will not be declared unconstitutional unless it is determined to
be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kinner, 398
So.2d 1360, 1363 (Fla. 1981).
I. ESTABLISHMENT CAUSE
Appellants challenge section 806.13, Florida Statutes
(1991), and particularly that portion of the statute which makes
it a felony to deface a place of worship,’ asserting that it
Section 806.13 provides as follows:
806.13 Criminal mischief.--
(1)(a) A person commits the offense of criminal
mischief if he willfully and maliciously injures or damages by
any means any real or personal property belonging to another,
including, but not limited to, the placement of graffiti thereon
or other acts of vandalism thereto.
(b)1. If the damage to such property is $200 or less,
it is a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
3a
violates the Establishment Clauses of both the state and federal
2. If the damage to such property is greater thar $200
but less than $1,000, it is a misdemeanor of the first degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.
3. If the damage is $1,000 or greater, or if there is
interruption or impairment of a business operation or public
communication, transportation, supply of water, gas or
power, or other public service which costs $1,000 or more in
labor and supplies to restore, it is a felony of the third degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.
(2) Any person who willfully and maliciously defaces,
A NO RE PE RN “te ‘ity of a fel F the third desree,
‘chabl vided j 775.082 775.083
77 4.3
(3) Whoever, without the consent of the owner
thereof, willfully destroys or substantially damages any public
telephone, or telephone cables, wires, fixtures, antennas,
amplifiers, or any other apparatus, equipment, or appliances,
which destruction or damage renders a pubiic telephone
inoperative or which opens the body of a public telephone,
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as
provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084; provided,
however, that a conspicuous notice of the provisions of this
subsection and the penalties provided shall have been posted
on or near the destroyed or damaged instrument and visible
to the public at the time of the commission of the offense.
(4) Any person who violates a provision of this
section may, in addition to any other criminal penalty, be
required to pay for the damages caused by such offense.
(Emphasis added.)
4a
sn
constitutions. The Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”? Article I,
Section 3, of the Florida Constitution is substantially the same.
It provides: “There shall be no law respecting the
establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free
exercise thereof.”* The Establishment Clause was intended to
afford protection against sponsorship, financial support, and
active involvement of the sovereign in religious activities.
Lemon vy. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 91 S. Ct. 2105,
2111, 29 L. Ed. 2d 745, 755 (1971). Three tests have been
developed to determine whether a statute violates the
Establishment Clause. First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and third, the
statute must not foster excessive government entanglement with
religion. Id, at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111, 209 L. Ed. 2d at
755.
Although not controlling, we find People v. Carter, 592
N.E.2d 491 (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 602 N.E.2d 461
(Ill. 1992), persuasive in determining that section 806. 13(2)
does not violate the Establishment Clause. In Carter, the
defendant raised an establishment challenge to a criminal
?The First Amendment is applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Fla,, 480 U.S. 136, 139-40, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1048, 94
L.Ed. 2d 190 197 (1987).
3Because the language regarding establishment in the
Florida constitution parallels the language of the First Amendment,
federal law will be of great value in determining issues under
Florida’s constitution. See 25A Fla. Stat. Ann. 79 (1991
(Commentary).
Sa
statute that permitted the sentencing court to impose a more
severe sentence upon a defendant who committed an offense in
a place of worship. In determining that the statute dic not
violate the Establishment Clause, the court applied the tests
announced in Lemon. The court found that the articulated
purpose, iLe., to protect places of worship and those who use
them, provided the requisite secular basis. The statute merely
reflected the legislature’s determination that crimes commutted
in such places, like crimes against the elderly, are more
repugnant to the community than some other offenses. It
acknowledges our country’s long tradition of respect for the
free exercise of religion. Id, at 497. In determining that the
Statute’s primary effect did not advance religion, the court
found that the statute’s primary effect falls on criminals rather
than their victims. While some benefit was conferred on those
who attend religious services in houses of worship, the court
concluded that such benefit was too indirect to violate the
Establishment Clause. Id, at 498. Citing State v. Vogenthaler,
548 P.2d 112 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976), which upheld a statute
that criminalized defacing a church, the court noted that
statutes which provide penalties for damaging property do not
advance religion. Jd, As to the question of excessive
entanglement, the court found none, because the statute did not
benefit religious institutions other than indirectly and it did not
establish a continuing relationship between the religious
institutions and government which required day-to-day
surveillance or administration of religious activities. Id. After
considering the Lemon tests, we agree with the result in Carter,
as indicated in the following analysis.
A. Turning to the first test, secular legislative
purpose, as explained in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 90 L. Ed. 2d 273
(1987), this does not mean that the law’s purpose must be
unrelated to religion -- that would amount to a requirement that
6a
the government show a callous indifference to religious groups,
which the Establishment Clause has never been interpreted to
mean. Rather, the purpose requirement is aimed at preventing
the government from abandoning neutrality and acting with the
intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious
matters. To warrant a finding that a statute is unconstitutional
for lack of secular purpose, the challenge must demonstrate
conclusively that the statute was motivated wholly by religious
consideration. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680, 104 S.
Ct. 1355, 1362, 79 L. Ed. 604, 614 (1984). The relevant
inquiry is the legislative purpose of the statute and not the
possible religious motives of the legislators. Board of Educ. of
Westside Community v, Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 249, 110S.
Ct. 2356, 2371, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 215 (1991). Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2579, 96
L.Ed. 2d 510, 521 (1987) (court is normally deferential to
state’s articulation of a secular purpose).
In the instant case, the Staff Summary and Analysis
concerning the addition of subsection 806.13(2) provides: “It
is believed that legislation of this type is necessary to curtail
the increasing number of criminal mischief acts committed in
a place of worship and in cemeteries.” Since the legislature's
articulated purpose was to deter criminal mischief, it cannot be
said that the statute lacks a secular purpose. See Lynch
(concluding that city’s inclusion of nativity scene in its
Christmas display did not violate the Establishment Clause,
because there were legitimate secular purposes for its inclusion,
ie., to celebrate the holiday and depict the origins of it);
Lemon (where statutes for providing financial support to non-
public schools and paying supplements to teachers in non-
public schools were aimed at improving secular education in all
schools, the legislative purpose was not to advance religion,
rather the state had a legitimate concern in maintaining
minimum standards in all schools); Committee for Pub. Educ.
& Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 93 S. Ct. 2955,
Ta
37 L. Ed. 2d 948 (1973) (where legislature specified purposes
for law granting financial aid to non-public schools were to
preserve health and safe environment for all children, promote
pluralism and diversity, and to avoid overburdening the public
school system, all those were legitimate secular considerations
and did not require a finding of unconstitutionality under the
first test). Appellants’ argument ignores this stated legislative
purpose, to which we give great deference, and instead :elics
on their assumption of the legislative purpose.
Appellant's reliance on Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock,
489 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 890, 103 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1989), for the
notion that a statute which confers a benefit only on religious
institutions Or organizations cannot have a secular purpose, to
prove that section 806.13 necessarily lacks a secular purpose is
misplaced for two reasons. First, Bullock dealt with a tax
exemption which directly benefited religious organizations as
it granted the exemption to religious literature. Here, the
statute does not directly benefit religious organizations in that
it merely increases the penalty when criminal mischief is
committed to houses of worship. Carter. Second, unlike
Bullock, where the exemption only applied to religious
literature, an increased penalty under section 806.13 also
applies to criminal mischief involving telephone services. §
806.13(3), Fla. Stat. (1991). Thus, Bullock does not compel
a finding of a nonsecular purpose.
B. Turning to the second test, the principal or
primary effect of advancing religion, the law’s purpose or
effect must be to “endorse” religion for the law to be violative
of the Establishment Clause. County of Allegheny v.
Lenctican Civil Lihertite Ueinn ( Pittsburgh C}
492 U.S. 573, 592, 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3100, 106 L. Ed. 2d 472,
494 (1989). The government is prohibited from conveying the
message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored
or preferred. Id, at 593, 109S. Ct. at 3101, 106 L. Ed. 2d at
494. As explained in Corporation of Presiding Bishops, 438
8a
OE REAR AY EGE
STG RATT eo nO fener ae
te BREE A
eens ner pene oman we swt
U.S. at 337, 107 S. Ct. at 2869, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 283, for a law
to have forbidden effects, it must be fair to say that the
government itself has advanced religion through its own
activities and influence.
Here, although appellants have argued that section
806.13(2)’s primary effect or purpose is to benefit houses of
worship, the statute clearly shows that its primary purpose is
to punish those who deface all sorts of property, including
religious property. Admittedly, there is some benefit to
religious institutions since there is a greater deterrence for
criminal mischief involving religious property, but such benefit
is indirect. Carter. As noted in Bullock, 489 U.S. at 10, 109
S. Ct. at 897, 103 L. Ed. 2d at 10, government policies with
secular policies may incidentally benefit religion. Thus, it
cannot be said that the statute’s primary effect is to advance or
endorse religion.
In so saying, we once again reject appellants’ reliance
on Bullock’s breadth analysis. This is not a situation where the
law only applies to religious institutions; an enhanced penalty
also applies to criminal mischief involving telephone services.
ore As for the third test, that of excessive
entanglement, appellant has argued that the statute causes
excessive entanglement because the state will have to determine
what an “other place of worship” is and what “religious
articles” are. The entanglement which is forbidden is
comprehensive, discriminating and _ continuing _ state
surveillance, Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684, 104 S. Ct. at 1365, 79
L. Ed. 2d at 617; day-to-day surveillance or administration of
religious activities, Board of Educ, of Westside Community
Schs, v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 252-53, 110 S. Ct. 2356,
2373, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 217 (1990); and programs whose
very nature are apt to entangle the state in the details of
administration, Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614-15, 91 S. Ct. at 2112,
29 L. Ed. 2d at 757. We fail to see how determining whether
defaced property is a place of worship or a religious article
9a
therein constitutes the type of entanglement contemplated by
the Establishment Clause test. Accord Carter.
In conclusion, because section 806.13(2) passes muster
under each of the tests set out in Lemon, the trial court’s vider
denying appellants’ motions to dismiss should be affirmed as io
the Establishment Clause issue.
Il. EQUAL PROTECTION
Appellants argue that they are denied equal protection,
because section 806.13 treats acts of criminal mischief
differently depending upon whether they involve secular or
religious property. In regard to equal protection, the Florida
Constitution provides that “[a]ll natural persons are equal
before the law,” and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no state may “deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.”
Art. I, § 2, Fla. Const.; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The
Equal Protection clause does not, however, deny to states the
power to treat different classes of persons in different ways so
long as such classifications are reasonably related to a
legitimate state interest. Stall v. State, 570 So.2d 257, — n. :
(Fla. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Long v. Florida,
__, LIL S. Ct. 2888, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1054 (1991).
In determining the equal protection challenge in the
instant case, it has been conceded that the rational basis test is
the appropriate standard. See Corporation of Presiding Bishop,
483 U.S. at 338-39, 107 S.Ct. at 2870, 97 L. Ed. 2d at 285
(laws affording a uniform benefit to all religions should be
analyzed under the rational basis test). Thus, the question
before us is whether the government has chosen a rational
classification to further a legitimate end.
As discussed under Issue I, subsection A, the state has
a legitimate interest in deterring crime. Moreover, as indicated
in the staff summary and analysis, there is an increasing
number of criminal mischief acts perpetrated against religious
institutions. The statute’s enhanced penalties for acts against
10a
ee Te Se
ee ee
such institutions are rationally related to a legitimate state
interest. Therefore, the law does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. Walker v. State, 501 So.2d 156 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1987) (assault and battery statute which divides people
for sentencing purposes into two classes, i.e., those subject to
the discipline of the school and who are not, did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause, because the legislative aims to
maintain and protect the integrity of the school setting and
standing of teachers as role models were legitimate objectives,
and the statute’s effect, L¢e., enhancing the penalty from a
misdemeanor to a felony for battery or a school board
employee when the defendant is not subject to school
discipline, was rationally related to achieve the intended end).
Consequently, the trial court’s order should be affirmed as to
the equal protection issue.
AFFIRMED.
SMITH, SENIOR JUDGE, and PADOVANO, PHILIP J.,
ASSOCIATE JUDGE, CONCUR.
lla
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF
FLORIDA, IN AND FOR
COLUMBIA COUNTY, FLORIDA.
STATE OF FLORIDA
-VS- CASE NO. 92-370-CF
JASON TODD
Defendant(s)
THIS CAUSE was heard on the Motions to Dismiss filed in
the respective criminal cases by counsel for Defendant Hutchingson
[sic] and Defendant Todd. The Court has considered the Motions to
Dismiss and the Memorandum of Law filed to support the Motions,
the Memorandum of Law filed by the State and the Amicus Curiae
Brief of the American Jewish Congress.
Florida Statute 806.13(2) is Constitutional and does not
violate the United States Constitution or the constitution of the State
of Florida. The Motions to Dismiss filed in the Joseph Hutchingson
and Jason Todd case are DENIED.
In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105,
29 L.E.D. 745, the Supreme Court held that a statute does not violate
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment if it has a valid
secular purpose, does not advance nor inhibit religion and does not
foster excessive entanglement with religion.
Florida Statute 806.13(2) has a valid secular purpose and there
is no evidence that the statute was wholly motivated by religious
considerations. Churches and other places of worship make a unique
contribution to the pluralism of American Society. See State vs.
Vogenthaler, 548 P. 2d 112 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976). Places of worship
12a
are uniquely vulnerable buildings in that they are often vacant
especially at night when acts of criminal mischief typically occur.
The statute in question does not advance nor inhibit religion,
it is only a penalty enhancing statute that applies to what would
otherwise be unlawful conduct under Florida Statute 806.13(1).
Likewise, the statute does not foster excessive entanglement with
religion as places of worship would be afforded protection without the
benefit of Florida Statute 806. 13(2).
Florida Statute 806.13(2) does not violate the right to equal
protection under the United States Constitution or the Constitutional
of the State of Florida. The State has a compelling interest in
protecting places of worship from vandalism and all individuals who
unlawfully vandalize places of worship are treated equally just as all
places of worship are treated equally under the law.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers in Lake City, Columbia
County, Florida, this _6th_ _ day of OCTOBER, 1992.
/s/
L. Arthur Lawrence, Jr.
Circuit Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was furnished by U. S. Mail/Hand Delivery to Phyllis E.
Rosier, Assistant State Attorney, P. O. Box 551, Lake City, FL.
32056; Wade Griffin, Attorney At Law, P. O. box 2149, Lake City, FL
32056; and to Duncan Jones, Assistant Public Defender, P. O. Drawer
1209, Lake City, FL 32056, this _7th_ day of OCTOBER, 1992.
—ls/
PERSON SENDING COPIES
13a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
OF FLORIDA, IN AND FOR
COLUMBIA COUNI),
FLORIDA.
STATE OF FLORIDA
-VS- CASE NO. 92-370-CF
JASON TODD
Defendant(s)
ORDER
THIS CAUSE was before the Court for seniencing on
November 3, 1992. Pursuant to Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes,
the Court declines to impose juvenile sanctions and as grounds,
would show:
1. The Court has received and considered the
Predisposition Report prepared by the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services. All interested parties, including the
Defendant, his attorney and his parents or custodian have had an
opportunity to comment on the issue of sentence and any proposed
rehabilitation plan to be offered in this case.
2. The Defendant is before the Court to be sentenced on
the following charges: Criminal Mischief (3 cts).
3. The offenses for which the Defendant is being
sentenced are serious and the protection of the community requires
adult disposition.
4. The offenses was committed in a willful manner.
5. The nature of the present criminal offenses
considered together with the record and previous history of the
Defendant (including contacts with the department, law enforcement
agencies, courts, prior records of community control, and
commitment) indicate that there are no reasonable prospects of
rehabilitation in the juvenile system.
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Pov
eee ke ee Ee Le ee ee oe
6. It is in the best interest of the public that the
Defendant be sentenced as an adult in this cause.
7. Jason Todd will be 18 years of age on December 13,
1974, and owes a significant amount of restitution. Juvenile
sanctions are not of sufficient duration considering the seriousness of
the offense and the impact on the community.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at the Columbia
County Courthouse in Lake City, Florida this __3rd__ day of
November, A.D., 1992.
/s/
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
Copies to:
Phyllis E. Rosier
Assistant State Attorney
P. QO. Box 551
Lake City, FL 32056
Wade Griffin
Attorney for Defendant
P. O. Box 2149
Lake City, FL 32056
15a
In the Circuit Court, Third Judicial
Circuit, in and for Columbia
County, Florida.
Division: Felony
Case Number: 92-370 CF
State of Florida
Vv.
Jason Oneil Todd
Defendant.
JUDGMENT
The Defendant, Jason Oneil Todd, being personally before
this court represented by Wade Griffin, the attorney of record, and
the state represented by Phyllis Rosier, and having
been tried and found guilty by jury/by court of the
following crime(s)
_._—S—>—s entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s)
_X entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following
crime(S)
Offense
Statute Degree Case OBTS
Count Crime Number of Crime Number Number
I Criminal 80613 F3° 92-370 5587503
Mischief
Il Criminal 80613 F3° 92-370 5587503
Mischief
lil Criminal 80613 F3° 92-370 5587503
Mischief
_X and no cause being shown why the
defendant should not be adjudicated guilty,
IT IS ORDERED THAT the defendant is
hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the
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|
:
:
|
|
|
|
|
:
|
|
above crime(s).
and pursuant to section 943.325, Florida Statutes,
having been convicted of attempts or offenses
relating to sexual battery (ch. 794) or lewd or
lascivious conduct (ch.800) the defendant shall be
required to submit blood specimens.
and good cause being show; IT IS ORDERED
THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE
WITHHELD.
the defendants Drivers License shall be suspended
for _____ years.
17a
FINGERPRINTS OF DEFENDANT
1. Right Thumb 2. Right Index 3. Right Middle
4. Right Ring 5. Right Little 6. Left Thumb
7. Left Index 8. Left Middle 9. Left Ring
10.Left Little
Fingerprints taken by: /s/
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing are the
fingerprints of the defendant, JASON ONEIL TODD, and that they
were placed thereon by the defendant in my presence in open court
of this date.
DATE AND ORDERED in open court in LAKE CITY,
COLUMBIA County, Florida, this 3rd day of November, 1992.
Judge
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In the Circuit Court, Third
Judicial Circuit, in and for
Columbia County, Florida.
Division: Felony
Case Number: 92-353 CF
State of Florida
v.
Joseph Hugh Hutchingson
Defendant.
JUDGMENT
The Defendant, Joseph Hugh Hutchingson, being personally
before this court represented by Duncan Jones, the attorney of
record, and the state represented by Phyllis Rosier, and having
been tried and found guilty by jury/by court of the
following crime(s)
Pn entered a plea of guilty to the following crime(s)
_X entered a plea of nolo contendere to the following
crime(S)
| Offense
: Statute Degree Case OBTS
Count Crime Number of Crime Number Number
I Criminal 80613 3 F3° 92-353 5587500
| Mischief
} Il Criminal 80613 3 F3° 92-353 5587500
Mischief
Ill Criminal 80613 3 F3° 92-353 5587500
Mischief
_X and no cause being shown why the
defendant should not be adjudicated guilty,
IT IS ORDERED THAT the defendant is
hereby ADJUDICATED GUILTY of the
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above crime(s).
and pursuant to section 943.325, Florida Statutes,
having been convicted of attempts or offenses
relating to sexual battery (ch. 794) or lewd or
lascivious conduct (ch.800) the defendant shall be
required to submit blood specimens.
and good cause being show; IT IS ORDERED
THAT ADJUDICATION OF GUILT BE
WITHHELD.
the defendants Drivers License shall be suspended
for _____ years.
20a
FINGERPRINTS OF DEFENDANT
1. Right Thumb 2. Right Index 3. Right Middle
4. Right Ring 5. Right Little 6. Left Thumb
7. Left Index 8. Left Middle 9. Left Ring
10.Left Little
Fingerprints taken by: ls/
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the above and foregoing are the
fingerprints of the defendant, JOSEPH HUGH HUTCHINGSON,
and that they were placed thereon by the defendant in my presence
in open court of this date.
DATE AND ORDERED in open court in LAKE CITY,
COLUMBIA County, Florida, this 3rd day of November, 1992.
Judge
21a
In the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit,
in and for Columbia County, Florida.
Division: Felony
Case Number: 92-370 CF
Count I, II, Ill
State of Florida
V.
Jason Oneil Todd
Defendant.
ORDER OF PROBATION
This cause coming on this day to be heard before me, and
you, the defendant Jason Todd, being now present before me and you
having:
entered a plea of guilty
X entered a plea of nolo contendere to
been found guilty by jury verdict to
been found guilty by the court trying the case with a jury of
the offense(s) of
CTI - Criminal Mischief
CT Il - Criminal Mischief
CT Ill - Criminal Mischief
“-<CTION I. Judg f
X The Court hereby adjudges you to be guilty of the above
offense(s).
Now, therefore it is ordered and adjudged that you be placed on
probation for a period of 5 years, each count consecutive (15 years
total) under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, subject
to Florida law.
SECTION 2: Order Withholding Adiudicati
22a
Now therefore, it is ordered and adjudged that the
adjudication of guilt is hereby withheld and that you be placed on
probation for a period of under the
supervision of the Department of Corrections, subject to Florida law.
It is further ordered that you shall comply with the following
conditions and sanctions of probation:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Not later than the fifth of each month, you wili make a full
and truthful report to your Probation Officer on the form
provided for that purpose.
You will pay to the State of Florida the amount of $40.00
per month toward the cost of your supervision unless
otherwise waived in compliance with Florida Statutes.
You will not change your residence or employment or lave
the county of your residence without first procuring the
consent of your Probation Officer.
You will neither possess, carry or Own any weapons or
firearm without first securing the consent of your Probation
Officer.
You will live and remain at liberty without violating any law.
A conviction in a court of law shall not be necessary in order
for such a violation to constitute a violation of your
probation.
You will not use intoxicants to excess; nor will you visit
places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous
substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used.
You will work diligently at a lawful occupation and support
any dependents to the best of your ability, as directed by
your Probation Officer.
You will promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries
directed to you by the Court or the Probation Officer, and
23a
(9)
allow the Officer to visit in your home, at your employment
site or elsewhere, and you will comply with all instructions
he/she may ,ive you.
You will submit to and pay for random urinalysis,
breathalizer, or blood test at any time requested by your
probation officer, or the professional staff of any treatment
center where you are receiving treatment, to determine
possible use of alcohol, drugs, or controlled substances.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS
You will perform 150 hours of public service work as
directed by your probation officer, for a total of 150 hours
in all counts.
You will submit to an evaluation by the TASC Program.
comply with all recommendations, dn be responsible for all
cost incurred in said program.
You will submit to mental health counseling as directed by
your probation officer and shall be responsible for the
payment of any costs incurred while receiving said
counseling.
You are to enter the Department of Corrections Non-Secure
Drug Treatment Program, or other residential treatment
program, as approved by your probation officer. You are to
remain until you successfully complete said Program and you
are to comply with all Rules and Regulations of the Program.
You are/are not confined in the county jail until placement
in said program, and if you are confined the Sheriff of
County is ordered to transport you to said
program.
You will have no contact with victim(s) in this case.
You will have no contact with children under 16 years of age
unless an adult is present who is aware of this conviction.
24a
You shall abstain from the use of any alcoholic beverages.
You shall make a good faith effort to obtain your GED/high
school diploma.
You will report to the Probationers Education Growth
(P.E.G.) Program for an evaluation of your educational
level. You will be referred into the appropriate Adult
Education Program. You will attend class on a regular basis
as determined by your probation officer and PEG personnel.
Your progress will be monitored and reports will be
furnished to your probation officer.
You shall take Antabuse if so deemed medically feasible and
you shall pay all costs for treatment.
You shall participate in and successfully complete the
programs of the Probation and Restitution Center for a
period of . You shall report to the Center
when and as directed by your probation officer.
You shall be confined to the county jail for a period of a 48
hour weekend with credit for NO jail time.
You shall report to the Lake City Probation Office, 1992
South First Street, Lake City, Florida immediately upon
release.
You will pay restitution, cost and/or fees in accordance with
attached.
This case is to run concurrent/consecutive to prison
sentence/community control/probation/county jail received
in Case # -.
Other: You will submit to a psychological Evaluation, and
shall be responsible for the payment of any costs incurred.
You will abide by a curfew of 9:00 p.m. on weeknights and
25a
10:00 p.m. on the weekends unless otherwise given written
permission by your probation officer.
You are hereby placed on notice that the Court may at any
time rescind or modify any of the conditions or your probation, or
may extend the period of probation as authorized by law, or may
discharge vou from further supervision; and that if you violate any
of the conditions of your probation, you may be arrested and the
Court may revoke your probation, and impose any sentence which
it might have imposed before placing you on probation.
If is further ordered that when you have reported to the
Probation Officer and have been instructed as to the conditions of
probation you shall be released from custody if you are in custody
and if you are at liberty on bond, the sureties thereon shall stand
discharged from liability.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court file this order
in his/her office, record the same in the Minutes of the Court, and
forthwith provide copies of same to the Probation Officer for his/her
use in compliance with the requirements of law.
DONE AND ORDERED IN OPEN COURT, this the 3rd
day of November, 1992, and confined in writing this 3rd day of
November, 1992.
ls/
Circuit Judge
| acknowledge receipt of a copy of this order and that the conditions
have been explained to me.
Date:
Probationer
Instructed by:
Correctional Probation Officer
26a
In the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit,
in and for Columbia County, Florida.
Division: Felony
Case Number: 92-353 CF
Count I, Il, Hl
State of Florida
v.
Joseph Hugh Hutchingson
Defendant.
ORDER OF PROBATION
This cause coming on this day to be heard before me, and
you, the defendant Joseph Hutchingson, being now present before me
and you having:
entered a plea of guilty
_X entered a plea of nolo contendere to
been found guilty by jury verdict to
been found guilty by the court trying the case with a jury of
the offense(s) of
CTI - Criminal Mischief
CT Il - Criminal Mischief
CT Ill - Criminal Mischief
SECTION |: Judgment of Guilty
X The Court hereby adjudges you to be guilty of the above
offense(s).
Now, therefore it is ordered and adjudged that you be placed on
probation for a period of 5 years, each count consecutive (15 years
total) under the supervision of the Department of Corrections, subject
to Florida law.
SECTION 2: Onter Withhokline Adiudicati
27a
Now therefore, it is ordered and adjudged that the
adjudication of guilt is hereby withheld and that you be placed on
probation for a period of under the
supervision of the Department of Corrections, subject to Florida law.
It is further ordered that you shall comply with the following
conditions and sanctions of probation:
(1) Not later than the fifth of each month, you will make a full
and truthful report to your Probation Officer on the form
provided for that purpose.
(2) You will pay to the State of Florida the amount of $40.00
per month toward the cost of your supervision unless
otherwise waived in compliance with Florida Statutes.
(3) You will not change your residence or employment or lave
the county of your residence without first procuring the
consent of your Probation Officer.
es
(4) You will neither possess, carry or Own any weapons or
firearm without first securing the consent of your Probation
Officer.
(5) You will live and remain at liberty without violating any law.
A conviction in a court of law shall not be necessary in order
for such a violation to constitute a violation of your
probation.
(6) You will not use intoxicants to excess; nor will you visit
places where intoxicants, drugs or other dangerous
substances are unlawfully sold, dispensed or used.
(7) You will work diligently at a lawful occupation and support
any dependents to the best of your ability, as directed by
your Probation Officer.
(8) You will promptly and truthfully answer all inquiries
directed to you by the Court or the Probation Officer, and
28a
(9)
allow the Officer to visit in your home, at your employment
site or elsewhere, and you will comply with all instructions
he/she may give you.
You will submit to and pay for random urinalysis,
breathalizer, or blood test at any time requested by your
probation officer, or the professional staff of any treatment
center where you are receiving treatment, to determine
possible use of alcohol, drugs, or controlled substances.
SPECIAL CONDITIONS
You will perform 150 hours of public service work as
directed by your probation officer, for a total of 150 hours
in all counts.
You will submit to an evaluation by the TASC Program,
comply with all recommendations, dn be responsible for all
cost incurred in said program.
You will submit to mental health counseling as directed by
your probation officer and shall be responsible for the
payment of any costs incurred while receiving said
counseling.
You are to enter the Department of Corrections Non-Secure
Drug Treatment Program, or other residential treatment
program, as approved by your probation officer. You are to
remain until you successfully complete said Program and you
are to comply with all Rules and Regulations of the Program.
You are/are not confined in the county jail until placement
in said program, and if you are confined the Sheriff of
County is ordered to transport you to said
program.
You will have no contact with victim(s) in this case.
You will have no contact with children under 16 years of age
unless an adult is present who is aware of this conviction.
29a
You shall abstain from the use of any alcoholic beverages.
You shall make a good faith effort to obtain your GED/high
school diploma.
You will report to the Probationers Education Growth
(P.E.G.) Program for an evaluation of your educational
level. You will be referred into the appropriate Adult
Education Program. ‘You wiil attend class on a regular basis
as determined by your probation officer and PEG personnel.
Your progress will be monitored and reports will be
furnished to your probation officer.
You shall take Antabuse if so deemed medically feasible and
you shall pay all cosis for treatment.
You shall participate in and successfully complete the
programs of the Probation and Restitution Center for a
period of . You shall report to the Center
when and as directed by your probation officer.
You shall be confined to the county jail for a period of a 48
hour weekend with credit for NO jail time.
You shall report to the Lake City Probation Office, 1992
South First Street, Lake City, Florida immediately upon
release.
You will pay restitution, cost and/or fees in accordance with
attached.
This case is to run concurrent/consecutive to prison
sentence/community control/probation/county jail received
in Case # -.
Other: You will submit to a psychological Evaluation, and
shali be responsible for the payment of any costs incurred.
You will abide by a curfew of 9:00 p.m. on weeknights and
30a
10:00 p.m. on the weekends unless otherwise given written
permission by your probation officer.
You are hereby placed on notice that the Court may at any
time rescind or modify any of the conditions or your probation, or
may extend the period of probation as authorized by law, or may
discharge you from further supervision; and that if you violate any
of the conditions of your probation, you may be arrested and the
Court may revoke your probation, and impose any sentence which
it might have imposed before placing you on probation.
If is further ordered that when you have reported to the
Probation Officer and have been instructed as to the conditions of
probation you shall be released from custody if you are in custody
and if you are at liberty on bond, the sureties thereon shall stand
discharged from liability.
It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court file this order
in his/her office, record the same in the Minutes of the Court, and
forthwith provide copies of same to the Probation Officer for his/her
use in compliance with the requirements of law.
DONE AND ORDERED IN OPEN COURT, this the 3rd
day of November, 1992, and confined in writing this 3rd day of
November, 1992.
/s/
Circuit Judge
I acknowledge receipt of a copy of this order and that the conditions
have been explained to me.
Date:
Probationer
Instructed by:
Correctional Probation Officer
3la
In the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit,
in and for Columbia County, Florida.
Case Number: 92-370 CF
State of Florida *
v. .
Jason Oneil Todd .
a
Defendant.
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER
AS COUNSEL ON APPEAL
THE DEFENDANT having been adjudged insolvent and it
appearing the Court that the Defendant continues to be insolvent, it
is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Office of the Public
Defender, Third Judicial Circuit, be and is hereby appointed to
represent the Defendant on appeal to the First District Court of
Appeal.
DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of December, 192.
—/s/_ L. Arthur Lawrence, Jr.
Circuit Judge
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished
to DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public Defender, P. O. Drawer
1209, Lake City, FL and to PHYLLIS ROSIER, Assistant State
Attorney, P.O. Box 551, Lake City, FL this 4th day of December,
1992.
NAME:_ Duncan A. Jones
POSITION:_Assistant Public Defender _
32a
etapa <a He I Pe
In the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit,
in and for Columbia County, Florida.
Case Number: 92-353 CF
State of Florida *
Vv. °
Joseph Hugh Hutchingson °
Defendant. *
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC DEFENDER
AS COUNSEL ON APPEAL
THE DEFENDANT having been adjudged insolvent and it
appearing the Court that the Defendant continues to be insolvent, it
is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Office of the Public
Defender, Third Judicial Circuit, be and is hereby appointed to
represent the Defendant on appeal to the First District Court of
Appeal.
DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of December, 192.
—/s/_ L. Arthur Lawrence, Jr.
Circuit Judge
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished
to DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public Defender, P. O. Drawer
1209, Lake City, FL and to PHYLLIS ROSIER, Assistant Siate
Attorney, P.O. Box 551, Lake City, FL this 4th day of December,
1992.
NAME:_ Duncan A, Jones
POSITION: _Assistant Public Defender _
33a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN. AND FOR COLUMBIA
COUNTY, FLOP'DA.
JASON ONEIL TODD °
*
Defendant, Appellant
-VS- . CASE NO. 92-370CF
STATE OF FLORIDA, '
Plaintiff, Appellee. °
ORDER APPROVING DESIGNATION
THE COURT having considered Appellant’s designation to
the court reporter, NINI ST. JOHN, and finding that it requires
transcription of only so much of the record as will be needed to
support the issues to be raised on appeal, the same is hereby
approved.
DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of January, 1993.
/s/
L. ARTHUR LAWRENCE, JR.
Circuit Judge
| HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished
to PHYLLIS ROSIER, Assistant State Attorney, P. O. Box 551,
Lake City, FL, DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public Defender, P.
O. Drawer 1209, Lake City, FL, NINI ST. JOHN, Court Reporter,
Rt. 12, Box 82, Lake City, FL, ROBERT BUTTERWORTH,
Attorney General, The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32301 and to
JASON ONEIL TODD, c/o DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public
Defender, P.O. Drawer 1209, Lake City, FL this 11th day of
January, 1993.
34a
= — eS ENE NRCP RE MO NO 8H
NAME:
/s/ Pam Sweat
POSITION:
Secretary, Public Defender’s Office
35a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COLUMBIA
COUNTY, FLORIDA.
JOSEPH HUGH HUTCHINGSON, *
Defendant, Appellant *
-VS- * CASE NO. 92-353CF
STATE OF FLORIDA, °
Plaintiff, Appellee. .
ORDER APPROVING DESIGNATION
THE COURT having considered Appellant’s designation to
the court reporter and finding that it requires transcription of only so
much of the record as will be needed to support the issues to be
raised on appeal, the same is hereby approved.
DONE AND ORDERED this 4th day of December, 1992.
/s/
L. ARTHUR LAWRENCE, JR.
Circuit Judge
| HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished
to PHYLLIS ROSIER, Assistant State Attorney, P. O. Box 551,
Lake City, FL, DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public Defender, P.
O. Drawer 1209, Lake City, FL, NINI ST. JOHN, Court Reporter,
Rt. 12, Box 82, Lake City, FL, ROBERT BUTTERWORTH,
Attorney General, The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32301 and to
JOSEPH HUGH HUTCHINGSON, c/o DUNCAN A. JONES,
Assistant Public Defender, P.O. Drawer 1209, Lake City, FL this
30th day of December, 1992.
NAME: /s/_ Pamela Sweat
POSITION: Secretary, Public Defender’s Office
36a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR COLUMBIA
COUNTY, FLORIDA.
JASON ONEIL TODD °
Defendant, Appellant *
-VS- . CASE NO. 92-370CF
STATE OF FLORIDA, °
Plaintiff, Appellee. °
ORDER APPROVING SUPPLEMENTAL DESIGNATION
THE COURT having considered Appellant’s designation to
the court reporter, ANN LEWIS, and finding that it requires
transcription of only so much of the record as will be needed to
support the issues to be raised on appeal, the same is hereby
approved.
DONE AND ORDERED this 6th day of January, 1993.
/s/
L. ARTHUR LAWRENCE, JR.
Circuit Judge
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy hereof has been furnished
to PHYLLIS ROSIER, Assistant State Attorney, P. O. Box 551,
Lake City, FL, DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public Defender, P.
O. Drawer 1209, Lake City, FL, ANN LEWIS, Court Reporter, 102
West Madison Street, Lake City, FL, ROBERT BUTTERWORTH,
Attorney Generai, The Capitol, Tallahassee, FL 32301 and to
JASON ONEIL TODD, c/o DUNCAN A. JONES, Assistant Public
Defender, P.O. Drawer 1209, Lake City, FL this 1ith day of
January, 1993.
37a
NAME: /s/ Pam Sweat
POSITION:__ Secretary, Public Defender’s Office
38a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, THIRD JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT, IN AND FOR COLUMBIA COUNTY,
FLORIDA.
CASE NO. 92-370CF
IN RE: Invoice dated 12/28/92,
in the amount of $60.00.
/
ORDER ON COURT REPORTER COSTS
It appearing that a judgment is required before Columbia
County will be considered for reimbursement of expenses
aforementioned and heretofore attached, it is, pursuant to Florida
Statute 27.54(3) regarding costs taxed by the Court against counties.
ORDERED that Columbia County make payment for the
invoice attached and the approval of the undersigned judge
authorizing payment of the attached invoice is confirmed.
DONE AND ORDERED this 7th day of January, 1993 in
Lake City, Columbia County, Florida.
Ls/
Circuit Judge
39a
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT,
THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN
AND FOR COLUMBIA
COUNTY, FLORIDA.
CASE NO. 92-353CF, 92-597CF
IN RE: Invoice dated 12/14/92,
in the amount of $60.00.
Invoice dated 12/14/92
in the amount of $193.45.
/
ORDER ON COURT REPORTER COSTS
It appearing that a judgment is required before Columbia
County will be considered for reimbursement of expenses
aforementioned and heretofore attached, it is, pursuant to Florida
Statute 27.54(3) regarding costs taxed by the Court against counties.
ORDERED that Columbia County make payment for the
invoice attached and the approval of the undersigned judge
authorizing payment of the attached invoice is confirmed.
DONE AND ORDERED this 23rd day of December, 1992
in Live Oak, Suwannee County, Florida.
/s/
Circuit Judge
ee ea ee
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
December 8, 1992
CASE NO: 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
The appellant/petitioner has failed to tender the required
$250.00 filing fee per Section 35.22(3), Florida Statutes and Florida
Rules of appellate Procedure Rule 9.110(b).
The appellant/petitioner is hereby directed to forthwith
forward to this office within 30 days a cashiers check or money order
in the amount of $250.00 to cover the filing fee. If
appellant/petitioner seeks to proceed with prepayment of costs
| waived, appellant/petitioner is hereby directed to file a motion and
affidavit of indigency with the clerk of the lower tribunal (the court,
agency, officer, board, commission or body whose order is to be
reviewed) so said clerk may issue a Certification of Indigency
pursuant to Section 57.081(1), Florida Statutes (1991). The affidavit
of indigency must bear a notarized signature. The failure of
appellant/petitioner to submit a Certification of Indigency or the
required filing fee within 30 days will result in the dismissal of this
cause without further order of the court.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of)
the original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
4la
By:__/s/_ Vickie Maloy
Deputy Clerk
(SEAL)
Copies:
Wade L. Griffin
Robert A. Butterworth
42a
oe OR
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
February 5, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
The above-styled appeal being one which this Court has
deiermined to accord expedited treatment it is ordered that:
Z Pursuant to Rule 9.600(a), Florida Rules of Appellate
Procedure, as amended effective July 1, 1987, The Florida Bar re:
Amendments to Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and Rules of
Judicial Administration, 509 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1987), all motions for
extension of time must be filed with, and directed to, this court.
y 2 No motions for extension of time will be granted
except in case of extreme emergency. Any such motion, whether
filed by a party or a court reporter, shall set forth with particularity
the grounds constituting such emergency.
3. Within ten days of this date, counsel for appellant (or
appellant if proceeding pro se) shall file with this court a certification
substantially as follows indicating the name, address, and telephone
number of the court reporter(s), if any, on whom appellant will rely
in preparing transcripts of proceedings:
Certification
I hereby certify that the following court reporter has been
requested to prepare and file a transcript of proceedings in
the above-styled appeal:
(name of court reporter)
43a
(address)
(telephone number)
The designations to the reporter were served on the reporter
on (date).
I have provided the court reporter a copy of this order on
(date).
-OR-
I hereby certify that no transcript has been or will be
requested to be prepared in connection with this appeal.
(signature of counsel of self-
represented appellant)
A copy of the certification shall be properly served on
opposing counsel and the court reporter.
4. In the event appellee has ordered or intends to order
preparation of a transcript from any court reporter not identified in
the appellant’s certification, appellee shall file a certification as
described above within ten days of service of the appeilant’s
certification.
3. Failure to timely comply with “ie terms of this order
may result in the imposition of sanctions possibly including, but not
limited to, dismissal of the appeal.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:_/s/_ Vickie Maloy
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Wade L. Griffin Duncan A. Jones
John G. Crabtree Robert A. Butterworth
P. DeWitt Cason
pate te OA TB 00, dentate
Khoa OE.
| ita aaa
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1850
Telephone (904) 488-6151
February 26, 1993
CASE NO. 92-4116 and 92-4136
JASON TODD, et al. vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellants’ motions filed February 10, 1993, are granted and
the above cases are consolidated for purposes of briefing. Time for
service of the initial brief is extended to March 17, 1993.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:_/s/_ Laurie Black
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Robert A. Butterworth
45a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1850
Telephone (904) 488-6151
March 3, 1993
LT 92-370-CF CASE NO. 92-4116
JASON TODD vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant/Petitioner Appellee/Respondent.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
In view of appellarit’s response to this court’s order giving
this case expedited treatment as a “child” case, this court’s order
dated February 5, 1993, is hereby vacated and this appeal shall not
be given further expedited treatment.
| HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:_/s/ Laurie Black
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Robert A. Butterworth P. DeWitt Cason
46a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
March 9, 1993
; CASE NO. 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant’s motion for extension of time to serve initial brief,
. filed on March 5, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the initial
; brief is extended to April 16, 1993.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/_ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
| Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Robert A. Butterworth
47a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
March 9, 1993
CASE NO. 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Joseph Hugh Hutchingson v. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant’s motion for extension of time to serve initial brief,
filed on March 5, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the initial
brief is extended to April 16, 1993.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/_ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Robert A. Butterworth
48a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1850
Telephone (904) 488-6151
April 21, 1993
CASE NO. 92-041 16/92-04136
JASON TODD v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Appellant Appellee
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
It appears the initial brief filed on April 19, 1993 fails to
comply with Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure and/or the Florida
Rules of Judicial Administration as indicated below. Appellant is
ordered to show cause within 10 days why the brief should not be
stricken. In lieu of a response to this order, appellee may serve a
complete amended brief (original and 3 copies) within 10 days of this
order. Substitute pages will not be accepted to correct the cited
deficiencies. The brief should be clearly designated as “amended”
initial/answer/reply or cross-reply brief. Failure to respond to this
order or serve an amended brief may result in imposition of
sanctions, possibly including, but not limited to, dismissal of the case
and/or in the case of an unacceptable answer, reply or cross-reply
brief, submission of the case to the court without benefit of the brief.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410. The time for service of
any authorized responsive brief is tolled until service of the amended
brief or discharge of this show cause order.
GENERAL PREPARATION AND FORM
(Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a)).
__ insufficient margins ___ ho cover sheet
___ inappropriate single spacing
__ more than 27 printed lines cover sheet lacking:
per page __ party on whose
AX. inappropriate type face or behalf brief is
characters per inch filed
__ no heading __ name/address of
49a
__ brief exceeds 50 pages attorney filing
__ no heading X lower tribunal
__ reply or cross-reply brief
exceed 15 pages
___ unauthorized paper used
(onionskin or nonwhite)
__ brief not securely bound
__ wrong size paper used
__ no table of contents table of citations:
__ table of contents does __ not included
not list issues for review __ does not list cases
__ no statement of the case alphabetically
__ no statement of the facts __ does not show page
__ no summary of argument numbers on which
___ summary of argument exceeds citations appear
five pages __ no conclusion
__ conclusion exceeds
one page
SUBSTANCE OF BRIEF (Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(b)):
__ record references lacking __ conclusion fails to set
or insufficient forth precise relief
___ summary of argument merely sought
repetition of argument __ answer brief is not
headings responsive to initial
brief
__ fails to state precise
issues presented for
review
OTHER
__ failure to file original __ copied material (appendix,
and three copies of brief etc.) illegible
__ recycled paper not used __ no certificate of service
(Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.055) (Fla.R.App.P. 9.420)
__ brief not signed by counsel
or pro se party
(Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.060(d))
50a
elms 8 IBN oe. hte PT Ti Ne Bie SRN A SR RA RPA Be avahbontio sate e
__ other (as specified):
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk
By:_/s/ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels
Robert A. Butterworth
S5la
(SEAL)
John G. Crabtree
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
May 20, 1993
CASE NO: 92-041 16/92-04136
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd v. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Upon review of the recently filed amended brief/response by
the appellant in this case, the court sua sponte discharges its order of
April 21, 1993 requiring appellant to file an amended brief or to
show cause why the sanctions should not be imposed.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/_ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Robert A. Butterworth
52a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
June 4, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd v. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellee’s motion for extension of time to serve answer
brief, filed on May 27, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the
answer brief is extended to June 28, 1993.
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By: _/s/ Laurie Black _
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
53a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
June 4, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116/92-04136
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
CORRECTED
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellee’s motion for extension of time to serve answer
brief, filed on May 27, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the
answer brief is extended to June 28, 1993.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By: __/s/ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
54a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
July 2, 1993
CASE NO: 92-041 16/92-04136
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellee’s motion for extension of time to serve answer
brief, filed on June 30, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the
answer brief is extended to July 28, 1993. No further extensions will
be granted to movant except in case of emergency.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
By:_/s/ Laurie Black (SEAL)
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
55a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
August 11, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116/92-04136
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
It appears the answer brief filed on July 26, 1993 fails to
comply with Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure and/or the Florida
Rules of Judicial Administration as indicated below. Appellee is
ordered to show cause within 10 days why the brief should not be
stricken. In lieu of a response to this order, appellee may serve a
complete amended brief (original and 3 copies) within 10 days of this
order. Substitute pages will not be accepted to correct the cited
deficiencies. The brief should be clearly designated as “amended”
initial/answer/reply or cross-reply brief. Failure to respond to this
order or serve an amended brief may result in imposition of
sanctions, possibly including, but not limited to, dismissal of the case
and/or in the case of an unacceptable answer, reply or cross-reply
brief, submission of the case to the court without benefit of the brief.
Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.410. The time for service of
any authorized responsive brief is tolled until service of the amended
brief or discharge of this show cause order.
GENERAL PREPARATION AND FORM
(Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(a)).
___ insufficient margins __ no cover sheet
__ inappropriate single spacing
__ more than 27 printed lines cover sheet lacking:
per page __ party on whose
56a
__ inappropriate type face or behalf brief is
characters per inch filed
; __ no heading __ name/address of
__ brief exceeds 50 pages attorney filing
__ no heading __ lower tribunal
__ reply or cross-reply brief
exceed 15 pages
___ unauthorized paper used
(onionskin or nonwhite)
__ brief not securely bound
__ wrong size paper used
__ no table of contents table of citations:
__ table of contents does __ not included
not list issues for review __ does not list cases
__ no statement of the case alphabetically
__ no statement of the facts __ does not show page
___ ho summary of argument numbers on which
___ summary of argument exceeds citations appear
five pages X. no conclusion
__ conclusion exceeds
one page
SUBSTANCE OF BRIEF (Fla. R. App. P. 9.210(b)):
__ record references lacking __ conclusion fails to set
or insufficient forth precise relief
___ summary of argument merely sought
repetition of argument __ answer brief is not
headings responsive to initial
brief
__ fails to state precise
issues presented for
review
OTHER
__ failure to file original __ copied material (appendix,
and three copies of brief etc.) illegible
__ recycled paper not used X_ no certificate of service
(Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.055) (Fla.R.App.P. 9.420)
X. brief not signed by counsel
57a
or pro se party
(Fla.R.Jud.Admin. 2.060(d))
__ other (as specified):
| HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk
(SEAL)
By:_/s/ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
Copiés:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
58a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
August 18, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Motion to enlarge page limits, filed August 17, 1993, is
denied without prejudice to refile the motion along with the original
and three copies of the proposed reply brief. Bennett v. Florida
National Bank, 517 So.2d 97 (Fla. Ist DCA 1987).
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/ Laurie Black _
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
59a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
August 18, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04136
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
ie Hugh Hutchingson v. State of Florida
Aaguliuaiie. Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Motion to enlarge page limits, filed August 17, 1993, is
denied without prejudice to refile the motion along with the original
and three copies of the proposed reply brief. Bennett v. Florida
National Bank, 517 So.2d 97 (Fla. Ist DCA 1987).
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/ Laurie Black
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
August 26, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116/92-04136
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Upon Review of the recently filed amended brief/response by
the Appellee in this case, the court sua sponte discharges its order of
August 11, 1993 requiring appellee to file an amended brief or to
show cause why the sanctions should not be imposed.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/ Vickie Maloy
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
6la
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
DATE August 30, 1993
CASE NO: 92-4136 & 92-4116 (consolidated)
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
appellant/petitioner, appellee/respondent
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
The motion of the American Jewish Congress, et ai. for leave
to appear as amici curiae before this court aligned with the appellees
is granted.
| HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk
By:__/s/ Laurie Black (SEAL)
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand Mitchell Horwich
Marc D. Stern Lois C. Waldman
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr.
62a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
September 14, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant’s motion for extension of time to serve reply brief,
filed on September 3, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the reply
brief is extended to October 11, 1993.
I] HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
By:___/s/ Laurie Black (SEAL)
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand Mitchell Horwich
Marc Stern Lois C. Waldman
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr.
63a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
September 14, 1993
CASE NO: 92-04136
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Joseph Hugh Hutchingson v. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant’s motion for extension of time to serve reply brief,
filed on September 3, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the reply
brief is extended to October 11, 1993.
! HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
By:___/s/ Laurie Black (SEAL)
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand Mitchell Horwich
Marc Stern Lois C. Waldman
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr.
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
October 22, 1993
CASE NO. 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Appellant’s motion for extension of time to serve reply brief,
filed on October 8, 1993, is granted. Time for service of the reply
brief is extended to November 10, 1993. No further extensions will
be granted to movant except in case of emergency.
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:__/s/_ Karen Roberts
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michaei J. Neimand Mitchell Horwich
Marc Stern Lois C. Waldman
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr.
65a
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-1850
Telephone (904) 488-6151
DATE: April 26, 1994
CASE NO.: 92-4116/92-4136
JASON TODD & JOSEPH HUGH vs. STATE OF FLORIDA
HUTCHINGSON
Appellants/Petitioners Appellee/Respondent
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
The above cases, previously consolidated for purposes of
briefing, are simsilarly consolidated for the purpose of oral
argument. Oral argument is granted and each party is permitted a
total of 15 minutes per side as to both of the consolidated cases. Oral
argument is set for June 2, 1994, at 9:00 A.M. at the First District
Court of Appeal, 300 Martin Luther King, Jr. Boulevard,
Tallahassee, Florida, 32399-1850.
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true copy of the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
(SEAL)
By:_/s/_ Sondra Joyner
Deputy Clerk
Copies: Nancy Daniels
John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand
Mitchell Horwich
Marc Stern
Lois C. Waldman
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr.
66a
Supreme Court of Florida
WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 18, 1995
JASON TODD,
Petitioner,
v.
CASE NO. 84,512
STATE OF FLORIDA, District Court of Appeal,
ist District - No. 92-4136
a = 2 a ee oS ee
Respondent.
a
kkREKKKKKKRKR KEK KK KK
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court on
jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record deemed necessary to
reflect jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b), Florida Constitution
(1980), and the court having determined that it should decline to
accept jurisdiction, it is ordered that the Petition for Review is
denied.
No Motion for Rehearing will be entertained by the court.
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d).
OVERTON, SHAW, HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ.,
concur
A True Copy BHP
Ge: Hon. Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk
TEST: Hon. P. Dewitt Cason, Clerk
Hon. L. Arthur Lawrence, Judge
(SEAL)
P. Daniel Brinkmeyer, Atty.
Sid J. White Nancy Daniels, Atty.
Clerk, Supreme Court John G. Crabtree, Atty.
Michael J. Neimand, Atty.
James W. Rogers, Atty.
Marc D. Stern, Atty.
67a
Lois Waldman, Atty.
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr., Atty.
Mitchell Horwich, Atty.
68a
Supreme Court of Florida
FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1995
JOSEPH HUGH HUTCHISON,*
Petitioner,
v. CASE NO. 84,347
=
*
*
*
*
STATE OF FLORIDA, ° District Court of Appeal,
° Ist District - No. 92-4136
Respondent. °
*
a
Kee KkRK KKK KKK KK KK K
This cause having heretofore been submitted to the Court on
jurisdictional briefs and portions of the record deemed necessary to
reflect jurisdiction under Article V, Section 3(b), Florida Constitution
(1980), and the court having determined that it should decline to
accept jurisdiction, it is ordered that the Petition for Review is
denied.
No Motion for Rehearing will be entertained by the court.
See Fla. R. App. P. 9.330(d).
GRIMES, C.J., OVERTON, KOGAN, HARDING and WELLS, JJ.,
concur
SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., dissent
A True Copy BHP
cc: Hon. Jon S. Wheeler, Clerk
TEST: Hon. P. Dewitt Cason, Clerk
Hon. L. Arthur Lawrence, Judge
(SEAL)
Mr. John G. Crabtree
Sid J. White Mr. Michael J. Neimand
Clerk, Supreme Court Mr. P. Douglas Brinkmeyer
69a
Mr. Lois Waldman
Mr
Mr
Mr
70a
. Marc D. Stern
. Thomas A. Horkin, Jr.
. Mitchell Horwich
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL, FIRST DISTRICT
Tallahassee, Florida 32399
Telephone No. (904) 488-6151
October 11, 1994
CASE NO: 92-04116
L.T. CASE NO. 92-370-CF
Jason Todd Vv. State of Florida
Appellant(s), Appellee(s).
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Motion for rehearing, filed September 6, 1994, is DENIED.
| HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is (a true copy of) the
original court order.
JON S. WHEELER, CLERK
By: _/s/ Sondra Joyner
(SEAL)
Deputy Clerk
Copies:
Nancy Daniels John G. Crabtree
Michael J. Neimand Mitchell Horwich
Marc Stern Lois C. Waldman
Thomas A. Horkan, Jr. James W. Rogers
Tila
Chapter 38, Section 1005-5-3.2(a) of the 1989 Illinois Statutes
provided:
(a) The following factors shall be accorded weight in favor of
imposing a term of imprisonment or may be considered by the court
as reasons to impose a more severe sentence under Section 5-8-1.
(1) the defendant's conduct caused or threatened serious
harm;
(2) the defendant received compensation for committing
the offense;
(3) the defendant has a history of prior delinquency or
criminal activity;
(4) the defendant, by the duties of his office or by his
position, was obligated to prevent the particular offense committed
or to bring the offenders committing it to justice;
(5) the defendant held public office at the time of the
offense, and the offense related to the conduct of that office;
(6) the defendant utilized his professional reputation or
position in the community to commit the offense, or to afford him an
easier means of committing it;
(7) the sentence is necessary to deter others from
committing the same crime;
(8) the defendant committed the offense against a person
who is physically handicapped;
(10) _ the offense took place in a place of worship or on the
grounds of a place of worship, immediately prior to, during or
immediately following worship services. For purposes of this
subparagraph, “place of worship" shall mean any church, synagogue
or other building, structure or place used primarily for religious
worship;
(11) the defendant was convicted of a felony committed
while he was released on bail or his own recognizance pending trial
for a prior felony and was convicted of such prior felony, or the
defendant was convicted of a felony committed while he was serving
a period of probation or conditional discharge for a prior felony;
(12) the defendant committed or attempted to commit a
felony while he was wearing a bulletproof vest. For the purposes of
this paragraph (12), a bulletproof vest is any device which is
designed for the purpose of protecting the wearer from bullets, shot
72a
or other lethal projectiles;
(13) _ the defendant held a position of trust or supervision
such as, but not limited to, teacher, scout leader, baby sitter, or day
care worker, in relation to a victim under 18 years of age, and the
defendant committed an offense in violation of Section 11-6, 11-11,
11-15.1, 141-19.1, 11-19.2, 11-20.1, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15 or 12-16 of
the Criminal Code of 1961 against the victim.
73a
ne
Bill Analysis
FLORIDA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
STAFF SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS
CS for HB 235 and 351 by DATE: _January 20, 1982
C ; Pciminal Justice
Elaine Gordon and L.J. Smith REVISED:_January 20, 1982
relating to criminal mischief
REVISED:
Other Committee of Reference:
None SENATE BILL:
| __ SUMMARY
A. __ PRESENT SITUATION:
Section 806.13, Florida Statutes, defines “criminal mischief”
as an offense where the perpetrator willfully and maliciously injures
or damages any real or personal property of another.
This section further provides that if the damage done is $200
or less, the crime is a second degree misdemeanor punishable by a
definite term of imprisonment not to exceed 60 days and a fine of
$500. If the damage done exceed $200 but does not exceed $1,000,
the crime is a first degree misdemeanor punishabie by a definite term
of imprisonment not to exceed one year and a fine of $1,000. If the
damage done exceeds $1,000 or if the operation of a business is
interrupted or impaired, the crime is a third degree felony,
punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 5 years and a
fine of $5,000.
B,_ _ EFFECT OF PROPOSED CHANGES:
This bill would create a new section which provides that any
person who “defaces, tampers with, or commits an act of criminal
mischief” to a church, synagogue, mosque or other place of worship
or other real property used for religious purposes, or to any religious
74a
article contained therein will be guilty of a third degree felony
punishable by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 5 years and a
fine of $5,000. This bill omits the criminal classifications based on
the value of damage done (which are enumerated in §806. 13) if the
mischief is committed in a place of worship.
This bill also provides that if in the perpetration of criminal
mischief upon a place of worship, bodily injury results to another,
the perpetrator shall be guilty of a second degree felony punishable
by a term of imprisonment not to exceed 15 years and a fine of
$10,000. This bill expressly specifies that real property shall include
but not be limited to places used or intended to be used for the
permanent interment of human remains.
IL___ FISCAL IMPACT
The Department of Corrections has no present data that
distinguishes criminal mischief in a place of worship from other acts
of criminal mischief. As such there is no definitive method which
could predict, with any preciseness, the fiscal impact of this bill.
The Department of Corrections, however, concedes that the fiscal
impact of this bill will likely be minimal.
lil, COMMENTS
It is believed that legislation of this type is necessary to
curtail the increasing number of criminal mischief acts committed in
a place [sic] of worship and in cemeteries.
IV, _ AMENDMENTS
Prepared by: ls/
Edward G. Sullivan
Staff Director: _ls/
Thomas R. Tedcastle
Copy to Sponsor: _January 20, 1982
75a
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.